Alexander An - Pr. 1.8-13 PDF

Alexander of Aphrodisias
On Aristotle Prior Analytics 1.8-13

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Alexander
of Aphrodisias
On Aristotle
Prior Analytics 1.8-13
(with 1.17,36b35-37a31)
Translated by Ian Mueller with

Josiah Gould
Introduction, Notes and

Appendices by
Ian Mueller
LON DON N E W DE L H I N E W YOR K SY DN EY

Bloomsbury Academic
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First published in 1999 by Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd.

Paperback edition first published 2014
Ian Mueller, 1999
Ian Mueller asserts his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988,
to be identified as Author of this work.
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Acknowledgements
The present translations have been made possible by generous and imaginative funding from the
following sources: the National Endowment for the Humanities, Division of
Research Programs, an independent federal agency of the USA; the Leverhulme
Trust; the British Academy; the Jowett Copyright Trustees; the Royal Society (UK);
Centro Internazionale A. Beltrame di Storia dello Spazio e del Tempo (Padua); Mario Mignucci;
Liverpool University; the Leventis Foundation; the Humanities Research Board of the
British Academy; the Esme Fairbairn Charitable Trust; the Henry Brown Trust; Mr and
Mrs N. Egon; The Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO/GW).
The editor wishes to thank Jonathan Barnes, Tad Brennan, Kevin Flannery, Pamela Huby,
Michael B. Papazian, Richard Patterson and Donald Russell for their
comments on the volume, and Han Baltussen for preparing the volume for press.
Typeset by Ray Davies

Printed and bound in Great Britain
Contents
Editors Note vii

Preface ix
Introduction
I. Assertoric syllogistic 4
II. Modal syllogistic without contingency 9
II.A. Conversion of necessary propositions 9
II.B. NN-combinations 11
II.C. N+U combinations 13
III. Modal syllogistic with contingent propositions 19
III.A. Strict contingency and its transformation rules 19
III.B. Alexander and the temporal interpretation of
modality 23
III.C. Conversion of necessary propositions 25
III.D. Conversion of contingent propositions 27
III.D.1 Conversion of affirmative contingent
propositions 27
III.D.2 Non-convertibility of negative contingent
propositions 31
Notes 34
Summary (overview of symbols and rules) 39
Translation: The commentary

Textual Emendations 52
1.8 Combinations with two necessary premisses 53
1.9-11 Combinations with one necessary and one unqualified
premiss 58
1.9 The first figure 58
1.10 The second figure 70
1.11 The third figure 81
1.12 Summary remarks on the necessary and the unqualified 89
1.13 Remarks on contingency 93
1.17, 36b35-37a31 Failure of EE-conversion for contingent
premisses 106
vi Contents
Notes 117
Appendix 1. The expression by necessity (ex ananks) 145
Appendix 2. Affirmation and negation 147
Appendix 3. Conditional necessity 148
Appendix 4. On Interpretation, chapters 12 and 13 153
Appendix 5. Weak two-sided Theophrastean contingency 155
Appendix 6. Textual notes on Aristotles text 159
Bibliography 163
English-Greek Glossary 165
Greek-English Index 169
Subject Index 185
Index Locorum 187
Editors Note
This text, translated in two volumes, is a very important one because

Alexanders is the main commentary on the chapters in which Aristotle
invented modal logic, i.e. the logic of necessary (possible) and contingent
propositions. Because it is more technical than the other texts in this
series, Ian Mueller explains the modal logic in his masterly introduc-
tion, which takes an exceptional form, being couched in logical symbols
partly of his own devising. All symbols are explained on first occurrence.
Symbols are entirely excluded from the translation itself, and this can
be consulted freely by those who do not wish to master the entire modal
system.
In this volume, Alexander reaches the chapter of Aristotles Prior
Analytics (1.13) where Aristotle discusses the notion of contingency,
and we have added Alexanders commentary on that part of 1.17 where
the conversion of contingent propositions is handled, the contingent
being what may or may not happen.
Aristotle also invented the theory of the syllogism, and in the present
chapters he discusses syllogisms consisting of two necessary proposi-
tions, as well as the more controversial syllogisms containing one
necessary and one non-modal premiss. The discussion of syllogisms
containing contingent propositions is reserved for the companion
volume.
December 1998 R.R.K.S.

Preface
This translation has been literally decades (two) in the making. Josiah
Gould, acting on a suggestion of Ian Mueller, prepared a first draft of
the translation. Mueller produced a second draft and, then, in consult-
ation with Gould, a third and final version with introduction, notes,
appendices, and indices. We are certain that errors remain, but know
that there would have been many more without the advice of Tad
Brennan, Glenn Most, Richard Patterson, Robin Smith, and several
anonymous readers whose friendly but stern admonitions turned us
from some paths. We take full responsibility for remaining on other
paths despite their counsel.
December 1998 I.M.

J.G.
Introduction
We offer here a translation of Alexander of Aphrodisias commentary on

chapters 8-13 and most of 17 of book 1 of Aristotles Prior Analytics. In
chapters 8-12 Aristotle presents what we call his modal logic as applied
to necessary and to what we call unqualified propositions. In chapter 13
Aristotle discusses the notion of contingency, and in the part of 17
translated here he treats the so-called conversion of contingent propo-
sitions. In a separate volume we have translated Alexanders
commentary on chapters 14-22, in which Aristotle treats arguments
involving contingent propositions. Chapters 1, 2, and 4-7 of the Prior
Analytics constitute a self-contained presentation of what we will call
non-modal or assertoric syllogistic. Alexanders commentary on this
material (and on chapter 3) has been admirably translated and dis-
cussed by Barnes et al. We refer the reader to their introduction for
information about Alexander, ancient commentaries, and the general
character of Alexanders commentary on the whole Prior Analytics.
In making choices for how to deal with our task, we have always
begun by consulting Barnes et al. for guidance, and in many cases have
followed their practices. But the greater difficulty of the material we
have to present here has led us to diverge from them in some significant
ways. First of all, in our notes and discussions we have relied on a
quasi-formal symbolism. We hope that the symbolism is enlightening;
we are confident that a full exposition of our text not using some
formalism would run to much greater length. To put this another way,
if one used a formal symbolism one could encapsulate the full content
of Alexanders commentary in many fewer pages than Alexander has
used.
We have, however, not thought it a good idea to introduce formal
symbolism into the translation itself. Our major departure from Alex-
anders text is that we have used considerably more variables than
Alexander uses; we have sometimes done the same thing in our trans-
lations of Aristotle. To give one example, at 121,4-6, where Alexander
writes,
In both cases the conclusion proved is a particular negative necessary

proposition of which the opposite is It is contingent of all (endekhetai
panti).
2 Introduction
we have translated,
In both cases the conclusion proved is a particular negative necessary

proposition of which the opposite is It is contingent that X holds of all Y.
There is in general no way for a reader to tell whether, e.g., the

translation A holds of all B is literal or corresponds to something like
holds of all or universal affirmative without consulting the Greek
text.1
The modern literature on Aristotles modal logic is substantial and
itself difficult. The interpretations offered have been quite diverse, and
a number of them have connected the modal logic with Aristotelian
metaphysics. We did not see any way to enter into these various
interpretations, and we have thought it best to focus on what we would
call logical content, which seems to us also to be the focus of Alexanders
commentary. In fact, it seems to us that Alexanders frequently ex-
pressed perplexities about what Aristotle says are a more accurate
reflection of Aristotles presentation of modal logic than is the work of
many subsequent interpreters who have attempted to turn the modal
logic into a coherent system. In our notes and discussions we have
primarily tried to extract the logical content of Alexanders tortured
prose. Just as we have not devoted much attention to modern interpre-
tations of Aristotles logic, so we have not devoted much to parallel
passages in other ancient texts. In both cases limitations of our time, of
our knowledge, and of the space allotted by the publisher have con-
strained us.
We have included a complete translation of the text of Aristotle as
read by Alexander (insofar as we can infer that) in the lemmas; we have
inserted texts as lemmas in places where there is no lemma in the
edition of Wallies, on which our translation is based; and we have
sometimes produced a stretch of Aristotelian text more than once. The
reader can identify the exact extent of the lemmas in Wallies text, since
material not in the lemmas is enclosed in square brackets. Our own
judgment is that the lemmas are matters of convenience; they tell us
more about the practice of scribes and later teachers than about the
practices of ancient commentators.
In our translation we have adopted the unusual practice of placing
note references at the beginning of paragraphs which we judge to be
especially difficult to follow. We believe that some readers will find it
useful to have an account of what Alexander is going to say before trying
to follow his own words. Those who prefer to make their own way
through the text can simply ignore those notes initially and recur to
them as they deem necessary.
In section I of this introduction we give a brief and schematic
presentation of non-modal syllogistic to familiarize the reader with
Introduction 3
terminology and with some of our apparatus for representing Alexan-
ders discussions. In section II we try to give at least a partial overview
of chapters 8-12 and the part of chapter 3 relevant to it. But we shall
postpone the discussion of some of that material because it presupposes
the discussion of contingency, which we take up in section III. On
occasion the reader may find it useful to refer to the formal Summary
which follows this introduction.
Here is an outline of the contents of the first 22 chapters of the Prior
Analytics:
1.1-3 Introductory material

1.1 Preliminary definitions
1.2 Conversion of unqualified propositions
1.3 Conversion of necessary and contingent propositions
1.4-7 Combinations with only unqualified premisses
1.4-7 Combinations with two unqualified premisses
1.4 First figure
1.5 Second figure
1.6 Third figure
1.7 Further remarks
1.8-12 Combinations with at least one necessary but no contingent
premiss
1.8 Combinations with two necessary premisses
1.9-11 Combinations with one necessary and one unqualified premiss
1.9 First figure
1.10 Second figure
1.11 Third figure
1.12 Summarizing remarks on necessity
1.13-22 Combinations with a contingent premiss
1.13 Discussion of contingency
1.14-16 The first figure
1.14 Both premisses contingent
1.15 One premiss unqualified
1.16 One premiss necessary
1.17-19 The second figure
1.20-22 The third figure
4 Introduction
I. Assertoric syllogistic (1.1, 2, 4-7)

For the most part it suffices for understanding Aristotelian modal
syllogistic to have only a schematic understanding of the non-modal or
assertoric syllogistic as it is developed in the first six chapters of the
Prior Analytics. We present such a schematic representation here in
quasi-formal terms which we will also rely on in our commentary.
Qualifications of this schematic representation will be introduced only
as they are needed.
A. Terms are capital letters from the beginning of the alphabet: A, B, C,

D, , (standing for general terms such as human or animal).
B. Propositions. There are four types of propositions:
XaY (read X holds of all Y or All Y are X)

XeY (read X holds of no Y or No Y are X)
XiY (read X holds of some Y or Some Y are X)
XoY (read X does not hold of some Y or Some Y are not X)
where X and Y are terms (called respectively the predicate and the
subject of the proposition).2 These propositions are sometimes referred
to as a-propositions, e-propositions, etc. Propositions of the first two
kinds are called universal, those of the last two particular; a- and
i-propositions are called affirmative, e- and o- negative. Universality
and particularity are called quantity, affirmativeness and negativeness
quality. When we wish to represent a proposition in abstraction from
its quantity and quality we write, e.g., XY.
C. Pairs of propositions with one common term are called combinations,

and assigned to one of three figures:
First figure XZ ZY
Second figure ZX ZY
Third figure XZ YZ
As members of combinations propositions are called premisses. In the

schemata given, Z is called the middle term of the combination, and X
and Y are called extremes or extreme terms. In addition X is called the
major term, Y the minor term; and the premiss containing the major
term is called the major premiss, the one containing the minor term the
minor premiss.
D. The major problem for Aristotle is to determine which combinations

are syllogistic, that is imply a proposition (called the conclusion) with
Introduction 5
the major term as predicate and the minor as subject.3 Aristotle restricts
himself to considering the strongest conclusion implied by a syllogistic
combination. In the first figure he recognizes the following syllogistic
combinations:4
1. AaB BaC AaC (1.4, 25b37-40)

2. AeB BaC AeC (1.4, 25b40-26a2)
3. AaB BiC AiC (1.4, 26a23-5)
4. AeB BiC AoC (1.4, 26a25-7)
As a preliminary notation for these syllogisms (which will be compli-

cated when we take up modal syllogistic) we introduce
1. AAA1
2. EAE1
3. AII1
4. EIO1
where the letters give the quality and quantity of the propositions
involved and the subscripted number gives the figure. When we wish to
represent just a pair of premisses we write such things as
EE_1
to represent the pair
AeB
BeC
We will, in fact, use something like this notation for pairs of pre-
misses, but after some hesitation, we have decided also to use the
medieval names for the categorical syllogisms in the belief that most
people who work on syllogistic will find them easier to read than the
more abstract symbolism. Those unfamiliar with the names need only
remember that the sequence of vowels in the medieval names repro-
duces the sequence of letters in the symbolism we have introduced; for
further clarity we will add to the names numerical subscripts indicating
the figure.5 Thus we will refer to the four first-figure syllogisms as
1. Barbara1
2. Celarent1
3. Darii1
4. Ferio1
Aristotle calls these four syllogisms complete (teleios, rendered perfect

6 Introduction
by Barnes et al). Aristotle says that a syllogism is complete if it needs
nothing apart from the assumptions in order for the necessity <of the
conclusion> to be evident (1.1, 24b22-4). Modern scholars have disputed
what Aristotle means here,6 but Alexander clearly thinks that the
complete syllogisms receive a kind of justification from the so-called
dictum de omni et nullo, which he takes to give an account of the
relations expressed by a and e:7
For one thing to be in another as in a whole and for the other to be

predicated of all of the one are the same thing. We say that one thing is
predicated of all of another when it is not possible to take any of it of
which the other is not said. And similarly for of none. (1.1, 24b26-30)
Alexander understands this passage to be saying something like:
XaY if and only if it is not possible to take any Y which is not an X;

XeY if and only if it is not possible to take any Y which is an X.
Alexanders treatment of Barbara1 and Ferio1 show how he invokes the

dictum in the treatment of complete syllogisms:
Let A be the major extreme, B the middle term, and C the minor extreme.
If C is in B as in a whole, B is said of every C. Therefore, it is not
possible to take any C of which B is not said. Again, if B is in A as in a
whole, A is said of every B. Hence it is not possible to take any of B of
which A is not said. Now, if nothing of B can be taken of which A is not
said, and C is something of B, then by necessity A will be said of C too.
(54,12-18)
If something of C is in B as in a whole,8 and B is in no A, then A will not

hold of some C. For something of C is under B; but nothing of B can be
taken of which A is said. Hence A will not be said of that item of C which
is something of B. (60,27-61,1)
Whether one thinks that for Aristotle complete assertoric syllogisms are
simply self-evident or in agreement with Alexander that their
validity depends on the dictum de omni et nullo, affects ones under-
standing of Aristotles conception of logic, but it does not affect ones
understanding of which assertoric combinations are syllogistic. In the
case of modal syllogistic the situation changes. At least in antiquity the
dictum played a role in disputes about whether certain combinations
are syllogistic. We will say more about the issue in section II.C.
E. At this point it is convenient to describe the principal procedure by

which Aristotle shows that a combination is non-syllogistic. We would
normally show that a given first-figure combination XY, YZ does not
yield a specific conclusion XZ by specifying concrete terms which, when
Introduction 7
substituted for X, Y, and Z, make XY and YZ true and XZ false. Thus to
show that AaB and BeC do not imply AeC we can point out that although
All humans are animals and No cows are humans are true, No cows
are animals is false. Aristotle shows that a first-figure combination of
specific premisses XY and YZ yields no conclusion (of the relevant kind
with X as predicate and Z as subject) by giving two interpretations, one
which makes XY, YZ, and XaZ true, the other of which makes XY, YZ,
and XeY true. This procedure works because of the following relations
among propositions:
a. XaY and XoY are contradictories, i.e.,

XaY if and only if (XoY) (so that also XoY if and only if (XaY));
b. XeY and XiY are contradictories, i.e.,
XeY if and only if (XiY) (so that also XiY if and only if (XeY));
c. XaY and XeY are contraries, i.e., they cannot be true together
(although they might both be false).9
Given these relationships, an interpretation making XaZ true rules out

any negative conclusion XZ and an interpretation making XeZ true rules
out any affirmative conclusion.
On pp. 12-14 Barnes et al. discuss Alexanders understanding of this
method of rejecting non-syllogistic pairs and say, He always misunder-
stands it. In a footnote they add, He may seem to get it right at in An.
Pr. 101,14-16 and 328,10-20; but in these passages it seems reasonable
to think that he has succeeded by mistake. We agree with this assess-
ment of Alexander. He consistently treats the method of rejection as a
matter of showing that both XaY and XeY (or their analogues in modal
syllogistic, X holds of all Y by necessity and X holds of no Y by
necessity) follow from a pair of premisses. We have signalled Alexan-
ders misapprehension in cases where if we have understood him
correctly it has led him to express a false opinion or made his
discussion less cogent than it might be, and sometimes we have done so
in the many more numerous passages where Alexanders misdescrip-
tion of what is going on is harmless. But we have frequently left it to
the reader to realize that in a given passage Alexander speaks about,
e.g., P3 following from P1 and P2 when he should be speaking about all
three propositions being true.10
F. Aristotle shows that second- and third-figure assertoric combinations

are syllogistic by completing them or reducing them to first-figure
syllogisms. Reductions are either direct or indirect. Direct reductions
make use of the following rules of conversion enunciated and discussed
by Aristotle in the second chapter of the Prior Analytics:
8 Introduction
EE-conversion: XeY YeX (25a14-17)
AI-conversion: XaY YiX (25a17-19)
II-conversion: XiY YiX (25a20-2)
Aristotle uses terms to reject the possibility of any kind of O -conversion

at 25a22-6.
The second-figure syllogisms are:
1. Cesare2 AeB AaC BeC (1.5, 27a5-9)

2. Camestres2 AaB AeC BeC (1.5, 27a9-15)
3. Festino2 AeB AiC BoC (1.5, 27a32-6)
4. Baroco2 AaB AoC BoC (1.5, 27a36-b3)
The first three of these are completed directly. We indicate the way in
which we will describe their reductions or proofs (deixeis), as Alexander
most frequently calls them, in the Summary. Baroco2 is justified indi-
rectly by reductio ad absurdum: from the contradictory of the conclusion
and one of the premisses, one uses a first-figure syllogism to infer the
contradictory of the other premiss. For our representation of the argu-
ment see the Summary, which gives similar representations for the
third figure. These derivations for modally unqualified propositions are
worth learning since in general Aristotle tries to adapt them to modally
qualified propositions. In the directly derivable cases he faces few
problems so that many of the main issues for them arise already in
connection with the first figure. However, the addition of the modal
operators causes special problems in the indirect cases.
G. Aristotle seems to assume the completeness of his reduction proce-

dures, that is, he assumes that any combination can either be refuted
by a counterinterpretation or reduced to a first-figure syllogism. He also
assumes that the system is consistent in the sense that one cannot give
both a counterinterpretation and a reduction for a given syllogism.
These assumptions are correct for assertoric syllogistic, and they make
possible another method of showing a combination non-syllogistic: show
that the rules do not allow the combination to be reduced to a first-figure
syllogism.11 Aristotle does not use this method in assertoric syllogistic,
but he does apply it in modal syllogistic (e.g. at 1.17, 37a32-6), and
Alexander does it even more frequently. The applications of this method
are not up to the standards of modern proof theory, but they are
generally corrrect.
A more important point is that the modal syllogistic is not consistent,
so that a derivation does not suffice to show that a counterinterpreta-
tion is impossible, and a counterinterpretation does not suffice to show
that a derivation is impossible. Alexander is aware of some of the cases
in which this is true,12 but as is frequently the case in the commentary
Introduction 9
he does not seem to be aware of either the depth of the problem created
by this situation or its devastating effect on Aristotles modal syllogistic.
II. Modal syllogistic without contingency

(1.3, 25a27-36 and 8-12)
As a first approximation modal syllogistic can be understood as an
extension of assertoric syllogistic brought about by adding for every
proposition P of assertoric syllogistic the propositions It is necessary
that P and It is contingent that P. The issues which arise in connection
with the notion of contingency are considerably more complex than
those which arise in connection with necessity. Unfortunately some of
the issues which arise in connection with necessity are inextricably
bound up with contingency. We are going to try to abstract from those
issues here, and return to them after we have discussed contingency.
We shall adopt the abbreviation NEC(P) for various Greek expressions
which we take to have the sense of It is necessary that P. Ultimately
we will use abbreviation CON(P) for It is contingent (usually endekh-
etai) that P, using the word possible informally (and in the translation
of such expressions as dunaton, dunatai, enkhrei, hoion, estai). We
shall call a proposition NEC(P) a necessary proposition, CON(P) a
contingent proposition; if NEC(P) (CON(P)) is true we will say that P is
necessary (contingent). To be explicit we shall call a proposition of
assertoric syllogistic an unqualified proposition.13 We will define various
formal notions in the same way as before, but we will extend our
representation of syllogisms and combinations. Assertoric Barbara1
now becomes:
Barbara1(UUU)
and the assertoric combination AE_1 becomes:
AE_1(UU_).
The following examples should make the notation to be employed clear:
Barbara1(NUN) NEC(AaB) BaC NEC(AaC)

Bocardo3(NCU) NEC(AoC) CON(BaC) AoB
EA_2(CU_) CON(AeB) AaC
II.A. Conversion of necessary propositions (1.3, 25a27-36)

Aristotle accepts the same conversion laws for necessary propositions
as for unqualified ones, that is, he accepts:
10 Introduction
EE-conversionn: NEC(XeY) NEC(YeX) (25a29-31)
AI-conversionn: NEC(XaY) NEC(YiX) (25a32-4)
II-conversionn: NEC(XiY) NEC(YiX) (25a32-4)
To justify EE-conversionn Aristotle writes,
If it is necessary that A holds of no B, it is necessary that B holds of no A;

for if it is contingent that B holds of some, it will be contingent that A
holds of some B. (25a29-32)
Aristotle here appears to reduce EE-conversionn to:
II-conversionc: CON(XiY) CON(YiX)
a law which he does not take up until 25a40-b3, and which he appears
to justify by citing EE-conversionn. For AI-conversionn and II-conver-
sionn Aristotle writes,
If A holds of all or some B by necessity, it is necessary that B holds of some

A. For if it is not necessary, A will not hold of some B by necessity.
(25a32-4)
apparently taking for granted that
NEC(BiA) NEC(AiB)
which, if it is not just another formulation of II-conversionn itself, would

seem to involve some such reasoning as the following. Assume
NEC(AiB) and NEC(BiA). Then since:
(i) NEC(P) CON( P) (N C)
CON(BeA). But:
(ii) CON(XeY) CON(YeX) (EE-conversionc)
So CON(AeB), and since:
(iii) CON(P) NEC( P) (C N )
NEC(AiB), contradicting NEC(AiB).
The problem with this reconstruction is not simply that Aristotle relies
on laws concerning contingency which he has not yet discussed, but (i)
and (ii) are laws which Aristotle rejects at 1.17, 36b35-37a31. In the
Introduction 11
course of doing so he denies that an indirect argument works by denying
an instance of:
CON(P) NEC( P) ( C N )
which is equivalent to (i). Aristotle is, however, committed to C

N and its equivalent:
NEC(P) CON( P) (N C )
Since we cannot hope to clarify this situation without looking at Aris-

totles treatment of contingency and Alexanders understanding of it, we
shall for now simply take for granted the conversion laws for necessary
propositions and turn to Aristotles application of them. However, before
doing so we mention one other law assumed by Aristotle:
P NEC( P) (U N )
that is, if a proposition holds, its contradictory is not necessary.
II.B. NN-combinations (1.8)

The perfect parallelism between the conversion laws for unqualified and
necessary propositions greatly simplifies the treatment of NN combina-
tions in chapter 8, and Aristotles discussion is very succinct. The
principal value of Alexanders commentary on chapter 8 is its scholas-
ticism, the concrete filling out of what Aristotle describes in outline. We
here follow Alexanders account. Aristotle assumes that an NN combi-
nation is syllogistic if the corresponding UU combination is, and that
the former will yield the conclusion NEC(P) if the latter yields the
conclusion P. The argument that the converses of these assumptions
holds has three steps. The first two are stated briefly in the following
passage:
For, if the terms are posited in the same way in the case of holding and in
that of holding by necessity or in the case of not holding there either
will or there wont be a syllogism <in both cases>, except that they will
differ by the addition of holding or not holding by necessity to the terms.
For the privative converts in the same way, and we will give the same
account of being in as a whole and said of all. (29b37-30a3)
Alexander points out that Aristotle means to include all conversion rules
in this remark (120,20-5), and he applies the reference to the dictum de
omni et nullo to the first figure (120,13-15), a sure sign that he takes
Aristotle to be treating the first-figure NNN syllogisms as complete.
Thus the argument is that the parallel first-figure combinations are
12 Introduction
syllogistic of parallel conclusions and that conversion will generate the
parallel directly verified syllogisms in the second and third figures. The
only remaining problem concerns:
Baroco2(NNN) NEC(AaB) NEC(AoC) NEC(BoC)

Bocardo3(NNN) NEC(AoC) NEC(BaC) NEC(AoB)
the UUU analogues of which were established indirectly.

This whole way of looking at modal syllogistic is basic to Aristotle.
Roughly, one can say that for Aristotle the fundamental question is to
decide which modal analogues of the complete first-figure assertoric
syllogisms are syllogistic14 and then to ask whether the second- and
third-figure analogues of syllogisms can be derived in ways analogous
to those in which the first-figure ones were. Only when a derivation
cannot be provided does Aristotle look for counterinterpretations. In
other words, Aristotle does not appear to first raise the question
whether a second- or third-figure combination is syllogistic, but first
asks what, if any conclusion can be derived from the combination by a
derivation of the type used with the analogous assertoric combination.
If that analogous derivation fails he looks for a counterinterpretation.
If he cant find one and decides there isnt one, he looks for an alterna-
tive derivation.
If we try to copy the indirect derivations of Baroco2(UUU) and
Bocardo3(UUU) for the corresponding NNN cases we run into the same
kind of problems we encountered with Aristotles indirect arguments
for the conversion laws for necessary propositions. We here give the
indirect arguments which we would seem to need, first for:
Assume NEC(AaB), NEC(AoC), and NEC(BoC). Then ( N C )

CON(BaC). Now, if we had Barbara1(NCC), we could infer CON(AaC),
which implies (C N ) NEC(AoC), contradicting NEC(AoC). The
argument for
Bocardo3(NNN) NEC(AoC) NEC(BaC) NEC(AoB)
is quite analogous. Assume NEC(AoC), NEC(BaC), and NEC(AoB).

