Chapter 3

PRASANGAPADANA OF NAGARJUNA
(Dialectics of Nagarjuna)
Nagarjunas place in the history of Indian philosophy and the exact
location of his philosophy were dealt in the introductory chapter of the thesis.
Nagarjuna is discussed to be the founder and developer of the Madhyamika
system which is one important school of Mahayana Buddhism. He is one of the
most original, influential and at the same time most controversial philosophers
in the history of Indian philosophy. He is the one who is asserted as the most
faithful representative of Buddha and is even praised as the second Buddha
by Tibetan and East Asian Mahayana traditions of Buddhism.
One major tenet that differentiates Mahayana from Theravada is the
status assigned to the Buddha. According to Mahayana, Buddha is not simply
a historical personality. The real Buddha is transcendental, eternal and even
infinite; the historical Buddha is a messenger sent by the real Buddha to teach
Dharma to the inhabitants of the world. The Mahasanghikas who are traced to
be the original source of Mahayana affirm this status of the Buddha.1 With this
understanding of Mahayana Buddhism, a study of the philosophy of Nagarjuna
encounters many initial obstacles. Nagarjuna is one who raised his voice
against all transcendental and metaphysical suppositions held by any Indian
school of philosophy. His philosophy was the very first attempt to
systematically question all the epistemological suppositions and metaphysical
speculations of philosophies. According to Nagarjuna, not only the individual
person is empty and lacking an eternal self, but the dharmas are also empty. He
extends the concept of sunyata to refute the idea of essence of all concepts and
all entities.
There is no stance in Nagarjunas writing that supports the idol worship
of Buddha. In spite of Nagarjuna commonly accepted as a Mahayanist by his
interpreters like Christian Lindtner, his philosophy holds assiduously to the

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non-Mahayana canon and he does not make explicit reference to Mahayanist
texts. A.K.Warder has raised this question, Is Nagarjuna a Mahayanist?2
After a detailed investigation of the topic he emphasizes that, the doctrine of
Buddha either by name or by quoting Mula Madhyamaka Karika makes no
verbatim reference to any Mahayana Sutra.3 He firmly states, Our aim must
be, to try to understand Nagarjuna in his own words, not in those of Candrakirti
or any one else.4 R.H.Robinson has also insisted these words as he writes,
Synchronic and diachronic considerations have not been treated separately,
with the result that Nagarjunas system has not been clearly distinguished from
Chandrakirti.5
Though the philosophical conceptions of Nagarjuna like sunyata,
pratityasamutpada, anatma-adharma6 are found in the Mahasangikas and
many other early schools, Nagarjuna is the one who gave it a critical shape and
developed it. He owes his analytical method of inquiry mostly to the Buddha.
We can trace the origin of Nagarjunas writing in the way of Buddhas
investigations into the problems of language and fact, truth and impossibility of
knowledge, knowledge and belief, meaning and truth, meaning and naming,
being and time, identity of the self and referring, - into many such problems of
epistemological, logical, metaphysical and ethical nature.7So identifying
Nagarjunas Madhyamika under the general category of Mahayana Buddhism
is refuted by many in a scholarly manner. Nagarjuna therefore is not a founder
of Mahayana religion but of Mahayana philosophy. Naming him a Buddhist
philosopher would be more appropriate than calling him as a Buddhist monk.
But a mythical stature has been given to Nagarjuna which obscures much
understanding of him. As his thought seems impenetrable his philosophy is
also misinterpreted and misrepresented variously.
Nagarjuna clearly demonstrates that anything stated as absolute is
absurd and meaningless. He in fact refutes the Vedic systems and Buddhist
Abidharmika schools for holding extreme positions and that is what his way of

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philosophizing is. This has led to the question whether Madhyamika is
Nihilism. most Buddhists in India, familiar with the Abhidharma, still feel
that the Madhyamaka position was tantamount to nihilism for the simple
reason that it is incoherent to maintain that all are merely conceptual
constructs8 remarks Paul William. Some modern thinkers like T.R.V.Murti
claim Nagarjunas philosophical method of questioning nihilism, to be
absolutism.9
There are various other confusions and charges over the philosophy of
Nagarjuna. It is criticized as skepticism when it scrutinizes and subjects into
doubt any point of view of reality. It is adjudged as Agnosticism as the
metaphysical and transcendental spheres are left unanswered. Some perceive it
as pessimism since it does not put forth an objective ideology to get relieved
from the bondage and finally attain the ultimate reality. Even it is contended as
absolute monism which is not very much different from Sankaras Advaita
Vedanta. All these charges and questions over Nagarjuna and his Madhyamika
are prevalent even now as they were in the past. But in the
Mulamadhyamakakarika10 Nagarjuna clearly refutes eternalism
(Sasvatavada) and nihilism (Ucchedavada) and uses the form of tetralemma in
his refutation. G.C.Nayak points out that the classical thinkers have better
represented sunyata than the modern thinkers. All critical questions in this
regard shall be unmasked, dissected and answered in the following pages.

Difference between Abhidarmika & Madhyamika:

Nagarjunas Buddhist philosophical approach when compared to the
abhidarmika Buddhists thoughts has got huge differences. Though both of
them are from Buddhist background their view of reality is in contrast to one
another. Even regarding the key Buddhist doctrines such as the Four Noble
Truths, pratityasamutpada, nirvana, dharma and the tathagata Nagarjunas
radical sunyavadin stance is diametrically opposed to the abhidarmika who

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proclaim the ultimacy of dharmas. While Nagarjuna is clear that his
madhyamika is a middle path that continues the silence of the Buddha
regarding the questions on ultimate reality, the abhidarma system contends that
dharmas are the ultimate existents in this fluctuating universe out of which all
conventional entities are constructed. One Buddhist school that strongly holds
this view of abhidarma and in fact developed its own complete abhidarma
system is the Theravada. On the other hand, the Buddhist school that vividly
says that everything including all dharmas are sunya (empty); are empty of
svabhava (svabhava-sunya); are without svabhava (nihsvabhava); their
svabhava is non-existent (abhava-svabhava) is Nagarjunas Madhyamika.
Here the term svabhava is employed with number of possible translations such
as, essence, own-being, inherent existence, self-existence, self-nature, essential
nature, intrinsic nature, intrinsic reality and so on. Actually the concept of
svabhava or svabhavata is found throughout various Indian Sanskrit texts with
the concept of inherent nature of something. The essence of something
deployed in various texts may mean a common everyday something or even
the absolute essence of the universe. So the doctrine of an existing essence is
svabhavata. Rather the doctrine that argues nothing has an essence, nothing
has an inherent nature is nihsvabhavata; such a philosophy is taught in
Prasangika Madhyamaka Buddhism.

Viewing Sunyata through the lens of Pratityasamutpada:

Nagarjunas primary contribution to Buddhist philosophy is through the
development of the concept of sunyata or "emptiness. Nagarjuna says things
are empty (sunya) of own-existence, and to be empty is another expression for
lacking own-being (nihsvabhavata).11 At the core of Mahayana philosophy
lays this idea of Sunya and Sunyata which is the most striking feature of the
Madhyamika School. The importance of the concept of sunyata is so
significant in the Madhyamika analysis that the school itself came to be called

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by the name, sunyavada (the way of sunya). That is, the philosophy that
affirms sunya as the characterization of reality. But there is no such thing as
sunyata.
Sunya is one of the key themes in Nagarjunas philosophy that has been
miserably misunderstood, misrepresented and misinterpreted by both Buddhist
and non-Buddhist scholars due to various reasons. This is mainly because both
the terms sunya and its substantive sunyata are very difficult to translate.
They derive from the root su which means "to be swollen," both like a hollow
balloon and like a pregnant woman; therefore the usual English translation
"empty" and "emptiness" must be supplemented with the notion of "pregnant
with possibilities." (Sprung's translation uses the cumbersome "absence of
being in things.")12
Sunyata is a Sanskrit word with literal meaning nothing. Sunyata is
translated variously as negation, emptiness, voidness, essencelessness,
devoidness, nihilism in different contexts by different thinkers. Sunyata is even
defined as the representation of nothingness. Some scholars use the word in the
ontological sense by saying that sunya is the void which is also fullness; such a
explication is made by T.R.V.Murti who specifies the term as Sunya-vada
(Absolutism)13 and argues throughout his work The Central Philosophy of
Buddhism that Sunyata is absolutism, not nihilism or positivism. T.R.V.Murti
who is also a Buddhist scholar in the sense he took the task of explaining the
philosophy of Buddhism has given such a translation for the term sunya. But
by surfing the writings of Nagarjuna, it is seen that sunyata is deployed
synonymous with nihsvabhavata and / or pratityasamutpada and/or svabhava
sunyata in different contexts.
So Nagarjuna has actually equated the term with empty, lacking own
existence, devoid of essence, indescribable, interdependence, relative being,
etc and definitely not in the sense of absolutism. The middle-way
understanding of sunyata is found among scholars like David J.Kalupahana

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who delineates sunyata as emptiness as he translates
Mulamadhyamikakarika,

Sarvam ca yujyate tasya sunyata yasya yujyate,

Sarvam na yujyate tasya sunyam yasya na yujyate. 14

Everything is pertinent for whom emptiness is proper.

Everything is not pertinent for whom the empty is not proper.

G.C.Nayak from his critical analysis states, Madhyamika philosophy is not

Voidism or Nihilism, but only essencelessness of concepts and things
(nihsvabhavata).15 Those who misconstrue sunyata with ontological
implications designate it to be nihilism. Since sunyata is the ultimate mode of
existence, it is even misconstrued as absolutism, totally separate from, and
independent of, the conventional realities which make up all existence. Non-
Buddhist scholars give sunyata the definition of no reality doctrine.
Scholars who take Sunyata in soteriological sense alone describe it as
the absence of any kind of innate or permanent existence. In the words of
Mahayanists, Sunyata is used to describe the nature of things, the way things
really are. Relativity or non-ultimacy of views and conditionedness or non-
substantiality of entities this is the truth that is borne out by sunyata in
reference to mundane nature of things16 says K.Venkata Ramanan. Nagarjuna
in Mulamadhyamakakarika (MMK) describes the essenceless, illusory nature
of reality and affirms sunya / sunyata to be an antidote to wrong views on
reality. K.Venkata Ramanan in his book Nagarjunas Philosophy as presented
in The Maha-prajnaparamita-Sastra affirms that, for Nagarjuna, the
ultimate meaning of the sense of lack, the sense of devoidness (sunyata) which
is the thirst for the real, lies in the realization of this real nature of oneself. In
Nagarjunas terms sunyata is mostly synonymous with pratityasamutpada
(dependant origination) which expounds how each event depends on its parts

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and on other events to come into existence. Pratityasamutpada can be called as
the flipside of sunyata. Vedanta which says change to be maya (superficial)
and proclaims that there lays a permanent universal being beyond all changes
raises objections to the ksanika vada (momentary argument) and anatma vada
(no soul argument) doctrines of Buddhism. Morny Joy considers the principle
of pratityasamutpada that signifies interdependence may provide a solution to
this problem. Morny Joy in her essay, Mindfulness of the Selves: Therapeutic
Interventions in a Time of Dis-solution, points out that the principle of
pratitya-samutpada, is variously translated as dependent co-arising, mutual
dependent causation, dependent origination, conditioned co-production or
genesis. In this context she finds pratityasamutpada as providing a way to
conceptualize the self as existing but only through its relationships with
other relationally constituted selves.
The theory of interdependent origination is another central concept in
Buddhism that has been variously interpreted by Buddhist schools. According
to the Theravada Buddhists who emphasize the abhidharma,
pratityasamutpada is the guiding light for changes to take place. So
pratityasamutpada is taken in the sense of causal law that is responsible for
momentary nature of things. But the Madhyamikas emphasize
pratityasamutpada as suggesting the dependence of one thing on another and
not the temporal sequence of entities. Especially, Nagarjuna through the
doctrine of pratityasamutpada laid emphasis upon the relativity of phenomena
and rejected the particularity doctrine put forth by the Buddhist realist. Indeed
Nagarjuna strengthens his dialectics with the interdependence concept and
explicitly calls sunyata to be synonymous with pratityasamutpada. Nagarjuna
uses the idea of pratityasamutpada to handle both metaphysical and
epistemological engagements.

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 Through pratityasamutpada Nagarjuna explicates that the
interdependence between one thing and other thing brings existence. That is,
things come into existence only through the relation they pertain with other
things. Even the word thing that is repeatedly deployed here does not mean
things-in-themselves. It used with certain limitations. It aims to communicate
that everything is relational and only relation contributes epistemic sensibility.
The interdependency of phenomena is very much important for Nagarjuna,
such that he systemized his sunyata philosophy with the development of
Buddhas teaching of the doctrine of Pratityasamutpada. Nagarjuna bows to
Buddha for rendering pratityasamutpada and asserts that it is same as sunyata
and madhyama pratipat. Nagarjuna writes in MMK as,

yah pratityasamutpadah sunyatam tam pracaksmahe,

sa prajnaptirupadaya pratipat saiva madhyama17

We state that whatever is dependent arising, that is

emptiness. That is dependent upon convention. That itself is
the middle path.

