PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL [P.E.T. CASE No. 002.

March 29, 2005]

RONALD ALLAN POE a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR. vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

RESOLUTION

The issue here is: May the widow substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during the pendency of the latters protest case?

Rule 14 of the PET Rules provides: Rule 14. Election Protest.Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the
Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as
the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the
winner.

Pursuant to this rule, only two persons, the 2nd and 3rd placers, may contest the election. This Tribunal, however, does not have any rule on
substitution nor intervention but it does allow for the analogous and suppletory application of the Rules of Court, decisions of the Supreme Court, and
the decisions of the electoral tribunals.

Rule 3, Section 16 is the rule on substitution in the Rules of Court. This rule allows substitution by a legal representative. It can be gleaned from
the citation of this rule that movant/intervenor seeks to appear before this Tribunal as the legal representative/substitute of the late protestant
prescribed by said Section 16. However, in our application of this rule to an election contest , we have every time ruled that a public office is personal to
the public officer and not a property transmissible to the heirs upon death. Thus, we consistently rejected substitution by the widow or the heirs in
election contests where the protestant dies during the pendency of the protest.

While the right to a public office is personal and exclusive to the public officer, an election protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the
protestant or to the protestee such that the death of either would oust the court of all authority to continue the protest proceedings. Hence, we have
allowed substitution and intervention but only by a real party in interest. A real party in interest is the party who would be benefited or injured by the
judgment, and the party who is entitled to the avails of the suit. In one case, we permitted substitution by the vice-mayor since the vice-mayor is a real
party in interest considering that if the protest succeeds and the protestee is unseated, the vice-mayor succeeds to the office of the mayor that becomes
vacant if the one duly elected cannot assume office. In contrast, herein movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ, herself denies any claim to the august office of
President. Thus, given the circumstances of this case, we can conclude that protestants widow is not a real party in interest to this election protest.
WHEREFORE, the motion of movant/intervenor JESUSA SONORA POE a.k.a. SUSAN ROCES to intervene and substitute for the deceased protestant is
DENIED for lack of merit.

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL P.E.T. Case No. 003 January 18, 2008

LOREN B. LEGARDA vs. NOLI L. DE CASTRO

Legarda, in assuming the office of Senator and discharging her duties as such, has effectively abandoned or withdrawn her protest, or abandoned
her determination to protect and pursue the public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate. Such abandonment or
withdrawal operates to render moot the instant protest.

In the case at bar, Legarda's tenure in the Senate coincides with the term of the Vice-Presidency 2004-2010, that is the subject of her protest.
In Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos, the protestant's tenure in the Senate also coincided with the term of the Presidency she was vying for. Like the
protestant in the aforementioned case, the protestant in the case at bar filed her certificate of candidacy for the Senate, campaigned for the office,
assumed office after election, and discharged the duties and functions of said office. Thus, we agree concerning the applicability of the Defensor-
Santiago case as a precedent in the resolution of the present protest, though they differ in that Defensor-Santiago's case involves the Presidency while
Legarda's protest concerns only the Vice-Presidency.

On the matter of the alleged spurious ER copies, we agree with the protestee that the protestant had not adequately and convincingly rebutted
the presumption that as public documents, the Congress-retrieved ER copies, used for the proclamation of the protestee by the NBC, are authentic and
duly executed in the regular course of official business. As to the alleged break-in in Congress, which allegedly facilitated the switching of ERs, no
conclusive evidence has been given. At any rate, as pointed out by protestee, even assuming arguendo that all the votes in the 497 precincts included in
the pilot areas for the First Aspect with approximately 99,400 votes are considered in favor of protestant, still the protestant would not be able to
overcome the lead of the protestee. The margin in favor of protestee adds up to a total of 881,722 votes, and it would take much more than a hundred
thousand votes to overcome this lead.

G.R. No. 191618 November 23, 2010

ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL vs. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

The Supreme Court, as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) are electoral tribunals, each specifically and exclusively clothed with jurisdiction by the Constitution to act respectively as "sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications" of the President and Vice-President, Senators, and Representatives. Unquestionably, the
Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to decide presidential and vice-presidential election protests while concurrently acting as an independent
Electoral Tribunal. On its face, the contentious constitutional provision does not specify the establishment of the PET. But neither does it preclude, much
less prohibit, otherwise. The Court could not have been more explicit then on the plenary grant and exercise of judicial power. Plainly, the abstraction of
the Supreme Court acting as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal from the unequivocal grant of jurisdiction in the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of
the Constitution is sound and tenable.

Be that as it may, we hasten to clarify the structure of the PET as a legitimate progeny of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, composed of
members of the Supreme Court, sitting en banc. A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of authority to the
Supreme Court sitting en banc. In the same vein, although the method by which the Supreme Court exercises this authority is not specified in the
provision, the grant of power does not contain any limitation on the Supreme Courts exercise thereof. The Supreme Courts method of deciding
presidential and vice-presidential election contests, through the PET, is actually a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the
aforequoted constitutional provision

Section 1 of Republic Act No. 1793, which provides that:

"There shall be an independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal x x x which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the president-elect and the vice-president-elect of the Philippines."

has the effect of giving said defeated candidate the legal right to contest judicially the election of the President-elect of Vice-President-elect and to
demand a recount of the votes case for the office involved in the litigation, as well as to secure a judgment declaring that he is the one elected
president or vice-president, as the case may be, and that, as such, he is entitled to assume the duties attached to said office. And by providing, further,
that the Presidential Electoral Tribunal "shall be composed of the Chief Justice and the other ten Members of the Supreme Court," said legislation has
conferred upon such Court an additional original jurisdiction of an exclusive character. Republic Act No. 1793 has not created a new or separate court. It
has merely conferred upon the Supreme Court the functions of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal. The Presidential Electoral Tribunal is not inferior to the
Supreme Court, since it is the same Court although the functions peculiar to said Tribunal are more limited in scope than those of the Supreme Court in
the exercise of its ordinary functions.

By the same token, the PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the Supreme Court, albeit it has functions peculiar only to the Tribunal. It is
obvious that the PET was constituted in implementation of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, and it faithfully complies not unlawfully defies
the constitutional directive. The adoption of a separate seal, as well as the change in the nomenclature of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices
into Chairman and Members of the Tribunal, respectively, was designed simply to highlight the singularity and exclusivity of the Tribunals functions as a
special electoral court.

[G.R. Nos. 146710-15. March 2, 2001]

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA vs. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND
CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B.
FRANCISCO, JR.

[G.R. No. 146738. March 2, 2001]

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President

Section 8, Article VII of the Constitution provides: Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of the
President, the Vice President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or
resignation of both the President and Vice President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, shall then acts as President until President or Vice President shall have been elected and qualified. x x x.

The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as President or should be considered resigned as of January 20, 2001 when respondent took her
oath as the 14th President of the Republic. Resignation is a factual question and its elements are: there must be intent to resign and the intent
must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It
can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. In the cases at bar, the facts shows
that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he evacuated Malacaang Palace in the Afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the
oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions before, during
and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material
relevance on the issue.

Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacaang. In the press release
containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation
about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing
process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the
presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he
was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future
challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioners reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of
the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation
and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The
press release was petitioners valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense.

After petitioner contended that as a matter of fact he did not resign, he also argues that he could not resign as a matter of
law. He relies on section 12 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which allegedly prohibits his resignation, viz:
Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him,
for any offense under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.

Be that as it may, the intent of the law ought to be obvious. It is to prevent the act of resignation or retirement from being used
by a public official as a protective shield to stop the investigation of a pending criminal or administrative case against him and to
prevent his prosecution under the Anti-Graft Law or prosecution for bribery under the Revised Penal Code. To be sure, no person can be
compelled to render service for that would be a violation of his constitutional right. A public official has the right not to serve if he really wants to retire
or resign. Nevertheless, if at the time he resigns or retires, a public official is facing administrative or criminal investigation or prosecution, such
resignation or retirement will not cause the dismissal of the criminal or administrative proceedings against him. He cannot use his resignation or
retirement to avoid prosecution.

There is another reason why petitioners contention should be rejected. In the cases at bar, the records show that when petitioner resigned on
January 20, 2001, the cases filed against him before the Ombudsman were OMB Case Nos. 0-00-1629, 0-00-1755, 0-00-1756, 0-00-1757 and 0-00-
1758. While these cases have been filed, the respondent Ombudsman refrained from conducting the preliminary investigation of the petitioner for the
reason that as the sitting President then, petitioner was immune from suit. Technically, the said cases cannot be considered as pending for the
Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction to act on them. Section 12 of RA No. 3019 cannot therefore be invoked by the petitioner for it contemplates of cases
whose investigation or prosecution do not suffer from any insuperable legal obstacle like the immunity from suit of a sitting President.

Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation that, under section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from
resigning. We hold otherwise. The exact nature of an impeachment proceeding is debatable. But even assuming arguendo that it is an administrative
proceeding, it can not be considered pending at the time petitioner resigned because the process already broke down when a majority of the senator-
judges voted against the opening of the second envelope, the public and private prosecutors walked out, the public prosecutors filed their Manifestation
of Withdrawal of Appearance, and the proceedings were postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect, no impeachment case pending against petitioner
when he resigned.

Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as President.

The centerpiece of petitioners stance is that he is a President on leave and respondent Arroyo is only an Acting President. An
examination of section 11, Article VII is in order.

What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the
President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary . Congress
has clearly rejected petitioners claim of inability.

Even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is
merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President
made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
 Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit. Assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent of the immunity

Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him before the respondent Ombudsman should be prohibited because he
has not been convicted in the impeachment proceedings against him; and second, he enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil.

We reject his argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The
impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed,
on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio. Since the Impeachment
Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be
prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution.

Incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure but not beyond.

We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada
are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially
plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the allege mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. It will be anomalous to hold that
immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the
State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser.

G.R. No. 138965 March 5, 2007

PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., LAUREANO T. ANGELES and JOCELYN P. CELESTINO vs MAGDANGAL B. ELMA, as Chief Presidential
Legal Counsel and as Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government, and RONALDO ZAMORA, as Executive Secretary

DECISION (June 30, 2006)

The issue in this case is whether the position of the PCGG Chairman or that of the CPLC falls under the prohibition against multiple offices
imposed by Section 13, Article VII and Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, which provide that: Section 13. The President, Vice-
President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. x x x

Art. IX-B. x x x x Section 7. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position
during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.

Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while
Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants.

The general rule contained in Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution permits an appointive official to hold more than one office only if allowed
by law or by the primary functions of his position. There is no legal objection to a government official occupying two government offices and performing
the functions of both as long as there is no incompatibility. The crucial test in determining whether incompatibility exists between two offices was -
whether one office is subordinate to the other, in the sense that one office has the right to interfere with the other.

In this case, an incompatibility exists between the positions of the PCGG Chairman and the Chief Presidential
Legal Counsel (CPLC). The duties of the CPLC include giving independent and impartial legal advice on the actions of
the heads of various executive departments and agencies and to review investigations involving heads of executive
departments and agencies, as well as other Presidential appointees. The PCGG is, without question, an agency under
t h e E x e c u t i v e D e p a r t m e n t . T h u s , t h e a c t i o n s o f t h e P C G G C h a i r m a n a r e s u b j e c t t o t h e r e v i e w o f t h e C P L C . As CPLC,
respondent Elma will be required to give his legal opinion on his own actions as PCGG Chairman and review any investigation conducted by the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission, which may involve himself as PCGG Chairman. In such cases, questions on his impartiality will inevitably be
raised. This is the situation that the law seeks to avoid in imposing the prohibition against holding incompatible offices.

While Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution applies in general to all elective and appointive officials, Section 13, Article VII, thereof
applies in particular to Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries and assistant secretaries. These terms must be given their common and general acceptation
as referring to the heads of the executive departments, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries. Public officials given the rank equivalent to a
Secretary, Undersecretary, or Assistant Secretary are not covered by the prohibition, nor is the Solicitor General affected thereby. It is clear that the
strict prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is not applicable to the PCGG Chairman nor to the CPLC, as neither of them is a
secretary, undersecretary, nor an assistant secretary, even if the former may have the same rank as the latter positions.

It must be emphasized, however, that despite the non-applicability of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to respondent Elma, he
remains covered by the general prohibition under Section 7, Article IX-B and his appointments must still comply with the standard of compatibility of
officers laid down therein; failing which, his appointments are hereby pronounced in violation of the Constitution.

The Court stressed that the language of Section 13, Article VII is a definite and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple
offices or employment. The Court cautiously allowed only two exceptions to the rule against multiple offices: (1) those provided for under the
Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII, authorizing the Vice-President to become a member of the Cabinet; or (2) posts occupied by the Executive
officials specified in Section 13, Article VII without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary
functions of said officials office.

With its forgoing qualifications, it is evident that even Section 13, Article VII does not sanction this dual appointment. Appointment to the
position of PCGG Chairman is not required by the primary functions of the CPLC, and vice versa. The primary functions of the PCGG Chairman involve
the recovery of ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family and associates, the investigation of graft and
corruption cases assigned to him by the President, and the adoption of measures to prevent the occurrence of corruption. On the other hand, the
primary functions of the CPLC encompass a different matter, that is, the review and/or drafting of legal orders referred to him by the President. And
while respondent Elma did not receive additional compensation in connection with his position as CPLC, he did not act as either CPLC or PGCC Chairman
in an ex-officio capacity. The fact that a separate appointment had to be made for respondent Elma to qualify as CPLC negates the premise that he is
acting in an ex-officio capacity.

RESOLUTION (March 5, 2007)

Respondent Elma was appointed as Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) on 30 October 1998. Thereafter, during his
tenure as PCGG Chairman, he was appointed as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC). He accepted the second appointment, but waived
any remuneration that he may receive as CPLC. Petitioners sought to have both appointments declared as unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.

In response to the respondents request for clarification, the Court ruled that respondent Elmas concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC
are unconstitutional, for being incompatible offices. This ruling does not render both appointments void. Following the common-law rule on
incompatibility of offices, respondent Elma had, in effect, vacated his first office as PCGG Chairman when he accepted the second office as CPLC.
G.R. No. 88211 September 15, 1989

FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., IRENE M. ARANETA, IMEE MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC,
GREGORIO ARANETA, PACIFICO E. MARCOS, NICANOR YIGUEZ and PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA),
represented by its President, CONRADO F. ESTRELLA vs. HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOEZ,
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Executive
Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Immigration Commissioner, Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff, respectively

It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These
are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's country, a totally distinct right under
international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Humans Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave a country, and
the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. It would therefore be inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to
one's country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.

The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the
right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and,
under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and
enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]

Having clarified the substance of the legal issue, we find now a need to explain the methodology for its resolution. Our resolution of the issue will
involve a two-tiered approach. We shall first resolve whether or not the President has the power under the Constitution, to bar the Marcoses from
returning to the Philippines. Then, we shall determine, pursuant to the express power of the Court under the Constitution in Article VIII, Section 1,
whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the
return of the Marcose's to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.

Executive Power

The Constitution provides that "[t]he executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines." [Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However, it does not define
what is meant by executive power" although in the same article it touches on the exercise of certain powers by the President. The inevitable question
then arises: by enumerating certain powers of the President did the framers of the Constitution intend that the President shall exercise those specific
powers and no other?

We hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is
traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific
powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.

The Power Involved

The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people" and that "[t]he
maintenance of peace and order,the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by
all the people of the blessings of democracy." [Art. II, Secs. 4 and 5.]

Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of
the general welfare are essentially ideals to guide governmental action. But such does not mean that they are empty words. Thus, in the exercise of
presidential functions, in drawing a plan of government, and in directing implementing action for these plans, or from another point of view, in making
any decision as President of the Republic, the President has to consider these principles, among other things, and adhere to them.

Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the President is, under the Constitution,
constrained to consider these basic principles in arriving at a decision. More than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the
President has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest. To the President, the
problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the
President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people. To
paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the President but also his duty to do anything not forbidden by the Constitution or the laws
that the needs of the nation demand. It is a power borne by the President's duty to preserve and defend the Constitution. It also may be viewed as a
power implicit in the President's duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed

What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light
solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions. It must be treated as a matter
that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in
that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on
the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.

ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III AND JUANITO G. ARCILLA vs. SALVADOR MISON, in his capacity as COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF
CUSTOMS, AND GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET, respondents, COMMISSION
ON APPOINTMENTS

Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution says:

The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads
of the departments, agencies, commissions or boards.

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but
such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of
the Congress.
It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, just quoted, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall
appoint. These four (4) groups are:

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from
the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The clear and expressed intent of its framers was
to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the
first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII.

Now, it is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of
appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law (RA 1937) to
appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. Consequently, we rule that the President of the Philippines acted within her constitutional authority
and power in appointing respondent Salvador Mison, Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, without submitting his nomination to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation.

G.R. No. 164978 October 13, 2005

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., EDGARDO J. ANGARA, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, LUISA P. EJERCITO-ESTRADA, JINGGOY E. ESTRADA,
PANFILO M. LACSON, ALFREDO S. LIM, JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, and SERGIO R. OSMEA III vs. EXEC. SECRETARY EDUARDO R.
ERMITA, FLORENCIO B. ABAD, AVELINO J. CRUZ, JR., MICHAEL T. DEFENSOR, JOSEPH H. DURANO, RAUL M. GONZALEZ, ALBERTO G.
ROMULO, RENE C. VILLA, and ARTHUR C. YAP

The petition questions the constitutionality of President Arroyos appointment of respondents as acting secretaries without the consent of the
Commission on Appointments while Congress is in session.

On the Nature of the Power to Appoint

The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the legislature may not interfere with the exercise of this executive power except in those
instances when the Constitution expressly allows it to interfere. The scope of the legislatures interference in the executives power to appoint is limited
to the power to prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office. Congress cannot appoint a person to an office in the guise of prescribing
qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress impose on the President the duty to appoint any particular person to an office. However, even if the
Commission on Appointments is composed of members of Congress, the exercise of its powers is executive and not legislative. The Commission on
Appointments does not legislate when it exercises its power to give or withhold consent to presidential appointments. The Commission is independent of
Congress. The powers of the Commission do not come from Congress, but emanate directly from the Constitution.

The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until
the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a
department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her
choice could assume office. Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary as her
temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing
qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a department
secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even while Congress is in session.

The law expressly allows the President to make such acting appointment. Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that "[t]he President
may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the
executive branch." Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as the President
deems that person competent. Petitioners claim that the issuance of appointments in an acting capacity is susceptible to abuse. Petitioners fail to
consider that acting appointments cannot exceed one year as expressly provided in Section 17(3), Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292. The law has
incorporated this safeguard to prevent abuses, like the use of acting appointments as a way to circumvent confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.

In distinguishing ad interim appointments from appointments in an acting capacity, a noted textbook writer on constitutional law has observed:

Ad-interim appointments Appointments in an acting capacity

effective upon acceptance effective upon acceptance

may be extended only during a recess of Congress may be extended any time there is a vacancy

submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or not submitted to the Commission on Appointments
rejection

We find no abuse in the present case. The absence of abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyos issuance of ad interim appointments to
respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year.

