G.R. No. 80508 January 30, 1990 2. June l9, 1987 at about l0:00 PM in Mata Street, Panday Manila.
PM in Mata Street, Panday Manila. Most of them are in civilian
EDDIE GUAZON, JOSEFINA CABRERA, YOLANDA DACUNES,
VIOLETA SEVILLA, QUERUBIN BILLONES, ESTELITA
BILLONES, GORGONIA MACARAEG, LAUREANA JOAQUIN,
CRESTITA LICUP, SOLIDAD ABURDO, ROSALINA VILLARDA,
CONRADA HOBALANE, ERLINDA RESTORAN, VERIDIAN
FLORA, ROSELA CONDE, SOSIMA COSTO, JOSEFINA
ALDIANO, ROSALINA DOMINGO, ARESTIO YANGA,
MILAGROS GONZALES, ESTRELITA ESTARES, BONIFACIA
ANTIVO, PATRIA VALLES, ERLINDA LEE, MELANIO
GAROFIL, ERIBERTO MATEO, FRANCISCO HORTILLANO,
ANATALIA PESIMO, LOSENDO GARBO, VIRGINIA LORESTO,
LYDIA ELA, RAFAEL VILLABRILLE, MA. RECHILDA
SABALZA, EDITHA MAAMO, ELENIETA BANOSA,
ALEXANDER LABADO, ANDREW GO, WYNEFREDO REYES,
ROSARIO SESPENE, ROSA MARTIN and JAIME
BONGAT, petitioners,
vs.
MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER
AGUIRRE, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN.
ALFREDO LIM, and COL. JESUS GARCIA, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction
to prohibit the military and police officers represented by
public respondents from conducting "Areal Target Zonings"
or "Saturation Drives" in Metro Manila.
The forty one (41) petitioners state that they are all of
legal age, bona fide residents of Metro Manila and
taxpayers and leaders in their respective communities.
They maintain that they have a common or general interest
in the preservation of the rule of law, protection of their
human rights and the reign of peace and order in their
communities. They claim to represent "the citizens of
Metro Manila who have similar interests and are so
numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before
this Court."
The public respondents, represented by the Solicitor
General, oppose the petition contending inter alia that
petitioners lack standing to file the instant petition for
they are not the proper parties to institute the action.
According to the petitioners, the following "saturation
drives" were conducted in Metro Manila:
1. March 5, 1987 at about 9:30 PM in Tindalo, Kagitingan,
and Magdalena Streets, Tondo, Manila.
Pira Extension and San Sebastian Street, Tondo, Manila.
3. July 20, 1987 at about 8:00 AM in Bangkusay Street,
Tondo, Manila.
4. August 11 to l3, 1987 between 11:00 PM and 2:00 AM in
six blocks along Aroma Beach up to Happy Land, Magsaysay
Village, Tondo, Manila.
5. August 19, 1987 at 9:00 PM in Herbosa Extension, Quirino
Street, and Pacheco Street, Tondo, Manila.
6. August 28, 1987 at l0:30 PM, in Block 34, Dagat-dagatan
Navotas, Metro Manila.
7. August 30, 1987 at 9:30 PM at Paraiso Extension,
Magsaysay Village, Tondo, Manila.
8. October 12, 1987 at 12:00 midnight in Apelo Cruz
Compound, Quezon City.
9. October 17, 1987 at 11:00 PM in Quirino Street, Tondo,
Manila.
10. October 23, 1987 at 2:30 A.M. in Sun Valley Drive,
Manila International Airport, Pasay City.
11. November 1, 1987 at 4:00 A.M. in Cordillera Street, Sta.
Mesa, Manila.
12. November 3, 1987 at 5:00 A.M. in Lower Maricaban,
Pasay City, Metro Manila.
According to the petitioners, the "areal target zonings" or
saturation drives" are in critical areas pinpointed by the
military and police as places where the subversives are
hiding. The arrests range from seven (7) persons during the
July 20 saturation drive in Bangkusay, Tondo to one
thousand five hundred (1,500) allegedly apprehended on
November 3 during the drive at Lower Maricaban, Pasay
City. The petitioners claim that the saturation drives follow
a common pattern of human rights abuses. In all these
drives, it is alleged that the following were committed:
1. Having no specific target house in
mind, in the dead of the night or early
morning hours, police and military units
without any search warrant or warrant
of arrest cordon an area of more than
one residence and sometimes whole
barangay or areas of barangay in Metro
clothes and without nameplates or
identification cards.
2. These raiders rudely rouse residents
from their sleep by banging on the
walls and windows of their homes,
shouting, kicking their doors open
(destroying some in the process), and
then ordering the residents within to
come out of their respective
residences.
3. The residents at the point of high-
powered guns are herded like cows, the
men are ordered to strip down to their
briefs and examined for tattoo marks
and other imagined marks.
4. While the examination of the bodies
of the men are being conducted by the
raiders, some of the members of the
raiding team force their way into each
and every house within the cordoned
off area and then proceed to conduct
search of the said houses without
civilian witnesses from the
neighborhood.
5. In many instances, many residents
have complained that the raiders
ransack their homes, tossing about the
residents' belongings without total
regard for their value. In several
instances, walls are destroyed, ceilings
are damaged in the raiders' illegal
effort to 'fish' for incriminating
evidence.
6. Some victims of these illegal
operations have complained with
increasing frequency that their money
and valuables have disappeared after
the said operations.
7. All men and some women who
respond to these illegal and unwelcome
intrusions are arrested on the spot and
hauled off to waiting vehicles that take
them to detention centers where they
are interrogated and 'verified.' These
arrests are all conducted without any
warrants of arrest duly issued by a
judge, nor under the conditions that
will authorize warrantless arrest. Some
 hooded men are used to fingerpoint
suspected subversives.
8. In some instances, arrested persons
are released after the expiration of the
period wherein they can be legally
detained without any charge at all. In
other instances, some arrested persons
are released without charge after a few
days of arbitrary detention.
9. The raiders almost always brandish
their weapons and point them at the
residents during these illegal
operations.
10. Many have also reported incidents
of on-the-spotbeatings, maulings and
maltreatment.
11. Those who are detained for further
'verification' by the raiders are
subjected to mental and physical
torture to extract confessions and
tactical information. (Rollo, pp. 2-4)
The public respondents stress two points in their Comment
which was also adopted as their Memorandum after the
petition was given due course.
First, the respondents have legal authority to conduct
saturation drives. And second, they allege that the
accusations of the petitioners about a deliberate disregard
for human rights are total lies.
Insofar as the legal basis for saturation drives is concerned,
the respondents cite Article VII, Section 17 of the
Constitution which provides:
The President shall have control of all
the executive departments, bureaus
and offices. He shall ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed. (Emphasis
supplied )
They also cite Section 18 of the same Article which
provides:
The President shall be the Commander-
in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. ...
There can be no question that under ordinary
circumstances, the police action of the nature described by
the petitioners would be illegal and blantantly violative of
the express guarantees of the Bill of Rights. If the military
and the police must conduct concerted campaigns to flush
out and catch criminal elements, such drives must be
consistent with the constitutional and statutory rights of all
the people affected by such actions.
There is, of course, nothing in the Constitution which
denies the authority of the Chief Executive, invoked by the
Solicitor General, to order police actions to stop unabated
criminality, rising lawlessness, and alarming communist
activities. The Constitution grants to Government the
power to seek and cripple subversive movements which
would bring down constituted authority and substitute a
regime where individual liberties are suppressed as a
matter of policy in the name of security of the State.
However, all police actions are governed by the limitations
of the Bill of Rights. The Government cannot adopt the
same reprehensible methods of authoritarian systems both
of the right and of the left, the enlargement of whose
spheres of influence it is trying hard to suppress. Our
democratic institutions may still be fragile but they are not
in the least bit strengthened through violations of the
constitutional protections which are their distinguishing
features.
In Roan v. Gonzales (145 SCRA 687; 690-691 [1986]), the
Court stated:
One of the most precious rights of the
citizen in a free society is the right to
be left alone in the privacy of his own
house. That right has ancient roots,
dating back through the mists of history
to the mighty English kings in their
fortresses of power. Even then, the
lowly subject had his own castle where
he was monarch of all he surveyed.
This was his humble cottage from which
he could bar his sovereign lord and all
the forces of the Crown.
That right has endured through the
ages albeit only in a few libertarian
regimes. Their number, regrettably,
continues to dwindle against the
onslaughts of authoritarianism. We are
among the fortunate few, able again to
enjoy this right after the ordeal of the
past despotism. We must cherish and
protect it all the more now because it
is like a prodigal son returning.
That right is guaranteed in the
following provisions of Article IV of the
1973 Constitution:
SEC. 3. The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall not be
violated, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined
by the judge, or such other responsible
officer as may be authorized by law,
after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
xxx xxx xxx
Only last year, the Court again issued this reminder in 20th
Century Fox Film Corporation v. Court of Appeals (164
SCRA 655; 660- 661 [1988]):
This constitutional right protects a
citizen against wanton and
unreasonable invasion of his privacy
and liberty as to his person, papers and
effects. We have explained in the case
of People vs. Burgos (144 SCRA 1)
citing Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA
345) why the right is so important:
It is deference to one's personality that
lies at the core of this right, but it
could be also looked upon as a
recognition of a constitutionally
protected area, primarily one's home,
but not necessarily thereto confined.
(Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 US 293
[1966]) What is sought to be guarded is
a man's prerogative to choose who is
allowed entry to his residence. In that
haven of refuge, his individuality can
assert itself not only in the choice of
who shall be welcome but likewise in
the kind of objects he wants around
him. There the state, however
powerful, does not as such have access
 except under the circumstances above
noted, for in the traditional
formulation, his house, however
humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed
any unwarranted intrusion by
government, which is called upon to
refrain from any invasion of his
dwelling and to respect the privacies of
his life. (Cf. Schmerber v. California,
384 US 757 [1966], Brennan J. and Boyd
v. United States, 11 6 630 [1886]). In
the same vein, Landynski in his
authoritative work (Search and Seizure
and the Supreme Court [1966]), could
fitly characterize constitutional right as
the embodiment of a spiritual concept:
the belief that to value the privacy of
home and person and to afford its
constitutional protection against the
long reach of government is no less
than to value human dignity, and that
his privacy must not be disturbed
except in case of overriding social
need, and then only under stringent
procedural safeguards. (ibid, p. 74.)
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Rochin
v. California, (342 US 165; 96 L. Ed. 183 [1952])
emphasizes clearly that police actions should not be
characterized by methods that offend a sense of justice.
The court ruled:
Applying these general considerations
to the circumstances of the present
case, we are compelled to conclude
that the proceedings by which this
conviction was obtained do more than
offend some fastidious squeamishness
or private sentimentalism about
combatting crime too energetically.
This is conduct that shocks the
conscience. Illegally breaking into the
privacy of the petitioner, the struggle
to open his mouth and remove what
was there, the forcible extraction of his
stomach's contents this course of
proceeding by agents of government to
obtain evidence is bound to offend
even hardened sensibilities. They are
methods too close to the rack and the
screw to permit of constitutional
differentiation.
It is significant that it is not the police action perse which
is impermissible and which should be prohibited. Rather, it
is the procedure used or in the words of the court, methods
which "offend even hardened sensibilities." In Breithaupt v.
Abram (352 US 432, 1 L. Ed. 2nd 448 [1957]), the same
court validated the use of evidence, in this case blood
samples involuntarily taken from the petitioner, where
there was nothing brutal or offensive in the taking. The
Court stated:
Basically the distinction rests on the
fact that there is nothing 'brutal' or
'offensive' in the taking of a sample of
blood when done, as in this case, under
the protective eye of a physician. To be
sure, the driver here was unconscious
when the blood was taken, but the
absence of conscious consent, without
more, does not necessarily render the
taking a violation of a constitutional
light; and certainly the rest was
administered here would not be
considered offensive by even the most
delicate. Furthermore, due process is
not measured by the yardstick of
personal reaction or the sphygmogram
of the most sensitive person, but by
that whole community sense of
'decency and fairness that has been
woven by common experience into the
fabric of acceptable conduct....
The individual's right to immunity from such invasion of his
body was considered as "far outweighed by the value of its
deterrent effect" on the evil sought to be avoided by the
police action.
It is clear, therefore, that the nature of the affirmative
relief hinges closely on the determination of the exact
facts surrounding a particular case.
The violations of human rights alleged by the petitioners
are serious. If an orderly procedure ascertains their truth,
not only a writ of prohibition but criminal prosecutions
would immediately issue as a matter of course. A persistent
pattern of wholesale and gross abuse of civil liberties, as
alleged in the petition, has no place in civilized society.
On the other hand, according to the respondents, the
statements made by the petitioners are a complete lie.
The Solicitor General argues:
This a complete lie.
Just the contrary, they had been
conducted with due regard to human
rights. Not only that, they were
intelligently and carefully planned
months ahead of the actual operation.
They were executed in coordination
with barangay officials who pleaded
with their constituents to submit
themselves voluntarily for character
and personal verification. Local and
foreign correspondents, who had joined
these operations, witnessed and
recorded the events that transpired
relative thereto. (After Operation
Reports: November 5, 1987, Annex 12;
November 20, 1987, Annex 13;
November 24, 1987, Annex 14). That is
why in all the drives so far conducted,
the alleged victims who numbered
thousands had not themselves
complained.
In her speech during turn-over rites on
January 26, 1987 at Camp Aguinaldo,
President Aquino branded all
accusations of deliberate disregard for
human rights as 'total lies'. Here are
excerpts from her strongest speech yet
in support of the military:
All accusations of a deliberate
disregard for human rights have been
shown- up to be total lies.
...To our soldiers, let me say go out
and fight, fight with every assurance
that I will stand by you through thick
and thin to share the blame, defend
your actions, mourn the losses and
enjoy with you the final victory that I
am certain will be ours.
You and I will see this through
together.
I've sworn to defend and uphold the
Constitution.
We have wasted enough time answering
their barkings for it is still a long way
to lasting peace. . . . The dangers and
hardships to our men in the field are
great enough as it is without having
them distracted by tills worthless
carping at their backs.
 Our counter-insurgency policy remains
the same: economic development to
pull out the roots-and military
operations to slash the growth of the
insurgency.
The answer to terror is force now.
Only feats of arms can buy us the time
needed to make our economic and
social initiatives bear fruit. . . Now that
the extreme Right has been defeated, I
expect greater vigor in the prosecution
of the war against the communist
insurgency, even as we continue to
watch our backs against attacks from
the Right. (Philippine Star, January 27,
1988, p. 1, Annex 15; emphasis
supplied)
Viewed in the light of President
Aquino's observation on the matter, it
can be said that petitioners
misrepresent as human rights violations
the military and police's zealous
vigilance over the people's right to live
in peace and safety. (Rollo, pp. 36-38)
Herein lies the problem of the Court. We can only guess the
truth. Everything before us consists of allegations.
According to the petitioners, more than 3,407 persons were
arrested in the saturation drives covered by the petition.
No estimates are given for the drives in Block 34, Dagat-
dagatan, Navotas; Apelo Cruz Compound, Pasig; and Sun
Valley Drive near the Manila International Airport area. Not
one of the several thousand persons treated in the illegal
and inhuman manner described by the petitioners appears
as a petitioner or has come before a trial court to present
the kind of evidence admissible in courts of justice.
Moreover, there must have been tens of thousands of
nearby residents who were inconvenienced in addition to
the several thousand allegedly arrested. None of those
arrested has apparently been charged and none of those
affected has apparently complained.
A particularly intriguing aspect of the Solicitor General's
comments is the statement that local and foreign co-
respondents actually joined the saturation drives and
witnessed and recorded the events. In other words, the
activities sought to be completely proscribed were in full
view of media. The sight of hooded men allegedly being
used to fingerpoint suspected subversives would have been
good television copy. If true, this was probably effected
away from the ubiquitous eye of the TV cameras or, as the
Solicitor General contends, the allegation is a "complete
lie."
abuses. However, the remedy is not to stop all police
The latest attempt to stage a coup d'etat where several
thousand members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
sought to overthrow the present Government introduces
another aspect of the problem and illustrates quite clearly
why those directly affected by human rights violations
should be the ones to institute court actions and why
evidence of what actually transpired should first be
developed before petitions are filed with this Court.
Where there is large scale mutiny or actual rebellion, the
police or military may go in force to the combat areas,
enter affected residences or buildings, round up suspected
rebels and otherwise quell the mutiny or rebellion without
having to secure search warrants and without violating the
Bill of Rights. This is exactly what happened in the White
Plains Subdivision and the commercial center of Makati
during the first week of December, 1989.
The areal target zonings in this petition were intended to
flush out subversives and criminal elements particularly
because of the blatant assassinations of public officers and
police officials by elements supposedly coddled by the
communities where the "drives" were conducted.
It is clear from the pleadings of both petitioners and
respondents, however, that there was no rebellion or
criminal activity similar to that of the attempted coup d'
etats. There appears to have been no impediment to
securing search warrants or warrants of arrest before any
houses were searched or individuals roused from sleep
were arrested. There is no strong showing that the
objectives sought to be attained by the "areal zoning" could
not be achieved even as the rights of squatter and low
income families are fully protected.
Where a violation of human rights specifically guaranteed
by the Constitution is involved, it is the duty of the court to
stop the transgression and state where even the awesome
power of the state may not encroach upon the rights of the
individual. It is the duty of the court to take remedial
action even in cases such as the present petition where the
petitioners do not complain that they were victims of the
police actions, where no names of any of the thousands of
alleged victims are given, and where the prayer is a
general one to stop all police "saturation drives," as long as
the Court is convinced that the event actually happened.
The Court believes it highly probable that some violations
were actually committed. This is so inspite of the alleged
pleas of barangay officials for the thousands of residents
"to submit themselves voluntarily for character and
personal verification." We cannot imagine police actions of
the magnitude described in the petitions and admitted by
the respondents, being undertaken without some
undisciplined soldiers and policemen committing certain
actions, including the essential and legitimate ones. We
see nothing wrong in police making their presence visibly
felt in troubled areas. Police cannot respond to riots or
violent demonstrations if they do not move in sufficient
numbers. A show of force is sometimes necessary as long as
the rights of people are protected and not violated. A
blanket prohibition such as that sought by the petitioners
would limit all police actions to one on one confrontations
where search warrants and warrants of arrests against
specific individuals are easily procured. Anarchy may reign
if the military and the police decide to sit down in their
offices because all concerted drives where a show of force
is present are totally prohibited.
The remedy is not an original action for prohibition brought
through a taxpayers' suit. Where not one victim complains
and not one violator is properly charged, the problem is
not initially for the Supreme Court. It is basically one for
the executive departments and for trial courts. Well
meaning citizens with only second hand knowledge of the
events cannot keep on indiscriminately tossing problems of
the executive, the military, and the police to the Supreme
Court as if we are the repository of all remedies for all
evils. The rules of constitutional litigation have been
evolved for an orderly procedure in the vindication of
rights. They should be followed. If our policy makers
sustain the contention of the military and the police that
occasional saturation drives are essential to maintain the
stability of government and to insure peace and order,
clear policy guidelines on the behavior of soldiers and
policemen must not only be evolved, they should also be
enforced. A method of pinpointing human rights abuses and
identifying violators is necessary.
The problem is appropriate for the Commission on Human
Rights. A high level conference should bring together the
heads of the Department of Justice, Department of
National Defense and the operating heads of affected
agencies and institutions to devise procedures for the
prevention of abuses.
Under the circumstances of this taxpayers' suit, there is no
erring soldier or policeman whom we can order prosecuted.
In the absence of clear facts ascertained through an orderly
procedure, no permanent relief can be given at this time.
Further investigation of the petitioners' charges and a hard
look by administration officials at the policy implications of
the prayed for blanket prohibition are also warranted.
In the meantime and in the face of a prima facie showing
that some abuses were probably committed and could be
committed during future police actions, we have to
temporarily restrain the alleged banging on walls, the
kicking in of doors, the herding of half-naked men to
assembly areas for examination of tattoo marks, the
violation of residences even if these are humble shanties of
squatters, and the other alleged acts which are shocking to
the conscience.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby REMANDED to the
Regional Trial Courts of Manila, Malabon, and Pasay City
where the petitioners may present evidence supporting
their allegations and where specific erring parties may be
pinpointed and prosecuted.
Copies of this decision are likewise forwarded to the
Commission on Human Rights, the Secretary of Justice, the
Secretary of National Defense, and the Commanding
General PC-INP for the drawing up and enforcement of
clear guidelines to govern police actions intended to abate
riots and civil disturbances, flush out criminal elements,
and subdue terrorist activities.
In the meantime, the acts violative of human rights
alleged by the petitioners as committed during the police
actions are ENJOINED until such time as permanent rules to
govern such actions are promulgated.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.
Grio-Aquino, J., I join JJ. Cruz, Padilla and Sarmiento's
dissents.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
Mr. Justice Gutierrez and I are kindred spirits and usually
find ourselves together on the side of liberty. It saddens me
that in the case at bar he is on the side of authority.
This is not to say that liberty and authority are
irreconcilable enemies. The two must in fact co-exist, for
only in a well-ordered society can rights be properly The saturation drive is not unfamiliar to us. It is like the
enjoyed. Implicit in that theory, however, is the other "zona" of the Japanese Occupation. An area was surrounded
imperative: that the highest function of authority is to by soldiers and all residents were flushed out of their
insure liberty. houses and lined up, to be looked over by a person with a
bag over his head. This man pointed to suspected
guerrillas, who were immediately arrested and eventually
While acknowledging that the military is conducting the
if not instantly executed.
saturation drives, the majority practically blinks them away
on mere technicalities. First, there are no proper parties.
Second, there is no proof. Therefore, the petition is To be sure, there are some variations now. The most
dismissed. important difference is that it is no longer 1943 and the
belligerent occupation is over. There is no more war. It is
now 1990, when we are supposed to be under a free
The approach is to me too much simplification. We do not
Republic and safeguarded by the Bill of Rights.
choose to see the woods for the trees. The brutal fact is
staring us in the face but we look the other way in search
of excuses. Article III, Section 2, clearly provides:
The majority says it cannot act against the drives because Sec. 2 The right of the people to be
no one directly affected has complained. Such silence, if I secure in their persons, houses, papers,
understand the ponencia correctly, has in effect purged the and effects
drives of all oppressiveness and washed them clean. against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
(The reason for the silence is fear. These raids are
search warrant or warrant of arrest
conducted not in the enclaves of the rich but in the
shall issue except upon probable cause
deprived communities, where the residents have no power
to be determined personally by the
or influence. The parties directly aggrieved are afraid.
judge after examination under oath or
They are the little people. They cannot protest lest they
affirmation of the complainant and the
provoke retaliation for their temerity. Their only hope is in
witnesses he may produce, and
this Court, and we should not deny them that hope.)
particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to
The ruling that the petitioners are not proper parties is a be seized. (Emphasis supplied.)
specious pretext for inaction. We have held that technical
objections may be brushed aside where there are
The provision is intended to protect the individual from
constitutional questions that must be met. There are many
official (and officious) intrusions, no matter how humble
decisions applying this doctrine. (Rodriguez v. Gella, 92
his abode and however lowly his station in life. Against the
Phil. 603; Tolentino v. Commission on Elections, 41 SCRA
mighty forces of the government, the person's house is his
702; Philconsa v. Jimenez, 65 SCRA 479; Edu v. Ericta, 35
castle, his inviolate refuge and exclusive domain where he
SCRA 481; Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 27 SCRA
is the monarch of all he surveys.
835; Lagunsad v. Court of Appeals; 154 SCRA 199; Demetria
v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208). Lozada was in fact an aberration.
Yet in the dead of night, armed soldiers may knock on one's
door and command him at gunpoint to come out so he and
I believe that where liberty is involved, every person is a
his neighbors, who have also been rounded up, can all be
proper party even if he may not be directly injured. Each
placed on public examination, as in a slave market. This is
of us has a duty to protect liberty and that alone makes
followed by the arrest and detention of those suspected of
him a proper party. It is not only the owner of the burning
villainy, usually on the basis only of the tattoos on their
house who has the right to call the firemen. Every one has
bodies or the informer's accusing finger.
the right and responsibility to prevent the fire from
spreading even if he lives in the other block.
Where is the search warrant or the warrant of arrest
required by the Bill of Rights? Where is the probable cause
The majority seems to be willing to just accept the
that must be determined personally by the judge, and by
Solicitor General's assertion that the claimed abuses are
no other, to justify the warrant? Where is the examination
"complete lies" and leave it at that. But a blanket denial is
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
not enough. The evidence is there on media, in the papers
witnesses he may produce to establish the probable cause?
and on radio and television, That kind of evidence cannot
Where is the particular description that must be stated in
be cavalierly dismissed as "complete lies."
the warrant, of the places to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized? And where, assuming all these may
be dispensed with, is the admissible exception to the rule?
Saturation drives are not among the accepted instances
when a search or an arrest may be made without warrant.
They come under the concept of the fishing expeditions
stigmatized by law and doctrine. At any rate, if the
majority is really introducing the "zona" as another
exception to the rule, it must not equivocate. It must state
that intention in forthright language and not in vague
generalizations that concede the wrong but deny the right.
To justify the "zona" on the basis of the recent coup
attempt is, in my view, to becloud the issue. The "zonas"
complained of happened before the failed coup and had
nothing whatsoever to do with that disturbance. There was
no "large scale mutiny or actual rebellion' when the
saturation drives were conducted and there were no
"combat areas" either in the places where the violations
were committed. The failed coup cannot validate the
invalid "zonas' retroactively.
The ponencia says that "we cannot take judicial notice of
the facts and figures given by the petitioners regarding
these saturation drives conducted by the military and
police authorities." Maybe so. But we can and should take
judicial notice of the saturation drives themselves which
are not and cannot be denied by the government.
I urge my brethren to accept the fact that those drives
are per se unconstitutional. I urge them to accept that
even without proof of the hooded figure and the personal
indignities and the loss and destruction of properties and
the other excesses allegedly committed, the mere waging
of the saturation drives alone is enough to make this Court
react with outraged concern.
Confronted with this clear case of oppression, we should
not simply throw up our hands and proclaim our
helplessness. I submit that this Court should instead
declare categorically and emphatically that these
saturation drives are violative of human rights and
individual liberty and so should be stopped immediately.
While they may be allowed in the actual theater of military
operations against the insurgents, the Court should also
make it clear that Metro Manila is not such a battleground.
The danger to our free institutions lies not only in those
who openly defy the authority of the government and
violate its laws. The greater menace is in those who, in the
name of democracy, destroy the very things it stands for as
in this case and so undermine democracy itself.
Where liberty is debased into a cruel illusion, all of us are sanctity of the home is pulverized by military and police
degraded and diminished. Liberty is indivisible; it belongs action. Thus, while the checkpoint is a defensive device, on
to every one. We should realize that when the bell tolls the the part of government, the "areal target zoning" or
death of liberty for one of us, "it tolls for thee" and for all "saturation drive" is a direct assault against, an intrusion
of us. into individual rights and liberties.
PADILLA, J., separate opinion: Respondents, fortunately, have branded petitioners'
allegations of such brutality, as total lies. It is indeed
difficult to even contemplate that such methods
This case is another classic instance of state power
reminiscent of a "police state" can exist in a society built
colliding with individual rights. That the State, acting
on a republican and constitutional system. Respondents
through the government and its forces, has the authority to
Must be given a chance to face their accusers and prove
suppress lawless violence in all its forms cannot be denied.
that they are indeed fabricating falsehoods. But the stakes
The exercise of that authority is justified when viewed
I submit, are too high for this Court, as the guardian of
from the standpoint of the general welfare, because the
individual liberties, to avoid a judicial confrontation with
State has the elementary and indispensable duty to insure a
the issue.
peaceful life and existence for its citizens. A government
that loses its capability to insure peace and order for its
citizens loses the very right to remain in power. I vote, therefore, to refer this case (dispensing with normal
venue requirements) to the Executive Judge, RTC of
Manila, for him
But, in the exercise of such authority, i.e., in the choice of
the means and methods to suppress lawless violence, the
right of the individual citizen to the dignity of his person 1. to receive the evidences of all the parties, in support
and the sanctity of his home cannot and should not be and in refutation of the petitioners' allegations;
violated, unless there is, in a particular case, a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a
2. to decide the case expeditiously on the bases of the
compelling duty to suppress or abate.
evidence, subject to review by this Court;
Petitioners' vivid description of the "areal target zoning" or
3. to report to this Court on action taken.
"saturation drives" allegedly conducted by police and
military units in Metro Manila, obviously intended to ferret
out criminals or suspected criminals in certain cordoned SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:
areas, while vigorously denied by respondents, deserves an
effective and immediate response from this Court.
