De Jesus V Syquia

Nov 28, 1933

Provision:
Art. 21.
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Art. 2176.
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

Facts:
Cesar Syquia, following amorous realtions with Antonia Loanco, fathered a baby boy [Ismael].
Defendant was a constant visitor of Antonia, in the early months of the pregnancy, and in February 1931,
handed a letter to Loanco, directed to the Priest to baptize the child, as follows:
Saturday, 1:30 p. m.
February 14, 1931
Rev. FATHER,
The baby due in June is mine and I should like for my name to be given to it.

Several letters followed the above, showing Cesar Syquias interest in the wellbeing of the mother
and the (then unborn) child. After the birth of the first child, Syquia took Antonio, and said child, and lived
together for a year in regular family style; when Antonia began to show signs of a second pregnancy Cesar
Syquia left.
Cesar Syquia is now married to another woman, and his first child with Antonia was christened as
Isamel Loanco.

An action was instituted in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila by Antonia Loanco de Jesus,
representing her Children, Ismael and Pacita Loanco, asking said court to compel defendant Cesar Syquia
to:
1. pay damages (30,000 pesos) for a breach of a marriage promise with plaintiff Antonia Loanco
De Jesus
2. recognize Ismael and Pacita Loanco as his Natural Children with Antonia Loanco
3. pay for the maintenance of the three Loancos, at a rate of 500 pesos a month
 CFI Manila responded, decree requiring the defendant to recognize Ismael Loanco as his natural
child and to pay maintenance for him at the rate of fifty pesos per month, with costs, dismissing the action
in other respects.

Issue:
1. The first question that is whether the note to the padre, quoted above, in connection with the
letters written by the defendant to the mother during pregnancy, proves an acknowledgment of
paternity,
2. The second question is whether the trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been
in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child
3. Whether Antonia is entitled to damages for the alleged breach of promise to marry.

Held:

1. Yes, the acknowledgment thus shown is sufficient.

Recognition can be made out by putting together the admissions of more than one
document, supplementing the admission made in one letter by an admission or admissions
made in another.
In the case before us the admission of paternity is contained in the note to the padre
and the other letters suffice to connect that admission with the child then being carried by
Antonia L. de Jesus. There is no requirement in the law that the writing shall be addressed
to one, or any particular individual.
It is merely required that the writing shall be indubitable.
2. No, the lower court did not err in determining Ismael Loancos status.

The facts already stated are sufficient, in our opinion, to justify the conclusion of
the trial court on this point.

The defendant had acknowledged this child in writings above referred to must
be taken in connection with the facts found by the court upon the second point.

It is undeniable that from the birth of this child the defendant supplied a home for
it and the mother, in which they lived together with the defendant. This situation continued
for about a year, and until Antonia became enciente a second time, when the idea entered
the defendant's head of abandoning her.
 3. Antonia is NOT entitled to damages relating to the breach of promise to marry.

Such promise is not satisfactorily proved, and we may add that the action for
breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to
recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise.

Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment could be based requiring

the defendant to recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco.

Analysis:

Only Art 21 applies to the instant case for there exists no law that explicitly penalizes the breach
of a promise to marry, specifically. As such, compensation is the only available relief for Petitioner-
Appellant Antonia.