Nagarjuna's argument merely brings out more fully the implications of

pratityasamutpada, showing that dependent-origination should rather be
understood as non-dependent non-origination. Pratityasamutpada does not
teach a causal relation between entities, because the fact that the twelve factors
are mutually dependent means that they are not really entities; none could
occur without the conditioning of all the other factors. In other words, none of
the twelve phenomena -- which are said to encompass everything -- self-exists
because each is infected with the traces of all the others: none is "self-present"
for they are all sunya. Or, better: that none is self- present is the meaning of
sunya. Rather than sunyata being solely a negative concept, however,

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Nagarjuna emphasizes that it is only because everything is sunya that any
change, including spiritual transformation, is possible.18
The verse of Candrakirti highlights the point, The entire Madhyamika is a re-
interpretation of pratityasamutpada,
tad atrnirodhadyastavisesanavisistah pratityasamutpadah sastra bhidhe
yarthah19 Nagarjuna has already expressed this in his MMK as Whoever
perceives dependant arising also perceives suffering, its arising, its ceasing and
the path [leading to its ceasing]
Yah pratityasamutpadam pasyatidam sa pasyati,
duhkham samudayam caiva nirodham margam eva ca.20
Through his MMK, Nagarjuna approaches everything from the
perspective of sunyata/ pratityasamutpada. He points out that since there is no
element (dharma) which comes into existence without conditions, there is no
element which is not sunya. In the same way he explains how every concept
is dependent on another concept for its intelligibility and proves that fixed
essence is impossibility. As Nagarjuna asserts that interdependence of concepts
and sunyata (essencelessness) of concepts are same, understanding
Nagarjunas pratityasamutpada means the understanding of the absence of
independent and individual essence.
Nagarjuna applies dependant origination to the notions of motion,
becoming and destruction, cause and effect, and even to the basic tenets of
Buddhism such as Four Noble Truth and Nirvana. What this amounts to
ontologically, is that no-thing has a permanent or individual essence
(svabhava). It is the dependant origination that brings about the relation
between things and makes even existence a possibility. Everything is empty
means that concepts are empty and void. No concept could give a true picture
of reality.

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 Thus, because of the emptiness of all existents, where, to
whom, which and for what reason views such as the eternal
could ever occur?21
Nagarjuna takes up the (madhyamaka) middle-way teachings of the
Buddha and argues that all philosophical theories are empty of content. He
assures that he does not put forward any views of his own while he criticizes
other views. Nagarjuna exposes how absurd it is to hold any view in the
context of the true nature of things. He also affirms that sunyata
(pratityasamutpada) is not another view or a concept that could be broken.
Yadi kacana pratijna syanme tata esa me bhaveddosah /
nasti ca mama pratijna tasmannaivasti me dosah22
"If I had any proposition (pratijna), then this defect (dosa)
would be mine. I have, however, no proposition (nasto ca
mama pratijna). Therefore, there is no defect that is mine
(tasman naivasti me dosah)."
How Nagarjuna performs this tactic would be dealt in detail in the later
part of this chapter. Nagarjunas critique is directed at the notions of self-
existence held by the various abidharma schools and should not be wrongly
viewed as an attack on philosophy. As we shall see, Nagarjuna wishes to avoid
any accusations over him as nihilist or absolutist or pessimist or agnostic or the
propagator of any dogmatic ideology. The Mulamadhyamakakarika is thus
called The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way as it strikes a balance
between the extremes of eternalism and nihilism.
This balance does not point to an exact middle position between two
extremes. It comes all the way when extremes are refuted and rejected. This
madhyamika is not in synthesizing opposed views such as the real is
permanent and the real is changing but in showing the hollowness of both
the claims. When Nagarjuna says, nothing is real it does not mean that there
is no reality; it means that everything is devoid of its innate or independent

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nature. That being the case anything that appears in order to come into
existence depends upon causes and conditions. It cannot therefore be said that
there is anything in its innate form.
Voidness refers to the state of being devoid of own being, suchness
(tathata) which lets things be what they are, so that mountains are mountains,
waters are waters. In Abes (a Kyoto school Buddhist philosopher who was
much inspired by Yogacara than Nagarjunas Madhyamika) words everything
is empty is equivalent to everything is just as it is. Nagarjuna teaches that it
is absurd to talk of reality being true or false. Reality simply is. Nagarjuna goes
to the extent of even attacking the view that accepts interdependent origination
as inherently existent. He gains this strength from Buddhas philosophy which
characterizes all things-interdependent origination and impermanence are not
themselves inherently existent. Nagarjuna writes,
anirodhamanutpadamanucchedamasasvtam,anekarthamananarthamanagam
amanirgmam which means, pratityasamutpada which is same as sunyata
being the tattva or the true significance of the concepts, one cannot again
meaningfully talk of its origination, destruction,etc.23

Nagarjuna is very much aware that sunyata will be driven into the
danger of metaphysics. Nagarjuna warns that sunyata is a heuristic, not a
cognitive notion. Nagarjuna repeatedly states that sunya is not to be taken in
the literal sense of the void. It is definitely neither a nihilistic nor an
absolutistic concept. Nagarjuna writes in his MMK, sunyamiti na
vaktavyamasunyamiti va bhavet, ubhayam nobhayam ceti prajnaptyartham tu
kathyate which means, one should not call it sunya nor should one call it
asunya, it is neither both nor neither, it is called sunya only for the purpose
of communication.24

It could be clearly understood from the following discussion that

Nagarjunas Sunyavada is not nihilism. Chandrakirti in his comment on MMK

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makes a reference to the verses of Buddha to Kasyapa which clarifies the status
of sunyata. The Buddhas instruction to Ksayapa is, points out Candrakirti O
Kasyapa, it would be better to entertain the substance view (pudgala drsti) of
the magnitude of mount Sumeru than to hug the sunyata view of the nihilist
(abhavabhinivesinah). I call him incurable who clings to sunyata itself as a
theory. If a drug administered to a patient were to remove all his disorders but
were to foul the stomach itself by remaining in it, would you call the patient
cured? Even so, sunyata is an antidote to all dogmatic views, but if a man were
to cling to it for ever as a view in itself he is doomed.25 Sunyata is therefore
not logical negation, not a mere lack, an absence, rather it is opposed to both
metaphysical essentialism and metaphysical nihilism. Madhyamika is not
voidism or nihilism but only essencelessness of concepts and things
(nihsvabhavata) and truly the middle path.
Nagarjuna also warns about the transcendental approach to sunyata as,
Vinasayati durdrsta sunyata mandamedhasam,
sarpo yatha durgrhito vidya va dusprasadhita26 i.e., just as a snake
caught in a wrong manner by a dull-witted fellow only causes death to him or
as a magic wrongly employed destroys the magician, so also sunyata wrongly
seen and understood only ruins the person concerned.
Therefore, Sunyata is a guiding, not a cognitive, notion, presupposing
the everyday.27 Once it is comprehended that even pratityasamutpada and
sunyata cannot be claimed as universal concepts, one gets freed from the
essentialist thought-constructions and the cravings of the mind. Such a state of
realization of the essencelessness of idea is called bhutapratyaveksa or
perception of the real nature of fact.

In the same way as all Buddhists, Nagarjuna too begins by dedicating

the Mulamadhyamakakarika to the Buddha, but then he devotes the most
important chapter to prove that there can be no such thing as a Buddha, just as

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there is no other self-present transcendental-signified. The serenity human seek
is the coming-to-rest of all ways of taking things, the repose of named things
(sarvopalambhopasamaprapanc-opasamah). His commentator Candrakirti
glosses this verse: "the very coming to rest, the non-functioning, of perceptions
as signs of all named things, is itself nirvana... When verbal assertions cease,
named things are in repose; and the ceasing to function of discursive thought is
ultimate serenity.28

The second stage in Nagarjunist Buddhism is marked by the movement

between the oppositions of being (existence) and non-being (nonexistence).
Inadas explanation of the Buddhist concept of sunyata, or the middle path, is
illuminating. He points out that the Buddhists have gone beyond the either-
or logic since either-or only operates within the realm of reason.29 The main
purpose of Nagarjunas sunyata is to release the human mind from the
imprisonment of binary structures. Logically two things can be thought as
either the same or different on the condition that they are entities. But they are
not entities they cannot be either same or different. This is what is conveyed
by Nagarjuna as he explicates the relation between sunyata and
pratityasamutpada which is called by Robert Magliola as the slide of pure
dependency.30

Samvrtti satya, Paramartha satya and Nirvana:

There are questions over Nagarjunas approach to philosophy, such as

does Nagarjuna undertake Madhyamika to merely critically review, refute and
reject all doctrines or is there any mission in his attitude. Nagarjuna who is
from the Buddhist background has definitely got one ultimate aim. It is to
attain Nirvana. This motto for liberation in Buddhist context is a much
contested topic. In Buddhist philosophy, epistemology or ontology, liberation
is broadly spoken in the soteriological context. Buddha though did not directly

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speak about what Nirvana exactly is. He had expounded a lot about what
Nirvana is not. Moksa need not necessarily be a change in the physical state is
what Buddha repeatedly has professed. The Buddhas attitude seems to have
been that its not helpful to talk about it very much; so that if you want to know
what nirvana is, you must experience it yourself. Except for some terms of
praise, the few descriptions are negative: they say what nirvana is not31writes
David Loy. In Nagarjunas word to get freed from the bondage and attain
Nirvana means to put an end to wrong views. The destruction of false or
mistaken views is therefore necessary if one hopes to attain real wisdom.
Nagarjuna assures that, ultimate serenity is the coming to rest of all ways of
taking things, the repose of named things; no truth has been taught by a
Buddha for anyone, anywhere.

The Buddha did not teach the appeasement of all objects,

the appeasement of obsession, and the auspicious as some
thing to some one at some place.32

Samsara is where the things are born, undergo change and pass away
and it is a world of suffering. But liberation is not an escape from the sorrowful
world. In fact, Nirvana is not a state separate from the samsara. Nagarjuna
strongly states that there is no difference between the everyday world and
nirvana.
Nirvanasya ca ya kotih kotih samsaranasya ca,
na tayor antaram kimcit susuksmam api vidyate33
Thus Nagarjuna gladly says, there is no specifiable difference between
every day world and nirvana; nor even the subtlest difference between the two.
Therefore nirvana is a difference of perspective; or rather a difference in the
way thinks are taken. G.C.Nayak describes Nagarjunas idea of nirvana as
In nirvana one is not transmitted from one world to another transcendental
order of reality, one does not cross the boundary of our concepts so as to have

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a vision of some non-conceptual Absolute.34 In the MMK Nagarjuna vividly
explicates the nature of nirvana to prove that there is no transcendental
signified and from his investigation he communicates that, unless the
transactional realm is accepted as a base, the surpassing sense cannot be
pointed out; if the surpassing sense is not comprehended nirvana cannot be
attained.35
Thus Nagarjuna makes it clear that the ontic range of nirvana is the
ontic range of the everyday world. But this nirvana is achievable only on
realizing that there is no essence to hang upon. So becoming anti-metaphysical
is one important aspect of nirvana or philosophical enlightenment. Nagarjuna
proves that there is no transcendental signified for the nirvana in the twenty-
fifth chapter of the MMK. He writes nirvana too does not have self-existence
and thence nirvana also is sunya.
Nirvana though a state of liberation by no means refers to a
transcendental state according to the philosophy of Nagarjuna. His
philosophical insight consistently attempts to avoid all sorts of metaphysical
speculation and vividly states that nirvana consists in the complete
eradication of all kalpanas or thought constructions, (Prasannapada,
Niravasesa kalpanaksayarupameva nirvanam, Sarvakalpanaksaya rupameva
nirvanam ) and speaks of Tathagata as one who is never engaged in thought
constructions (Ibid., Tatra tathagata na kalpayati na vikalpayati,
sarvakalpavikalpajali vasanaprapancavigato hi santamate tathagatah) is
reduced to a victim of thought-construction36 eloquently says G.C.Nayak.
But modern thinkers like T.R.V.Murti state that both Vedanta and
Madhyamika agree that the absolute is transcendent to thought and as any
absolutist system would do, both distinguish between the Paramartha and
samvrtti.37 He emphasizes that only the approach differs, Vedanta is about the
known whereas Madhyamika focuses upon the knowing faculty and both
firmly assert that with the purification of the intellect, intuition emerges.

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 Another modern interpreter of Madhyamika, R.C.Pandeya refuses the
absolutist approach toward madhyamika. He holds that madhyamika could be
called an analytic philosophy where analysis is confined only to concepts and
not to facts. He says that reality is not to be confused with truth. In his book,
The Madhyamika Philosophy: A New Approach Pandeya says reality is
distinct from propositions, because it can neither be affirmed nor denied; it is
neither true nor false. He is for sure that Madhyamika is not at all concerned
with a real outside thought, and thus anti-metaphysical. He firmly says at no
point, is the madhyamika concerned with the reality of the so-called objects of
concepts. T.R.V.Murti on the other hand opines that regarding reality there is
an absolute beyond concepts which could be conceived by prajna. Pandeya
says such as a supposition is against the spirit of Madhyamika whose analysis
is purely linguistic and conceptual.
Confusion arises between reality and truth. Madhyamika as a
system of analysis of concepts is concerned only with truth which is applicable
only to propositions. Concepts are incapable of giving any absolute truth not
because they do not correspond to a reality outside but because of their
interdependence. So R.C.Pandeya seems to suggest that even to ask whether a
reality exists outside our concepts is against the spirit of Madhyamika. An
unwarranted jump is made by saying reality to be conceptual there is the
urge to affirm a reality outside the mental realm. David R. Loy comments that
the teaching of the Buddha is wholly based on there being two truths: that of a
personal everyday world and a higher truth which surpasses it. Those who do
not clearly know the true distinction between the two truths cannot clearly
know the hidden depths of the Buddha's teaching.38
The Madhyamakas apply the terms, Sunya and Sunyata in the context of
truths. Nagarjuna assures that there are two truths corresponding to reality. The
conventional truth is a truth about conventional reality and ultimate truth
corresponding to ultimate reality.