G.R. No. 196271 February 28, 2012

DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA, in his personal capacity, and in representation of MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS
IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HADJI MUHMINA J. USMAN, JOHN ANTHONY L. LIM, JAMILON T. ODIN, ASRIN TIMBOL JAIYARI,
MUJIB M. KALANG, ALIH AL-SAIDI J. SAPI-E, KESSAR DAMSIE ABDIL, and BASSAM ALUH SAUPI vs.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President JUAN PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, thru SPEAKER
FELICIANO BELMONTE, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, thru its Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Office of the
President Executive Secretary, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR., Secretary of Budget, and ROBERTO TAN, Treasurer of the Philippines

See digest in Legislative Cases.

G.R. No. 93252 August 5, 1991

RODOLFO T. GANZON vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS T. SANTOS

The core question: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the President's alter ego, can suspend and/or remove local officials.

It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional language, the charter did not intend to divest the
legislature of its right or the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local officials . It
is our opinion that the omission (of "as may be provided by law") signifies nothing more than to underscore local governments' autonomy from congress
and to break Congress' "control" over local government affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive the
legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning discipline.

Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate making mini-states out of local government units, as in the federal governments of the United States of
America (or Brazil or Germany), although Jefferson is said to have compared municipal corporations euphemistically to "small republics." Autonomy, in
the constitutional sense, is subject to the guiding star, though not control, of the legislature, albeit the legislative responsibility under the Constitution
and as the "supervision clause" itself suggest-is to wean local government units from over-dependence on the central government.

It is also noteworthy that in spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local government under the general supervision of the Executive. It is
noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress to include in the local government code provisions for removal of local officials, which suggest that
Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to the President. Autonomy,
however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership and inter-dependence between the central administration and local government units, or
otherwise, to user in a regime of federalism. The Charter has not taken such a radical step. Local governments, under the Constitution, are subject to
regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self- government.

The petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of
investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally, "supervision" is not
incompatible with disciplinary authority as this Court. "In administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see
that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to
make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter." But from this pronouncement it
cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President over local government officials does not include the power of investigation
when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires, as postulated in Section 64(c) of the Revised Administrative Code.

Supervision" and "removal" are not incompatible terms and one may stand with the other notwithstanding the stronger expression of local autonomy
under the new Charter.

The successive sixty-day suspensions imposed on Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon is albeit another matter. What bothers the Court, and what indeed looms very
large, is the fact that since the Mayor is facing ten administrative charges, the Mayor is in fact facing the possibility of 600 days of suspension, in the
event that all ten cases yield prima facie findings. To make him serve 600 days of suspension, which is effectively, to suspend him out of office. It is a
basic assumption of the electoral process implicit in the right of suffrage that the people are entitled to the services of elective officials of their choice.
The protracted continuance of this preventive suspension had outrun the bounds of reason and resulted in sheer oppression. A denial of due process is
thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an unconstitutional application that the order of suspension should be lifted.

In resume the Court is laying down the following rules:

1. Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentralization of administration, not of power, in which local officials remain accountable
to the central government in the manner the law may provide;

2. The new Constitution does not prescribe federalism;

3. The change in constitutional language (with respect to the supervision clause) was meant but to deny legislative control over local governments; it
did not exempt the latter from legislative regulations provided regulation is consistent with the fundamental premise of autonomy;

4. Since local governments remain accountable to the national authority, the latter may, by law, and in the manner set forth therein, impose disciplinary
action against local officials;

5. "Supervision" and "investigation" are not inconsistent terms; "investigation" does not signify "control" (which the President does not have);

6. The petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon. may serve the suspension so far ordered, but may no longer be suspended for the offenses he was charged
originally; provided:

a) that delays in the investigation of those charges "due to his fault, neglect or request, (the time of the delay) shall not be counted in
computing the time of suspension. [Supra, sec. 63(3)]

b) that if during, or after the expiration of, his preventive suspension, the petitioner commits another or other crimes and abuses for which
proper charges are filed against him by the aggrieved party or parties, his previous suspension shall not be a bar to his being preventively
suspended again, if warranted under subpar. (2), Section 63 of the Local Government Code.

G.R. No. 167798 April 19, 2006

KILUSANG MAYO UNO, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU), JOSELITO V. USTAREZ,
EMILIA P. DAPULANG, SALVADOR T. CARRANZA, MARTIN T. CUSTODIO, JR. and ROQUE M. TAN vs. THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL,
NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, and THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET and MANAGEMENT
On the Alleged Usurpation of Legislative Power

Section 3 of EO 420 limits the data to be collected and recorded under the uniform ID system to only 14 specific items, namely: (1) Name; (2) Home
Address; (3) Sex; (4) Picture; (5) Signature; (6) Date of Birth; (7) Place of Birth; (8) Marital Status; (9) Name of Parents; (10) Height; (11) Weight; (12)
Two index fingers and two thumbmarks; (13) Any prominent distinguishing features like moles or others; and (14) Tax Identification Number. These
limited and specific data are the usual data required for personal identification by government entities, and even by the private sector. Any one who
applies for or renews a drivers license provides to the LTO all these 14 specific data. There is no dispute that government entities can individually limit
the collection and recording of their data to the 14 specific items in Section 3 of EO 420. There is also no dispute that these government entities can
individually adopt the ID format as specified in Section 3 of EO 420. Such an act is certainly within the authority of the heads or governing boards of the
government entities that are already authorized under existing laws to issue IDs.

A unified ID system for all these government entities can be achieved in either of two ways. First, the heads of these existing government entities can
enter into a memorandum of agreement making their systems uniform. If the government entities can individually adopt a format for their own ID
pursuant to their regular functions under existing laws, they can also adopt by mutual agreement a uniform ID format, especially if the uniform format
will result in substantial savings, greater efficiency, and optimum compatibility. This is purely an administrative matter, and does not involve the exercise
of legislative power.

Second, the President may by executive or administrative order direct the government entities under the Executive department to adopt a uniform ID
data collection and format. Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the "President shall have control of all executive departments,
bureaus and offices." The same Section also mandates the President to "ensure that the laws be faithfully executed." Certainly, under this constitutional
power of control the President can direct all government entities, in the exercise of their functions under existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data
collection and ID format to achieve savings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and convenience to the public. The Presidents constitutional power of
control is self-executing and does not need any implementing legislation.

Of course, the Presidents power of control is limited to the Executive branch of government and does not extend to the Judiciary or to the independent
constitutional commissions. Thus, EO 420 does not apply to the Judiciary, or to the COMELEC which under existing laws is also authorized to issue
voters ID cards. This only shows that EO 420 does not establish a national ID system because legislation is needed to establish a single ID system that
is compulsory for all branches of government.

Clearly, EO 420 is well within the constitutional power of the President to promulgate. The President has not usurped legislative power in issuing EO
420. EO 420 is an exercise of Executive power the Presidents constitutional power of control over the Executive department. EO 420 is also
compliance by the President of the constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Legislative power is the authority to make laws
and to alter or repeal them. In issuing EO 420, the President did not make, alter or repeal any law but merely implemented and executed existing laws.
EO 420 is simply an executive issuance and not an act of legislation. Thus, the issuance of EO 420 does not constitute usurpation of legislative power.

G.R. No. 167324 July 17, 2007

TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR TROPICAL MEDICINE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION,
NATIONAL ORTHOPEDIC WORKERS UNION, DR. JOSE R. REYES MEMORIAL HOSPITAL EMPLOYEES UNION, SAN LAZARO HOSPITAL
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, ALLIANCE OF HEALTH WORKERS, INC., HEALTH ALLIANCE FOR DEMOCRACY, COUNCIL FOR HEALTH
DEVELOPMENT, NETWORK OPPOSED TO PRIVATIZATION, COMMUNITY MEDICINE DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION INC., PHILIPPINE
SOCIETY OF SANITARY ENGINEERS INC., KILUSANG MAYO UNO, GABRIELA, KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS, KALIPUNAN NG
DAMAYAN NG MGA MARALITA, ELSA O. GUEVARRA, ARCADIO B. GONZALES, JOSE G. GALANG, DOMINGO P. MANAY, TITO P. ESTEVES,
EDUARDO P. GALOPE, REMEDIOS M. YSMAEL, ALFREDO BACUATA, EDGARDO J. DAMICOG, REMEDIOS M. MALTU AND REMEGIO S.
MERCADO vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, SECRETARY OF HEALTH MANUEL M. DAYRIT,
SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT EMILIA T. BONCODIN

This Court has already ruled in a number of cases that the President may, by executive or administrative order, direct the reorganization of government
entities under the Executive Department. This is also sanctioned under the Constitution, as well as other statutes. Section 17, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, clearly states: "[T]he president shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices."

Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10 of Executive Order No. 292, also known as the Administrative Code of 1987 reads: SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the
President to Reorganize his Office - The President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose, he may take any of
the following actions:

(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the immediate offices, the Presidential Special
Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring
functions from one unit to another;

(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of
the President from other Departments or Agencies; and

(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other department or agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the
President from other Departments or agencies.

The law grants the President the power to reorganize the Office of the President in recognition of the recurring need of every President to reorganize his
or her office "to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency." To remain effective and efficient, it must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the
President in the manner the Chief Executive deems fit to carry out presidential directives and policies.

The Administrative Code provides that the Office of the President consists of the Office of the President Proper and the agencies under it. Agency of the
Government refers to any of the various units of the Government, including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-owned or
controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein. The DOH is among the cabinet-level departments enumerated under Book IV of
the Administrative Code, indubitably, the DOH is an agency which is under the supervision and control of the President and, thus, part of the Office of
the President. The President did not usurp any legislative prerogative in issuing Executive Order No. 102. It is an exercise of the Presidents
constitutional power of control over the executive department, supported by the provisions of the Administrative Code, recognized by other statutes,
and consistently affirmed by this Court.