Then ( N C ) CON(AaB). So, if we had Barbara1(CNC), we could
infer CON(AaC), which implies (C N ) NEC(AoC), contradict-
ing NEC(AoC).
One obvious difficulty with these arguments is the use of N C
, which, as we have said, Aristotle rejects. However, it is also true that
Aristotle sometimes uses the equivalent of this rule, namely C N
. Indeed, he uses it without acknowledgement in arguing that Bar-
Introduction 13
bara1(NC ) yields a contingent conclusion.15 Alexander is quite clear
that because of the use of C N the conclusion is of the form
NEC (AaC), and that this is not equivalent to CON(AaC); it involves
what we will call Theophrastean contingency because it was the notion
of contingency highlighted by Theophrastus.16 The situation is suffi-
ciently fluid that we might choose to allow Aristotle the use of N
C in arguing for Baroco2(NNN) and Bocardo3(NNN). By itself this
would take care of Bocardo3(NNN), since Aristotle takes Bar-
bara1(CNC) to be complete at 1.16, 36a2-7. However, Barbara1(NCC)17
is not complete for Aristotle and requires an argument which invokes
the notion of contingency.
In any case it is quite clear that Baroco2(NNN) and Bocardo3(NNN)
are valid. Aristotle chooses to verify them with what he calls an ekthesis.
The ekthesis works on the premiss NEC(AoC), and involves taking a
part D of C of which A does not hold by necessity. Substituting
NEC(AeD) for NEC(AoC), we have in the case of Baroco2(NNN) an
instance of Camestres2(NNN) with the conclusion NEC(BeD); but D is
part of C, so NEC(BoC). For Bocardo3(NNN), one changes the second
premiss to NEC(BaD) to get an instance of Felapton3(NNN). (In both
cases Alexander carries out the reduction to the first figure.) Alexander
discusses the character of the ekthetic arguments starting at 123,3-24,
drawing a contrast between them and the ekthesis arguments of asser-
toric syllogistic. At 123,18-24 he provides the important historical
information that Theophrastus preferred to postpone the treatment of
Baroco2(NNN) and Bocardo3(NNN) until he could establish them indi-
rectly, that is, use some version of the argument we have just sketched.
We discuss the question of how Theophrastus might have done this in
the introduction to the second volume (section IV).
II.C. N+U combinations (1.9-11)

In chapters 9-11 Aristotle takes up the N+U cases, devoting a chapter
to each of the three figures. In 9 he takes as complete all the NUN and
UNU analogues of the complete UUU first-figure syllogisms. Given
these syllogisms, the direct derivations for the second- and third-figure
N+U combinations are straightforward. The indirect cases are again
problematic. Aristotle decides that each of the four N+U cases of Baroco2
and Bocardo3 yields only an unqualified conclusion. He gives no positive
argument for any of the four, but only uses terms to show that none of
the four combinations yield a necessary conclusion. We shall discuss his
use of terms to show that certain N+U combinations yield an unqualified
conclusion in a moment. For now we simply remark that all four cases
accepted by Aristotle have simple indirect derivations. Alexander points
out at 144,23-145,20 and 151,22-30 that the kind of ekthesis argument
which Aristotle used to establish Baroco2(NNN) could be used for
14 Introduction
Baroco2(UNN) and Bocardo3(NUN). Unfortunately, Alexanders discus-
sion of the implications of this situation in which a proof and a
counterinterpretation conflict (145,4-20 and 151,22-30) is very indeci-
sive, to say the least.
We shall approach Aristotles treatment of the complete combina-
tions in terms of the two cases of Barbara1. For Barbara1(UNU)
Aristotle takes for granted that Barbara1(UN ) yields either an un-
qualified or a necessary conclusion and offers two kinds of arguments
to show that the conclusion cannot be necessary. One is a specification
of terms, which, indeed, work if one assumes the truth of the following
propositions:
(a) All animals are in motion;

(b) It is necessary that all humans are animals;
(c) It is not necessary that all humans are in motion.18
Unfortunately the use of these terms seems to cast doubt on Bar-

bara1(NUN) since to use an example of Theophrastus mentioned by
Alexander at 124,24-5 it would seem to be just as much true that:
(b) It is necessary that all humans are animals;

(a) Everything in motion is a human;
(c) It is not necessary that everything in motion is an animal.
All humans are animals is, of course, a standard example of a necessary

truth. (a) and (a) are typical problematic examples of an unqualified
truth: they are not, in fact, true, but they are taken to be true for the
sake of making an argument, in Alexanders terminology, they are
hypotheses.19 Unfortunately, this way of interpreting unqualified
statements makes it very difficult to see that there is any difference
between unqualified and contingent propositions. Alexander raises this
issue in connection with Aristotles remarks at 1.15, 34b7-18 in the
context of an apparent counterinterpretation to Barbara1(UCC); see
volume 2.
A modern way of making a distinction between (c) and (c) invokes
the distinction between what are called de re and de dicto necessity. To
say that NEC(XaY) is true de dicto is to say that there is some lawlike
connection between the notion of being a Y and the notion of being an
X, so that just knowing that something is a Y is enough to know it is an
X. Both (c) and (c) are true de dicto because there is no such connection
between being an animal and being in motion or between the latter and
being a human; knowing that something is an animal does not suffice
to tell us that it is in motion and knowing that something is in motion
does not suffice to tell us it is a human. We find the notion of de re
necessity hard to grasp, but perhaps the following will do. We must
Introduction 15
imagine that individuals have necessary properties, that, for example,
Socrates is necessarily a human being and an animal. Socrates has
those properties no matter how he is described, e.g., as the anathema of
the politicians. Now we say that NEC(XaY) is true de re if each of the
Ys has the property of being necessarily X. If (a) is true, then each of
the things in motion is necessarily an animal, even though there is no
lawlike connection between being in motion and being an animal. Thus,
if (a) is true, (c) is in fact false on the de re interpretation. On the other
hand, (c) is true de re because no individual human being is necessarily
in motion.
The issues surrounding the de re/de dicto distinction and the inter-
pretation of Aristotles modal syllogistic have received a great deal of
discussion, which we cannot recapitulate here.20 We shall occasionally
invoke the distinction in our notes, but on the whole we shall leave it
out of account since it does not come to the surface in Alexanders
remarks. In the Appendix on conditional necessity we discuss another
distinction which he does sometimes invoke, namely the distinction
between what is necessary without qualification and what is necessary
on a condition.
Aristotles brief remarks about the validity of Barbara1(NUN) have
been taken as an expression of the notion of de re necessity. He says:
if A has been taken to hold of B by necessity and B just to hold of C ,

A will hold of C by necessity. For since A is assumed21 to hold of all
B by necessity and C is some of the Bs, it is evident that [A will hold] of
C by necessity. (30a17-23)
Alexanders paraphrase of this passage shows that he takes it to involve

an application of the dictum de omni et nullo and hence to be an
argument for completeness:
For since A is said of all B by necessity, and C is under B and is some of

B, A is also said of C by necessity. For what is said of all B by necessity
will also be predicated of what is under B by necessity at least if being
said of all is when nothing of the subject can be taken of which the
predicate will not be said.22 But C is some of the Bs. For being said of all
by necessity is taken in the same way <as unqualified being said of all>,
as he said before in the case of necessary things: For the privative
converts in the same way, and we will give the same account of to be in
as a whole and said of all <1.8, 30a2-3>. (126,1-8)
For Alexander, then, the validity of Barbara1(NUN) depends on inter-

preting NEC(AaB) as saying that no B can be taken of which A does not
hold by necessity (to which we might add, no matter how the B is
described). Alexander explicitly refrains from committing himself on
the correctness of Aristotles position, but it is clear that he is quite
impressed by the arguments of Theophrastus and Eudemus,23 who, as
16 Introduction
Alexander tells us, rejected Barbara1(NUN) in favour of Barbara1(NUU),
and adopted what Bochenski (1947, p. 79) called la rgle du peiorem
and we will call the peiorem rule, according to which the conclusion of
a combination can be no stronger than its strongest premiss.24 Through-
out the commentary Alexander signals when a move of Aristotles
depends or appears to depend on his acceptance of first-figure NUN
syllogisms, a clear indication that he thinks the move is problematic.25
It may be that his ultimate position is that the notion of necessity is
ambiguous. Commenting on a passage (1.13, 32b25-32) in which Aris-
totle says that contingency can be taken in two ways, Alexander writes:
But if It is contingent that A holds of that of which B is said has two

meanings, so will By necessity A holds of that of which B is said have two
meanings; for it will mean either A holds by necessity of all of that of
which B is said unqualifiedly or A holds by necessity of all of that of
which B is said by necessity. But if this is true, it will not be the case that
A is said of all B by necessity is equivalent to A is said by necessity of all
of that of which B is said, as is said by some of those <defenders of
Aristotle> who show that it is true that the conclusion of a necessary
major and an unqualified minor <in the first figure> is necessary.
(166,19-25)
Before he gives terms for rejecting Barbara1(UNN), Aristotle offers the

following argument against it:
But if the proposition AB is not necessary, but BC is necessary, the

conclusion will not be necessary. For, if it is, it will result that A holds of
some B by necessity through the first and through the third figure. But
this is false. But it is possible that B is such that A can hold of none of it.
(30a23-28)
After giving terms Aristotle says that the proof that Celarent1(UNN)
fails will be the same. Later, having affirmed Darii1(NUN) and
Ferio1(NUN), Aristotle rejects Darii1(UNN) and Ferio1(UNN):
But if the particular premiss is necessary, the conclusion will not be

necessary; for nothing impossible results, just as in the universal syllo-
gisms. Similarly in the case of privatives. Terms: motion, animal, white.
(30b2-6)
It seems reasonably clear that Alexander is right to interpret Aristotles

first rejection of Barbara1(UNN) as something like the following correct
argument:
Assume that AaB and NEC(BaC) yield NEC(AaC). But NEC(AaC) and
NEC(BaC) yield (Darapti3(NNN)) NEC(AiB). However, we ought to be
able to make AaB true while making NEC(AiB) false. Hence, the assump-
tion that Barbara1(UNN) holds is wrong.
Introduction 17
We prefer the following paraphrase of this argument:
Assume, as is possible, that AaB, NEC(AiB), NEC(BaC), and assume

that Barbara1(UNN) is valid. Then NEC(AaC), which with NEC(BaC)
implies (Darapti3(NNN)) NEC(AiB), contradicting NEC(AiB). Hence
Barbara1(UNN) is not valid.
We shall call such an argument against a rule of inference an incom-

patibility rejection argument, meaning an argument which shows that
acceptance of a proposed rule of inference would allow one to derive an
inconsistency from a set of compatible premisses, and we shall call an
argument against the possibility of an incompatibility rejection argu-
ment an incompatibility acceptance argument. In his remarks on
Darii1(UN ) and Ferio1(UN ) Aristotle claims that he has incompatibil-
ity acceptance arguments for all four first-figure UNU cases as well as
incompatibility rejection arguments for the UNN cases. The former
claim is incorrect in the case of Barbara1(UNU), since once the
complete Darii1(NUN) (or Darapti3(UNN)) is available the argument
we have given above could be formulated as a rejection of Bar-
bara1(UNU).26 On the other hand, the claim is correct for the other three
cases. We do the arguments. For:
Celarent3(UNU) AeB NEC(BaC) AeC
the two negative propositions entail nothing, and AeC and NEC(BaC)
entail (Felapton3(UNU)) AoB which is certainly not incompatible with
AeB.27 For:
Darii1(UNU) AaB NEC(BiC) AiC
and
Ferio1(UNU) AeB NEC(BiC) AoC
the conclusion and either premiss entail nothing. However, in the case
of these two the situation is exactly the same if the conclusion is taken
to be NEC(AiC) or NEC(AoC), as Alexander points out at 134,32-135,6
and 135,12-19. Hence Aristotle cannot give incompatibility rejection
arguments for either Darii1(UNN) or Ferio1(UNN).
At 129,9-22 Alexander more or less shows that there is no incompati-
bility rejection argument for Barbara1(NUN). The same is true for the
other first-figure NUN cases.28 In commenting on the rejection of
Barbara 1(UNN) (128,3-129,7) and Celarent1(UNN) (130,27-131,4)
Alexander contents himself with showing that incompatibility argu-
ments work for rejecting these. However, as we have seen, when he gets
18 Introduction
to Aristotles specification of terms, he points out (129,23-130,24) that
very similar terms would suffice for the rejection of Barbara1(NUN),
and offers essentially Theophrastean considerations against Aristotles
position. He subsequently (131,8-21) tries to explain the difference
between incompatibility rejection arguments and reductios, and then
says that Aristotle doesnt seem to be entirely confident about these
rejection arguments. This remark might seem out of place, given what
Alexander has said up to this point, but it is not if we realize the
complications which we have already outlined. Alexander goes on to
give his own method (132,5-7), which involves the attempt to produce a
reductio on the denial of a purported conclusion; if one is produced the
purported conclusion follows, if it isnt, the purported conclusion does
not. Application of the method requires Alexander to look ahead not
only to third-figure N+U (and UU) combinations, which is all right since
these combinations reduce to first-figure ones, but because the denial
of a necessary proposition is a contingent one also to N+C (and U+C)
combinations. The method appears to work for accepting Bar-
bara1(UNU) and rejecting Barbara1(UNN), but it would commit
Aristotle to acceptance of Celarent1(UNN).29
Alexander is obviously in difficulty when he gets to Aristotles rejec-
tion of Darii1(UNN) and Ferio1(UNN), since what Aristotle says or
clearly implies is false: we cannot give incompatibility rejection argu-
ments for these cases. Essentially Alexander considers various
alternatives without clearly espousing any one of them. We describe the
text, since it offers some difficulty. Alexander considers three alterna-
tive interpretations. He first suggests (133,20-9) that Aristotle is
intending to apply his method of incompatibility argumentation to
Darii1(UNN) and Darii1(NUN). But now he claims that the method
would not generate a contradiction if applied to Barbara1(NUN). This
claim is, of course, false, and in trying to defend it Alexander uses
Darapti3(UNU) rather than the stronger Darapti3(UNN) which is ac-
cepted by Aristotle.30 In any case, as we have seen, he subsequently
(134,32-135,6 and 135,12-19) asserts correctly that Aristotles incom-
patibility arguments will not work to reject either Darii1(UNN) or
Ferio1(UNN).
Alexanders second alternative interpretation of Aristotles words
(133,29-134,20) is his own method. He shows more or less that it will
suffice to confirm Darii1(NUU) but not Darii1(UNN). He does not point
out that it also confirms Darii1(NUN). Nor does he say anything about
Ferio1. In fact his method confirms both Ferio1(UNN) and Ferio1(NUN),
hardly a satisfactory result from Aristotles point of view.31
Alexanders third alternative is that Aristotle has in mind concrete
counterinterpretations. This has the benefit of putting Aristotle on
logically sound ground, but it is hard to believe that this is what the text
means.
Introduction 19
III. Modal syllogistic with contingent propositions (1.13-22)

We have seen that full treatment of Aristotles discussion of the conver-
sion of necessary propositions requires reference to his treatment of
conversion for contingent propositions. In III.A we say something about
Alexanders understanding of the notion of contingency and the rules
for converting contingent propositions. In III.B we go into more detail
on Alexanders interpretation of the three modal notions, and in III.C
and D we look in more detail at his treatment of conversion for necessity
and contingency.
III.A. Strict contingency and its transformation rules

(1.13, 32a18-32b1)
At the beginning of his discussion of the transformation rules for
contingency in 1.3 Aristotle says that to be contingent is said in many
ways, since we say that the necessary and the non-necessary and the
possible are contingent (25a37-9). Commenting on this remark, Alex-
ander writes:
He (sc. Aristotle) showed us the homonymy of contingent in On Interpre-

tation <13,23a7-20> too. For we apply It is contingent to what is neces-
sary when we say that it is contingent that animal holds of every human;
and to what holds if we say of what holds of something that it is contin-
gent that it holds. Here he indicates what holds with the words the
non-necessary; for what holds differs in this way from what is necessary
while sharing with it the fact of holding at the present time. (Note the
expression: what holds contingently is the same as what is signified by an
unqualified proposition.) Contingent is also applied to what is possible.
He will explain what this means a little later on when he says <25b14-15>
Those which are said to be contingent inasmuch as they hold for the most
part and by nature this is the way in which we determine the contingent
. (37,28-38,10)
We discuss the reference to On Interpretation in Appendix 4 (On Inter-

pretation, chapters 12 and 13). At this point what is important is that
Alexander understands Aristotle to hold that we use It is contingent
that in three different senses when we apply it to a proposition express-
ing a necessary truth, a proposition expressing something which holds
but is not necessary, and a proposition which expresses a mere possibil-
ity. For Alexander it is only the third sense which gives the strict
meaning of contingency, the one which is central to Aristotles syllogis-
tic. We also wish to signal the curious sentence in parenthesis calling
attention to the notion of holding contingently (endekhomens). In the
next sections we shall emphasize occurrences of this word by including
the transliterated Greek.
In his comment on 25b14, Alexander says:
20 Introduction
He set down only this sort of contingency what holds for the most part
and is by nature (for what is by nature is for the most part), since only
this sort is useful in the employment of syllogisms. The possible also
covers what holds in equal part and what holds infrequently, but syllo-
gisms with material terms of this kind are of no use. (39,19-23)
In other words, holding for the most part is not the defining feature of
contingency. Aristotle specifies the defining feature toward the begin-
ning of chapter 13 when he announces what Alexander calls (on the
basis of 1.14, 33b21-3, 1.15, 33b25-31, and 1.15, 34b27-9) the diorismos
of contingency:
I call P contingent or say it is contingent that P if P is not necessary and

if, when P is posited to hold, nothing impossible will be because of it. For
we call what is necessary contingent homonymously. (32a18-21)
It seems reasonably clear that Aristotle intends a biconditional here:
CON(P) iff (i) NEC(P) and (ii) no impossibility follows from P
The only clear and explicit use Aristotle makes of clause (ii) is in his
specious justifications of certain first-figure UC and NC syllogisms,
notably Barbara1(UC_) and Celarent1(UC_).32 Commenting on the
diorismos Alexander argues that for Aristotle CON(P) rules out P as
well as NEC(P):
Since he is going to discuss syllogisms from contingent premisses, he first

defines the contingent. He does not define it in its homonymous use since
it is not possible to define something as it is used homonymously. Rather
he isolates contingency as said of the necessary and the unqualified from
the contingent. For he showed that the contingent is also predicated of
these things.
By saying when P is posited to hold he indicates that, in addition to
not being necessary, the contingent is not unqualified either. For what is
contingent according to the third adjunct33 is of this kind and it differs
from what is necessary and what is unqualified because if P is said to be
possible (dunasthai), P is not yet (mdep) the case. So, P would be
contingent in the strict sense if P is not the case and if when P is posited
to be the case it has nothing impossible as a consequent. And he would
have spoken more strictly about the contingent if he said P is not the case
and when P is posited to hold. For although what is not the case is not
necessary, what is not necessary is not ipso facto not the case. (156,11-
22)34
Thus we may state Alexanders diorismos as:
CON(P) iff (i) P, and (ii) no impossibility follows from P35

Introduction 21
Alexander frequently refers to this strict sense of contingency as contin-
gency in the way specified (kata ton diorismon).
At 32a29-35 Aristotle announces rules of transformation for contin-
gent propositions:
It results that all contingent propositions convert with one another. I do

not mean that the affirmative converts with the negative, but rather that
whatever has an affirmative form converts with respect to its antithesis,
e.g., that It is contingent that X holds converts with It is contingent that
X does not hold, and It is contingent that A holds of all B converts with
It is contingent that A holds of no B and with It is contingent that A does
not hold of all B, and It is contingent that A holds of some B converts
with It is contingent that A does not hold of some B, and the same way
in the other cases.
If one understands It is contingent that X holds, converts with It is

contingent that X does not hold to mean that CON(P) is equivalent to
CON( P) and applies that understanding to modal syllogistic, the
result, taken in conjunction with other equivalences accepted by Aris-
totle is to make all contingent statements involving two terms A and B
equivalent and so to render syllogistic with contingency more or less
bankrupt. It seems certain that Aristotle does not intend this, and the
thought that he might doesnt even enter Alexanders head.36 He takes
Aristotles point to apply only to so-called indeterminate propositions,
that is, propositions which are ambiguous with respect to quantity.37
This means that the relevant transformations for syllogistic are simply:
AE-transformationc:38 CON(AaB) CON(AeB)

EA-transformationc: CON(AeB) CON(AaB)
IO-transformationc: CON(AiB) CON(AoB)
OI-transformationc: CON(AoB) CON(AiB)
Unfortunately, Aristotle does not offer any argument for any of these
rules, but simply says,
For since the contingent is not necessary, and what is not necessary may
(enkhrei) not hold, it is evident that, if it is contingent that A holds of B,
it is also contingent that it does not hold of B, and if it is contingent that
it holds of all, it is also contingent that it does not hold of all. And similarly
in the case of particular affirmations. (32a36-40)
Alexander does not choose to expand significantly on these remarks,

telling us only that this position is reasonable (eikots) given the
diorismos of contingency.
When we add to these transformation rules the conversion rules
announced at 1.3, 25a37-b3:
22 Introduction
AI-conversionc: CON(AaB) CON(BiA)
II-conversionc: CON(AiB) CON(BiA)
the result is still the equivalence of:
(ia) CON(AaB)
(ib) CON(AeB)
and of all of:
(iia) CON(AiB)
(iib) CON(AoB)
(iic) CON(BiA)
(iid) CON(BoA)
as well as the implication of any of (iia)-(iid) by either of (ia) or (ib). On

the other hand, as we have already mentioned, Aristotle denies EE-
conversionc at 1.17, 36b35-37a31.
The equivalences Aristotle does accept have the effect of generating
what we will call waste cases of syllogistic validity. For example, since
Aristotle accepts:
Barbara1(CCC) CON(AaB) CON(BaC) CON(AaC)
the equivalence of (ia) and (ib) would also commit him to
EAA1(CCC) CON(AeB) CON(BaC) CON(AaC)

AEA1(CCC) CON(AaB) CON(BeC) CON(AaC)
EEA1(CCC) CON(AeB) CON(BeC) CON(AaC)
to give only examples with an a-conclusion. Aristotles handling of the

waste cases is not always perspicuous. He mentions some and not
others, and, for example, he chooses to endorse Celarent1(CCC) without
mentioning EAA1(CCC). For the most part the waste cases are of no
interest, and we shall not worry about them. But in some places,
particularly after Aristotle loses sight of or perhaps interest in the
various notions of contingency which he has brought into play, Alexan-
der addresses difficulties implicit in determining exactly what waste
case Aristotle is espousing.
The diorismos of contingency appears to commit Aristotle to the
following instances of CON(P) NEC(P) (C N):
(i) CON(AaB) NEC(AaB)

(ii) CON(AeB) NEC(AeB)
(iii) CON(AiB) NEC(AiB)
(iv) CON(AoB) NEC(AoB)
Introduction 23
The first two of these propositions are clearly Aristotelian, but the last
two cause some difficulty. One can see in a rough way that if sense could
be made of a de dicto reading of particular propositions these two would
be true de dicto, but false de re, since, for example, there might be some
animals, e.g., humans, for which it is contingent that they are white and
other animals, e.g., swans for which it is necessary that they are white.
We are not confident about Aristotles view of (iii) and (iv), but we note
that at 1.14, 33b3-8 (cf. 1.15, 35a20-4) he takes CON(Animal i White)
and CON(Animal o White) to be true, whereas at 1.16, 36b3-7 (cf. 1.9,
30b5-6) he takes NEC(Animal i White) and NEC(Animal o White) to be
true. The last pair seems reasonable enough on a de re reading, but the
first pair seems to be false on such a reading.
Whatever Aristotle may have thought about (iii) and (iv), Alexander
is uneasy with violations of them. Thus, when Aristotle takes CON
(Animal i White) and CON(Animal o White) as true, Alexander says
(171,30-172,5) that a truer choice of terms would involve taking
CON(White i Walking) and CON(White o Walking) to be true. This
choice is equally problematic on the intuitive de re reading which lies
behind Alexanders acceptance of NEC(Animal i White) and NEC
(Animal o White), but it allows him to preserve (iii) and (iv).
III.B. Alexander and the temporal interpretation of modality:

preliminary remarks
At the beginning of chapter 2 Aristotle announces that every proposi-
tion says either that something holds or that it holds by necessity or
that it is contingent that it holds (25a1-2). Alexanders comment on this
passage helps to fill out our understanding of his conception of the three
modalities:
It is necessary to understand the word categorical added to the words

every proposition, since he is now talking about such propositions and
syllogisms <as opposed to hypothetical ones>. Now in every categorical
proposition one term is predicated of another either affirmatively or
negatively, i.e., as holding or not holding of the subject; and if X holds of
Y, it either holds always or holds at some time and doesnt hold at
another. If what is said to hold holds always and is taken to hold always,
the proposition saying this is necessary true affirmative; but a necessary
negative true proposition is one which takes what by nature never holds
of something as never holding of it. But if X does not always hold of Y, if
it holds at the present moment, the proposition which indicates this is an
unqualified true affirmative; and similarly a proposition which says that
what does not now hold does not now hold is an unqualified true negative.
But if X does not hold of Y at the present time but can (dunamenon) hold
of it and is taken in this way i.e., as being able to hold the proposition
is a true contingent (endekhomenon) affirmative; and a proposition which
says of what holds or does not hold but can (hoion) both hold and not hold
24 Introduction
that it is contingent that it does not hold is a true contingent negative.
(25,26-26,14)39
In this passage, as in many others, it is not entirely clear whether

Alexander is speaking about (in our formulations) the assertion that
Animal a Human is a (true) necessary proposition, the assertion that
NEC(Human a Animal) or just the expression NEC(Human a Animal).
Let us begin by talking about the simple categorical propositions, AaB,
AeB, AiB, AoB, which we represent by P. In this paragraph Alexander
commits himself to at least a partial temporal interpretation of neces-
sity, contingency, and unqualified holding. Part of the difficulty in
construing what Alexander has in mind here arises from his attempt to
distinguish between affirmative propositions, which we shall temporar-
ily represent as XaffY, and negative ones, which we shall represent as
XnegY. We can construe Alexanders account of the modalities as
follows:
XaffY is necessary iff X holds of Y always;