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Based on this the Mahayana-Buddhism developed the principle of the two
truths.
1. Conventional Truth (samvrtti satya): Every day common-sense truth,
basically distorted but open to skillful manipulation
2. Absolute Truth (Paramartha satya): The things as they really are.
Which means, empty and beyond thought and description.
Dve satye samupasritya buddhanam dharma desana,
loka-samvrti-satyam ca satyam ca Paramarthatah 39
The teaching of the doctrine by the Buddhas is based upon two
truths: truth relating to worldly convention and truth in terms of
ultimate fruit
Things that are conventionally true are the truths concerning the
empirical world. Nagarjuna calls them as samvrtti satya or occasionally as
vyavahara satya. This is an ambiguous concept much contested even
amongst Madhyamikas. In one point of view it means ordinary or everyday
truth which is conceived by common sense augmented by good science. In
another sense, it means truth by agreement. But it can also mean concealing,
hiding, obscuring, occluding. So samvrtti satya is a costumed truth, something
that conceals the truth, or its real nature as is regarded as a truth by an obscured
or a deluded mind.
Paramartha satya is something that needs close observation with regard
to the notion of sunya. Only by understanding the idea of emptiness which for
Nagarjuna is emphatically not nonexistence rather interdependent existence
one could understand the concept of ultimate truth. For a thing to have an
essence it has to be what it is, in and of itself, independently of all other things.
In this sense to be empty is to have no essence. The ultimate truth according to
Nagarjuna is sunyata i.e., everything is empty. Much of the arguments of
MMK are evolved to prove that everything is sunya.

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 The term sunya (empty) and sunyata (emptiness) may be made
reference to the above specification of conventional truth and absolute truth,
respectively. Phenomena are sunya as they are empty of thing-hood
(nihsvabhava). The absence of thing-hood is stated because things are
dependant on each other for their existence. This does not mean absolute
nothingness. The absolute is Sunyata as it is completely devoid of the
conceptual distinctions of existence and nonexistence and totally free from all
subjectivity (nirvikalpa, nirviprapanca). So sunyata does not claim the lack of
being rather shows that the absolute is indescribable. Hence both the absolutes
such as affirmative predicates (sat, bhava) and negative predicates (asat,
abhava) are equally denied.
At the same time, Sunyata as a negation neither rejects vyavahara nor
Paramartha, but the perversions and the clinging with regard to things. In fact,
Madhyamika does not differentiate the status between Paramartha satya and
loka samvrtisatya. It lays emphasis only on gaining the knowledge of the
difference between them. Thus K.Venkata Ramanan points out, the basic
perversion is mistaking the unreal for the real, seizing the conditioned as
unconditioned and the relative as self-contained.
Nagarjuna says those who do not know the distinction between these
two truths cannot understand the deep significance of the teachings of Buddha
yenayorna vijananti vibhagam satyayordvayoh, te tattvam na vijananti
gambhiram Buddha-sasane.40 One important point to be understood with
utmost care is the Paramartha satya and loka samvrti satya that Buddha
professed and Nagarjuna has highlighted does not mean the distinction
between the transcendental reality and the world. Paramartha means the
highest truth and highest good and not absolute ontology. It simply means
every concept is sunya (nihsvabhavata). Concepts are sunya because the
things about which they speak are devoid of essence. Placing lofty principles

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about things which are empty is illogical and worthless; Nagarjuna makes this
very clear through his dialectics.
Vyavaharam anasritya paramartho na desyate,
Paramartham anagamya nirvanam nadhigamyate 41
Without relying upon convention, the ultimate fruit is not
taught. Without understanding the ultimate fruit, freedom is
not attained.
David Loy remarks,the double strategy of Buddhism, the "two
truths" On the one hand, language must be used to expose the traps of
language: in addition to Nagarjuna's deconstruction of self-existent things,
there are, for example, all the binary dualisms (purity vs. impurity, life vs.
death, being vs. nothingness, success vs. failure, men vs. women, self vs. other)
whereby we "tie ourselves without a rope" as we vainly try to valorize one half
and reject the other.42
R.C.Pandeya gives a unique interpretation of Buddhist two truths by
saying samvrtti is a less correct truth and paramartha is a more correct truth
about reality. Truth and falsity being applicable only to concepts, the
paramartha cannot be taken as an absolute, outside the realm of thought.
Relativity of concepts is an absolute truth in that it is true of all concepts, but in
itself nothing. Madhyamikas analysis is purely conceptual. Relativity of
concepts being the truth about concepts (samvrtti), truth as such is the negation
of concepts. paramartha is not the affirmation of a reality outside concepts, nor
a negation of it. Hence, R.C.Pandeya confirms that samvrtti and paramartha
both being truths applicable to concepts, paramartha is not to be taken to
suggest a reality outside concepts even indirectly.
Yet as for T.R.V.Murti, Madhyamika suggest a reality outside thought,
that is grasped by mystical intuition or rather the intuition itself is Paramartha.
T.R.V. says, Dialectics is the purification of the intellect by sunyata and as
a result prajna emerges which is outside the realm of thought.43

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R.C.Pandeya calls this kind of supposition of reality outside the realm of
concepts as an unwarranted jump from concept to reality. He writes,
invariably the tract of all metaphysical systems.44 He confirms both the truths
of samvrtti and paramartha has to belong to the realm of thought and concepts.
Relativity of concepts is samvrtti and relativity as the absolute standard of
reference to all concepts is the parmartha or the absolute truth. So the
misunderstanding arises precisely because Nagarjunas negations is taken as
ontological rather than grammatical, leading to the false idea that Nagarjuna
negates real.
As Nagarjuna brings forward the emptiness of things and
interdependence of concepts by expounding the two truths, his dialectics
projects the sharp contrast between the Vedantas conception of Vyavaharika,
Paramarthika and the Buddhas Samvrtti, Paramartha. Nagarjuna clearly
shows that the two truths are only for right understanding and not for the
purpose of establishing any view or standpoint to be the ultimate. While
Vedantins consider bheda drsti or differentiation to be ignorance, madhyamika
assert that any view as such (drsti) is ignorance. For Vedantins, Brahman is the
negation of vyavaharika and the establishment of unity after negating the
difference (bheda). The absolute Brahman is devoid of all the three
differences, namely, Internal difference (svagatha bheda) - the difference
between different parts of a complex entity; Sajatiya bheda the difference
between two objects of the same class; Vijatiya bheda difference between
objects of different class. Only by opposing conventional, relative, particulars
the ultimate truth (paramartha) is explained by Vedantin.
In contrast Madhyamikas samvrtti springs from interdependence
(sunya) and pratityasamutpada is the truth for practical purposes. Difference
between samvrtti and paramartha is entirely different from Vedantin as it
demands a radical change in ones way of looking at things. It doesnt propose
an ultimate ideal standpoint opposed to everyday life, but instigates to find out

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the conditions which structure ones experiences. Sticking to one standpoint is
a sickly state of existence. Treatment is given through dialectics where one is
made aware of her/his bias and presuppositions. Nirvana is a return to the
healthy state not by conceiving an ideal that is dismissed from worldly
conventions rather is a goal that is to be achieved by working with what is
given (samvrtti). K.Venkata Ramanan in Nagarjunas Philosophy as presented
in the Maha-prajnaparamita - Sastra states, The major function of the
negative arguments in the karika is to reveal the relativity of the mundane; the
question of the ultimate reality constitutes a minor part.45
The ultimate truth is the negation of clinging on to a particular
standpoint as ultimate. Sunyata as the relative truth is the exposition of the
dependent origination of thought. Thus within samvrtti, paramartha is sought.
They both are one and the same, the difference being epistemic i.e., Samsara is
Nirvana. That is, finally both samvrtti and paramartha are dissolved into
silence, for they are not two in reality.

Dialectical Analysis:
It is already stated that some of the important tenets of Nagarjuna were
already present in the Mahasangika system and prajnaparamita literature. What
was Nagarjunas original contribution is the act of evolving the dialectic. To
study the prasanga (a method of refutation) method of Nagarjuna the
researcher needs a main reference to the Mula Madhyamaka Karika and the
Vigraha-Vyavartani. Nagarjuna gave a new dimension to various doctrines of
Mahayana i.e. of Mahasangika and prajnaparamita by performing a critical
exposition on all doctrines in these works. The mysterious silence of Buddha
on the most fundamental questions of metaphysics led Nagarjuna to investigate
into the reason of such a silence. By an inquiry into this silence, dialectics was
born.Many questions were declared as avyakrta (inexpressible answers) by
Buddha. Nagarjuna explicates them as,

144
Iha caturdasa avyakrta-vastuni bhagavata nirdistani
The Lord announced 14 things to be inexpressible such as:
1. Whether the world is a) eternal, b) or not, c) or both, d) or neither =4
2. Whether the world is a) finite, b) infinite, c) or both, d) or neither =4
3. Whether the Tathagata a) exists after death, b) or does not,
c) or both, d) or neither =4
4. Whether the soul is identical with the body or different from it =2
----
14
----
The four alternatives that are stated in each question form the basis of catuskoti
or tetralemma of Nagarjuna dialectic. Nagarjuna has incorporated the
tetralemma from the Indian logical form which consists in the use of a four-
pronged set of possible perspectives (catuskoti), such as:
X is a
X is not-a
X is both a and is not a
X is neither is a nor is not a
Catuskoti is interpreted as a form of absolute negation (prasajya
pratisedha), in which the negation is total and simple. Out of 450 stanzas
(karikas) arranged in 27 chapters of the Mula Madhyamaka Karika, this
tetralemmic form of negation (comprising the four positions) has been used in
single stanzas only in 8 Karikas in 8 chapters46 says Ramendranath Ghose in
his book, The Dialectics of Nagarjuna. Ghose gives a detailed exposition of
each of the tetralemmic stanzas but at this point it would be sufficient to just
mention them. They are chapter I.3, XII.1, XXII.11, XXV.17, XXVII.13.
Except these stanzas the tetralemmic form of negation is expressed in some
places in the form of a set of stanzas. One such example is chapter XXV.4-16
is a set of thirteen stanzas.

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 In each tetralemmic stanza there is i) a positive thesis, opposed by ii) a
negative counter-thesis. These two are basic alternatives, iii) conjunctively
affirmed to form third alternative, iv) disjunctively denied to form fourth
alternative. The yes or no answer to these fundamental questions could not do
justice to truth. Buddha calls them ditthivada and refuses them to be answered.
In this situation Nagarjuna had before him these questions and Buddhas
silence as a sign of refusal to give any categorical answer. Buddha used to say,
he neither believed in sasvata-vada (absolute affirmation) nor in ucchedavada
(absolute negation). He followed the position-less position of madhyama
pratipada (middle position).
Nagarjuna after pondering on Buddhas silence came to the conclusion
that reality was transcendent to thought. Nagarjuna systematized the four
alternatives (antas or kotis), mercilessly exposed the disconcerting implications
of each alternative, brought the antinomies of reason luminously to the fore by
hunting them out from every cover, and demonstrated the impossibility of
erecting a sound metaphysics on the basis of dogmatism or rationalism. This
was his dialectic47 muses, Jaideva Singh. Buddha has already formulated these
four alternatives whereas Nagarjunas originality comes here as he drew reason
and logic to the alternatives; proved the absurdities in constructing theories and
took a right-about-turn (paravrtti) toward prajna.

Structure of the Dialectic: Method or Tactic

The dialectics of Nagarjuna is a movement of thought which examines
pros and cons of a question, brings about a clear consciousness of the
antinomies into which reason gets bogged up, and hints at a way out of the
impasse by rising to a plane higher than reason. It is to be remembered that the
structure of Nagarjunas dialectic is a flexible technique. The technique of the
dialectic consisting in first drawing out the viewpoint of the opponent on the
basis of the principles accepted by him or her then as a second step showing

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the self-contradictory character of that view. So the opponents conception
turns against oneself. Thus a conception is reduced to the position of absurdity
as the self-contradictory consequences of ones own assumptions are revealed.
Hence dialectic is a rejection of views by reductio ad absurdum
argument which is technically called prasanga. Shohei Ichimura says this as,
By dialectic I am referring to the Nagarjunian method of reductio-ad-
absurdum argument (prasanga-vakya).48 T.R.V.Murti gives a beautiful
description for the dialectics of Nagarjuna, The dialectic is a series of reductio
ad absurdum arguments (prasangapadanam). Every thesis is turned against
itself. The Madhyamika is a prasangika or vaitandika, a dialectician or free-
lance debater. The Madhyamika disproves the opponents argument thesis, and
does not prove any thesis of his own. Prasanga is disproof simply, without
the least intention to prove any thesis.49
Bimal Krishna Matilal remarks, If the Madhyamika negates all
philosophical doctrines on the ground of latent contradictions, his own doctrine
can be subjected to the same criticism and shown to involve contradiction. This
is how the early Naiyayikas must have criticized Nagarjuna. He tried to answer
50
such criticisms in his VigrahaVyavartani. Matilal names the
VigrahaVyavartani because the purpose of Nagarjunas method is clearly
expounded in the text. In fact, the title of the book itself literally means a
treatise on the refunction of the opposition. Candrakirti interprets the term
Vigraha in the title of the treatise VigrahaVyavartani as the finding of an
error in a position of the opponent.51
What is to be clearly understood is the reductio ad absurdum of the
Madhyamika does not establish any thesis. It accepts a particular thesis
tentatively, draws out its implication and finally shows up the inner
contradiction which has escaped the notice of the opponent. Nor does the
rejection of a thesis entail, as a necessary consequence of this rejection itself,
the acceptance of a counter-thesis. Therefore the reductio ad absurdum is for

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the sole benefit of the holder of the thesis and it is done with his own logic, on
principles and procedure fully acceptable to him.