G.R. No. 225973, November 08, 2016

SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, TRINIDAD H. REPUNO, BIENVENIDO LUMBERA, BONIFACIO P. ILAGAN, NERI JAVIER COLMENARES, MARIA
CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, M.D., SAMAHAN NG EXDETAINEES LABAN SA DETENSYON AT ARESTO (SELDA), REPRESENTED BY DIONITO
CABILLAS, CARMENCITA M. FLORENTINO, RODOLFO DEL ROSARIO, FELIX C. DALISAY, AND DANILO M. DELAFUENTE v. REAR
ADMIRAL ERNESTO C. ENRIQUEZ (IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR RESERVIST AND RETIREE AFFAIRS,
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES), THE GRAVE SERVICES UNIT (PHILIPPINE ARMY), AND GENERAL RICARDO R. VISAYA (IN HIS
CAPACITY AS THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES), DEFENSE SECRETARY DELFIN LORENZANA, AND HEIRS OF
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, REPRESENTED BY HIS SURVIVING SPOUSE IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS

The President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance with the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence

The second sentence of Sec. 17 of Art. VII pertaining to the duty of the President to " ensure that the laws be faithfully executed," which is identical to
Sec. 1, Title I, Book III of the Administrative Code of 1987, is likewise not violated by public respondents. Being the Chief Executive, the President
represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his or her department. Under the
Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power to take "necessary and proper steps" to carry into execution the law. The mandate is self-
executory by virtue of its being inherently executive in nature and is intimately related to the other executive functions. The provision simply
underscores the rule of law and, corollarily, the cardinal principle that the President is not above the laws but is obliged to obey and execute them.

Consistent with President Duterte's mandate under Sec. 17, Art. VII of the Constitution, the burial of Marcos at the LNMB does not contravene R.A. No.
289, R.A. No. 10368, and the international human rights laws cited by petitioners.

A. On R.A. No. 289

R.A. No. 289 authorized the construction of a National Pantheon as the burial place of the mortal remains of all the Presidents of the Philippines,
national heroes and patriots. It also provided for the creation of a Board on National Pantheon to implement the law. On May 12, 1953, President Elpidio
R. Quirino approved the site of the National Pantheon at East Avenue, Quezon City. On December 23, 1953, he issued Proclamation No. 431 to formally
"withdraw from sale or settlement and reserve as a site for the construction of the National Pantheon a certain parcel of land located in Quezon City."
However, on July 5, 1954, President Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 42 revoking Proclamation Nos. 422 and 431, both series of 1953, and reserving
the parcels of land embraced therein for national park purposes to be known as Quezon Memorial Park.

It is asserted that Sec. 1 of R.A. No 289 provides for the legal standard by which a person's mortal remains may be interred at the LNMB, and that AFP
Regulations G 161-375 merely implements the law and should not violate its spirit and intent. They maintain that public respondents are not members
of the Board on National Pantheon, which is authorized by the law to cause the burial at the LNMB of the deceased Presidents of the Philippines,
national heroes, and patriots.

Petitioners are mistaken. Both in their pleadings and during the oral arguments, they miserably failed to provide legal and historical bases as to their
supposition that the LNMB and the National Pantheon are one and the same. This is not at all unexpected because the LNMB is distinct and separate
from the burial place envisioned in R.A. No 289. The parcel of land subject matter of President Quirino's Proclamation No. 431, which was later on
revoked by President Magsaysay's Proclamation No. 42, is different from that covered by Marcos' Proclamation No. 208. The National Pantheon does not
exist at present.

Even if the Court treats R.A. No. 289 as relevant to the issue, still, petitioners' allegations must fail. To apply the standard that the LNMB is reserved
only for the "decent and the brave" or "hero" would be violative of public policy as it will put into question the validity of the burial of each and every
mortal remains resting therein, and infringe upon the principle of separation of powers since the allocation of plots at the LNMB is based on the grant of
authority to the President under existing laws and regulations. Also, the Court shares the view of the OSG that the proposed interment is not equivalent
to the consecration of Marcos' mortal remains. The act in itself does not confer upon him the status of a "hero." Despite its name, which is actually a
misnomer, the purpose of the LNMB, both from legal and historical perspectives, has neither been to confer to the people buried there the title of "hero"
nor to require that only those interred therein should be treated as a "hero." Lastly, petitioners' repeated reference to a "hero's burial" and "state
honors," without showing proof as to what kind of burial or honors that will be accorded to the remains of Marcos, is speculative until the specifics of
the interment have been finalized by public respondents.

B. On R.A. No. 10368

For petitioners, R.A. No. 10368 modified AFP Regulations G 161-375 by implicitly disqualifying Marcos' burial at the LNMB because the legislature, which
is a co-equal branch of the government, has statutorily declared his tyranny as a deposed dictator and has recognized the heroism and sacrifices of the
Human Rights Violations Victims (HRVVs) under his regime. We beg to disagree.

Certainly, R.A. No. 10368 recognizes the heroism and sacrifices of all Filipinos who were victims of summary execution, torture, enforced or involuntary
disappearance, and other gross human rights violations committed from September 21, 1972 to February 25, 1986. This Court cannot subscribe to
petitioners' logic that the beneficial provisions of R.A. No. 10368 are not exclusive as it includes the prohibition on Marcos' burial at the LNMB. It would
be undue to extend the law beyond what it actually contemplates. That would be tantamount to judicial legislation.

C. On International Human Rights Laws

Petitioners argue that the burial of Marcos at the LNMB will violate the rights of the HRVVs to "full" and "effective" reparation, which is provided under
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims
of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law adopted by the U.N. General Assembly
on December 16, 2005, and the Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to Combat Impunity dated
February 8, 2005 by the U.N. Economic and Social Council.

We do not think so. The ICCPR, as well as the U.N. principles on reparation and to combat impunity, call for the enactment of legislative measures,
establishment of national programmes, and provision for administrative and judicial recourse, in accordance with the country's constitutional processes,
that are necessary to give effect to human rights embodied in treaties, covenants and other international laws.

Contrary to petitioners' postulation, our nation's history will not be instantly revised by a single resolve of President Duterte, acting through the public
respondents, to bury Marcos at the LNMB. Whether petitioners admit it or not, the lessons of Martial Law are already engraved, albeit in varying
degrees, in the hearts and minds of the present generation of Filipinos. As to the unborn, it must be said that the preservation and popularization of our
history is not the sole responsibility of the Chief Executive; it is a joint and collective endeavor of every freedom-loving citizen of this country.

The President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is not done whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or
personal bias

A. National Shrines

As one of the cultural properties of the Philippines, national historical shrines (or historical shrines) refer to sites or structures hallowed and
revered for their history or association as declared by the NHCP.

As one of the cultural agencies attached to the NCAA, the NHCP manages, maintains and administers national shrines, monuments, historical
 sites, edifices and landmarks of significant historico-cultural value. Excluded, however, from the jurisdiction of the NHCP are the military
memorials and battle monuments declared as national shrines, which have been under the administration, maintenance and development of
the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (PVAO) of the DND.

B. The Libingan Ng Mga Bayani

Contrary to the dissent, P.D. No. 105 (Declaring National Shrines as Sacred (Hallowed) Places and Prohibiting Desecration thereof) does not
apply to the LNMB. Despite the fact that P.D. No. 208 predated P.D. No. 105, the LNMB was not expressly included in the national shrines
enumerated in the latter. Assuming that P.D. No. 105 is applicable, the descriptive words "sacred and hallowed" refer to the LNMB as a place
and not to each and every mortal remains interred therein. Hence, the burial of Marcos at the LNMB does not diminish said cemetery as a
revered and respected ground. Neither does it negate the presumed individual or collective "heroism" of the men and women buried or will be
buried therein. That being said, the interment of Marcos, therefore, does not constitute a violation of the physical, historical, and cultural
integrity of the LNMB as a national military shrine.

The LNMB is considered as a national shrine for military memorials. The PVAO, which is empowered to administer, develop, and maintain
military shrines, is under the supervision and control of the DND. The DND, in turn, is under the Office of the President.

The presidential power of control over the Executive Branch of Government is a self-executing provision of the Constitution and does not
require statutory implementation, nor may its exercise be limited, much less withdrawn, by the legislature. This is why President Duterte is not
bound by the alleged 1992 Agreement between former President Ramos and the Marcos family to have the remains of Marcos interred in
Batac, Ilocos Norte. As the incumbent President, he is free to amend, revoke or rescind political agreements entered into by his predecessors,
and to determine policies which he considers, based on informed judgment and presumed wisdom, will be most effective in carrying out his
mandate.

Moreover, under the Administrative Code, the President has the power to reserve for public use and for specific public purposes any of the
lands of the public domain and that the reserved land shall remain subject to the specific public purpose indicated until otherwise provided by
law or proclamation. At present, there is no law or executive issuance specifically excluding the land in which the LNMB is located from the
use it was originally intended by the past Presidents. The allotment of a cemetery plot at the LNMB for Marcos as a former President and
Commander-in-Chief, a legislator, a Secretary of National Defense, a military personnel, a veteran, and a Medal of Valor awardee, whether
recognizing his contributions or simply his status as such, satisfies the public use requirement. The disbursement of public funds to cover the
expenses incidental to the burial is granted to compensate him for valuable public services rendered. Likewise, President Duterte's
determination to have Marcos' remains interred at the LNMB was inspired by his desire for national healing and reconciliation.