There is only one question here: Whether or not the police
actions (saturation drives) complained of constitute a valid
I submit that since this Court is not a trier of facts and this exercise of police power.
case involves certainty of facts alleged by petitioners and
denied by respondents this case should be referred to a
The fact that on twelve occasions between March and
proper trial court where the petitioners can
November, 1987 the military conducted the saturation
present evidence to support and prove the allegations they
drives in question is a fact open to no question. The
make of such brutal and inhuman conduct on the part of
Solicitor General admits that they, the saturation drives,
military and police units.
had been done, except that they had been done "with due
regard to human rights." "Not only that," so he states:
More than the military and police checkpoints sustained by
this Court as a general proposition during abnormal times,**
... they were intelligently and carefully
and which involve the right of military and police forces to
planned months ahead of the actual
check on vehicles and pedestrians passing through
operation. They were executed in
certain fixed points for the purpose of apprehending
coordination with barangay officials
criminals and/or confiscating prohibited articles like
who pleaded with their constituents to
unlicensed firearms, the "areal target zoning" and
submit themselves voluntarily for
"saturation drives", as described in petitioners' allegations,
character and personal verification.
are actual raids on private homes in selected areas, and
Local and foreign correspondents, who
are thus positive assaults against the individual person and
had joined these operations, witnessed,
his dignity. The individual is, as described, yanked out of
and reported the events that transpired
his home, without any arrest warrant, to face investigation
relative thereto. (After Operation
as to his connections with lawless elements. In short, the
 Reports: November 5, 1987, Annex 12;
November 20, 1987, Annex 13;
November 24, 1987, Annex 14). That is
why in all the drives so far conducted,
the alleged victims who numbered
thousands had not themselves
complained.
The question, then, is purely one of law: Are the saturation
drives in question lawful and legitimate? It is also a
question that is nothing novel: No, because the arrests
were not accompanied by a judicial warrant. 1
Therefore, the fact that they had been carefully planned,
executed in coordination with Tondo's barangay officials,
and undertaken with due courtesy and politeness (which I
doubt), will not validate them. The lack of a warrant makes
them, per se illegal.
According to the majority, "the remedy is not to stop all
police actions, including the essential and legitimate
ones . . . [w]e see nothing wrong in police making their
presence visibly felt in troubled areas . . . " 2 But the
petitioners have not come to court to "stop all police
actions" but rather, the saturation drives, which are,
undoubtedly, beyond police power.
That "[a] show of force is sometimes necessary as long as
the rights of people are protected and not violated 3 is a
contradiction in terms. A "show of force" (by way of
saturation drives) is a violation of human rights because it
is not covered by a judicial warrant.
In all candor, I can not swallow what I find is a complete
exaggeration of the issues:
...A show of force is sometimes
necessary as long as the rights of
people are protected and not violated.
A blanket prohibition such as that
sought by the petitioners would limit
all police actions to one on one
confrontations where search warrants
and warrants of arrests against specific
individuals are easily procured. Anarchy
may reign if the military and the police
decide to sit down in their offices
because all concerted drives where a
show of force is present are totally
prohibited. 4
As a general rule, a peace officer can not act unless he is
possessed of the proper arrest or search warrant. The
exception is when a criminal offense is unfolding before
him, in which case, action is justified and necessary. The CRUZ, J., dissenting:
majority would have the exception to be simply, the
general rule.
Mr. Justice Gutierrez and I are kindred spirits and usually
find ourselves together on the side of liberty. It saddens me
The fact of the matter is that we are not here confronted that in the case at bar he is on the side of authority.
by police officers on the beat or prowl cars on patrol. What
we have and I suppose that everybody is agreed on it- are
This is not to say that liberty and authority are
lightning raids of homes, arbitrary confiscation of effects,
irreconcilable enemies. The two must in fact co-exist, for
and summary arrests of persons, the very acts proscribed
only in a well-ordered society can rights be properly
by the Constitution. If this is a "show of force", it certainly
enjoyed. Implicit in that theory, however, is the other
has no place in a constitutional democracy.
imperative: that the highest function of authority is to
insure liberty.
I find allusions to the last aborted coup d'etat inapt. In that
case, our men in uniform had all the right to act amidst
While acknowledging that the military is conducting the
crimes being committed in flagrante. The instant case is
saturation drives, the majority practically blinks them away
quite different. There are no offenses being committed,
on mere technicalities. First, there are no proper parties.
but rather, police officers fishing for evidence of offenses
Second, there is no proof Therefore, the petition is
that may have been committed, As I said, in that event, a
dismissed.
court warrant is indispensable.
The approach is to me too much simplification. We do not
That "the problem is not initially for the Supreme Court 5 is
choose to see the woods for the trees. The brutal fact is
to me, an abdication of judicial duty. As I indicated, the
staring us in the face but we look the other way in search
controversy is purely one of law the facts being undisputed.
of excuses.
Law, needless to say, is the problem of the Supreme Court,
not the Executive.
The majority says it cannot act against the drives because
no one directly affected has complained. Such silence, if I
Worse, it is passing the buck. The petitioners, precisely,
understand the ponencia correctly, has in effect purged the
have a grievance to raise, arising from abuses they pinpoint
drives of all oppressiveness and washed them clean.
to the lower offices of the Executive (which presumably has
its imprimatur). To make it an executive problem, so I
hold, is to make the Executive judge and jury of its own (The reason for the silence is fear. These raids are
acts, and hardly, a neutral arbiter. conducted not in the enclaves of the rich but in the
deprived communities, where the residents have no power
or influence. The parties directly aggrieved are afraid.
I am also taken aback by references to "[w]ell meaning
They are the little people. They cannot protest lest they
citizens with only second hand knowledge of the events ...
provoke retaliation for their temerity. Their only hope is in
keep[ing] on indiscriminately tossing problems -of the
this Court, and we should not deny them that hope.)
Executive, the military, and the police to the Supreme
Court as if we are the repository of all remedies for all
evils." 6 First, the facts are not "second-hand", they are The ruling that the petitioners are not proper parties is a
undisputed: Ther had been saturation drives. Second, the specious pretext for inaction. We have held that technical
petitioners have trooped to the highest court with a objections may be brushed aside where there are
legitimate grievance against the Executive (and military). constitutional questions that must be met. There are many
decisions applying this doctrine. (Rodriguez v. Gella, 92
Phil. 603; Tolentino v. Commission on Elections, 41 SCRA
The fact that the majority would "remand" the case to the
702; Philconsa v. Jimenez, 65 SCRA 479; Edu v. Ericta, 35
lower courts and the various echelons of the Executive for
SCRA 481; Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 27 SCRA
investigation is to admit that walls have indeed been
835; Lagunsad v. Court of Appeals; 154 SCRA 199; Demetria
banged, doors kicked in, and half-naked men herded. I do
v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208). Lozada was in fact an aberration.
not see therefore why we can not issue a writ of
prohibition as prayed for, in the midst of these facts.
I believe that where liberty is involved, every person is a
proper party even if he may not be directly injured. Each
of us has a duty to protect liberty and that alone makes
him a proper party. It is not only the owner of the burning
Separate Opinions house who has the right to call the firemen. Every one has
the right and responsibility to prevent the fire from
spreading even if he lives in the other block.
The majority seems to be willing to just accept the
Solicitor General's assertion that the claimed abuses are
"complete lies" and leave it at that. But a blanket denial is
not enough. The evidence is there on media, in the papers
and on radio and television, That kind of evidence cannot
be cavalierly dismissed as "complete lies."
The saturation drive is not unfamiliar to us. It is like the
"zona" of the Japanese Occupation. An area was surrounded
by soldiers and all residents were flushed out of their
houses and lined up, to be looked over by a person with a
bag over his head. This man pointed to suspected
guerrillas, who were immediately arrested and eventually
if not instantly executed.
To be sure, there are some variations now. The most
important difference is that it is no longer 1943 and the
belligerent occupation is over. There is no more war. It is
now 1990, when we are supposed to be under a free
Republic and safeguarded by the Bill of Rights.
Article III, Section 2, clearly provides:
Sec. 2 The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects
against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to
be seized. (Emphasis supplied.)
The provision is intended to protect the individual from
official (and officious) intrusions, no matter how humble
his abode and however lowly his station in life. Against the
mighty forces of the government, the person's house is his
castle, his inviolate refuge and exclusive domain where he
is the monarch of all he surveys.
Yet in the dead of night, armed soldiers may knock on one's
door and command him at gunpoint to come out so he and
his neighbors, who have also been rounded up, can all be
placed on public examination, as in a slave market. This is
followed by the arrest and detention of those suspected of
villainy, usually on the basis only of the tattoos on their
bodies or the informer's accusing finger.
Where is the search warrant or the warrant of arrest
required by the Bill of Rights? Where is the probable cause
that must be determined personally by the judge, and by
no other, to justify the warrant? Where is the examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce to establish the probable cause?
Where is the particular description that must be stated in
the warrant, of the places to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized? And where, assuming all these may
be dispensed with, is the admissible exception to the rule?
Saturation drives are not among the accepted instances
when a search or an arrest may be made without warrant.
They come under the concept of the fishing expeditions
stigmatized by law and doctrine. At any rate, if the
majority is really introducing the "zona' as another
exception to the rule, it must not equivocate. It must state
that intention in forthright language and not in vague
generalizations that concede the wrong but deny the right.
To justify the "zona" on the basis of the recent coup
attempt is, in my view, to becloud the issue. The "zonas'
complained of happened before the failed coup and had
nothing whatsoever to do with that disturbance. There was
no "large scale mutiny or actual rebellion' when the
saturation drives were conducted and there were no
"combat areas" either in the places where the violations
were committed. The failed coup cannot validate the
invalid "zonas' retroactively.
The ponencia says that "we cannot take judicial notice of
the facts and figures given by the petitioners regarding
these saturation drives conducted by the military and
police authorities." Maybe so. But we can and should take
judicial notice of the saturation drives themselves which
are not and cannot be denied by the government.
I urge my brethren to accept the fact that those drives
are per se unconstitutional. I urge them to accept that
even without proof of the hooded figure and the personal
indignities and the loss and destruction of properties and
the other excesses allegedly committed, the mere waging
of the saturation drives alone is enough to make this Court
react with outraged concern.
Confronted with this clear case of oppression, we should
not simply throw up our hands and proclaim our
helplessness. I submit that this Court should instead
declare categorically and emphatically that these
saturation drives are violative of human rights and
individual liberty and so should be stopped immediately.
While they may be allowed in the actual theater of military
operations against the insurgents, the Court should also
make it clear that Metro Manila is not such a battleground.
The danger to our free institutions lies not only in those
who openly defy the authority of the government and
violate its laws. The greater menace is in those who, in the
name of democracy, destroy the very things it stands for as
in this case and so undermine democracy itself.
Where liberty is debased into a cruel illusion, all of us are
degraded and diminished. Liberty is indivisible; it belongs
to every one. We should realize that when the bell tolls the
death of liberty for one of us, "it tolls for thee" and for all
of us.
PADILLA, J., separate opinion:
This case is another classic instance of state power
colliding with individual rights. That the State, acting
through the government and its forces, has the authority to
suppress lawless violence in all its forms cannot be denied.
The exercise of that authority is justified when viewed
from the standpoint of the general welfare, because the
State has the elementary and indispensable duty to insure a
peaceful life and existence for its citizens. A government
that loses its capability to insure peace and order for its
citizens loses the very right to remain in power.
But, in the exercise of such authority, i.e., in the choice of
the means and methods to suppress lawless violence, the
right of the individual citizen to the dignity of his person
and the sanctity of his home cannot and should not be
violated, unless there is, in a particular case, a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a
compelling duty to suppress or abate.
Petitioners' vivid description of the "areal target zoning" or
"saturation drives" allegedly conducted by police and
military units in Metro Manila, obviously intended to ferret
out criminals or suspected criminals in certain cordoned
areas, while vigorously denied by respondents, deserves an
effective and immediate response from this Court.
I submit that since this Court is not a trier of facts and this
case involves certainty of facts alleged by petitioners and
denied by respondents-this case should be referred to a
proper trial court where the petitioners can
present evidence to support and prove the allegations they
make of such brutal and inhuman conduct on the part of
military and police units.
More than the military and police checkpoints sustained by
this Court as a general proposition during abnormal times,**
and which involve the right of military and police forces to
check on vehicles and pedestrians passing through
certain fixed points for the purpose of apprehending
criminals and/or confiscating prohibited articles like
unlicensed firearms, the "areal target zoning" and
"saturation drives", as described in petitioners' allegations,
are actual raids on private homes in selected areas, and
are thus positive assaults against the individual person and
his dignity. The individual is, as described, yanked out of
his home, without any arrest warrant, to face investigation
as to his connections with lawless elements. In short, the
sanctity of the home is pulverized by military and police
action. Thus, while the checkpoint is a defensive device, on
the part of government, the "areal target zoning" or
"saturation drive" is a direct assault against, an intrusion
into individual rights and liberties.
Respondents, fortunately, have branded petitioners'
allegations of such brutality, as total lies. It is indeed
difficult to even contemplate that such methods
reminiscent of a "police state" can exist in a society built
on a republican and constitutional system. Respondents
Must be given a chance to face their accusers and prove
that they are indeed fabricating falsehoods. But the stakes
I submit, are too high for this Court, as the guardian of
individual liberties, to avoid a judicial confrontation with
the issue.
I vote, therefore, to refer this case (dispensing with normal
venue requirements) to the Executive Judge, RTC of
Manila, for him-
1. to receive the evidences of all the parties, in support
and in refutation of the petitioners' allegations;
2. to decide the case expeditiously on the bases of the
evidence, subject to review by this Court;
3. to report to this Court on action taken.
SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:
There is only one question here: Whether or not the police
actions (saturation drives) complained of constitute a valid
exercise of police power.
The fact that on twelve occasions between March and
November, 1987 the military conducted the saturation
drives in question is a fact open to no question. The
Solicitor General admits that they, the saturation drives,
had been done, except that they had been done "with due
regard to human rights." "Not only that," so he states:
... they were intelligently and carefully individuals are easily procured. Anarchy
planned months ahead of the actual may reign if the military and the police
operation. They were executed in decide to sit down in their offices
coordination with barangay officials because all concerted drives where a
who pleaded with their constituents to show of force is present are totally
submit themselves voluntarily for prohibited. 4
character and personal verification.
Local and foreign correspondents, who
As a general rule, a peace officer can not act unless he is
had joined these operations, witnessed,
possessed of the proper arrest or search warrant. The
and reported the events that transpired
exception is when a criminal offense is unfolding before
relative thereto. (After Operation
him, in which case, action is justified and necessary. The
Reports: November 5, 1987, Annex 12;
majority would have the exception to be simply, the
November 20, 1987, Annex 13;
general rule.
November 24, 1987, Annex 14). That is
why in all the drives so far conducted,
the alleged victims who numbered The fact of the matter is that we are not here confronted
thousands had not themselves by police officers on the beat or prowl cars on patrol. What
complained. we have and I suppose that everybody is agreed on it- are
lightning raids of homes, arbitrary confiscation of effects,
and summary arrests of persons, the very acts proscribed
The question, then, is purely one of law: Are the saturation
by the Constitution. If this is a "show of force", it certainly
drives in question lawful and legitimate? It is also a
has no place in a constitutional democracy.
question that is nothing novel: No, because the arrests
were not accompanied by a judicial warrant. 1
I find allusions to the last aborted coup d'etat inapt. In that
case, our men in uniform had all the right to act amidst
Therefore, the fact that they had been carefully planned,
crimes being committed in flagrante. The instant case is
executed in coordination with Tondo's barangay officials,
quite different. There are no offenses being committed,
and undertaken with due courtesy and politeness (which I
but rather, police officers fishing for evidence of offenses
doubt), will not validate them. The lack of a warrant makes
that may have been committed, As I said, in that event, a
them, per se illegal.
court warrant is indispensable.
According to the majority, "the remedy is not to stop all
That "the problem is not initially for the Supreme Court 5 is
police actions, including the essential and legitimate
to me, an abdication of judicial duty. As I indicated, the
ones . . . [w]e see nothing wrong in police making their
controversy is purely one of law the facts being undisputed.
presence visibly felt in troubled areas . . . " 2 But the
Law, needless to say, is the problem of the Supreme Court,
petitioners have not come to court to "stop all police
not the Executive.
actions" but rather, the saturation drives, which are,
undoubtedly, beyond police power.
Worse, it is passing the buck. The petitioners, precisely,
have a grievance to raise, arising from abuses they pinpoint
That "[a] show of force is sometimes necessary as long as
to the lower offices of the Executive (which presumably has
the rights of people are protected and not violated 3 is a
its imprimatur). To make it an executive problem, so I
contradiction in terms. A "show of force" (by way of
hold, is to make the Executive judge and jury of its own
saturation drives) is a violation of human rights because it
acts, and hardly, a neutral arbiter.
is not covered by a judicial warrant.
I am also taken aback by references to "[w]ell meaning
In all candor, I can not swallow what I find is a complete
citizens with only second hand knowledge of the events ...
exaggeration of the issues:
keep[ing] on indiscriminately tossing problems -of the
Executive, the military, and the police to the Supreme
...A show of force is sometimes Court as if we are the repository of all remedies for all
necessary as long as the rights of evils." 6 First, the facts are not "second-hand", they are
people are protected and not violated. undisputed: Ther had been saturation drives. Second, the
A blanket prohibition such as that petitioners have trooped to the highest court with a
sought by the petitioners would limit legitimate grievance against the Executive (and military).
all police actions to one on one
confrontations where search warrants
and warrants of arrests against specific
The fact that the majority would "remand" the case to the
lower courts and the various echelons of the Executive for
investigation is to admit that walls have indeed been
banged, doors kicked in, and half-naked men herded. I do
not see therefore why we can not issue a writ of
prohibition as prayed for, in the midst of these facts.
Footnotes
Padilla, J.
** Valmonte vs. Gen. de Villa, et al.,
G.R. No. 83988, 29 September 1989.
Sarmiento, J.
1 CONST., art III, sec. 21; People v.
Burgos, No. 68955, September 4, 1986,
144 SCRA 1.
2 Decision, 15; emphasis supplied.
3 Supra; emphasis supplied.
4 Supra.
5 Supra; emphasis supplied.
6 Supra.
$ + GRSI Copyrightregno N94-027
{bmr footnote.bmp}75909_2_5_90_footnotes>mainG.R.
No. 75909 February 5, 1990
RAMON FRANCISCO vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 75909 February 5, 1990
RAMON FRANCISCO and CRISTINA MANALO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. BERNARDO P.
PARDO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, Branch XLIII, and SPS. BENJAMIN
BANGAYAN and EMILIANA BANGAYAN, respondents.
Manuel B. Dulay for petitioners.
Natalio M. Panganiban for private respondents.
FERNAN, C.J.:
Petitioners spouses Ramon Francisco and Cristina Manalo
seek a review of the decision dated August 29, 1986 of
the then Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC), now Court
of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 06866, entitled "Ramon
Francisco, et al., Petitioners vs. Hon. Bernardo Pardo,
etc., et al., Respondents", denying due course to their
petition, thereby affirming their ejectment from the
subject premises as decreed by both the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MTC) and the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila.
The facts as found by the RTC and adopted by the IAC
are as follows:
The premises in question located at
1512 Antipolo St., Sta. Cruz, Manila,
consist of a lot and a two-storey
building owned by Antonio Chua.
Defendant (herein petitioner) Ramon
Francisco leased the ground floor and
a room in the second floor of the said
building since 1961, (and) used (the
same) as an auto spare parts store
and residence. . . . (T)he latest rental
as of June, 1982 was Pl,500.00 duly
paid to Antonio Chua.
In 1978, the plaintiffs (herein private
respondents) acquired the ownership
of the premises by purchase from the
former owner Antonio Chua but it was
agreed between the plaintiffs and the
former owner that the tenant
defendant Ramon Francisco would
continue to pay to the former owner
the monthly rental of P1,000.00 until
the end of 1978 and that thereafter
the rentals shall accrue to the
plaintiffs. Nonetheless, starting
January, 1979, plaintiffs received the
monthly rentals not from defendants
but from the former owner Antonio
Chua who agreed to assume
responsibility in paying the rental on
behalf of Ramon Francisco. Because
Antonio Chua failed to remit the
rental to the plaintiffs, since
September, 1979 and effective
January, 1981 at the increased rate
of Pl,500.00 a month, on February 3,
1982, plaintiffs wrote former owner
Antonio Chua to pay the unpaid
rentals then amounting to
P35,000.00. Parenthetically on July
3, 1982, plaintiffs counsel sent a
letter of demand to the defendant
Ramon Francisco by registered mail
but the latter was returned
unclaimed.
Another letter dated January 24,
1983 was addressed to defendant
Cristina Manalo but was also returned
unclaimed.
In fact, however, defendants were
paid up to the month of June, 1982
and defendants stopped paying
rentals when they received a copy of
the letter of plaintiffs to the former
owner Antonio Chua. 1
On March 7, 1983, private respondents Benjamin and
Emiliana Bangayan filed before the MTC of Manila a
complaint for ejectment against the petitioners on the
following grounds: a) non-payment of the agreed
monthly rental of P2,000.00; and b) subleasing of the
premises in violation of the condition of the lease.
Petitioners denied the existence of the grounds for
ejectment. They asserted that Antonio Chua, the
previous owner of the leased property assumed the
responsibility of paying the rentals. They further stated
that there was no existing sublease but only a change of
name of their auto parts business from Impala Auto
Supply to Starlet Supply Center. They likewise denied
knowledge of the transfer of ownership of the property
involved from Antonio Chua, the previous owner, to the
private respondents.
The MTC, after due hearing, rendered judgment
declaring petitioners to have defaulted in the payment
of the rent. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
Accordingly, judgment is hereby
rendered ordering the defendants
Ramon Francisco and Cristina Manalo
 and all persons claiming rights under
them to immediately vacate the
premises . . . and to restore
possession thereof to plaintiffs; and
for the said defendants to pay jointly
and severally the herein plaintiffs the
amount of Pl,500.00 as monthly
rentals of the premises from August
1982 and every month thereafter
(less any amount they have paid to
the plaintiffs) until they have actually
vacated the premises and the costs of
the suit. 2
On appeal to the RTC, the lower court's decision was
affirmed with modification. The RTC pronounced:
WHEREFORE, the court affirms the
decision subject of the appeal with
modification so as to make the
decision definite and certain because
in the appealed decision, the lower
court authorized deduction of any
amount they have paid the plaintiffs
which being undetermined, makes
the decision uncertain and void
(Cf. del Rosario vs. Villegas, 49 Phil.
634). Defendants and all persons
claiming rights under them are
ordered to immediately vacate the
premises . . . and to restore
possession thereof to plaintiffs, to
pay plaintiffs the sum of Pl,500.00 a
month as rental for the premises from
July, 1982 and every month
thereafter until they actually vacate
the premises, and costs.
SO ORDERED. 3
As earlier intimated, the Court of Appeals also denied
due course to petitioners' petition for review. Hence,
this recourse, petitioners contending that the appellate
court committed the following errors in its decision:
I
PUBLIC RESPONDENT ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO
CONTRACT OF LEASE BETWEEN THE
PARTIES;
II
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS MERELY STEPPED INTO
THE SHOES OF THE PREVIOUS OWNER;
III
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE NON-PAYMENT OF
RENTALS FROM JULY, 1982 UP TO
JANUARY, 1983 WAS SUFFICIENT
GROUND TO EJECT PETITIONERS;
IV
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE DEMAND
ALLEGEDLY GIVEN BY THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS PRODUCED THE EFFECT
OF NOTIFICATION
V July, 1982 to January, 1983 was sufficient ground to
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE LOWER COURT
DID NOT EXERCISE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN NOT FIXING A LONGER
PERIOD OF LEASE. 4
Petitioners allege that when private respondents finally
disclosed to them in July, 1982 that they, private
respondents, were the new owners and lessors of the
leased premises, a confrontation occurred because of
the disagreement regarding the rate of rental. Since no
agreement as to the rate of rental was arrived at, no
contract of lease was created. This being the case,
petitioners aver that they could not have violated the
lease contract as there was no contract to speak of in
the first place.
Such contention is clearly fallacious. The property
subject of the controversy was sold by the former owner
Antonio Chua to private respondents while the lease was
subsisting. Under Article 1676 of the New Civil Code,
The purchaser of a piece of land
which is under a lease that is not
recorded in the Registry of Property
may terminate the lease, save when
there is a stipulation to the contrary
in the contract of sale, or when the
purchaser knows of the existence of
the lease.
In the case at bar, private respondents chose to allow
the lease to continue. Despite the change of ownership
then, the contract of lease subsisted. As aptly held by
the appellate court:
As buyers of the premises, private
respondents merely stepped into the
shoes of the previous owner. The
change of ownership did not affect
the contract of lease between the
petitioners and previous owner.
Petitioners still had the same
obligations, including the payment of
rentals, under the contract without
the necessity of entering into another
agreement with the new owners. 5
Having shown the existence of the lease, all the other
issues can be easily resolved.
No error was committed by the appellate court in ruling
that the failure of petitioners to pay the rentals from
eject them. It is a basic tenet that if the lessor raises the
rent at the expiration of the lease, the tenant has to
leave if he does not pay the new
rental. 6
As held in the case of Vda. de Roxas vs. Court of
Appeals, 63 SCRA 302, it is the owner's prerogative to fix
the rental for which he wishes to lease his property and
the occupant has the option of accepting the rent as
fixed or negotiating with the owner and in the event of
failure to come to an agreement, to leave the property
so as not to be liable for the rental fixed and demanded
by the owner.
The rent in this case was being paid monthly. The lease
was therefore on a month-to-month basis, which expires
at the end of each month and at which time, either party
may opt to terminate or continue the lease under the
same or under new terms and conditions.
Private respondents having opted to increase the rate of
rentals, petitioners either have to accept the new rate
or leave the premises if no agreement is reached. But
they cannot excuse themselves from paying rentals
altogether just because the negotiation as to such
increase failed to materialize. For the fact is that they
still occupy the leased property. They derive benefit
from such occupation. NEMO CUM ALTERIUS
DETRIMENTO LOCUPLETARI PROTEST. No one shall
enrich himself at the expense of another.
Petitioners' argument that no demand to vacate was
given them deserves scant consideration. As found by
the Court of Appeals, private respondents' counsel sent
petitioners two (2) letters of demand, one addressed to
Ramon Francisco and the other to Cristina Manalo. These
letters were returned unclaimed despite the fact that
they were properly addressed to the petitioners and
despite notice given to the addressees of the letters. In
the case of Gaspay vs. Hon. Sangco, et al., L-27826,
December 18, 1967, we held that therein petitioners'
claim that they were not served with notice is belied by
proof that they had refused to receive the same. No
person is entitled to profit from his wrong act of
commission or omission.
As to the issue of whether the appellate court erred in
not fixing a longer period of lease, we find no cogent
reason to depart from the aforesaid court ruling. Article
1687 of the New Civil Code empowers the courts to fix
the period of lease. Such prerogative is addressed to the
court's sound judgment. 7 And such discretion was
certainly judiciously exercised in the case at bar for,
again, as observed by the appellate court:
. . . Certainly, the default of
petitioners in the payment of the
rentals could not have inspired the
court to extend any further their stay
in the premises as this would have
imposed more unjustifiable burden on
the part of the owners. 8
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Corts, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 pp. 20-21, Rollo.
2 p. 25, Rollo.
3 pp. 21-22, Rollo.
4 p. 5, Petition, p. 7, Rollo.
5 p. 28, Rollo.
6 46 Phil. 184.
7 F.S. Divinagracia Agro Commercial,
Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 104 SCRA
180.
8 p. 29. Rollo
$ + GRSI Copyrightregno N94-027
{bmr footnote.bmp}77867_2_6_90_footnotes>mainG.R.
No. 77867 February 6, 1990
ISABEL DE LA PUERTA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 77867 February 6, 1990
ISABEL DE LA PUERTA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CARMELITA DE
LA PUERTA, respondents.
Isabel de la Puerta for and in her own behalf.
Gilbert D. Camaligan for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
The basic issue involved in this case is the filiation of
private respondent Carmelita de la Puerta, who claims
successional lights to the estate of her alleged
grandmother.
Dominga Revuelta died on July 3, 1966, at the age of 92,
with a will leaving her properties to her three surviving
children, namely, Alfredo, Vicente and Isabel, all
surnamed de la Puerta. Isabel was given the free portion
in addition to her legitime and was appointed executrix
of the will. 1
The petition for the probate of the will filed by Isabel
was opposed by her brothers, who averred that their
mother was already senile at the time of the execution
of the will and did not fully comprehend its meaning.
Moreover, some of the properties listed in the inventory
of her estate belonged to them exclusively. 2
Meantime, Isabel was appointed special administratrix by
the probate court. 3 Alfredo subsequently died, leaving
Vicente the lone oppositor. 4
On August 1, 1974, Vicente de la Puerta filed with the
Court of First Instance of Quezon a petition to adopt
Carmelita de la Puerta. After hearing, the petition was
granted. 5 However, the decision was appealed by Isabel
to the Court of Appeals. During the pendency of the
appeal, Vicente died, prompting her to move for the
dismissal of the case 6
On November 20, 1981, Carmelita, having been allowed
to intervene in the probate proceedings, filed a motion
for the payment to her of a monthly allowance as the
acknowledged natural child of Vicente de la Puerta. 7 At
the hearing on her motion, Carmelita presented
evidence to prove her claimed status to which Isabel was
allowed to submit counter-evidence.