Purpose of the Dialectic:

The motto of the dialectic is to refute and disprove the dogmas and not
to prove any view of ones own. Only one who has got a thesis has to convince
others, if not there is no necessity. Nagarjuna states this clearly in
VigrahaVyavartani (stanza 29) as he writes, If I were to advance any thesis
whatsoever, that in itself would be a fault; but I advance no thesis and so
cannot be faulted. After negating, Nagarjuna does not put forth any of his own
standpoint. He negates all philosophical convictions that are conventional and
false. The dialectic is directed against dogmatists and rationalists who maintain
a definite view about reality. By exhibiting the emptiness of their argument he
proceeds to disprove the claims of reason to apprehend reality. Nagarjuna
precisely dismantled very philosophical opinion of his time not sadistically but
with a definite purpose. Negatively to prove that reality could not be measured
by the three-foot rule of discursive thought.
Positively, it shows that phenomenon or empirical reality is in a realm
of relativity so it is sunya or nihsvabhava i.e. devoid of independent reality or
unconditionedness. Secondly reality cannot be expressed in terms of is, is
not with a dichotomizing mind. Since Nagarjuna performs a critical
examination on various philosophical thoughts without placing any viewpoint
of his own, it is doubted Nagarjuna a mere vaitandika i.e one who simply
argues for the sake of argument. The vaitanda is a technical word in Indian
philosophy, introduced by Gautama in his Nyaya-sutras. Gautama defines it as,
sa (jalpah) pratipaksasthapanahino vitanda. jalpah in its turn is defined as
vijagisu katha jalpah or yathoktopapannachalajati nigrahasthana

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sadhanopalambho jalpah. Two groups entering into argument over an issue
with the only motive to achieve victory, and relentlessly make use of fallacious
logic and act unjust then it is called jalpa. If along with process of jalpa, one
goes on refuting the opponents views without establishing any conclusion of
ones own, it is called vitanda. One who engages in vitanda is named
vaitandika.
When the same criterion of vitanda is compared with Nagarjunas
madhyamika, it becomes obvious that Madhyamikas are definitely not
vaitandikas even though they do not have any metaphysical thesis of their own.
This is because the Madhyamika do not merely argue for victory against the
opponents, there is a wise objective. Prajnaparamita or the highest wisdom
which consists in a critical insight into the exact nature of concepts as they
really are, is the summum bonum or the highest end kept in view by the
madhyamikas throughout their philosophy.

Application of Dialectics:
Nagarjuna by way of his dialectics destroys the notion of ultimacy of
any theory or concept. He pursues a systematic criticism of human thought. He
goes to the very end of logic to prove the voidness in the answers to those
questions that are centered upon transcendental realties. Even the dogmatic
doctrines found in earlier Buddhist schools such as accepting the theory of
unique and momentary particulars and the theory of absolute non-self were
subject to criticism by the revolutionary dialectics of Nagarjuna.
Nagarjuna shows how language which is a truth in the practical realm
loses its elasticity when stretched beyond the phenomenal sphere. The
categories of thought have got their own limitations. They are useful for
practical purposes but when taken in the absolute sense, cannot withstand the
philosophical scrutiny because they are empty of essence. When the language

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structure and the logical renderings are thoroughly examined there would
remain no essence or svabhava.
In his dialectics Nagarjuna uses the two-level paradox from the angle of
Buddhism. He uses A-predicates from the angle of Paramartha satya and B-
predicates from the angle of Samvrtti satya. He does not logically classify the
distinction in a scheme of logic.52 Sibajiban Battacharyya explains the capacity
of language and the authentic criticisms of Nagarjuna on logical structure of
language as, Nagarjunas position is that all philosophical theories are
nonsense, but he also shows that ordinary sentences, when interpreted
philosophically, are also nonsensical (cf. his examination and rejection of it is
moving). If P, ~P, P&~P and Pv~P are all nonsense, they can be
rejected as nonsense, this does not mean that their negations (truth-functional
or otherwise) are true. This is why Nagarjuna claims that his refutation of the
philosophical theories of others is, again, not a philosophical theory.53 If two
terms, A and B, are related by the relation R, then either A and B are different
or they are identical. If they are identical, they cannot be related; if they are
altogether different then they cannot also be related, for they would have no
common ground. The notion of "partial identity and partial difference" is also
rejected as unintelligible. The notion of causality is rejected on the basis of
similar reasonings. The concepts of change, substance, self, knowledge, and
universals do not fare any better. Nagarjuna also directed criticism against the
concept of pramana, or the means of valid knowledge.
But the Svatantrika raises the following charges against the
Prasangapadana method of Nagarjuna which Candrakirti quotes his writing:
i) The method of dialectics is a mere deduction ad absurdum, ii) It does not
corroborate to syllogistic inferences providing reasons and examples in support
of their own propositions, iii) It brings some assertions which cannot be
proved, iv) Since the method cannot prove the self-referential propositions, it
cannot convince others of its reliability.

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 One could unravel these perplexing objections by comprehending that
Prasangapadana which is the method of dialectics of Nagarjuna is a logical
form of analysis that has been used over centuries by numerous Indian classical
thinkers. Prasanga is synonymous with tarka (logical argument). The
component term apadana means assumption or deliberate imposition. The
tarka or prasanga makes the opponent to arrive at impossible conclusions. So
when an argument is reduced to the state of impossibility to maintain a
position, the logic of deducing, reducing or deriving certain objections (apatti)
takes the form of a negation (pratisedha). Any wrong imposition which is
logically objectionable in a process of entailed inference is called apadya,
(the consequent of reasoning) and the base of such an imposition, or
assumption is called apadaka. The prasanga determines that apadaka which
is unacceptable in a knowledge-situation. Thus the very first step in the
prasanga is excluding the possibilities of error. So they push the opponents
position to the logical extreme and negate it.
Since Nagarjuna rejects all logical alternatives his dialectics is prone to
the criticism of the violation of the Law of Excluded Middle and denial of the
Law of Contradiction. Aristotle formulated two divisions of law as logical and
metalogical formulation. The Principle of Excluded Middle (the tertium non
datur) is regarded as a distinct law which is the result of the law of
contradiction. So there can be logical, metalogical; but there cannot be an
intermediary between contradictions. Every affirmation has to be either true or
false. I.M.Bochenski has direct reply to this question as he writes, The
principle of contradiction must have appeared as the foundation of deduction
whereas the reductioad absurdum was the main instrument of thought-as it was
so in dialectics.54 What is understood from this discussion is, the Law of
excluded middle is something that operates within the realm of logic and the
question of its violation does not arise in case of prasanga because logic as
much is denied in the end of Nagarjunas dialectics.

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Application of Negation:

Apoha, the theory of Negation as explained by Santaraksita is of two

types: 1.Prasajya or simple negation as that of Nagarjuna, 2. Paryudasa or
relative negation which is propounded by Yogacara. In simple or absolute
negation, negation is primary whereas in relative negation the emphasis is
more on the affirmation of the contrary. In the paryudasa, mental image is
primary. That is it would say X alone is true and non-X is false. Other than
X everything is denied so, presupposition ground. In madhyamika negation is
absolute or simple. In the statement X is not non-X, the emphasis is on the
verb is not and not on the noun X. Here affirmation is secondary in the
sense that X relates itself to a mental image only for practical purpose. For
the sole purpose to distinguish itself from non-X; but X has no objective
ground. There being no connection between the word and the actual thing it
denotes, the presuppositional ground (mental image) and that which is asserted
(the actual) both are neglected. Therefore for the madhyamika the Apoha
theory is purely negative as words cannot reach the real and negation cannot be
absolute as all negations presuppose a positive ground.

Deconstructing Metaphysics & Epistemology

Nagarjuna employs the 4 cornered dialectic and attacks essentialism
claimed by various concepts in Indian philosophy. He vigilantly critiques the
various theories of essentialists (svabhavavadi) such as sasvatavada,
ucchedavada, nityativada, ahetuvada, visamahetuvada, akriyavada,
nastikavada, etc. His dialectic process proves the absence of the permanent and
independent nature of things.
Nagarjuna traces that the craving for essentialism was fundamentally
present only in the asika darshans. The heterodox schools that resisted the
Vedic tradition had no marks of svabhava vada in their formative period. But
in later times, the absolutistic notions of astika systems spread even to the

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nastika systems such as Jainism, carvaka and even to some Buddhist realist
schools. So the heterodox schools have been indirectly influenced by the
orthodox systems. Contending any thing to have a fixed svabhava or
independent nature is a reflection of the metaphysical picture of reality.
Metaphysics not only speaks of transcendental realities; it is a theory that tries
to frame the truth of even phenomenal entities. In that manner, not only theistic
ideologies hold metaphysics, even atheistic thoughts which erect the idea of
matter after uprooting the concept of spirit have metaphysical theories.
In this situation while various philosophical systems in the gamut of
Indian philosophy were speaking of well-defined groups of immutables such
as: akasa and dik (space), kala [time), paramanu [atom) and atman (soul),
Buddha was the first philosopher who cautiously refrained himself from
propounding metaphysical theories. He is said to have adopted the madhyama
pratipat [the middle path], avoiding the extremes of metaphysical positions.
Later Nagarjuna systematically questioned all the epistemological
suppositions and metaphysical assertions of philosophies. The philosophical
problems that Nagarjuna mainly addresses in his Mulamadhyamakakarika
are: The problem of causality, problems concerning the reality of motion,
mental phenomena, self, categories and elements, forces of life and the
phenomenal world, the problem of relations and relata, the problem of
characteristics and the characterized, illusions and opinions, substance and
essence, agent and action, bondage and liberation, momentariness and
relativity, problems arising out of reality of the Four Noble Truths and the
Buddha. Each of these problems are handled one after the other and Nagarjuna
relates them to his view-point of criticism. The highlight here is, Nagarjuna
produces and in relevant contexts even reproduces his arguments to refute the
adverse interpretations of them. His vigorous examination expands gradually
as he proceeds. Nagarjuna systematically uses the prasanga method to confute
the positions of his opponents. His analysis enters into every nook and corner

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of the opponents positions and makes them contradict with themselves. To
showcase such a paradox Nagarjuna expresses his refutation in a language that
is the language of his opponents with regard to their presuppositions. Hence,
the Mulamadhyamakakarika and Vigraha Vyavartani exhibit a series of
ranks of languages.
In Vigraha Vyavartani, Nagarjuna begins with the question in the
form of an objection leveled against him, can word (devoid of essence) deny
things (i.e., the intrinsic nature of things)? In this argument Nagarjuna does
not name his opponents, but the object-language he uses refers to a system or
systems, which criticize the Buddhist systems in general and Nagarjunas
system in particular. Nagarjuna activated his dialectics on the universals and
notions of the classical Nyaya system, the dharmas (elements), khandas
(cluster of elements), pluralistic doctrines and dogmas of the Hinayana
Buddhism. But Nagarjuna did not stop with this. He applied his dialectics to
both religious and philosophical arguments and various arguments were
analysed crucially by him operationally and theoretically.
Nagarjuna while examining the thought process and formulation of
philosophical views by human mind says that subjective rationality tries to
establish its position taking into consideration some binary concepts and their
relationships in various combinations. Nagarjuna analyses and proves these
criteria with various arguments. Taking into consideration the binary
opposition between identity and difference, Nagarjuna finds 4 possible views
and negates all the four in their claim to establish reality. The four judgments
regarding the instance of identity and difference are: mere identity, mere
difference, both identity and difference, neither identity nor difference. The
same four positions apply to the concepts of causality that operates with the
binary of cause and effect, and other concepts such as subject and attribute,
reality and appearance etc. The whole system in Indian philosophy operates
within the framework of Identity and Difference.

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 In the subsequent paragraphs the researcher will discuss how Nagarjuna
traces out the serious flaws and arbitrariness that incur in the functioning of
reason which builds a theory and also objectifies its intended objects. The
application of Nagarjunas dialectics will illustrate the emptiness of every such
theory and thence their absurdity.

Examination of Self:

Buddha asserted satkaryadrsti as the root cause of all miseries. He

repeatedly emphasized that clinging and longing for an eternal and permanent
self is the grand entrance to all sufferings and conflicts while all experiences
are fragmented and fluid. Harmony in human experience can be explained by
dependent origination and there is no need to assume an unchanging self
behind all changes. Even the Theravada and Mahayana sects of Buddhism
which widely differ from one another are in consent in accepting this
anatmavada of Buddha.