XaffY is unqualified iff X holds of Y now but not always;
XaffY is contingent iff X does not hold of Y now but can hold of Y.
XnegY is necessary iff X never holds of Y;
XnegY is unqualified iff X does not hold of Y now (but does hold at
some time);
XnegY is contingent iff X can hold of Y and can not hold of Y.
One problem here is the obvious asymmetry between the definitions of

contingency for affirmative and negative statements. We can see Alex-
anders difficulty by considering the two possible ways of making the
definitions symmetrical:
(i) XaffY is contingent iff X does not hold of Y now but can hold of Y;
XnegY is contingent iff X holds of Y now, but can not hold of Y.
(ii) XaffY is contingent iff X can not hold of Y and can hold of Y.
XnegY is contingent iff X can hold of Y and can not hold of Y;
Of these two alternatives (ii) might seem to be preferable since Aristotle

is committed to AE-, EA-, IO- and OI-transformationc. However, it is
relatively certain that Alexander thinks of (ii) as something like a
feature of contingency, whereas (i) is closer to a genuine analysis of it.
For we have seen that for him the primary account of contingency is
given by the diorismos, which he takes to imply that what is contingent
does not hold. For this reason we take (i) instead of (ii) as the relevant
account of contingency. We can then drop the distinction between aff
and neg, and write the three accounts as
Introduction 25
(Nt) P is necessary iff P is always true;
(Ut) P is unqualified iff P is true now and not always true;
(C*) P is contingent iff P is not true now, but P can be true.
The assertion that P can be true is ultimately of no more help in

unpacking the notion of contingency than the assertion that nothing
impossible follows from the assumption that P. In both cases we are
using the notion of possibility to explain the notion of possibility.
Unfortunately, Alexander does not seem to have any non-circular way
of explaining what can be true means. However, it is useful to have in
mind a strictly temporal version of (C*), since Alexander sometimes
seems to flirt with the following idea:40
(Ct) P is contingent iff P is not true now, but P will be true at some
time.41
It is clear that Nt allows one to give simple justifications of the conver-

sion laws for necessary propositions and that Ct allows one to do the
same for not only AI-conversionc and II-conversionc, but also EE-conver-
sionc. In order to indicate Alexanders apparent flirtation with Ct we
shall look at his account of Aristotles justification of the conversion laws
for necessary propositions, which as we explained in section II.A, seem
to rely on claims about contingency which Aristotle hasnt proved or
worse yet ultimately decides are false. However, before doing so, we
should mention that, insofar as Alexander equates contingency with
possibility, he explicitly assigns C* rather than Ct to Aristotle at
184,9-11.
III.C. Conversion of necessary propositions (1.3, 25a27-36)

The laws in question are:
EE-conversionn: NEC(AeB) NEC(BeA)

AI-conversionn: NEC(AaB) NEC(BiA)
II-conversionn: NEC(AiB) NEC(BiA)
We recall Aristotles justification of EE-conversionn:
If it is necessary that A holds of no B, it is necessary that B holds of no A;

for if it is contingent that B holds of some, it will be contingent that A
holds of some B. (25a29-32)
Here is Alexanders comment:
Here again he seems to have used the conversion of particular contingent

26 Introduction
affirmative propositions in his proof for necessary universal negative
ones, even though he has not yet discussed conversions of contingent
propositions. Or should we rather say this? He holds it to be agreed that
(i) particular affirmative contingent propositions are opposite to univer-
sal necessary negative ones since they are contradictories, and therefore
assumes this. Having assumed it, then, (ii) since if B holds of some A but
not by necessity, it is said that it is contingent that B holds of some A and
that it holds contingently (endekhomens) of some A, and (iii) since he has
proved that particular unqualified <affirmative> propositions convert
with themselves, he makes use of propositions of this kind. Thus he does
away with the necessity by saying that it is contingent that A holds of
some B because (iv) what holds of some when it holds converts.42 (v)
But if it is contingent that B holds of some A, then either it already holds
of A or it is possible (hoion) that it will hold of it at some time. (vi) In this
way what holds of no B by necessity will at some time hold of some of it,
which is impossible. (vii) He says a little later when he distinguishes
kinds of contingency that what holds but not by necessity is said to be
contingent. (viii) For he says that contingency signifies both what is
necessary and also what is not necessary but holds and he now uses it
in application to the latter case. (ix) And what holds contingently (ende-
khomens) of some or will hold of some is the opposite of what holds of
none by necessity. (36,7-25)
We propose the following interpretation of Alexanders argument:
Aristotle takes for granted that NEC(XeY) is equivalent to It is

contingent that XiY (i). Hence (ii) he assumes NEC(BeA) and infers It
is contingent that (BiA) and so (v) either BiA or it is contingent that B
will hold of A at some time. But (iv) at the time BiA holds, AiB holds by
II-conversionu. But this conflicts with the assumption NEC(AeB) (vi and
ix). Hence we see that Aristotle uses only II-conversionu. When in his
argument he seems to invoke II-conversionc he is using contingent in the
sense in which applies to what holds; he could just as well have written
if B holds of some A, A holds of some B. (iii; vii-viii)
Alexander underlines this last point in a subsequent reference back to

this argument:
It is clear from this that in the previous proof too he used It is contingent
that B holds of some A in connection with something unqualified; for
there for if it is contingent that B holds of some should be understood to
mean For if B holds contingently (endekhomens) of some A. (37,17-21;
cf. 149,5-7)
Clearly (vi) and (ix) presuppose Nt, but Alexanders vocabulary shows
the same wavering between (C*) and (Ct) to which we have already
called attention. There is a perhaps more serious problem raised by (i).
Alexander offers no justification for how Aristotle can take this for
granted when he himself holds that CON(XiY) does not follow from
NEC(XeY), since NEC(XeY) is compatible with NEC(XaY), which is
Introduction 27
incompatible with CON(XiY). Perhaps when Alexander says that Aris-
totle takes (i) to be something agreed, he means that Aristotle is taking
(i) as an endoxon, albeit one which he does not accept.
Alexanders discussion of AI- and II-conversionn, to which we now
turn, throws some further light on his treatment of EE-conversionn.
Alexanders summary of the argument involves another (to us approxi-
mate) use of temporal considerations and the same assertion of the
equivalence of NEC(P) and It is contingent that P.
He proves that particular affirmative necessary propositions convert

from both universal affirmative necessary and particular affirmative
necessary ones in the same way as he did in the case of privative universal
ones. For if A holds of all or some B by necessity, but B does not hold of
some A by necessity, it will be contingent that B hold of no A at some time;
for the negation of It is necessary that B holds of some A is It is not
necessary that B holds of some A, which is equivalent to It is contingent
that B holds of no A, since It is not necessary that B holds of some A and
It is contingent43 that B holds of no A are the same. But when B holds of
no A, A will hold of no B (for this has been proved). Hence, A will not hold
of all or some B by necessity. (37,3-13)
Insofar as there is anything new in Alexanders discussion of AI- and

II-conversionn, it comes when he tries to defend Aristotle against the
charge of using EE-conversionc:
It is clear that he has not conducted the proof with contingent negative
propositions; for he thinks that they do not convert. Rather he reduces
<the contingent negative proposition> to an unqualified one, subtracting
necessity from it.44 He makes this clear by no longer using the word
contingent but simply saying For if it is not necessary. For he is
assuming that unqualified propositions convert. (37,14-17)
Here Alexander lights on the fact that in the justification of AI- and
II-conversionn Aristotle does not say something like if NEC(BiA), then
it is contingent that B holds of no A, and so it is contingent that A holds of
no B and so NEC(AiB), but simply if NEC(BiA) then NEC(AiB).
III.D. The conversion of contingent propositions

III.D.1 Conversion of affirmative contingent propositions
(1.3, 25a37-b3); more on Alexander and the temporal
interpretation of modality
Aristotle argues for AI- and II-conversionc simultaneously. We wish to
consider what he says as an alternative to a simple argument which one
might have expected him to use. Suppose CON(YiX). Then ( C N )
NEC(YeX). But (EE-conversionn) NEC(XeY), contradicting CON(XaY)
or CON(XiY). Aristotle avoids such an argument because of the use of
28 Introduction
C N ; he later (1.17, 37a9-31) rejects the analogous argument
for EE-conversionc: assume CON(YeX); then ( C N ) NEC(YiX),
so that (II-conversionn) NEC(XiY), contradicting CON(XeY). But Aris-
totles own argument for AI- and II-conversionc is very problematic:
Since to be contingent is said in many ways (since we say that the

necessary and the non-necessary and the possible are contingent) in the
case of contingent propositions, the situation with respect to conversion
will be the same in all cases of affirmative propositions. For if it is
contingent that A holds of all or of some B, then it will be contingent that
B holds of some A. For if of none, then A of no B; this has been proved
earlier. (25a37-b3)
Alexander takes for granted that Aristotles argument must turn on the
three ways in which contingency is said, and that it will proceed
indirectly by moving from:
(i) It is not contingent that B holds of some A
to:
(ii) a universal negative statement in which B is the predicate and A

is the subject,
and then to:
(iii) a universal negative statement in which A is the predicate and

B is the subject,
which contradicts:
(iv) It is contingent that A holds of some B.
To try to work out an interpretation satisfying these conditions Alexan-

der takes it that there are three cases of (i):
(ia) possibility: CON(BiA)

(ib) holding: (BiA)
(ic) necessity: NEC(BiA)
and three corresponding antecedents of the conditional from which to

find an inconsistency:
(iva) CON(AiB)
(ivb) AiB
(ivc) NEC(AiB)
Introduction 29
Case (b) is easy since (BiA), i.e., BeA, yields (EE-conversionu) AeB,
contradicting AiB. Similarly, given C N , which Alexander
presumably again takes as agreed, case (c) reduces to EE-conversionn.
For case (a) Alexander takes for granted N C and gives his most
straightforward temporal argument: if NEC(BiA) then ( N C
) CON(BeA), so that (Ct) at some time BeA, so that at that time AeB, so
CON(AeB), contradicting NEC(AiB). He does not seem to notice that if
this argument were correct it would establish EE-conversionc.
Alexander preserves for us something like such an argument of
Theophrastus and Eudemus for a version of EE-conversion for contin-
gent propositions, although it too shows an unclear handling of
temporal considerations:
If it is contingent that A holds of no B, it is also contingent that B holds

of no A. For since it is contingent that A holds of no B, when it is
contingent that it holds of none, it is then contingent that A is disjoined
from all the things of B. But if this is so, B will then also have been
disjoined from A, and, if this is so, it is also contingent that B holds of no
A. (220,12-16)
Alexander defends Aristotle against this argument:
It seems that Aristotle expresses a better view than they do when he says
that a universal negative which is contingent in the way specified does
not convert with itself. For if X is disjoined from Y it is not thereby
contingently (endekhomens) disjoined from it. Consequently it is not
sufficient to show that when it is contingent that A is disjoined from B,
then B is also disjoined from A; in addition <one must show> that B is
contingently disjoined from A. But if this is not shown, then it has not
been shown that a contingent proposition converts, since what is sepa-
rated from something by necessity is also disjoined from it, but not
contingently. (220,16-23; cf. 221,1-2)
Alexander here seems to concede that if CON(AeB), then at some time

AeB and therefore BeA. But he insists that one cannot infer CON(BeA)
because one doesnt know that BeA holds contingently if we have
inferred BeA from AeB, where AeB holds contingently.45 It seems clear
that Alexander is invoking a distinction between the ways in which
things hold. We cannot infer CON(P) from P unless we know that P
holds contingently.
Alexander uses the words necessarily (anankais) and unquali-
fiedly (huparkhonts) as well as contingently in the commentary.46
Although Aristotle never uses any of these words in a logical context,
they are also found in the other commentaries on his logical works. For
the most part they are simply variants of expressions such as It is
contingent that, but we are convinced that Alexander wishes to put
special weight on the ideas of holding contingently and of holding but
30 Introduction
not holding necessarily. By insisting on the latter notion Alexander is
able to maintain the position that unqualified propositions for Aristotle
do not signify holding necessarily or eternally. But he has much more
difficulty with what the difference is between a contingent and an
unqualified proposition. Indeed, his assertion at 38,5-7 that holding
contingently correlates with what is signified by an unqualified propo-
sition is probably intended to justify the application of II-conversionu
which Alexander detects in Aristotles justification of AI-conversionc.
Similarly in his account of the justification of EE-conversionn Alexander
wants to stress that NEC(BeA) implies that BiA holds contingently
to justify the alleged application of the same rule. If Alexander were
willing to use the temporal reading of the modal operators straightfor-
wardly, he would have no difficulty, but, as we have seen, he instead
mixes the temporal reading with the idea of something holding contin-
gently. But using that idea depends on blurring the distinction between
what holds now and what holds at some time. To put this point another
way, for Alexanders reasoning to work, one has to assume that Aris-
totle proves II-conversionu not just for propositions which hold now, but
for proposition which hold at some time. But, on the temporal reading
of the modalities, that is to say that II-conversionu is or includes
II-conversionc.
Although Alexander makes no such claim, it seems to us that his
handling of the modal conversion rules more or less commits him to
some such idea. Moreover the lumping together of unqualified and
contingent propositions is quite in keeping with Aristotles use of false
but possible truths, e.g., All animals are moving to interpret unquali-
fied propositions and with his willingness to use the same terms to
verify corresponding contingent and unqualified propositions.47 As Al-
exander explains in connection with the proposition No horse is white:
For if someone requires that we take as universal what holds always but
not what holds at some time, he will be requiring nothing else than that
the unqualified be necessary, since the necessary does always hold.
Furthermore, he himself, when he is considering an unqualified proposi-
tion with respect to terms does not ever consider it with respect to terms
of this kind. (232,32-6; cf. 130,23-4)
If Alexander adhered to a strict temporal interpretation of contingency

what he says here would implicitly commit him to the identification of
unqualified truths with propositions true at some time, that is, with
contingent propositions. He, of course, never makes this identification.
If he had, he might have seen problems which face any interpreter trying
to understand why Aristotle accepts certain U+C combinations while
rejecting their CC analogues. There are many reasons why Alexander
never offers a strict temporal interpretation. Perhaps the most impor-
Introduction 31
tant is that for him the meaning of contingency is determined by the
diorismos, not by any temporal account.
III.D.2. Non-convertibility of negative contingent propositions

(1.3, 25b3-19; 1.17, 36b35-37a31)
Aristotles denial of EE-conversionc is controversial. Alexanders discus-
sion of it is dense, but is largely a scholastic defence of Aristotles
position. We will mention a few points in it, but we will mainly content
ourselves with describing Aristotles text.
In the case of negative propositions, it is not the same. With those which
are said to be contingent inasmuch as they do not hold by necessity or they
hold but not by necessity, the case is similar, e.g., if someone were to say
that it is contingent that what is human is not a horse or that white holds
of no cloak. For of these examples the former does not hold by necessity,
and it is not necessary that the latter hold and the proposition converts
in the same way; for, if it is contingent that horse holds of no human, it
will be possible (enkhrei) that human holds of no horse, and if it is
possible that white holds of no cloak, it is possible that cloak holds of
nothing white for if it is necessary that it holds of some, then white will
also hold of some cloak by necessity (for this was proved earlier). And
similarly in the case of particular negatives. (25b3-14)48
Alexander understands Aristotle to be dealing here with the situation

in which an unqualified or necessary proposition is said to be contingent,
and to be conceding that EE-conversion does hold in those cases.
According to Alexander, Aristotle illustrates necessity with the propo-
sition It is contingent that horse holds of no human and unqualified
holding with It is possible that white holds of no cloak. Aristotles
argument that the latter converts seems to be a straightforward indirect
argument moving from It is not possible that cloak holds of nothing
white to ( C N ) NEC(Cloak i White) to (II-conversionn)
NEC(White i Cloak). Alexander insists on reparsing what Aristotle says
to make it fit the case of contingency as holding:
He says for if it is necessary that it holds of some, then white will also
hold of some cloak by necessity since a particular affirmative necessary
proposition must be the opposite of a contingent universal negative one,
and the unqualified proposition was assumed as contingent in its verbal
formulation. And the verbal opposite will contain necessity, although
what is signified by it will be particular affirmative unqualified. For this
is the opposite of a universal negative unqualified proposition. (39,4-11,
our italics)
That is to say, according to Alexander, Aristotle uses the vocabulary of

necessity although he expects us to understand that he is talking about
32 Introduction
unqualified propositions. Aristotle has little to say about the third case.
He remarks that EE-conversionc fails and OO-conversionc works, but
defers discussion until chapter 17:
But those things which are said to be contingent inasmuch as they are for
the most part and by nature and this is the way we specify contingency
will not be similar in the case of negative conversions. Rather a
universal negative proposition does not convert, and the particular does
convert. This will be evident when we discuss contingency. (25b14-19)49
Aristotles actual argument for rejecting EE-conversionc is confusing for

a number of reasons, one of which is his tacit reliance on the equivalence
of CON(XaY) and CON(XeY). He begins the rejection, which is what we
have called an incompatibility rejection argument, as follows:
It should first be shown that a privative contingent proposition does not

convert; that is, if it is contingent that A holds of no B, it is not necessary
that it is also contingent that B holds of no A. For let this be assumed and
let it be contingent that B holds of no A. Then, since contingent affirma-
tions convert with negations both contraries and opposites and it is
contingent that B holds of no A, it is evident that it will also be contingent
that B holds of all A. But this is false. For it is not the case that if it is
contingent that X holds of all Y, it is necessary that it be contingent that
Y holds of all X. So the privative does not convert. (36b35-37a3)
Here Aristotle takes for granted the equivalence of CON(XeY) and

CON(XaY) and the compatibility of CON(XaY) (or equivalently
CON(XeY)) and CON(YaX). We may represent his argument as
follows. Assume that EE-conversionc holds and that CON(AeB) (or
equivalently CON(AaB)) and, what is possible, CON(BaA). Then
(EE-conversionc) CON(BeA) and (EA-transformationc) CON(BaA), con-
tradicting CON(BaA). Therefore EE-conversionc cannot be correct.50
Aristotle goes on to give terms for rejecting EE-conversionc:51
Furthermore nothing prevents it being contingent that A holds of no B,

although B does not hold of some A by necessity. For example, it is
contingent that white does not hold of any human being for it is also
contingent that it holds of every human being , but it is not true to say
that it is contingent that human holds of nothing white. For it does not
hold of many white things by necessity, but what is necessary is not
contingent. (37a4-9)
Using our symbols we represent what Aristotle says as follows: further-

more, in some cases, CON(AeB) and NEC(BoA) (i.e., NEC (BaA)).
For example, CON(White e Human), since CON(White a Human), but
CON(Human e White), since NEC(Human o White) (since, e.g.,
swans are not human by necessity) and nothing necessary is contingent.
We turn now to perhaps the most difficult part of Aristotles rejection
Introduction 33
of EE-conversionc, his rejection of the following indirect argument for it:
Suppose CON(AeB) and CON(BeA). Then NEC (BeA), i.e.,

NEC(BiA). But then (II-conversionn) NEC(AiB), contradicting
CON(AeB).
Aristotle rejects the transition from CON(BeA) to NEC (BeA) or,

equivalently, NEC(BiA). Underlying his rejection is the idea that, even
if NEC(BiA), one might have CON(BeA) because NEC(BoA). That
is, although it is true that:
(NCe) NEC(BiA) v NEC(BoA) CON(BeA)
it is not true that:
* CON(BeA) NEC(BiA)
since one might have NEC(BoA) and NEC(BiA). For this discussion
it is also useful to have the analogue of (NCe) for a-propositions:
(NCa) NEC(BiA) v NEC(BoA) CON(BaA)
What does not emerge clearly from Aristotles text is whether or not he
accepts the converses of (NCe) and (NCa), that is
( CeN) CON(BeA) NEC(BiA) v NEC(BoA)

( CaN) CON(BaA) NEC(BiA) v NEC(BoA)
We discuss Alexanders view of these two propositions in the Appendix

on weak two-sided Theophrastean contingency. We now look at Aris-
totles rejection of *. It begins at 37a14:
It is not the case that if it is not contingent that B holds of no A, it is

necessary that B holds of some A. For It is not contingent that B holds of
no A is said in two ways; it is said if B holds of some A by necessity and
if it does not hold of some by necessity. (37a14-17)
We take Aristotle to here be asserting (NCe) and not ( CeN). He goes

on to assert a consequence of (NCe) and its analogue for (NCa):
For if B does not hold of some A by necessity, it is not true to say that it
is contingent that it does not hold of all, just as if B does hold of some A
by necessity, it is not true to say that it is contingent that it holds of all.
(37a17-20)
That is,
34 Introduction
(NCe) NEC(BoA) CON(BeA)
(NCa) NEC(BiA) CON(BaA)
He now goes on to deny the analogue of * for a- and o-propositions, and

insist that we might have CON(BaA), NEC(BoA) and NEC(BiA):
So, if someone were to maintain that, since it is not contingent that B

holds of all A,52 it does not hold of some by necessity, he would take things
falsely. For it holds of all,53 but we say that it is not contingent that it
holds of all because it holds of certain of them by necessity. (37a20-24)
Aristotle now says:
Consequently both X holds of some Y by necessity and X does not hold

of some Y by necessity are opposite to It is contingent that X holds of all
Y. And similarly in the case of It is contingent that X holds of no Y.
(37a24-6)
Clearly Aristotle is asserting the same thing about CON(BaA) and

CON(BeA). What is not clear is whether he is simply asserting (NCa)
and (NCe) or also ( CaN) and ( CeN). That he intends to make the
stronger assertion is suggested by what he goes on to say about the
alleged indirect proof of EE-conversionc:
It is clear then that with respect to things which are contingent and not
contingent in the way which we have specified initially it is necessary to
take B does not hold of some A by necessity and not B holds of some A
by necessity. But if this is taken, nothing impossible results, so there is
no syllogism. (37a26-30)
We are inclined to think that Aristotle should say simply that we have
no right to infer NEC(BiA) from CON(BeA). But instead he says that
we must infer NEC(BoA). Alexander54 understands Aristotles claim to
be based on the idea that NEC(BiA), i.e., NEC(AiB), is incompatible
with the assumed CON(AeB). This interpretation seems to presup-
pose the truth of ( CeN). That is, the interpretation assumes that if
CON(BeA), then either NEC(BiA) or NEC(BoA) and rules out the
former option. If this interpretation is correct, then Aristotle presum-
ably also accepts ( CaN).
Notes
1. The reader can be sure that any variable letter other than A, B, C, D
and E has no correspondent in the Greek original.
2. In the Introduction and Summary we ignore Aristotles treatment of
so-called indeterminate propositions, X holds of Y and X does not hold of Y.
3. We also use the word syllogism to mean roughly valid inference. If the
Notes to pp. 5-13 35
premisses P1 and P2 are syllogistic, Alexander says things such as There is (or
will be) a syllogism, and if the conclusion yielded is P3, he often says there is a
syllogism of P3. We frequently render the former words as The result is a
syllogism and the latter There is a syllogism with the conclusion P3.
4. We adopt the convention of writing the conclusions of syllogistic combina-
tions after the premisses.
5. We will also frequently write out the propositions involved in a combina-
tion or syllogism. The order in which we list the syllogisms correponds to the
way Alexander orders them. He occasionally refers to, e.g., the third syllogism
in the first figure, meaning Darii1. See, for example 120,25-7.
6. For discussion see Patzig (1968), pp. 43-87.
7. See the note on 32,11 in Barnes et al., p. 87.
8. On this understanding of BiC see the notes on 49,22 (p. 111) and 32,20 (p.
88) of Barnes et al.
9. On Alexanders terminology for contradictories and contraries, see Barnes
et al., pp. 26-7. We have followed them in rendering antikeimenon opposite and
enantios contrary, saving antiphasis and antiphatikos for contradictory. In
some passages (e.g. 195,18-22, 237,29-32) Alexander uses antikeimenon as a
general term of which contraries and contradictories are species. But most often,
e.g., in representations of reductio proofs, he uses antikeimenon to refer to the
contradictory of a proposition.
The reader is well advised to learn the equivalences expressed by a and b,
since both Alexander and Aristotle by and large take them for granted.
10. We remark here that in the introduction and summary we pay virtually
no attention to Aristotles uniform rejection of combinations which do not
include a universal premiss.
11. Generally speaking it is not feasible to show that a combination is
syllogistic by showing directly that it admits no counterinterpretation because
it is not feasible to survey all possible interpretations.
12. See especially 238,22-38.
13. We do not, however, say that if P is an unqualified proposition and true,
P is unqualified, because if NEC(P), then P, but P is necessary, not unqualified.
The notation we have adopted represents necessity and contingency as
operators on sentences. Many interpreters prefer to represent them as operators
on predicates or the copula joining predicate to subject. See, e.g., Patterson
(1995). Our view is that no uniform representation, i.e., one in which the same
words of Aristole are always or almost always represented by the same formula,
is fully satisfactory, and that the notation we have adopted is simple and by and
large adequate to capture Alexanders perspective. For the most part, notation
becomes significant when one is concerned with the question of truth, e.g.,
whether or not it is the case that a certain combination is syllogistic or a
conversion rule correct. When one is concerned, as Alexander for the most part
is, with the overall coherence of what Aristotle says, the interpretation of a
formalism is much less significant: roughly speaking one can interpret the
formalism however one wants as long as one interprets it consistently.
14. And also except in the UC and NC cases complete. The situation
changes somewhat when contingent premisses are introduced because the
conversion rules allow for the justification of syllogisms with no analogue among
combinations not containing a contingent premiss.
15. More precisely, Aristotle uses the equivalent in his argument at 1.15,
34a34-b2 that Barbara1(UC_) yields a contingent conclusion and claims at 1.16,
36 Notes to pp. 13-20
35b37-36a2 that the fact that Barbara1(NC_) also yields such a conclusion will
be proved in the same way as in the preceding cases.
16. See, e.g., 174,13-19.
17. We here begin a practice of writing C or CON where there is some
unclarity about the specific character of an allegedly contingent propostion.
18. Aristotles formulation at 30a30-2 is slightly different.
19. It appears that some people tried to reject (a) by saying that Aristotle
does not interpret unqualified propositions as hypotheses. Alexander shows the
untenability of this position; see 126,9-22 and 130,23-4.
20. See Patterson (1995).
21. See the textual note on 30a21-2 (Appendix 6).
22. This is the way Alexander expresses 1.1, 24b29-30. When applied to the
notion of holding of all by necessity it provides one of the clearest expressions
of the idea of de re necessity: A holds of all B by necessity if A holds by necessity
of whatever is under B. Cf. 129,34-130,1 and 167,14-18.
23. Alexander most frequently refers to Theophrastus and Eudemus with
some such phrase as his [i.e., Aristotles] associates; sometimes he names them
both, and sometimes he names only Theophrastus. At no point does he distin-
guish between their views, and we see no basis for trying to do so. We shall
follow most modern scholarship by talking only about Theophrastus.
24. Alexanders fullest discussion is at 123,28-127,16; cf. 129,21-130,24 and
132,23-34. The crucial applications of the rule come in connection with the
first-figure NUN cases (and their consequences) and first-figure NC_ cases
which Aristotle says imply unqualified conclusions. See, e.g., 1.16, 36a7-17 with
Alexanders discussion at 208,8-209,32.
25. See, e.g., 247,39-248,3.
26. Assume, as is possible, that AaB, NEC(AiB), NEC(BaC), and assume
that Barbara1(UNU) is valid. Then AaC, which with NEC(BaC) implies
(Darapti3(UNN)) NEC(AiB), contradicting NEC(AiB). Hence Barbara1(UNU)
is not valid. This argument is a demonstration of the incoherence of Aristotles
treatment of combinations with a necessary and an unqualified premiss.
27. Alexander gives the incompatibility rejection argument for Celar-
ent1(UNN) at 130,25-131,4.
28. We give the arguments. For
Celarent1(NUN) NEC(AeB) BaC NEC(AeC)
NEC(AeC) and NEC(AeB) entail nothing, and NEC(AeC) and BaC entail
(Ferison3(NUN)) NEC(AoC), which is implied by NEC(AeC). In the case of:
Darii1(NUN) NEC(AaB) BiC NEC(AiC)
and:
Ferio1(NUN) NEC(AeB) BiC NEC(AoC),
nothing is entailed by the conclusion and either of the other premisses.
29. See the notes on 132,8 and 17.
30. See the note on 133,20.
31. For discussion see the note on 132,29.
32. See chapter 1.16 and volume 2, Introduction, section III.E.2.a.
33. The third adjunct (prosrhsis) is It is contingent that. See 1.2, 25a2-3
with Alexanders explanation at 26,29-27,1.
34. At 156,26 Alexander mentions a second consideration: that an unquali-
fied proposition is necessary on a condition and so ruled out by the words if P
is not necessary. For discussion see Appendix 3 on conditional necessity.
35. Alexanders interpretation is very problematic. For, as we will see shortly,
Aristotle is committed to the idea that, e.g., CON(AaB) implies CON(AoB). But
then, if CON(AaB) is true, so is CON(AoB), and hence so are (AaB)
and (AoB), i.e., AoB and (AoB). Alexander attempts unsuccessfully to
wriggle out of these difficulties at 161,3-26; see also 222,16-35.
36. We note that this means that, at least within the context of syllogistic,
neither of them is committed to two-sided contingency, if that means the
equivalence of CON(P) and CON( P) for any proposition P.
37. See 159,22-4.
38. Here and elsewhere Aristotle speaks of conversion. Modern scholars
sometimes speak of complementary conversion. In our discussion we use the
word transformation to bring out that the order of terms is preserved when the
rule is applied.
39. For an incisive account of the difficulties involved in what Alexander says
here see Barnes et al., pp. 79-80, n. 157. Although we do not claim to be able to
eliminate these difficulties, we hope to give some sense of what Alexander has
in mind.
40. See especially 38,23-6.
41. We use the future tense will be because Alexander says things such as
that a contingent proposition does not yet (mdep) hold (e.g. at 156,18).
Alexander never considers the possibility of a proposition which held at some
time in the past but never thereafter, but it does not seem unreasonable for
logical purposes to take his references to the future in such contexts to include
the past, so that a contingent proposition is understood to be one that holds at
some time but not at the present. For a discussion of this whole topic see
Hintikka (1973). For a discussion of Alexanders conception of possibility see
Sharples (1982).
42. Here we depart significantly from the translation of Barnes et al. And
this is one of the many places in which we have inserted variables where
Alexander has none. In the present case the insertion requires interpretation
of the text. One might choose to interchange the Bs and As in sentence (v).
43. Accepting the reading endekhetai of some manuscripts adopted by Barnes
et al.
44. Here we follow the manuscripts rather than accepting the emendation of
Barnes et al.; see their note 51 on 37,16 (p. 94); nothing significant turns on this
difference.
45. We note that in Alexanders argument for EE-conversionn, the question
of how AiB holds is irrelevant since, no matter how it holds, AiB contradicts
NEC(AeB).
46. See the Greek-English Index.
47. Compare, e.g., 1.14, 33b3-8 with 1.15, 35b11-19.
48. For deviations of Alexanders text of this passage from Rosss see Barnes
et al., pp. 200-1.
49. Most of Alexanders discussion of this passage (39,17-40,4) is devoted to
explaining that, although what is contingent may not hold for the most part,
Aristotle mentions only what holds for the most part which, according to
Alexander, is the same as what holds by nature because there is no scientific
value in arguments about what holds no more often than it fails to hold. Aristotle
has something further to say on this subject at 1.13, 32b4-22, and in connection
with this material Alexander discusses the subject in more detail (161,29-
165,14).
50. As always, Aristotle and so Alexander present these arguments in
what we think is a less satisfactory way. They assume EE-conversionc and
CON(AeB), infer CON(BaA) and then point out that CON(AeB) is compatible
with CON(BaA).
51. Alexander (221,7-13) shows uncertainty about whether what follows is
an independent argument.
52. Aristotles text actually says C holds of all D, but the change in letters
is irrelevant.
53. Aristotle does not need BaA only NEC(BoA), i.e., NEC (BaA);
see the note on 225,21.
54. See especially 226,13-31. Immediately after this passage at 226,32-227,9
Alexander gives the correct explanation of the illegitimacy of the inference.
Summary
Symbols and rules
Our symbols are all explained in the introduction. We here give brief
explications of the less usual ones. NEC(P) is read It is necessary that
P. CON(P) is read It is contingent that P. In the introduction we have
tried to unfold our understanding of the relevant notion of contingency.
Because Aristotle wavers in his understanding we sometimes write
CON(P) to indicate that the notion of contingency is uncertain in one
way or another. We frequently write NEC (P) to stand for It is
contingent (in another sense) that P; this sense is so-called Theo-
phrastean contingency; we sometimes use CONt(P) as an abbreviation
for NEC (P). Finally, Aristotle sometimes infers It is contingent
that P from P; in these cases we write CONu(P). We also recall the
following abbreviations:
XaY for X holds of all Y or All Y are X