On November 12,1982, the probate court granted the
motion, declaring that it was satisfied from the evidence
at hand that Carmelita was a natural child of Vicente de
la Puerta and was entitled to the amounts claimed for
her support. The court added that "the evidence
presented by the petitioner against it (was) too weak to
discredit the same. 8
On appeal, the order of the lower court was affirmed by
the respondent court, 9 which is now in turn being
challenged in this petition before us.
The petitioner's main argument is that Carmelita was not
the natural child of Vicente de la Puerta, who was
married to Genoveva de la Puerta in 1938 and remained
his wife until his death in 1978. Carmelita's real parents
are Juanita Austrial and Gloria Jordan.
Invoking the presumption of legitimacy, she argues that
Carmelita was the legitimate child of Juanita Austrial and
Gloria Jordan, who were legally or presumably married.
Moreover, Carmelita could not have been a natural child
of Vicente de la Puerta because he was already married
at the time of her birth in 1962.
To prove her point, Isabel presented Amado Magpantay,
who testified that he was a neighbor of Austrial and
Jordan. According to him, the two were living as
husband and wife and had three children, including a girl
named "Puti," presumably Carmelita. He said though that
he was not sure if the couple was legally married. 10
Another witness, Genoveva de la Puerta, Identified
herself as Vicente de la Puerta's wife but said they
separated two years after their marriage in 1938 and
were never reconciled. In 1962, Gloria Jordan started
living with Vicente de la Puerta in his house, which was
only five or six houses away from where she herself was
staying. Genoveva said that the relationship between her
husband and Gloria was well known in the community. 11
In finding for Carmelita, the lower court declared that:
. . . By her evidence, it was shown to
the satisfaction of the Court that she
was born on December 18, 1962 per
her birth certificate (Exh. A); that her
father was Vicente de la Puerta and
her mother is Gloria Jordan who were
living as common law husband and
wife until his death on June 14, 1978;
that Vicente de la Puerta was married
to, but was separated from, his legal
wife Genoveva de la Puerta; that
upon the death of Vicente de la
Puerta on June 14, 1978 without
leaving a last will and testament, she
was the only child who survived him
together with his spouse Genoveva de
la Puerta with whom he did not beget
any child; that she was treated by
Vicente de la Puerta as a true child
from the time of her birth until his
father died; that the fact that she was
treated as a child of Vicente de la
Puerta is shown by the family pictures
showing movant with Vicente de la
Puerta (Exhs. D, D-1 and D-2) and
school records wherein he signed the
report cards as her parent (Exh. E and
E-1); that during the hearing of her
adoption case in Special Proceeding
No. 0041 in Branch V of this Court at
Mauban, Quezon, Vicente de la
Puerta categorically stated in court
that Carmelita de la Puerta is his
daughter with Gloria Jordan (Exhs. B
and B-1); that it was Vicente de la
Puerta during his lifetime who spent
for her subsistence, support and
education; . . . 12
This is a factual finding that we do not see fit to disturb, Art. 256. The child shall be presumed
absent any of those circumstances we have laid down in legitimate, although the mother may
a long line of decisions that will justify reversal. 13 Among have declared against its legitimacy
these circumstances are: (1) the conclusion is a finding or may have been sentenced as an
grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and adulteress.
conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly
mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the
These rules are in turn based on the presumption that
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the
Juanito and Gloria were married at the time of
findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals
Carmelita's birth in 1962, pursuant to Rule 131, Sec.
went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are
5(bb) of the Rules of Court, providing that:
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellees; (7) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said findings Sec. 5. Disputable presumptions.
of facts are conclusions without citation of specific The following presumptions are
evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set forth satisfactory if uncontradicted, but
in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and may be contradicted and overcome by
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and other evidence:
(10) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
xxx xxx xxx
contradicted by the evidence on record.
(bb) That a man and woman deporting
The petitioner insists on the application of the following
themselves as husband and wife have
provisions of the Civil Code to support her thesis that
entered into a lawful contract of
Carmelita is not the natural child of Vicente de la Puerta
marriage;
but the legitimate child of Juanito Austrial and Gloria
Jordan:
But this last-quoted presumption is merely disputable
and may be refuted with evidence to the contrary. As
Art. 255. Children born after one
the Court sees it, such evidence has been sufficiently
hundred and eighty days following the
established in the case at bar.
celebration of the marriage, and
before three hundred days following
its dissolution or the separation of the The cases 14 cited by the petitioner are not exactly in
spouses shall be presumed to be point because they involve situations where the couples
legitimate. lived continuously as husband and wife and so could be
reasonably presumed to be married. In the case before
us, there was testimony from Vicente's own wife that her
Against this presumption no evidence
husband and Gloria lived together as a married couple,
shall be admitted other than that of
thereby rebutting the presumption that Gloria was
the physical impossibility of the
herself the lawful wife of Juanita Austrial.
husband's having access to his wife
within the first one hundred and
twenty days of the three hundred Such testimony would for one thing show that Juanito
which preceded the birth of the child. and Gloria did not continuously live together as a
married couple. Moreover, it is not explained why, if he
was really married to her, Juanito did not object when
This physical impossibility may be
Gloria left the conjugal home and started openly
caused:
consorting with Vicente, and in the same neighborhood
at that. That was unnatural, to say the least. It was
(1) By the impotence of the husband; different with Genoveva for she herself swore that she
had separated from Vicente two years after their
marriage and had long lost interest in her husband. In
(2) By the fact that the husband and
fact, she even renounced in open court any claim to
wife were living separately in such a
Vicente's estate. 15
way that access was not possible;
The presumption of marriage between Juanito and Gloria
(3) By the serious illness of the
having been destroyed, it became necessary for the
husband.
petitioner to submit additional proof to show that the
two were legally married. She did not.
Turning now to the evidence required to prove the
private respondent's filiation, we reject the petitioner's
contention that Article 278 of the Civil Code is not
available to Carmelita. It is error to contend that as she
is not a natural child but a spurious child (if at all) she
cannot prove her status by the record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or any authentic
writing. On the contrary, it has long been settled that:
The so-called spurious children or
illegitimate children other than
natural children, commonly known as
bastards, include adulterous children
or those born out of wedlock to a
married woman cohabiting with a man
other than her husband or to a
married man cohabiting with a woman
other than his wife. They are entitled
to support and successional rights
(Art. 287, CC). But their filiation must
be duly proven.(Ibid, Art. 887)
How should their filiation be proven?
Article 289 of the Civil Code allows
the investigation of the paternity or
maternity of spurious children under
the circumstances specified in
Articles 283 and 284 of the Civil
Code. The implication is that the
rules on compulsory recognition of
natural children are applicable to
spurious children.
Spurious children should not be in a
better position than natural children.
The rules on proof of filiation of
natural children or the rule on
voluntary and compulsory
acknowledgment for natural children
may be applied to spurious
children. 16
This being so, we need not rule now on the admissibility
of the private respondent's certificate of birth as proof
of her filiation. That status was sufficiently established
by the sworn testimony of Vicente de la Puerta at the
hearing of the petition for adoption on September 6,
1976, where he categorically declared as follows:
Q What relation if
any do you have
with Carmelita de
la Puerta?
A She is my
daughter. 17
Finally, we move to the most crucial question, to wit:
May Carmelita de la Puerta claim support and
successional rights to the estate of Dominga Revuelta?
According to Article 970 of the Civil Code:
Art. 970. Representation is a right
created by fiction of law, by virtue of
which the representative is raised to
the place and the degree of the
person represented, and acquires the
rights which the latter would have if
he were living or if he could have
inherited.
The answer to the question posed must be in the
negative. The first reason is that Vicente de la Puerta did
not predecease his mother; and the second is that
Carmelita is a spurious child.
It is settled that
In testamentary succession, the right
of representation can take place only
in the following cases: first, when the
person represented dies before the
testator; second, when the person
represented is incapable of
succeeding the testator; and third,
when the person represented is
disinherited by the testator. In all of
these cases, since there is a vacancy
in the inheritance, the law calls the
children or descendants of the person
represented to succeed by right of
representation. 18
xxx xxx xxx
The law is clear that there is
representation only when relatives of
a deceased person try to succeed him
in his rights which he would have had
if still living. In the present case,
however, said deceased had already
succeeded his aunt, the testatrix
herein. . . . It is a fact that at the
time of the death of the testatrix,
Reynaldo Cuison was still alive. He
died two months after her
(testatrix's) death. And upon his
death, he transmitted to his heirs,
the petitioners herein Elisa Cuison et
al., the legacy or the right to succeed
to the legacy. . . . In other words, the
herein petitioners-appellants are not
trying to succeed to the right to the
property of the testatrix, but rather
to the right of the legatee Reynaldo
Cuison in said property. 19
Not having predeceased Dominga Revuelta, her son
Vicente had the right to inherit from her directly or in
his own right. No right of representation was involved,
nor could it be invoked by Carmelita upon her father's
death, which came after his own mother's death. It
would have been different if Vicente was already dead
when Dominga Revuelta died. Carmelita could then have
inherited from her in representation of her father
Vicente, assuming the private respondent was a lawful
heir.
But herein lies the crux, for she is not. As a spurious
child of Vicente, Carmelita is barred from inheriting from
Dominga because of Article 992 of the Civil Code, which
lays down the barrier between the legitimate and
illegitimate families. This article provides quite clearly:
Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no
right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of
his father or mother; nor shall such
children or relatives inherit in the
same manner from the illegitimate
child.
Applying this rule in Leonardo v. Court of
Appeals, 20 this Court declared:
. . . even if it is true that petitioner is
the child of Sotero Leonardo, still he
cannot, by right of representation,
claim a share of the estate left by the
deceased Francisca Reyes considering
that, as found again by the Court of
Appeals, he was born outside wedlock
as shown by the fact that when he
was born, his alleged putative father
and mother were not yet married,
and what is more, his alleged father's
first marriage was still subsisting. At
most, petitioner would be an
 illegitimate child who has no right to
inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of
his father, like the deceased
Francisca Reyes.
The reason for this rule was explained in the recent case
of Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 21 thus:
Article 992 of the New Civil Code
provides a barrier or iron curtain in
that it prohibits absolutely a
succession ab intestato between the
illegitimate child and the legitimate
children and relatives of the father or
mother of said legitimate child. They
may have a natural tie of blood, but
this is not recognized by law for the
purpose of Article 992. Between the
legitimate family and the illegitimate
family there is presumed to be an
intervening antagonism and
incompatibility. The illegitimate child
is disgracefully looked down upon by
the legitimate family; the family is in
turn, hated by the illegitimate child
the latter considers the privileged
condition of the former, and the
resources of which it is thereby
deprived; the former in turn sees in
the illegitimate child nothing but the
product of sin, palpable evidence of a
blemish broken in life; the law does
no more than recognize this truth, by
avoiding further ground of
resentment. 22
Indeed, even as an adopted child, Carmelita would still
be barred from inheriting from Dominga Revuelta for
there would be no natural kindred ties between them
and consequently, no legal ties to bind them either. As
aptly pointed out by Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino:
If the adopting parent should die
before the adopted child, the latter
cannot represent the former in the
inheritance from the parents or
ascendants of the adopter. The
adopted child is not related to the
deceased in that case, because the
filiation created by fiction of law is
exclusively between the adopter and
the adopted. "By adoption, the
adopters can make for themselves an
heir, but they cannot thus make one
for their kindred. 23
The result is that Carmelita, as the spurious daughter of
Vicente de la Puerta, has successional rights to the
intestate estate of her father but not to the estate of
Dominga Revuelta. Her claims for support and
inheritance should therefore be filed in the proceedings
for the settlement of her own father's
estate 24 and cannot be considered in the probate of
Dominga Revuelta's Will.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the appealed
decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, with costs
against the private respondent. It is so ordered.
Narvasa, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ.,
concur.
Footnotes
1 Original records, p. 1, Ibid., pp. 43-
44.
2 Ibid., pp. 6-7.
3 Ibid., p. 31.
4 Ibid., p. 108.
5 Annex "E"
6 Ibid.
7 Original records, p. 7.
8 Annex "F".
9 Rollo, p. 48. Penned by Francisco,
J. with Lombos de la Fuente and
Benipayo, JJ., concurring.
10 TSN, March 5, 1982, p. 6; Ibid., p.
9; Ibid., p. 13.
11 TSN January 21, 1982, pp. 3,
7; Ibid., p. 13.
12 Rollo, p. 49.
13 Malaysian Airline System Bernad
vs, Court of Appeals, 156 SCRA 321;
Baliwag Transit, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, 147 SCRA 82; Sacay vs.
Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593.
14 Umingan vs. Umingan, CA-G.R. No.
8193-R, December 16, 1952; Bell vs.
Territory, 56 P 853, 8 Okl. 75;
Estrada vs. Reyes, CA-G.R. No. 4835-
R, February 24, 1951; Andal vs.
Macaraeg, L-2474, May 30, 1951, 89
Phil. 465; Sudario vs. Acro Taxi Cab
Co., Inc., CA-G.R. No. 3677-R, August
2, 1951.
15 TSN January 21, 1982, pp. 23-24.
16 Pactor vs. Pestano 107 Phil. 685;
Reyes vs. Zuzuarregui, 102 Phil. 346,
354; Paulino and Nieto vs. Paulino,
113 Phil. 697, 700.
17 Exhibit "B-I," TSN, Vicente de la
Puerta, Sept. 6, 1974, p. 7.
18 Jurado, Comments and
Jurisprudence on Succession, 7th
edition, p. 424.
19 Cuison, et al. vs. Villanueva, et al.,
90 Phil. 850.
20 120 SCRA 890.
21 150 SCRA 645.
22 7 Manresa 110 cited in Grey v.
Fabie, 40 OG [First S] No. 3, p. 196.
23 Tolentino, Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of
the Philippines, volume three, 1979,
p. 464.
24 Gutierrez, Jr. vs. Macandog, 150
SCRA 442.
$ + GRSI Copyrightregno N94-027
A.M. No. RTJ-88-272 February 6, 1990
RAUL H. SESBREO vs. JUDGE PEDRO T. GARCIA
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. RTJ-88-272 February 6, 1990
RAUL H. SESBREO, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE PEDRO T. GARCIA, respondent.
GRINO-AQUINO, J.:
This administrative complaint against respondent Judge
Pedro Garcia is the culmination of the complainant's
frustrations with Branch 20 of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu where in 1985 or five years ago, he filed a criminal
case for estafa against millionaire Ricardo Silverio, Sr.
and Hermilo Rodis of the notorious Philfinance caper. Up
to this time, Silverio has not been arraigned allegedly
because his heart condition will not permit him to fly to
Cebu to be arraigned, although he has flown in and out
of the country and is still out now.
For some cause not shown in the records of this
administrative case, even before the defendant was
arraigned, Criminal Case No. CU-10568 reached the
Court of Appeals (CA-G. R. SP No. 04445) which rendered
a decision on October 14, 1986 directing the Presiding
Judge of Branch 20 (then Judge Exaltacion A. Navarro)
to set the arraignment and trial of Silverio, Sr. "as soon
as possible" (p.145, Rollo). Instead of complying with the
Appellate Court's directive, Judge Navarro dismissed the
case. On January 30, 1988, complainant filed a motion
for reconsideration of the court's order, and numerous
other pleadings. However, on April 16,1988, Judge
Navarro retired without acting on his motion for
reconsideration.
On June 6, 1988, respondent Judge Pedro T. Garcia was
appointed to the position vacated by Judge Navarro.
According to complainant, respondent Judge Garcia also
refused to act on his motion for reconsideration and on
his other pleadings in the Silverio case praying for the
immediate arraignment and trial of Silverio.
Finally on August 15, 1988, Judge Garcia issued an order
for the arrest of Silverio and set his arraignment on
October 18, 1988.
The accused filed a motion for postponement which the
complainant opposed. Nevertheless, Judge Garcia
granted Silverio's motion, and made it appear in his
order that there had been no objection by the
complainant. The latter filed two manifestations and
memoranda objecting to the judge's statement in the
order of October 18, 1988.
On November 29, 1988, respondent Judge issued an
order chastising Attorney Sesbreo for the insolent,
disrespectful, and contemptuous language of his
pleadings and for imputing that he (respondent Judge)
granted Silverio's motion for postponement without his
(Atty. Sesbreo's) knowledge and consent.
Attorney Raul H. Sesbreo has charged respondent Judge
Pedro T. Garcia with the following misfeasances:
1. Neglect of duty for delay in acting on the
complainant's pleadings praying for the arrest and
arraignment of Silverio;
2. Dishonesty or serious misconduct if the respondent
Judge misrepresented in his Certificates of Service for
the months of May or June, 1988 that there were no
motions pending resolution in his sala, so he could
collect his salary for that period;
3. Oppression for warning the complainant in his
Order of November 29, 1988 that the complainant would
be declared in contempt of court if he repeats the
allegedly offensive language he used in his two
Manifestations/Memoranda dated October 19,1988,
without giving complainant an opportunity to explain
that the language in his pleadings was not insolent,
disrespectful, nor contemptuous; and
4. Acts of impropriety or intemperance for accusing
the complainant, without factual basis, of making a
veiled threat that he would file administrative charges
against Judge Garcia should the latter decide Criminal
Case No. CU-10568 in favor of Silverio.
Complainant explained that he opposed the accused's
motion for postponement of the October 18, 1988
hearing because four (4) long years have already elapsed
since Criminal Case No. CU-10568 was filed in 1985, but
due to the many postponements granted by the court to
the accused, the latter has yet to be arraigned. While he
was agreeable to the postponement of the October 18,
1988 hearing, complainant wanted the court to limit the
delay to only one month, or not later than November 18,
1988. However, respondent Judge reset Silverio's
arraignment on December 7, 1988 although the accused
was also scheduled to appear in Branch 9 on that date,
and that respondent Judge would by then have gone on
leave of absence. As it happened later, Silverio did not
appear in both salas of the court.
In his comment on the verified complaint, respondent
Judge explained that when he assumed the position of
Presiding Judge of Branch 20 on June 6, 1988, his
predecessor had previously issued an Order on March 30,
1988, deferring action on all motions and pleadings in
the case "pending on whatever action the Court of
Appeals may take on the Motion for Reconsideration filed
by the private respondent." (p. 30, Rollo.) On June 20,
1988, he called complainant's attention to that order of
Judge Navarro. He explained that the delay in resolving
complainant's motions could not be helped because "the
entire records of the above-entitled case is still with the
Court of Appeals in Manila" (Annex A of Respondent's
Answer).
In his order dated June 27, 1988, respondent Judge
remarked that the complainant's Urgent Motion dated
June 26, 1988 was "highly litigious" meaning hostile and
provocative (p. 54, Rollo).
Upon receipt of the records from the Court of Appeals,
Judge Garcia issued on August 15, 1988 a warrant for
the arrest of Silverio and his co-defendant (Exh. E,
Respondent's Answer).
Silverio posted bail. The case was set for arraignment on
October 18, 1988. Instead of appearing in court on the
scheduled date, Silverio, through his counsel, Atty.
Reyes, asked for postponement on account of his heart
condition.
The transcript of the stenographic notes of the hearing
on October 18, 1988 records the following exchanges on
the defendant's motion for postponement:
ATTY. REYES:
We pray that the arraignment be
postponed to another date, your
Honor.
ATTY. SESBREO
The prosecution, your Honor, has
filed the opposition to that motion
today, October 18, and in that
opposition, we aver that up to today,
I have not been furnished with a copy
of said motion, so that the 3-day prior
notice as required in Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court has not been complied,
and therefore, that motion is just a
mere scrap of paper, and should be
denied for failure to comply with the
requirements. It is very clear in the
medical certificate that accused
Silverio is not confined in a hospital,
and he is a walking patient.
Considering that he is a walking
patient, there is no reason, no valid
reason, for him why he cannot attend
to this arraignment, your Honor. He
can come to court just to listen to the
reading of the information, which
activity is not strenuous. It will not
strain him physically. There is no
record that he is hospitalized. He can
walk and can move around, and there
is no impossibility to attend the
arraignment. As stated in our
opposition, your honor, accused
Silverio has filed cases against the
PNB for the recovery of his Delta
Motors Corporation and also against
the Securities and Exchange
Commission and a bank for the
rehabilitation of Philfinance. In all
these cases, he never complained
that he is sick. Only in this case, your
Honor, that he complained that he is
sick, and this case has been filed in
1985 yet, or more than three (3)
years ago, and he has not been
arraigned yet. So, this is another
dilatory tactic, your Honor.
COURT: (to Atty. Reyes)
By the way, the doctor who issued
the medical certificate, is he a
government physician?
ATTY. REYES:
Your Honor, please. He is a very
prominent heart specialist at the
Philippine Heart Center. And there is
no reason, your Honor, to doubt his
professional competence. I would not
like to take responsibility of advising
my client to come to Cebu at the risk
of exposing him to a heart attack. His
heart condition is not an ordinary
illness, your Honor.
COURT:
In the interest of justice, at least to
give the accused reasonable time to
come, only for purposes of
arraignment.
ATTY. REYES:
Yes, your Honor, if he gets clearance
from his doctor.
COURT:
If he gets clearance? If that is the
condition, we have no way of knowing
when will that be?
ATTY. REYES:
Well, at any rate, we can have the
next setting on another date, your
Honor.
ATTY. SESBREO:
If that is the condition that the
accused can only come if he gets
clearance from his doctor, then there
is no assurance, your Honor, that we
can have the arraignment.
COURT:
Yes, but in the meanwhile, we give
the benefit of the doubt for the
sickness of the accused in this case.
In the sense of fairness and good
judgment, we will give him the
chance to recuperate at least, if he is
really sick. It will be unchristian to
order him to come here if he is really
sick. He might die on the way.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. SESBREO:
May I suggest, your Honor, that during
the next setting, if it is possible, just
to have the arraignment of this case.
Anyway, we could have the trial ex-
parte later on without the presence
of accused. The accused, your Honor,
is a wailing patient and he should be
required to attend even in the
company of his physician so that if he
is really having a heart ailment, as
what was said he had a heart attack,
a physician should attend to him,
because if the accused says that he
will attend the arraignment only if he
gets clearance from his doctor
(unfinished)
COURT: (butted in)
The image of the Court will be placed
in a predicament, as it will appear
that this is a one-way traffic affair, if
we allow that condition. It is a matter
of public knowledge that the accused
here is a multi- millionaire. He might
think his is an exceptional case. That
is why I am asking the cooperation of
Atty. Reyes. For purposes of the
arraignment, to satisfy also Atty.
Sesbreo because this is his personal
case. He is the plaintiff himself, and
you know, Atty. Sesbreo is very
brave. He is one of the fightingest
lawyer here in Cebu. He fights for his
right, even to the extent of filing
cases after cases against Judges. In
other words, the Court would decide
this case on the level and would be
impartial and fair in handling this
case, in accordance with law, as his
conscience may dictate.
ATTY. SESBREO:
I would like to make it of record, that
if only the medical certificate shows
that the accused Silverio is confined
in a hospital, I could not have
interposed my objection, but he is
not confined and he is a walking
patient.
COURT:
Millionaires, usually do not want to be
confined in a hospital. They dislike
that. They just want to stay in their
luxurious homes, and they can afford
to call any specialist they want. They
can have the best services of any
specialist if they want to. So, I think
that the accused in this case do the
same. I know the old man, the late
Durano, He avoided staying in
hospitals if possible. He even sent his
personal physician to the United
States to fetch the best doctor when
he had the coronary ailment, the
heart attack.
The Court do not look with favor to
the accused in this case, but because
according to the words of Atty. Reyes
that he is not taking responsibility of
advising his client to come for the
arraignment, so we will just give him
at least the chance to appear for the
arraignment.
So, when shall be the most
reasonable time? Will it be next
month? For purposes of arraignment.
ATTY. SESBREO:
I suggest within one (1) month, your
Honor.
COURT:
Yes, within one month. We will do
that.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. REYES:
May I suggest, your Honor, because
we have another case, an
arraignment on December 7, 1988,
May I suggest that date?
COURT:
Here?
ATTY. REYES: ATTY. SESBREO:
In Branch 9, your Honor, before May I suggest within one month, your
Judge Gaviola. Honor, the arraignment be set within
one month, to conform with the
rules.
ATTY. SESBREO:
COURT:
I think there might be some hitches,
because the accused there in that
case has not been arrested, your Make it one month, but due to the
Honor. exceptional predicament of the
accused, we will just reset this to
December 7, 1988 at 8:30 in the
COURT:
morning, to give the accused the
chance.
Who?
ATTY. SESBREO:
ATTY. SESBREO:
In view of the suggestion of the
Accused Silverio has not been Court, I may accede. (pp. 3-12, t.s.n.,
arrested in that case. October 18, 1988; pp. 74-83, Rollo;
italics supplied.)
COURT:
The order of the Court dated October 18, 1988 reads as
follows:
Oh, Atty. Reyes?
On the suggestion of Atty. Edwin
ATTY. REYES:
Reyes, counsel for the accused
Ricardo Silverio, to reset the
He is bonded, your Honor. arraignment and pre-trial to
December 7, 1988 at 8:30 in the
morning, considering that the accused
ATTY. SESBREO:
Silverio is also appearing in Branch 9
of this Court on said date and without
But the bond has expired. The 30-day objection on the part of Atty. Raul
period has expired and the bonding Sesbreo the court is constrained to
company was ordered to produce the defer the arraignment of the accused
accused and to explain why the bond on said date and time. On suggestion
should not be confiscated. also of Atty. Sesbreo Atty. Reyes is
hereby directed to handcarry
the subpoena for his client and also
COURT:
the bondsmen to appear before this
Court on December 7, 1988 at 8:30 in
The problem of the Court now is the morning. (p. 61, Rollo.)
whether on December 7 he can be
here. Well, inasmuch as the accused
Postponements are left to the sound discretion of the
has another case in another sala on
court. The fact that the postponement exceeded one
December 7, we might as well set the
month from October 18, 1988 was not such a grave
arraignment here on said date, to
abuse of discretion as to call for disciplinary action
coincide with the date of the
against respondent Judge, it appearing that there was a
arraignment of the accused in Branch
good reason for resetting the arraignment of the accused
9, so that the accused will travel only
on December 7, 1988 because he (Silverio) would be
in one instance.
appearing in another sala on that date. He would have to
make only one trip to Cebu for the two cases. The
postponement of less than two months was a reasonable
period.
Complainant's allegation that respondent Judge
neglected to resolve with reasonable dispatch
complainant's pleadings, urging the immediate arrest and
arraignment of Silverio, Sr. is not supported by the
records of the case. Indeed, more than four (4) long
years have elapsed since Criminal Case No. CU-10568
was filed in 1985, but that delay may not be laid at
respondent Judge's doorstep for he assumed office as
Presiding Judge of Branch 20 on June 6, 1988 only.
However, respondent Judge erroneously believed that
the records of the case were still in the Court of Appeals.
The fact is that the records were returned by the Court
of Appeals to the lower court on January 9, 1987 yet.
On August 15, 1988, or two months after Judge Garcia
took over from Judge Navarro, he issued a warrant for
the arrest of Silverio. He clearly acted with reasonable
promptitude, but since the accused has not been
arraigned up to this time, there is reason for Attorney
Sesbreo's complaint that the court has not acted with
determination and resourcefulness to foil the dilatory
maneuvers of the accused and his lawyers.
The charge of dishonesty or serious misconduct against
Judge Garcia is not worth considering as it is
hypothetical, i.e., if respondent Judge stated in his
certificates of service for the months of May and/or
June, 1988 that no motions were pending resolution in
his sala. Complainant did not even attempt to present a
shred of evidence to prove this charge.
Complainant's charges of oppression and acts of
impropriety or intemperance refer to respondent Judge's
Order of November 29, 1988 which reads in part as
follows:
A cursory reading of the above-
mentioned facts will ineluctably show
that the court had traversed on the
middle ground of the road in order to
satisfy both parties. As to why Atty.
Raul Sesbreo filed two (2)
manifestations/memoranda using
insolent, disrespectful and
contemptuous language impressing
the court that the latter opted in
favor of the postponement of this
case, without his knowledge and
consent and that he was just
compelled to accept because the
Court, in effect, handled the
postponement in arbitrary manner is
beyond the comprehension of the honor as well as the majesty of the
Court. law. (pp. 23 & 23-A, Rollo.)