But it is well known that Buddha suggested that an individual is the

aggregation of five skandas. When mind and various other mental phenomena
such as the rupa, vedana, samjna, samskara, vijnana are accepted by Buddha
why does he raise objections to the idea of self is a major perplexing question.
Another issue is where does Nagarjuna and his madhyamika enter into this
arena. A short traverse into the development of the atma-tradition in Indian
philosophy will bring to surface the answers to these problematics.
T.R.V.Murti writes in his widely celebrated work The Central Philosophy of
Buddhism that, There are two principal views of the self (atman): one is the
conception, in vogue with the Brahminical systems, of a permanent and
immutable entity identical amidst changing states and therefore different from
them; the other is the Buddhistic conception of atman as a conventional name
(prajnapti-sat) for a series of discrete momentary states (skandharupa),
sensation and feeling, intellection and conation. There is nothing unitary or

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identical amidst the changing states, and nothing hidden beneath them as the
atman.55 Further T.R.V.Murti makes it clear that the concept of atman was
also handled from other point of views by the Jainas and Vatsiputriyas.

From this note it could be understood that the brahminical systems

conceive reality on the pattern of an inner core or soul which is beyond change
and to which changing states are attached in a more or less loose manner. What
Buddha denies is this conceptual construction of atman as a permanent and
eternal reality. He is not denying the soul or spirit as a whole but the act of
defining it to be an absoludity.
Nagarjuna has devoted an entire chapter in his master piece
Mulamadhyamakakarika to examine the conception of self. Jonah Winters
writes that Nagarjuna apparently felt that he had not yet explained in his
former writings fully the way in which belief in a permanent individual leads
to bondage. And thats why Nagarjuna addresses this issue more directly in a
section56 Nagarjuna begins his critical investigation of self entitled as Atma-
pariksa with a striking comparison between the aggregates and the self.

Atma skandha yadi bhaved udaya-vyaya-bhag bhavet,

skandhebhyo nyo yadi bhaved bhaved askandha-laksanah.57
If the self were to be identical with the aggregates, it will
partake of uprising and ceasing. If it were to be different from
the aggregates, it would have the characteristics of the non-
aggregate.
Thus Nagarjuna dismantles the idea of self by raising two questions in
relation to the nature of self, particularly in relation to the five aggregates. If
the self and the aggregates were identical, then the self has to take part in the
characteristics of the aggregates. Which means the self is subject to arising and
ceasing, so the self cannot be permanent and eternal. On the contrary, if the

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self is stated to be different from the aggregate then self cannot have the same
characteristics of the aggregate. It cannot have the potential for perception or
the quality of consciousness. Nagarjuna halts his argument with this allowing
the readers to arrive at their own conclusions.
As discussed before Nagarjuna does not endorse any special intuitive
faculty to enable anybody to see beyond the world of change and
impermanence. Though he speaks of two truths he explicates them as the levels
that hold difference only in the psychological level and not in ontological level.
More to the point Nagarjuna states samsara is nirvana which conveys the
meaning that there is not even the subtle difference between the conventional
state and the liberated state. Here David J.Kalupahana strengthens the thesis as
he writes, Indeed, all that he (Nagarjuna) has admitted points to his
recognition of sense experiences as the foundation of human knowledge. The
impermanent aggregates constitute not only the human personality, but also its
experiences. If the self is considered to be different from the aggregates,
Nagarjuna is here implying that it is unknowable, not merely inconceivable, for
it will not have any of the characteristics of the aggregates that are all that we
know through sense experience.58
Nagarjuna in his second argument raises the next critical question that
In the absence of the self, how can there be something that belongs to the
self? because the self is examined to have neither characteristics nor
possessions, one abstains from creating the notions of mine and I.59
Atmany asati catmiyam kuta eva bhavisyati,
nirmamo nirahamkarah samad atmatmani-nayoh.(Ch.XVIII.2)
When this is not understood there pertains grasping. Jonah Winters explains
the verse thus: if the perceived world is believed to have a real existence,
leads to a desire for pleasant sensation and an aversion from unpleasant ones.
Both are forms of grasping. If, on the other hand, the world is believed to be
founded on nonexistence, then the Buddha taught, yet another form of grasping

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results: one fears the supposed nihility of nonexistence and clings even more
strongly to the cycle of repeated births. All of these forms of greedy clinging
are rooted in the belief that there is a permanent soul which can possess things:
possession leads to obsession. The teaching of soullessness counteracts these
self-created fetters, for by definition, the theory of no-self negates self-ish-
ness 60
Nirmamo nirahamkaro yas ca so pi na vidyate,
nirmamam nirahamkaram yah pasyati na pasyati. (Ch.XVIII.3)
Memety aham iti ksine bahirdhadhyatmam eva ca,
Nirudhyata upadanam tat ksayaj janmanah ksayah. (Ch.XVIII.4)
Nagarjuna argues again that When views pertaining to mine and I
have withered away then grasping comes to cease.61 When grasping ceases
then all sorts of extreme obsessions such as attraction and aversion, hedonism
and excessive asceticism will also cease. Thus when all the obsessions have
drooped the soullessness is realized which means realization of emptiness.
So The Buddhas have made known the conception of self and taught the
doctrine of no-self Nagarjuna now emphasizes that it is at this point one has
to carefully understand that Buddhism does not assert the identity of the
universe as anatman. He writes that Buddha have not spoken of something as
the self or as the non-self62
Atmety api prajnapitam anatmety api desitam,
Buddhair natma na canatma kascid ity api desitam (Ch.XVIII.6)
That is, Buddhism denies both atman and anatman. When such obsessions are
appeased, then a person does not get involved either in a notion of a permanent
self or in a theory of complete annihilation. The realization that self-awareness
is dependently arisen is a realization that it is empty of a permanent substance
(svabhava-sunya). This latter is the middle path that avoids eternalism and
annihilationism.63 In the remaining verses of the chapter Nagarjuna warns not
to indulge in the construction of anatman theory.

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Further while speaking about Buddha, Nagarjuna states that even the teachings
of Buddha is,
Sarvam tathyam na va tathyam tathyam catathyam eva ca,
Naivatathyam naiva tathyam etad buddhanusasanam.64
Everything is such, not such, both such and not such, and
neither such and not such: this is the Buddhas admonition.
This quadruple position consists of the following four statements.
1. Everything is suchness
2. Everything is not suchness
3. Everything is both suchness and not suchness
4. Everything is neither suchness nor not suchness
The tertalemma of Nagarjuna brings to our knowledge the contradiction
among and within each and every statement. The second statement contradicts
the first, the third which joins the first and the second statement is self-
contradictory, and the fourth contradicts the third statement. In the logical
symbols, the third statement is a ~a = 0. Especially this third statement is
constructed intentionally to show the self-contradiction. When taken
extensionally it expresses that the symbolized class is empty and has no
number. The fourth and the last statement that negates the previous self-
contradictory statement is equivalent to the falsification of the law of excluded
middle.
This is a sample of Nagarjunas critique of any sort of extremism. Even
when it is going to be the Buddha, Nagarjuna is never carried away by any
absolute position. All that Nagarjuna aims at is to strengthen the doctrine of the
Middle Way (Madhyamika) of Buddhism. The same argument can also be
taken to emphasize his initial point says Jonah Winters as he describes The
self is neither real not non-real and the Buddhas purpose in teaching anatman
was wholly and simply pragmatic. The doctrine of soullessness is not to be
understood as an independent and real truth.65

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 The twenty seventh chapter of the Mulamadhyamakakarika which is
the examination of Views (Drsti-pariksa) has got the thirteenth verse in a
perfect tetralemmic form that negates (prasajyate) all predicates about the
theories or opinions of self (Atmadrsti or Satkayadrsti).
Evam drstir atite ya nabhum aham abhum aham,
ubhayam nobhayam ceti naisa samupapadyate. (XXVII.13)
Thus, whatever view there is such as, I existed in the past; I
did not exist; both or neither, is not really appropriate.66
Nagarjuna writes in his chapter on the examination of Tathagata,
There exists no tathagata independent of the aggregates. How can he who
does not exist independently be grasped?67. Later he states, Whatever is the
self-nature of the tathagata, that is also the self-nature of the universe. The
tathagata is devoid of self-nature. This universe is also devoid of self-
nature.68 Through these verses Nagarjuna audaciously disrupts the very
essence of Buddha by scrutinizing the tathagata he questions the idea of self-
existence and finally concludes his premises in marking out that Buddha is
without a self-existent nature and thereby the cosmos is too without a self-
existent nature.

Examination of Dharma:
All that Nagarjuna is aiming at is to strengthen the middle way approach of
Buddha. He wants to do this not merely by criticizing other schools of thought
but Buddhism itself. Before entering into Nagarjunas critique of the idea of
dharma, the four ways in which the word dharma is being used in Buddhist
philosophy and religion shall be discussed here.
a) Dharma as an ultimate reality which is both immanent and transcendent
to the world and also the governing law within it.
b) Dharma as doctrine, scripture, and religion as the Buddhist dharma
c) Dharma as virtue, righteousness

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 d) Dharma as elements of existence. In this sense it is used in plural as
dharmas.
Scholar Jaideva Singh writes in his book An Introduction to Madhyamaka
Philosophy that, Dharma is the essence of being, the ultimate reality, the
Absolute. The Dharma-kaya is the essential nature of the Buddha.69 He gives
further explanation to the concept of Dharma by saying that when Buddha
remarked He who sees the Dhamma sees Me. He who sees Me sees the
Dhamma Buddha meant that the real Buddha was the Dharma, not the
historical Gautama known as the Buddha, and thus the idea of Dharma-kaya
was developed.70 He gives a grand narrative statement that, Dharma-kaya is
the essential transcendental aspect of the Buddha.71
This puts the researcher under trouble because a scholar like Jaideva
Singh who works on the philosophy of Madhyamika almost reflects the
attitude of a Vedantic scholar. On the other hand scholar Vincent Fatone in his
work, The Philosophy of Nagarjuna uses the word Dharmas throughout his
book in meaning of elements. He writes, When the origin of dharmas is
sought in relation with causes and conditions, numerous questions are raised in
this connection Within the same dharma the origin of which we are trying to
explain? Outside of it? at the same time within it and outside of it? neither
within it nor outside of it?72
It is well known that Nagarjuna rejects all these four propositions in the
very first verse of the Mulamadhyamakakarika. Vincente says in this context
that, Once the criticism of the very principle of the dependent origination of
the dharmas was made, it was unnecessary for Nagarjuna and his disciples to
proceed to the analysis of each one of the forms.The analysis did not require
new efforts; rather, it was a simple illustration.73
Also T.R.V.Murti says, For the Mahayana, Buddha is not a historical
person. He is the essence of all Being (dharmakaya); has a glorious divine
form (sambhogayakaya)74 He then contends that Nagarjuna too conveys the

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same thought about the Buddha. The Salistamba Sutra says: Whosoever sees
the Pratityasamutpada sees the Buddha, and whosoever sees the Buddha sees
the Dharma (Truth or Reality). Nagarjuna expresses himself similarly in his
Mulamadhyamika Karika in XXIV.4075
David J.Kalupahana in his translation of Mulamadhyamakakarika
entitled, The Philosophy of the Middle Way gives the translation to fifth
verse of the chapter eighth:
Dharmadharmau na vidyete kriyadinam asambhave,
Dharma casaty adharme ca phalm tajjam na vidyate.76
With the non-occurrence of activity, etc., good and bad are
also evident. When both good and bad do not exist, a fruit
arising from these would also not be evident.
In continuation to this translation Kalupahana says, Inadas rendering
of this verse clearly indicates his faithful adherence to the transcendentalist
interpretation of Nagarjuna offered by previous interpreters like Stcherbatsky,
Murti, Conze, and most of the Japanese scholars. In spite of Kumarajivas very
clear rendering into Chinese, Inada translates dharma and adharma as factors
and non-factors respectively. While it is true that the term dharma is used in
the Buddhist texts, both in an ontological sense (referring to phenomena) and
in a more ethical sense (meaning good), there is no evidence at all that the
negative term a-dharma was ever used in the former sense.77 Though the
sarvastivadins were critiquing the idea of self it is true that they considered the
dharmas, somehow to be existent in all the three times such as past, present,
and future. But Nagarjuna finds this to be a violation of Buddhas warning and
in fact his silence. For Nagarjuna, it is a fundamental error to consider them to
be real with self-existence and essence (sva-bhava). He points out that if there
are things that are completely independent then they cannot fall under the law
of dependent co-arising which is the key theme of Buddhism.

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 Once it is stated that all dharmas lack essence there emerges another
problematic issue. Once a declaration is made that all dharmas lack essence
and for this reason they may be said to be empty it itself becomes a dharma. So
for that argument to be valid there comes the question, will it not be necessary
for it to have an essence?
Nagarjuna deals this situation in Vigrahavyavartani as follows:
dharmas do not have an essence. In some way, one is before
a judgment. It shall be considered as negative. If in this
judgment the essence of the dharmas is negated, what value
does negation have, also recognized as a dharma devoid of
essence? 78
Hence the argument is related to the impossibility of negation. That is,
any negation implies the activity of judgment which would posit itself as
dharma even in the act which we call negation. If all the dharmas are empty,
then judgment which is dharma would also be empty could not negate. The
critique of Nagarjuna is proceeded to show that the absurdity of the idea of
anything can be independent not in support of nothingness. Even if it is the
dharmas they must be interdependent, relative to their place in the chain of
causes and conditions. Their truth is not anything above the surface truth of
phenomena that change in accordance with the changing conditions. This
doesnt mean that things are unreal but that they are only sunya (empty) of
svabhava (self-existence). Besides, Nagarjuna critiques the construction of
binary oppositions in every thing. He condemns the act of dichotomizing real
as something which is against the unreal. What Nagarjuna emphasizes is truth
is neither nor both or either but only the sunyata (emptiness).

