Garrigou-Lagrange, Three Ages of the Spiritual Life, Part II chap.

21

SINS OF IGNORANCE, FRAILTY, AND MALICE

We have been told that people in certain milieux are inclined to think that only the sin of malice is
mortal, and that so-called sins of ignorance and frailty are never mortal. On this point we should recall
the teaching of theology, such as it is profoundly formulated by St. Thomas Aquinas in the Summa.(16)

The sin of ignorance is that which springs from voluntary and culpable ignorance, called vincible
ignorance. The sin of frailty is that which arises from a strong passion which diminishes liberty and
impels the will to give its consent. As for the sin of malice, it is committed with full liberty, quasi de
industria, intentionally and often with premeditation, even without passion or ignorance. We shall recall
what St. Thomas teaches about each of them.

SINS OF IGNORANCE

In relation to the will, ignorance may be either antecedent or consequent or concomitant. Antecedent
ignorance is that which is in no way voluntary; it is said to be morally invincible. For example, thinking
that he is firing at an animal in the forest, a hunter may kill a man who had given no sign of his
presence and whom the hunter would never suspect of being there. In this case there is no voluntary
fault, but only a material sin.

Consequent ignorance is that which is voluntary, at least indirectly so, because of negligence in
learning what one can and ought to know. It is called vincible ignorance because one could free oneself
from it with morally possible application. It is the cause of a formal sin, at least indirectly willed. For
example, a medical student yields gravely to sloth; nevertheless, as it were by chance, he receives his
medical degree. But he is ignorant of many elementary facts of his profession which he ought to know,
and it happens that he hastens the death of some of his patients instead of curing them. In this case
there is no directly voluntary sin, but there is certainly an indirectly voluntary fault, which may be
grave and which may even go as far as homicide through imprudence or grave negligence.

Concomitant ignorance is that which is not voluntary, but which accompanies sin in such a way that,
even if it did not exist, one would still sin. This is the case of a very vindictive man who, wishing to kill
his enemy, one day, as a matter of fact, unwittingly does kill him, thinking that he is killing an animal
in a thicket. This case is manifestly different from the two preceding cases.

We may conclude, consequently, that involuntary or invincible ignorance is not a sin, but that voluntary
or vincible ignorance of what we could and should know is a more or less serious sin according to the
gravity of the obligations in which we fail. Voluntary or vincible ignorance cannot completely excuse
sin, for there was negligence; it only diminishes culpability. Absolutely involuntary or invincible
ignorance completely exculpates from sin; it does away with culpability. As for concomitant ignorance,
it does not excuse from sin, for, even if it did not exist, one would still sin.

Invincible ignorance is called "good faith." That ignorance be truly invincible or involuntary, it is
necessary that the person cannot morally free himself from it by a serious effort to know his duties. It is
impossible to be invincibly ignorant of the first precepts of the natural law: Do good and avoid evil; do
not do to others what you would not wish them to do to you; you shall not kill; you shall not steal; one
God alone you shall adore. At least by the order of the world, the starry sky, and the whole creation,
man can easily obtain a knowledge of the probability of the existence of God, supreme Ordainer and
Legislator. When he has this probability, he must seek to become more enlightened and must ask for
light; otherwise he is not in genuine good faith or in absolutely involuntary and invincible ignorance.
As much must be said of a Protestant for whom it becomes seriously probable that Catholicism is the
true religion. He must clarify his idea by study and ask God for light. Unless he does this, as St.
Alphonsus says, he already sins against faith by not wishing to take the means necessary to obtain it.

Pious people are often not sufficiently attentive to sins of ignorance, which they sometimes commit
without considering, as they can and ought, their religious duties or the duties of their state, or again the
rights and qualities of persons, superiors, equals, or inferiors with whom they are in relation. We are
responsible not only for the inordinate acts that we place, but also for the omission of all the good that
we ought to do, and that we would accomplish in fact if we had true zeal for the glory of God and the
salvation of souls. One of the causes of the present evils of society is found in the forgetfulness of these
words of the Gospel: "The poor have the gospel preached to them," in the indifference of those who
possess a superabundance toward those who lack even the necessaries of life.