C. AFP Regulations on the LNMB

Under AFP Regulations G 161-375, the following are eligible for interment at the LNMB: (a) Medal of Valor Awardees; (b) Presidents or
Commanders-in-Chief, AFP; (c) Secretaries of National Defense; (d) Chiefs of Staff, AFP; (e) General/Flag Officers of the AFP; (f) Active and
retired military personnel of the AFP to include active draftees and trainees who died in line of duty, active reservists and CAFGU Active
Auxiliary (CAA) who died in combat operations or combat related activities; (g) Former members of the AFP who laterally entered or joined
the PCG and the PNP; (h) Veterans of Philippine Revolution of 1890, WWI, WWII and recognized guerillas; (i) Government Dignitaries,
Statesmen, National Artists and other deceased persons whose interment or reinterment has been approved by the Commander-in-Chief,
Congress or the Secretary of National Defense; and G) Former Presidents, Secretaries of Defense, Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists,
widows of Former Presidents, Secretaries of National Defense and Chief of Staff. Similar to AFP Regulations G 161-374, the following are not
qualified to be interred in the LNMB: (a) Personnel who were dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from the service; and (b)
Authorized personnel who were convicted by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude.

In the absence of any executive issuance or law to the contrary, the AFP Regulations G 161-375 remains to be the sole authority in
determining who are entitled and disqualified to be interred at the LNMB. The validity of AFP Regulations G 161-375 must, therefor, be
sustained for having been issued by the AFP Chief of Staff acting under the direction of the Secretary of National Defense, who is the alter
ego of the President.

For his alleged human rights abuses and corrupt practices, we may disregard Marcos as a President and Commander-in-Chief, but we cannot deny him
the right to be acknowledged based on the other positions he held or the awards he received. In this sense, We agree with the proposition that Marcos
should be viewed and judged in his totality as a person. While he was not all good, he was not pure evil either. Certainly, just a human who erred like
us.

2. Disqualification under the AFP Regulations

Aside from being eligible for burial at the LNMB, Marcos possessed none of the disqualifications stated in AFP Regulations G 161-375. He was neither
convicted by final judgment of the offense involving moral turpitude nor dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from active military service.

There are certain things that are better left for history - not this Court - to adjudge. The Court could only do so much in accordance with the clearly
established rules and principles. Beyond that, it is ultimately for the people themselves, as the sovereign, to decide, a task that may require the better
perspective that the passage of time provides. In the meantime, the country must move on and let this issue rest.

G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010

LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO vs. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission

The question, therefore, before the Court is this: Does the creation of the PTC fall within the ambit of the power to reorganize as expressed in Section
31 of the Revised Administrative Code? Section 31 contemplates "reorganization" as limited by the following functional and structural lines: (1)
restructuring the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions
from one unit to another; (2) transferring any function under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3)
transferring any agency under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa. Clearly, the provision refers to reduction of
personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. These points to situations where a body or an
office is already existent but a modification or alteration thereof has to be effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less
envisioned in said provision. Accordingly, the answer to the question is in the negative.

But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any department or agency in the executive branch does not have to end
here. The creation of the PTC is not justified by the Presidents power of control. Control is essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter. Clearly, the
power of control is entirely different from the power to create public offices. The former is inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from
either a valid delegation from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws.
The question is this, is there a valid delegation of power from Congress, empowering the President to create a public office? The Presidents power to
conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency
is inherent in the Presidents powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to
execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority.

Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the President are not limited to those
specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the
power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed.

The Chief Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted . Having been constitutionally granted full
control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees
faithfully comply with the law. It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters
which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and
enforcement of the laws of the land.

G.R. No. 171396 May 3, 2006

PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LORENZO TAADA III, RONALD LLAMAS, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, ROGER R. RAYEL,
GARY S. MALLARI, ROMEL REGALADO BAGARES, CHRISTOPHER F.C. BOLASTIG vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS PRESIDENT
AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, HON. AVELINO CRUZ II, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE, GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO
LOMIBAO, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE

I. Review of Factual Bases

Petitioners maintain that PP 1017 has no factual basis. Hence, it was not "necessary" for President Arroyo to issue such Proclamation. As to how the
Court may inquire into the Presidents exercise of power, Lansang adopted the test that "judicial inquiry can go no further than to satisfy the
Court not that the Presidents decision is correct," but that "the President did not act arbitrarily." Thus, the standard laid down is not correctness, but
arbitrariness. Judging the seriousness of the incidents, President Arroyo was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress
what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.

II. Constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5

From Locks "theory of prerogative," to Watkins doctrine of "constitutional dictatorship" and, eventually, to McIlwains "principle of constitutionalism" ---
ultimately aim to solve one real problem in emergency governance, i.e., that of allotting increasing areas of discretionary power to the Chief
Executive, while insuring that such powers will be exercised with a sense of political responsibility and under effective limitations and
checks.

Fresh from the fetters of a repressive regime, the 1986 Constitutional Commission, in drafting the 1987 Constitution, endeavored to create a
government in the concept of Justice Jacksons "balanced power structure." Executive, legislative, and judicial powers are dispersed to the President,
the Congress, and the Supreme Court, respectively. Each is supreme within its own sphere. But none has the monopoly of power in times of
emergency. Each branch is given a role to serve as limitation or check upon the other. This system does not weaken the President; it
just limits his power, using the language of McIlwain. In other words, in times of emergency, our Constitution reasonably demands that we repose a
certain amount of faith in the basic integrity and wisdom of the Chief Executive but, at the same time, it obliges him to operate within carefully
prescribed procedural limitations.

Constitutional Basis of PP 1017

The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus:

First provision:

"by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order
throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion"

Second provision:

"and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;"

Third provision:

"as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency."

First Provision: Calling-out Power

Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a "sequence" of graduated powers. From the most to the least
benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law.
Citing Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, the Court ruled that the only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that "whenever it
becomes necessary," the President may call the armed forces "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." Are these
conditions present in the instant cases? As stated earlier, considering the circumstances then prevailing, President Arroyo found it necessary to issue PP
1017. Owing to her Offices vast intelligence network, she is in the best position to determine the actual condition of the country.

Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed forces to aid him in suppressing lawless violence, invasion and rebellion. This
involves ordinary police action. But every act that goes beyond the Presidents calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra vires. In declaring a state
of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the States extraordinary power to take over
privately-owned public utility and business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such
Proclamation cannot be deemed harmlessor without legal significance.
PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is no more than a call by the President to the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence.
Justice Mendoza further stated that specifically, (a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies; (c) take-over of news
media and agencies and press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees, are powers which can be exercised by the President as
Commander-in-Chief only where there is a valid declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.

Second Provision: "Take Care" Power

The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. This is based on Section 17, Article VII which
reads: The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.

As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested, the primary function of the President is to enforce the laws as well as to formulate policies to
be embodied in existing laws. He sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. In the exercise of such function,
the President, if needed, may employ the powers attached to his office as the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the country, including the
Philippine National Police under the Department of Interior and Local Government.

Petitioners assail the clause "to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally
or upon my direction." Petitioners contention is understandable. A reading of PP 1017 operative clause shows that it was lifted from Former President
Marcos Proclamation No. 1081. Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate "decrees"? President Arroyos ordinance power is limited to
the issuances mentioned under Chapter 2, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987. Presidential Decrees are laws which are of
the same category and binding force as statutes because they were issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative power during the period of
Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution.

Third Provision: Power to Take Over

x x x and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders, and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as
provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a state of national emergency.

The import of this provision is that President Arroyo, during the state of national emergency under PP 1017, can call the military not only to enforce
obedience "to all the laws and to all decrees x x x" but also to act pursuant to the provision of Section 17, Article XII which reads: Sec. 17. In times of
national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it,
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.

During the existence of the state of national emergency, PP 1017 purports to grant the President, without any authority or delegation from Congress, to
take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Petitioners claim that President Arroyos
inclusion of Section 17, Article XII in PP 1017 is an encroachment on the legislatures emergency powers.

Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution reads:

(1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the
existence of a state of war.

(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution
of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above provision refers not only to war but also to "other national emergency." If the
intention of the Framers of our Constitution was to withhold from the President the authority to declare a "state of national emergency" pursuant to
Section 18, Article VII (calling-out power) and grant it to Congress (like the declaration of the existence of a state of war), then the Framers could have
provided so. Clearly, they did not intend that Congress should first authorize the President before he can declare a "state of national emergency." The
logical conclusion then is that President Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency even in the absence of a
Congressional enactment. But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or business affected with
public interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress. Thus, when Section 17, Article XII states that the "the State may,
during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately
owned public utility or business affected with public interest," it refers to Congress, not the President.

Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that such Proclamation does not
authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public
interest without authority from Congress.

G.R. No. 231658 July 04, 2017

REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C. LAGMAN, TOMASITO S. VILLARIN, GARY C. ALEJANO, EMMANUEL A. BILLONES, AND TEDDY BRAWNER
BAGUILAT, JR. vs. HON. SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; HON. DELFIN N. LORENZANA, SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEF'ENSE AND MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR; AND GEN. EDUARDO ANO, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND MARTIAL LAW IMPLEMENTOR

In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of suspension, the Court considers only the information and data available to the
President prior to or at the time of the declaration; it is not allowed to "undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings." On the other
hand, Congress may take into consideration not only data available prior to, but likewise events supervening the declaration. Unlike the Court which
does not look into the absolute correctness of the factual basis as will be discussed below, Congress could probe deeper and further; it can delve into
the accuracy of the facts presented before it. In addition, the Court's review power is passive; it is only initiated by the filing of a petition "in an
appropriate proceeding" by a citizen. On the other hand, Congress' review mechanism is automatic in the sense that it may be activated by Congress
itself at any time after the proclamation or suspension was made.