Parenthetically, the offended party We have read the two manifestations/memoranda
made mentioned to place on (Annexes C & D) of Attorney Sesbreo and find nothing
records his reaction to postpone the therein which can be described as "insolent,
arraignment, which was not reflected disrespectful and contemptuous" or "covertly
in the transcript of the stenographic contumacious" or resembling a "veiled threat" against
notes, especially his veiled threat, respondent Judge to warrant a warning that he may be
which is covertly contumacious when cited for contempt of court if he should repeat words of
he said in the two (2) the same import.
manifestations/memoranda that the
same are filed for: (1) for record
More than once in the past, we had occasion to admonish
purposes; and (2) for reference use in
judges not to be onion-skinned when confronted by
the future in the appropriate
dissatisfied lawyers or litigants. Their power to punish
opportuned time. The Court is not
for contempt is not a bludgeon to be used for the
naive to understand that should this
purpose of exacting silent submission to their rulings and
case be adversed to him, he would
orders however questionable or unjust they may be. It
use this incident as a means to
should be used only to protect and vindicate the dignity
vindicate or retaliate against the
and authority of the court (Slade Perkins vs. Director of
Presiding Judge. It is already a matter
Prisons, 58 Phil. 271). Courts should exercise their
of public knowledge that movant
power to punish for contempt on the preservative and
counsel is in the habit of filing cases
not on the vindictive principle, on the corrective and not
against any government official
on the retaliatory idea of punishment (Villavicencio vs.
before whom the investigation or
Lukban, 39 Phil. 778; People vs. Alarcon, 69 Phil. 265;
hearing are conducted whenever the
Gamboa vs. Teodoro, L-4893, May 13, 1952; People vs.
orders or decisions are adverse to
Rivera, L-364, May 26, 1952; In re Lozano, 54 Phil. 801).
him.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Pedro Garcia is
Let it be known that it either
admonished to abstain from intemperate and abrasive
pressure nor threat/influence of any
language in his orders. He is further urged to be decisive
material considerations whatsoever
and resourceful in implementing the processes and
can dissuade the court from properly
orders of his court. He should dispose of his cases with
exercising and dispensing the
equal dispatch, whether the parties be menials or
administration of justice.
millionaires, so that the aggrieved party will have no
reason to complain that justice is only for the rich and
To think that one has the absolute influential and that the poor must await the rich man's
monopoly of legal knowledge and pleasure.
virtue is downright officious and a
pretension of the highest magnitude.
SO ORDERED.
They say, in heaven one can not find
a saint who was never humble here
on earth. Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,
Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Corts,
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
xxx xxx xxx
Fernan, C.J., took no part.
Without further digging into the
intricacies and insolent words, which
are self-evident and self-explanatory, $ + GRSI Copyrightregno N94-027
the Court hereby warns him not to G.R. No. 77756 March 26, 1990
repeat using words of the same PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. vs. RENATO M. JAVIER
import and meaning, otherwise the
Court will be constrained to cite him
Republic of the Philippines
for contempt of court in order to
protect and enforce its dignity and
 SUPREME COURT THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING violet powder to use as purchase
THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND money (pp. 2-3, tsn, Dec. 2, 1985).
REASONABLE DOUBT CONSIDERING
Manila
THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT
Sgt. Aladano and Brgy. Capt. De La
ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE
Cruz found appellant at around 4:45
THIRD DIVISION DOUBT. (Appellant's Brief, p. 1; Rollo,
o'clock that afternoon and
p.41)
approached him De La Cruz, who was
G.R. No. 77756 March 26, 1990 appellant's cousin, introduced Sgt.
Hence, this appeal presents the issue of whether or not Aladano to appellant. Sgt. Aladano
the quantum of evidence sufficient to render a judgment intimated his desire to buy
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt has been met. marijuana. For marijuana in two (1)
vs.
aluminum foils, Sgt. Aladano gave
RENATO MENDOZA JAVIER y TORRES, accused-appellant.
appellant the marked money.
The information filed on September 25,1985 on the basis
Thereafter, appellant left.
of a buy-bust operation conducted by the Narcotics
The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-
Command (NARCOM) headed by Police Lieutenant
appellee.
Leonardo Lavares reads: After some time, appellant returned.
He handed over to Sgt. Aladano
Citizens Legal Assistance Office for accused-appellant. something wrapped in a piece of
That on or about the 11th day of
paper. When Sgt. Aladano opened the
September 1985, in the municipality
package, he found the two small
of Las Pinas, Metro Manila, Philippines
packages of marijuana. Immediately,
and within the jurisdiction of this
he signaled his companions who were
Honorable Court, the above-named
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: more or less 7 to 10 meters away
accused did then and there wilfully,
from them (p. 7, tsn, January 6,
unlawfully and feloniously sell and/or
1986).
Defendant-appellant Renato Mendoza Javier y Torres deliver dried marijuana fruiting tops,
was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati, a prohibited drug. (Rollo, p. 6)
Branch 133, in Criminal Case No. 19359 of violation of Appellant tried to escape, but Sgt.
Article II, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as Aladano held him by his waist. The
The facts for the prosecution are stated by the Solicitor
amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act team swooped down on appellant.
General in his Brief for the Appellee as follows:
of 1972 and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of life They introduced themselves as
imprisonment and a fine of P20,000.00. He now seeks a members of the NARCOM.
reversal of the judgment of conviction by the court a At about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon
quo assigning as errors, to wit: of September 11, 1985, the Narcotics
The team brought appellant and the
Command Unit (NARCOM) of the
marijuana to their headquarters.
Philippine Constabulary in Camp
I
Crame, Quezon City, received a
report that a certain Ray was selling Lt. Tita Advincula, a forensic chemist
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING marijuana to out-of-school youth in of the PC-INP Crime Laboratory,
CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE Pulang-Lupa, Las Pias (p. 7, tsn, Jan. examined the contents of the package
PROSECUTION'S WITNESSES WHICH 6,1986). (Exhibit "H") seized from appellant.
WERE TAINTED WITH She reported that the contents were
INCONSISTENCIES AND indeed marijuana.
The NARCOM Commanding Officer, Lt.
IMPROBABILITIES.
Manuel Raval, ordered Lt. Lavares to
form a team for the 'buy-bust' Appellant himself was examined at
II operation and to arrest the suspect. the PC Crime Laboratory. In her
The team was composed of Lt. report (Exh. E ), Engr. Isidra de
Lavares as team leader, Sgt. Aladano Guzman stated that she found
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN
buyer-poseur, Sgt. Lagos, Pfc. appellant positive of ultra-violet
COMPLETELY DISREGARDING THE
Labucay and Pulang-Lupa, Las Pinas flourescent powder on both hands,
TESTIMONY OF THE ACCUSED-
Brgy. Capt. De La Cruz who was the arms and face. (Rollo, pp. 55-58)
APPELLANT.
informant. The team immediately
proceeded to Tramo, Pulang-Lupa of
On the other hand, the defendant-appellant has a
III Las Pias. Upon arriving at the
different version of the facts as follows:
designated place, Lt. Lavares gave
Sgt. Aladano four 5 peso bills which
were previously dusted with ultra-
... [O]n September 11, 1985 between
the hours of five and six in the
evening, defendant-appellant was
having a snack in a store near their
house when all of the sudden, a group
of men, introducing themselves as
NARCOM agents, arrested him for
allegedly selling marijuana fruit tops.
After he was handcuffed, he saw a
red car with three men on board
which suddenly stopped behind him.
Two men alighted from the car and
approached him. One of them, whom
he later identified as Lt. Lavares,
placed dried marijuana leaves on his
pocket, while a policeman from Las
Pias, a certain Pat. Antonio,
demanded money from him in
exchange for his release. Since
accused-appellant failed to produce
any money, he was then brought to
Camp Crame in Quezon City,
At Camp Crame, he was brought to
the Office of the NARCOM and led into
a room where he was interrogated by
an investigator in civilian clothes.
Inside said room was a table, on top
of which were marijuana leaves
wrapped in an empty pack of Philip
Morris cigarettes (Exhs. "H" and "H-
1"). The said marijuana leaves were
not the same one (sic) which was
placed on his pocket earlier that day.
He was then forced to admit
ownership of such marijuana leaves
and was made to affix his signature
on the wrapper. Although very much
against his will, he nevertheless
reluctantly affixed his signature on
said wrapper because he was afraid
that more punishment would be
inflicted upon his person if he will
refuse to do what was told of him.
Before he was actually led inside said
room, he asked permission from his
escorts for him to use the comfort
room. While he was then relieving
himself, a NARCOM agent in civilian
clothes started kicking him. With said
NARCOM agent was another man who
held his hands and rubbed powder on
it. Accused-appellant attempted to
wash-off said powder but was
prevented from doing so by the two
men. It was then after he was
maltreated by the NARCOM agent and
his companion, when accused-
appellant was brought to the room for
investigation.
Two days after he was arrested, he
was brought before a forensic chemist
of the PC-INP Crime Laboratory who
examined his hands for possible
presence of ultra-violet powder. He
narrated to said chemist how said
powder got into his hands, but the
latter just laughed-off his claim.
(Brief for the Accused-Appellant, pp.
5-6)
At the arraignment, a plea of not guilty was entered by
the defendant-appellant.
During the trial, the witnesses for the prosecution
included Lt. Leonardo Lavares, head of the buy-bust
operation, Sgt. Aladano the poseur-buyer, Chemical
Engineer Isidra de Guzman of the PC Crime Laboratory
who conducted the physical examination of the
defendant-appellant to determine the presence of ultra-
violet powder on his person and Lt. Tita Advincula,
Forensic Chemist of the PC-INP Crime Laboratory who
examined the specimen submitted to her, in connection
with this case containing two foils of dried leaves.
The report submitted by Isidra de Guzman shows the
following findings:
xxxxxxxxx
Findings:
Examination conducted under the
ultra-violet radiation revealed the
following results:
A. Renato Mendoza POSITIVE for
the presence of a bright yellow ultra-
violet, flourescent powder on both
hands, arms and on his face.
B. The above-mentioned money bills
POSITIVE for the presence of a
bright yellow ultra-violet flourescent
powder. (Exh. E ) (Rollo, p. 21)
The pertinent portion of the report filed by Lt. Tita
Advincula reads:
xxx xxx xxx
Findings:
Qualitative examination conducted on
the above-mentioned specimen gave
POSITIVE result to the tests for
marijuana, a prohibited drug. (Exh. 1)
(Rollo, p. 21)
The witnesses presented by the defense were the
defendant-appellant himself and his mother in support of
the claim that the former was plainly a victim of an
incriminatory machination perpetrated by the members
of the alleged buy-bust operation team of Lt. Lavares.
On rebuttal, the prosecution presented Cpl. Antonio B.
Antonio to disprove the extortion charges against him by
the defendant-appellant who averred that the said police
officer demanded money in exchange for the latter's
release after his arrest.
On sur-rebuttal, the defendant-appellant's father
Eleuterio Javier was called to the witness stand to
bolster the claim that Cpl. Antonio was guilty of
extortion.
After trial, the defendant-appellant was adjudged guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as charged.
In resolving the issue of whether or not the degree of
proof required in criminal cases has been met, the
credibility of witnesses who appeared in court becomes a
foremost matter. On credibility, it is an oft-repeated rule
that this Court will not disturb the findings of the trial
judge unless he has plainly overlooked certain facts of
substance and value that, if considered, might affect the
result of the case (see People v. Jose Pirreras, G.R. No.
63462, November 6, 1989 and People v. Eduardo Paco y
Tamayo, G.R. No. 76893, February 27,1989)
The defendant-appellant alleges that the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses are tainted with
inconsistencies and improbabilities, namely: (a) that in
Sgt. Aladano's testimony, it took the accused twenty
minutes to get the marijuana leaves after the deal to sell
them to the poseur-buyer was made while according to
Lt. Lavares, almost an hour transpired before the
defendant-appellant came back and handed something to
Sgt. Aladano; (b) that the buy-bust operation team of Lt.
Lavares was planned, executed and successfully carried
out within a matter of two hours without any preliminary
surveillance on the defendant-appellant; and (c) that if
the defendant-appellant was indeed a drug pusher, the
fact that he trusted his cousin, Barangay Captain Dela it is a weak defense that is easy to concoct but difficult A. Yes sir.
Cruz, the alleged informer as to the poseur-buyer's to prove (See People v. Sergio Nabinat y Asag, G.R. No.
identity would mean that the latter had acted as 84392, February 7, 1990). It is difficult to believe that
Q. As a matter of
"middleman" in previous transactions otherwise the the NARCOM agents who did not know the appellant and
fact, not knowing
defendant-appellant would not allow the said informer to whom the appellant did not know would suddenly
anyone of them,
be involved in his illegal activity. pounce upon a completely unknown and innocent person
you did not have
taking a merienda and not only plant marijuana in his
any
clothes but also forcibly rub ultraviolet powder on his
We find the above allegation devoid of merit. The misunderstanding
hands while he was relieving himself in the toilet at
inconsistencies pointed out by the defendant-appellant with anyone of
Camp Crame. During the cross-examination of the
are too minor to affect the credibility of the prosecution them prior to
defendant-appellant, he made the following
witnesses who are law enforcers presumed to have September 11,
declarations:
regularly performed their duties in the absence of 1985, is it not?
convincing proof to the contrary. (People v. Lamberto
Borja y Martinez, G.R. No. 71838, February 26, 1990, xxx xxx xxx
A. I do not have
citing People v. Patog, 144 SCRA 429 [1986]; People v.
sir.
Said Sariol y Muhamading, G.R. No. 83809, June 22,
FISCAL:
1989 citing People v. Capulong, 160 SCRA 533 [1988];
People v. Boholst 152 SCRA 263 [1987] citing People v. Q. Who was the
Gamayon, 121 SCRA 642 [1983]; People v. Campana, 124 xxx xxx xxx one who placed
SCRA 271 [1983]; People v. Rosas, 149 SCRA 464 [1987]) this powder in
With respect to the alleged improbabilities, they are your hands?
Q. You were
grounded on fanciful conjectures and speculations which
present when Sgt.
cannot topple the evidence adduced by the prosecution.
Aladano testified A. A man, but I
Thus, we are constrained to give credence to the
here in Court and think he was not a
witnesses of the prosecution who had proven beyond
pointed to you? Narcom agent.
reasonable doubt every essential element of the crime of
which defendant- appellant was charged. After all,
"proof beyond reasonable doubt" is defined under Rule A. Yes sir. Q. According to
133, section 2 of the Rules of Court as follows: you, Lt. Lavares
this marijuana in
COURT: Was he
your pocket
... Proof beyond a reasonable doubt the one who
against you and
does not mean such a degree of proof planted the
did you file any
as, excluding possibility of error, marijuana?
case against this
produces absolute certainty. Moral
Lt. Lavares?
certainty only is required, or that
A. No Your Honor,
degree of proof which produces
it was Lt. Lavares.
conviction in an unprejudiced and A. I cannot file any
mind. case or complaint
FISCAL: because I was
handcuffed and
In the instant case, there is clear proof that the
they brought me
defendant-appellant was caught in flagrante delicto, Q. Prior to
to Camp Crame.
i.e., in the very act of selling and delivering dried September 11,
marijuana fruiting tops, a prohibited drug under Article 1985, did you
I, section 2, subsections (e) and (i) of the Dangerous know already Sgt. Q. You did not file
Drugs Act, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 179. Salvador Aladano? any complaint
Prosecution witnesses Sgt. Aladano and Lt. Lavares against the man
competently narrated the pertinent details attendant to who put this
A. No sir.
the crime of which the trial court convicted the powder which
defendant-appellant who was positively identified as the according to you is
perpetrator by the said witnesses. Furthermore, Q. In the same against your will
corroborative evidence was offered by the prosecution manner that you
through the testimonies of the chemical engineer and do not know also
A. No sir, because
forensic chemist of the PC Crime Laboratory. Lt. Lavares prior
I was brought
to September 11,
upstairs and I was
1985?
The defense of having been framed-up was not instructed to wait
satisfactorily proved by convincing evidence. Like alibi, for my parents.
 Q. Were you not FISCAL: We thought that
presented by the would be the
arresting officers proper subject of
Objection. No
to the this examination.
basis because
investigators in
according to the
Camp Crame?
witness, while he FISCAL:
admitted he met
A. I was presented this Antonio and
This is a direct
sir. conversation was
testimony of the
pondered on
witness and proper
asking why he was
Q. They wanted to basis should be
arresting his son.
get your statement laid.
but you refused to
give ant ATTY. GARIN:
COURT:
statement?
The basis is the
Sustain. Reform.
COURT: testimony of this
witness Antonio.
Now I am asking to ATTY. GARIN:
Q. Why did you
confirm or deny
refuse to give your
the same.
statement? Q. Were you able
to talk to your son
FISCAL: while he was in
A. Because I have
prison?
not committed any
offense. I was just But basis should be
taking my snack or laid. A. No sir.
'meryenda'
(Original Records,
ATTY. GARIN: Q. Your wife?
pp. 123-124).

I will reform the A. I do not know

The extortion theory advanced by defense was not also
question your whether my wife
substantiated as can be gleaned from the evidence on
Honor. was able to talk to
record. During the direct examination of the defendant-
my son while in
appellant's father, the defense failed to lay the basis of
prison.
the extortion charges, thus: Q. This Pat.
Antonio testified
here in Court Q. On or before
xxx xxx xxx
denying that he the ll th day of
never asked September 1985,
ATTY. GARIN: money from you, do you remember
did you have any this Antonio
conversation talking to your
xxx xxx xxx
regarding that wife?
extraction of
Q. Pat. Antonio money?
A. No sir.
likewise testified
he denies the
FISCAL:
allegations of your ATTY. GARIN:
son that he was
extracting money The question has
That will he all for
from you, what no basis.
the witness.
can you say about
(Original Records,
this?
ATTY. GARIN: pp. 130-131)
In the absence of any motive shown on the part of the
NARCOM agents to implicate the defendant-appellant and
considering the foregoing evidence for the prosecution,
we agree with the trial court's assessment that the
presumption of innocence in favor of the defendant-
appellant has been overcome.
The argument that the Narcotics Command cannot
organize a team and send it from Camp Crame to Las
Pias in a period of two hours has no merit. The
NARCOM's main function is to stem the traffic in
prohibited drugs and catch and prosecute violators of the
Dangerous Drugs Act. By the very nature of its work,
NARCOM should have agents on duty all the time and
ready to rush wherever they are needed. Two hours is
not too short for this purpose.
According to the appellant, the fact that he trusted the
barangay captain who introduced the buyers to him
shows that the captain must have acted as middleman in
other drug transactions. Assuming this to be true, we fail
to see how it proves that the appellant is innocent. In
truth, familiarity and trust do not arise solely from joint
participation in illegal acts. Mr. dela Cruz was not only a
leading member of the Pulang-lupa community but he
was also the appellant's relative. It simply did not occur
to the appellant that dela Cruz was against his drug
dealing activities to the extent of turning him in to the
authorities;
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment
appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J. (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes,
JJ., concur.
$ + GRSI Copyrightregno N94-027
{bmr
footnote.bmp}_78583_84_3_26_90_footnotes>mainG.R.
Nos. 78583 March 26, 1990
BENIGNO TODA, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 78583-4 March 26, 1990
BENIGNO TODA, JR., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ROSE MARIE TUASON-TODA,
respondents.
G.R. Nos.78696-7 March 26,1990
ROSE MARIE TUASON-TODA, petitioner,
vs.
BENIGNO TODA, JR., respondent.
Bautista, Picazo, Buyco, Tan & Fider for Benigno Toda,
Jr. Belo, Abiera & Associates for petitioner Rose Marie
Tuason Toda.
REGALADO, J.:
These consolidated cases seek a review of the decision
of the Court of Appeals promulgated on January
29,1987 1 in CA-G.R. CV Nos. 06675 and 07936, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered:
1. Ordering the payment of the cash
dividends declared on July 1, 1981
amounting to P2,191.62 and those
declared on July 25, 1981 amounting
to P40,196.12 to Rose Marie Toda as
her separate property. The cash
dividends declared on April 25, 1981
amounting to P37,196.30 (sic) are
hereby adjudicated to Benigno Toda,
Jr. as his share in the conjugal
partnership assets; the portion of the
order dated November 2, 1981 with
respect to the payment of the amount
of P360,095.12 to Rose Marie T. Toda
is set aside;
2. Ordering the payment of the
amount of P4,1623,982.24 to Rose
Marie Toda representing the balance
of P15, 749,135.32 obligated to be
paid as estate taxes by Benigno Toda,
Jr.;
3. Setting aside the order of the
lower court dated June 2, 1982
directing Benigno Toda, Jr. to pay
interest and non-payment penalty of
18% and 5%, respectively; and
4. Setting aside the order of the
lower court directing the annotation
of lien on the property of Benigno
Toda, Jr.
SO ORDERED.
Benigno Toda, Jr. (Benigno for brevity) and Rose Marie
Tuason-Toda (Rose Marie for brevity) were married on
June 9, 1951 and were blessed with two children.
Individual differences and the alleged infidelity of
Benigno, however, marred the conjugal union thereby
prompting Rose Marie to file on December 18, 1979 in
the former Court of First Instance of Rizal, 2 as Civil Case
No. 35566, a petition for termination of conjugal
partnership for alleged mismanagement and dissipation
of conjugal funds against Benigno.
After hearings were held, the parties in order to avoid
further "disagreeable proceedings," filed on April 1, 1981
a joint petition forjudicial approval of dissolution of
conjugal partnership under Article 191 of the Civil Code,
docketed as Special Proceeding No. 9478, 3 which was
consolidated with the aforesaid civil case. This petition
which was signed by the parties on March 30, 1981,
embodied a compromise agreement allocating to the
spouses their respective shares in the conjugal
partnership assets and dismissing with prejudice the said
Civil Case No. 35566, CA-G.R. No. 11123-SP of the Court
of Appeals and G.R. No. 56121 of this Court. The said
petition and the compromise agreement therein were
approved by the trial court in its order of June 9, 1981. 4
Thereafter, several orders were issued by the lower
court pertaining to the interpretation and
implementation of the compromise agreement, as
follows:
1. Order, dated November 20, 1981,
ordering Benigno, inter alia, to pay
Rose Marie the cash dividends on the
shares declared on April 25, 1981
amounting to P37,126.30; that
declared on July 25, 1981 amounting
to P40,196.12; that declared on July
1, 1981, given on September 25,
1981 amounting to P2,191.62; and
the payment of P360,095.12 to Rose
 Marie which is the balance of P2 conjugal partnership during the a
million paid on April 4, 1981; 5 marriage and further agree to obtain y
judicial approval of their said m
agreement as provided by Article 191 e
2. Order, dated June 2, 1982,
of the Civil Code. n
ordering Benigno to pay Rose Marie
t
interest at 18% per annum on the
o
amounts required to be paid in the (b) The following shall be adjudicated
f
order of November 20,1981, as well to petitioner Rose Marie Tuason-Toda:
t
as 5% non-payment penalty should
h
the said order of November 20,1981
(1) Forty Million Peson e
be sustained on appeal; 6
(P40,000,000.00) to be paid as e
follows: s
3. Order, dated December 9, 1982, t
denying Benigno's motion to inhibit a
(
Judge Rizalina Bonifacio Vera from t
a
hearing the case; 7 e
)
t
P
a
4. Order, dated March 1, 1983, e
x
ordering the annotation of a lien on t
e
certain properties of Benigno as i
s
security for any and all amounts that t
,
he may finally be ordered to pay to i
i
Rose Marie under the compromise o
n
agreement; 8 and n
t
e
e
r
5. Order, dated March 14, 1983, r
B
ordering Benigno to pay Rose Marie e
e
the amount of P4,623,929.24, with s
n
interest and penalties thereon t
i
a
g
n
at the rates stipulated in the compromise agreement n
d
from date of at the rates stipulated in the compromise o
p
agreement from date of demand by Rose Marie. 9 T
e
o
n
d
The compromise agreement which, as earlier stated, was a
a
incorporated in the petition for dissolution of the l
,
conjugal partnership and was approved by the court t
J
below, contains the following stipulaitons: i
r
e
.
s
xxx xxx xxx s
t
h
h
a
4. For the best interest of each of e
l
them, petitioners have agreed to r
l
dissolve their conjugal partnership e
a
and to partition the assets thereof, o
s
under the following terms and n
s
conditions this document, a ,
u
pleading, being intended by them to p
m
embody and evidence their e
e
agreement; r
t
t
h
a
(a) Petitioners as the parties hereto e
i
agree upon the dissolution of their p
n
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i r o
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 b as stock dividends study room and
l of or on pre- T.V. room and,
i emptive zighta from the family
g pertaining to the rooin, all antiques,
a shares of stock in rugs, paintings of
t said corporation of Old Fort Manila,
i petitioner Rose books and
o Marie Tuason mementos.
n Toda's brother the Petitioner Benigno
u late Manuel Toda, Jr. commits
n Tuason, Jr. (of that no servant
d course, the now living in the
e original shares of Tolentino street
r the latter pertain apartments shall
t to petitioner Rose be evicted.
h Marie Tuason Toda
i also), free from all
(5) The San
s liens and
Francisco
a encumbrances
apartment at
g except for the
Apartment 905,
r estate tax lien.
No. 1750 Taylor
e Petitioner Rose
Street, San
e Marie Tuason Toda
Francisco,
m hereby grants
California, U.SA.,
e petitioner Benigno
and its contents,
n Toda, Jr. an
free from all liens
t irrevocable proxy,
and
. for three years
encumbrances,
through the 1983
except that
stockholders'
(2) All shares of petitioner Benigno
meeting whether
stock in San Nguel Toda, Jr. shall
annual or special
Corporation remove therefrom
to elect directors
registered solely in his personal
for all shares of
the name of effects.
stock she owns
petitioner Rose
directly or
Marie Tuason Toda
indirectly (6) The artifacts
whether stock
including those already removed
dividends or stocks
from the late by petitioner Rose
acquired on pre-
Manuel Tuason, Jr. Marie Tuason Toda
emptive rights
in San Miguel from the Madrid
including those
Corporation. Apartment at No.
acquired in the
4 San Pedro de
names of both
Valdivia. She shall
petitioners (4) The Banaba
return to it its
Benigno Toda, Jr. Forbes Park
silver ware, china
and Rose Marie conjugal dwelling
ware, paintings
Tuason Toda and its contents
and etchings. She
(whetherjointly or free from all liens
may retain the
alternately and encumbrances
three fans encased
'and/or'), free except that
in glass and may
from all liens and petitioner Benigno
remove her
encumbrances. Toda, Jr. shall
clothes, perfumes
remove therefrom
and toiletries, the
his personal
(3) All shares of Sansa painting ofa
effects including
stock in San Miguel shell dedicated to
furniture and
Corporation her, the painting
appliances in his
acquired whether of the Madonna
and tapestry (11) One share in present and
hanging in her Club Puerta de future, without
bedroom, 5 Hierro in Madrid, the consent of the
Persian rugs, 1 Spain if there is other;
writing desk and one registered in
chair and the 2 petitioner Rose
(2) All earnings
lamps thereon and Marie Tuason
from any
1 lamp on the Toda's name.
profession
night table, and
business or
the statuette given
(12) Share in industry shall
her by Hagedorn.
Montemar Beach likewise belong to
Club in Bagac, each of them
(7) Jewelry. Bataan respectively;
petitioner Rose
Marie Tuason Toda
(8) Motor vehicles (3) All expenses
agreeing to assume
registered in her and obligations
the balance of the
name. incurred by each
acquisition cost
of them shall be
thereof.
their respective
(9) Within forty-
and separate
five (45) days from
(c) All other properties of the responsibilities.
signing of this
conjugal partnership of whatever and
agreement, One
wherever located shall be adjudicated
Million Pesos (f) With the signing of this document,
to petitioner Benigno Toda, Jr. even
(Pl,000,000.00) as Civil Case No. 35566 of this same
though acquired in the name of
attorneys' fees Court, CA-G.R. No. 11123-SP and SC-
petitioner Rose Marie Tuason Toda or
petitioner Rose G.R. No. L-56121 shall be deemed
both of them she undertaking to
Marie Tuason Toda dismissed with prejudice as between
execute the corresponding deeds of
agreeing to hold the parties hereto. 10
conveyances.
petitioner Benigno
Toda, Jr. harmless
The parties then prayed that judgment be rendered:
from any claim fo (d) Petitioner Benigno Toda, Jr. shall
attorneys' fees and assume the payment of all conjugal
expenses that may obligations, petitioner Rose Marie (a) Approving the agreement for
be filed against Tuason Toda representing and voluntary dissolution and partition of
the conjugal warranting that she has no pending the conjugal partnership;
partnership or obligation or incurred no obligation
herself for chargeable to the conjugal
(b) declaring the conjugal partnership
services rendered partnership except those listed in
of petitioners dissolved and
to her in the Annex 'A' hereof.
adjudicating to each of them his or
prosecution of her
her share in the properties and assets
claims against said
If the Rosaria Apartment is subject to of said conjugal partnership in
conjugal
a mortgage loan and such loan is a accordance with the agreement
partnership or
conjugal debt, petitioner Benigno embodied in paragraph 4 hereof; and
against petitioner
Toda, Jr. shall assume such loan and
Benigno Toda, Jr.
shall obtain the discharge of the
or to secure her (c) enjoining the parties to comply
mortgage.
paraphernal with the terms and conditions of the
estate. aforesaid agreement. 11
(e) After the signing of this document:
(10) Two shares Ironically, the said agreement failed to fully subserve the
with two lots in (1) Each of them intended amicable settlement of all the disputes of the
Valley Golf & shall own, dispose spouses. Instead, as lamented by the counsel of one of
Country Club. of, possess, them, the compromise agreement which was designed to
administer and terminate a litigation spawned two new petitions, with
enjoy his or her each party initiating one against the other. Thus,
separate estate, illustrative of the saying that a solution which creates
another problem is no solution, the contradictory
interpretations placed by the parties on some provisions
of the agreement resulted in appeals to respondent court
and, eventually, the present recourse to us.
Benigno appealed from the aforestated orders of the
trial court of November 20, 1981, June 2, 1982,
December 9, 1982, March 1, 1983 and March 14, 1983
containing the directives hereinbefore respectively set
out. The same were disposed of by the Court of Appeals
as explained at the start of this decision.