XeY for X holds of no Y or No Y are X
XiY for X holds of some Y or Some Y are X
XoY for X does not hold of some Y or There are some Y which are
not X
The following three equivalences are frequently taken for granted:
P if and only if P
XaY if and only if (XoY) (so that also XoY if and only if (XaY))
XeY if and only if (XiY) (so that also XiY if and only if (XeY))
The relations among the different modal notions are given by the
following rules:
U N P NEC (P)
C N CON(P) NEC (P)
P CONu(P)
Aristotle accepts the following transformation rules:
EE-conversionu: XeY YeX (1.2, 25a14-17)

AI-conversionu: XaY YiX (1.2, 25a17-19)
II-conversionu: XiY YiX (1.2, 25a20-2)
40 Summary
EE-conversionn: NEC(XeY) NEC(YeX) (1.3, 25a29-31)

AI-conversionn: NEC(XaY) NEC(YiX) (1.3, 25a32-4)
II-conversionn: NEC(XiY) NEC(YiX) (1.3, 25a32-4)
AI-conversionc: CON(XaY) CON(YiX) (1.3, 25a37-b3)
II-conversionc: CON(XiY) CON(YiX) (1.3, 25a37-b3)
EA-transformationc: CON(XeY) CON(XaY) (1.13, 32a34)
AE-transformationc: CON(XaY) CON(XeY) (1.13, 32a34)
IO-transformationc: CON(XiY) CON(XoY) (1.13, 32a35)
OI-transformationc: CON(XoY) CON(XiY) (1.13, 32a35)
He rejects:
OO-conversionu: XoY YoX (1.2, 25a22-6)

OO-conversionn: NEC(XoY) NEC(YoX) (1.3, 25a34-6)
*EE-conversionc: CON(XeY) CON(YeX).1 (1.17, 36b35-37a31).
Theophrastus apparently followed Aristotle on the conversion of un-

qualified and necessary propositions, but he accepted analogues of the
same rules for Ct propositions, i.e.,
AI-conversionCt: CONt(XaY) CONt(YiX)

II-conversionCt: CONt(XiY) CONt(YiX)
EE-conversionCt: CONt(XeY) CONt(YeX)
but not
OO-conversionCt: CONt(XoY) CONt(YoX)
These principles are consequences of Aristotelian assumptions about

NEC and the definition of CONt as NEC .
Assertoric Syllogistic (Chapters 4-6)

First figure (Chapter 4)
Complete
Barbara1(UUU) AaB BaC AaC (25b37-40)
Celarent1(UUU) AeB BaC AeC (25b40-26a2)
Darii1(UUU) AaB BiC AiC (26a23-5)
Ferio1(UUU) AeB BiC AoC (26a25-7)
Summary 41
Second figure (Chapter 5)
Direct reductions
Cesare2(UUU) AeB AaC BeC (27a5-9)
Since AeB (EE-conversionu) BeA. So (Celarent1(UUU)) BeC.
Camestres2(UUU) AaB AeC BeC (27a9-15)
Since AeC (EE-conversionu) CeA. So (Celarent1(UUU)) CeB, and so
(EE-conversionu) BeC.
Festino2(UUU) AeB AiC BoC (27a32-6)
Since AeB (EE-conversionu) BeA. So (Ferio1(UUU)) BoC.
Indirect reduction
Baroco2(UUU) AaB AoC BoC (27a36-b3)
Assume (BoC), i.e., BaC. So (Barbara1(UUU)) AaC, contradicting AoC.
Third figure (Chapter 6)

Direct reductions
Darapti3(UUU) AaC BaC AiB (28a17-26)
Since BaC (AI-conversionu) CiB. So (Darii1(UUU)) AiB.
Felapton3(UUU) AeC BaC AoB (28a26-30)
Since BaC (AI-conversionu) CiB. So (Ferio1(UUU)) AoB.
Datisi3(UUU) AaC BiC AiB (28b7-11)
Since BiC (II-conversionu) CiB. So (Darii1(UUU)) AiB.
Disamis3(UUU) AiC BaC AiB (28b11-15)
Since AiC (II-conversionu) CiA. So (Darii1(UUU)) BiA, and
(II-conversionu) AiB.
Ferison3(UUU) AeC BiC AoB (28b33-5)
Since BiC (II-conversionu) CiB. So (Ferio1(UUU)) AoB.
Indirect reduction
Bocardo3(UUU) AoC BaC AoB (28b17-21)
Assume (AoB), i.e., AaB. So Barbara1(UUU)) AaC, contradicting AoC.
All other premiss combinations rejected.
Modal syllogistic without contingency

NNN (Chapter 8)
First figure
Complete
Barbara1(NNN) NEC(AaB) NEC(BaC) NEC(AaC)
Celarent1(NNN) NEC(AeB) NEC(BaC) NEC(AeC)
42 Summary
Darii1(NNN) NEC(AaB) NEC(BiC) NEC(AiC)
Ferio1(NNN) NEC(AeB) NEC(BiC) NEC(AoC)
Second figure
Direct reductions (cf. the corresponding UUU cases)
Cesare2(NNN) NEC(AeB) NEC(AaC) NEC(BeC)
Camestres2(NNN) NEC(AaB) NEC(AeC) NEC(BeC)
Festino2(NNN) NEC(AeB) NEC(AiC) NEC(BoC)
Proof by ekthesis (not accepted by Theophrastus)

*Baroco2(NNN) NEC(AaB) NEC(AoC) NEC(BoC) (30a6-14)
Take D to be a part of C such that NEC(AeD). Then (Camestres2(NNN))
NEC(BeD). But D is part of C. So NEC(BoC).
Third figure
Direct reductions (cp. the corresponding UUU cases)
Darapti3(NNN) NEC(AaC) NEC(BaC) NEC(AiB)
Felapton3(NNN) NEC(AeC) NEC(BaC) NEC(AoB)
Datisi3(NNN) NEC(AaC) NEC(BiC) NEC(AiB)
Disamis3(NNN) NEC(AiC) NEC(BaC) NEC(AiB)
Ferison3(NNN) NEC(AeC) NEC(BiC) NEC(AoB)
Proof by ekthesis (not accepted by Theophrastus)

*Bocardo3(NNN) NEC(AoC) NEC(BaC) NEC(AoB) (30a6-14)
Take D to be a part of C such that NEC(AeD). Then, since by necessity
all C are B and D is a part of B, NEC(BaD) and (Felapton3(NNN))
NEC(AoB).
All other NN combinations (tacitly) rejected.
N+U (Chapters 9-11)

Complete
NUN (held to be NUU by Theophrastus)2

*Barbara1(NUN) NEC(AaB) BaC NEC(AaC) (30a17-23)
*Celarent1(NUN) NEC(AeB) BaC NEC(AeC) (30a17-23)
*Darii1(NUN) NEC(AaB) BiC NEC(AiC) (30a37-b2)
*Ferio1(NUN) NEC(AeB) BiC NEC(AoC) (30a37-b2)
Summary 43
UNU
Barbara1(UNU) AaB NEC(BaC) AaC (30a23-33)
Celarent1(UNU) AeB NEC(BaC) AeC (30a23-33)
Darii1(UNU) AaB NEC(BiC) AiC (30b2-6)
Ferio1(UNU) AeB NEC(BiC) AoC (30b2-6)

Cesare2(NUN) NEC(AeB) AaC NEC(BeC) (30b9-13)
Cesare2(UNU) AeB NEC(AaC) BeC (30b18-19)
Camestres2(UNN) AaB NEC(AeC) NEC(BeC) (30b14-18)
Camestres2(NUU) NEC(AaB) AeC BeC (30b18-40)
Festino2(NUN) NEC(AeB) AiC NEC(BoC) (31a5-10)
Festino2(UNU) AeB NEC(AiC) BoC absent
Indirect reductions
*Baroco2(NUU) NEC(AaB) AoC BoC (31a10-15)
*Baroco2(UNU) AaB NEC(AoC) BoC (31a15-17)

Darapti3(NUN) NEC(AaC) BaC NEC(AiB) (31a24-30)
Darapti3(UNN) AaC NEC(BaC) NEC(AiB) (31a31-3)
Felapton3(NUN) NEC(AeC) BaC NEC(AoB) (31a33-7)
Felapton3(UNU) AeC NEC(BaC) AoB (31a37-b10)
Datisi3(NUN) NEC(AaC) BiC NEC(AiB) (31b19-20)
Datisi3(UNU) AaC NEC(BiC) AiB (31b20-31)
Disamis3(UNN) AiC NEC(BaC) NEC(AiB) (31b12-19)
Disamis3(NUU) NEC(AiC) BaC AiB (31b31-3)
Ferison3(NUN) NEC(AeC) BiC NEC(AoB) (31b35-7)
Ferison3(UNU) AeC NEC(BiC) AoB (32a1-4)
Indirect reductions
*Bocardo3(UNU) AoC NEC(BaC) AoB (31b40-32a1)
*Bocardo3(NUU) NEC(AoC) BaC AoB (32a4-5)
All other N+U combinations (tacitly) rejected.

44 Summary
Syllogistic with contingency (Chapters 13-22)

CCC (Chapters 14, 17, 20)
Complete
Barbara1(CCC) CON(AaB) CON(BaC) CON(AaC) (32b38-33a1)
Celarent1(CCC) CON(AeB) CON(BaC) CON(AeC) (33a1-5)
Darii1(CCC) CON(AaB) CON(BiC) CON(AiC) (33a23-5)
Ferio1(CCC) CON(AeB) CON(BiC) CON(AoC) (33a25-7)
Waste cases justifiable by transformationc rules

(but not by Theophrastus transformationCt rules)
AEA1(CCC) CON(AaB) CON(BeC) CON(AaC) (33a5-12)
EEA1(CCC) CON(AeB) CON(BeC) CON(AaC) (33a12-20)
AOI1(CCC) CON(AaB) CON(BoC) CON(AiC) (33a27-34)
EOO1(CCC) CON(AeB) CON(BoC) CON(AoC) (included in
general statement
at 33a21-3)
Aristotle rejects all forms with a particular major and either a universal
or a particular minor premiss at 33a34-b17.

*Aristotle rejects all second-figure CC combinations.

Darapti3(CCC) CON(AaC) CON(BaC) CON(AiB) (39a14-19)
Felapton3(CCC) CON(AeC) CON(BaC) CON(AoB) (39a19-23)
Datisi3(CCC) CON(AaC) CON(BiC) CON(AiB) (39a31-5)
Disamis3(CCC) CON(AiC) CON(BaC) CON(AiB) (39a35-6)
Ferison3(CCC) CON(AeC) CON(BiC) CON(AoB) (39a36-8)

EEI3(CCC) CON(AeC) CON(BeC) CON(AiB) (39a26-8)
AEI3(CCC) CON(AaC) CON(BeC) CON(AiB) (not mentioned)
AOI3(CCC) CON(AaC) CON(BoC) CON(AiB) (not mentioned)
OAI3(CCC) CON(AoC) CON(BaC) CON(AiB) (39a36-8?)
OEO3(CCC) CON(AoC) CON(BeC) CON(AiB) (39a38-b2)
EOO3(CCC) CON(AeC) CON(BoC) CON(AiB) (39a38-b2)
IEO3(CCC) CON(AiC) CON(BeC) CON(AoB) (not mentioned)
Summary 45
Aristotle rejects CC combinations with no universal premisses at
39b2-6.
U+C (Chapters 15, 18, 21)

Complete (CUC)
Barbara1(CUC) CON(AaB) BaC CON(AaC) (33b33-6)
Celarent1(CUC) CON(AeB) BaC CON(AeC) (33b36-40)
Darii1(CUC) CON(AaB) BiC CON(AiC) (35a30-5)
Ferio1(CUC) CON(AeB) BiC CON(AoC) (35a30-5)
Incomplete (UCC)3
*Barbara1(UCC) AaB CON(BaC) NEC (AaC) (34a34-b2)
*Celarent1(UC N ) AeB CON(BaC) NEC (AeC) (34b19-35a2)
Darii1(UCC) AaB CON(BiC) NEC (AiC) (35a35-b8)
Ferio1(UC N ) AeB CON(BiC) NEC (AoC) (35a35-b8)

AEA1(UCC) AaB CON(BeC) NEC (AaC) (35a3-11)
EEE1(UC N ) AeB CON(BeC) NEC (AeC) (35a11-18)
AOI1(UCC) AaB CON(BoC) NEC (AiC) (35a35-b8)
EOO1(UC N ) AeB CON(BoC) NEC (AoC) (35a35-b8)
Aristotle rejects EE_1(CU_) and AE_1(CU_) at 35a20-4, AO_1(CU_) and

EO_1(CU_) at 35b8-11, all forms with a particular major and either a
universal or a particular minor premiss at 35b11-19.

Cesare2(UCC) AeB CON(AaC) NEC (BeC) (37b23-8)
*Camestres2(CUC) CON(AaB) AeC NEC (BeC) (37b29)
Festino2(UCC) AeB CON(AiC) NEC (BoC) (38a3-4)
*IEO2(CU?) CON(AiB) AeC NEC (CoB)? (38a3-4?)

EEE2(UCC) AeB CON(AeC) NEC (BeC) (37b29-35)
EEE2(CUC) CON(AeB) AeC NEC (BeC) (37b29-35)
EOO2(UCC) AeB CON(AoC) NEC (BoC) (38a4-7)
OEO2(CU?) CON(AoB) AeC NEC (CoB)? (38a4-7?)
46 Summary
Rejected standard cases

Cesare2(CU_) CON(AeB) AaC (37b19-23)
Camestres2(UC_) AaB CON(AeC) (37b19-23)
Festino2(CU_) CON(AeB) AiC (37b39-38a2)
Baroco2(UC_) AaB CON(AoC) (37b39-38a2)
Baroco2(CU_) CON(AaB) AoC (38a8-10)
Aristotle rejects the waste cases AA_2(CU_) and AA_2(UC_) at 37b35-8,

and he rejects OA_2(UC_), OE_2(UC_), and EO_2(CU_) at 38a8-10. He
apparently rejects IE_2(UC_) and OA_2(CU_) at 37b39, and he rejects
cases without a universal premiss at 38a10-12. He does not mention the
waste cases AI_2(CU_), AI_2(UC_), IA_2(UC_), and IA_2(CU_), which are
presumably rejected.

Darapti3(UCC) AaC CON(BaC) NEC (AiB) (39b10-16)
Darapti3(CUC) CON(AaC) BaC CON(AiB) (39b16-22)
Felapton3(CUC) CON(AeC) BaC CON(AoB) (39b16-22)
Felapton3(UCC) AeC CON(BaC) NEC (AoB) (39b16-22)
*AE?3(CU?) CON(AaC) BeC NEC (AoB)? (39b22-5)
*EE?3(CU?) CON(AeC) BeC NEC (AoB)? (39b22-5)
Datisi3(CUC) CON(AaC) BiC CON(AiB) (39b26-31)
Datisi3(UCC) AaC CON(BiC) NEC (AiB) (39b26-31)
Disamis3(UCC) AiC CON(BaC) CON(AiB) (39b26-
31)
Disamis3(CUC) CON(AiC) BaC NEC (AiB) (39b26-31)
Ferison3(CUC) CON(AeC) BiC CON(AoB) (39b26-31)
Ferison3(UCC) AeC CON(BiC) NEC (AoB) (39b26-31)
IEO3(UCC) AiC CON(BeC) CON(AoB) (39b26-
31)
IE?3(CU?) CON(AiC) BeC NEC (AoB)? (39b26-31)

AEI3(UCC) AaC CON(BeC) NEC (AiB) (39b22-5)
EEO3(UCC) AeC CON(BeC) NEC (AoB) (39b22-5)
EOO3(UCC) AeC CON(BoC) NEC (AoB) (not men-
tioned)
OE?3(CU?) CON(AiC) BeC NEC (AoB)? (not mentioned)
Indirect reductions
Summary 47
*Bocardo3(CUC) CON(AoC) BaC NEC (AoB) (39b31-9)
AO?3(UC?) AaC CON(BoC) ? (39b31-9?)
AO?3(CU?) CON(AaC) BoC ? (39b31-9?)
OA?3(UC?) AoC CON(BaC) ? (39b31-9?)
Further waste cases

EO?3(CU?) AeC CON(BoC) ? (not mentioned)
OA?3(CU?) CON(AoC) BaC ? (not mentioned)
These are all the third-figure U+C combinations.
N+C (Chapters 16, 19, 22)

Complete (CNC)
Barbara1(CNC) CON(AaB) NEC(BaC) CON(AaC) (36a2-7)
Celarent1(CNC) CON(AeB) NEC(BaC) CON(AeC) (36a17-24)
Darii1(CNC) CON(AaB) NEC(BiC) CON(AiC) (not mentioned)
Ferio1(CNC) CON(AeB) NEC(BiC) CON(AoC) (36a39-b2)
Incomplete (NCC)4
*Barbara1(NCC) NEC(AaB) CON(BaC) NEC (AaC) (35b37-
36a2)
*Celarent1(NCCu) NEC(AeB) CON(BaC) CONu(AeC) (36a7-17)
*Darii1(NCC) NEC(AaB) CON(BiC) NEC (AiC) (36a39-b2)
Ferio1(NCCu) NEC(AeB) CON(BiC) CONu(AoC) (36a34-9)
AEA1(NCC) NEC(AaB) CON(BeC) NEC (AaC) (36a25-27)
EEE1(NCCu) NEC(AeB) CON(BeC) CONu(AeC) (not mentioned)
AOI1(NCC) NEC(AaB) CON(BoC) NEC (AiC) (35b28-30?)
EOO1(NCCu) NEC(AeB) CON(BoC) CONu(AoC) (35b30-31?)
Aristotle rejects AE_1(CN_) and EE_1(CN_) at 36a27-31, IA_1(NC_),

OA_1(NC_), IE_1(NC_), and OE_1(NC_) at 36b3-7, IE_1(CN_),
OE_1(CN_), IA_1(CN_), and OA_1(CN_) at 36b7-12, and all combinations
with two particular premisses at 36b12-18. He tacitly rejects AO_1(CN_)
and EO_1(CN_).

Cesare2(NCCu) NEC(AeB) CON(AaC) CONu(BeC) (38a16-25)
Camestres2(CNC ) CON(AaB) NEC(AeC) CONu(BeC)
u
(38a25-6)
48 Summary
Festino2(NCCu) NEC(AeB) CON(AiC) CONu(BoC) (38b24-7)
IEO2(CN?) CON(AiB) NEC(AeC) CONu(CoB)? (38b24-7?)
EEE2(NCC ) u
NEC(AeB) CON(AeC) CONu(BoC) (38b6-12)
EEE2(CNCu) CON(AeB) NEC(AeC) CONu(BoC) (38b12-13)
EOO2(NCCu) NEC(AeB) CON(AoC) CONu(BoC) (38b31-5)
OEO2(CN?) CON(AoB) NEC(AeC) CONu(CoB)? (38b31-5?)
Rejected standard cases

*Cesare2(CN_) CON(AeB) NEC(AaC) (38a26-b4)
*Camestres2(NC_) NEC(AaB) CON(AeC) (38b4-5)
Festino2(CN_) CON(AeB) NEC(AiC) (not mentioned)
*Baroco2(NC_) NEC(AaB) CON(AoC) (38b27-9)
Baroco2(CN_) CON(AaB) NEC(AoC) (not mentioned)
The rejected standard cases generate the following equally problematic

waste cases: AA_2(CN_) and AA_2(NC) (both rejected at 38b13-23),
AI_2(CN_) and AI_2(NC_) (both rejected at 38b29-31, where Aristotle
also rejects IA_2(CN_) and IA_2(NC_)) and EO_2(CN_), which Aristotle
does not discuss. Aristotle also rejects OA_2(CN_) at 38b27-29, and the
rejection of IA_2(NC_) carries with it the rejection of IE_2(NC_). He
rejects all forms with two particulars at 38b35-7. He tacitly rejects
OA_2(NC_) and OE_2(NC_).
Third-figure (Chapter 22)

Darapti3(NCC) NEC(AaC) CON(BaC) NEC (AiB) (40a12-16)
Darapti3(CNC) CON(AaC) NEC(BaC) CON(AiB) (40a16-18)
Felapton3(CNC) CON(AeC) NEC(BaC) CON(AoB) (40a18-25)
Felapton3(NCCu) NEC(AeC) CON(BaC) CONu(AoB) (40a25-32)
Datisi3(CNC) CON(AaC) NEC(BiC) CON(AiB) (40a40-b2)
Datisi3(NCC) NEC(AaC) CON(BiC) NEC (AiB) (40a40-b2)
Disamis3(NCC) NEC(AiC) CON(BaC) CON(AiB) (40a40-b2)
Disamis3(CNC) CON(AiC) NEC(BaC) NEC (AiB) (40a40-b2)
Ferison3(CNC) CON(AeC) NEC(BiC) CON(AoB) (40b2-3)
Ferison3(NCCu) NEC(AeC) CON(BiC) CONu(AoB) (40b3-4)
*Bocardo3(CNC) CON(AoC) NEC(BaC) NEC (AoB) (40b2-3)5
Bocardo3(NCCu) NEC(AoC) CON(BaC) CONu(AoB) (40b3-4?)