Examination of Causality:
During the period of Nagarjuna, causality was the central problem of
philosophy so he fires the first shot against causality says Jaideva Singh79

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Likewise T.R.V.Murti comments that the Madhyamika Karika and other
Madhyamika treatises open with a critique of causality. He says that several
chapters in the Karikas such as I (Pratyaya Pariksa), XV (Svabhava Pariksa),
XX (Samagri Pariksa) and XXI (Sambhava Vibhava Pariksa) deal with this
problem that show how much causality has been a big issue during Nagarjuna
times.80
One more significance of the investigation of causality in Nagarjunas
work is, the Mulamadhyamakakarika which has got only eight karikas with
exact tetralemmic form has two tetralemmic stanzas on causality. K.I.3
[subject: Causality] denies the Origination of anything out of itself or of
something else, or of the ways in union, or of no reason. The same subject of
causality in the same fourfold structure of predicate-negation with slight
variation of language, to bear upon a slightly different context, has been
repeated in the K. XII.1 (subject: the positions about the emergence of an
effect and sufferings). Candrakirti comments on the K.I.3 that the absolute
negation having been intended (prasajya pratisedhyasya vivaksitatvat) by the
author, each position is simply negated.81
Except the materialists (the svabhavavadins) the Buddhists, the Jaina
and the Vedic systems all subscribe to the principle of causality. So while
refuting philosophical theses about Causality Nagarjuna has made a two-
pronged attack on Isvara-parinamavada and Prakrti-parinamavada i.e on the
theory of evolution following from the primordial nature. Interestingly, he has
used the same form of dialectics A thing does not originate out of itself, nor
out of something else ? etc., to disprove either of the possibilities.
Explicit reference to samkhya view of causality is found in the MMK. So at the
background of the dialectical criticism of causality there lies the Samkhya
system as the pioneer of causal principle though Nagarjuna has targeted even
the causal notion of Samkhya. In fact, the entire Buddhist philosophy revolves
around the key idea of pratityasamutpada which is equated with causal

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relationship by most of the Buddhist systems except the Madhyamika that
gives the interpretation for pratityasamutpada to be Sunyata.
Especially the Abhidarmika schools emphasize that four conditions
(pratyaya) are responsible for the production of effect, such as
i) The cause condition (hetu pratyaya)
ii) Objectively supporting condition (alambana pratyaya)
iii) Antecedent condition (samanantara pratyaya)
iv) Dominant condition (adhipati pratyaya)
Actually, Nagarjuna too accepts all these conditions, but he differs from
them as he repeatedly states there is no need for permanence or identity to be a
necessary condition. Hence after deconstructing all these four conditions
Nagarjuna does not endorse a new condition. A fifth condition does not exist
for him. In this situation, Nagarjuna takes up the four views that are possible in
the case of causality.
1) View of svata utpattih or satkarya vada, the theory of self-becoming or self-
causation
2) View of parata utpattih or asatkarya vada, i.e. production from another or
external causation
3) View of dvabhyam utpattih i.e.production from both i.e. from itself and
from another or synthesized
4) View of ahetuta utapattih i.e. production without any cause, production by
chance or accidentalism.

1. Svata utpattih: It means that cause and effect are identical that is, effect is
supposed to be contained in the cause before it comes into existence. Samkhya
philosophy professes this kind of causation as it explicates the satkarya vada.
It contends that effect pre-exists in cause. So effect is the manifestation of
cause i.e., effect is a mere appearance.

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 The criticism now arises by first raising the question, what is the
difference between cause and effect? Suppose identity exists between the cause
and effect then only self-copying. Thereby seed will produce another seed. If
potentiality or the ability to manifest lies already in cause it means the cause
which is existent at the moment is both actual and potential (effect). It means it
contains two-contradictions. So, acceptance of satkarya vada leads to self-
duplication and abolition of differences which is contradictory to the theory of
causation which presupposes differences.
The Madhyamika criticism of this theory is systematically given as follows:
i) If the effect is already present in the cause, there is no meaning in the
process called re-production. The argument placed by the Samkhya that effect
may be present in the cause is unacceptable since manifestation (abhivyakti) is
something new. This does not mean that the effect is a completely new
substance. It only means that effect is a new form of the already existing
substance. So, this difference in form goes against the identity of the
underlying substratum.
ii) If it is argued that cause is partly actual, and partly potential, it would mean
that we are accepting opposed natures in one and the same thing. If the cause is
totally potential it cannot by itself become actual without an extraneous aid.
Oil cannot be extracted from the seed, unless it is pressed by a crusher. If cause
has to depend on an external aid, then there is no svata utpattih or self-
production. So satkaryavada is a vulnerable argument.
iii) If cause and effect are identical it would be impossible to identify one as
producer of the other. The identical view of cause and effect (Satkaryavada) is
therefore, entails self-contradiction.

2. Parata Utpattih: On the other hand, the Nyayas propagate arambhavada or

asatkaryavada which states the production of an entirely new effect. The effect
here is not at all identical with the cause. The cause and effect are different

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which the meaning of parata utpattih is. Even the Sarvastivadins and
Sautrantikas or the Hinayanists uphold this view in general. Here entails
external causation where both cause and effect are claimed to be entirely
different. This is another extreme stand that is criticized by Nagarjuna. The
madhyamika raises the question if cause and effect are totally different then
cause will cease to be a cause since nothing comes out of nothing.
Nagarjunas criticism of this view is as follows:
i) If the cause is different from the effect then no relation can be
evolved between the two. If that is the case, then anything can be
produced from anything.
ii) Hinayanists believe that with the production of the effect the cause
ceases to exist. But ex hypothesi causality is a relation between two.
If cause and effect do not coexist they cannot be related. If they
cannot be related causality becomes meaningless.
iii) Hinayanists have conceived that effect is produced by combination
of various factors. Now, for the coordination of these factors, further
more factors would be required and again for the coordination of the
additional factor with the previous one, another factor would be
required. Hence, there arises the problem of regresses ad infinitum.
3. Dvabhyam utpattih: This is one theory that contends that the effect is both
identical and different from the cause. In this third formulation an attempt is
made to reconcile the opposition between the first two conflicting theories. So
both theories are treated to be partially true but to get a higher truth the two
have to be synthesized. This is the philosophy of the Jaina theory of
manifoldness (anekantavada). When it said that both satkaryavada and
asatkaryavada happen at one and the same time the inconsistencies of both
occur here.
4. Ahetutah Utpattih: This theory states that effect is something that is
produced without a cause but just by chance. So both identity and difference

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and any sort of relationship between them are denied. It is the
Svabhavavadins, Naturalists and Sceptics who believe in such an accidental
theory. In this case if no reason is assigned for a theory, it means dogmatism.
On contrary if a reason is assigned then it means accepting a cause.
Hence, Nagarjuna exposes the inconsistencies in all perspectives of
causality and proves it to be a mere thought-construct imposed upon the
objective order of existence. To avoid any metaphysical interpretation being
given to the doctrine of four conditions, Nagarjuna says that conditions are
conditions only in so far they produce an effect. That is, the conditions are
dependant upon the effect and vice versa. Thus the conditions lack self nature.
Nagarjuna denies both views that effect arises from the conditions and effect
arises from non-conditions. Therefore, both alternatives effect being identical
or different from cause are rejected.
In rejecting one thesis the Madhyamika does not accept its counter-
thesis. He does not set one opponent against another. In refuting the
Samkhya view of causation we do not enlist the support of his opponent.
The consideration of several views does not mean that one is false because of
the other. The knowledge of the opposite thesis merely makes us critical, helps
us discovering the flaw within it. It is false because of its inherent weakness.
Every thesis is self-convicted and not counter-balanced by an anti-thesis.82 His
Mulamadhyamakakarika denies the production of existence from themselves,
from another, from both, from a non-cause-Being, non-Being, Being and non-
Being, neither being nor non-being and so on.
Nagarjuna shows that in the cause-effect relationship, it is not possible
to establish any relationship between them in terms of identity or difference or
in their simultaneous affirmation or simultaneous denial. At the same time,
without the terms of identity and difference nothing can be established which
ultimately prove to be empty in content. This is an incurable paradox which a
theory faces. Hence, Nagarjuna refutes causa materialis and also causa

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effciens, but does not deny causation altogether. He also criticizes the nihilistic
views. His arguments seem to draw finally on relativity in a case of causal
situation.83
There is an ironical remark upon Nagarjunas approach to
pratityasamutpada stating that pratityasamutpada uses causation to refute
causation. It deconstructs the self-existence into their conditions and
interdependence, causality itself then disappears, because without anything to
cause or be effect, the world will not be experienced in terms of cause and
effect. This is a sheer misunderstanding of Nagarjuna because has not refuted
all theories of cause and effect. He has actually deconstructed only the
substantialist theories of cause and effect. He clearly illustrates that if
philosophical assumptions are made that things in the world derive from some
unique material and essential basis, then one would return only empty-handed
in a search to explain how things could possibly relate to one another, and so
would have no way of describing how changes happen.

Examination of Time:
Just in the same way as trees, flowers, earth and stars continue to exist
in spite of the presence of human beings the inexorable flow of time is believed
to be an unchanging element in an ever-changing universe. The middle-way of
Nagarjuna attempts to show how the concept of the flow of time is dispensable
by proving it has no self-existence. Nagarjuna devotes chapter 19 of
Mulamadhyamakakarika for Kala-pariksa (examination of time) where he
makes a different approach in his analysis. Instead of using the tetralemmic
tactic he performs a direct attack on the conception of time which seems much
interesting.
The crux of his argument is, if time is suggested as a substance then no
past, present, future since they are relative. Whereas if time is professed as an
essential condition for events to take place, then time called as eternal reality

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with its divisions- past, present, future should also be eternal. If it is eternal
then no divisions are possible. Hence time as substance and as derived notion
is negated.
Nagarjuna presents all these in six arguments. His first argument is
based on the common sense view that time is split into past, present, and
future. He argues if parts of time have essence or own-being then the concept
of time could be simply vanquished because, If the present and the future
exist contingent upon the past, then the present and the future would be in the
past time
Pratyutpanno nagatas ca yady ati tam apeksya hi,
pratyutpanno nagatas ca kale tite bhavisyati. 84
The next argument raises the counter question, suppose
Again, if the present and the future were not to exist therein
[i.e., in the past], how could the present and the future be
contingent upon that?85
Pratyutpanno nagatas ca na stas tatra punar yadi,
pratyutpanno nagatas ca syatam katham apeksya tam.
So no relation could be claimed between the parts. In such case, the very
notion of present and future imply a relation to the past becomes self-
contradictory. This shows present and future does not exist. Likewise
Nagarjuna dismantles other positions regarding the absoludity of time. David
Kalupahana summarizes Nagarjuna's view here nicely, Time denied by him is
absolute time....This is a rejection not of temporal phenomena, but only of time
and phenomena as well as their mutual dependence so long as they are
perceived as independent entities.86 Thus Nagarjuna denies the independent
existence of time in this chapter, whereas he does not denying what is called
the unmediated experience of change.

