Reliability diagnostics of electronic

equipment
V. Solja(~i(~ and M. Kosic
Iskra Automatika, Research Institute, 61000 Ljubljana, Stegne 15/b, Yugoslavia

Reliability diagnostics is important in the selection and design of equipment and spare
parts, and for establishing maintenance policy. Three possible methods are: failure
rate analysis; failure mode, effect and criticality analysis; and fault tree analysis. The
importance of reliability diagnostics in the early planning and design stages is
emphasised.
Keywords: Diagnostics,reliability,failure rate, failure mode, fault tree

1. Introduction resistors, capacitors, integrated circuits, connectors,

Reliability diagnostics of electronic equipment in the
early phase of a design is based on prediction of the
reliability of component parts, units, equipment and
systems. Early estimation and diagnostics is necessary
for choosing the most satisfactory design of equipment,
for the correct planning of spare parts, determining
better maintenance policy and for achieving better
availability during the life cycle of the equipment.
2. S u g g e s t e d m e t h o d s
From literature and practice we know a few methods
for early diagnostics of the incorrect working of equip-
ment, from the reliability point of view. The most often
used are:
(a) failure rate analysis (A)
(b) failure mode, effect and criticality analysis
(FMECA)
(c) fault tree analysis (FFA).
It should be mentioned that these methods as analysis
and reliability diagnostics can be divided into two
groups: the inductive and the deductive approaches.
The inductive approach, including failure rate analysis
and FMECA, analyses the influence of separate items
and events on the function of the equipment or the sys-
tem. The deductive approach, including FTA, analyses
the reasons for some failure of equipment or system.
Thus it can be stated that the inductive approach is
used when we want to determine what kind of states of
equipment are possible (generally a failure state), and
the deductive approach is used when we want to deter-
mine how a given system state (usually a failed state) can
Occur.
etc, in all kinds of applications and laboratories. A
design engineer uses such formulae to calculate failure
rates of individual components, units and even equip-
ment. Based on this analysis, the 'weak points' of equip-
ment can be determined.
The widely used mathematical models for calculation
are in handbooks: MIL-HDBK217 ( A , . . . E), CNET's
and BELL-COR's. The basic form of these models is:
Ax = Ab.,rr 1-,n-2.. . .
where Ax is the failure rate of the electronic part and Ab
is the basic failure rate of the electronic part, taking into
account the technology, temperature and electrical
stress. ~'), 7 r 2 . . . are factors connected to quality, con-
struction, environment, electrical stress, application,
etc.
Here it has to be pointed out that it is assumed that the
equipment is in the flat part of the so-called 'bath-tub'
curve (Fig 1). That means that the equipment is in the
'stable' part of its useful life (period B), and that early
failures (period A) are eliminated in the production
phase (burn-in, run-in). In this case the failures that
occur because of wearing out are not taken into con-
sideration (period C).

(a) Failure rate analysis r

Failure rate analysis is carried out based on knowing

the failure rate of an equipment's electronic parts. The A B C
mathematical model for estimating the failure rate of
electronic parts is the result of many years observation of Fig 1 Typical failure rates over time