SINS OF FRAILTY

A sin of frailty is one which springs from a strong passion, which impels the will to give its consent.
With this meaning, the Psalmist says: "Have mercy on me, a Lord, for I am weak." (17) The spiritual
soul is weak when its will yields to the violence of the movements of the sensible appetites. It thus
loses rectitude of practical judgment and of voluntary election or choice, by reason of fear, anger, or
concupiscence. Thus, during the Passion, Peter yielded through fear and denied our Lord three times.
When, by reason of a lively emotion or of a passion, we are inclined toward an object, the intellect is
induced to judge that it is suitable for us, and the will to give its consent contrary to the divine law.(18)

But we must distinguish here the so-called antecedent passion, which precedes the consent of the will,
and that called consequent, which follows it. Antecedent passion diminishes culpability, for it
diminishes the liberty of judgment and of voluntary choice; it is particularly apparent in very
impressionable people. On the contrary, consequent or voluntary passion does not lessen the gravity of
sin, but augments it; or rather it is a sign that the sin is more voluntary, since the will itself arouses this
inordinate movement of passion, as happens in a man who wishes to become angry the better to
manifest his ill will.(19) Just as a good consequent passion, such as Christ's holy anger when He was
driving the merchants from the Temple, increases the merit, so an evil consequent passion augments the
demerit.

The sin of frailty, of which we are speaking here, is that in which the will yields to the impulse of an
antecedent passion; and thereby the gravity of the sin is lessened. This does not mean, however, that it
is never a mortal sin. It is truly mortal when the matter is grievous, and the sinner yields to passion with
advertence and full consent. This is the case of homicide committed under the impulse of anger.(20)

A person can resist, especially at the beginning, the inordinate movement of passion. If he does not
resist it at the beginning as he ought, if he does not pray as he ought to obtain the help of God, passion
is no longer simply antecedent, it becomes voluntary.

The sin of frailty, even when serious and mortal, is more pardonable than another, but here
"pardonable" is by no means a synonym for "venial" in the current meaning of this word.(21)
Even pious people ought to be attentive to this point for they may have unrepressed movements of
jealousy which may lead them to grave faults: for example, to serious rash judgments and to words and
exterior acts which are the cause of profound breaches, contrary both to justice and to charity.

It would be a gross error to think that only the sin of malice can be mortal because it alone implies the
sufficient advertence, the full consent, together with the serious matter, necessary for the sin which
gives death to the soul and renders it worthy of eternal death. Such an error would result from a badly
formed conscience, and would contribute to increase this deformity. Let us remember that we can
easily resist the beginning of the inordinate movement of passion, and that it is a duty for us to do so
and also to pray for help, according to the words of St. Augustine, quoted by the Council of Trent:
"God never commands the impossible, but, in commanding, He warns us to do what we are able and to
ask Him for help to do that which we cannot." (22)

THE SIN OF MALICE

In contradistinction to the sin of ignorance and that of frailty, the sin of malice is that by which one
chooses evil knowingly. In Latin it is called a sin de industria, that is, a sin committed with deliberate
calculation, design, and express intention, free from ignorance and even from antecedent passion. The
sin of malice is often premeditated. This is not equivalent to saying that evil is willed for the sake of
evil; since the adequate object of the will is the good, it can will evil only under the aspect of an
apparent good.

Now he who sins through malice, acting with full knowledge of the case and through evil will,
knowingly wills a spiritual evil (for example, the loss of charity or divine friendship) in order to
possess a temporal good. It is clear that this sin thus defined differs in the degree of gravity from the sin
of ignorance and that of frailty. But we must not conclude from this that every sin of malice is a sin
against the Holy Ghost. This last sin is one of the gravest of the sins of malice. It is produced when a
man rejects through contempt the very thing that would save him or deliver him from evil: for example,
when he combats recognized religious truth, or when by reason of jealousy, he deliberately grows sad
over the graces and spiritual progress of his neighbor.