Examination of Motion & Space:

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 The very first point to be kept in mind is Nagarjuna does not deny
motion. This is evident from Kalupahanas annotation to Nagarjunas
delineation of motion, It is not any kind of mover or movement that is
rejected as being impossible. It is the really or substantially or independent
existent (sad) mover or movement that is rejected. This is a criticism of
eternalism (sasvada-vada).87 This is what Nagarjuna places as a final
argument to refute motion,
An existent mover does not carry out the movement in any
of the three ways. Neither does a non-existent mover carry
out the movement in any of the three ways. Nor does a person
carry out a movement, both existent and non-existent, in any
of the three ways. Therefore, neither motion, nor the mover,
nor the space to be moved is evident.88
There are three types of space such as space traversed, being traversed,
yet to be traversed and three kinds of agents namely, the moved, the moving
and the not yet moved. In case of space traversed and yet to be traversed, body
moved and not yet moved movement cannot be attributed. In case of moving
body and traversing space also no movement as that would mean duplication of
movement that is, moving body moves. Therefore, mover and movement are
neither identical nor different.
Here, the moving things denied are those which have own-being. In his
previous arguments Nagarjuna demonstrates how the object moved and the
destination achieved is relative to one another.
If two movements are allowed, it would follow that there
would be two movers. For, separated from a mover, a
movement is not appropriate.89
If it is thought that a movement separated from a mover is
not appropriate, then, when no movement exists, how could
there be a mover?90

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 Nagarjuna brings the argument that he applies to examine causality
where he establishes the relativity of two mutually dependent conceptions, i.e
the inapplicability of identity and difference:
Whose establishment is not evident either through identity or through
difference, how is their establishment evident at all?91
Nagarjuna is stating that motion and movers do not exist as conceived
of by his opponent. Instead he proceeds along the middle way empty of
extremes towards his intangible goal. He does not assert a static ultimate
reality in which they do not exist at all. His goal is a view of reality based upon
interdependent origination. What emerges then are not entities but relations.
Motion, as stated before, can exist only as the relation between the positions of
a body over time and is thus dependent upon that body and those positions.
Moreover, motion emerges as a conventional entity which we can identify and
speak of only to the extent that we make the decision to identify an object
which differs from another only by position over time as the same object.
Nagarjuna concludes that motion cannot be conceived apart from
objects which move because motion is not an independent category of being.
In fact Nagarjuna emphasizes throughout his writings that own-being is self-
contradictory. Any concept is simply a mental construct and by negation any
concept can be proved to be paradoxical. Once the relativity is recognized
there is no need of metaphysical notions to explain motion and it objects.
Prapanca analysis of independence of conceptual framework results in
dropping of all standpoints as empty. Assuming the determinate to be
indeterminate is because of these exclusive views. This understanding leads to
prajna highest wisdom (the other side of sunya).
Nagarjunas examination of space is carried out in the fifth chapter of
the MMK which is entitled as the Examination of Elements. This section of
arguments is quite different from other sections of the

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Mulamadhyamakakarika. Here Nagarjuna affirms a principle in the first
sentence of the first verse that,
An existent that is without characteristics is nowhere evident.92
Here there is no denial of space, but only the rejection of a particular
way of understanding or conceiving it comments Kalupahana who adds, If
space were to be understood as the ultimately real pure entity, a substance to
which various characteristics are attributed, in which case space precedes the
characteristics, then Nagarjuna finds no epistemological justification for it.93
What Nagarjuna opines is, whatever is accepted to be existing is something
that has to be apprehended by the senses. So to do this some defining
characteristics of the thing is essential. The problem with space is it has no
defining characteristics, nor can it be considered as something that is prior to
characteristics because there is nothing there to be considered. In this
situation it seems that one must conclude that space does not exist.
But at the same time Nagarjuna raises the most perplexing question,
When an existent is not evident, whose non-existence can
there be? Who could comprehend the distinct things: existent
and non-existent as well as existence and non-existence?94
In that case, Nagarjuna answers, space must have a defining characteristic.
Since no such case is established he marks that space is both existing and non-
existing. Nagarjuna concludes it as, space is not existing, not non-existing, nor
both existing and non-existing. To make his point much clear that there cannot
be anything with own-being Nagarjuna puts his final stanza for the chapter as,
Those who are of little intelligence, who perceive the
existence as well as the non-existence of existents, do not
perceive the appeasement of the objects of the auspicious95
Hence, instead of eliminating both existence and non-existence and looking
for transcendent reality, a reality that is beyond both existence and non-

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existence, it is possible to appease, calm, or pacify ones disposition
(samskara) or obsessions (prapanca).96
Thus, Nagarjuna shows how to recognize conventions to be the base of
ontology and not vice versa. Regardless of our descriptions of it, the reality
remains such as it is; non-conceptual and indescribable. However there arises
the question that even though the links between conditions and consequences
are empty, the change represented by the arising of the consequences is real.
Nagarjuna most likely intends the attack on motion and on space viewed as an
inherently existent phenomenon. In the same way, he does not stick on to
supposing that change and impermanence are inherently existent. Nagarjuna
through his dialectics apparently shows that one cannot hold that what is real
is permanent or impermanent. He teaches that the beliefs relating to motion,
rest and space, generated by ordinary consciousness and by its logic, are
illusory and invalid, whereas awareness of the void can alone lead to freedom.

Dialectical Criticism of the Concept of Karma and God:

Nagarjuna is very straight forward in denying any kind of
transcendental principles. The madhyamika firmly teaches that connections
between good deeds and rewards, and bad deeds and punishments are not
objective laws in nature and society, but subjective projections of mind. His
antimetaphysical approach makes it clear that he is a hardcore critic of the
belief in the rebirth and karmic forces. In that sense even the karmic law of the
Buddhist schools could be critically reviewed from Nagarjunas point of view.
Though there is no immediate reference to prove that Nagarjuna refuted
karma, there are substantial evidences that prove Nagarjuna wanted to show
that it is unintelligible to assert the existence of God as the creator or maker of
the universe. Nagarjuna identifies God with the Indian deity Isvara.
Nagarjunas small treatise entitled Isvara-Kartrtvanira-Karana-visnoh-
ekakartrtva-nirakarana which is the Refutation of the view of God being the

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creator of the world and of the view of Visnu being the sole creator of the
whole world is a work translated into its Sanskrit original from Stcherbatskys
Russian rendering, along with the introduction translated from Russian into
English by Harish C.Gupta and published by Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya in
the Indian Studies past and Present, Soviet Indology Series. No.2: papers of
Th. Stcherbatsky, (Calcutta: 3 Sambhunath Pandit Street, Nov.30, 1969;
reprinted Nov. 25, 1975). In this book, there is an introductory note of
Stcherbatsky that confirms that the author of the treatise is the same Nagarjuna
who founded the Prasangika School. In this treatise, Nagarjunas atheistic
attitude is reflected in his dialectical arguments against proofs for the existence
of God as the creator. This atheism is consistent with his arguments against
causality in MMK, which is a standing proof that Isvara-Kartrtva-nira-Karana
is the work of Nagarjuna.
The prasangapadana method of Nagarjuna is vividly found in this
treatise as follows:
Does the creator, who creates something external to Him, create it being
Himself born or unborn? Kim svayam utpadya paran karo ti anutpannah va.
He cannot create something external to Him being Himself unborn. Why?
Because He is Himself something unborn, like the son of a barren woman,
who being unborn, cannot perform any action like the digging of the earth.
God also is in such a position [Being Himself unborn, he cannot create things
external to Himself].97 Now, comes the analysis of the other case. He creates
the external things after being Himself born. But wherefrom is He born? Is He
born out of Himself or from something else or from both (i.e., both from
Himself and something external to Himself) (Atha ca svayam utpadya paran
karoti, tada kasmat utpannah, kim svatah kim paratah, ubhayatah va.)
As regards the first of these alternatives, it needs to be observed that He
could not have been born out of Himself, since ones own actions cannot relate
to ones own self. The blade of a sword, however sharp it may be, cannot cut

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itself. Besides, it is never observed that one and the same object is the
produced (janya) and the producer (janaka) (Atra svatah tatvat na utpannah,
svatmani kriyavirodhat. Na hi kharatara-karavala dhara svam atmanam
chettum samartha bhavati. kim ca svayam eva janyah svayam iti evam
drstam istam).
From these arguments of Nagarjuna, it is apparent that he has hit the
nail on the head by refuting the conception of God. At the same time it appears
as that Nagarjuna is a rebellious atheist. But the true Madhyamika approach is
neither theistic nor atheistic, but merely that God cannot be conceived of as
existing. Thus Nagarjuna rejects theism, atheism and even agnosticism since
all of them adhere to some position.

Refutation of Epistemology:

Nagarjuna through his long philosophical journey finds that though

Indian philosophical systems like Nyaya and Vaisesika did not propound high-
ended metaphysics the logic and epistemology on which they concentrated
were indispensably working on binaries. He directly criticizes Nyayaika notion
of pramana in his Vigraha Vyavartani, Sopajnavartani (an
autocommentary) and Vaidalyaprakarana. The Madhyamika does not believe
in any valid source of knowledge and thus refutes pramana. As a prasangika he
takes his defence against the pramana-vadins in his works. Nagarjuna
philosophically demonstrates how and why the dichotomy of good versus evil,
knowledge versus ignorance, can be resolved on the basis of critical
examination rather than one-sided belief and conviction.

The problem of Fire and illumination versus darkness is a major

metaphor discussed by the Nyaya to support the concept of pramana. In
religious and philosophical literatures metaphors like light and darkness are
widely used. This kind of dichotomies instead of resolving the conflicts

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between human thought and actions have more dramatized and lit them98
comments Shohei Ichimura. The Naiyayika theory of pramana states, that an
individual cognizes an object (prameya) by means of cognitive faculty and that
cognition of an object is acquired by the pramana. Here the metaphor of the
light of a candle flame refers to the faculty of cognition and the darkness refers
to the object of cognition. Nagarjuna repudiates this logical position of the
Nyayas as follows:

If such and such objects are established for you through the
pramana (yadi ca pramanatas tetesam prasiddhir arthanam),
tell me how those pramana are established for you (tesam
punah prasiddhim bruhi katham te pramananam). 99

If the pramanas are established through other pramanas, the

there is an infinite series (anavastha). Neither the beginning
nor the middle nor the end can then be established.100

Nagarjuna raises his first criticism that, if objects are established by

pramana then pramana need some other pramana to establish them, which
leads to infinite regress. If pramana are not established by other pramana then
it is fallacious to hold that all objects are established by pramanas. The
following arguments are placed such as,

tesamatha pramanairvina prasiddhirvihityate vadah/

vaisamikatvam tasminvisesahetusca vaktavyam//

visamopanyaso yam na hyatmanam prakasayatyagnih/

na hi tasyanupalabdhirdrsta tamasiva kumbhasya//101

Nagarjuna asks, If it is said that pramana illumine themselves as well as

other objects, it is a too defective statement. The supportive example they place

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is fire illumines itself and other objects. It is unacceptable since fire does not
first exist in darkness and then illumines itself. There is contact between fire
and darkness it should destroy darkness even at some other place.

In the later arguments, Nagarjuna strips off the epistemological

constructions by critiquing that, if fire is said to illumine itself and other things
then fire will also burn itself. So such a statement is not valid. Likewise, the
XXXVI argument says, if it said that fire illumines both other things and itself,
then darkness will cover both other things and itself. In the final arguments
Nagarjuna deconstructs the claims that pramana are established by prameyas.
He critiques them as, if pramanas are established by prameyas then pramana
become prameyas and vice versa. Thus it leads to circular reasoning.

Nagarjunas vibrant dialectics reveals that the pramanas are established

neither by themselves, nor by one another, nor by other pramana, nor by
prameyas nor accidentally. Still there remains the question, is criticism
possible without the acceptance of pramana? The general notion is that, there
cannot be any criticism without accepting the valid sources of knowledge. But
one has to think over the following question, does all philosophies profess or
accept same pramanas? Same way by establishing one pramana over another
another infinite regression occurs. On the other way, if pramana are stated to
be self-evident that would be arbitrary and dogmatic.

Nagarjuna refuses to accept even the pramanas and argues that he never
takes resort into the instruments of knowledge. In fact, there is an objection
upon Nagarjuna with the question, how could he deny the objective validity of
knowledge, the pramanas. Nagarjuna asserts that he had not made use of the
instruments of knowledge such as perception, inference, comparison, and
verbal testimony to analyze any argument. If so, he could either be affirming or
denying them. But since, he states that there are no objects to apprehend, he

178
has nothing to affirm or deny. To support his position-less position, Nagarjuna
raises the question that if some one believes that the existence of object is
established by the means of knowledge, then what establishes that means? If
they themselves are established without the help of the means of any
knowledge, then such means are not at all necessary. But this statement would
be countered by the argument that the pramanas establish both themselves and
other things in the same way as fire illuminates both itself and other things. But
Nagarjuna finds such an analogy to be defective and that has been discussed in
detail. A pot in darkness is illuminated by fire. The darkness has made the pot
invisible, while the light of the fire makes it visible again. But a fire by itself is
never invisible in the darkness and so cannot be said to illumine itself. In the
same way if fire is related to other things as it is related to itself, then fire
would burn itself in the same way as it burns other things. Thus Nagarjunas
dialectics disproves even the essence of basic elements such as fire. He extends
his arguments to refute the element (akasa) space and all other five elements.
As Nagarjuna points out,

Tasman na bhavo nabhavo na laksyam napi laksanam,

akasam akasa-sama dhatavah panca ye pare.102
Therefore, there is neither an existent nor a non-existent,
neither the characterized nor the characteristic, neither space
nor the other five elements similar to space.
Thence, Nagarjuna proceeds by such logical techniques to empty
everything a philosophical Buddhist might consider real. What might be
considered real includes the following: the relational conditions between things
(the doctrine of dependent origination); change or movement in space and
time; the six internal bases of sensation (5 internal bases plus mind); the 5
leaps or aggregates, physical and mental, that make up the human being, the
fundamental elements (to the Buddhists, earth, water, fire, air, space and

179
consciousness); the cycle of birth and death (samsara); pain or suffering; self-
nature or own-being (svabhava); the self (atman); time past, present and future;
and all combinations of cause and effect. For a Buddhist, the climatic
deconstruction comes when Nagarjuna includes the Buddha (tathagata), the
four noble truths and nirvana.103 Nagarjuna questions the entire project of
philosophy. He does not spare a single well-known concept; even the tathagata
does not escape his onslaught. Tathagato nihsvabhavo,
nihsvabhavamidamjagat that is, both the tathagata and the world are devoid of
svabhava or essence (fixed nature of their own).104
Generally the social, political, cultural aspects are declared to be soft-
core aspects of philosophy and even alienated from the main project of
philosophy. Whereas metaphysics, epistemology are alone considered to be
core philosophy. Here, Nagarjuna unearths and unravels the basement of
philosophy. Madhyamika is anti-metaphysical because it demonstrates
metaphysics as mere theories that are constructed to propagate absolutism and
transcendentalism which are actually essenceless. This does not mean
Madhyamika is against reality. Madhyamika accepts ultimate truth but not
transcendental reality. Suppose, if Nagarjuna had suggested that there is
certainly a transcendental reality but beyond thought-constructions and is
indescribable, this would turnaround as a metaphysical stand of Nagarjuna. So
a careful application of language is very much important while describing the
philosophy of Nagarjuna. One has to deploy Nagarjunas dialectics with
caution. If not, the critical philosophy of Nagarjuna would be misunderstood as
assuring the existence of a transcendental reality that could be realized only
through a non-relational intuition. Then it will turn as a trap for Nagarjuna
himself. With this, the kotis (positions) will emerge and this will result in the
dualistic fight of asti / nasti, ubaya / anubhaya, etc. So the metaphysics of
presence will take hold of the situation, which Nagarjuna was trying to avoid
throughout his journey.