AE_3(NCC) NEC(AaC) CON(BeC) NEC (AiB)? (40a33-5)
Summary 49
EEO3(NCCu) NEC(AeC) CON(BeC) CONu(AoB) (not discussed)
AOI3(NCC) NEC(AaC) CON(BoC) NEC (AiB) (40b2-3?)
IEO3(NCC) NEC(AiC) CON(BeC) CON(AoB) (40b8-12)6
EOO3(NCCu) CON(AeC) NEC(BoC) CONu(AoB) (not discussed)
OEO3(NCCu) NEC(AeC) CON(BiC) CONu(AoB) (not discussed)
Rejected Cases
*AE_3(CN_) CON(AaC) NEC(BeC) (40a35-8)
*IE_3(CN_) CON(AiC) NEC(BeC) (40b8-12)
These two rejections imply rejection of their equivalents, EE_3(CN_) and

OE_3(CN_). Aristotle tacitly rejects AO_3(CN_), EO_3(CN_), and all
third-figure N+C combinations with two particular premisses.
Notes
1. Asterisks indicate places of difficulty in the modal syllogistic on which
Alexander has an interesting discussion.
2. The controversy concerning these four syllogisms transfers to any N+U
combination held by Aristotle to have a necessary conclusion.
3. These cases are very problematic, especially Barbara and Celarent; their
problematic nature transmits itself to combinations reduced to them.
4. The difficulties attaching to Barbara1(UCC) transfer to Barbara1(NCC).
New difficulties arise with Celarent1(NCCu).
5. Alexander wavers between thinking Aristotle espouses Bocardo3(CNC)
and OAI3(CNC), the waste case of Disamis3(CNC).
6. The waste case (of Disamis3(NCC)) would actually be:
IEI3(NCC) NEC(AiC) CON(BeC) CON(AiB)
but Aristotle implies a derivation of the syllogism we have given, and Alexander
carries it out at 253,23-7, perhaps in order to keep the conclusion of a syllogism
with a negative premiss negative.
Alexander of Aphrodisias
On Aristotle
Prior Analytics 1.8-13
(with 1.17, 36b35-37a31)
Translation
Textual Emendations
1.8 Combinations with two necessary
premisses. All figures1
29b29 Since holding, holding by necessity and it being contin- 119,7

gent that something holds are distinct [for many things hold,
but not by necessity; others hold neither by necessity nor at all,
but it is contingent that they hold it is clear that a syllogism
of each of these things will also be distinct and its terms will not
be related in the same way, but one syllogism will be from
necessary things, a second from unqualified ones, a third from
contingent ones.]2
It is reasonable that he next gives his account of necessary syllogisms,
which are from necessary premisses, and, after treating them, his 10
account of contingent syllogisms, since holding and holding by neces-
sity and it being contingent that something holds are distinct. And,
since these are distinct, it is clear that the corresponding propositions
and syllogisms will differ from one another in accordance with these
differences. Consequently, since they do differ, it is necessary for 15
anyone who discusses syllogisms and their construction and produc-
tion to speak about them also. For in this way he will have spoken
about the construction and production of all categorical syllogisms if
he goes through all the modalities with respect to which such syllo-
gisms differ.
He indicates to us very clearly the way in which the unqualified
proposition differs from the necessary and the contingent one when
he says:
29b30 For many things hold, but not by necessity; others hold 20
neither by necessity nor at all, but it is contingent that they
hold.
For in this way unqualified propositions will be indicative of holding
but not necessarily holding, necessary propositions of necessarily
holding, and contingent propositions of not holding now and being
capable of holding;3 and these propositions truly indicate what they 25
indicate if they are true, falsely indicate it if they are false. It is clear
that the difference of propositions and of the syllogisms with respect
to the modalities can be recognized by the addition of the modalities;
54 Translation
for the appropriate modality will be co-predicated for each proposition
and each syllogism.
120,1 29b33 [it is clear that a syllogism of each of these things will be
distinct] and its terms will not be related in the same way, [but
one syllogism will be from necessary things, a second from
unqualified ones, a third from contingent ones.]
He says that the syllogism of each of these things (i.e., of what is
necessary or unqualified or contingent) will be distinct, and he
indicates how they are distinct: they are not from similar propositions
and terms, but some syllogisms will be from necessary things, some
5 from unqualified ones, and some from contingent ones.
29b364 They are related in much the same way in the case of
necessary and of unqualified things. [For, if the terms are
posited in the same way in the case of holding and in that of
holding by necessity or in the case of not holding there either
will or there wont be a syllogism <in both cases>, except that
they will differ by the addition of holding or not holding by
necessity to the terms. For the privative converts in the same
way, and we will give the same account of being in as a whole
and said of all.]
He says that the syllogisms with a necessary conclusion will exist in
the same way in each figure as they were proved to occur in the case
10 of the unqualified. For in each figure the same combination of pre-
misses along with the addition of necessity will make necessary
syllogisms. And there will be four syllogistic combinations in the first
figure, four in the second, and six in the third. The reason for this is,
<first>, that said of all and said of none through which the
15 syllogisms in the first figure are proved are taken in the same way
in the case of what is necessary and of what is unqualified, and,
<second>, that the conversions of necessary propositions through
which three syllogisms in the second figure and five in the third are
proved to yield a conclusion have been shown to be the same in the
case of unqualified things and of necessary ones.
30a2 For the privative converts in the same way, [and we will
give the same account of being in as a whole and said of all. In
the other cases the conclusion will be shown to be necessary by
conversion in the same way as in the case of unqualified hold-
ing. But in the middle figure, when the universal is affirmative
and the particular privative,5 and again in the third figure when
Translation 55
the universal is affirmative and the particular is privative,6 the
demonstration will not be the same, but it is necessary to set out
something of which each does not hold and make the syllogism
with respect to this. For the syllogism will be necessary in the
case of these things. But if the syllogism is necessary with
respect to what is set out, it is necessary with respect to some
of what is set out. For what is set out is just what some of the
original term is. And each of the syllogisms comes in the appro-
priate figure.]
The words for the privative converts in the same way should not be 20
understood as meaning only the privative converts similarly. For
affirmative propositions also convert similarly. He mentions only
negative propositions because the affirmatives convert in the same
way in all modalities, but the negatives do not, since they do so
differently in the case of contingent propositions.7 Since conversion
is not thought to be the same in the case of all negatives, he reminds
us that these also behave in the same way in these modalities.
However, in the case of syllogisms composed of unqualified propo- 25
sitions, neither the fourth syllogism in the second figure, which has
a negative particular minor, nor the sixth in the third, which has a
particular negative major, was proved by conversion, but by reductio
ad impossibile.8 As will be clear, he does not use the same proof in the
case of these syllogisms when they have necessary premisses. <To
indicate this> he adds the words in much the same way.9 The others 30
are proved in <exactly> the same way. Consequently he doesnt
mention them further, thinking that what he said about <their
analogues with unqualified propositions> is also sufficient for under-
standing them. But he does mention the syllogisms which are not 121,1
still proved in the same way, and he tells us how in their case we
should give the proof and make them syllogistic. In their case he does
not use reductio ad impossibile as he did when the premisses were
unqualified because the opposite of what is necessary is contingent.
In both cases the conclusion proved is a particular negative necessary 5
proposition of which the opposite is It is contingent that X holds of
all Y. But if this is taken as hypothesis <for a reductio> and the other
premiss, which is necessary universal affirmative, is added, this
combination is a mixture of a contingent universal affirmative propo-
sition and a necessary universal affirmative one. But in the case of
such mixtures it is not yet known what follows.10 Furthermore, it is
necessary to understand the simple cases11 first, and then to under- 10
stand the composite ones. Therefore, he rejects the indirect method
of proof as unclear and dependent on posterior things. And he speaks
about both of them12 with the following words:
56 Translation
30a9 [But in the middle figure, when the universal is affirm-
ative and the particular privative, and again in the third figure
when the universal is affirmative and the particular is priva-
tive, the demonstration will not be the same,] but it is necessary
to set out something of which each does not hold and make the
syllogism with respect to this. [For the syllogism will be neces-
sary in the case of these things. But if the syllogism is necessary
with respect to what is set out, it is necessary with respect to
some of what is set out. For what is set out is just what some of
the original term is. And each of the syllogisms comes in the
appropriate figure.]
15 He is speaking about the particular negative premisses in the two
figures at the same time. And he is not saying about both of them that
it is necessary for something of which they do not hold to be set out;
for, if he said that, he would be speaking about two negative premisses
and he would not even say that they compose the combinations under
consideration.13 Rather, he is maintaining the following. In both the
combinations, that in the second figure and that in the third, there is
20 a particular negative premiss; therefore, taking in the case of each
combination of premisses all that of which <the predicate of the
premiss> does not hold,14 one makes the syllogism with respect to that
by transforming the particular negative premiss into a universal
negative one and proving by conversion that the combination with
the universal negative premiss is syllogistic just as was done in the
case of the other combinations in which the universal premiss was
25 negative; what has been proved in this way is that by necessity it does
not hold of some of that of which the other is a part.15 For example, if
A holds of all B by necessity and A does not hold of some C by necessity
(for this is the second-figure combination which he is discussing), he
says that one should take from C that <part> of it of which A does not
hold by necessity and because of which A was said not to hold of some
30 C by necessity, and, taking that, make the necessary premiss univer-
sal negative with respect to it. Let D be some part of C of which A
does not hold by necessity. Then the whole combination will be the
following: A holds of all B by necessity, and A holds of no D (which is
some of C) by necessity. This combination is proved to be syllogistic
122,1 by conversion of the universal negative premiss. For if A holds of no
D by necessity, D holds of no A by necessity as well; but also A holds
of all B by necessity; therefore, D holds of no B by necessity, so that
B also holds of no D by necessity for to prove the proposed conclusion
5 a combination of this kind in the second figure requires conversion of
the conclusion. Thus, if B holds of no D by necessity and D is some of
C, B also does not hold of some C by necessity.
16
The proof is the same in the case of the sixth syllogism in the
Translation 57
third figure. For let A not hold of some C by necessity and B hold of
all C by necessity. And again let some part of C of which A does not 10
hold by necessity be taken, and let it be D. (For it was assumed that
A does not hold of some C by necessity.)17 Then A holds of no D by
necessity and B of all D; for if B holds of all C by necessity, it would
also hold of part of it by necessity. If then, we convert the universal
affirmative BD, which is necessary, the result will be that D holds of
some B by necessity. But also A holds of no D by necessity. Therefore, 15
A does not hold of some B by necessity. So, if the proof relative to a
part of C is sound, there will also be a sound proof relative to some
of C.
It should be noted that this form of ekthesis is not the same as the
one which he mentioned in <treating> the third figure when his topic
was unqualified syllogisms.18 There what is set out and taken was
simply some sensible which did not need proof, and consequently its 20
being taken was sufficient to make the inference evident. But here
what is taken is not still taken in this way, nor is he satisfied with
sense perception; rather he makes the syllogism with respect to the
thing set out. This is why he here adds the phrase and make the
syllogism with respect to this, but there he did not make use of any
proof after taking the ekthesis. And this was reasonable. For <if he 25
had tried to use a proof there> he would have been doing the same
thing with respect to some other subject which, being equivalent to
and the same as the original subject, would prove nothing about it.
He also indicates the nature of what is taken in ekthesis in the
present case by saying, For what is set out is just what some of the
original term is.19 For this will be a certain part or species of the
term. Therefore, if holds of none of what is set out <D> by
necessity, then it also does not hold of some of that from which
what is set out is taken <C> by necessity. For what is set out is 30
such as to be just what some of <C> is.
And even if the ekthesis <in the present case> is a matter of
perception, the same thing will also be proved in this way. For
example, in the second figure, if D is some of C and an individual,
none of A will be said of it,20 so that neither will B be. For B is some
of A, since A is said of all B. The proof is the same in the case of the
third figure. For if A does not hold of some C by necessity, but B holds 35
of all C by necessity and some individual of C of which A does not hold
is taken none of A will be said of it. But that individual is itself also 123,1
some of B, since all C is under B. Therefore, A will not hold of some
B by necessity.
In both combinations it is reasonable for him to take in the ekthesis
that thing of some of which something does not hold.21 For by neces-
sity what holds of all of something holds of that part of it of which 5
something is assumed not to hold. But it is not the case that by
58 Translation
necessity what is assumed not to hold of some of something will not
hold of a random part taken of that of which the thing was assumed
to hold of all; for it is possible for it to belong to this part of it, but not
to some other part. (He also used this method a short while ago22
when he did an ekthesis with respect to a particular negative pre-
miss.)
10 Having said how one should carry out the proof in the case of these
combinations, he adds that And each of the syllogisms comes in the
appropriate figure. He means that in the case of the syllogisms
involving the term set out, the one for the second figure will be in the
second figure and that for the third in the third. For in each combi-
nation the universal negative premiss constructed in relation to the
15 term set out does not alter the figure; rather the first is in the second
figure and the second in the third, as we have set forth.23 For they are
proved by a reduction to the first figure using conversion, and what
is proved is in the second figure in one case and in the third in the
other.
24
However, Theophrastus, discussing these things in the first book
20 of his Prior Analytics, does not use the method of ekthesis for proving
that the combinations under consideration are syllogistic. Rather he
postpones discussion of them because it requires reductio ad impos-
sibile, but what results <from a reductio> is not prima facie clear
because a mixture of premisses results and it is not yet known what
follows from mixtures.
1.9-11 Combinations with one necessary and one

unqualified premiss
1.9 The first figure25
<30a15-32 Two universal premisses>
25 30a1526 It sometimes results that the syllogism27 is necessary
when just one of the premisses is necessary not either one of
the premisses, but only that with respect to the major extreme
term, [for example, if A has been taken to hold or not to hold of
B by necessity and B just to hold of C. If the premisses have been
taken in this way, A will hold or not hold of C by necessity. For
since A is assumed28 to hold or not to hold of all B by necessity
and C is some of the Bs, it is evident that one or the other of
these will be in the case of C by necessity.]
Having first discussed the syllogisms in each figure from two unquali-
30 fied premisses and then those from necessary ones, he speaks next
about the syllogisms in each figure from a mixture of a necessary and
an unqualified premiss, saying what they are, what quality of conclu-
Translation 59
sion results in their mixtures, and what the differences in the result- 124,1
ing syllogisms corresponding to the mixtures of these modalities are.
Subsequently he will speak about syllogisms involving contingency.
He says that sometimes a necessary conclusion results from the
mixture of a necessary and an unqualified premiss, and he says in
addition when a conclusion of this kind results. For he says that in
the first figure, when both premisses are universal, if the major 5
premiss is necessary and either affirmative (as in the first indemon-
strable29) or negative (as in the second), the conclusion is necessary.
This is what he says, but his associates Eudemus and Theophrastus30
do not agree. They say that in all the combinations of a necessary and
an unqualified premiss which are put together syllogistically, the 10
conclusion is unqualified. They take this from the <idea> that in
every <syllogistic> combination the conclusion is always like the less
and weaker of the premisses assumed.31 For the conclusion which
follows from an affirmative and a negative premiss is negative, and
the conclusion which follows from a universal and a particular pre-
miss is particular. And, <they say,> it is the same way in the case of 15
mixed premisses: in the case of combinations of a necessary and an
unqualified premiss the conclusion is unqualified because the un-
qualified is less than the necessary.
They also prove this by argument. For if B holds of all C but not
by necessity, it is contingent that B sometime be disjoined32 from C.
But when B has been disjoined from C, A will also be disjoined from
it. And if this is so, A will not hold of C by necessity. 20
And they also prove that this is so using material terms. For they
take the major premiss to be universal necessary and either affirm-
ative or negative, and the minor to be universal affirmative
unqualified, and they prove that the conclusion is unqualified. For
animal holds of every human by necessity; let human hold of all that
moves; it is not true that animal holds of all that moves by necessity. 25
Furthermore, if having knowledge is said of everything literate by
necessity, and literate is said of every human unqualifiedly, it is not
true that having knowledge is said of every human by necessity. And
moving by means of legs is said of all that walks by necessity; let
walking hold of every human; it is not true that moving <by means 30
of legs> holds of every human by necessity.33
And this seems to be reasonable.34 For if the major extreme is
applied to the minor by means of the middle term, the major is
related to the last term as the middle is to the minor; for the major is
applied to the last term by means of the middle. Thus, as that because 125,1
of which the major is attached to the last term is to the last term, so
will the major be to the last term.
<It is incorrect>35 to maintain that Aristotle has not here said that
the conclusion of mixtures of this kind is <always> necessary, but
60 Translation
only when certain material terms are used and that this is confirmed
5 by his having said, It sometimes results <that the syllogism is
necessary> when just one of the premisses is necessary. For the word
sometimes does not apply to such a mixture as if the conclusion of
such a mixture is sometimes necessary and sometimes not; rather the
word applies to the mixture generally. For the conclusion of a mixture
of a necessary and an unqualified premiss is necessary sometimes.
10 For it is not always necessary, since he also says that nothing
necessary follows if the minor premiss is taken to be necessary <and
the major unqualified>. Thus the word sometimes indicates the
character of the mixture and not that with the same character and
same combination the conclusion is sometimes necessary and some-
times unqualified. And he himself indicates this clearly by adding
15 not either one of the premisses, but only that which concerns the
major extreme term, thereby indicating the point of adding the word
sometimes. And it is ridiculous to think that he says sometimes
because the conclusion of such a combination is necessary in the case
of certain material terms. For on this way <of looking at things>
nothing would prevent one from saying that even non-syllogistic
combinations are syllogistic sometimes; for they will be found to
yield a conclusion in the case of certain material terms. For example,
20 in the second figure the combination with two universal affirmatives
will imply a universal affirmative conclusion, if the extremes are
co-extensive with one another and terms of this kind have been
taken. For if every human is an animal but also everything that
laughs is an animal, it follows that every human is a thing that
laughs. But the combination is not syllogistic just because something
follows sometimes in the case of certain material terms.
Furthermore if he wanted to indicate this, he would have proved
25 in the case of which material terms it holds.36 For this would be
appropriate for someone who added the word sometimes for this
reason. But he does not do this; he carries out his discussion using
letters; he gives universal proofs using these because they cannot
apply more to these material terms than to those. Consequently one
ought to reject this <interpretation> as totally empty.
We ought also to decline an extensive investigation of what he
30 says, since we have discussed it in our work On the difference between
Aristotle and his associates concerning mixtures <of premisses>.37 We
shall set down here both the things which Aristotle uses to make
what he says credible and the things someone would use to support
<the claim> that what he says is sound. He himself uses <the
126,1 definition of> said of all. 38For since A is said of all B by necessity, and
C is under B and is some of B, A is also said of C by necessity. For
what is said of all B by necessity will also be predicated of what is
under B by necessity at least if being said of all is when nothing of
Translation 61
the subject can be taken of which the predicate will not be said.39 But 5
C is some of the Bs. For being said of all by necessity is taken in the
same way <as unqualified being said of all>, as he said before in the
case of necessary things: For the privative converts in the same way,
and we will give the same account of to be in as a whole and said
of all.40
Of those who support his view some maintain that he takes the
unqualified universal affirmative in such a mixture to be true, i.e., as 10
holding truly and not relative to a hypothesis; for <if the premiss is
taken> in the latter way it becomes a postulate and is no longer
<really> true.41 For if a proposition is taken to be true in actuality42
and universally, what it says will not be established as false in the
case of certain material terms. For Human holds of all that moves
is not true in the sense of holding universally. Nor is Literate holds
of every human. Nor Walking holds of every human. The conclusion 15
is not necessary when the premisses are taken as holding in this way,
because they are not true when taken as holding universally.
However, what will these people say when the minor unqualified
premiss is no longer taken as universal but as particular? For in this
case he says that if the major premiss is necessary the conclusion is 20
necessary; and it is no longer possible to say that the particular
unqualified premiss is not true, e.g., Human holds of something that
is moving or Literate holds of some human.
Others <who support Aristotles view> say that if the proposition
which says that A is said of all B is the same as the proposition which
says that A is said of all of that of all of which B is said as he43 says
several times then, also, the proposition that A is said of all B by 25
necessity will be the same as the proposition that A is said by
necessity of all of that of all of which B is said. And if this is what a
universal necessary proposition signifies, the conclusion is always
necessary even if the minor premiss is taken as unqualified.44
45
There are also some people who try to prove that what Aristotle
says is sound by reductio ad impossibile. For let the mixture under 30
consideration hold; let A hold of all B by necessity; and let B just hold
of all C. I say that A holds of all C by necessity. For, if not, the opposite
<is the case>: it is contingent that A does not hold of some C. But it
is assumed that A holds of all B by necessity. The result is a
combination in the second figure of a major premiss which is neces- 35
sary universal affirmative, and a minor which is particular negative
contingent. This combination implies a particular negative contin-
gent conclusion, according to what both Theophrastus and Eudemus 127,1
think. Therefore, it is contingent that B does not hold of some C. But
it was hypothesized to hold of all.
46
That what Aristotle says is sound will be best confirmed by
reductio ad impossibile using the third figure. For let it be assumed
62 Translation
5 that A holds of all B by necessity and that B holds of all C. I say that
A holds of all C by necessity. For if not, the opposite <is the case>: it
is contingent that A does not hold of some C. But it is assumed that
B holds of all C. The result is a combination in the third figure of a
minor premiss which is unqualified universal affirmative and a
major which is contingent particular negative. These imply a particu-
10 lar negative contingent conclusion. Therefore, it is contingent that A
does not hold of some B, which is impossible, since it is assumed that
it holds of all by necessity. Both Aristotle and his associates47 think
that in such a combination in the third figure, the conclusion is
particular contingent negative.
Such and so many are the considerations which a supporter of
15 Aristotles view on these matters might use. As I said,48 we have said
in detail elsewhere which of the considerations seem to be sound and
which not.
30a17 for example, if A has been taken to hold or not to hold of

B by necessity.
He is talking about the first two combinations in the first figure.49 For
20 if the major premiss is affirmative and universal necessary and the
minor is unqualified universal affirmative, and if, again, the major is
negative and similarly necessary and the minor is unqualified uni-
versal affirmative, he says that the conclusion is necessary and
affirmative in one combination, negative in the other.
25 30a21 For since A is assumed to hold or not to hold of all B50 by

necessity and C is some of the Bs, it is evident that one or the
other of these will be in the case of C by necessity.
He has said one or the other of these instead of <A holding>
affirmatively or negatively. And he has stated the reason why he
thinks that the conclusion will be necessary when the terms are
30 related in this way: because C is some of the Bs and A is assumed to
hold or not to hold of all B by necessity.
128,1 30a2351 But if the proposition AB is not necessary, but BC is

necessary, the conclusion will not be necessary. [For, if it is, it
will result that A holds of some B by necessity through the
first and through the third figure. But this is false. But it is
possible52 that B is such that A can hold of none of it. It is also
evident from terms that the conclusion will not be necessary, for
example, if A is motion, B animal, C human. For a human is an
Translation 63
animal by necessity, but an animal does not move by necessity,
nor does a human.]
He says that if the minor premiss is taken to be necessary universal,
the major to be unqualified universal, the conclusion he says will
not be necessary. With these words he indicates why he said earlier
It sometimes results that the conclusion is necessary when just one 5
of the premisses is necessary.53 Showing that the conclusion of such
a combination is not necessary, he says that if the conclusion were
necessary it will result that A holds of some B by necessity through
the first and the third figure, which will be false because it is assumed 10
that A holds of all B, but not by necessity. It will be proved in the first
figure that A holds of some B by necessity in the following way. Let
the combination be assumed: A holds of all B, B holds of all C by
necessity. Let the conclusion A holds of all C by necessity be taken
as necessary. But C also holds of some B by necessity. For since B 15
holds of all C by necessity but a particular affirmative necessary
proposition converts with respect to a universal affirmative necessary
one, C will also hold of some B by necessity. But it is also assumed
that A holds of all C by necessity. Therefore A holds of some B by
necessity; for there are two necessary propositions, one universal and
one particular. He says that this is false because A was assumed to 20
hold of all B simply and it is possible that what holds of all holds of
none at some time.
The same thing could be proved through the third figure in the
following way. Let the conclusion of the combination under consid-
eration be taken to be that A holds of all C by necessity, and let the
minor necessary premiss, B holds of all C by necessity, be added. The
result is a combination in the third figure of two universal affirmative 25
necessary propositions, which implies a particular affirmative neces-
sary conclusion. Therefore, A holds of some B by necessity. Which is
false. For it was assumed to hold of all of it simply, but what holds of
all of a thing simply might also hold of none of it. (He indicates this
when he says But it is possible that B is such that A can hold of none
of it,54 thereby indicating to us again what sort of thing he means an 30
unqualified proposition to be.)
55
It should be noted that he does not say that it is impossible for A
to hold of some B by necessity. For nothing prevents what holds of all 129,1
of something from also holding of some of it by necessity. But since
the holding of all is not necessary, holding of some of something by
necessity is not directly contained in holding of all of it.56 For it is
possible that it holds of all of it in such a way that it is also possible
that it holds of none. For a universal affirmative unqualified propo- 5
sition is not prevented from being true in this way. Consequently, the
proposition that what holds of all of something holds of some of it by
64 Translation
necessity is false in the case of a proposition which is unqualified
universal true in this way.
30a27 But it is possible that B is such a thing.57