Rose Marie now submits that the Court of Appeals erred:
1. In holding that the compromise
agreement of the parties herein
became effective only after its
judicial approval on June 9, 1981 and
not upon its execution on March
30,1981;
2. In setting aside the order of the
lower court dated June 2, 1981
directing Benigno to pay interest of
eighteen percent and non-payment
penalty of five percent; and
3. In setting aside the order of the
lower court directing the annotation
of Rose Marie's lien on Benigno's
property. 12
On the other hand, Benigno contends in his present
petition before us that:
1. The Court of Appeals erred on a
question of law when it affirmed the
lower court's award of P4,623,929.24
without trial and evidence-taking and
overruled petitioner's claim of
violation of his due process right;
2. The Court of Appeals erred on a
question of law and due process when
it upheld the lower court's denial of
petitioner's motion for her
inhibition/disqualification;
3. Since the document (the parties'
compromise agreement) explicitly
provided for assumption of liability
rather than agency to pay and since
there was no evidence-taking, the
Court of Appeals finding of an agency to conclusively explain such deduction, there exists the
to pay is reviewable as a question of legal presumption that all property of the marriage
law; and belongs to the conjugal partnership absent any proof
that it is the exclusive property of either spouse. 16 Since
Rose Marie failed to prove that the amount forms part of
4. The Court of Appeals on a question
her paraphernal property, it is presumed to be conjugal
of law involving the parol evidence
property. Consequently, Benigno is entitled to the said
rule. 13
amount of P360,095.12, hence he rightfully deducted
the same from the amount due to Rose Marie.
The award of cash dividends basically depends on the
date of effectivity of the compromise agreement as this
The issue regarding the annotation of the lien on
will determine whether the same is conjugal property or
Benigno's properties has been mooted by our resolution
separate property of the spouses.
dated Aprjl 3, 1989 wherein, at his instance, we ordered
the cancellation thereof upon his posting of the
We are in agreement with the holding of the Court of corresponding bond. In our resolution of February 26,
Appeals that the compromise agreement became 1990, we noted Benigno's comphance, approved the
effective only on June 9, 1981, the date when it was bond he filed, and ordered the cancellation of the hens
approved by the trial court, and not on March 30,1981 annotated on the certificates of title of the
when it was signed by the parties. Under Article 190 of propertiesinvolved.
the Civil Code, 14 "(i)n the absence of an express
declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation
Likewise, the order denying the motion to inhibit Judge
of property between spouses during the marriage shall
Rizalina Bonifacio Vera has become academic considering
not take place save in virtue of a judicial order." Hence,
that she no longer presides over the court where the
the separation of property is not effected by the mere
case was filed. Besides, as correctly explained by
execution of the contract or agreement of the parties,
respondent court, the groundfor inhibition raised by
but by the decree of the court approving the same. It,
Benigno is not valid it being merely on the basis of the
therefore, becomes effective on y upon judicial
judge having acquired knowledge of the facts
approval, without which it is void. 15 Furthermore,
surrounding the agreement of the parties, hence she
Article 192 of said Code explicitly provides that the
would be a material witness to the issue of the true
conjugal partnership is dissolved only upon the issuance
agreement which is contested by the parties. However,
of a decree of separation of property.
those facts came to the knowledge of the judge in the
course of her efforts to effect a compromise between
Consequently, the conjugal partnership of Benigno and parties and are also known to the parties.This is not a
Rose Marie should be considered dissolved only on June ground for disqualification; on the contrary, said, acts of
9, 1981 when the trial court approved their joint the judge were in accord with the rule encouraging
petition for voluntary dissolution of their conjugal compromises in litigations, especially between members
partnership. Conformably thereto, the cash dividends of the same family.
declared on July 1, 1981 and July 25,1981 in the
amount of P2,191.62 and P40,196.12, respectively,
Anent the tax savings of P4,623,982.24 obtained by
should pertain to Rose Marie; and that declared on April
Benigno, we hold that this forms part of the P40 million
2,5, 1981 in the amount of P37,126.30 ought to be paid
allocated to Rose Marie under paragraph 4 (b) (1) of the
to Benigno, pursuant to Paragraph 4 (c) of the
compromise agreement.We give credit to the
compromise agreement which awards to Benigno the
ratiocination thereon of the trial court as quoted with
conjugal assets not otherwise specifically assigned to
approval by respondent court:
Rose Marie.
The records show that petitioner
With respect to the amount of P360,095.12 which
Benigno Toda, Jr. paid only
Benigrio deducted from the P2 million supposed to be
Pl,125,152.48 in estate taxes,
paid to Rose Marie, it is not clear from the records where
although the amount stated in the m
said amount came from. The Court of Appeals, in holding
Compromise Agreement was
that it is conjugal and therefore belongs to Benigno,
P15,749,135.32. The balance of
presumed it to be in the nature of cash dividends
P4,623,929.24 is now being claimed
declared prior to the approval of the compromise
by both parties as aforestated. In the
agreement by reason of the fact that the amount was
opinion of this court, the pertinent
deducted by Benigno from the P2 million which he paid
terms of the Agreement as quoted,
on April 14,1981. While no sufficient proof was adduced
are clear and do not require any
 interpretation. In brief, under, the
Agreement, petitioner Rose Marie T.
Toda is adjudicated the fixed sum of
P40 million, to be paid as follows: (a)
Payment by petitioner Benigno Toda,
Jr. of the estate taxes, interests and
penalties thereon, pertaining to the
estate of the late Manuel Tuason, Jr.
in the amount of Pl5,749,135.32 as of
March 31, 1982; (b) P2 million within
30 days after signing of the
Agreement; (c) the balance within six
months after date of signing of the
Agreement. This Court notes that the
amount of taxes, interests and
penalties is fixed at P15,749,135.32
and this figure was provided by
Benigno Toda, Jr. There is no
provision as contended by petitioner
Benigno Toda, Jr. that the amount
was only an assumed liability and that
he could attempt to reduce it by suit
or compromise. It is clear that if the
amount of P4,623,929.24 is to be
credited to Benigno Toda, Jr. then
the P40 million which petitioner Rose
Marie T. Toda is to receive would be
short by that amount. This Court is
also of the opinion that under the
Agreement, petitioner Benigno Toda,
Jr. was constituted as agent to pay to
the government the liability of the
estate of the late Manuel Tuason, Jr.
in the fixed amount of
P15,749,135.32 and if he was able to
secure a reduction thereof, then he
should deliver to his principal such
reduction... 17
We do not believe that Benigno was denied due process
when the trial court resolved the motion of Rose Marie
for the payment of P4,623,982.24 without the benefit of
a hearing. The records disclose that the hearing thereon
was postponed twice at the instance of Benigno, which
prompted the court to thereafter consider the motion
submitted for resolution on the basis of the allegations
therein and the answer filed by counsel for both parties.
Benigno cannot now be heard to claim that he was
deprived of his day in court. Furthermore, respondent
court correctly held that the issue involved was more of
a question of interpretation of a contract rather than a
determination of facts. Benigno failed to make a
plausible showing that the supposed evidence he had
intended to present, if any, would not be merely
collateral matters.
Considering that the amount of P4,623,982.24 actually 8 Ibid., 122-125.
forms an integral part of the P40 million (minus the
lawful and authorized deductions that may be made
9 Ibid.,110-115.
therefrom) which Benigno categorically undertook to pay
to Rose Marie, the same must earn interest at the rate of
18% per annum and 5% non-payment penalty, the same 10 Ibid., 69-73.
being included in and within the contemplation of
Paragraph 4 (b) (1) (c) of the compromise agreement.
11 Ibid., 73.
Said provision of the agrdement provides for the
payment of the interest and penalty upon non-payment
of the balance of the P40 million after the specific 12 Ibid., 22.
authorized deductions therefrom. Since the amount of
P4,623,982.24 was not to be lawfully deducted by
13 Ibid., G.R. Nos. 78583-84,13-26.
Benigno, as hereinbefore explained, it constitutes part
of the contemplated contingent balance which might tum
out to be due to Rose Marie and, therefore, subject to 14 Now Art. 134 of the Family Code.
the imposition of said increments on Benigno's liability.
15 Lacson vs. Lacson, et al., 24 SCRA
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby 837 (1968); see also Tolentino, Civil
AFFIRMED, with the modification that Benigno Toda, Jr. Code, Vol. 1, 1987 Ed., 487.
is hereby ordered to pay Rose Marie Tuason Toda
interest at the rate of a 18% per annum and 5% non-
16 Article 160, Civil Code.
payment penalty on the tax savings of P4,623,982.24
from date of formal demand until the same is fully paid.
17 Rollo. G.R. Nos. 78696-61-62.
SO ORDERED.
$ + GRSI Copyrightregno N94-027
{bmr footnote.bmp}62603_3_27_90_footnotes>mainG.R.
Melencio-Herrrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and
No. L-62603 March 27, 1990
Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
UNITED REALTY CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
ET AL.
Republic of the Philippines
Footnotes
SUPREME COURT
1 Justice Jose A.R. Melo, ponente,
with Justices Ricardo P. Tensuan and
Manila
Jaime M. Lantin, concurring; Rollo, G.
R. Nos. 78583-84, 29-45.
FIRST DIVISION
2 Presided over by then Judge
Rizalina Bonifacio Vera. G.R. No. L-62603 March 27, 1990
3 Rollo, G.R. Nos. 78696-97,69-74. UNITED REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and REVEREND FATHER JOSE
4 Ibid., 75-84.
TORRALBA SY, respondents.
5 Ibid., 85-98.
6 Ibid., 102-105.
GANCAYCO, J.:
7 Ibid., 62.
Whether the contract of lease is for a definite or
indefinite period of time and the applicability of the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 20 and Batas
Pambansa Bilang 25 are the issues in this case.
The facts are undisputed.
In March 1964 and December 1964 petitioner and private
respondent Rev. Father Jose Torralba Sy, entered into
separate contracts of lease over two apartments located
at 913-E and 193-F Josefina Street, Sampaloc, Manila,
with the common provision covering its duration as
follows:
To hold the same for one month from
the (15th day of March, 1964 for Apt.
No. 913-E and lst day of January,
1964 for Apt. No. 913- F) and so on
from month to month at a rent of
TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P200.00),
Philippine Currency, per month,
payable in advance on the first TEN
(10) days of each calendar month,
until the lease shall terminate, which
termination shall be determined by
either party giving FIVE (5) days
notice in writing. 1
It was further stipulated in the two contracts that "in
case the lessee shall continuously withhold possession of
the apartments after he or she has been properly
notified of the termination of his or her right to occupy
the same, the lessor shall be entitled to collect P400.00
every month or fraction thereof, as reasonable
compensation for the use of the place and as damages."
Private respondent removed the portion separating the
two apartments and converted the same principally for
use as a Buddhist chapel.
On August 1, 1970, petitioner leased to private
respondent the apartment at 937-E Josefina Street,
Sampaloc, Manila, effective August 1, 1970 for the
monthly rental of P300.00, 2 payable in advance within
the first ten (10) days of the month for his use as
residence only. It was also stipulated in said contract
that "in case the lessee shall continuously withhold
possession of the apartments after he/she has been
notified of the termination of his/her right to occupy the
same, the lessor shall be entitled to collect P500.00
every month or fraction thereof, as reasonable
compensation for the use of the place and as damages.
On September 24, 1975, petitioner sent a letter to Republic Act No. 6359 defines
private respondent that effective November 1, 1975 the 'dwelling unit as follows:
new rental for the two apartments will be P500.00 per
door or P1,000.00 for the two doors, likewise payable in
"A dwelling unit
advance within the first ten (10) days of the calendar
refers to a house
month, with the request that petitioner be informed of
and lot used for
private respondent's decision as to the new rate not
residential
later than October 25, 1976 so that it may be guided
purposes and shall
accordingly. 3 Instead private respondent complained to
include not only
the Department of Public Information, Malacanang,
buildings, dwelling
Manila. In the confrontation between the parties, the
places, except
Presidential Complaint and Action Committee found that
motels, hotels, or
there was no violation of P.D. No. 20 as the subject
hotel rooms; but
premises are being principally as a Buddhist Temple and
also those used for
therefore are not covered. Private respondent then sent
home industries or
a letter-complaint thru counsel dated November 13,
retail store if the
1975 to them Asst. Executive Secretary Ronaldo E.
owner thereof and
Zamora who in response issued Opinion No. 480, Series
his family actually
of 1975 dated November 20, 1975 signed by Deputy
live therein and
Executive Secretary Roberto V. Reyes. 4 Therein it was
use it principally
held that the increase in rental demanded was in
for residential
violation of P.D. No. 20 and that as 1/4 of the two-door
purpose; Provided
apartments is being used likewise as a chapel incidental
, That in case of a
to the calling of the private respondent as a monk it
retail store the
cannot be called as a commercial or public establishment
capital thereof
or as a place for the exercise of one's profession because
does not exceed
the same is not for profit.
five thousand
pesos." (Emphasis
However, on November 16, 1976, in response to the supplied.)
letter of petitioner, Secretary Ronaldo E. Zamora, as
Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs, issued Opinion
Thus if the leased apartment units are
No. 629, Series of 1976, as follows:
used principally for purposes of
religious worship, the incidental fact
While it may be that Father Sy and/or his family live
conceded arguendo that for being therein will not include them in that
used as a place for worship, the class of tenants favored by the
premises may not necessarily be emergency law on housing (Morales
considered as commercial for vs. Zamora, 31 Phil. 204). In such
purposes of ruling out the case, the matter of regulating the
applicability of Presidential Decree monthly rentals become conventional
No. 20 dated October 12, 1972, between him and the URC. This
which freezes rates of rentals of should not be understood to mean,
dwelling unit at their present levels however, that the latter is free to
when the same do not exceed demand an arbitrary amount. Equity
P300.00 per month, it is equally true and justice require that both parties
that the same will, as it does, not fall observe reasonable terms and
within the protective mantle of the conditions in bringing about a mutual
decree. covenant.
It is to be noted that the decreed Under the circumstances, therefore,
prohibition against rental increase this Office, on equitable
applies only to dwelling units or lots considerations and for reasons of
used for residential purposes, the public policy, believes that rental
monthly rent of which does not increases should be raised to
exceed P300.00. On this point reasonable levels only. 5
On January 3, 1977, petitioner through counsel
furnished private respondent through counsel a xerox
copy of said Opinion No. 629, Series of 1976 and
demanded that the private respondent vacate and
surrender the two premises within five (5) days from
receipt of the same and to pay his rental indebtedness
minus the deposit made. Nevertheless, private
respondent failed to vacate the premises.
Hence, petitioner filed a complaint for unlawful detainer
in the City Court of Manila on March 7, 1977. After the
issues were joined and the trial on the merits, a decision
was rendered on February 16, 1981 dismissing the
complaint and counter-claim without pronouncement as
to costs. Both parties asked for a reconsideration of the
decision but the same was denied. Hence, both parties
appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila,
wherein in due course a decision was rendered on
December 28, 1981 affirming the judgment of the City
Court with the modification finding private respondent
entitled to moral damages in the amount of P4,000.00,
exemplary damage ages in the amount of P2,000.00 and
attorney's fees of P2,000.00 and the costs of the suit. A
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied
by the trial court in an order of February 25, 1982.
Hence, a petition for review was filed by petitioner with
the Court of Appeals, wherein after the issues were
joined, a decision was rendered on October 7, 1982
dismissing the petition with costs against petitioner. 6 A
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the
decision was denied in a resolution of November 17,
1982.
Thus, this petition.
A reading of the two contracts of lease entered into
between petitioner and private respondent hereinabove
reproduced show that its period is from month to month
and that the lease may be terminated when either party
gives a 5 days notice in writing.
No doubt such a stipulation between the parties
demonstrates that the agreement of lease is for a
definite period and not for an indefinite period as held
by the appellate court.
In Rantael vs. CA, 7 involving a similar contract of lease
between the parties this Court found that a lease on a
month to month basis expires after the last day of the
30th day period repeating the same cycle of the 30-day
period until either party express their prerogative under
their agreement to terminate the same.
The only difference between Rantael and the present WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of
case is that in the former the parties may terminate the the Court of Appeals dated October 7, 1982 and its
agreement upon 30 days notice while in this case, the Resolution dated November 17, 1982 are hereby
agreement is that the termination by either party may reversed and set aside and another judgment is hereby
be upon 5 days notice. Such difference is of no moment. rendered ordering private respondent and/or his heirs or
And such agreement is binding and is the law between successors-in-interest to immediately vacate the
the parties. premises of the property in question and to pay the
unpaid rentals thereof of P1,000.00 a month for the two
apartments until they vacate the premises, with costs
Since the lease agreement in question is for a definite
against private respondent.
period it follows that petitioner has a right to judicially
eject private respondent from the premises as an
exception to the general rule provided for in Section 4 of SO ORDERED.
P.D. No. 20 which provides as follows:
Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Except when the lease is for a
definite period, the provisions of
Grio-Aquino, J., took no part.
paragraph (1) of Article 1673 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines insofar as
they refer to dwelling unit or land on
which another's dwelling is located
shall be suspended until otherwise
Footnotes
provided; but other provisions of the
Civil Code and the Rules of Court of
the Philippines on lease contracts 1 Exhibits A and A-1; page 6, Rollo.
insofar as they are not in conflict with
the provisions of this Act, shall apply.
2 Exhibit A-2.
(Emphasis supplied.)
3 Exhibit B.
Moreover, under Section of 5(f) of B.P. Blg. 25 one of the
grounds for ejectment is the expiration of the period of
a written lease contract. In this case, because of the 4 Exhibits D and D-2
failure of the private respondent to pay the increased
rental demanded by petitioner, petitioner elected to
5 Exhibit E-1; pages 44-45, Rollo.
terminate the contract and asked the private respondent
to vacate the premises. A lease contract may be
terminated at the end of any month, which shall be 6 Madame Justice Milagros A. German
deemed terminated upon the refusal to pay the was the ponente, concurred in by
increased monthly rental demanded by the petitioner, Justices Carolina C. Grio-Aquino and
provided the same is not exhorbitant. 8 Vicente V. Mendoza.
Further, there is no question in this case that the two 7 97 SCRA 453 (1980).
apartments subject of litigation if not a greater portion
thereof is not used by private respondent as his
8 Vda. de Kraut vs. Lontok, 7 SCRA
residence but for a Buddhist Temple. Thus, it is with
281 (1963).
more reason that this lease agreement does not fall
within the protective mantle of the provision of P.D. No.
20 and B.P. No. 25 which covers only dwelling units. $ + GRSI Copyrightregno N94-027
{bmr footnote.bmp}87585_3_27_90_footnotes>mainG.R.
No. 87585 March 27, 1990
Lastly, considering that during the pendency of this
BLUE MANILA, INC. vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
appeal, the private respondent died on August 23, 1987,
COMMISSION, ET AL.
thus the said lease agreements were effectively
terminated by the death of private respondent who is
the lessee of the premises in question. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
 Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 87585 March 27, 1990
BLUE MANILA, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PHILIPPINE
OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION and
EMMANUEL E. ABELLANEDA, respondents.
Capuyan & Quimpo Law Office for petitioner.
Manuel L. Montilla for private respondents.
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
The petition for certiorari alleges a single ground for the
allowance of the writ, to wit:
THE HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION ACTED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR IN
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE DECISION OF
THE PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS
EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION
DESPITE CLEAR AND PATENT
CONFLICT BETWEEN THE FINDINGS OF
FACT AND LAW AND THE DISPOSITIVE
PORTION OF THE DECISION. (p. 11,
Rollo.)
The petitioner is the recruitment agent that shipped the
private respondent, Emmanuel Abellaneda, to the Middle
East to serve for a period of six (6) months as a seaman
on the vessel of its foreign principal, the Seatrans
Offshore Ltd. After his contract was preterminated, he
sued for his unpaid wages. The facts, as alleged in the
pleadings and summarized in the decision of the POEA,
are as follows:
The complainant in his complaint-
affidavit alleged that sometime in
May, 1986, he applied for overseas
work with respondent Blue Manila,
Inc. On September 16, 1986, he was
sent to Bahrain to board the vessel
'GRAY-VANGUARD' as AB/Oiler at the
agreed basic salary of US$335 per
month for a period of six (6) months
with a further understanding that he
will receive a war zone bonus at 100%
of his basic salary plus overtime pay.
On October 3, 1986, the vessel
actually entered the war zone until
November 10, 1986. On said date, the
principal SEATRANS OFFSHORE LTD.
informed the crew that its lease over
the vessel had expired, hence, the
crewmembers disembarked at Kharg
Island, Iran where complainant was
offered the same job to work with the
vessel MV 'SEATRANS 23' leased by
the same principal. Complainant
accepted the offer and on November
11, 1986, he embarked and
commenced working thereon with the
sole purpose of completing the
remaining portion of his contract.
However, from the time he started
working, he was not paid his salary
and other benefits due him. This
prompted him to get cash advances
for his family's sustenance in the
Philippines allegedly amounting to
$512.48. For the same reason,
complainant voluntarily decided to
disembark on January 28, 1987 at
Bahrain. While therein, he demanded
from the Operations Manager of
Seatrans, Mr. Horst Jager, his long
overdue salaries and other benefits
covering the period from November
11, 1986 to January 28, 1987.
However, instead of giving in to
complainant's just and valid claims,
Mr. Jager charged him for simulated
offenses for which complainant was
incarcerated from 8:00 P.M. of
January 28, 1987 until 10:00 A.M. of
the next day. After representation
with the Immigration Office in
Bahrain, Mr. Jager promised that
complainant shall receive his entire
salary in Manila giving him a letter
dated January 29, 1987 (attached as
Annex 'A' of the complaint) addressed
to Capt. Mangabat to evidence said
promise. However, in Manila, Capt.
Mangabat refused to pay said claim
for alleging that the money has not
been remitted yet. Despite repeated
demands for payment Capt. Mangabat
still refused to pay complainant's
claim saying that the latter was no
longer entitled to receive his claim
considering that respondent has paid
for his plane fare and his
replacement.
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, respondent in its
answer specifically denied the money
claims of complainant asserting that
complainant had obtained substantial
cash advances and that it had paid
the airfare ticket of complainant and
his replacement which consequently
compensated, satisfied and/or
extinguished the same. Respondent,
further claimed that if ever there is
any balance due the complainant, the
same has not been remitted by its
foreign principal Seatrans Offshore
Co., Ltd. (pp. 46-48, Rollo.)
The POEA ascertained that the amount of $1,451.22 was
the cost of airfare for both complainant and his
replacement. Hence, it concluded that complainant's
airfare was half of that amount, or $725.64 (p. 50,
Rollo.)
After computing the unpaid wages due Abellaneda as
well as the cash advances he had received from his
employer, the POEA rendered judgment ordering
respondent to pay to complainant the following amounts,
to wit:
1. THREE THOUSAND SEVENTEEN and
54/l00 US DOLLARS (US$3,017.54) or
its equivalent in Philippine Currency
at the time of payment, representing
the balance of unpaid salaries, less
cash advances in the total amount of
P23,500.00;
2. SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE and
64/100 US DOLLARS (US$725.64) or
its equivalent in Philippine Currency
at the time of payment, representing
airfare ticket of complainant's
replacement;
3. TEN PERCENT (10%) of the total
award as and by way of attorney's
fees.
 There is no other pronouncement. (p.
51, Rollo.)
It may be observed that in computing the amount due
Abellaneda, the POEA failed to deduct the airfare of
US$725.64 which his employer paid for his return trip to
Manila. Instead, the POEA erroneously ordered the
petitioner to pay him the airfare (US$725.64) of his
replacement, as if Abellaneda (instead of the petitioner)
had advanced the cost of said airline ticket.
In its appeal to the NLRC, the petitioner failed to notice
this error in the decision (p. 46, Rollo). It assailed only
that part of the decision holding it solidarily liable with
its foreign principal for the money judgment in favor of
Abellaneda. It argued that:
1. Respondent Blue Manila, Inc. [now
petitioner] is merely an agent of a
disclosed principal and it has not
waived its right to non-liability nor
acted beyond its authority; and
2. It is error to state that the joint
and solidary liability of the local
agent and the foreign principal is
well-settled in this jurisdiction. (p.
53, Rollo.)
Upon the affirmance in toto of the POEA decision by the
NLRC (p. 65, Rollo), the petitioner filed this petition for
certiorari pointing out the inconsistency between
paragraph 2 of the dispositive portion of the POEA
decision and the finding in the body of the decision that
since "complainant (Abellaneda *) out of his volition
unilaterally preterminated his contract of employment,
..., it is only equitable that respondent (now
petitioner *) deduct the repatriation expenses from the
complainant's salary. However, it is unfounded to deduct
the airfare ticket of complainant's replacement from his
salary" in accordance with Sec. H (4), Part II of the
Standard Format which provides that "the seaman when
discharged shall not be liable for the transportation cost
of his replacement." (pp. 48-49, Rollo.)
The Solicitor General in his comment on the petition
admits an error in the dispositive portion of the POEA's
decision. He says:
... petitioner should not have been
ordered to pay private respondent
the sum of US$725.64 since the latter
did not spend for the transportation
of his replacement nor was the
amount reflected as a deduction from cash advances in the total of
his gross salary receivable. In the P23,500.00 and the sum of SEVEN
same manner, the cost of the ticket HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE and 64/100
for private respondent himself was US DOLLARS (US$725.64) or its
not reflected as a deduction from his equivalent in Philippine Currency at
salary receivable. Since petitioner the time of payment, representing
spent for the return ticket of private the airfare ticket for the repatriation
respondent, the amount must be of the complainant; and
allowed as additional deduction from
private respondent's unpaid salary so
2. TEN PERCENT (10%) of the total
that petitioner may be refunded of
award as and by way of attorney's
the amount spent for the return
fees.
ticket of private respondent as ruled
by the POEA. (pp. 97-98, Rollo.)
SO ORDERED.
He argues, however, that since the error was not raised
by the petitioner in its appeal to the NLRC, the error is Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea,
deemed waived. Errors of judgment may not be JJ., concur.
reviewed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
(Hermogenes vs. Amores, 111 SCRA 658). Appeal is the
proper remedy.
Footnotes
While the rule is that "No error which does not affect
the jurisdiction over the subject matter will be
considered unless stated in the assignment of errors and * Words in parenthesis supplied.
properly argued in the brief," the exception to the rule
is: "save as the court, at its option, may notice plain
$ + GRSI Copyrightregno N94-027
errors not specified, and also clerical errors" (Sec. 7,
{bmr footnote.bmp}79329_3_28_90_footnotes>mainG.R.
Rule 51, Rules of Court).
No. 79329. March 28, 1990.
MOBIL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, ET AL. vs. NATIONAL
The mathematical error in the POEA decision is a plain LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.
error which this Court may correct (Sec. 7, Rule 51,
Rules of Court). To overlook it would be inconsistent
Republic of the Philippines
with substantial justice, for it would permit a party to
unjustly profit from a mistake or inadvertence of
another or others, the POEA and the petitioner in this SUPREME COURT
case. It would also put a premium on a technicality
contrary to the spirit and purpose of the Labor Code
Manila
(Art. 221, Labor Code).
THIRD DIVISION
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The
dispositive part of the decision of the POEA and the NLRC
in Case No. M-87-06-525 is hereby modified as follows: G.R. No. 79329 March 28, 1990
WHEREFORE, premises considered, MOBIL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (MEA) and INTER-ISLAND
judgment is hereby rendered ordering LABOR ORGANIZATION-IBMEWA (ILO), petitioners,
respondent Blue Manila, Inc. to pay to vs.
complainant Emmanuel E. Abellaneda NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION; MOBIL OIL
the following amounts, to wit: PHILIPPINES, INC. (MOPI), MOBIL PHILIPPINES, INC. (MPI),
MOBIL PETROLIUM COMPANY, INC. (MOBILPET), J.P.
BAILLEAUX, E.G. JAVELOSA, V.S. TINTOC and F.U. UMALI;
1. THREE THOUSAND SEVENTEEN and
CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC. (CPI) and A.R. GUTIERREZ
54/100 US DOLLARS (US$3,017.54) or
and OTHER MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS,
its equivalent in Philippine Currency
respondents.
at the time of payment, representing
the balance of unpaid salaries, less
Bayani V. Faylona for petitioners.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for private
respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
In 1983, Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc. ("MOPI"), a domestic
corporation engaged in the marketing of petroleum
products, was the subject of sale negotiations between
Mobil Petroleum Company of New York ("Mobil Pet") and
Caltex Petroleum Company, New York, U.S.A., ("Caltex
Pet"). The negotiations covered, among other things, the
sale of (a) Mobil Pet's one hundred percent (100%)
interest in MOPI to Caltex Pet and (b) Mobil Pet's forty
percent (40%) interest in the Bataan Refining Company
("BRC").