Re-examination is proper in the Court's pronouncement in Fortun vs President Macapagal-Arroyo. The Court willingly but unwittingly clipped its own
power and surrendered the same to Congress as well as: abdicated from its bounden duty to review. Worse, the Court considered' itself just on stand-
by, waiting and willing to act as a substitute in case Congress "defaults." We, therefore, hold that the Court can simultaneously exercise its power of
review with, and independently from, the power to revoke by Congress.
Among the three extraordinary powers, the calling out power is the most benign and involves ordinary police action. The President may resort to this
extraordinary power whenever it becomes necessary to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. "[T]he power to call is fully
discretionary to the President;" the only limitations being that he acts within permissible constitutional boundaries or in a manner not constituting grave
abuse of discretion. In fact, "the actual use to which the President puts the armed forces is xx x not subject to judicial review." The extraordinary
powers of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and/or declaring martial law may be exercised only when there is actual invasion or
rebellion, and public safety requires it. The 1987 Constitution imposed the following limits in the exercise of these powers: "(1) a time limit of sixty days;
(2) review and possible revocation by Congress; [and] (3) review and possible nullification by the Supreme Court.

A state of martial law is peculiar because the President, at such a time, exercises police power, which is normally a function of the Legislature. In
particular, the President exercises police power, with the militarys assistance, to ensure public safety and in place of government agenci5s which for the
time being are unable to cope with the condition in a locality, which remains under the control of the State. In David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, the
Court, quoting Justice Mendoza stated that under a valid declaration of martial law, the President as Commander-in-Chief may order the "(a) arrests and
seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies; (c) [takeover] of news media and agencies and press censorship; and ( d) issuance of
Presidential Decrees. Worthy to note, however, that the above-cited acts that the President may perform do not give him unbridled discretion to infringe
on the rights of civilians during martial law. This is because martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution; neither does it supplant the
operation of civil courts or legislative assemblies. Moreover, the guarantees under the Bill of Rights remain in place during its pendency. And in such
instance where the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is also suspended, such suspension applies only to those judicially charged with rebellion or
offense connected with invasion.

It must be stressed, however, that the graduation refers only to hierarchy based on scope and effect. It does not in any manner refer to a sequence,
arrangement, or order which the Commander-in-Chief must follow. This so called "graduation of powers" does not dictate or restrict the manner by
which the President decides which power to choose. The power to choose, initially, which among these extraordinary powers to wield in a given set of
conditions is a judgment call on the part of the President. The Congress and the Court must necessarily refrain from calibrating the President's decision
of which among his extraordinary powers to avail given a certain situation or condition.

Even the recommendation of, or consultation with, the Secretary of National Defense, or other high-ranking military officials, is not a condition for the
President to declare martial law. A plain reading of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution shows that the President's power to declare martial law is
not subject to any condition except for the requirements of actual invasion or rebellion and that public safety requires it.

It must be stressed that prior to Proclamation No. 216 or the declaration of martial law on May 23, 201 7, the President had already issued Proclamation
No. 55 on September 4, 2016, declaring a state of national emergency on account of lawless violence in Mindanao. This, in fact, is extant in the first
Whereas Clause of Proclamation No. 216. Based on the foregoing presidential actions, it can be gleaned that although there is no obligation or
requirement on his part to use his extraordinary powers on a graduated or sequential basis, still the President made the conscious and deliberate effort
to first employ the most benign from among his extraordinary powers. As the initial and preliminary step towards suppressing and preventing the armed
hostilities in Mindanao, the President decided to use his calling out power first. Unfortunately, the situation did not improve; on the contrary, it only
worsened. Thus, exercising his sole and exclusive prerogative, the President decided to impose martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus on the belief that the armed hostilities in Mindanao already amount to actual rebellion and public safety requires it.

The Court's ruling in these cases will not, in any way, affect the! President's declaration of a state of national emergency on account of1 lawless violence
in Mindanao through Proclamation No. 55 dated September 4, 2016. The President's calling out power is in a different category from the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to declare martial law. In other words, the President may exercise the power to call
out the Armed Forces independently of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and to declare martial law, although, of course,
it may also be a prelude to a possible future exercise of the latter powers, as in this case.

The phrase "sufficiency of factual basis" in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution should be understood as the only test for judicial review of the
President's power to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. The
Court does not need to satisfy itself that the President's decision is correct, rather it only needs to determine whether the President's decision had
sufficient factual bases. We conclude, therefore, that Section 18, Article VII limits the scope of judicial review by the introduction of the "sufficiency of
the factual basis" test. As Commander-in-Chief, the President has the sole discretion to declare martial law and/or to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, subject to the revocation of Congress and the review of this Court. Since the exercise of these powers is a judgment call of the
President, the determination of this Court as to whether there is sufficient factual basis for the exercise of such, must be based only on facts or
information known by or available to the President at the time he made the declaration or suspension which facts or information are found in the
proclamation as well as the written Report submitted by him to Congress.

Section 18, Article VII itself sets the parameters for determining the sufficiency of the factual basis for the declaration of martial law and/or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, "namely (1) actual invasion or rebellion, and (2) public safety requires the exercise of such
power." Without the concurrence of the two conditions, the President's declaration of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus must be struck down. Since the Constitution did not define the term "rebellion," it must be understood to have the same meaning as the
crime of "rebellion" in the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, for rebellion to exist, the following elements must be present, to wit: "(l) there is a (a) public
uprising and (b) taking arms against the Government; and (2) the purpose of the uprising or movement is either (a) to remove from the allegiance to
the Government or its laws: (i) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or (ii) anybody of land, naval, or other armed forces; or (b) to deprive
the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives."

The President deduced from the facts available to him that there was an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was to remove from the
allegiance to the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and to deprive the Chief Executive of any of his powers and prerogative, leading the
President to believe that there was probable cause that the crime of rebellion was and is being committed and that public safety requires the imposition
of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. A review of the aforesaid facts similarly leads the Court to conclude that the
President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual ' bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The President's conclusion, that
there was an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was the removal from the allegiance of the Philippine Government a portion of its
territory and the deprivation of the President from performing his powers and prerogatives, was reached after a tactical consideration of the facts. In
fine, the President satisfactorily discharged his burden of proof. After all, what the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable cause for a
valid declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution states that "[i]n case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, [the President] may x x x
suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law." Clearly, the Constitution grants to the
President the discretion to determine the territorial coverage of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. He may put
the entire Philippines or only a part thereof under martial law. This is both an acknowledgement and a recognition that it is the Executive Department,
particularly the President as Commander-in-Chief, who is the repository of vital, classified, and live information necessary for and relevant in calibrating
the territorial application of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It, too, is a concession that the President has
the tactical and military support, and thus has a more informed understanding of what is happening on the ground.

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS sufficient factual bases for the issuance of Proclamation No. 216 and DECLARES it as CONSTITUTIONAL.

G.R. No. 190259 June 7, 2011

DATU ZALDY UY AMPATUAN, ANSARUDDIN ADIONG, REGIE SAHALI-GENERALE vs. HON. RONALDO PUNO, in his capacity as Secretary
of the Department of Interior and Local Government and alter-ego of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and anyone acting in his
stead and on behalf of the President of the Philippines, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP), or any of their units operating in
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, or any of their units operating in ARMM

Petitioners contend that the President unlawfully exercised emergency powers when she ordered the deployment of AFP and PNP personnel in the
places mentioned in the proclamation. But such deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood under Section 23 (2), Article
VI of the Constitution, which provides: SECTION 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law
enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence
in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same.

While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the Presidents exercise of the above power, it would generally defer to her
judgment on the matter. As the Court acknowledged in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, it is clearly to the President that the
Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence. Unless it is shown that
such determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court will accord respect to the Presidents judgment. If the petitioner fails, by way
of proof, to support the assertion that the President acted without factual basis, then this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond
the pleadings. The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since matters
considered for satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are not always accessible to the courts.

On the other hand, the President, as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be classified as
highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in
emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military to prevent or
suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all.

Here, petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state of emergency in the Provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City, as well
as the Presidents exercise of the "calling out" power had no factual basis. But, apart from the fact that there was no such take over to begin with, the
OSG also had clearly explained the factual bases for the Presidents decision to call out the armed forces. Since petitioners are not able to demonstrate
that the proclamation of state of emergency in the subject places and the calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence there
have clearly no factual bases, the Court must respect the Presidents actions.

G.R. No. 190293 March 20, 2012

PHILIP SIGFRID A. FORTUN and ALBERT LEE G. ANGELES vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, as Commander-in-Chief and President of
the Republic of the Philippines, EDUARDO ERMITA, Executive Secretary, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP), or any of their
units, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP), or any of their units, JOHN DOES and JANE DOES acting under their direction and control

The issue of the constitutionality of Proclamation 1959 is not unavoidable for two reasons:

One. President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus before the joint houses of
Congress could fulfill their automatic duty to review and validate or invalidate the same. Although Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution vests
in the President the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, he shares such power with the Congress. Thus:

1. The Presidents proclamation or suspension is temporary, good for only 60 days;

2. He must, within 48 hours of the proclamation or suspension, report his action in person or in writing to Congress;

3. Both houses of Congress, if not in session must jointly convene within 24 hours of the proclamation or suspension for the purpose of
reviewing its validity; and

4. The Congress, voting jointly, may revoke or affirm the Presidents proclamation or suspension, allow their limited effectivity to lapse, or
extend the same if Congress deems warranted.

The President and the Congress exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after the President has initiated the proclamation
or the suspension, only the Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the situation on the ground, a power that the President
does not have.Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is automatic
rather than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through such review should the Supreme Court step in
as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the Presidents proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political
question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court.

Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of Congress, which had in fact convened, could act on the same.
Consequently, the petitions in these cases have become moot and the Court has nothing to review.