He says but instead of for.58 This is the congruous construal of what
is said.
10 59
It is not the case that, if someone were to say that the conclusion
is necessary when the major is necessary and the minor is unquali-
fied, something false of this kind follows. For if A holds of all B by
necessity and B just holds of all C, and one takes it that A holds of all
C by necessity, a falsehood similar to the preceding follows neither in
the first figure nor in the third. For it follows either that A holds of
15 some B by necessity (if it had been agreed that if the major premiss
is necessary so is the conclusion), or that A just holds of some B (if
someone were to say that the conclusion of such a mixture is also
unqualified); neither of these is false when it is assumed that A holds
of all B by necessity. Thus it is also reasonable60 for him, being moved
by this difference, to lay down that the conclusion is necessary in the
20 mixture in which the major premiss is necessary, but unqualified in
that in which the minor is necessary.
30a2861 It is also evident from terms that the conclusion will not
be necessary, [for example, if A is motion, B animal, C human.
For a human is an animal by necessity, but an animal does not
move by necessity, nor does a human.]
He also gives a refutation and proof using terms. For if A is motion,
B animal, and C human, it will be the case that motion holds of all
25 animals unqualifiedly, animal of all humans by necessity, and motion
will hold of all humans, but not by necessity.
It is worth observing here how it is that, even though he estab-
lishes through terms that no necessary conclusion follows in the case
of this combination, he does not recognize that this same thing can
also be proved in the case of combinations having their major univer-
30 sal and necessary. For setting down the same terms proves that the
conclusion is not necessary in their case either. For, if we take it that
animal holds of all humans and human of all that moves, it will follow
that animal holds of all that moves.62 But it seems to follow only if
said of all by necessity <is understood> as signifying when nothing
of the subject can be taken of which the predicate will not be said by
130,1 necessity.63 If one takes what is under B64 as being some things of B,
he takes it that A is predicated of what is under B by necessity. And
this would be true if everything under B were a part of B and some
things of B in the sense of being in its substance. But if some things
Translation 65
under B can also be separated from it, A will not hold of the things 5
under B in this way by necessity. The cause of the mistake concerning
the universal unqualified proposition <is the following>:65 since in
the case of such a proposition, A must always hold of the things under
B, it seems to follow that, if A holds necessarily of all B, it will hold
of what is under B necessarily, the reason being that the things under
B are some things of B. But being some things of B is a quite general 10
expression, and it does not convey the impression that the things are
in the substance of B. But if they are not in the substance, A will not
hold of them by necessity. For what holds by necessity holds not just
at the present but also in the future; therefore, it does not posit an
unqualified proposition. For in the case of these things what is
predicated of all B by necessity will also hold by necessity of the
things under B in which B is by necessity. In the case of what is 15
predicated of all B unqualifiedly it is true that nothing is predicated
of the things under B of which what is said of all B will not be
predicated. For it is true to say that what is predicated of all of B
holds of what B is predicated of either necessarily or unqualifiedly.
But it is not true that what is predicated of all B by necessity will be
predicated by necessity of that of which B is predicated unqualifiedly. 20
For it is true to say that what holds by necessity holds, but it is not
true to say that what simply holds holds by necessity. And he also
indicated just now66 that the unqualified universal premiss is a
hypothesis through the terms he set down.
30a32 67 Similarly, too, if AB is privative; for the demonstration 25

is the same.
He says that it will be proved similarly that the conclusion is not
necessary either if the major premiss is universal negative unquali-
fied. For again we will hypothesize68 that the conclusion is universal
negative necessary. And if we make the proof in the first figure, we 30
will convert the universal affirmative necessary premiss BC and we
will have that A holds of no C by necessity and C of some B by
necessity. From these it will follow69 that A does not hold of some B
by necessity, which is false, since it was hypothesized to hold of none 131,1
simply. And if we make the proof in the third figure, we will have that
A holds of no C by necessity and B of all C by necessity (since this was
assumed). From these again it will follow70 that A does not hold of
some B by necessity.
It will also be proved again through the same terms that the 5
conclusion is not necessary. For let motion hold of no animal and
animal of all humans by necessity; motion will hold of no human, but
not by necessity.
71
It is necessary to understand that, although his proof resembles
66 Translation
a reductio ad impossibile, it is not the same as it. For he did not
10 hypothesize the opposite of the conclusion. For As holding of all C by
necessity is not the opposite of As holding of all C, nor is its holding
of none by necessity the opposite of its holding of none. But these
<necessary propositions> are what he hypothesized. 72Nor was what
was proved from the hypotheses impossible, as he himself indicated,
but false.73 For what was hypothesized was also false since it was not
impossible.74 And it is not impossible either that what holds of all also
15 holds of some by necessity; and what holds of none is not prevented
from not holding of some by necessity. Thus a falsehood followed from
a false hypothesis; for an impossibility follows from an impossibity,
a falsehood from a falsehood. 75Furthermore, insofar as the proof is
concerned, the proposed conclusion76 was not established. For just
because holding of all by necessity is done away with as false, it is not
20 thereby necessary that holding of all <simply> is true. For only the
opposite of a thing is posited by necessity when the thing is denied
and the denial refuted. But these things <holding of all by necessity
and holding of all> are not opposites.
Nor does he seem to be entirely confident about this method of
proof.77 However he uses it to prove that if something false follows
when the conclusion is taken to be necessary but not when it is taken
to be unqualified, then it is necessary for the conclusion to be unquali-
fied; and since the premisses78 are of this kind, the conclusion would
25 be proved to be unqualified. For he has not applied reductio ad
impossibile to what is proved <the proposed conclusion>, but taking
another proposition, a necessary instead of an unqualified one, and
making a syllogistic combination from this and the other assumed
premiss, the minor, he finds that what follows is false and uses this
fact to establish that the conclusion <of the original syllogism> is not
necessary.
30 Someone might also ask this: what is the necessity that there is no
necessary conclusion, if something false follows when the unqualified
132,1 proposition is transformed into a necessary one? Isnt it because a
falsehood does not follow from things which are true? He then has
added this <point> from outside: if the conclusion is hypothesized to
be necessary, something false follows when the minor premiss, which
is itself also necessary, is added.
5 79
If someone refused to agree that the conclusion is unqualified,
one could also prove that what follows is not necessary but unquali-
fied by positing it to be unqualified, using80 reductio ad impossibile,
and encountering something impossible, but, on the other hand, not
encountering something impossible when assuming it necessary.
81
For let it be assumed that A holds of all B unqualifiedly, but B of all
C by necessity. I say that A holds of all C. For if not, the opposite <is
10 the case>: A does not hold of all C. And let there be added the premiss
Translation 67
B holds of all C by necessity. From these it follows that A does not
hold of some B, which is impossible, since it was assumed to hold of
all of it. But if in the case of the combination under consideration A
holds of all C by necessity is taken <as conclusion>, and the opposite
of holding of all by necessity (it is contingent that A does not hold of
some C) is taken <as premiss>, and if B holds of all C by necessity
is added, it follows that it is contingent that A does not hold of some 15
B, which is not impossible. For if A holds of all B it is not impossible
that it is contingent that A does not hold of some B.
82
The proof is again the same if the major premiss is universal
negative unqualified, the minor universal affirmative necessary. For
also in this case if someone making a proof by reductio ad impossibile
using the third figure posits that the conclusion is unqualified nega- 20
tive, something impossible will follow, but not if he posits that the
conclusion is necessary. Consequently, if the conclusion can be
proved to be unqualified but cannot be proved to be necessary by
means of reductio ad impossibile, the conclusion will be unqualified.
83
Theophrastus expresses in this way the view that the conclusion
in this combination84 is not necessary: For if B holds of C by neces- 25
sity, A of B not by necessity, and what is not by necessity might be
separated, it is evident that A will be separated from C when it is
separated from B, so that <A does not hold of C> by necessity because
of the premisses assumed. This being shown, he adds, Likewise too,
if the major is necessary. For since the middle <term> is not by
necessity, it might be separated <from the minor term>, but if this is
separated, so will the major be. For if someone takes the major 30
premiss as if it said what B is said of, A is said of by necessity, he
is taking both premisses as if they were necessary. For if he does not
take them in this way, it is false.85 In this way Theophrastus shows
that in mixtures in which there is an unqualified and a necessary
premiss, the conclusion is unqualified, whichever of the premisses is
necessary.
<30a33-b6 One particular premiss>

30a3386 In the case of the particular syllogisms, if the universal 133,1
premiss is necessary, the conclusion will also be necessary. [But
it will not be necessary if the particular premiss is necessary,
whether the universal premiss is privative or affirmative. For
first let the universal be necessary, and let A hold of all B by
necessity and B just hold of some C. Then it is necessary that A
hold of some C by necessity. For C is under B and A held of every
B by necessity. Similarly, if the syllogism is privative; for the
demonstration will be the same.
30b287 But if the particular premiss is necessary, the conclu-
68 Translation
sion will not be necessary; for nothing impossible results, just
as in the universal syllogisms.88 Similarly in the case of priva-
tives.
30b5 Terms: motion, animal, white.]
He has spoken about the two combinations in the first figure in which
a universal conclusion follows from two universal premisses, and said
5 that if the premisses are a mixture of an unqualified and a necessary
proposition the conclusion sometimes will be necessary (and he said
which premiss is taken to be necessary) and sometimes unqualified.
Now he also speaks about two combinations in which the minor
premiss is particular affirmative, the major universal and either
affirmative or negative, and he says that also in these combinations,
if the major is necessary and either affirmative or negative, the
10 conclusion will be necessary, as in the case of the first combinations,
but, if the minor is necessary, the conclusion will be unqualified.
Using the same <method of proof> in these cases he thinks89 that he
proves that the conclusion is necessary when the major premiss is
necessary universal. For he thinks it will follow from A holding of all
B by necessity and some of C being under B that A holds of that C
15 which is under B by necessity. The argument is the same if the major
is universal negative necessary.
(30b2) He says that, if the particular premiss is necessary, the
conclusion will not be necessary, and he adds the reason when he
says, for nothing impossible results, just as in the universal syllo-
20 gisms. 90One thing he might mean is this. 91If the conclusion is
hypothesized to be unqualified, nothing impossible (that is false)92
follows, just as when both premisses were universal and the neces-
sary one was the minor. For in the case of them, when the conclusion
was hypothesized to be necessary something false followed, but
nothing false followed when it was hypothesized to be unqualified; for
if we hypothesize in the case of the universal premisses that A holds
of all C unqualifiedly and also take it that B holds of all C by
25 necessity, it follows in the third figure that A holds of some B, which
is true, since it was hypothesized to hold of all. As, then, in that case,
when the conclusion was hypothesized to be necessary something
false followed, but not when the conclusion was hypothesized to be
unqualified, so, he says, it will be the same in the case of particular
syllogisms, if the minor premiss is particular affirmative necessary.
93
Alternatively the words for nothing impossible results just as
30 in the universal syllogisms might mean the following. As in the
universal cases nothing impossible (just something false)94 followed
when the conclusion was posited to be necessary and we used reduc-
tio ad impossibile to try to establish it so that a necessary conclusion
is not proved (this was shown by the preceding95), so too <in the
Translation 69
present case> if the minor is posited to be particular necessary 134,1
affirmative. For if A held of all B and B of some C by necessity, and
someone wanted to prove by reductio ad impossibile that A holds of
some C by necessity, he would take the opposite of this: it is contin-
gent that A holds of no C; if B holds of some C by necessity is added, 5
it would follow in the third figure that it is contingent that A does not
hold of some B, which is not impossible, since A was assumed to hold
of all B. Thus it is not established <that A holds of some C by
necessity>. But if we want to prove that the conclusion is particular
affirmative and not necessary but unqualified by reductio ad impos-
sibile, the argument will go through and something impossible will 10
follow from the hypothesis. For the opposite of A holds of some C is
A holds of no C. And if B holds of some C by necessity is added, it
will follow that A does not hold of some B, which is impossible, since
it holds of all of it. Thus the hypothesis which says that A holds of no
C is impossible; therefore A holds of some. As, then, in the case of
universal syllogisms the conclusion was not necessary because noth- 15
ing impossible followed when we applied reductio ad impossibile to
them, so too in the case of particular syllogisms. He did not set out
the proof by impossibility which we have mentioned in the case of
either universal or particular syllogisms, but only indicated it be-
cause it involved a mixture of a contingent and a necessary premiss
and he has not yet discussed this mixture. 20
96
It is possible that he has said for nothing impossible results not
to suggest to us either the proof which he used to show that some-
thing false follows when <the conclusion> is hypothesized to be
necessary nor the reductio ad impossibile about which I have just
spoken, but rather the evidence provided by terms. For the proof from
terms also fits what is said. For if the propositions in this combina- 25
tion and mixture are taken, the conclusion is unqualified. But what
we said would be impossible if refutation using terms were at issue.
(30b5) That he sets down terms immediately may be an indication
that this is what is meant. For motion holds of every animal (or of
none) unqualifiedly, and animal holds of something white (e.g., swan) 30
by necessity, and motion holds of something white, but not by neces-
sity (or does not hold of something white unqualifiedly).
97
It is necessary to understand that in the case of these syllogisms
one cannot use the proof which derives a falsehood and which he used
in the case of the universal syllogisms. For if it is assumed that A
holds of some C by necessity, whichever of the assumed premisses we 135,1
add to this conclusion, the resulting combination is non-syllogistic.
For if we add that B holds of some C by necessity, we will have two
particular affirmatives in the third figure; and similarly in the first
figure if we convert B holds of some C <, we will have two particular
affirmatives>. But if we assume that A holds of all B <unqualifiedly> 5
70 Translation
and of some C by necessity, again we will have two affirmatives in
the second figure, and a proof will not be possible.
98
It is possible for us to maintain that we produce a justification for
the particular syllogisms from that for the universal ones. For since
the particular syllogisms differ from the universal ones only by
yielding a particular conclusion, and nothing impossible, i.e., false,
10 followed in the case of universal syllogisms when the conclusion was
posited to be unqualified, so in the case of these particular syllogisms,
as in the case of those universal ones, the conclusion will be unquali-
fied, but it will be particular <rather than universal>; for only this
difference was assumed in the premisses.
99
Furthermore, nothing impossible results if the conclusion is
assumed to be unqualified because no syllogistic combination
(through which an impossibility is proved) results. And100 this is so
even if the conclusion is hypothesized to be necessary. Nor does the
15 proof go through if the universal unqualified major is taken to be
negative. For, again, both premisses become particular and in the
first or third figure, one negative and one affirmative; or both become
negative in the second figure. The terms which he sets down also fit
this combination.101
1.10 The second figure

<30b7-40 Two universal premisses>
20 30b7102 In the case of the second figure, if the privative premiss
is necessary, the conclusion will also be necessary; but if the
affirmative premiss is necessary, the conclusion will not be
necessary.
It is necessary to understand universal along with the words if the
privative premiss is necessary. For he speaks first about syllogisms
25 from universal premisses. For in the combination in which the par-
ticular premiss is privative and the negative is particular in the
fourth combination103 when this premiss is necessary, the conclu-
sion is not necessary. Therefore one should understand the words if
the privative premiss is necessary as applying to the universal
syllogisms <of the second figure>. For he discusses these things first;
and he says later, Things will also be the same in the case of the
particular syllogisms.104
30 The things which he says in the case of the second figure follow
from what he proved in the case of the first. <The reason is the
following:> in the first figure with mixed premisses, when the major
premiss is necessary, the conclusion was necessary; and the second
136,1 figure is produced from the first (for the second figure was produced
when the major premiss in the first figure was converted); and
Translation 71
most105 of the syllogisms in the second figure are reduced to the first
figure by conversion (for when a universal privative premiss in the
second figure is converted, it becomes a major premiss in the first
figure); consequently, when the universal privative premiss in a 5
second-figure syllogism is necessary, the conclusion will also be
necessary. For in the first figure it is necessary for the major to be
universal if there is to be a syllogism; so it is necessary for something
in the second figure to become the major premiss <of a syllogism in
the first figure> when it is converted, since the second figure was
generated in this way, and this converted premiss will be one which
both is universal and remains universal when it is converted. But
only the universal negative is of this kind. Therefore, the reduction 10
of the second figure to the first occurs when it is converted. And when
it is necessary, the conclusion will be necessary, since it remains
necessary when it is converted and becomes a major premiss in the
first figure. But it is not true that the conclusion is necessary when
an affirmative premiss in the second figure is necessary. For in the 15
reduction of combinations in the second figure to the first figure, this
is the premiss which becomes the minor; but when the minor premiss
in the first figure was necessary, the conclusion was unqualified.
30b9106 For first, let the privative premiss be necessary, [and let
it be not contingent that A holds of any B and let it just hold of
C. Then, since the privative converts, it is not contingent that B
holds of any A; but A holds of all C, so that it is not contingent
that B holds of any C. For C is under A.]
The proof is clear. He converts the universal negative premiss, which 20
is necessary, and produces the first figure; since in the first figure
when the major premiss is necessary, the conclusion is necessary, he
says that the situation will be the same also in the case of this
<second> figure. 107It is known that the phrase It is not contingent
that X holds of any Y, which has been applied to the premiss AB,
being the negation of contingency, indicates necessity. For if it is not
contingent that A holds of any B, A holds of no B by necessity. For 25
the proposition has not been taken as contingent but as the negation
of a contingent proposition and is equivalent to A holds of no B by
necessity. And the same holds for so that it is not contingent that B
holds of any C. For what is said is the same as it is not contingent
that B holds of some C, which is equivalent to B holds of no C by
necessity.
And he uses the same consideration again108 when he says For C
is under A. For since A was assumed to hold of all C and B holds of 30
no A by necessity, B will hold of no C, which is some of the A, of none
of which B holds by necessity.
72 Translation
137,1 30b14109 Likewise, if the privative is posited with respect to C.

[For if it is not contingent that A holds of any C, then it is not
possible that C holds of any A. But A holds of all B, so that it is
not contingent that C holds of any B. For, again, the first figure
results. Therefore, it is not contingent that B holds of any C; for
the conclusion converts in the same way.]
There were two syllogisms from universal premisses in the second
figure,110 one when the major is universal negative and one when the
minor is; and both were reduced to the first figure when the universal
5 negative was converted and became a major premiss in the first
figure. Their difference from one another was that the one having the
major universal negative was proved by inferring the proposed con-
clusion through a single conversion whereas the other having the
minor universal negative was proved through two conversions; for in
the latter case not only was the negative premiss converted; the
10 conclusion a universal negative was converted as well. Since, then,
also in the second figure, when the minor premiss was universal
negative and it was converted, the first figure with it as major
resulted, he says that if the minor premiss in the second figure is
universal negative necessary, the conclusion will be necessary. For
whatever was said about the combination before this one will also
15 apply to it, except that in this case it will also be necessary to convert
the conclusion, as he indicates when he adds:
30b17 Therefore, it is not contingent that B holds of any C; for

the conclusion converts in the same way.
The addition of in the same way indicates that if the converted
proposition is necessary the result of converting it is necessary, and
20 if it is unqualified the result will be unqualified. Or perhaps <it
indicates that conversion applies> in the same way to necessary and
to unqualified propositions.111
30b18112 But if the affirmative premiss is necessary, the con-

clusion will not be necessary. [For let A hold of all B by
necessity, and let it just hold of no C. If the privative premiss is
converted, the first figure results. But it has been shown in the
case of the first figure that the conclusion will not be necessary,
if the privative premiss relating to the major term is not neces-
sary, so that neither will the conclusion be necessary in the case
under consideration.
30b24 Furthermore, if the conclusion is necessary, it results
that C does not hold of some A by necessity. For if B holds of no
Translation 73
C by necessity, C will also hold of no B by necessity. But it is
necessary for B to hold of some A, since A held of every B by
necessity. Thus it is necessary that C does not hold of some A.
But nothing prevents A from being taken in such a way that it
is contingent that C holds of all of it.
30b31 Furthermore it would be possible to show, by setting
out terms, that the conclusion is not necessary without qualifi-
cation, but only if certain things are the case. For example, let
A be animal, B human, and C white, and let the premisses be
taken in the same way for it is contingent that animal holds
of nothing white. Then, human will also hold of nothing white,
but not by necessity; for it is contingent that a human be white,
although not so long as animal holds of nothing white. So the
conclusion will be necessary if certain things are the case, but
it will not be necessary without qualification.]
He proves that when in the second figure the affirmative premiss is
universal and necessary and the other premiss is universal negative 25
unqualified, the conclusion is not necessary; he reduces the combina-
tion under consideration to the first figure by conversion <of the
negative premiss>, and he shows that in the first figure the minor
premiss is the necessary one. For in the syllogistic combinations in
the first figure the negative proposition is the major, because the
minor must always be affirmative. But if the negative premiss was 138,1
not necessary, the conclusion was not necessary.
30b24113 Furthermore, if the conclusion is necessary, it results

that C does not hold of some A by necessity. [For if B holds of no
C by necessity, C will also hold of no B by necessity. But it is
necessary for B to hold of some A, since A held of every B by
necessity. Thus it is necessary that C does not hold of some A.
But nothing prevents A from being taken in such a way that it
is contingent that C holds of all of it.]
He doesnt prove that the combination with the universal affirmative 5
premiss necessary and universal negative one unqualified in the
second figure does not imply a necessary conclusion just by reduction
to the first figure; he also proves it by showing that something false
follows if the conclusion is hypothesized to be necessary. (He also did
a proof in this way in connection with the first figure when the minor
premiss was universal affirmative necessary.114) For let the combina- 10
tion be assumed, and let A hold of all B by necessity, and let it just
hold of no C. If someone should say that it follows that B holds of
no C by necessity, it will also be the case that C holds of no B by
necessity, since the proposition converts. But since A was assumed
74 Translation
to hold of all B by necessity, B will also hold of some of the As by
15 necessity. From these premisses in the first figure with two necessary
premisses, the major universal negative and the minor particular
affirmative, a particular negative necessary conclusion will follow,
namely C does not hold of some A by necessity. He says this
conclusion is false because when A is assumed to hold of no C nothing
prevents A from then being such that it can hold of all C even though
C holds of no A (because it is assumed that A holds of no C, and a
20 universal negative converts to a universal negative). For the negative
proposition which says that C holds of no A is not prevented from
being true, <even> if it is contingent that it holds of all of it. Thus,
when the negative premiss A holds of no C has been taken in such a
way that it is contingent that A holds of all C and C of all A115 and it
25 is inferred that C does not hold of some A by necessity, what is inferred
will be false. Thus, when the conclusion of the combination under
consideration is hypothesized to be necessary, something false fol-
lows. Therefore, the hypothesis is false, since something false cannot
be inferred from truths.
30 He also set down terms116 for which it is contingent117 that the
universal negative premiss is true and contingent that what is truly
denied of the subject holds of all of it. For if A is animal, C moving,
A, i.e. animal, may hold of nothing moving. But this does not preclude
139,1 that it is also contingent that it holds of everything moving. Simi-
larly, too, even if moving were to hold of no animal, it is nevertheless
also contingent that it holds of all. For moving can hold of no animal,
that is, C can hold of no A because the universal negative converts.
But in fact it is also contingent that it holds of all. For also, even if
5 someone were not to agree that animal can hold of all that moves,118
nevertheless he would agree that it is contingent that moving holds
of all animal. Thus if it is contingent for things to be this way in some
cases, but the person who makes the conclusion negative particular
necessary does away with this contingency (for he proves that what
was assumed to hold simply of none does not hold of some by
necessity), he would be shown to be wrong in taking the conclusion
10 to be necessary in the case of this mixture and combination of
premisses.
119
That the conclusion is not necessary when the combination is of
this kind is also proved by reductio ad impossibile. For if, when the
15 conclusion is posited to be unqualified and the opposite of the conclu-
sion is hypothesized, an impossibility follows but if the conclusion is
hypothesized to be necessary, nothing impossible is proved by reduc-
tio ad impossibile, it is clear that the conclusion will be proved to be
unqualified, not necessary. For, let it be assumed that A holds of all
B by necessity and of no C. I say that B will hold of no C. For if not,
20 it holds of some. But A also holds of all B by necessity. Therefore, A
Translation 75
holds of some C by necessity, which is impossible, since it was
assumed to hold of none of it. But suppose someone were to say that
in the case of the combination under consideration a necessary
negative universal conclusion follows and B holds of no C by neces-
sity. If we take the opposite of this, which is It is contingent that B
holds of some C and we add A holds of all B by necessity, the
conclusion will be It is contingent that A holds of some C, which is 25
not impossible, since it is not impossible that A holds of no C and it
is contingent that it holds of some.
30b31120 Furthermore it would be possible to show, by setting

out terms, that the conclusion is not necessary without qualifi-
cation, but only if certain things are the case. [For example, let
A be animal, B human, and C white, and let the premisses be
taken in the same way for it is contingent that animal holds
of nothing white. Then, human will also hold of nothing white,
but not by necessity; for it is contingent that a human be white,
although not so long as animal holds of nothing white. So the
it will not be necessary without qualification.]
He also proves by setting down terms that the conclusion of a
combination of this kind is not necessary. For if A is animal, B 30
human, and C white, A, animal, will hold of all B, human, by 140,1
necessity and of no C, white, simply. He posits this together with an
explanation when he says, For it is contingent that animal holds of
nothing white. (For if this is not the case, something else for which
it is the case can be taken.121) Human, then, will hold of nothing 5
white, but not by necessity. He makes clear both the words not by
necessity and what the proposition which says neither will human
hold of anything white signifies by adding that it is contingent that
a human be white. For the person who says human holds of nothing
white says nothing white is human, which is equivalent to no
human is white. But even if the proposition saying no human is 10
white were true, that would not mean that some human will not be
white by necessity. For as long as animal does not hold of white, a
human will not be white, but this is not always so, nor does it hold by
necessity.
By adding the words:122
although not so long as animal holds of nothing white. So the 15

it will not be necessary without qualification
he indicates that when he says, in connection with mixtures, that the

76 Translation
conclusion is necessary, he means necessary without qualification
and not necessary on a condition, as some of the interpreters of the
topic of mixture of premisses say, thinking that they strengthen his
position; they assert that he does not speak about inferring necessity
20 without qualification, but about inferring necessity on a condition.
For they say that when animal holds of every human by necessity and
as in the first figure human of all that moves or walks, the
conclusion is necessary on a condition; for animal holds of all that
moves or walks as long as the middle, human, holds of it. For it is not
25 the case that if the minor premiss is necessary, the conclusion is
necessary; for it is not the case that if moving holds of every animal
and animal of every human by necessity, moving holds of every
human by necessity as long as animal holds of every human for that
is false but for as long as moving holds of every animal.
He has indicated that he does not intend the conclusion to be
30 necessary in this <conditional> way <in general> when, in showing
that the conclusion is of this kind and necessary in this <conditional>
way in the second figure if the affirmative premiss, whether it is the
major or the minor, is necessary, he did not say that the conclusion
of such a mixture is necessary without qualification.123 Alternatively,
if he had said that this conclusion is necessary in a way similar to
that one,124 he would have added to that one the words It is not
necessary without qualification, but necessary on a condition,125 as
141,1 he also does in this case. At the same time he has also indicated by
the addition <of the words although not so long as animal holds of
nothing white. So the conclusion will be necessary if certain things
are the case, but it will not be necessary without qualification> that
he is aware of the division of necessity which his associates126 have
made, and which he has also already established in On Interpreta-
tion, where, discussing contradiction of propositions about the future
5 and individual things, he says, It is necessary that what is is when
it is, and that what is not is not when it is not.127 For the necessary
on a hypothesis is of this kind.
What he has said would be more evident if we were to take instead
truer terms. For the premisses were not true in the case of the terms
with which he tried to carry out his proof. For the premiss animal
holds of nothing white is not true since it holds of swan by necessity.
Let us either posit moving instead of white or take other terms. Let
10 A be being awake or moving, B walking, C human. Then, being awake
holds of all that walks by necessity, and so does moving. But let being
awake hold of no human. Then walking will hold of no human, but it
will not hold by necessity of either no human or some human. For it
15 is contingent that a human walks, but not in a situation in which it
is true that being awake or moving holds of no human.
128
If the minor premiss is universal affirmative necessary and the
Translation 77
major negative universal unqualified, then, if the conclusion BC is
hypothesized to be necessary, then it would not seem that in this case
the conclusion is proved to be false, either in the first or the third
figure. This is so in the case of the first figure because two negative 20
premisses result. For A is assumed to hold of no B and of all C by
necessity. If B holds of no C by necessity is taken as the conclusion
of these propositions and converted, it will be the case that C also
holds of no B by necessity. But it is also the case that B holds of no A,
since A was assumed to hold of no B. The result is two negative
propositions, and the combination is non-syllogistic. This is also true 25
in the third figure. For the minor negative premiss is B holds of no
C by necessity; and A holds of all C by necessity.
However, perhaps such a combination is non-syllogistic with respect
to the proposed <necessary> conclusion (just like the combination
just discussed when the major was necessary affirmative).129 The
conclusion B does not hold of some A by necessity does indeed follow 30
syllogistically through the combination by conversion of the affirm-
ative premiss (just as in the other case C does not hold of some A by
necessity followed, although this was thought impossible since it was 142,1
contingent that C sometime holds of A).130 For B holds of no C by
necessity and C of some A by necessity; from these it follows that B
does not hold of some A by necessity. But again it is false to say that
B does not hold of some A by necessity when it is only assumed that 5
A holds of no B simply, as was proved a little while ago.131 For because
of conversion it is contingent that what holds of no A does not hold in
such a way that it is also contingent that it holds of all.132 Conse-
quently the conclusion <that B holds of no C> would be true, but it
would not be, in addition, necessary.
The same thing133 would also be proved to be false in the second
figure if both propositions were converted. For if, by conversion of the 10
conclusion and of the assumed affirmative necessary premiss, one
takes it that C holds of no B by necessity and C holds of some A by
necessity, it follows that B does not hold of some A by necessity,
which is false. For it was assumed to not hold simply, so that it is also
possible for it to hold.
It is also prima facie clear through terms that the conclusion is not
necessary in the case of this combination either. For animal holds of 15
nothing that moves, and it holds of every human by necessity, and
moving holds of no human, but not by necessity.
<31a1-17 One particular premiss>