To protect its interests, Mobil Employees Association
("MEA"), with whom MOPI-Luzon had an existing
Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") covering the
period from 1 May 1982 to 30 April 1985, inquired about
the impending sale in talking to officials of MOPI. The
latter were then non-commital as no definite agreement
had as yet been reached. The negotiations on the
proposed sale were taking place off-shore, i.e., between
two (2) foreign corporations, Mobil Pet and Caltex Pet,
outside the Philippines. The sale of Mobil Pet's 40%
interest in BRC was made one of the conditions
precedent to the perfection of the sale of MOPI. Finally,
approval by Philippine government agencies such as the
Board of Investments and the Central Bank of the
projected sale had yet to be obtained.
On 3 August 1983, the Philippine National Oil Company
("PNOC"), owner of sixty percent (60%) interest in BRC
signified its intention to buy all of Mobil Pet's interest in
BRC. Thus, on the same date, officials of MOPI issued a
memorandum circular addressed to all their employees
regarding the conclusion of the sale negotiations and
eventually, the cessation of MOPI's business operation on
31 August 1983.
In a letter dated 5 August 1983, MOPI's President, J.P.
Bailleaux informed all the employees that on 31 August
1983 their employment with the company would cease
as a result of MOPI's withdrawal from business. Mr.
Bailleaux however, assured them that they would be
paid compensation up to or until 5 September 1983; that
they would be given separation pay equivalent to 2.25
months basic salary as of 31 August 1983 for every year members of their respective Boards of Directors as
of service; and that their unused vacation leave for the respondents. Still later, another amendment to the
current year would be paid in cash. Simultaneously, complaint was filed to include as additional petitioner
notices of MOPI's withdrawal from business were also Inter-Island Labor Organization ("ILO"), with whom MOPI-
sent to the then Ministry of Labor and Employment Iloilo had a CBA for the period from 1 May 1982 to 31
("MOLE") and its regional offices in places where MOPI May 1985. Finally, a supplementary mental complaint
had branches. was filed charging respondents with another count of
ULP, i.e., failure of the latter to check-off and pay
petitioners' union dues for September, 1983.
In a letter dated 12 August 1983, MOPI employees
requested Mr. Bailleaux to improve their termination
package. In a decision in NLRC Case No. NCR-8-3929-83 dated 12
December 1984, 2 the Labor Arbiter dismissed the
complaint for failure of petitioner to prove that MOPI
On 18 August 1983, MOPI, thru Mr. Bailleaux, improved
was guilty of ULP and illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter
the employees' termination package considerably: (1)
found that the termination of all MOPI employees was
repayment of all personal loans of employees, except
caused by cessation of MOPI's business operations in the
those obtained under the company car policy, was
country; that in respect of this kind of termination,
waived by the company; (2) for purposes of computation
MOPI's only task pursuant to the Labor Code was to serve
of their termination pay, CBA increases due to union-
notice of termination on its employees and on the then
represented employees in October, November and
MOLE and its regional offices at least thirty (30) days
December 1983 on one hand were incorporated in their
before its effectivity date and to pay separation pay to
basic salary, while the budgeted merit increase from
affected employees in accordance with law; 3 that MOPI
September to December, 1983 for non-bargainable
did comply with these requirements; that the dissolution
employees on the other hand was added to their basic
was done in good faith, no proof having been presented
salary; (3) employees who were not previously scheduled
to establish that the dissolution was carried out to
to receive merit increases in 1983 were granted an
circumvent the CBAs between MOPI and the petitioner
adjustment to their basic salary; (4) the monthly cost of
unions; that the newly created subsidiary of Mobil Pet,
living allowance was included in the calculation of the
MPI, could not be categorized as a successor-in-interest
encashment of outstanding and unused vacation leave
of MOPI because MOPI's main line of business was the
for separating employees; (5) the ten (10) working days
marketing of petroleum products while MPI was engaged
sick leave encashment privilege under company policy
in the marketing of Mobil Pet's chemicals and
was granted to separating employees in Salary Groups 1
international business like high octane aviation fuels,
to 15 pro-rated on the basis of 8/12 of one year
marine fuels and exports; that Caltex Pet, upon
privilege; (6) the actual unused sick leave carry-over as
acquiring the shares of stock of MOPI caused the latter's
of December 31, 1975, maximum of 15 working days,
dissolution at the SEC; that MPI's hiring of some of MOPI's
was encashed irrespective of salary grouping of the
employees was merely for the purpose of liquidating and
affected separating employees; and (7) the 1983 year-
winding up the affairs of MOPI; that MOPI had not
end bonus was paid to separating employees pro-rated
restricted exercise of the right to self-organization of
on the basis of 8/12 of one year's privilege.
members of MEA, who had free access to the use of the
conference room of MOPI in Makati, which access had
Upon conclusion of the contract of sale between Mobil not been availed of by MEA; that MEA had not proved
Pet and Caltex Pet, on 31 August 1983, 1 the latter that its counsel, who was not an employee of MOPI, was
caused MOPI's dissolution by appropriate filings with the refused entrance to MOPI's Makati-based conference
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") in Manila. All room; and that, finally, check-off was no longer available
the employees separated from the service, 467 of them, considering that MOPI's relationship with the employees
were paid a total of P5,646,817.73 including loans had ceased by 31 August 1983.
waived, pursuant to the revised termination package.
Some of these employees were hired, on a contractual
In a resolution of the NLRC Second Division dated 6 April
basis, to wind up MOPI's affairs, by a newly formed
1987, petitioners' appeal from the decision of the Labor
subsidiary of Mobil Pet, Mobil Philippines, Inc. ("MPI").
Arbiter was dismissed for lack of merit.
On 31 August 1983, MEA filed a complaint for unfair
In the present Petition for Certiorari, petitioners claim
labor practice ("ULP"), illegal lay-off and separation
that private respondents committed acts constituting
benefits against MOPI with the National Labor Relations
unfair labor practices. These acts, in their allegations,
Commission ("NLRC"), National Capital Region. The
were:
complaint was later on amended to include Mobil
Philippines, Inc. ("MPI"), Mobil Pet, Caltex Pet and all the
 (a) the termination of the
employment of MOPI's employees
without notice to the petitioner
unions, in violation of relevant
provisions of their CBAS;
(b) the failure of private respondents
to check off and pay to petitioner
unions their dues for September
1983;
(c) the dissolution of MOPI and the
creation of MPI were done to
circumvent the CBA agreements
between MOPI and petitioner MEA on
the one hand and MOPI and petitioner
ILO on the other hand; and
(d) the interference with petitioner
unions' members in the exercise of
their right to self-organization by
refusing a non-MOPI employee the use
of the company conference room.
Petitioners supplementarily argue, apparently in relation
to (c) above, that MPI is a successor-in-interest of MOPI,
considering that MPI is a wholly owned subsidiary of
Mobil Pet in the same manner that MOPI was; that the
members of MPI's Board of Directors are the same
persons who had served as Directors of MOPI; and that
MPI had hired some of MOPI's former employees.
We do not find the contentions of petitioners persuasive.
The relevant provisions in the CBAs invoked by
petitioners are identical and read as follows:
EFFECTIVITY
Section 1. This agreement shall be
effective from the l st day of May l982
to 30th April 1985, subject to
automatic extension for yearly
periods unless terminated at the end
of the original period or any
subsequent year thereafter upon
sixty (60) days prior written notice by
either party to the other of its
intention to terminate, modify,
amend or supplement this
agreement. (Art. XVIII MEA-MOPI CBA,
Annex 'A'; Art. XIX, Annex 'LL' for ILO
CBA, emphasis supplied). 4
Art. II Management Clause
Section 1. The union recognizes the
following as the rights of the
company.
xxx xxx xxx
In cases of termination, dismissal,
lay-off and shut down, the company
may effect such actions, subject to
the provisions of the New Labor Code
and its implementing Rules and
Regulations.
In the exercise of its above rights,
time and circumstances permitting
the management whenever possible
shall enlist the support of the union
in actions affecting the vital interests
of the bargainable employees. Art II,
MEA CBA; Art. II, ILO CBA. 5
Examination of the CBA provisions entitled "Effectivity "
shows that the written notice to terminate that is
required to be given by either party to the other relates
to notice to terminate the CBA at the end of the original
three-year period or any subsequent year thereafter, in
the absence of which written notice, the duration of the
CBA would be automatically extended for one (1) year
periods. What is involved in the instant Petition is not,
however, the termination of the CBA itself, considering
that the sale by Mobil Pet of its wholly owned subsidiary
MOPI to Caltex Pet took place in 1983, in the middle of
original period of the CBAs. It appears to the Court that
the applicable provision is Article II, Section 1, quoted
above. Under Article II, Section 1, in cases of
termination of services of employees, the company is
required to comply with the provisions of the Labor Code
and its implementing Rules and Regulations and, "time
and circumstances permitting" and "whenever possible,"
management should enlist the support of the unions in
actions affecting the vital interests of the bargainable
(i.e., member) employees. It may be well to add that,
since actual notice was given to all of MOPI's employees,
including, of course, the employees who were members
of petitioner unions, such notice may also be regarded as
effectively the notice to the unions contemplated by the
CBA provision on "Effectivity."
Article 284 of the Labor Code as it existed in 1983
provided as follows:
Art. 284. Closure of establishment
and reduction of personnel. The
employer may also terminate the
employment of any employee due to
the installation of labor-saving
devices, redundancy, retrenchment
to prevent losses or the closing or
cessation of operation of the
establishment or undertaking, unless
the closing is for the purpose of
circumventing the provisions of this
title by serving a written notice on
the workers and the Ministry of
Labor and Employment at least one
(1) month before the intended date
thereof. In case of termination due to
the installation of labor-saving
devices or redundancy, the worker
affected thereby shall be entitled to a
separation pay equivalent to at least
his one (1) month pay or to at least
one (1) month pay for every year of
service, whichever is higher. In case
of retrenchment to prevent losses
and in cases of closures or cessation
of operations of establishment or
undertaking not due to serious
business losses or financial reverses,
the separation pay shall
be equivalent to one (1) month pay
or at least one-half (1/2) month pay
for every year of service, whichever
is higher. A fraction of at least six (6)
months shall be considered one (1)
whole year. (Emphasis supplied.)
Under Article 284 above, three (3) requirements may be
seen to be established in respect of cessation of business
operations of an employer company not due to business
reverses, namely:
(a) service of a written notice to the
employees and to the MOLE at least
one (1) month before the intended
date thereof;
(b) the cessation of or withdrawal
from business operation petitions
must be bona fide in character; and
(c) payment to the employees of
termination pay amounting to at least
one-half (1/2) month pay for each
year of service, or one (1) month pay,
whichever is higher.
As noted earlier, MOPI's employees and the MOLE were
notified in writing on 5 August 1983 that the employees'
services would cease on 31 August 1983, but that
employees would nonetheless be paid their salaries and
other benefits until or as of 5 September 1983. We
believe that is more than substantial compliance with
the notice requirements of the Labor Code. In respect of
requirement (c) above relating to payment of
termination pay to the employees, we also noted earlier
that the termination pay package given by MOPI to all its
employees far exceeded the minimum requirement of
one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service laid
down in Article 284 of the Labor Code. The very
generosity of the termination pay package thus given to
the employees argues strongly that the cessation of
business operations by MOPI was a bona fide one. It is
very difficult for this Court to believe that MOPI would
be dissolved and all its employees separated with
generous separation pay benefits, for the sole purpose of
circumventing the requirements of MOPI's CBA with
petitioner unions. Indeed, petitioners have not suggested
any reason why MOPI should have undertaken such a
fundamental and non-reversible business reorganization
merely to evade its obligations under the CBA. The
establishment of MPI with the same Directors who had
served as such in MOPI and the hiring of some former
MOPI employees for the purpose of settling and winding
up the affairs of MOPI, does not detract from the bona
fide character of MOPI's dissolution and withdrawal from
business. MPI's residual business consisting of the
marketing of chemicals, aviation and marine fuels as well
as exports, all of which constituted a fraction of the
prior business of MOPI, similarly does not argue against
the bona fide character of the corporate reorganization
which here took place. The net effect of the
reorganization was the liquidation by Mobil Pet of the
great bulk of its former business in the Philippines, the
dissolution of the corporate entity of MOPI and the
transfer of its physical assets and business to some other
Philippine entity owned and controlled by Caltex Pet,
presumably Caltex Philippines, without any impact upon
the foreign exchange reserves of the Philippines.
The final argument of petitioner unions need not detain
us for long. Having validly ceased to operate as of 31
August 1983, the duty of MOPI to cheek off and turn over
to petitioners union dues from their members for
September 1983, or until the expiration of the CBA in
accordance with its terms, also ceased. In respect of
alleged interference by MOPI with the rights of
petitioners' members to self-organization, petitioners
have not adduced any compelling reason for overturning
the findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that MOPI
had not interferred or encroached upon such right.
Petitioner MEA admitted that it had not been denied the
use of the company conference room. Indeed, this
matter appears to us to be a de minimis affair.
We conclude that petitioners have failed to show any
grave abuse of discretion or any act without or in excess
of jurisdiction on the part of the NLRC in rendering its
decision dated 6 April 1987.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED for
lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J. (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and
Cortes, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Comment, p. 12; Rollo, p. 74.
2 Rollo, p. 107.
3 See Article 284 (now Article 283) of
the Labor Code dealing with closing or
cessation of operation of the company
not due to serious business losses.
4 Petition, pp. 8-9; Rollo, pp. 10-11;
Comment, p. 6; Rollo, p. 175;
underscoring supplied.
5 Petition, p. 13; Rollo, p. 15;
underscoring supplied.
$ + GRSI Copyrightregno N94-027
{bmr footnote.bmp}80042_3_28_90_footnotes>mainG.R.
No. 80042 March 28, 1990.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ADOLFO QUIONES, ET
AL.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 80042 March 28, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ADOLFO QUIONES, RONILO CANABA, AMADO CONDA,
JR., ZALDY CIVICO and ALFREDO ABAN, accused-
appellants.
The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-
appellee.
Citizens Legal Assistance Office for accused-appellants.
CRUZ, J.:
On June 30, 1986, the bodies of three men were found
in a wooded area in barangay Tuaco, Basud, Camarines
Norte. The corpses were in a state of decomposition and
bore various contusions, stab and bullet wounds, and
other injuries indicating foul play. The victims were later
positively identified as Alexander Sy, Augusto Gabo and
Frisco Marcellana.
In due time, an information for robbery with multiple
homicide was filed against Adolfo Quiones, Alfredo
Aban, Zaldy Civico, Ronilo Canaba, Amado Conda, Jr.,
Santiago Solarte, Armando Buitre and one John Doe. 1
On their arraignment on November 13, 1986, Quiones,
Canaba, Aban, Civico and Conda pleaded not guilty. On
November 20, 1986, Conda, Canaba, and Quiones
withdrew their plea of not guilty and entered a plea of
guilty. 2 On April 1, 1986, Conda was allowed to
withdraw his former plea of guilty and substitute the
same With not guilty. 3 Solarte escaped and is presently
at large while Buitre was killed in an encounter with the
Manila police. 4
Judge Luis D. Dictado of the Regional Trial Court of Daet,
Camarines Norte directed the prosecution to present
evidence also against Quiones and Canaba despite their
plea of guilty, which they maintained even after being
informed of its possible consequences, including the
death penalty. After trial, judgment was rendered
convicting all the accused (except Solarte, who had not
yet been arrested, and Buitre). 5
The evidence for the prosecution established that the
three victims were riding in a dark blue Mitsubishi car at
about seven o'clock in the evening of June 27 or 28,
1986, when they were intercepted along the Maharlika
Highway in the above-named barangay by the accused,
who had placed sacks on the road to block the way. The
three were taken to the nearby woods where they were
killed. 6 According to his brother, Napoleon, Alexander
Sy was at that time carrying P300,000.00, representing
the weekly collections of his business, a necklace with
pendant worth P20,000.00, a P10,000.00 diamond ring,
and a licensed .22 caliber handgun. 7 All this, together
with the other articles belonging to the victims, were
taken by the accused, who also used the car in fleeing to
Sapang Palay, where it was recovered without the stereo
and the spare tire. 8
The first to be picked up for questioning was Conda, who
implicated the other accused and led a police team to
the house of Sonny Tabalan, where Solarte was hiding,
Inexplicably, Conda and Solarte both escaped. However,
the police found in Tabalan's house one live grenade,
one .38 caliber pistol, a defective air rifle with
magazine, and a wooden rifle which he said had been
brought there by Solarte and Quiones. In separate
extra-judicial statements, 9 both Quiones and Canaba
identified these weapons as the ones used in the
commission of the crime. 10
Testifying for the prosecution, Francisco Bariuan
declared that on July 7, 1986, Solarte came to his house
and asked him to pawn a watch for P300.00. Solarte
returned the following day with Canaba and Conda. They
were carrying guns and a grenade. Solarte informed him
that they were the ones who, together with Buitre,
Quiones and Aban, had killed Sy and his companions. He
and Solarte left later to hire jeep and Canaba and Conda
stayed behind, warning him that they would blow up his
house if he squealed on them. 11
But the case for the prosecution really depended on the
statements of the accused themselves, principally
Quiones and Canaba. Both were informed of their
constitutional rights before their investigation and were
actually assisted by Atty. Santiago Ceneta when they
gave their separate confessions. 12 Both confessed to the
crime charged and narrated in detail their participation
in its commission.
Quiones later testified that he had been subjected to
torture to force him to admit the killing and
robbery, 13 but as the trial judge noted, no proof of such
coercion was ever presented in court. Moreover, the
witness' narration of the commission of the offense
substantially jibed with the testimony of the other
accused, thus negating the suspicion that it had been
merely concocted. Understandably, Quiones sought to
minimize his participation in this crime by claiming that
he stayed in the car when the three victims were
forcibly taken to the woods where they were robbed and
slain. 14 This is another indication that the had not been protruding tongues tell a tale of their own of the
manhandled into signing the confession. defendants' perverted ruthlessness.
lt is important to note that when asked at the trial if he By contrast, the defense was practically one of mere
was affirming his extra-judicial statement, he denial. Even the claimed maltreatment of Quiones has
categorically said he was, 15 thus in effect reiterating his not been established.
detailed account of the conduct of the several accused,
including their escape to Manila in the stolen car and
It is clear from the evidence on record that there was a
their distribution of the loot among themselves. This was
conspiracy among the perpetrators of the crime to rob
now a judicial confession. Interestingly, Quiones also
and slay. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons
admitted to two other hold-ups and his membership in
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
another gang of robbers headed by one Kapitan Mitra, an
felony and decide to commit it. This need not be
unnecessary embellishment that lent further credence to
established by direct evidence but may be proven
his confession. 16
through the series of acts done by each of the accused in
pursuance of the common unlawful purpose. 21
Canaba's own statement corroborated Quiones'
confession and provided more elaboration. Like
Proof of conspiracy in the case at bar was supplied,
Quiones, he admitted that they had placed sacks on the
paradoxically enough, mainly by defendants Quiones
load and forced the three victims to go with them to the
and Canaba themselves. From the time they blocked the
parke where they were unclothed and killed, two by
road to waylay their prey to the killing and robbing in
Buitre and the third by Solarte. Quiones remained in
the woods, to the distribution of the loot and their
the car. Afterwards, the accused distributed the cash
escape in the stolen car, all the accused were acting in
among themselves, each receiving P10,000.00, with
concert and in accordance with their common plan.
Solarte and Buitre getting the weapons also. Using Sy's
car, they proceeded to Sapang Palay after leaving the
weapons with Sonny Tabalan in his house in Tigbinan. 17 It is argued that Civico and Aban were not part of the
conspiracy and that Quiones himself categorically said
so in answer to a question from the prosecution.
Conda also gave an extra-judicial confession, but this
Interpreting this merely as a gesture of loyalty or
was not made with the assistance of counsel and so must
perhaps goodwill or charity toward his fellow criminals,
be rejected. It is totally worthless and inadmissible
we dismiss it as a falsity. On the other hand, Civico
against him. Such a confession is anathema in a free
himself admitted his own participation in the offense,
society. It was not recognized even during the era of
and in his sworn confession (which he affirmed in court)
martial law under the 1973 Constitution as interpreted
also implicated Aban. And there is also Bariuan's
by the Court in People v. Galit. 18 And it is also scorned
testimony that Aban was one of the armed group,
under the present Constitution, which is more deeply
including the other accused, that went to his house on
committed to the protection of the rights of the accused.
July 8, 1986, and talked of their commission of the
crime. These declarations are enough to place the two
Civico also gave an extra-judicial confession, likewise defendants within the conspiracy together with the
without the assistance of counsel. 19 But testifying on his other defendants.
behalf, he purged it of invalidity when he freely affirmed
it on the stand in the presence of the judge himself and
In a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all and every
with the assistance of defense counsel. 20 By so
one of the conspirators is guilty with the others in equal
testifying, he in effect reiterated but validly this time
degree. Hence, every member of the group that
his earlier narration, replete with all the damming
perpetrated the killing and robbery of the three victims
details, of the commission of the crime.
must suffer the same penalty prescribed by law even if
they had different modes of participation in the
The Court is satisfied that the evidence against the commission of the crime. 22
accused is sufficient to justify their conviction. The
declarations of the prosecution witnesses and more so
The trial judge found all the accused guilty as charged
of defendants Quiones and Canaba, both of whom had
and sentenced each of them to serve the triple penalty
pleaded guilty are telling enough to toll their guilt.
of reclusion perpetua and to pay actual and
The seized weapons and the other exhibits offer strong
compensatory damages in the amount of P380,000.00 to
corroboration that has not been refuted. The state of
the heirs of Alexander Sy, P50,000.00 to the heirs of
the cadavers of the swollen scrotums and the
Augusta Gabo, and P50,000.00 to the heirs of Frisco
Marcellana. The firearms were also confiscated in favor term of reclusion perpetua for the crime of robbery with 18 135 SCRA 465.
of the State. homicide. The monetary awards are also modified in
accordance with the preceding paragraph. It is so
19 Records, p. 9.
ordered.
The Court finds that the accused were incorrectly
charged with robbery with multiple homicide and so
20 TSN, April 8, 1987, pp. 11-13.
were also incorrectly sentenced by the trial court. The Narvasa (Chairman), Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and
reason is that there is no crime of robbery with multiple Medialdea JJ., concur.
homicide under the Revised Penal Code. The charge 21 People v. Pineda, 157 SCRA 71.
should have been for robbery with homicide only
regardless of the fact that three persons were killed in
22 People vs. Salvador, 163 SC RA
the commission of the robbery. In this special complex
574.
crime, the number of persons killed is immaterial and Footnotes
does not increase the penalty prescribed in Article 294
of the said Code. As held in People v. Cabuena: 23 23 98 Phil. 919.
1 Rollo, p. 6.

But it was error to sentence the $ + GRSI Copyrightregno N94-027

2 Records, pp. 54, 60, 65.
appellants to three life imprisonments {bmr footnote.bmp}82027_3_29_90_footnotes>mainG.R.
each as if 3 separate crimes had been No. 82027 March 29, 1990
committed. The complex crime of 3 Ibid., p. 178. ROMARICO G. VITUG vs. COURT OF APPEALS
robbery with homicide is not to be
multiplied with the number of
4 Rollo, p. 53. Republic of the Philippines
persons killed. As was said by this
Court in People vs. Madrid (88 Phil.
1), "the general concept of this crime 5 Ibid., p. 18. SUPREME COURT
does not limit the taking of human
life to one single victim making the
6 Records, p. 39. Manila
slaying of human being in excess of
that number punishable as separate
individual offense or offenses. All the 7 TSN, January 28, 1987, p. 5. SECOND DIVISION
homicides or murders are merged in
the composite, integrated whole that
8 TSN, March 19, 1987, p. 7. G.R. No. 82027 March 29, 1990
is robbery with homicide so long as
the killings were perpetrated by
reason or on the occasion of the 9 Records, pp. 28, 36. ROMARICO G. VITUG, petitioner,
robbery. vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ROWENA
10 TSN, November 27, 1986, pp. 47-
The penalty prescribed for the crime of robbery with FAUSTINO-CORONA, respondents.
48.
homicide is reclusion perpetua, to be imposed
only once even if multiple killings accompanied the Rufino B. Javier Law Office for petitioner.
robbery. Furthermore, the discussion by the trial court 11 TSN, March 24, 1987, pp. 6-12.
of the attendant circumstances was unnecessary because
Article 63 of the Code provides that when the law Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for private
12 Records, pp. 28, 36.
prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied respondent.
without regard to the mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that may have attended the commission of 13 TSN, April 1, 1987, pp. 21-23.
the crime.
14 Records, p. 29.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The civil indemnity for each of the three victims is
reduced to P30,000.00, to be paid to their respective 15 TSN, April 1, 1987 p. 54.
heirs. The heirs of Alexander Sy are also awarded the This case is a chapter in an earlier suit decided by this
additional sum P330,000.00, representing the value of Court 1 involving the probate of the two wills of the late
the articles taken from him by the accused. 16 Records, pp. 32-34. Dolores Luchangco Vitug, who died in New York, U. S.A.,
on November 10, 1980, naming private respondent
Rowena Faustino-Corona executrix. In our said decision,
WHEREFORE, the conviction of all the accused-appellants 17 Ibid., pp. 37-38.
we upheld the appointment of Nenita Alonte as co-
is AFFIRMED, but each of them is sentenced to only one special administrator of Mrs. Vitug's estate with her (Mrs.
Vitug's) widower, petitioner Romarico G. Vitug, pending
probate.
On January 13, 1985, Romarico G. Vitug filed a motion
asking for authority from the probate court to sell
certain shares of stock and real properties belonging to
the estate to cover allegedly his advances to the estate
in the sum of P667,731.66, plus interests, which he
claimed were personal funds. As found by the Court of
Appeals, 2 the alleged advances consisted of P58,147.40
spent for the payment of estate tax, P518,834.27 as
deficiency estate tax, and P90,749.99 as "increment
thereto." 3 According to Mr. Vitug, he withdrew the sums
of P518,834.27 and P90,749.99 from savings account
No. 35342-038 of the Bank of America, Makati, Metro
Manila.
On April 12, 1985, Rowena Corona opposed the motion
to sell on the ground that the same funds withdrawn
from savings account No. 35342-038 were conjugal
partnership properties and part of the estate, and
hence, there was allegedly no ground for
reimbursement. She also sought his ouster for failure to
include the sums in question for inventory and for
"concealment of funds belonging to the estate." 4
Vitug insists that the said funds are his exclusive
property having acquired the same through a
survivorship agreement executed with his late wife and
the bank on June 19, 1970. The agreement provides:
We hereby agree with each other and
with the BANK OF AMERICAN
NATIONAL TRUST AND SAVINGS
ASSOCIATION (hereinafter referred to
as the BANK), that all money now or
hereafter deposited by us or any or
either of us with the BANK in our
joint savings current account shall be
the property of all or both of us and
shall be payable to and collectible or
withdrawable by either or any of us
during our lifetime, and after the
death of either or any of us shall
belong to and be the sole property of
the survivor or survivors, and shall be
payable to and collectible or
withdrawable by such survivor or
survivors.
We further agree with each other and
the BANK that the receipt or check of
either, any or all of us during our
lifetime, or the receipt or check of
the survivor or survivors, for any
payment or withdrawal made for our
above-mentioned account shall be
valid and sufficient release and
discharge of the BANK for such
payment or withdrawal. 5
The trial courts 6 upheld the validity of this agreement
and granted "the motion to sell some of the estate of
Dolores L. Vitug, the proceeds of which shall be used to
pay the personal funds of Romarico Vitug in the total
sum of P667,731.66 ... ." 7
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals, in the petition
for certiorari filed by the herein private respondent,
held that the above-quoted survivorship agreement
constitutes a conveyance mortis causa which "did not
comply with the formalities of a valid will as prescribed
by Article 805 of the Civil Code," 8and secondly,
assuming that it is a mere donation inter vivos, it is a
prohibited donation under the provisions of Article 133
of the Civil Code. 9
The dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of
Appeals states:
WHEREFORE, the order of respondent
Judge dated November 26, 1985
(Annex II, petition) is hereby set aside
insofar as it granted private
respondent's motion to sell certain
properties of the estate of Dolores L.
Vitug for reimbursement of his
alleged advances to the estate, but
the same order is sustained in all
other respects. In addition,
respondent Judge is directed to
include provisionally the deposits in
Savings Account No. 35342-038 with
the Bank of America, Makati, in the
inventory of actual properties
possessed by the spouses at the time
of the decedent's death. With costs
against private respondent. 10
In his petition, Vitug, the surviving spouse, assails the
appellate court's ruling on the strength of our decisions
in Rivera v. People's Bank and Trust Co. 11 and Macam v.
Gatmaitan 12 in which we sustained the validity of
"survivorship agreements" and considering them as
aleatory contracts. 13
The petition is meritorious.
The conveyance in question is not, first of all, one
of mortis causa, which should be embodied in a will. A
will has been defined as "a personal, solemn, revocable
and free act by which a capacitated person disposes of
his property and rights and declares or complies with
duties to take effect after his death." 14 In other words,
the bequest or device must pertain to the testator. 15 In
this case, the monies subject of savings account No.