Two. Since President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in just eight days,
they have not been meaningfully implemented. The military did not take over the operation and control of local government units in Maguindanao. The
President did not issue any law or decree affecting Maguindanao that should ordinarily be enacted by Congress. No indiscriminate mass arrest had been
reported. Those who were arrested during the period were either released or promptly charged in court. Indeed, no petition for habeas corpus had been
filed with the Court respecting arrests made in those eight days.

The Court has not bothered to examine the evidence upon which President Arroyo acted in issuing Proclamation 1959, precisely because it felt no need
to, the proclamation having been withdrawn within a few days of its issuance.

Justice Antonio T. Carpio points out in his dissenting opinion the finding of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City that no probable cause exist
that the accused before it committed rebellion in Maguindanao since the prosecution failed to establish the elements of the crime. But the Court cannot
use such finding as basis for striking down the Presidents proclamation and suspension. For, firstly, the Court did not delegate and could not delegate
to the RTC of Quezon City its power to determine the factual basis for the presidential proclamation and suspension. Secondly, there is no showing that
the RTC of Quezon City passed upon the same evidence that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, had in her possession when
she issued the proclamation and suspension.
Notably, under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the Court has only 30 days from the filing of an appropriate proceeding to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. More than two years
have passed since petitioners filed the present actions to annul Proclamation 1959. When the Court did not decide it then, it actually opted for a default
as was its duty, the question having become moot and academic.

G.R. No. 170165 August 15, 2006

B/GEN. (RET.) FRANCISCO V. GUDANI AND LT. COL. ALEXANDER F. BALUTAN vs. LT./GEN. GENEROSO S. SENGA CORONA, AS CHIEF
OF STAFF OF THE CARPIO-MORALES, ARMED FORCES OF THE CALLEJO, SR., PHILIPPINES, COL. GILBERTO AZCUNA, JOSE C. ROA AS
THE PRE-TRIAL TINGA, INVESTIGATING OFFICER, THE CHICO-NAZARIO, PROVOST MARSHALL GENERAL GARCIA, and OF THE ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL

Petitioners wish to see annulled the "gag order" that required them to secure presidential consent prior to their appearance before the Senate, claiming
that it violates the constitutional right to information and transparency in matters of public concern; or if not, is tantamount at least to the criminal acts
of obstruction of justice and grave coercion.

The commander-in-chief provision in the Constitution is denominated as Section 18, Article VII, which begins with the simple declaration that "[t]he
President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines x x x" Outside explicit constitutional limitations, such as those found in
Section 5, Article XVI, the commander-in-chief clause vests on the President, as commander-in-chief, absolute authority over the persons and actions of
the members of the armed forces. Such authority includes the ability of the President to restrict the travel, movement and speech of military officers,
activities which may otherwise be sanctioned under civilian law.

It cannot be gainsaid that certain liberties of persons in the military service, including the freedom of speech, may be circumscribed
by rules of military discipline. Thus, to a certain degree, individual rights may be curtailed, because the effectiveness of the military in
fulfilling its duties under the law depends to a large extent on the maintenance of discipline within its ranks. Hence, lawful orders
must be followed without question and rules must be faithfully complied with, irrespective of a soldier's personal views on the
matter.

The necessity of upholding the ability to restrain speech becomes even more imperative if the soldier desires to speak freely on political matters. The
Constitution requires that "[t]he armed forces shall be insulated from partisan politics," and that [n]o member of the military shall engage directly or
indirectly in any partisan political activity, except to vote." Soldiers are constitutionally obliged to obey a President they may dislike or distrust. This
fundamental principle averts the country from going the way of banana republics.

We have to consider the question: may the President prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before a legislative inquiry? We hold that
the President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who
defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, we also hold that any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it
of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom
Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be
commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which
the President has the duty to faithfully execute.

As earlier noted, we ruled in Senate that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior consent on executive officials summoned by the
legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed that the
privilege must be formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying
before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executives power as commander-in-chief to control the
actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The Presidents prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the
same limitations as in executive privilege. The exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command mandate that the Presidents ability to
control the individual members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between obeying the President and
obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is
the President, and not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

If the President or the Chief of Staff refuses to allow a member of the AFP to appear before Congress, the legislative body seeking such testimony may
seek judicial relief to compel the attendance. And once the courts speak with finality, both branches of government have no option but to comply with
the decision of the courts, whether the effect of the decision is to their liking or disfavor.

G.R. No. 183591 October 14, 2008

THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, ET AL. vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON
ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP), ET AL.

Whether the President herself may exercise the power delegated to the GRP Peace Panel under E.O. No. 3, Sec. 4(a).

The President cannot delegate a power that she herself does not possess. May the President, in the course of peace negotiations, agree to pursue
reforms that would require new legislation and constitutional amendments, or should the reforms be restricted only to those solutions which the present
laws allow?

That the authority of the President to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution does not mean that
she has no such authority. The President is vested with unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and
which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are
expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. Similarly, the
Presidents power to conduct peace negotiations is implicitly included in her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief.

The President may not, of course, unilaterally implement the solutions that she considers viable, but she may not be prevented from submitting them as
recommendations to Congress, which could then, if it is minded, act upon them pursuant to the legal procedures for constitutional amendment and
revision. While the President does not possess constituent powers as those powers may be exercised only by Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or
the people through initiative and referendum she may submit proposals for constitutional change to Congress in a manner that does not involve the
arrogation of constituent powers.

From the foregoing discussion, the principle may be inferred that the President in the course of conducting peace negotiations may validly consider
implementing even those policies that require changes to the Constitution, but she may not unilaterally implement them without the intervention of
Congress, or act in any way as if the assent of that body were assumed as a certainty . Given the limited nature of the Presidents authority to
propose constitutional amendments, she cannot guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even
be submitted to a plebiscite.

G.R. No. 159618 February 1, 2011

BAYAN MUNA, as represented by Rep. SATUR OCAMPO, Rep. CRISPIN BELTRAN, and Rep. LIZA L. MAZA vs. ALBERTO ROMULO, in his
capacity as Executive Secretary, and BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs

Validity of the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement

Petitioners initial challenge against the Agreement relates to form, its threshold posture being that E/N BFO-028-03 cannot be a valid medium for
concluding the Agreement.

The terms "exchange of notes" and "executive agreements" have been used interchangeably, exchange of notes being considered a form of executive
agreement that becomes binding through executive action. On the other hand, executive agreements concluded by the President "sometimes take the
form of exchange of notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated agreements or protocols." It is fairly clear from the
foregoing disquisition that E/N BFO-028-03be it viewed as the Non-Surrender Agreement itself, or as an integral instrument of acceptance thereof or
as consent to be boundis a recognized mode of concluding a legally binding international written contract among nations.

Senate Concurrence Not Required

Petitioner parlays the notion that the Agreement is of dubious validity, partaking as it does of the nature of a treaty; hence, it must be duly concurred in
by the Senate.

There are no hard and fast rules on the propriety of entering, on a given subject, into a treaty or an executive agreement as an instrument of
international relations. The primary consideration in the choice of the form of agreement is the parties intent and desire to craft an international
agreement in the form they so wish to further their respective interests. Verily, the matter of form takes a back seat when it comes to effectiveness and
binding effect of the enforcement of a treaty or an executive agreement, as the parties in either international agreement each labor under the pacta
sunt servanda principle.

But over and above the foregoing considerations is the fact thatsave for the situation and matters contemplated in Sec. 25, Art. XVIII of the
Constitutionwhen a treaty is required, the Constitution does not classify any subject, like that involving political issues, to be in the form of, and
ratified as, a treaty. What the Constitution merely prescribes is that treaties need the concurrence of the Senate by a vote defined therein to complete
the ratification process.

Considering the above discussion, the Court need not belabor the issue raised, referring to the validity and effectivity of the Agreement without the
concurrence by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate. The Court has, in Eastern Sea Trading,48 as reiterated in Bayan, given recognition
to the obligatory effect of executive agreements without the concurrence of the Senate: x x x [T]he right of the Executive to enter into binding
agreements without the necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our history, we
have entered executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular relations, most favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark
and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims. The validity of these has never been seriously questioned by
our courts.

No Grave Abuse of Discretion

Petitioner would argue that the non-surrender agreement was executed by the President, thru the DFA Secretary, in grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioner virtually faults the President for performing, through respondents, a task conferred the President by the Constitutionthe power to enter into
international agreements.

By constitutional fiat and by the nature of his or her office, the President, as head of state and government, is the sole organ and authority in the
external affairs of the country. The Constitution vests in the President the power to enter into international agreements, subject, in appropriate cases, to
the required concurrence votes of the Senate. But as earlier indicated, executive agreements may be validly entered into without such concurrence. As
the President wields vast powers and influence, her conduct in the external affairs of the nation is, as Bayan would put it, "executive altogether." The
right of the President to enter into or ratify binding executive agreements has been confirmed by long practice.

In thus agreeing to conclude the Agreement thru E/N BFO-028-03, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, represented by the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, acted within the scope of the authority and discretion vested in her by the Constitution. At the end of the day, the Presidentby ratifying, thru
her deputies, the non-surrender agreementdid nothing more than discharge a constitutional duty and exercise a prerogative that pertains to her
office.

G.R. No. 106064 October 13, 2005

SPOUSES RENATO CONSTANTINO JR. and LOURDES CONSTANTINO and Their Minor Children RENATO, REDENTOR, ANNA
MARIKA LISSA, NINA ELISA, and ANNA KARMINA; FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION; and FILOMENO STA. ANA III v. The Hon. JOSE
B. CUISIA, in His Capacity as Governor of the Central Bank; The Hon. RAMON DEL ROSARIO, in His Capacity as Secretary of Finance;
The Hon. EMMANUEL V. PELAEZ, in His Capacity as Philippine Debt Negotiating Panel Chairman; and the NATIONAL TREASURER

The Financing Program extinguished portions of the countrys pre-existing loans through either debt buyback or bond-conversion. The buyback
approach essentially pre-terminated portions of public debts while the bond-conversion scheme extinguished public debts through the obtention of a
new loan by virtue of a sovereign bond issuance, the proceeds of which in turn were used for terminating the original loan.