MeasurementVol 8 No 3, JuI-Sep 1990 141

 Solja~i~ and Kosi#
For estimating the failure rate of units, from the re- rence of the predefined undesired event. It is important
liability point of view, the series model is used, which to understand that a fault tree is not a model of all
means that the sum of the parts' failure rates is the units' possible system failures or all possible causes for system
failure rate. For estimating the equipment's failure rate, failure. A failure tree is tailored to its top event, which
the realiability block diagram ( R B D ) is often used to corresponds to some particular system failure mode, and
estimate the critical part of the equipment (for example, the fault tree thus includes only those faults that con-
the receiver or transmitter in R R equipment). tribute to this top event.
Reliability diagnostics, where reliability is defined as A fault tree is a complex of entities known as 'gates'
the probability of an item to perform a required function which serve to permit or inhibit the passage of fault logic
under stated conditions for a stated period of time, is cal- up the tree. The gates show the relationships of events
culated by using the equation: needed for the occurrence of a 'higher' event. The
R = e -A' 'higher' event is the output of the gate; the 'lower' events
are the inputs to the gate. The gate symbol denotes the
Where: R is the reliability of the equipment; A is the type of relationship of the input events required for the
failure rate of the equipment; t is the time (in hours) output event.
which we expect the equipment or unit will have to
work.
3. E x a m p l e s from practice
In the case when we have the series R B D with i units
(i = 1,2 . . . . n) In this part we want to show the reliability diagnostics
results of three equipments done in recent time in our In-
R=~-~Ri
i= I
stitute. We have to point out that until now only the
basic reliability analysis has been included in develop-
ment work in the Institute, so we made an estimation of
In the case of parallel (active redundant) R B D , with i failure rate of elements, units and equipment. For this
units (i = 1,2 . . . . n), the equipment's reliability is work we used SW developed in-house and based on
M I L - H D B K - 2 1 7 E . Using the element-producer's data
and application data we calculated failure rates of units
R = ~ (l-R,) and equipment.
t= I
Application data include application stress factor,
For all other combinations we can find mathematical ambient temperature, t e m p e r a t u r e inside the unit,
models in the literature referring to these problems. application factor, etc. For our calculation we took into
consideration two possibilities of ambient temperature -
(b) Failure mode, effect and criticality analysis (FMECA) specified maximum ambient t e m p e r a t u r e (50C) and
temperature of 25C. In these two possibilities, calcula-
This analysis, known as down-top analysis, can be car-
tion was done with the stress factor appearing in the
ried out on all levels of the complex-elements, units,
application. The third calculation for every element was
equipment and electronic systems. In this analysis, be-
done for simulating the stand-by state with 20C of
sides failure rate, the criticality of failure, according to
ambient t e m p e r a t u r e and 10% stress factor for the ele-
function, is taken into account. As a result, we have an
ments. It was thus possible to see the influence of tem-
insight into the kind of failures which have an influence
perature and stress factor on the failure rate of elements,
on the correct work of the equipment. Reliability diag-
nostics using F M E C A has one very important feature:
all supposed possible failures are analysed, as well as TABLE 1 : Data for calculating MTTF
their causes and consequences. It is thus possible in time
EQP1 EQP2 EQP3
to 'build-in' added parts, or even units, to be able to
diagnose degradation of some characteristics or the Unit MTI'F (h) Unit MTTF (h) Unit M'I-rF (h)
appearance of the fault. Sometimes it is necessary to
make a re-design of the equipment's construction, to U1 15330 U1 15730 U1 7426
U2 40620 U2 20680 U2 8554
build in the element of better quality, or to build in U3 50080 U3 26560
redundant units. U4 58380 U4 38900
In the case of built-in SW, it can be very practical to U5 58940 U5 48340
build in special diagnostics SW for testing the ability of U6 67190 U6 58000
equipment and to be ready for correct work at a stated U7 79830 U7 71260
U8 112900 U8 72590
instant of time or over a stated period of time. Based on U9 116900 U9 198000
those results, we can in time take some action to put the U10 145900
equipment into the correct state. Ull 147300
U12 246100
(c) Fault tree analysis (FTA) U13 251900
U14 254600
A fault tree analysis can be simply described as a U15 395000
U16 499200
technique whereby an undesired state of the system is
U17 559500
specified (usually a state that is critical from the safety U18 705000
standpoint), and the system is then analysed in the con- U19 714200
text of its environment and operation to find all possible U20 778400
ways in which the undesired event can occur. The fault U21 1,5x106
tree itself is a graphic model of the various parallel and EQP1 4546 EQP2 4137 EQP3 3957
serial combinations of faults that will result in the occur-