The sin of malice often proceeds from a vice engendered by multiple faults; but it can exist even in the
absence of this vice. It is thus that the first sin of the devil was a sin of malice, not of habitual malice
but of actual malice, of evil will, of an intoxication of pride.

It is clear that the sin of malice is graver than the sins of ignorance and frailty, although these last are
sometimes mortal. This explains why human laws inflict greater punishment for premeditated murder
than for that committed through passion.

The greatest gravity of the sins of malice comes from the fact that they are more voluntary than the
others, from the fact that they generally proceed from a vice engendered by repeated sins, and from the
fact that by them man knowingly prefers a temporal good to the divine friendship, without the partial
excuse of a certain ignorance or of a strong passion.

In these questions one may err in two ways that are contradictory to each other. Some lean to the
opinion that only the sin of malice can be mortal; they do not see with sufficient clearness the gravity
of certain sins of voluntary ignorance and of certain sins of frailty, in which, nevertheless, there is
serious matter, sufficient advertence, and full consent.
Others, on the contrary, do not see clearly enough the gravity of certain sins of malice committed in
cold blood, with an affected moderation and a pretense of good will or of tolerance. Those who thus
combat the true religion and take away from children the bread of divine truth may be sinning more
gravely than he who blasphemes and kills someone under the impulse of anger.

Sin is so much the more grave as it is more voluntary, as it is committed with greater light and proceeds
from a more inordinate love of self, which sometimes even goes so far as contempt of God. On the
other hand, a virtuous act is more or less meritorious according as it is more voluntary, more free, and
as it is inspired by a greater love of God and neighbor, a love that may even reach holy contempt of
self, as St. Augustine says.

Thus he who prays with too great attachment to sensible consolation merits less than he who perseveres
in prayer in a continual and profound aridity without any consolation. But on emerging from this trial,
his merit does not grow less if his prayer proceeds from an equal degree of charity which now has a
happy reaction on his sensibility. It is still true that one interior act of pure love is of greater value in the
eyes of God than many exterior works inspired by a lesser charity.

In all these questions, whether good or evil is involved, particular attention must be paid to what
proceeds from our higher faculties, the intellect and will: that is, to the act of the will following full
knowledge of the case. And, from this point of view, if an evil act committed with full deliberation and
consent, like a formal pact with the devil, has formidable consequences, a good act, such as the
oblation of self to God, made with full deliberation and consent and frequently renewed, can have even
greater consequences in the order of good; for the Holy Ghost is of a certainty infinitely more powerful
than the spirit of evil, and He can do more for our sanctification than the latter can for our ruin. It is
well to think of this in the face of the gravity of certain present-day events. The love of Christ, dying on
the cross for us, pleased God more than all sins taken together displeased Him; so the Savior is more
powerful to save us than the enemy of good is to destroy us. With this meaning, Christ said: "Fear ye
not them that kill the body and are not able to kill the soul: but rather fear him that can destroy both
soul and body in hell." (28) Unless we open the door of our hearts to him, the enemy of good cannot
penetrate into the sanctuary of our will, whereas God is closer to us than we are to ourselves and can
lead us strongly and sweetly to the most profound and elevated meritorious free acts, to acts that are the
prelude of eternal life.

16. See Ia IIae, q.76-78.

17. Ps. 6: 3.

18. St. Thomas (Ia IIae, q.58, a.5; q.57, a.5 ad 3um; q.77, a.2) recalls on this subject the Aristotelian
principle: "Such as a man is, such does the end seem to him. . . for the virtuous man judges aright of the
end of virtue."
Whence the adage: "I see the better and approve it, I follow the worse."

19. Cf. ibid., q.77, a.6.

20. Ibid., a.8.

21. Ibid., ad Ium.

22. Council of Trent, Sess. VI, chap. 11(Denzinger, no. 804), from St. Augustine, De natura et gratia,
chap. 41, no. 50.

23. Matt. 10: 28.