31a1134 Things will also be the same in the case of the particular
syllogisms. [For when the privative premiss is universal and
necessary, the conclusion will also be necessary. But when the
78 Translation
affirmative premiss is universal, the privative particular, the
conclusion will not be necessary.]
He says that things will be the same in the case of the particular
20 combinations which yield a conclusion. For if the universal premiss
is negative necessary, the conclusion will be necessary, but if the
affirmative is necessary, whether it is particular (as in the third
syllogism, which consists of a universal negative major and a particu-
lar affirmative minor) or universal (as in the fourth, which consists
of a universal affirmative major and a particular negative minor) the
25 conclusion will not be necessary.
31a5135 First let the privative premiss be universal and neces-

sary, [and let it not be contingent that A holds of any B, and let
it hold of some C. Since the privative premiss converts, it will
not be contingent that B holds of any A. But A holds of some C,
so that B will not hold of some C by necessity.]
He proves in the third combination among the syllogisms of the
second figure how, if the universal negative premiss is necessary, the
conclusion is necessary. For since, when the universal negative pre-
30 miss is converted, there results the first figure and in that figure the
fourth syllogism, which has a universal negative necessary major
premiss, and since in a combination of this kind the conclusion is
143,1 necessary, it is clear that also in the second figure, when the pre-
misses are related in this way, the conclusion will be necessary
particular negative.
31a10136 Again, let the affirmative premiss be universal and

necessary, [and let the affirmative be assumed in relation to B.
Then, if A holds of all B by necessity, but does not hold of some
C, it is evident that B will not hold of some C, but not by
necessity. For the same terms as were used in the case of the
universal syllogisms will serve for the demonstration.
31a15 Neither will the conclusion be necessary if the privative
is necessary and taken as particular. The demonstration is
through the same terms.137]
138
He does not mention the fact that in the combination just discussed
5 the conclusion is not necessary if the particular premiss is affirmative
necessary because it is known. For by the same conversion the minor
necessary particular affirmative premiss of the third syllogism in
the second figure is produced in the first figure. And <the invalid-
ity> would be proved through terms if animal were taken to hold
of nothing that moves and of something white by necessity (since
Translation 79
animal holds of swan by necessity); for moving will not hold of
something white, but not by necessity.
He has turned to the fourth combination, in which the major 10
premiss is universal affirmative, the minor particular negative. His
proof in the case of unqualified premisses was not by conversion but
by reductio ad impossibile.139 In the case of necessary premisses his
proof was by ekthesis and taking something of which <the middle
term> does not hold.140 He proves in the case of the present combina- 15
tion that the conclusion is not necessary no matter which of the two
premisses is taken to be necessary; and first he proves why the
conclusion is not necessary if the universal affirmative is necessary.
He proves this by setting down terms. He himself says that when the
universal affirmative premiss is necessary the conclusion will be
proved not to be necessary by the same terms as were also used in
the case of the combination with two universal premisses, the affirm- 20
ative being necessary. These terms were animal, human, and
white.141 For animal holds of every human by necessity, it does not
hold of something white simply, and human will not hold of some-
thing white simply. But since these propositions are not <all> true,
just as they were not true when they were universal142 for the
proposition Animal does not hold of something white is not unquali- 25
fied but necessary , we will do the proof with other terms. Moving
holds of all that walks by necessity; let it just not hold of some human;
then also some human will not be walking, but not by necessity.
143
(31a15) Nor will the conclusion be necessary if the privative
particular premiss is taken to be necessary. 144For being awake
holds of everything literate unqualifiedly; let it necessarily not hold 30
of some human (viz, a sleeping one); it will not be the case that some
human will not be literate by necessity. Again, animal holds of all
that moves, and animal does not hold of something white by neces-
sity; moving will not hold of something white, but not by necessity. 144,1
Furthermore, two-footed holds of everything which is awake, it does
not hold of some animal by necessity, and being awake does not hold
of every animal,145 but not by necessity.
He says, The demonstration will be by means of the same terms
if just one of them is changed.146 For this is also added in some texts, 5
and <what it says> may seem to be unsound. For in the case of the
universal <combinations> terms were animal, human, white.147 With
these premisses the universal affirmative was necessary, but not the
particular negative, which is now under consideration. Nor <will it
be sound> if we interchange white and human, on the grounds that 10
animal holds of everything white unqualifiedly; for this is also
false.148 Nor <will it be sound> if we change white to A, human to B,
and animal to C, on the grounds that white holds of everything
human and does not hold of some animal by necessity. For then the
80 Translation
first premiss is false, and the conclusion is necessary.149 The reason
<that these changes do not suffice> is that these terms were not true
in the case of the universal premisses either, as we indicated when
15 we took moving instead of white.150 And just as we there took moving
instead of white, so here, if moving is taken instead of human and
white retained, what has been said will be sound. For what results is
that animal holds of all that moves unqualifiedly, animal does not
hold of some white thing (snow) by necessity, and moving will not
hold of something white, but not by necessity. Thus, a proof has been
20 given with one term being changed.151 (It is possible that the words
The demonstration will be through the same terms have been used
instead of The demonstration is through the same things. But what
is the sense of through the same things? For the proof is through
terms and the setting down of terms.)152
153
In the case of this combination someone might reasonably ask
why, according to him, the conclusion isnt necessary when the
25 particular negative premiss is. For when both premisses were neces-
sary, then by ekthesis one premiss was proved to turn into a universal
negative; for when A held of all B by necessity and not of some C by
necessity, he took some of C, namely D, of which A did not hold by
necessity and made AD universal negative necessary; then, convert-
ing it, he took the proposition D holds of no A by necessity. But also
30 A was assumed to hold of all B by necessity; therefore, D also holds
of no B by necessity; therefore, B also holds of no D in the same way;154
but, since D was some of C, B was proved not to hold of some C by
necessity. So if the particular necessary negative premiss becomes by
ekthesis universal negative necessary, then, when both155 of the
premisses are converted, there results a combination in the first
figure of a universal negative necessary premiss and a universal
35 affirmative unqualified one, of which the conclusion was assumed to
145,1 be156 necessary. For A holds of no D by necessity,157 A of all B
unqualifiedly; therefore, D holds of no B by necessity, and if this is
so, B also holds of no D by necessity; but since D is some of C, B also
does not hold of some C by necessity.
158
But he proved using terms that the conclusion is not necessary.
5 159
For animal holds of all that moves, it does not hold of some white
thing by necessity, and moving does not hold of some white thing, but
not by necessity. One should take this as an indication that according
to him the conclusion is not necessary in the case of a mixture of a
necessary and an unqualified premiss when he investigates them
using material terms and does not also invoke <the definition of>
10 being said of none by necessity.160 Invoking that leads to mistake.
161
For it is found that the conclusion is unqualified and not necessary.
However, if what was said earlier162 were true, it would be necessary
for the conclusion to be always necessary in the present combination,
Translation 81
as I proved. 163For that by using material terms the conclusion is
found to be unqualified when one of the premisses is unqualified is
clear from the fact that if the two premisses are taken to be necessary 15
in this combination it will no longer be possible for us to find, using
material terms, that the conclusion is unqualified. For let it be
assumed that animal holds of every human by necessity, and let
animal not hold of something white (e.g., snow) by necessity; human
will also not hold of something white by necessity since animal
doesnt either. For this is the conclusion corresponding to the pre-
misses assumed. 20
1.11 The third figure

<31a18b11 Two universal premisses>
31a18164 In the last figure if the terms are universally related

to the middle and both premisses are affirmative, [if either is
necessary, the conclusion will also be necessary. But if one is
privative and the other affirmative, when the privative is nec-
essary the conclusion will also be necessary, but when the
affirmative is necessary, it will not be necessary.]
He has turned to the third figure. He proves also in this case when
the conclusion is necessary and when it is unqualified, if one premiss
is necessary and the other unqualified. And in this figure, too, both 25
the necessary and the unqualified conclusion are proved by a reduc-
tion to the first figure using conversion. For, if a premiss <in a
combination> in the third figure is assumed necessary and when the
combination is reduced to the first figure by conversion, this premiss
is the major in that figure, the conclusion <of the combination> will
be necessary, but if it is the minor the conclusion will be unqualified.
[31a24165 For first let both premisses be affirmative, and let A

and B hold of all C, and let AC be necessary. Since, then, B holds
of all C, C will also hold of some B because the universal
converts with the particular; thus, if A holds of all C by necessity
and C holds of some B, it is also necessary that A holds of some
B; for B is under C. Thus the first figure results.
31a31166 It will be proved in the same way if BC is necessary.
For C converts with some A, so that, if B holds of all C by
necessity it will also hold of some A by necessity.]
When both affirmative premisses are universal, whichever is taken 30
to be necessary, the conclusion will be necessary. For if we keep the 146,1
universal affirmative necessary premiss fixed and convert the other,
82 Translation
unqualified, one and make it particular unqualified, we will have in
the first figure the major premiss affirmative universal necessary and
the minor particular affirmative unqualified;167 and when there is
5 such a combination the conclusion is necessary. For if A holds of all
C by necessity, B of all C unqualifiedly, if we convert BC, C will hold
of some B. But it is also assumed that A holds of all C by necessity.
From these propositions it will follow that A holds of some B by
necessity. He adds the words for B is under C to show that the first
10 figure results and that CB is the minor premiss in it because, since
A holds of all C by necessity, it will also hold of B <by necessity>.
(31a31) If, conversely, B is taken to hold of all C by necessity and
A holds of all C, the conclusion will be necessary. For we will convert
the unqualified premiss AC and C will hold of some A. But B was also
15 assumed to hold of all C by necessity. From these things it will follow
that B holds of some A by necessity. And since a particular affirm-
ative necessary proposition converts, A will also hold by necessity of
some B. For it is necessary that A be predicated in the conclusion
since it was assumed to be the major term. Therefore, in the case of
a combination of this kind we need to convert the conclusion also.
However, he does not mention converting the conclusion, perhaps
20 because it is clear. He only proves that B will also hold of some A by
necessity, since it was assumed to hold of all C by necessity. But
again, as I said, it is also necessary to convert BA in order that the
proof not be of something other than the proposed conclusion. For A
is assumed as the major term, so that it must be predicated in the
conclusion.
25 31a33168 Again, let AC be privative, BC affirmative, and let the

privative premiss be necessary. [Then, since C converts with
some B and A holds of no C by necessity, A will also not hold of
some B by necessity. For B is under C.]
He proves that also in the combination of a universal negative
necessary major and a universal affirmative unqualified minor the
conclusion is necessary, because, when the affirmative is converted
30 there results the first figure having the major universal negative
147,1 necessary. For let A hold of no C by necessity, and let B hold of all C.
If BC is converted it results that C holds of some B. But A was also
assumed to hold of no C by necessity. Therefore, A will not hold of
some B by necessity.
[31a37169 But if the affirmative is necessary, the conclusion will

not be necessary. For let BC be affirmative and necessary, AC
privative and not necessary. Then, since the affirmative con-
Translation 83
verts, C will also hold of some B by necessity, so that if A holds
of no C and C of some B, A will not hold of some B; but not by
necessity. For it has been shown in the first figure that if the
privative premiss is not necessary the conclusion will not be
necessary either.]
But if the privative AC is not necessary and the affirmative BC is 5
universal and necessary, the conclusion will not be necessary. For the
necessary affirmative premiss BC converts, and when it is converted
and becomes particular affirmative necessary, the result is a combi-
nation in the first figure having the minor necessary and the major
unqualified, namely the following: A holds of no C, C holds of some B
by necessity, and A will not hold of some B by necessity. 10
[31b4170 Furthermore, this would be evident through terms. For

let A be good, B animal, C horse. Then it is contingent that good
holds of no horse, but it is necessary that animal holds of all
horses; however, it is not necessary that some animal is not
good, since it is contingent that all are good. (Or, if this is not
possible, one should posit as a term being awake or asleep; for
these can apply to every animal.)]
Having proved by conversion that the conclusion is not necessary
because the minor premiss in the first figure is necessary, he also sets
down terms through which he also shows that the conclusion of these
premisses is not necessary. The terms which he takes are: A: good;
B: animal; C: horse. Good holds of no horse, animal of all horse by 15
necessity; therefore, good will not hold of some animal, but not by
necessity. Wanting to show that he has taken the negative premiss
to be unqualified and not necessary, he says, it is contingent that
good holds of no horse to indicate that good does not hold of horse
contingently, not by necessity. For he is not taking a contingent 20
premiss. Rather for him the proposition that it is contingent that good
holds of no horse and the proposition however, it is not necessary that
some animal is not good (which is equivalent to the good will not hold
of some animal, but it will not not hold by necessity) are both
indicative of non-necessity. He shows why this second proposition is
sound by adding the words since it is contingent that all are good.
For the good may not hold of some animal unqualifiedly when it is
also contingent that the good holds of all animals. 25
171
But since it is thought that not every animal is receptive of the
good, he says that one should change the term and posit that either
being awake or being asleep rather than good holds of no animal
unqualifiedly. But animal holds of every horse by necessity. The
result is that being awake or being asleep does not hold of some
84 Translation
30 animal, but not by necessity, as he shows by adding the words for
these can apply to every animal; for if they can apply to all, there will
be no animal of which being awake or being asleep does not hold by
necessity.
<31b11-32a5 One particular premiss>
[31b11172 It has then been said when the conclusion will be

necessary if the terms are related universally to the middle
term. If one is related universally, the other particularly and
both are affirmative, when the universal is necessary, the con-
clusion will also be necessary. The demonstration is the same
as in the preceding; for the particular affirmative also converts.
If, then, it is necessary for B to hold of all C and A is under C, it
is necessary that B holds of some A; but if it is necessary that B
holds of some A, it is also necessary that A holds of some B, since
it converts.]
Having spoken about mixtures of two universal premisses, he next
148,1 speaks about those having one premiss particular. When one premiss
is universal, the other particular, and both are affirmative, if the
universal premiss is the necessary one, the conclusion will be neces-
sary. For if the particular affirmative unqualified premiss is
converted the result is again the first figure having the major premiss
5 necessary. He first proves this, taking the minor premiss to be
universal affirmative necessary, the major to be particular affirm-
ative unqualified. For he takes it that A holds of some C and B holds
of all C by necessity; keeping the latter fixed, he converts AC and
takes C holds of some A; for this is <what he means by> A is under
10 C;173 for this comes about by conversion. From these propositions in
the third combination of the first figure174 it follows that B holds of
some A by necessity. But if B holds of some A, A holds of some B. (It
is necessary for the latter to be proved since A is the major extreme.)
Thus the proposed conclusion is proved if the particular affirmative
unqualified premiss, which is AC, is converted and so is the conclu-
15 sion BA, which is particular necessary affirmative.
[31b19175 Similarly, too, if AC is necessary and universal. For B

is under C.]
He says that the conclusion will be necessary similarly if the major
premiss is taken to be affirmative universal necessary, the minor
particular affirmative unqualified. For again, if the latter premiss is
converted the result is a major universal affirmative necessary pre-
miss in the first figure, so that again the conclusion is also particular
Translation 85
affirmative necessary. The difference is that in the previous combi- 20
nation it was necessary to convert the conclusion as well, but in the
present case in which the major is universal affirmative necessary,
we only convert the minor premiss. He briefly indicates the reason
why the conclusion is necessary when he says, For B is under C,176
thereby indicating also that the result of converting the minor pre- 25
miss BC is affirmative particular.
[31b20177 But if the particular premiss is necessary, the conclu-

sion will not be necessary. For let BC be particular and
necessary, and let A hold of all C, but not by necessity. If BC is
converted, the first figure results, and the universal premiss is
not necessary whereas the particular one is necessary. But
when the premisses were related in this way the conclusion was
not necessary, and so it isnt necessary in the present case
either.
31b27178 This is also evident from terms. For let A be being
awake, B two-footed, C animal. Then it is necessary that B holds
of some C, and it is contingent that A holds of C, and A holds of
B but not necessarily. For it is not necessary that something
two-footed not be asleep.179]
If the particular premiss is taken to be necessary, the conclusion is
no longer necessary, because then the minor premiss in the first
figure becomes necessary; and when this was the case and the major
was unqualified, the conclusion was unqualified. For let B hold of
some C by necessity and A hold of all C. If we convert BC and keep 30
the universal unqualified premiss AC fixed (for we cannot proceed in
any other way),180 it results that A holds of all C, C of some B by
necessity; but when the premisses were related in this way, the
conclusion in the first figure was not necessary.
(31b27) He also shows that the conclusion is not necessary by
setting down terms. He takes A to be being awake, B two-footed, C 149,1
animal. Two-footed holds of some animals (e.g., humans) by neces-
sity, being awake holds of every animal unqualifiedly, and being
awake holds of some two-footed things, but not by necessity. Again
he says that it is contingent that A holds of C,181 to indicate that A
holds of all C but not necessarily. It should be noted that here too he 5
speaks of contingency instead of holding, as he also did in the case of
the conversion of necessary propositions.182
183
The words For it is not necessary that something two-footed not
be asleep may indicate that it is contingent that being awake holds
of some animal and also contingent that it holds of none. For, if some
animal slept by necessity it would not be the case that being awake
held of all animals contingently. (The words For it is not necessary 10
86 Translation
that something two-footed not be asleep may indicate that it is
contingent that being awake holds of some animal and contingent
that it does not hold of some.)
[31b31184 It will be proved in the same way through the same

terms if AC is particular and necessary.]
He says that the conclusion will be proved not to be necessary through
the same terms if the major premiss AC is taken to be particular
15 necessary affirmative, and BC to be universal affirmative unquali-
fied. However, it will be necessary to interchange the terms and
change their order. For if the terms are assumed in the same way the
premisses are not true. Thus it is necessary to assign two-footed to A,
being awake to B. Then it will be the case again that two-footed holds
of some animal by necessity, being awake holds of all animals un-
qualifiedly, and two-footed holds of something which is awake, but
20 not by necessity. 185It is no less possible to reduce this to the first figure
by conversion of the particular affirmative necessary premiss and
prove that again the minor premiss in this figure is necessary (the
conclusion also being converted <in this case>).
31b33186 But if one of the terms is affirmative and one privative,

when the universal is privative [and necessary, the conclusion
will also be necessary. For if it is not contingent that A holds of
any C, and B holds of some C, it is necessary that A not hold of
some B.
31b37 But when the affirmative is posited as necessary
whether it is universal or particular or the privative is par-
ticular, the conclusion will not be necessary. The others are the
same as we also said in the case of the previous ones.
31b40 Terms when the affirmative necessary premiss is uni-
versal: being awake, animal, human; the middle is human.
32a1 When the affirmative necessary premiss is particular:
being awake, animal, white; for it is necessary that animal
holds of something white, and it is contingent that being awake
holds of nothing white, and it is not necessary that being awake
does not hold of some animal.
32a4 When the privative particular premiss is necessary:
two-footed, moving, animal; the middle is animal.]187
25 He says that if one premiss is privative, the other affirmative, if the
privative is universal and necessary, the conclusion is also necessary.
For he is now discussing combinations having one particular premiss.
But if the affirmative is necessary, the conclusion is unqualified and
not necessary. The reason is the following: when the privative pre-
Translation 87
miss is universal and the affirmative premiss is converted, the
privative premiss becomes the major premiss in the first figure so 30
that if it is necessary, the conclusion is also necessary (and he speaks
briefly about this combination, since the mixture is already known188);
but if the negative premiss is not necessary but the affirmative one,
which becomes a necessary minor in the first figure, is, the conclusion
will be unqualified. For if it is not contingent that A holds of any C,
i.e., if it holds of none by necessity, and B holds of some C, BC will be 35
converted and C will hold of some B; AC remains the major premiss 150,1
and is universal necessary negative. Therefore, it will follow189 that
A does not hold of some B by necessity.
(31b37)190 Suppose the affirmative is necessary, either universal
or particular, as when the major is either universal negative unquali-
fied or particular negative unqualified, and the minor is either 5
universal affirmative necessary or particular affirmative and like-
wise necessary. When the major is universal negative unqualified,
the minor is particular affirmative necessary, but when the major is
particular negative unqualified, the minor is universal affirmative
necessary. In neither case will a necessary conclusion follow, because
if the minor is converted, when it is particular,191 there results the 10
first figure having the minor necessary. He indicates this reference
to the argument from conversion when he says, The others are the
same as we also said in the case of the previous ones.192
(32a1)193 However, he also shows that the conclusion is not neces-
sary by setting down terms. He assigns being awake to A, animal to 15
B, white to C. For it is contingent that being awake holds of nothing
white, but animal does hold of something white by necessity, and
being awake does not hold of some animal, but not by necessity. (This
is what is meant by it is not necessary that being awake does not hold
of some animal.)
(31b40)194 He proves by setting down terms that the conclusion is 20
not necessary if the universal premiss is affirmative necessary and
the other premiss, the major, is particular negative unqualified; he
assigns being awake to A, animal to B, and human to C. For animal
holds of all humans by necessity, and being awake does not hold of
some human. It follows that being awake does not hold of some
animal simply, but not by necessity.
(32a4) However, in his proof he has spoken first about the combi- 25
nation having a universal affirmative necessary premiss and a
particular negative unqualified one this is the sixth syllogism195
and then about the one having a particular affirmative necessary
premiss and a universal negative unqualified one.196 The latter is the
only combination <of the three now under discussion> to which the
proof by conversion <as well as the proof by terms> also applies.
Wishing to indicate this fact, he says, The others are the same as we 30
88 Translation
also said in the case of the previous ones.197 For when the minor
premiss is universal and affirmative, whether it is necessary or
unqualified, the proof is not by conversion. However, if the particular
151,1 premiss is negative necessary, the conclusion will not be necessary
either. For as in the combination of the fourth syllogism in the second
figure the conclusion was not necessary no matter which premiss was
necessary because such a combination is not reduced to the first
figure by conversion,198 so also in the combination of the sixth syllo-
5 gism in the third figure the conclusion is not necessary no matter
which premiss is necessary. It was proved a little earlier199 that the
conclusion is not necessary when the affirmative premiss is universal
and necessary by using terms.200 201When the particular negative
premiss is necessary, terms are two-footed for A, moving for B, and
10 animal for C. For two-footed does not hold of some animal by neces-
sity, moving holds of every animal, and two-footed will not hold of
some thing that moves, but not by necessity. For if the proposition
two-footed does not hold of some thing that moves is equivalent to
Some two-footed thing does not move, then the proposition Two-
footed will not hold of some thing that moves by necessity will not be
true because nothing two-footed does not move by necessity.202
15 The words the middle is two-footed are added to the text in
accordance with the blunder of the person who transcribed the book
originally. For two-footed cannot be the middle term; animal must be.
And this is also shown in the setting down of terms. For he mentions
two-footed first, but his custom in the case of this figure is always to
posit the middle term last. Thus, it is necessary to suppose that he
does not say203 the middle is two-footed but the middle is animal.
20 For, if two-footed were the middle, neither of the terms mentioned,
moving and animal, would not hold of some of it by necessity.204
205
Alternatively, it is possible by saying the same things which we
have also said in the case of the fourth combination of the second
figure which has the negative necessary premiss particular to prove
25 that to the degree that it was necessary that the conclusion be
necessary in cases discussed previously, it must also be necessary in
this combination. For, using ekthesis we will get the particular nec-
essary negative premiss to be universal negative necessary. Since
this premiss is necessary, when the minor premiss is converted, it
becomes a universal negative necessary major in the first figure. But
the setting down of terms, which he also uses, shows that the
30 conclusion in the case of this sort of combination is not necessary.
Translation 89
1.12 Summary remarks on the necessary and the

unqualified206
32a6207 It is then evident that there is no syllogism of holding

unless both premisses are of holding, but there is a syllogism of
necessity if only one of the premisses is necessary.
If this assertion were made universally and without qualification, it
would be false and conflict with what has already been said. For he 152,1
has proved that the conclusion is also unqualified when one of the
premisses, e.g., the minor premiss in the first figure, is necessary.
And it has also been proved that in the second and third figure the
conclusion is unqualified when one of the premisses is necessary. 5
208
But if one were to understand the assertion as made of the third
figure, this would be true in a rather restricted sense. For in the third
figure when both premisses are universal affirmative, the conclusion
is not unqualified unless both premisses are unqualified, because if
either of them is taken to be necessary, the conclusion is necessary.
This was not true in the first figure when both premisses were 10
universal affirmative; for when just the minor premiss was neces-
sary, the conclusion was unqualified.209 And in the second figure
nothing at all followed from two affirmative premisses. With these
words he might then indicate the feature peculiar to the combination
of two universal affirmative premisses in the third figure. For he was
<just> talking about this figure. For in this figure when there are two 15
universal affirmative premisses, an unqualified conclusion will not
follow unless both premisses are unqualified, and the conclusion will
be necessary even if only one (no matter which) is necessary.
210
But since some combinations in which, conversely, unless both
premisses are necessary, the conclusion is not necessary either (as in
the case of the sixth) have already been proved, it is also possible to
understand holding as standing for affirmative; in this case he 20
would be saying that the conclusion is not affirmative unless both
premisses are affirmative, but it is necessary if only one of the
premisses is necessary. But perhaps such an understanding of what
is said will seem forced, since it would seem that the word holding
has not been taken to stand for affirmative, but as opposed to
necessity. This is evident from what is added. For he says, but there 25
is a syllogism of necessity if only one of the premisses is necessary.
211
If what is said was not just about the third figure but universal
and general, it might mean that there is no conclusion which is
simply unqualified <unless both premisses are unqualified>. For the
words there is no syllogism212 mean that no <simply unqualified>
conclusion follows unless both premisses are unqualified. For even in 30
those combinations in which just one of the premisses is necessary
90 Translation
and the conclusion is unqualified, the conclusion results from two
unqualified premisses, since the necessary is also unqualified. For
the necessary is also unqualified, but the unqualified is not neces-
153,1 sary. Therefore, when one of the premisses is necessary, it is possible
to say that both are unqualified, but if one is unqualified, it is not
possible to say that both are necessary. Therefore, an unqualified
conclusion follows from two unqualified premisses and a necessary
one follows if only one of the premisses is necessary.
213
It is perhaps better to understand the words It is then evident
that there is no syllogism of holding unless both premisses are of
5 holding as if he were saying that it has become evident from what
has been said that sometimes in some syllogistic combination an
unqualified conclusion is impossible unless both premisses are un-
qualified; for one should not understand what is said universally,
because said universally it is not true, but what is said is true of the
combination of two universal affirmative premisses in the third
10 figure, as he thinks has been proved. 214On the other hand, in every
syllogistic combination it is possible for there to be a necessary conclu-
sion, even if only one of the premisses is necessary, as he himself also
says. Or is it possible to say the same thing also in the case of the
necessary? For there are some combinations in which necessity does not
follow unless both premisses are necessary, as has been proved of the
15 fourth combination in the second figure and of the sixth in the third.
32a8 But there is a syllogism of necessity if only one of the

premisses is necessary.
He has proved in the case of the third figure that when there are two
universal affirmative premisses215 the conclusion is necessary which-
20 ever of the premisses is taken to be necessary; thus also if only one of
the premisses is necessary, the conclusion is necessary. It has also
been proved in the case of the other figures that if one of the premisses
is necessary the conclusion is also necessary.216 For it is not possible
to say that both premisses are necessary if one is unqualified; for the
unqualified is not necessary in the way that the necessary is also
unqualified.
25 32a8-9217 In both, when the syllogisms are affirmative or priva-