142 Measurement Vol 8 No 3, Jul-Sep 1990


units and equipment. This paper presents the results of
calculations for ambient temperature of 25C and real
stress factor for every element in the application. From
those data, M T I ' F is calculated, and presented in Table 1.
Analysing the results we found out that in E Q P 1 the
most critical unit is unit U1 and its monitor is the most
critical 'element' (MI"-FF = 10000 h). As mentioned
above, a series model of reliability is used (group of
switches) because the great number of that element also
has a big influence on the failure rate of the unit. The
most critical element in that unit is one type of connector.
Analysing the results of E Q P 2, it is obvious that the
most critical unit is U1. The most critical group of ele-
ments are the integrated circuits and inside that group
the highest failure rate is found with one linear integ-
rated circuit ( M T T F = 50000 h).
In E Q P 3, both units have approximately the same
1 As we supposed that just-failed units would be changed,
.?
,
|h \
\ %
\ U3, U4, U5, U6, U7), one group which can be put in the
.3
\ be critical, U1, because we can expect its total failure in
e 5(] LEE 15fl 2gE 25g' 3EE 35E .~glE ,tSe 5Be
~ 1 i ~ ^ 3 "c h ]
(a)
itl'x .C __
"21 e \\xx
,I \l Nx
5(: :88 tSg 28G 25e 3ge 35e 4ee 45e 51~
~ t e , , . 3 1: I;h~
(b)
Measurement Vol 8 No 3, JuI-Sep 1990
Solja#i& and Kosi&
TABLE 2: Complexity of
equipments
EQP 1 1820 elements
EQP2 1220 elements
EQP3 300 elements
failure rate and so too does the MTTF. As a group of
elements, the most critical are switches and linear integ-
rated circuits.
The complexity of those equipments, referring to the
number of electronic parts, is presented in Table 2.
The complexity is based only on the number of ele-
ments and not on the kind of elements because that is not
the object of this article. The reliability curves are shown
in Figs 2a, 2b and 2c.
The goal of reliability analysis was to plan the method
of maintenance and to plan for the necessary spare parts.
we analysed equipment from that point of view.
From the data shown it is evident that all three equip-
ments have expected mean-time-between-failures of ap-
proximately half a year, not depending on complexity.
All three equipments work in a ground-fixed environ-
ment. From numerical and graph analyses, it can be seen
that in the first equipment, EQP1, we have one group of
units which are not critical from the reliability point of
view (U12, U13, U14, U15, U16, U17, U18, U19, U20,
U21), one group which can be put in the upper level (U2,
lower level (US, U9, U10, U l l ) and one unit which can
the same time (tl) when the other units have a fairly high
probability of correct working.
Analysing the reliability diagnostic results of the sec-
ond equipment, EQP2, it is evident that the unit U9 is
not critical compared with the group of other units.
t
.7 \
8 5e Lee t5~. 2eE 25E 3El~ 35G 4E~ ,i.SE 51~le
(c)
Fig2 Reliability curves: (a) EQP1, (b) EQP2, (c) EQP3
143
Soljadid and Kosid
Inside that group it is also evident that unit U1 has one-
third the probability for correct work in the t = tl than
unit U8.
Based on the results of reliability diagnostics of EQP1
and EQP2, the decision on maintenance policy has to be
made. That means that the method of functional diag-
nostics has to be determined and the number of spare
parts has to be calculated and planned according to the
probability of equipment's and unit's working correctly
in the stated time. In our cases that means that an addi-
tional ntimber of critical units and of units from lower
levels of reliability has to be planned as spare parts in the
place where those equipments have to operate.
Looking at the results of units of the third equipment,
EQP3, it is evident that the units have much the same
probability of correct working during the expected work
life, and that they have to be treated in the same way
during maintenance activities.
4. C o n c l u s i o n
The reliability diagnostics of electronic equipment in
the early development phase or on the prototype is very
important because of the planning the other activities
during its life cycle. Also important are: burn-in, run-in,
planning the method of diagnosing during the equip-
ment's operation, planning the system of maintenance,
planning the spare parts, and availability and depend-
ability. The examples from practice are a modest effort
for reaching the mentioned goals.
5. R e f e r e n c e s
O'Connor, P. D. T. 1985. Practical Reliability Engineer-
ing (2nd edn).
Vesely, W. E., Goldberg, F. F., Roberts, N. I-I. and
l-laasl, D. F. 1981. Fault Tree Handbook, N U R E G -
0492, January.

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144 Measurement Vol 8 No 3, JuI-Sep 1990