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 It is because of the deep rooted prejudice (purvagraha), madhyamika
which is doctrinelessness (sarvadrst-prahana) is misunderstood to be another
doctrine (drsti), a vada. Human beings are conditioned in such a way that they
are unable to conceive a philosophical activity without putting it to one
doctrinal pigeonhole (vada) or the other. Nagarjuna puts this as,
Sunyata sarva-drstinam prokta nihsaranam jinaih,

yesam tu sunyata-drstis tan asadhyan babhsire 105

Thereby Nagarjuna remarks that it is out of mental clingingness and

sense of craving human beings deduce everything to one doctrine. This is an
incurable disease. Whereas the victorious ones, that is the Buddha have
announced that emptiness is the relinquishing of all views. Nagarjunas critical
insight consists in a consistent denial of all isms in philosophy and this is
what is known as prajnaparamita or wisdom par excellence in Mahayana
literature; it is the same as the bodhi or the enlightenment of Buddha.
Acceptance of the madhyamika position therefore does not leave any scope for
letting in a doctrine of absolutism, monism or some form of transcendental
mysticism by the back door.106 It is emphasized repeatedly that Nagarjunas
sunyata philosophy is critical philosophy neither absolutistic nor monistic nor
transcendental or any other type for that matter. As the presence of any
permanent essence is refuted by Nagarjuna, the possibility to put forth
metaphysical speculations withers away from the enterprise of philosophy.
Thus there is nothing to talk about the existence of a transcendental absolute in
Nagarjunas sunyavada. In fact the word vada or ism seems insignificant.

For Nagarjuna, however, sunyata aims at the exhaustion of all theories

and views because he has another ambition. The purpose of sunyata is to help
of human beings to become free from conflicts of identity including the
conflict upon sunyata. G.C.Nayak assures, sunyavada is simply a model of
philosophical activity leading to the critical insight into the nature and function

181
of concepts which in its turn gives us nirvana or freedom from all sorts of
thought-constructions or kalpana.107 So for Nagarjuna nirvana is the
attainment of philosophical illumination which comes through the
implementation of dialectics on all metaphysical speculations. It would be a
grave error to suppose that nirvana consists in the realization of a metaphysical
absolute. The only truth which Nagarjuna points out is that there is no
metaphysical entity or reality hidden behind or above this world of ordinary
discourse which is sunya or nihsvabhavata.

It is true that convictions are necessary up to a certain extent but when

they turn into authoritative manner as absolute and unchangeable truths they
become dogmas and become sickening. Thats why Nagarjuna has emphasized
that even grabbing sunyata as a view (drsti) with anti-essentialist bias is
dogmatic. Though neither Buddha nor Nagarjuna would like to give a single
line definition for the madhyamika philosophy, G.C.Nayak tries to sum up in
madhyamika in an appropriate manner as, a critical philosophy par excellence
108
devoid of essentialist picture-thinking and metaphysical commitment What
remains after the dissolution of all beliefs, thoughts is the pure mystical
intuition, prajna. Thus two aspects could be found here. In the negative
approach it is the negation of thought. The positive aspect is the opening of
another dimension. That is prajna, the highest wisdom. What Nagarjuna
conveys is all views about reality are instrumental in knowing ones
psychological inclinations, which are the result of his past. They are merely
conventional and purely subjective (vikalpa). The awareness of subjectivity of
thought is the perfection of wisdom, where one transcends reason.

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 Notes

1. Jaideva Singh and T.R.V.Murti in their writings are emphasizing that

the Mahayana tradition is assigning transcendental status to the Buddha.
Jaideva Singh, An Introduction to Madhyamaka Philosophy, (Delhi:
Motilal Banarsidass, 1987). and T.R.V.Murti, Central Philosophy of
Buddhism, (New Delhi: Munishiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd.,
2006).
2. A.K.Warder, Is Nagarjuna a Mahayanist?, The Problem of Two Truths
in Buddhism and Vedanta, Edited and Introduced by Sprung, Mervin
(Dordrect-Holland: DRP, 1973), pp.78-88.
3. Ibid., p.79.
4. Ibid., p.78.
5. R.H.Robinson, Some Logical Aspects of Nagarjunas System, PEW,
Vol. VI, No.4, pp.291-308 (Honolulu: UHP, 1957), p.292.
6. Ramendranath Ghose, The Dialectics of Nagarjuna, (Allahabad, India:
Vohra Publishers and Distributors, 1987), p.97.
7. Ibid., p.21.
8. Paul Williams, Buddhist Thought: A Complete Introduction to the
Indian Tradition, (New York: Routledge, 2000), p.150.
9. T.R.V.Murti in his magnificent work The Central Philosophy of
Buddhism, op.cit., p.4, equates sunyavada and madhyamika system with
absolutism. In fact he writes absolutism within brackets in such a way
that the middle phase or the Madhyamika system of Nagarjuna and
Arya Deva advocates Sunya-vada (Absolutism).
10. Nagarjuna, Mulamadhyamakarika (MMK), trans. David J.Kalupahana
(Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 2006). It has got 27

183
 chapters that examine and refute various concepts and finally prove
Madhyamika to be a philosophy of the middle way.
11. Paul Williams, op.cit., p.94.
12. David Loy, The Deconstruction of Buddhism, Coward & Foshay ed.,
Derrida and Negative Theology, (Sunny Press, 1992), p.233.
13. T.R.V.Murti, Central Philosophy of Buddhism, op.cit.
14. Nagarjuna, MMK, op.cit., XXIV:14.
15. G.C.Nayak, Madhyamika Sunyata- A Reappraisal, (New Delhi: ICPR,
2001), p.51.
16. K.Venkata Ramanan, Nagarjunas Philosophy as presented in The
Maha-prajnaparamita-Sastra, (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers
Private Limited, 1998), p.42.
17. Nagarjuna, MMK, op.cit., XXIV:18.
18. David Loy, op.cit., p.233.
19. MadhyamikaKarikaVrtii (Prasannapada) by Candrakirti. (Commentary
on MK) (Bib. Budd.IV), p.3.
20. Nagarjuna, MMK, op.cit., XXIV:40.
21. Ibid., XXVII:29.
22. Nagarjuna, The Dialectical Method of Nagarjuna-Vigrahavyavartani,
translated from the original Sanskrit with Introduction and Notes by
Kamaleshwar Bhattacharya, (Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass, 1986), Verse
29.
23. G.C.Nayak, op.cit., p.20.
24. Ibid., p.11.
25. Ibid., p.12.
26. Nagarjuna, MMK, op.cit., XXIV:11.
27. Nagarjuna, Mulamadhyamakakrika, XII:8, XXIV:11,18, The translation
used in this paper is Mervyn Sprung's in his edition of Lucid Exposition

184
 of the Middle Way (Boulder, CO: Prajna Press, 1979), Candrakirti's
classic commentary on the MMK.
28. David Loy, op.cit., p.249. and in Sprung's lucid exposition, p. 262.
29. Nagarjuna, Nagarjuna: A Translation of his Mulamadhyamakakarika,
translated by Kenneth Inada, (Delhi: Sri Sadguru Publications, 1983),
p.25.
30. Robert Magliola, Derrida on the Mend, (West Lafayette: Purdue
University Press 1984), p.116.
31. David R. Loy, op.cit., p.229.
32. Nagarjuna, MMK, op.cit., XXV:19, 20, 9, 24.
33. Ibid., XXV:20.
34. G.C.Nayak, p.36
35. Nagarjuna, MMK, op.cit., XXIV:8-10.
36. G.C.Nayak, op.cit., p.16.
37. T.R.V.Murti, Studies in Indian Thought, (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass
Publishers, 1996), pp.177-178.
38. David R. Loy, op.cit., p. 240.
39. Nagarjuna, MMK, op.cit., XXIV:8.
40. Ibid., XXIV:9.
41. Ibid., XXIV:10.
42. David R.Loy, The Deconstruction of Buddhism,p.241
43. T.R.V.Murti, Studies in Indian Thought, op.cit., pp.182.
44. R.C.Pandeya, The Madhyamika Philosophy: A New Approach, (Delhi:
Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1964), p.22.
45. K.Venkata Ramanan, op.cit., pp.328-329.
46. Ramendranath Ghose, The Dialectics of Nagarjuna, op.cit., p.24.
47. Jaideva Singh, An Introduction to Madhyamaka Philosophy, op.cit,
p.15.

185
48. Shohei Ichimura, Buddhist Critical Spirituality, (Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 2001), p.124.
49. T.R.V.Murti, Central Philosophy of Buddhism, op.cit., p.131.
50. Bimal Krishna Matilal, A Critique of the Madhyamika position, in
The Problem of two truths in Buddhism and Vedanta, pp.54-63, Sprung,
Marvin (Ed.), (Dordrect-Halland: D. Reidel Publishing Company,
1973), p.60)
51. Candrakirti, parapaksadusanam Vigraha, Pras., p.50, B.127,6.
52. Ramendranath Ghose, The Dialectics of Nagarjuna, op.cit., p.45.
53. S.Battacharyya, Some Unique Features of Buddhist logic, First
International Conference on Buddhism and National Cultures, New
Delhi, edited by Professor S.R.Bhatt, Department of Philosophy, Delhi
University.
54. I.M.Bochenski, Ancient Formal Logic, in Studies in Logic ed., by
L.E.J. Brouwer, et. Al. (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing
Company, 1963), p.40.
55. T.R.V.Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, op.cit., p.201.
56. Jonah Winters, Thinking in Buddhism: Nagarjunas Middle Way, 1994,
p.61-2. (net source)
57. Nagarjuna, MMK, op.cit., XVIII:1.
58. Ibid., p.263-4.
59. Ibid., XVIII:2.
60. Johan Winters, op.cit., p.62.
61. Nagarjuna, MMK, op.cit., XVIII:4.
62. Ibid., XVIII:6.
63. Ibid., p.267.
64. Ibid., XVIII:8.
65. Johan Winters, op.cit., p.64.
66. Nagarjuna, MMK, op.cit., XXVII:13.

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67. Ibid., XXII:6.
68. Ibid., XXII:16.
69. Jaideva Singh, op.cit., p.47.
70. Ibid., p.47-8.
71. Ibid., p.48.
72. Vincente Fatone, The Philosophy of Nagarjuna, (Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass, 1981), p.43.
73. Ibid., p.46.
74. T.R.V.Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, op.cit., p.6.
75. Ibid., p.7.
76. Nagarjuna, MMK, op.cit., VIII.5.
77. David J.Kaluphanas annotation to MMK, op.cit., p.183.
78. Nagarjuna, The Dialectical Method of Nagarjuna-Vigrahavyavartani,
op.cit., Verse 1. and Vincente Fatone, The Philosophy of Nagarjuna,
op.cit., p.93.
79. Jaideva Singh, op.cit., p.18.
80. T.R.V.Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, op.cit., p.166.
81. Ramendranath Ghose, The Dialectics of Nagarjuna, op.cit., p.24.
82. T.R.V.Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, op.cit., p.136.
83. Ramendranath Ghose, The Dialectics of Nagarjuna, op.cit., p.31.
84. Nagarjuna, MMK, op.cit., XIX.1.
85. Ibid., XIX.2.
86. David J.Kaluphanas annotation to MMK, op.cit., p. 27.
87. Ibid., p.131.
88. Nagarjuna, MMK, op.cit., II:24, 25.
89. Ibid., II:6.
90. Ibid., II:7.
91. Ibid., II:21.
92. Ibid., V:2.

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93. David J.Kaluphanas annotation to MMK, op.cit., p.148.
94. Nagarjuna, MMK, op.cit., V:6.
95. Ibid., V:8.
96. David J.Kaluphanas annotation to MMK, op.cit., p.152.
97. Chattopadhyaya Debiprasad, (ed.): Papers of Th. Stcherbatsky, p.9,11;
Anutpadaya ca svayam tavat paran kartum na saknoti. .
98. Shohei Ichimura, Buddhist Critical Spirituality, op.cit., p.123.
99. Nagarjuna, The Dialectical Method of Nagarjuna-Vigrahavyavartani,
op.cit., Verse 31.
100. Ibid., Verse 32: a,b,c,d.
101. Ibid.., Verse 33, 34.
102. Nagarjuna, MMK, op.cit., V.7.
103. Ben-Ami Scharfstein, A Comparative History of World
Philosophy: From the Upanisad to Kant, State University of
NewYork Press, p.244.
104. G.C.Nayak, op.cit., p.28.
105. Nagarjuna, MMK, op.cit., XIII:8.
106. G.C.Nayak, op.cit., p.16.
107. Ibid., p.20.
108. Ibid., p.41.

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