First Issue: The Scope of Section 20, Article VII

For their first constitutional argument, petitioners submit that the buyback and bond-conversion schemes do not constitute the loan contract or
guarantee contemplated in Sec. 20, Art. VII of the Constitution and are consequently prohibited.

On Bond-conversion

Loans are transactions wherein the owner of a property allows another party to use the property and where customarily, the latter promises to return
the property after a specified period with payment for its use, called interest. On the other hand, bonds are interest-bearing or discounted government
or corporate securities that obligate the issuer to pay the bondholder a specified sum of money, usually at specific intervals, and to repay the principal
amount of the loan at maturity.

The language of the Constitution is simple and clear as it is broad. It allows the President to contract and guarantee foreign loans. It makes no
prohibition on the issuance of certain kinds of loans or distinctions as to which kinds of debt instruments are more onerous than others. The only
restriction that the Constitution provides, aside from the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, is that the loans must be subject to limitations
provided by law. In this regard, we note that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 245 as amended by Pres. Decree (P.D.) No. 142, s. 1973, entitled An Act
Authorizing the Secretary of Finance to Borrow to Meet Public Expenditures Authorized by Law, and for Other Purposes , allows foreign loans to be
contracted in the form of, inter alia, bonds.

Petitioners, however, point out that a supposed difference between contracting a loan and issuing bonds is that the former creates a definite creditor-
debtor relationship between the parties while the latter does not. They explain that a contract of loan enables the debtor to restructure or novate the
loan, which benefit is lost upon the conversion of the debts to bearer bonds such that the Philippines surrenders the novatable character of a loan
contract for the irrevocable and unpostponable demandability of a bearer bond. Allegedly, the Constitution prohibits the President from issuing bonds
which are far more onerous than loans.

This line of thinking is flawed to say the least. The negotiable character of the subject bonds is not mutually exclusive with the Republics freedom to
negotiate with bondholders for the revision of the terms of the debt. Moreover, the securities market provides some flexibility if the Philippines wants to
pay in advance, it can buy out its bonds in the market; if interest rates go down but the Philippines does not have money to retire the bonds, it can
replace the old bonds with new ones; if it defaults on the bonds, the bondholders shall organize and bring about a re-negotiation or settlement. In fact,
several countries have restructured their sovereign bonds in view either of inability and/or unwillingness to pay the indebtedness. Petitioners have not
presented a plausible reason that would preclude the Philippines from acting in a similar fashion, should it so opt.

On the Buyback Scheme

In their Comment, petitioners assert that the power to pay public debts lies with Congress and was deliberately withheld by the Constitution from the
President. It is true that in the balance of power between the three branches of government, it is Congress that manages the countrys coffers by virtue
of its taxing and spending powers. However, the law-making authority has promulgated a law ordaining an automatic appropriations provision for debt
servicing by virtue of which the President is empowered to execute debt payments without the need for further appropriations.

Debt service is not included in the General Appropriation Act, since authorization therefor already exists under RA Nos. 4860 and 245, as amended, and
PD 1967. Precisely in the light of this subsisting authorization as embodied in said Republic Acts and PD for debt service, Congress does not concern
itself with details for implementation by the Executive, but largely with annual levels and approval thereof upon due deliberations as part of the whole
obligation program for the year. Upon such approval, Congress has spoken and cannot be said to have delegated its wisdom to the Executive, on whose
part lies the implementation or execution of the legislative wisdom. Specific legal authority for the buyback of loans is established under Section 2 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 240, which specifically allow the President to pre-terminate debts without further action from Congress.

Petitioners claim that the buyback scheme is neither a guarantee nor a loan since its underlying intent is to extinguish debts that are not yet due and
demandable. Thus, they suggest that contracts entered pursuant to the buyback scheme are unconstitutional for not being among those contemplated
in Sec. 20, Art. VII of the Constitution. Buyback is a necessary power which springs from the grant of the foreign borrowing power. The President is not
empowered to borrow money from foreign banks and governments on the credit of the Republic only to be left bereft of authority to implement the
payment despite appropriations therefor. It is inescapable from the standpoint of reason and necessity that the authority to contract foreign loans and
guarantees without restrictions on payment or manner thereof coupled with the availability of the corresponding appropriations, must include the power
to effect payments or to make payments unavailing by either restructuring the loans or even refusing to make any payment altogether.

Second Issue: Delegation of Power

Petitioners stress that unlike other powers which may be validly delegated by the President, the power to incur foreign debts is expressly reserved by
the Constitution in the person of the President. They submit that the requirement of prior concurrence of an entity specifically named by the
Constitution the Monetary Board reinforces the submission that not respondents but the President alone and personally can validly bind the country.

Petitioners position is negated both by explicit constitutional and legal imprimaturs, as well as the doctrine of qualified political agency. The evident
exigency of having the Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the President to execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the fact
that the process of establishing and executing a strategy for managing the governments debt is deep within the realm of the expertise of the
Department of Finance, primed as it is to raise the required amount of funding, achieve its risk and cost objectives, and meet any other sovereign debt
management goals.

As it was, the backdrop consisted of a major policy determination made by then President Aquino that sovereign debts have to be respected and the
concomitant reality that the Philippines did not have enough funds to pay the debts. Inevitably, it fell upon the Secretary of Finance, as the alter ego of
the President regarding the sound and efficient management of the financial resources of the Government, to formulate a scheme for the
implementation of the policy publicly expressed by the President herself.

There are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no amount
of approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, in his power to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus and proclaim martial law (PAR. 3, SEC. 11, Art. VII) and the exercise by him of the benign prerogative of mercy (par. 6, sec. 11,
idem). We cannot conclude that the power of the President to contract or guarantee foreign debts falls within the same exceptional class. Indubitably,
the decision to contract or guarantee foreign debts is of vital public interest, but only akin to any contractual obligation undertaken by the sovereign,
which arises not from any extraordinary incident, but from the established functions of governance.

G.R. No. 103567 December 4, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FRANCISCO SALLE, JR. Y GERCILLA @ "KA NONOY," RICKY MENGOTE Y CUNTADO @ "KA RICKY/KA
LIZA/KA JUN," and TEN JOHN DOES

Section 19, Article VII thereof reads as follows: Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the power to grant
amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.

No pardon may be extended before a judgment of conviction becomes final. A judgment of conviction becomes final (a) when no appeal is seasonably
perfected, (b) when the accused commences to serve the sentence, (c) when the right to appeal is expressly waived in writing, except where the death
penalty was imposed by the trial court, and (d) when the accused applies for probation, thereby waiving his right to appeal. Where the judgment of
conviction is still pending appeal and has not yet therefore attained finality, as in the instant case, executive clemency may not yet be granted to the
appellant.

The reason the Constitutional Commission adopted the "conviction by final judgment" requirement is to prevent the President from exercising executive
power in derogation of the judicial power. Hence, before an appellant may be validly granted pardon, he must first ask for the withdrawal of his
appeal, i.e., the appealed conviction must first be brought to finality. And now on the instant case, considering that appellant has not filed a motion to
withdraw his appeal up to this date the conditional pardon extended to him should not have been enforced.

G.R. No. 92013 July 25, 1990

SALVADOR H. LAUREL vs. RAMON GARCIA, as head of the Asset Privatization Trust, RAUL MANGLAPUS, as Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, and CATALINO MACARAIG, as Executive Secretary

There is no question that the Roppongi property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the authority of the respondent officials to validly dispose of
property belonging to the State.

The subsequent approval on October 4, 1988 by President Aquino of the recommendation by the investigating committee to sell the Roppongi property
was premature or, at the very least, conditioned on a valid change in the public character of the Roppongi property. Moreover, the approval does not
have the force and effect of law since the President already lost her legislative powers. The Congress had already convened for more than a year.
Assuming for the sake of argument, however, that the Roppongi property is no longer of public dominion, there is another obstacle to its sale by the
respondents.

There is no law authorizing its conveyance.

Section 79 (f) of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 provides

Section 79 (f ) Conveyances and contracts to which the Government is a party. In cases in which the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines is a party to any deed or other instrument conveying the title to real estate or to any other property the value of
which is in excess of one hundred thousand pesos, the respective Department Secretary shall prepare the necessary papers which,
together with the proper recommendations, shall be submitted to the Congress of the Philippines for approval by the
same. Such deed, instrument, or contract shall be executed and signed by the President of the Philippines on behalf of the
Government of the Philippines unless the Government of the Philippines unless the authority therefor be expressly vested by law in
another officer. (Emphasis supplied)

The requirement has been retained in Section 48, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292).

SEC. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real property of the Government is authorized by law to be
conveyed, the deed of conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the government by the following:

(1) For property belonging to and titled in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, by the President, unless the authority
therefor is expressly vested by law in another officer.

(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines but titled in the name of any political subdivision or of any corporate
agency or instrumentality, by the executive head of the agency or instrumentality. (Emphasis supplied)

It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on his or her own sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and
approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence. It is indeed true that the Roppongi property is valuable
not so much because of the inflated prices fetched by real property in Tokyo but more so because of its symbolic value to all Filipinos veterans and
civilians alike. Whether or not the Roppongi and related properties will eventually be sold is a policy determination where both the President and
Congress must concur. Considering the properties' importance and value, the laws on conversion and disposition of property of public dominion must be
faithfully followed.