35342-038 were in the nature of conjugal funds In the
case relied on, Rivera v. People's Bank and Trust
Co., 16 we rejected claims that a survivorship agreement
purports to deliver one party's separate properties in
favor of the other, but simply, their joint holdings:
xxx xxx xxx
... Such conclusion is evidently
predicated on the assumption that
Stephenson was the exclusive owner
of the funds-deposited in the bank,
which assumption was in turn based
on the facts (1) that the account was
originally opened in the name of
Stephenson alone and (2) that Ana
Rivera "served only as housemaid of
the deceased." But it not infrequently
happens that a person deposits money
in the bank in the name of another;
and in the instant case it also appears
that Ana Rivera served her master for
about nineteen years without actually
receiving her salary from him. The
fact that subsequently Stephenson
transferred the account to the name
of himself and/or Ana Rivera and
executed with the latter the
survivorship agreement in question
although there was no relation of
kinship between them but only that
of master and servant, nullifies the
assumption that Stephenson was the
exclusive owner of the bank account.
In the absence, then, of clear proof to
the contrary, we must give full faith
and credit to the certificate of
deposit which recites in effect that
the funds in question belonged to
Edgar Stephenson and Ana Rivera;
that they were joint (and several)
owners thereof; and that either of
them could withdraw any part or the
whole of said account during the
lifetime of both, and the balance, if
any, upon the death of either,
belonged to the survivor. 17
 xxx xxx xxx
18
In Macam v. Gatmaitan, it was held:
xxx xxx xxx
This Court is of the opinion that
Exhibit C is an aleatory contract
whereby, according to article 1790 of
the Civil Code, one of the parties or
both reciprocally bind themselves to
give or do something as an equivalent
for that which the other party is to
give or do in case of the occurrence
of an event which is uncertain or will
happen at an indeterminate time. As
already stated, Leonarda was the
owner of the house and Juana of the
Buick automobile and most of the
furniture. By virtue of Exhibit C,
Juana would become the owner of
the house in case Leonarda died first,
and Leonarda would become the
owner of the automobile and the
furniture if Juana were to die first. In
this manner Leonarda and Juana
reciprocally assigned their respective
property to one another conditioned
upon who might die first, the time of
death determining the event upon
which the acquisition of such right by
the one or the other depended. This
contract, as any other contract, is
binding upon the parties thereto.
Inasmuch as Leonarda had died
before Juana, the latter thereupon
acquired the ownership of the house,
in the same manner as Leonarda
would have acquired the ownership of
the automobile and of the furniture if
Juana had died first. 19
xxx xxx xxx
There is no showing that the funds exclusively belonged
to one party, and hence it must be presumed to be
conjugal, having been acquired during the existence of
the marita. relations. 20
Neither is the survivorship agreement a donation inter
vivos, for obvious reasons, because it was to take effect
after the death of one party. Secondly, it is not a
donation between the spouses because it involved no
conveyance of a spouse's own properties to the other.
It is also our opinion that the agreement involves no be shown in a given case that such
modification petition of the conjugal partnership, as held agreement is a mere cloak to hide an
by the Court of Appeals, 21 by "mere stipulation" 22 and inofficious donation, to transfer
that it is no "cloak" 23 to circumvent the law on conjugal property in fraud of creditors, or to
property relations. Certainly, the spouses are not defeat the legitime of a forced heir, it
prohibited by law to invest conjugal property, say, by may be assailed and annulled upon
way of a joint and several bank account, more commonly such grounds. No such vice has been
denominated in banking parlance as an "and/or" account. imputed and established against the
In the case at bar, when the spouses Vitug opened agreement involved in this case. 26
savings account No. 35342-038, they merely put what
rightfully belonged to them in a money-making venture.
xxx xxx xxx
They did not dispose of it in favor of the other, which
would have arguably been sanctionable as a prohibited
donation. And since the funds were conjugal, it can not There is no demonstration here that the survivorship
be said that one spouse could have pressured the other agreement had been executed for such unlawful
in placing his or her deposits in the money pool. purposes, or, as held by the respondent court, in order
to frustrate our laws on wills, donations, and conjugal
partnership.
The validity of the contract seems debatable by reason
of its "survivor-take-all" feature, but in reality, that
contract imposed a mere obligation with a term, the The conclusion is accordingly unavoidable that Mrs. Vitug
term being death. Such agreements are permitted by the having predeceased her husband, the latter has acquired
Civil Code. 24 upon her death a vested right over the amounts under
savings account No. 35342-038 of the Bank of America.
Insofar as the respondent court ordered their inclusion
Under Article 2010 of the Code:
in the inventory of assets left by Mrs. Vitug, we hold that
the court was in error. Being the separate property of
ART. 2010. By an aleatory contract, petitioner, it forms no more part of the estate of the
one of the parties or both reciprocally deceased.
bind themselves to give or to do
something in consideration of what
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate
the other shall give or do upon the
court, dated June 29, 1987, and its resolution, dated
happening of an event which is
February 9, 1988, are SET ASIDE.
uncertain, or which is to occur at an
indeterminate time.
No costs.
Under the aforequoted provision, the fulfillment of an
aleatory contract depends on either the happening of an SO ORDERED.
event which is (1) "uncertain," (2) "which is to occur at
an indeterminate time." A survivorship agreement, the
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and
sale of a sweepstake ticket, a transaction stipulating on
Regalado JJ., concur.
the value of currency, and insurance have been held to
fall under the first category, while a contract for life
annuity or pension under Article 2021, et sequentia, has
been categorized under the second. 25 In either case, the
element of risk is present. In the case at bar, the risk
Footnotes
was the death of one party and survivorship of the other.
1 Corona v. Court of Appeals, No.
However, as we have warned:
59821, August 30, 1982, 116 SCRA
316.
xxx xxx xxx
2 Kapunan, Santiago, M., J., ponente;
But although the survivorship Puno Reynato S. and Marigomen
agreement is per se not contrary to Alfredo, JJ., concurring.
law its operation or effect may be
violative of the law. For instance, if it
3 Rollo, 21.
4 Id., 22.
5 Id.
6 Judge (now Justice of the Court of
Appeals) Asaali S. Isnani presiding.
7 Rollo, 23.
8 Id., 26.
9 Now, Article 87 of the Family Code.
10 Rollo, 28-29.
11 73 Phil. 546 (1942).
12 64 Phil. 187 (1937).
13 CIVIL CODE, Art. 2010.
14 III TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES 26 (1973 ed.), citing 1
GOMEZ 53.
15 See CIVIL CODE, supra., arts. 793,
794, 930.
16 Supra.
17 Supra., 547.
18 Supra.
19 Supra., 190-191.
20 CIVIL CODE, supra, art. 160.
21 In the words of the Appellate
Court: "Since private respondent and
his late wife did not enter into a
marriage settlement before marriage,
their property relationship was that
of conjugal partnership governed by
the Civil Code. The system of conjugal
partnership prohibits, as already
mentioned, donation between the
spouses during the marriage, except
that which takes effect after the
death of the donor, in which case,
the donation shall comply with the
formalities of a will (Arts. 133, 728,
805). To allow the prohibited
donation by giving it a cloak of
aleatory contract would sanction a
(modification) of a marriage
settlement during marriage by a mere
stipulation. As mandated by Art. 52,
the nature, consequences and
incidents of marriage, which is not a
mere contract but an inviolable social
institution are governed by law, and
not subject to stipulation."
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 CIVIL CODE, supra., art. 1193.
25 V PARAS, CIVIL CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, 782 (1986 ed.)
26 Rivera, supra, 548.
$ + GRSI Copyrightregno N94-027
{bmr footnote.bmp}83798_3_29_90_footnotes>mainG.R.
No. 83798 March 29, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANILO R. DE LA CRUZ
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 83798 March 29, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DANILO DE LA CRUZ y RUADO, ROMEO SALVADOR y
MENDOZA, DANTES BELOSO y DE CASTRO, defendants-
Appellants.
The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-
appellee.
Natalio M. Panganiban for appellant Dantes Beloso.
Malinis & Associates for appellant Salvador.
Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez & Gatmaitan for appellant
Danilo Dela Cruz.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
A case of Carnapping with Homicide, as defined and
penalized under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539,
also known as the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972.
There is no question that on 5 December 1984, a Ford
Telstar automobile, TX5 bearing Plate No. N-PDW-382,
was carnapped, and that ANTHONY Banzon, the
registered owner of said car, was shot and killed.
The Trial Court decided * that the three accused, Danilo
DE LA CRUZ y Ruado, Romeo SALVADOR y Mendoza, and
Dantes BELOSO y de Castro, had "conspired to steal away
as they in fact stole and carried away the TELSTAR of
ANTHONY Banzon"; held them "liable as principals by
direct participation" for the crime of Carnapping with
Homicide; and sentenced them as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Danilo
de la Cruz y Ruado, Romeo Salvador y
Mendoza and Dantes Beloso y de
Castro, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of carnapping with
homicide, penalized under section 14
of R.A. 6539, the Court hereby
sentences each of them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua,
instead of the supreme penalty of
death, inasmuch as the latter penalty
has been deleted under the new
constitution; for each accused to
jointly and severally indemnify the
heirs of the deceased Anthony Banzon
in the amount of P30,000.00; also to
pay, jointly and severally,
P200,000.00 for moral damages;
P200,000.00 for lost earnings;
P6,002.50 for food expenses during
the wake; P8,000.00 for coffin and
memorial services; P2,530.00 for
interment fees; P800.00 for
transportation expenses; and
P2,947.00 for the hospitalization
expenses of Dionisia Alvarez Banzon,
the mother of the deceased.
Challenging their conviction, the three accused
interposed the present appeal. However, during the
pendency hereof, Danilo DE LA CRUZ withdrew his
appeal on 1 December 1989. This appeal is thus confined
to Dantes BELOSO and Romeo SALVADOR.
By piecing together the voluminous testimonial evidence
and documentary exhibits, the factual background from
the viewpoint of the prosecution may be narrated thus:
Danilo DE LA CRUZ, Dantes BELOSO and Romeo
SALVADOR were acquaintances. DE LA CRUZ, 31, claimed
to be a 1st Lieutenant of the Philippine Army as well as a
customs broker. BELOSO, 29, single was a jobless
individual. SALVADOR, 36, married, was also
unemployed. SALVADOR had known DE LA CRUZ since 16
November 1984 when they first met at Hot City Disco
Restaurant. They then met again on 4 December 1984
(pp. 5-6, TSN, 5 March 1986). BELOSO, for his part, had
known DE LA CRUZ since April of 1984 and had met with
him for about 4 or 5 times thereafter (p. 6, TSN, 9
October 1985). BELOSO stayed with DE LA CRUZ in the
latter's house for several months. BELOSO also met
SALVADOR once sometime in November 1984 at a night
club somewhere in Roxas Boulevard. Evidence further
shows that on the eve of 4 December 1984, DE LA CRUZ,
BELOSO and SALVADOR met at the Kool King Restaurant
along Pasong Tamo Street on Makati to discuss a certain
"car deal" that would take place the following day 5
December 1984 (p. 13, TSN, 6 January 1986).
On 29 November 1984, BELOSO caused the placing of an
advertisement in the Bulletin Today, page 29, column 3,
reading:
Wanted to Buy Car
Balikbayan 82-83 Silver
Edition or Lancer
Call 8164865 8164866
Mr. Garcia 9-5
(Exhibit "DD-l" p. 673-B, Records)
The victim, ANTHONY Banzon, a 23-year ld student of
aeronautical engineering, was among those who
responded to the advertisement and signified his interest
to sell his 1983 model Telstar.
On 5 December 1984, at around 9:00 A.M., Dionisia
Alvarez Banzon, mother of ANTHONY, received a
telephone call from a certain Mike Garcia who informed
her that he was the buyer of her son's car. ANTHONY,
arriving home a little later, was informed by his mother
of the telephone call. The victim, together with his
mother, then left for Garcia's office located at the
Centrum Condominium, Makati, Metro Manila, on board
the Telstar. They arrived at their destination a little
after 11:00 A.M. Once there, a man just across the
street where their car was parked was pointed to by
ANTHONY as Mr. Garcia, the person interested in buying
the car. In the identification made by Dionisia Alvarez
Banzon during the trial, that man turned out to be
accused Dantes BELOSO. Dionisia then proceeded to
Shoemart on a taxi, leaving ANTHONY at the Centrum
(pp. 53-58, TSN, 29 May 1985), little suspecting that it
would be the last time that she would see her son.
Inside the Centrum office ANTHONY and BELOSO
discussed the price of the car, which ANTHONY fixed at
P188,000.00. BELOSO then advised ANTHONY to wait for
Danilo DE LA CRUZ to arrive as he would be the one to
decide whether or not to buy the car. After a while, DE
LA CRUZ arrived and BELOSO introduced ANTHONY to the
former. At around 1:00 P.M., DE LA CRUZ and ANTHONY
left the office to go to the former's house. ANTHONY
brought with him an envelope containing the certificate
of registration, official receipt, and other papers
pertaining to the car (pp. 9-12, TSN, 9 October 1985).
When they arrived at the house, SALVADOR was already
there.
SALVADOR recounted in his Sworn Statement (Exhibit "B
") that DE LA CRUZ had told him to have some snacks at a
nearby "lugawan" while he and ANTHONY talked. When
SALVADOR returned, he saw DE LA CRUZ and ANTHONY
seated near the dining table. SALVADOR then went to
the comfort room and while inside, he heard a shot.
When he got out, he found ANTHONY sprawled on the
floor, the latter's head bathed in his own blood, and saw
DE LA CRUZ holding a gun (pp. 640-641, Records).
Strangely enough, the dyphenylamine paraffin tests done
on DE LA CRUZ on 6 December 1984 showed negative
results (Exhibit N") while those on BELOSO and
SALVADOR proved positive (Exhibits "O" and P The
paraffin casts on the latter two were taken on 7
December, which were then sealed and preserved until
the actual testing on 11 December 1984.
Continuing with the facts at around 3:00 P.M., Dantes
BELOSO, who was at the Centrum office, received a call
from DE LA CRUZ, who instructed him to proceed to his
(DE LA CRUZ) house at Obrero Street, Makati, Metro
Manila. On BELOSO called for DE LA CRUZ, who came out
and handed to him the key of the Telstar. DE LA CRUZ
instructed BELOSO to drive for SALVADOR who did not
know how to drive. BELOSO then boarded the car and
waited for SALVADOR who came out of the house some
15 to 20 minutes later. In his Affidavit (Exhibit "C-11 "),
BELOSO recounted that SALVADOR related to him that he
had seen a dead man in the house of DE LA CRUZ but
that they were to keep it to themselves because he
(SALVADOR) was seared of DE LA CRUZ. SALVADOR then
showed to BELOSO a phone number of a certain Mr.
Hernandez who was interested in buying the car. After
driving a short distance, BELOSO stopped at a telephone
booth to call Hernandez to ask for the latter's address.
They then started to look for the place but failed to
locate it. Since BELOSO was already hungry, he parked
the car at the Brunch Restaurant in front of UERM and
took his snack thereat while SALVADOR took a taxi and
proceeded to Hernandez (p. 13-16, TSN, 9 October
1985).
SALVADOR was able to reach Hernandez' place at about
4:00 P.M. Rodolfo Hernandez recalled during the trial
that SALVADOR introduced himself as ANTHONY Banzon
and offered to sell a car, which was parked at a nearby
Caltex station. They proceeded to the station to look at
the car. Hernandez then looked at the certificate of
registration of the car in the name of ANTHONY Banzon
and the residence certificate presented to him by
SALVADOR, which was also in the name of ANTHONY
Banzon. Believing that SALVADOR was really ANTHONY
Banzon, Hernandez then suggested that they go to the
actual buyer at the Metropolitan Pawnshop at P. Campa
Street, Sampaloc, Metro Manila, leaving BELOSO at the
UERM. At the pawnshop, they met Hernandez' contact,
Patrolman Rosauro de la Rosa, who is the brother of the
owner of the pawnshop. Again, SALVADOR introduced
himself as ANTHONY Banzon, the owner of the car and
offered to sell it for P130,000.00. Hernandez then left
the pawnshop (pp. 85-95, TSN, 1 March 1985; pp. 4-13,
TSN, 8 March 1985).
During the negotiation, Pat. de la Rosa became
suspicious that the car had been stolen because of the
low price of P130,000.00, and when told that he would
be paid the next day, SALVADOR insisted that if possible,
the former pay P100,000.00 in advance as he was in
need of money very badly. On top of that, when Pat. de
la Rosa declined to pay immediately, SALVADOR left the
car behind. Pat. de la Rosa then reported his suspicions
to Sgt. Reynaldo Roldan of the Quezon City Police (pp. 8-
19, TSN, 8 March 1985). Sgt. Roldan forthwith
dispatched Pfc. Damaso Osma, Pat. Edgardo de Leon,
Pat. Anthony Name and Pat. Justiniano Estrella, Jr., to
P. Campa Street (pp. 95-96, TSN, 27 February 1985; p.
4, TSN, 25 March 1985).
At P. Campa Street, the dispatched policemen, together
with Pat. de la Rosa, posted themselves and waited for
SALVADOR to arrive. At about 8:00 P.M., SALVADOR did
arrive together with BELOSO. They got inside the car
with BELOSO taking the steering wheel. The policemen
approached and asked the two to alight. BELOSO started
shouting that he was ANTHONY Banzon, the owner of the
car and showed the car registration and a residence
certificate, all in the name of ANTHONY Banzon. This all
the more aroused Pat. de la Rosa's suspicion for earlier it
was SALVADOR who claimed to be ANTHONY. The
policemen decided to take the two to the Quezon City
Police Headquarters for questioning (pp. 97-102, TSN, 29
February 1985; pp. 21-28, TSN, 8 March 1985; pp. 2631,
TSN, 13 March 1985; pp. 71-76, TSN, 18 March 1985).
Meanwhile, at around 9:00 P.M. of the same day, Cynthia
Juarez a boarder of the house of DE LA CRUZ, reported
to Pfc. Evelio Bactad of the Makati Police that when she
arrived at the boarding house she found it unlocked but
with the lights on and a dead man in the kitchen. The
house is located at Obrero Street, Makati, Metro Manila.
Bactad proceeded to the place to conduct an
investigation and there found a lifeless body of a man, a
already in the state of rigor mortis with a gunshot wound
on the forehead, and an empty super.38 caliber shell
about two feet away from the left side of his body (pp.
14-21, TSN, 25 February 1985). Cynthia Juarez
mistakenly identified the body to be that of her landlord
Danilo DE LA CRUZ.
At about 2:00 A.M. of 6 December 1984, a male person
went to the same Makati police station to report that his
house has been ransacked by someone. He introduced
himself as Danilo DE LA CRUZ. Pfc. Bactad, perplexed as
to the identity of the dead body, held DE LA CRUZ for
further questioning (pp. 14-25, TSN, 25 February 1985).
Pfc. Bactad then coordinated with the Quezon City
Police anti-carnapping unit, which had given notice that
they had apprehended two persons, Romeo SALVADOR
and Dantes BELOSO. These two were later turned over to
the Makati Police Precinct. Pfc. Bactad was subsequently
able to straighten out the identity of the victim to be
ANTHONY Banzon (pp. 22-27 and 95, TSN, ibid.).
The medical examination conducted by a medicolegal
officer of the NBI on the cadaver of the victim on 6
December 1984 revealed the cause of death to be
"hemorrhage, intracranial severe, secondary to gunshot
wound." The bullet used was identified as a .38 caliber
gun, fired at short distance from the victim, entered the
back of the head and exited through his forehead. The
same physician placed the time of death at about four
(4) hours, more or less, after he had taken his last meal
(pp. 57-59, TSN, 27 February 1985).
Sgt. Reynaldo Roldan, a Quezon City policeman, who was
called by Pat. de la Rosa to report the latter's suspicion
about a carnapped vehicle, interrogated BELOSO and
SALVADOR and elicited their modus operandi as follows:
1) blank residence certificates were secured and kept by
the three accused; 2) their "business" of buying of cars
was advertised in the newspapers; 3) the ads yielding
fruitful results, prospective sellers would be asked about
their respective certificates of registration and other
documents; 4) when the portion for the signature of the In a nutshell, it is BELOSO and SALVADOR's position that
owner is found to be blank, the accused would pretend they were unaware of any carnapping; that they were in
to test the car, demand the certificate of registration, a regular business transaction to sell a car with promise
and fill in the signature space with their own signature; of a commission; that they were not in the house of DE
5) present the same certificate of registration bearing LA CRUZ in the early afternoon of 5 December 1984
their own signature, along with the residence certificate when ANTHONY was killed; that they were unaware of
supplied by DE LA CRUZ which is made to coincide with the killing, of ANTHONY which, according to SALVADOR
the name and signature appearing in the certificate of was DE LA CRUZ' own doing.
registration, to the prospective buyers; and 6) pretend
to test the car although, in fact, just waiting for the
Both BELOSO and SALVADOR are in unison in claiming
opportunity to leave the owner of the car behind so that
that their statements, marked as Exhibits "B" for
the accused could dispose of the same in the meantime.
SALVADOR, and "C" and "K" for BELOSO, are inadmissible
in evidence as the same were extracted by force and
All accused, on the other hand, profess innocence. without the presence of counsel.
BELOSO claims that he was merely hired to man the
office at Centrum Condominium; that he had nothing to
The Trial Court gave no credence to the exculpatory
do with the carnapping of ANTHONY'S vehicle; that he
allegations of BELOSO and SALVADOR and convicted
went to the house of DE LA CRUZ at about 3:00 P.M. of 5
them, as well as DE LA CRUZ, of Carnapping with
December 1984, but was not allowed to enter the same;
Homicide. Hence, this appeal, filed originally by all three
and that while he was by the gate, he was given the key
accused.
of ANTHONY's car by DE LA CRUZ to drive for SALVADOR
who did not know how to drive; that, in turn, the
registration papers of the car and other documents were Appellants BELOSO and SALVADOR ascribe the following
handed to SALVADOR with specific instructions to bring errors to the Trial Court:
the vehicle to the prospective buyer, Hernandez.
By Dantes BELOSO:
For his part, SALVADOR claims that he was merely called
by DE LA CRUZ to go to the latter's house to assist
I. The Trial Judge who had no
BELOSO in the sale of the car. He denies having been a
occasion to observe demeanors of
long acquaintance of either DE LA CRUZ or BELOSO. He
witnesses as he merely prepared the
claims that on 5 December 1984 DE LA CRUZ instructed
decision in this case as the trial was
him to go to the Royal Beauty Parlor between 10:00 and
entirely heard by Justice Elbinas
11:00 A.M., which he did. After waiting for some ten
erred in concluding that at around
(10) to fifteen (15) minutes, DE LA CRUZ arrived on
9:00 A.M. of December 5, 1984 the
board a taxi cab. They proceeded to DE LA CRUZ's house.
late Anthony Banzon was called by
Arriving thereat and finding it closed, they went to
Beloso.
Lugawan sa Makati for a snack. After eating, they
returned to DE LA CRUZ's house around 12:00 noon. A
few minutes later, Elmer Mabunga, driver of DE LA CRUZ II. The Lower Court, with due
arrived (pp. 14-15, TSN, March 5, 1986). At 12:30 P.M., respect, gravely erred in holding that
the three of them left the house. Elmer rode in a the three (3) accused conspired in
jeepney while they took a taxi. DE LA CRUZ dropped him stealing the car subject of this case.
off at the Royal Beauty Parlor while DE LA CRUZ
proceeded to Centrum Condominium. He was instructed
III. The Lower Court again, with due
by DE LA CRUZ to wait from 2:00 to 2:30 P.M. after
respect, gravely erred in applying the
which he should go back to the house. At around 3:00
case of People vs. Mangulabnan, et
P.M., he went back and after calling DE LA CRUZ'name,
al. in concluding that the three (3)
the latter came out of the house, opened the first door,
accused are liable in the death of
and told him to wait for BELOSO. At around 3:20 to 3:30
Anthony Banzon and that Beloso
P.M., BELOSO arrived. From here on, the testimonies of
could have been present at the time
BELOSO and SALVADOR are substantially similar in that
the victim was shot.
they were given the keys of the car and some documents
and told to go to a certain Hernandez, a prospective
buyer. IV. The Court a quo gravely erred in
ruling that all the accused conspired
in the killing of Anthony Banzon and
Beloso 'could have been inside the
 house and was present at the time
Banzon was shot' because if he were
not present, 'he could have been
found negative of gun powder
nitrates.
V. All in all, the Lower Court, as far as
Beloso is concerned, as shown by
indubitable facts heretofore and/or
hereinafter discussed and as facts and
evidence on records will show,
committed grave error in convicting
Beloso of the crime charged.
By Romeo SALVADOR:
The Court a quo erred:
I. Gravely in admitting Salvador's
alleged extrajudicial confession
(Exibit 'B') taken by police officers
during custodial investigation without
assistance of counsel.
II. In giving equal weight and effect
on the prosecution's evidence
presented during the joint trial which
are not applicable to appellant
Salvador.
III. In finding Salvador a co-
conspirator of the crime charged
although his admitted participation
was only to assist in the aborted sale
of the car without knowledge that it
was a 'carnapped' vehicle and without
knowledge that the registered owner
was earlier-killed.
IV. In convicting Salvador in the
absence of proof beyond reasonable
doubt.
It may, indeed, be that Judge Phinney C. Araquil, who
penned the Trial Court Decision, had not heard the case
at all, the trial having been conducted by then Judge
Jesus M. Elbinias, who was elevated to the Court of
Appeals. Nonetheless, the transcripts of stenographic
notes taken during the trial were extant and complete
and there was no impediment for Judge Araquil to have
decided the case. It is not unusual for a Judge who did
not try a case to decide it on the basis of the record
(People vs. Escalante, L-37147, 22 August 1984, 131
SCRA 237). The fact that the Judge who heard the
evidence is not the one who rendered the judgment and papers of the Telstar with the instruction to bring the
that for that reason the latter did not have the car to a certain Hernandez, who was buying the car.
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses Following that bidding, the two left and looked for
during the trial but merely relied on the records of the Hernandez. But unable to locate him, SALVADOR went on
case does not render the judgment erroneous (Co Tao vs. his own in a taxi. BELOSO was left with the car at the
Court of Appeals, 101 Phil. 188 [1957]). Brunch Restaurant near UERM. After having located
Hernandez, SALVADOR, Hernandez, and a driver went
back to where BELOSO was, took the car and proceeded
The rest of the assigned errors center on the findings of
to the Metropolitan Pawnshop leaving BELOSO behind. At
conspiracy and guilt by the Trial Court and may be
this place, the three alighted. SALVADOR introduced
considered jointly.
himself as ANTHONY Banzon, the owner of the car and
the name appearing in the car's Certificate of
The evidence sustains those findings. Registration, to Pat. Rosauro de la Rosa, brother of the
pawnshop owner who was the real buyer of the car.
SALVADOR even showed the Registration Certificate and
The three accused had known one another some time
a Residence Certificate, purportedly ANTHONY'S, as
before December 1984 at relatively different periods.
proof thereof. SALVADOR then asked for P130,000.00 as
Before Pfc. Bactad at the police station, BELOSO and
selling price. Pat. de la Rosa agreed but asked that
SALVADOR identified DE LA CRUZ as an "associate"
payment be made the following day as banks were
although the latter denied it (p.29, TSN, 25 February
already closed. SALVADOR, however, insisted on
1985,). BELOSO had been hired through DE LA CRUZ to
payment that evening as he was badly in need of money.
man the office at Centrum Condominium, Perez Street,
This made Pat. de la Rosa suspicious that the car had
Legazpi Village, Makati. On 4 December 1984, they had
been stolen, and reported t6 the Quezon City police.
gotten together at the Kool King Restaurant at Pasong
Pat. de la Rosa then instructed SALVADOR to return to
Tamo, Makati, to discuss a "car deal" to be consummated
the pawnshop the next day. As SALVADOR did not know
the next day. Dantes BELOSO, masquerading for Mike
how to drive he left the Telstar at the pawnshop, went
Garcia, had caused an advertisement to be published in
to the Brunch Restaurant near UERM, picked up BELOSO
the 28 and 29 November issues of the Bulletin Today. On
so the latter could drive the car back to DE LA CRUZ.
the same dates, BELOSO had rented an office space at
When they returned that night and boarded the car,
the Centrum Condominium under the name of said
elements of the Quezon City police approached them
Garcia for the two days mentioned, and again on 5
and asked them questions. BELOSO got down from the
December 1984 at P50.00 per hour, complete with staff
car and started shouting that he was ANTHONY, the
facilities. BELOSO held himself out as in the business of
owner of the car (p. 23, TSN, March 8, 1985).
buying cars. The victim, ANTHONY, responded to the ad,
Notwithstanding, the police brought them to the Quezon
went to said office and offered to sell his Telstar, Model
City police headquarters. Here, the investigators
'83. Posing again as Mike Garcia, BELOSO called
recovered some documents inside BELOSO's clutch bag,
ANTHONY's house at around 9:00 A.M. on 5 December
among them, a residence certificate in ANTHONY's name
1984 and informed the latter's mother that he was the
(Exhibit "H-1"). In BELOSO's possession were also found a
buyer of the car. When ANTHONY went to the Centrum
motor registration certificate in ANTHONY's name, two
office, BELOSO told ANTHONY to wait for DE LA CRUZ.
(2) blank residence certificates and one residence
Upon the latter's arrival, he had a talk with ANTHONY.
certificate in the name of Mark Garcia (p. 120, TSN, 27
DE LA ORTIZ made sure that ANTHONY's certificate of
February 1985).
registration, official receipt and other pertinent papers
of the Telstar were in order (pp. 9-12, TSN, October 9,
1985). ANTHONY and DE LA CRUZ then proceeded to the BELOSO's and SALVADOR's protestations of innocence do
latter's house at Barrio Obrero, Makati. not inspire belief. Both of them posed as ANTHONY at
one time or another during the "negotiations." When
SALVADOR offered to sell the car to Rodolfo Hernandez,
Meanwhile, SALVADOR was instructed by DE LA CRUZ
he introduced himself as ANTHONY Banzon. He even
also to wait at the latter's house. When DE LA CRUZ and
presented to Hernandez a car registration certificate and
ANTHONY arrived, the former told SALVADOR to take a
a residence certificate all in the name of ANTHONY
snack somewhere while he (DE LA CRUZ) and ANTHONY
Banzon. Later, when Hernandez introduced SALVADOR
talked. It was after SALVADOR returned to the house that
to Pat. de la Rosa, the former's contact, SALVADOR again
the killing of ANTHONY transpired between 12:00 noon
introduced himself as ANTHONY Banzon (pp. 85-95, TSN,
and 2:00 P.M. Later, at about 3:00 P.M., DE LA CRUZ
1 March 1985; pp. 4-13, TSN, 8 March 1985). These
then allegedly called for BELOSO at the Centrum office.
misrepresentations are indication that he knew the car
When BELOSO arrived, DE LA CRUZ handed him the keys
was stolen. at further bolsters the conclusion that he had
to the car, which was parked nearby. DE LA CRUZ also
a hand in the commission of the crime was the fact that
handed to SALVADOR a brown envelope containing
when he and BELOSO were arrested by the Quezon City
anti-carnapping unit, it was now BELOSO claiming to be
ANTHONY Banzon (pp. 97-102, TSN, 29 February 1985;
pp. 21-28, TSN, 8 March 1985; pp. 26-31, TSN, 13 March
1985; pp. 71-76, TSN, 18 March 1985). BELOSO's claim
that he was ANTHONY Banzon and SALVADOR's silence in
the face of such claim, despite the fact that he had
earlier misrepresented himself as ANTHONY, all the
more reveal that the two of them were one in keeping
secret the true ownership of the car.
A more perfect example of a conspiracy cannot be
contrived BELOSO and SALVADOR shared the same
purpose with DE LA CRUZ in carnapping the vehicle with
a view to selling it at a low price and making money
which they badly needed. They were united in its
execution as may be inferred from the facts and
circumstances established by the evidence. Conspiracy
need not be established by direct evidence of the acts
charged, but may and generally must be proved by a
number of indefinite acts, condition and circumstances
which vary according to the purpose to be accomplished
(People vs. Colman, et al., G.R. Nos. L-6652-54, 28
February 1958, 103 Phil. 6). The existence of conspiracy
may be inferred from acts tending to show a community
of design or purpose (People vs. Mada-I Santalani, G.R.
No. L-29979, 28 September 1979, 93 SCRA 315).
What of the killing of ANTHONY? There is no question
that he was killed "in the commission of the carnapping"
(Sec. 14, RA 6539). It is clear from the evidence as well
that he was killed in the house of DE LA CRUZ between
1:30 and 2:00 P.M. on 5 December 1984 (Brief, Danilo de
la Cruz, p. 19). It was at that house where ANTHONY was
found dead by a boarder by the name of Cynthia Juarez
at around 9:00 P.M. of the same date. DE LA CRUZ tried
to camouflage the killing by ostensibly reporting to the
police that his place had been ransacked and that a
person had been killed. As Pat. Bactad testified,
however, when he and a police team went to the house,
belongings therein were found wrapped and ready to be
transferred.
BELOSO claims that he was sent for by DE LA CRUZ from
the Centrum office only at 3:00 P.M. on 5 December
1984 and was not, therefore, at the DE LA CRUZ
residence at the time the killing was perpetrated in the
nearly afternoon of that date. Similarly SALVADOR claims
that he went to the DE LA CRUZ house only at 3:00 P.M.
and when he did he was merely at the gate and did not
enter the house. Consequently they conclude that
neither of them can be held culpable for ANTHONY'S
death.
Those denial, however, cannot prevail over the physical
evidence that BELOSO and SALVADOR were found
positive for nitrates, which means that they were within
the vicinity when the gun was fired.
When a paraffin or nitrate test is
applied, there appears gunpowders
nitrate which are dark blue collor.
These spects are nothing more or less
than minutes particles of nitrate
which have blown into the skin by
what might be termed the invisible
backfire of the pistol, but they do not
appear unless a hand has been
instrumental in pulling the trigger,
(Rbinson, Science Cathes the
Criminal, pp. 99-100).
The fact that DE LA CRUZ was negative for powder burns,
although he was tagged by SALVADOR as the triggerman,
can only mean that he knew hoe to sufficiently protect
himself, a knowledge that must have been derived form
his stint as an officer of the Philippine Army.
The identical claims of BELOSO and SALVADOR that they
were heavy smokers, of about 3 packs of Marlboro
cigarretes a day, which accounts for the pressent of
nitrate in both their right and left hands, is contradicted
by the testimony of the forensic chemist that nitrates
produced by cigarrete smoking have different
characteristics form those caused by powder burns.
BELOSO's and SALVADOR's complicity in the kiling is,
therefore, established not by any of the extradujicial
confesions (Exhibits "B", "C" and "K") but by the physical
evidence on record. So that, even if those sworns
statements are declared inadmissible for having been
given without the presence of the counsel, their
culpability is borne out by the evidence indefendent of
the same.
That the respective participations of BELOSO and
SALVADOR in the kiling is not claercut is of no moment:
In order to determine the existence
of the crime of robbery with
homicide, it is enough that a
homicide would result by reason or
on the occasion of the robbery and it
is immaterial that the death would
supervene by mere accident provided
that the homicide be produced by
reason or on occasion of the robbery
inasmuch as it is only the result
obtained, without reference or
distinction as to the circumstances,
causes, modes or persons intervening
in the commission of the crime that
has to be taken into consideration."
(People vs. Mangulabnan, et al., 99
Phil. 992 [1956]).
Moreover, conspiracy having been adequately proven, all
the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of
the extent and character of their participation because
in contemplation of law, the act of one is the act of all.
The degree of actual participation by each of the
conspirators is immaterial (People vs. Loreno, G.R. No.
54414, 9 July 1984, 130 SCRA 311). As conspirators,
each is equally responsible for the acts of their co-
conspirators.
At this juncture, we find it apropos to state that
earmarks of the voluntariness of the extrajudicial
confessions exist. For one, there is no convincing
evidence of maltreatment. For another, SALVADOR
subscribed and swore to his Statement before Sr. State
Counsel Norberto C. Ponce who certified "I have
personally examined the affiant and that I am satisfied
that he voluntarily executed and understood his
affidavit." Signing as witness was Atty. Florito S. Macalino
of CLAO (Exhibit "B-5"). Similarly, BELOSO subscribed and
swore to his Affidavit before 2nd Asst. Fiscal Dennis M.
Villa Ignacio, with Atty. William T. Uy of CLAO, Makati, as
witness (Exhibit "C-4"). Of record also is the fact that
during the execution of the extrajudicial confessions,
Tim Olivares, a police reporter of the newspaper
"Tempo" was present. This would further negate the
alleged maltreatment suffered by BELOSO and SALVADOR
at the hands of police authorities. That reporter would
surely have pounced upon any sign or report of
maltreatment (People vs. Ladrera, G.R. No. 55539, 21
May 1987, 150 SCRA 113). Further, in BELOSO's
Affidavit, Exhibit "'C", erasures appear, duly
countersigned by him, which clearly negate his claim
that his confession was made involuntarily (People vs.
Tanchico, G.R. No. L-23690, 23 October 1979, 93 SCRA
575).
The crime committed is Camapping with Homicide, with
carnapping defined as "the taking, with intent to gain, of
a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's
consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation
of persons, or by using force upon things" (Sec. 2, RA No.
6539). The penalty prescribed by the same law reads:
Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping.
Any person who is found guilty of
carnapping, as this term is defined in
Section two of this Act, shall,
irrespective of the value of motor
vehicle taken, be punished by
imprisonment for not less than
 fourteen years and eight months and
not more than seventeen years and
four months, when the carnapping is
committed without violence or
intimidation of persons, or force upon
things; and by imprisonment for not
less than seventeen years and four
months and not more than thirty
years, when the carnapping is
committed by means of violence
against or intimidation of any person,
or force upon things; and the penalty
of life imprisonment to death shall be
imposed when the owner, driver or
occupant of the carnapped motor
vehicle is killed in the commission of
the carnapping (Sec. 14, ibid.).
In this case, the owner of the carnapped vehicle was
killed in the commission of the carnapping obviously to
gain possession of the car, its registration certificate and
other pertinent papers, get the owner out of the way,
and thus facilitate its sale to a third party, in keeping
with the modus operandi of the perpetrators.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED, with proportionate costs against accused-
appellants Dantes Beloso and Romeo Salvador.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Paras J., took no part.
Footnotes
* Penned by Judge Phinney C.
Araquil.
$ + GRSI Copyrightregno N94-027
{bmr
footnote.bmp}83843_44_4_5_90_footnotes>mainG.R.
Nos. 83843-44 April 5, 1990
ROSITA LABRADOR vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 83843-44 April 5, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL
OF MELECIO LABRADOR. SAGRADO LABRADOR
(Deceased), substituted by ROSITA LABRADOR, ENRICA
LABRADOR, and CRISTOBAL LABRADOR, petitioners-
appellants,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, 1 GAUDENCIO LABRADOR, and JESUS
LABRADOR, respondents-appellees.
Benjamin C. Santos Law Offices for petitioners.
Rodrigo V. Fontelera for private respondents.
PARAS, J.:
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the alleged
holographic will of one Melecio Labrador is dated, as
provided for in Article 810 2 of the New Civil Code.
The antecedent and relevant facts are as follows: On
June 10, 1972, Melecio Labrador died in the Municipality
of Iba, province of Zambales, where he was residing,
leaving behind a parcel of land designated as Lot No.
1916 under Original Certificate of Title No. P-1652, and
the following heirs, namely: Sagrado, Enrica, Cristobal,
Jesus, Gaudencio, Josefina, Juliana, Hilaria and Jovita,
all surnamed Labrador, and a holographic will.
On July 28, 1975, Sagrado Labrador (now deceased but
substituted by his heirs), Enrica Labrador and Cristobal
Labrador, filed in the court a quo a petition for the
probate docketed as Special Proceeding No. 922-I of the
alleged holographic will of the late Melecio Labrador.
Subsequently, on September 30, 1975, Jesus Labrador
(now deceased but substituted by his heirs), and
Gaudencio Labrador filed an opposition to the petition
on the ground that the will has been extinguished or
revoked by implication of law, alleging therein that on
September 30, 1971, that is, before Melecio's death, for
the consideration of Six Thousand (P6,000) Pesos,
testator Melecio executed a Deed of Absolute Sale,
selling, transferring and conveying in favor of oppositors
Jesus and Gaudencio Lot No. 1916 and that as a matter
of fact, O.C.T. No. P-1652 had been cancelled by T.C.T.
No. T-21178. Earlier however, in 1973, Jesus Labrador
sold said parcel of land to Navat for only Five Thousand
(P5,000) Pesos. (Rollo, p. 37)
Sagrado thereupon filed, on November 28, 1975, against
his brothers, Gaudencio and Jesus, for the annulment of
said purported Deed of Absolute Sale over a parcel of
land which Sagrado allegedly had already acquired by
devise from their father Melecio Labrador under a
holographic will executed on March 17, 1968, the
complaint for annulment docketed as Civil Case No. 934-
I, being premised on the fact that the aforesaid Deed of
Absolute Sale is fictitious.
After both parties had rested and submitted their
respective evidence, the trial court rendered a joint
decision dated February 28, 1985, allowing the probate
of the holographic will and declaring null and void the
Deed of Absolute sale. The court a quo had also directed
the respondents (the defendants in Civil Case No. 934-I)
to reimburse to the petitioners the sum of P5,000.00
representing the redemption price for the property paid
by the plaintiff-petitioner Sagrado with legal interest
thereon from December 20, 1976, when it was paid to
vendee a retro.
Respondents appealed the joint decision to the Court of
Appeals, which on March 10, 1988 modified said joint
decision of the court a quo by denying the allowance of
the probate of the will for being undated and reversing
the order of reimbursement. Petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration of the aforesaid decision was denied by
the Court of Appeals, in the resolution of June 13, 1988.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners now assign the following errors committed by
respondent court, to wit:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
NOT ALLOWING AND APPROVING THE
PROBATE OF THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL
OF THE TESTATOR MELECIO
LABRADOR; and
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THE ORDER OF THE
LOWER COURT DIRECTING THE
REIMBURSEMENT OF THE FIVE
 THOUSAND PESOS REPRESENTING THE
REDEMPTION PRICE WAS ERRONEOUS.
The alleged undated holographic will written in Ilocano
translated into English, is quoted as follows:
ENGLISH INTERPRETATION OF THE
WILL OF THE
LATE MELECIO LABRADOR WRITTEN IN
ILOCANO
BY ATTY. FIDENCIO L. FERNANDEZ
I First Page
This is also where it appears in
writing of the place which is assigned
and shared or the partition in favor of
SAGRADO LABRADOR which is the
fishpond located and known place as
Tagale.
And this place that is given as the
share to him, there is a measurement
of more or less one hectare, and the
boundary at the South is the property
and assignment share of ENRICA
LABRADOR, also their sister, and the
boundary in the West is the sea,
known as the SEA as it is, and the
boundary on the NORTH is assignment
belonging to CRISTOBAL LABRADOR,
who likewise is also their brother.
That because it is now the time for
me being now ninety three (93)
years, then I feel it is the right time
for me to partition the fishponds
which were and had been bought or
acquired by us, meaning with their
two mothers, hence there shall be no
differences among themselves, those
among brothers and sisters, for it is I
myself their father who am making
the apportionment and delivering to
each and everyone of them the said
portion and assignment so that there
shall not be any cause of troubles or
differences among the brothers and
sisters.
II Second Page
And this is the day in which we mothers JULIANA QUINTERO
agreed that we are making the PILARISA and CASIANA AQUINO
partitioning and assigning the VILLANUEVA Your father who made
respective assignment of the said this writing (WILL), and he is,
fishpond, and this being in the month MELECIO LABRADOR y RALUTIN (p.
of March, 17th day, in the year 1968, 46, Rollo)
and this decision and or instruction of
mine is the matter to be followed.
The petition, which principally alleges that the
And the one who made this writing is
holographic will is really dated, although the date is not
no other than MELECIO LABRADOR,
in its usual place, is impressed with merit.
their father.
The will has been dated in the hand of the testator
Now, this is the final disposition that I
himself in perfect compliance with Article 810. It is
am making in writing and it is this
worthy of note to quote the first paragraph of the
that should be followed and complied
second page of the holographic will, viz:
with in order that any differences or
troubles may be forestalled and
nothing will happen along these And this is the day in which we
troubles among my children, and that agreed that we are making the
they will be in good relations among partitioning and assigning the
themselves, brothers and sisters; respective assignment of the said
fishpond, and this being in the month
of March, 17th day, in the year 1968,
And those improvements and fruits of
and this decision and or instruction of
the land; mangoes, bamboos and all
mine is the matter to be followed.
coconut trees and all others like the
And the one who made this writing is
other kind of bamboo by name of
no other than MELECIO LABRADOR,
Bayog, it is their right to get if they so
their father. (emphasis supplied) (p.
need, in order that there shall be
46, Rollo)
nothing that anyone of them shall
complain against the other, and
against anyone of the brothers and The law does not specify a particular location where the
sisters. date should be placed in the will. The only requirements
are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the
hand of the testator. These requirements are present in
III THIRD PAGE
the subject will.
And that referring to the other places
Respondents claim that the date 17 March 1968 in the
of property, where the said property
will was when the testator and his beneficiaries entered
is located, the same being the fruits
into an agreement among themselves about "the
of our earnings of the two mothers of
partitioning and assigning the respective assignments of
my children, there shall be equal
the said fishpond," and was not the date of execution of
portion of each share among
the holographic will; hence, the will is more of an
themselves, and or to be benefitted
"agreement" between the testator and the beneficiaries
with all those property, which
thereof to the prejudice of other compulsory heirs like
property we have been able to
the respondents. This was thus a failure to comply with
acquire.
Article 783 which defines a will as "an act whereby a
person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by
That in order that there shall be basis law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his
of the truth of this writing (WILL) estate, to take effect after his death."
which I am here hereof manifesting of
the truth and of the fruits of our
Respondents are in error. The intention to show 17
labor which their two mothers, I am
March 1968 as the date of the execution of the will is
signing my signature below hereof,
plain from the tenor of the succeeding words of the
and that this is what should be
paragraph. As aptly put by petitioner, the will was not an
complied with, by all the brothers
agreement but a unilateral act of Melecio Labrador who
and sisters, the children of their two
plainly knew that what he was executing was a will. The
act of partitioning and the declaration that such
partitioning as the testator's instruction or decision to be
followed reveal that Melecio Labrador was fully aware of
the nature of the estate property to be disposed of and
of the character of the testamentary act as a means to
control the disposition of his estate.
Anent the second issue of finding the reimbursement of
the P5,000 representing the redemption price as
erroneous, respondent court's conclusion is incorrect.
When private respondents sold the property (fishpond)
with right to repurchase to Navat for P5,000, they were
actually selling property belonging to another and which
they had no authority to sell, rendering such sale null
and void. Petitioners, thus "redeemed" the property
from Navat for P5,000, to immediately regain possession
of the property for its disposition in accordance with the
will. Petitioners therefore deserve to be reimbursed the
P5,000.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated March 10, 1988 is hereby REVERSED. The
holographic will of Melecio Labrador is APPROVED and
ALLOWED probate. The private respondents are directed
to REIMBURSE the petitioners the sum of Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.
Footnotes
1 Penned by Justice Jorge S. Imperial
and concurred in by Justices Jose
A.R. Melo and Manuel C. Herrera
2 Article 810 provides: A person may
execute a holographic will which
must be entirely written, dated and
signed by the hand of the testator
himself. It is subject to no other
form, and may be made in or out of
the Philippines, and need not be
witnessed.
$ + GRSI Copyrightregno N94-027
{bmr
footnote.bmp}93419_32_9_18_90_footnotes>mainG.R.
Nos. 93419-32 September 18, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. vs. GUALBERTO P. DELGADO
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 93419-32 September 18, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. GUALBERTO P. DELGADO, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC,
Br. 29, Toledo City, ELSIE RAGO LUMANGTAD, VIVENCIA
ABARIDO, AVELINA BUTASLAC, ROSELLANO BUTASLAC,
HAYDELISA LUMANGTAD, SILVESTRE LUMANGTAD,
MAXIMO RACAZA, NENA RACAZA, VICTORIANO/ VICTOR
RAGO, EDNA TEJAS, MERCEDITA TEJAS, TEOFISTO TEJAS,
BERNABE TOQUERO, JR., and PEDRO RAFAELA,
respondents.
Jose P. Balbuena for petitioner.
Fred B. Casas for respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
The authority of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to review
the actions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in
the investigation and prosecution of election offenses
filed in said court is the center of controversy of this
petition.
On January 14, 1988 the COMELEC received a report-
complaint from Atty. Lauron E. Quilatan, Election
Registrar of Toledo City, against private respondents for
alleged violation of the Omnibus Election Code. The
COMELEC directed Atty. Manuel Oyson, Jr., Provincial
Election Supervisor of Cebu, to conduct the preliminary
investigation of the case.
After conducting such preliminary investigation, Oyson
submitted a report on April 26, 1989 finding a prima
facie case and recommending the filing of an information
against each of the private respondents for violation of
Section 261 (y) (2) and (5) of the Omnibus Election Code.
The COMELEC en banc in minute resolution No. 89-1291
dated October 2, 1989 as amended by resolution No. 89-
1574 dated November 2, 1989 resolved to file the
information against the private respondents as
recommended.
On February 6, 1990, fifteen (15) informations were
filed against each of private respondents in the RTC of
Toledo City docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. TCS-1220 to
TCS-1234. In three separate manifestations the Regional
Election Director of Region VII was designated by the
COMELEC to handle the prosecution with the authority to
assign another COMELEC prosecutor.
Private respondents, through counsels, then filed
motions for reconsiderations and the suspension of the
warrant of arrest with the respondent court on the
ground that no preliminary investigation was conducted.
On February 22, 1990 an order was issued by respondent
court directing the COMELEC through the Regional
Election Director of Region VII to conduct a
reinvestigation of said cases and to submit his report
within ten (10) days after termination thereof. The
Toledo City INP was directed to hold in abeyance the
service of the warrants of arrest until the submission of
the reinvestigation report. 1
On March 16,1990 the COMELEC Prosecutor filed a
motion for reconsideration and opposition to the motion
for reinvestigation alleging therein that it is only the
Supreme Court that may review the decisions, orders,
rulings and resolutions of the COMELEC. This was denied
in an order dated April 5, 1990 whereby the respondent
trial court upheld its jurisdiction over the subject
matter. 2
Hence, the herein petition for certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition wherein the following issues are raised:
(a) Whether or not the respondent
Court has the power or authority to
order the Commission on Elections
through its Regional Election Director
of Region VII or its Law Department to
conduct a reinvestigation of Criminal
Cases Nos. TCS-1220 to TCS-1234;
(b) Whether or not the respondent
court in issuing its disputed order
dated April 5,1990 gravely usurped
the functions of the Honorable
Supreme Court, the sole authority
that has the power to review on
certiorari, decisions, orders,
 resolutions or instructions of the
Commission on Elections; and
(c) Whether or not the respondent
Court has the power or authority to
order the Comelec Law Department
to furnish said respondent the
records of preliminary investigation
of the above criminal cases for
purposes of determining a probable
cause. 3
The main thrust of the petition is that inasmuch as the
COMELEC is an independent constitutional body, its
actions on election matters may be reviewed only on
certiorari by the Supreme Court. 4
On the other hand, the respondents contend that since
the cases were filed in court by the COMELEC as a public
prosecutor, and not in the exercise of its power to
decide election contests, the trial court has authority to
order a reinvestigation.
Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 2. The Commission on Elections
shall exercise the following powers
and functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, and recall
(2) Exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction over all contests relating
to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all elective regional,
provincial, and city officials and
appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective municipal
officials decided by trial courts of
general jurisdiction or involving
elective baranggay officials decided
by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of
the commission on election contests
involving elective municipal and
barangay offices shall be final,
executory, and not appealable
(3) Decide, except those involving the
right to vote, all questions affecting
elections, including determination of
the number and location of polling
places, appointment of election
officials and inspectors, and
registration of voters.
(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of
the President, law enforcement
agencies and instrumentalities of the
Government, including the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, for the
exclusive purpose of ensuring free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and
credible elections.
(5) Register, after sufficient
publication, political parties,
organizations, or coalitions which, in
addition to other requirements, must
present their platform or program of
government; and accredit citizens'
arms of the Commission on Elections.
Religious denominations and sects
shall not be registered. Those which
seek to achieve their goals through
violence or unlawful means, or refuse
to uphold and adhere to this
Constitution, or which are supported
by any foreign government shall
likewise be refused registration.
Financial contributions from foreign
governments and their agencies to
political parties, organizations,
coalitions, or candidates related to
elections constitute interference in
national affairs, and, when accepted,
shall be an additional ground for the
cancellation of their registration with
the Commission in addition to other
penalties that may be prescribed by
law.
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or
on its own initiative, petitions in
court for inclusions or exclusion of
voters; investigate and, where
appropriate, prosecute cases of
violations of election laws, including
acts or omissions constituting
election frauds, offenses, and
malpractices.
(7) Recommend to the Congress
effective measures to minimize
election spending, including
limitation of places where propaganda
materials shall be posted, and to
prevent and penalize all forms of
election frauds, offenses,
malpractices, and nuisance
candidates.
(8) Recommend to the President the
removal of any officer or employee it
has deputized, or the imposition of
any other disciplinary action, for
violation or disregard of, or
disobedience to its directive, order,
or decision.
(9) Submit to the President and the
Congress a comprehensive report on
the conduct of each election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or
recall. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 52, Article VII of the Omnibus Election Code
(Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) provides among the powers
and functions of the COMELEC as follows-
Sec. 52. Power and functions of the
Commission on Elections.-In addition
to the powers and functions
conferred upon it by the Constitution,
the Commission shall have exclusive
charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to
the conduct of elections for the
purpose of securing free, orderly and
honest elections .... (Emphasis
supplied.)
Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution reads thus
SEC, 7. Each Commission shall decide
by a majority vote of all its Members
any case or matter brought before it
within sixty days from the date of its
submission for decision or resolution.
A case or matter is deemed submitted
for decision or resolution upon the
filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum required by the rules of
the Commission or by the Commission
itself. Unless otherwise provided by
this Constitution or by law any
decision, order, of ruling or each
 Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days
from receipt of a copy thereof.
(Emphasis supplied.)
From the aforementioned provisions of Section 2, Article
IX-C of the Constitution the powers and functions of the
COMELEC may be classified in this manner
5 the Omnibus Election Code, it is clear that aside from
(1) Enforcement of election laws;
6
(2) Decision of election contests;
(3) Decision of administrative
questions; 7
(4) Deputizing of law enforcement
agencies; 8
(5) Registration of political
parties; 9 and
(6) Improvement of elections. 10
As provided in Section 7, Article IX of the Constitution,
unless otherwise provided by law, any decision, order or
ruling of the COMELEC may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty
days from receipt of a copy thereof.
In Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop vs.
Ferrer, 11 this Court held that "what is contemplated by
the term final orders, rulings and decisions' of the
COMELEC reviewable on certiorari by the Supreme Court
as provided by law are those rendered in actions or
proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance
of by said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or
quasi-judicial powers." Thus, the decisions of the
COMELEC on election contests or administrative
questions brought before it are subject to judicial review
only by this Court.
However, under Section 2(6), of Article IX-C of the
Constitution, the COMELEC may "investigate and, where
appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election
laws, including acts or omissions constituting election
frauds, offenses and malpractices." Under Section 265 of
the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC, through its
duly authorized legal officers, "have the exclusive power
to conduct preliminary investigation of all election
offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute
the same."
Section 268 of the same Code provides that: "The WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
regional trial courts shall have exclusive original No pronouncement as to costs.
jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or
proceedings for violation of this Code, except those
SO ORDERED.
relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to
vote which shall be under the jurisdiction of the
metropolitan or municipal trial courts. From the decision Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz,
of the courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases." Feliciano Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-
Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
From the foregoing provisions of the Constitution and
Fernan, C.J. and Paras, J., are on leave.
the adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC
to decide election contests and administrative questions,
it is also vested the power of a public prosecutor with
the exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary
investigation and the prosecution of election offenses Footnotes
punishable under the Code before the competent court.
Thus, when the COMELEC, through its duly authorized
1 Annex E to petition; pages 56 to 57,
law officer, conducts the preliminary investigation of an
rollo.
election offense and upon a prima facie finding of a
probable cause, files the information in the proper
court, said court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the 2 Annex G to petition; pages 60 to 62,
case. Consequently, all the subsequent disposition of rollo.
said case must be subject to the approval of the
court. 12 The COMELEC cannot conduct a reinvestigation
3 Pages 2 to 3, Rollo.
of the case without the authority of the court or unless
so ordered by the court. 13
4 Citing Section 7, Article IX and
section 2(l), Article IX-C of the
The records of the preliminary investigation required to
Constitution.
be produced by the court must be submitted by the
COMELEC. The trial court may rely on the resolution of
the COMELEC to file the information, by the same token 5 Section 2(l), Article IX-C,
that it may rely on the certification made by the Constitution.
prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation,
in the issuance of the warrant of arrest. Nevertheless
6 Id., paragraph (2).
the court may require that the record of the preliminary
investigation be submitted to it to satisfy itself that
there is probable cause which will warrant the issuance 7 Id., paragraph (3).
of a warrant of arrest. 14
8 Id., paragraph (4).
The refusal of the COMELEC or its agents to comply with
the order of the trial court requiring them to conduct a
reinvestigation in this case and to submit to the court 9 Id., paragraph (5).
the record of the preliminary investigation on the ground
that only this Court may review its actions is certainly 10 Id., paragraph (7). See also Cruz,
untenable. Philippine Political Law 1987 Edition,
pages 287 to 297.
One last word. The petition is brought in the name of the
People of the Philippines. Only the Solicitor General can 11 135 SCRA 25, 32 (1985).
represent the People of the Philippines in this
proceeding. 15 In the least, the consent of the Office of
the Solicitor General should have been secured by the 12 Crespo vs. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462
COMELEC before the filing of this petition. On this (1987).
account alone, the petition should be dismissed.
13 Ibid.
14 Section 2, Article III, Constitution.

l5 City Fiscal of Tacloban vs. Espina,

166 SCRA 614, 616 to 617 (1988).