tive, [it is necessary that one premiss be similar to the
conclusion. By similar I mean that if the conclusion is unquali-
fied a premiss is, and if necessary, necessary.]
By saying in both he indicates what he means by the words when
the syllogisms are affirmative or negative.218 Or rather he says in
both with reference to what has just been said, that is, to the
Translation 91
necessary and the unqualified, as he indicates through the things he
adds. For in the case of necessary and unqualified conclusions, if the 30
conclusion is affirmative or if it is negative, in either case it is
necessary that one premiss be similar to the conclusion in all the
figures. He says in what respect it is necessary for one of the assumed 154,1
premisses to be similar to the conclusion, and he adds the word
one,219 since both premisses might be similar to the conclusion. (Or
rather this is not possible in the case of mixtures, which he is now
discussing.220) He says how they are similar in the previously dis-
cussed mixtures; for he says, if the conclusion is unqualified a
premiss is, and if necessary, necessary. For it is not the case that if 5
the conclusion is particular it is necessary that one of the premisses
always be particular because in the third figure when the two pre-
misses are universal,221 the conclusion is also particular. (Or is it the
case that <in those moods> too a premiss has also been taken as
potentially particular? That this is so is made clear by the reduction
of <either> combination to the first figure through a conversion by
which one of the universal premisses becomes particular.) 10
222
The words in both could also indicate the mixture. For when in
combinations there is both an unqualified and a necessary premiss,
he says that it is necessary for one of the premisses to be similar to
the conclusion in modality.
It is also clear that if the conclusion is negative it is necessary that
a negative premiss be assumed. This is not added because he is now 15
only talking about the necessary and the unqualified, but it has been
noted for the future since it will be useful for him.223
224
He now indicates that he meant what was said a moment ago
namely that there will not be a syllogism with an unqualified conclu-
sion unless both premisses are unqualified to apply to the
combination of two universal affirmative premisses in the third
figure <only>. For speaking universally he now says, it is necessary 20
that one premiss be similar to the conclusion if the conclusion is
unqualified a premiss is, it being also possible for an unqualified
conclusion to result from one unqualified premiss.
32a12225 So this is also clear: the conclusion will not be either

necessary or unqualified unless a necessary or an unqualified
premiss is taken. 25
He has already used this fact sometimes, when, having proved that
something false follows from the hypothesis that the conclusion of a
mixture <in the first figure> of an unqualified major and a necessary
minor is necessary, he did away with the hypothesis and took the
conclusion to be unqualified.226 For he did this for no other reason
than that it is necessary in the mixture of such a combination that 30
92 Translation
155,1 the conclusion be either necessary or unqualified. He indicates that
the conclusion of a combination cannot be necessary or unqualified
unless a premiss has been taken to be necessary or unqualified
because this will also be useful for him in the future.227
228
Against him one might ask how this can be sound in the case of
a necessary premiss. (It is apparently sound in the case of an unquali-
fied premiss.) For the conclusion seems to be necessary even if
5 neither of the premisses is necessary. For consider, if you will, the
following case: moving holds of all humans and human of all that
walks unqualifiedly, and moving holds of all that walks necessarily.
(a) Or is it the case that he says that the conclusion is not
necessary unless one of the premisses is necessary since the situation
is not always this way,229 but it is always true that when a necessary
or an unqualified premiss is taken, the conclusion is similar, as he
has said?
10 (b) Or is it rather because necessity is signified by the addition of
the modality, and this will not be added unless it has also been added
to one of the premisses?
(c) Or, if someone were to judge necessity not by the addition of the
modality but by the nature of the thing, would it also be necessary
that moving holds of everything human, even if he customarily uses
15 this <proposition> as if it were unqualified? For there is never a time
when some human or, in general, animal is not moving.
(d) Or is it also necessary to specify further how moving holds of
human is being taken? For, if this is done, moving holds of human
will be unqualified, and the modality of the conclusion will be found
<to be the same>. For, moving in the sense of changing does not hold
of all that walks by necessity and this is the <purported> conclusion
if moving in the sense of changing holds of every human unquali-
fiedly.
20 (e) Or is it the case that even if it is taken that all that walks is
human and all humans move, still the conclusion all that walks
moves is not necessary without qualification but with the additional
condition as long as it is walking? For all that walks does not move
by necessity, if, indeed, it is true that what walks does not even walk
25 necessarily except, as I said, on the condition as long as it is walking.
32a15 [We have said pretty much enough] about necessity, how
it comes about [and how it differs from the unqualified.]
In other words, how the conclusion comes to be necessary (and
sometimes it comes about from one premiss, when the major premiss
is necessary), and that necessary combinations are syllogistic in a way
similar to unqualified ones, and that the necessary differs from the
Translation 93
unqualified because it holds eternally.230 He is speaking about neces- 30
sity as the necessity of a conclusion.
1.13 Remarks on contingency231

<32a16-29 The diorismos of contingency>
32a16 Next we speak232 about the contingent, about when and 156,1
how and through what things there will be a syllogism.
He turns to the third specification of propositions, which involves the
contingent. And he first establishes when there is a syllogism from
two contingent premisses, and how they are combined with one 5
another, and what is combined. For arbitrary combinations will not
produce a syllogism, nor will they do so in an arbitrary way, just as
was the case with unqualified and necessary propositions.
32a18 I call P contingent or say it is contingent that P if P is not

necessary and if, when P is posited to hold, nothing impossible
will be because of it.233 For we call what is necessary contingent 10
homonymously.
Since he is going to discuss syllogisms from contingent premisses, he
first defines the contingent. He does not define it in its homonymous
use since it is not possible to define something as it is used homony-
mously. Rather he isolates contingency as said of the necessary and
the unqualified from the contingent. For he showed234 that the con-
tingent is also predicated of these things. 15
By saying when P is posited to hold he indicates that, in addition
to not being necessary, the contingent is not unqualified either.235 For
what is contingent according to the third adjunct236 is of this kind and
it differs from what is necessary and what is unqualified because if
P is said to be possible,237 P is not yet the case. So, P would be
contingent in the strict sense238 if P is not the case and if when P is
posited to be the case it has nothing impossible as a consequent.239 20
And he would have spoken more strictly about the contingent if he
said P is not the case and when P is posited to hold. For although
what is not the case is not necessary, what is not necessary is not ipso
facto not the case.
Or does he deny that what is contingent is either necessary or
unqualified, necessary by saying is not necessary, unqualified by
saying posited to hold, since the word posited also denies holding of 25
the contingent? Or does he deny that what is contingent is unquali-
fied by saying if P is not necessary; for, according to him, necessity
is also predicated of the unqualified; for what holds of something
holds of it with necessity, as long as it holds. At any rate Theophras-
94 Translation
157,1 tus in the first book of his Prior Analytics, discussing the meanings
of necessity, writes the following: Third, what holds; for when it
holds it cannot not hold.240
Hypothesizing that what is not the case is the case is a peculiar
feature of the contingent, since if someone takes it that either the
unqualified or the necessary is the case, nothing impossible will
follow either, and the account of contingency would also apply to the
5 necessary and the unqualified. Therefore, it is a peculiar feature of
the contingent that when what itself does not hold is hypothesized to
hold it has nothing impossible as a consequent; for if when P is
hypothesized something impossible follows, P is impossible; but, if
something possible is hypothesized, nothing impossible follows (as he
will show241) since the peculiar feature of the possible is not that it
does not hold, but that when it does not hold and is assumed to hold,
10 nothing impossible results.
32a21242 It is evident from oppositions of affirmations and

negations243 that this is what the contingent is. [For It is not
contingent that X holds, It is impossible that X holds, and It
is necessary that X does not hold are either the same or follow
from each other, so that their opposites, It is contingent that X
holds, It is not impossible that X holds, and It is not necessary
that X does not hold will also be either the same or follow from
each other; for either the affirmation or the negation is said of
each thing. Therefore, what is contingent will not be necessary,
and what is not necessary will be contingent.]
He shows that the contingent is as he defined it. What is said will be
more understandable if we assume in advance what he asserts and
15 shows shortly hereafter;244 for this will make what is said more
evident to us. What he will show is this: if A follows from B and vice
versa, then the contradictory of B follows from the contradictory of A
and vice versa, since a thing or its contradictory is said of each thing245
(as he also adds here). For the sake of discussion let there be two
20 affirmations, A and B; and let C be the contradictory negation of A,
D the contradictory negation of B; and let the affirmation B follow
from the affirmation A and be true at the same time as it. Then the
negation D will also follow from the negation C, and will be true at
the same time as it. For let something of which the negation C is true
be taken, and let it be E. I say that the negation D is also true of this.
25 For if it is not, the affirmation B will be true of it. And if it is, so will
the affirmation A be. For they were assumed to follow one another
and to be true at the same time. Therefore, the affirmation A will be
true of that of which the negation C is true. Therefore, the contradic-
tory is true of the same thing at the same time which is impossible.
Translation 95
Therefore the negation D will apply to246 E. But the negation C also
applied to it. Therefore, it is universally true that if A and B are true 30
together with one another, their contradictories are also true together
with one another and follow from one another.
Now that this is proved, what he says will be understandable. For
if It is not contingent that X holds, It is impossible that X holds, and 158,1
It is necessary that X does not hold are either the same or follow
from each other as anyone would say and as has been shown in On
Interpretation247 (for even if these are not all the same, because one
is a negation and the others are affirmations, if one of them is true of
something, so are the others) , it is clear that the contradictories of 5
these will also follow from one another. The affirmation It is contin-
gent that X holds is the contradictory of It is not contingent that X
holds, which is negative; and It is not impossible that X holds and
It is not necessary that X does not hold248 are the contradictories of
the affirmations It is impossible that X holds and It is necessary
that X does not hold, which follow from the negation It is not
contingent that X holds. Therefore these things will also follow from 10
one another and It is contingent that X is and It is not impossible
that X is and It is not necessary that X is not will be true at the same
time.
Therefore if it is contingent that X is, it will be neither impossible
that X is nor necessary that X is not. Therefore, it is not necessary, it
is not unqualified, and, when it is hypothesized to hold nothing
impossible will follow since it is not impossible. This is true since an
impossibility follows <only> from an impossibility, as he, in proceed- 15
ing, will soon assert and show.249
32a28 Therefore, what is contingent will not be necessary, [and

what is not necessary will be contingent.]
He indicates why he has considered the implication relation between
the propositions: in order to show that in the definition of contingency
it is reasonable to lay down that P is not necessary and when P is
hypothesized to hold, nothing impossible follows. For what is contin- 20
gent is neither necessary nor impossible.
<32a29-b3 The transformation of contingent propositions>250
32a29 It results that all contingent propositions convert with

one another. [I do not mean that the affirmative converts with
the negative, but rather that whatever has an affirmative form
converts with respect to its antithesis, e.g., that It is contingent
that X holds converts with It is contingent that X does not hold,
96 Translation
and It is contingent that A holds of all B converts with It is
contingent that A holds of no B and with It is contingent that
A does not hold of all B, and It is contingent that A holds of
some B converts with It is contingent that A does not hold of
some B, and the same way in the other cases.]
Conversion is a peculiar feature of contingency, that is, that affirm-
25 ative propositions and negative propositions with respect to it are
equivalent to one another. I mean by negations with respect to
contingency contingent negatives,251 not negations of contingency.
For a contingent negative and a negation of contingency are different,
and so are a necessary negative and a negation of necessity. For the
proposition which says that it is necessary that X does not hold is a
necessary negative, but it is not the negation of the proposition It is
30 necessary that X holds. The proposition It is not necessary that X
holds is the negative252 of the necessary proposition It is necessary
that X holds and is negative in the strict sense. The other proposition
<It is necessary that X does not hold> is in itself an affirmative, but
the whole is a necessary negative. In the same way also, in the case
159,1 of contingency the negation in the strict sense, It is not contingent
that X is, is a negation of contingency, while It is contingent that X
is not, which is contingent, is in itself an affirmation.
It results from the meaning which contingency is now taken to
have253 that contingent negatives and contingent affirmatives are
equivalent to one another. For, if it is contingent (in this sense) that
5 X is, it is always also contingent that X is not. Because he is going to
use this kind of conversion of contingency in connection with syllo-
gisms from contingent premisses he first establishes that conversion
holds in this way. However, it is necessary to understand that this
kind of conversion of propositions is not sound according to the
10 associates of Theophrastus;254 nor do they use it. For there is the
same reason for saying that the universal negative contingent propo-
sition converts with itself in the way that the unqualified and
necessary <universal negative> propositions do, and that contingent
affirmatives do not convert with contingent negatives, as Aristotle
maintains. We will explain this when he discusses the term-conver-
sion of a contingent proposition.255
15 The words I do not mean that the affirmative converts with the
negative, but rather that whatever has an affirmative form converts
with respect to its antithesis indicate what has just been said. For
the proposition It is contingent that X is seems to be the opposite of
the one which says that It is contingent that X is not, because is is
co-ordinated with the one and is not with the other, and these seem
20 to be opposite to one another. But in fact, both have an affirmative
Translation 97
form because they are affirmations in which what negates is not
attached to the modality.
Having discussed indeterminate propositions, what they are and
how contingent negatives are taken to be equivalent to contingent
affirmatives, he next takes the determinate ones. He says that It is
contingent that A holds of all B is equivalent to It is contingent that 25
A holds of no B and likewise also to It is contingent that A does not
hold of all B; of these It is contingent that A holds of no B is a
universal contingent negative, and the second, in which it is taken
that it is contingent that A does not hold of all B, is a particular one;
he shows that all contingent negative propositions are true when the
contingent universal affirmative is. For neither of these propositions,
one of which <It is contingent that A holds of no B> is like a contrary,
the other <It is contingent that A does not hold of all B> like a
contradictory, is in truth either a contrary or a contradictory. For if 30
they were, they would not be true together <with It is contingent that
A holds of all B>. And it is clear from induction that propositions
taken in this way are equivalent.
And in the case of contingent propositions to hold of some and to
not hold of some convert even when some is taken to apply to the
same thing. For it is a peculiar feature of the contingent that things
asserted in this way of the same thing are true at the same time.
256
For if the Bs are taken as different things not only will the 160,1
contingent particular propositions <It is contingent that A holds of
some B and It is contingent that A does not hold of some B> be true
together, but unqualified and necessary propositions can also be true
together sometimes; and in these cases It is contingent that A holds
of some B and It is contingent that A does not hold of some B are
equivalent because one takes Socrates or Plato or some individual
and makes an antithesis with respect to contingency in relation to it 5
in the way discussed.
He says and the same way in the other cases in order to refer us
also to the other things which are equivalent to the contingent. These
are (i) the affirmation It is possible257 that X is with which It is
possible that X is not converts, no matter what the quantitative
determination258 of X, whether it is universal affirmative, universal
negative, particular affirmative or particular negative, as he proved
in the case of the contingent proposition; (ii) the negations, (iia) It is 10
not necessary that X is not for this follows from It is contingent
that X is from which It is not necessary that X is follows and with
which it converts, and (iib) It is not impossible that X is for this
follows from It is contingent that X is with respect to which the
proposition which says that it is not impossible that X is not converts.
98 Translation
32a36 For since the contingent is not necessary, [and what is

not necessary may not hold, it is evident that, if it is contingent
that A holds of B, it is also contingent that it does not hold of B,
and if it is contingent that it holds of all, it is also contingent
that it does not hold of all. And similarly in the case of particular
affirmations. For the demonstration is the same. Propositions
of this kind are affirmative, not privative; for It is contingent
that X is ordered in the same way as X is, as was said
earlier.259]
15 Having said that contingent negative propositions are equivalent to
contingent affirmative ones and what these propositions are, he now
sets down and gives the reason why they are equivalent and convert
with one another. For since It is contingent that X holds posits that
X does not hold by necessity since, as was indicated in his defini-
tion,260 P is contingent if P is not necessary, and what is not
20 necessary may also not hold, it is reasonable that It is contingent that
X does not hold is true together with It is contingent that X holds.
The situation is the same in the case of all the quantitative determi-
nations. He says that indeterminate propositions and determinate
universal affirmative and negative propositions are equivalent to
each other, and that particular affirmations and negations and indi-
vidual ones said of the same thing are equivalent. And they are
25 equivalent for the same reason: the affirmation under consideration
indicates that what is predicated cannot be by necessity. If the
contingent is of this sort, those people261 who do not think that
<contingent> affirmative propositions convert with contingent nega-
tive ones are wrong.
He reminds us that contingent negatives are affirmations and not
negations. For in On Interpretation262 he showed that propositions
30 having the modality predicated but not negated are all affirmations.
This is why he adds here the words as was said earlier. From these
very words it is also possible to show, contrary to Andronicus, that
161,1 On Interpretation is Aristotles. However, it is also true that he has
already spoken about this in this work when he said that the <con-
tingent> universal negative does not convert.263
264
I inquired how, if the contingent is such as it was defined to be
and is neither necessary nor unqualified, nevertheless negative con-
5 tingent propositions will convert with affirmative contingent ones
with contingency in the way specified265 being preserved in both. For
suppose if it is contingent that X is then X is not yet for this is
thought to be the peculiar feature of the contingent, that what is said
to be contingent is not yet; then what is contingent will not hold. And
if it is contingent that X is not, X does not yet not hold; therefore it
holds; thus a <contingent> affirmative is true when an unqualified
Translation 99
negative holds, and a negative one is true when an unqualified
affirmative holds. But it is impossible that both <affirmative and 10
negative> hold at the same time. Therefore, contingency in the way
specified cannot be being taken in the negative proposition.266
267
Or did he for this reason define the contingent268 by saying that
P is contingent if P is not necessary without adding that P absolutely
does not hold on the grounds that not holding is not the peculiar
feature of the contingent; rather, the peculiar feature is that when it
does not hold and is hypothesized to hold, nothing impossible follows
from it. He also indicated that he means this by saying269 For we call 15
what is necessary contingent homonymously without adding and
also the unqualified which should have been a necessary implica-
tion <if what holds is not contingent>; for <in fact> when we call the
unqualified contingent we do not speak homonymously.
It is not the case that, since if It is contingent that X is is true of
something, It is contingent that X is not is also true of it, it is thereby
also true that when one is true the other is; but <they may also be 20
true> at alternating times. For it is when X holds, not when it does
not hold, that it is contingent that it does not hold. For if X does not
hold and it is contingent that it does hold, then it is also contingent
that X does not hold when it does hold.
Alternatively, if It is contingent is said of things which are not yet,
then It is contingent that X is might be said instead of It is
contingent that X comes about. But if X is not and it is contingent
that X comes about, it is always also contingent that X does not come 25
about, so that both would apply to what is not yet.
<32b4-22 Forms of contingency>270
32b4 Having made these distinctions let us say next that

contingency is spoken of in two ways.271 [In one way what comes
about for the most part and falls short of necessity is contingent,
for example, for a person to get grey hair or to grow or decline,
or in general what holds naturally <of a human being> for this
does not have necessity continuously since a human does not
always exist, but when a human does exist, this is the case
either by necessity or for the most part. In another way, the
indefinite, which can be one way or the other, for example, that
an animal walks, or that there is an earthquake when it is
walking, or, in general, what comes about by chance for it is
not by nature any more one way than the other.]
Having said what the contingent is and that contingent affirmative
and negative propositions convert with one another, he says that the 30
contingent is spoken of in two ways, meaning it is spoken of homony-
100 Translation
mously; for he does not specify of which contingency he makes this
division; for the account which has been given applies to both. He
makes the division either as the division of the genus of contingency
into species which he sets out, or as the division of a whole into parts.
162,1 He says that one kind of contingency signifies that which applies to
things said <to be> for the most part. Since these things do not always
come about in this way, but happening always and by necessity are
interrupted because some of them do not turn out the same way
sometimes, these things are also contingent. Things which come
5 about by nature are of this sort; these things do not come about by
necessity because in some cases things sometimes also happen in
another way; but they come about the same way for the most part.
For human beings naturally turn grey when they age, and they turn
out this way for the most part for some people are already old and
they have not turned grey. And people grow for a certain length of
time, and they do so naturally and usually.
32b5 [In one way what comes about for the most part and falls
short of necessity is contingent, for example, for a person to get
grey hair or to grow or decline, or in general what holds natu-
10 rally <of a human being> ] for this does not have necessity
continuously since a human does not always exist, but when a
human does exist, this is the case either by necessity or for the
most part. [In another way, the indefinite, which can be one way
or the other, for example, that an animal walks, or that there is
an earthquake when it is walking, or, in general, what comes
about by chance for it is not by nature any more one way than
the other. Each of the kinds of contingency converts with respect
to the opposite propositions also, but not in the same way. If P
is by nature, it converts with P does not hold by necessity it
is contingent for a person not to turn grey in this sense. But if
P is indefinite, P converts with no more P than not P.]272
He introduces two reasons why these things which come about
usually are not necessary. One is that the things of which they hold
do not always exist. For what comes to be by nature is not eternal.
15 What is natural is not by necessity because the things of which we
say it is contingent that what is natural holds do not always exist
for what is natural holds of individuals. For what is necessary is
eternal and always in the same way in the case of things which are
<always> in the same condition. So it could be said that what holds
by necessity of what is not eternal is also contingent, even if it doesnt
cease to exist before <what is necessary happens to it,> because it is
20 contingent that what comes about by necessity (if a human being
existed forever) does not come about because <the human being> does
Translation 101
cease to exist before <what is necessary happens to it>. For example,
if by necessity every human went grey on reaching the age of sixty,
nevertheless it would still be contingent that a given human being
will become grey, because it is contingent that he also not reach such
an age. He indicates what is contingent for this reason when he says
for this does not have necessity continuously since a human does not 25
always exist, meaning that such things are not necessary because
they are not continuous.
A second reason why things which come about naturally are not
by necessity is that even if a person of which what is natural holds
were to have reached the age of sixty, he will only turn grey usually,
but not by necessity. He indicates this reason when he says, but
when a human does exist, this is the case either by necessity or for
the most part. For, if something is for the most part, it is clear that 30
it is not by necessity. One of the things which contingency signifies,
then, is this. Also ordered under this would be things that come about
as a result of choice.273 For being usual also applies to these things.
He says that the other thing which contingency signifies is the 163,1
indefinite. He means by indefinite both what is equally balanced and
will be no more one way than the other (for example, that Socrates
will take a walk in the afternoon or converse with a certain person),
and in addition what is opposite to the kind of contingency which
comes about usually, namely what comes about infrequently and
because of which, when it intervenes, what comes about usually is 5
prevented from coming about always and being necessary. A sixty-
year-old not becoming grey would be this sort of thing. What is by
chance is also included in the kind of contingency signified by infre-
quency. He indicates the kind of contingency which is equally
balanced with respect to opposites with the words <an animal>
walks; and he indicates the infrequent which is opposite to what
happens usually with the words that there is an earthquake when it 10
is walking, or, in general, what comes about by chance. Both of these
are indefinite, one because it could equally go either way; for what is
not any more one way than the other is indefinite. And what is
infrequent is indefinite because it comes about more or less without
a cause. For what is by chance is of this kind and comes about in this
way. For chance is a cause accidentally, not per se, and the future
itself is in general indefinite and unclear. For what is most of all 15
determined is what is necessary. In second place is what is close to
the necessary; this is what happens usually. But it is reasonable to
call what stands furthest from the determined indefinite. What is
equally balanced is of this kind, and what happens infrequently is
even more so. For, the necessary is like a line which has been
stretched from eternity into eternity, and the contingent comes into 20
being from this line when it is cut. For if this line is cut into unequal
102 Translation
segments, the result is the contingent as the natural and what is for
the most part, and also the contingent as the infrequent, which
includes chance and spontaneity. But if the line is cut into equal
segments there results the who can tell.274
Of these, if the contingent is taken in the sense of what is for the
25 most part, It is contingent that P converts with It is not necessary
that P holds. Consequently, if it is contingent (in the sense of usual)
that P holds, it is also true that it is contingent that P does not hold,
because if P is usual, it is true that it is not necessary that P holds;
for It is not necessary that P is follows from It is contingent that P
is, just as It is not necessary that P is not does. If the contingent is
taken in the sense of who can tell, It is contingent that P holds
converts with It is contingent that P does not hold; for what is
contingent in this sense is equally balanced and is no more one way
than the other.
30 He himself also makes these things clear, by adding the words
Each of the kinds of contingency converts with respect to the opposite
propositions also, but not in the same way. By each of the kinds of
contingency he means the usual and the indefinite. If the contingent
164,1 is taken in the sense of what is usually, he says that the proposition
It is contingent that P does not come about is true, not because it is
equally true with the proposition It is contingent that P comes about,
but because in the case of the contingent in the sense of what is
usually the proposition It is not necessary that P is is true; for the
contingent is not necessary. And the proposition which says that it is
contingent that P does not come about is true because <the proposi-
tion It is contingent that P is> interrupts the continuity of necessity.
5 The contingent as indefinite converts insofar as it is no more one way
than the other. For in the case of what is contingent in this way the
proposition It is contingent that P is not is true together with the
affirmation It is contingent that P is and converts with it because
one is no more true than the other.
The words each of the kinds of contingency converts with respect
10 to the opposite propositions also are equivalent to also each of the
kinds of contingency converts with respect to the opposite proposi-
tions.275 The conjunction also seems to be oddly placed. Or perhaps
he says with respect to the opposite propositions also because they
also convert in other ways. For they also convert by interchange of
terms.276
15 32b18 There is no science or demonstrative syllogism of what is

indefinite277 [because the middle is without order. However,
there is science and demonstrative syllogism of what is natural,
and almost all arguments and investigations concern what is
Translation 103
contingent in this way. There might be a syllogism in that
way,278 but it is not customary to inquire about it. These things
will be made more precise in what follows.]
Having said that one of the two meanings of contingency is the
indefinite, he says now that there is no science of what is contingent
in this way. For there cannot be a demonstration of anything from
premisses which are contingent in this way because what is proved
through the syllogism is no more than its opposite. The reason for 20
this is the indefiniteness of the middle term and its being no more
related to the extremes in the way it is taken to be than in the opposite
way. Consequently he rejects proving the syllogisms in the figures in
the case of this kind of contingency, not because such proof is impos-
sible, but because it is useless; he thereby indicates to us that in the
present subject it is necessary to take and work out only what is useful 25
for things which will be proved and to reject what is useless, even if
it has a certain formal validity.279 Therefore it is clear that it is
because of their uselessness and not because of his ignorance that he
leaves out those things which recent thinkers280 discuss but he has
not talked about and which are useless for demonstration. Examples
are duplicated arguments, duplicating arguments, what is called 30
infinite matter, and in general the thema which is called the second
by recent thinkers.281 For the usefulness of what is shown or comes
about using it is the measure of any instrument.282 And what is not 165,1
useful would not even be an instrument; for an adze which is useless
for a carpenter is not an adze except homonymously. He indicates this
most clearly by rejecting discussion of contingency in the sense of
indefiniteness. He says, There might be a syllogism in that way,283
but it is not customary to inquire about it, on the grounds that it is
syllogisms liable to have an application to things which are inquired 5
into and need proof which one must discuss. Thus he rejects talking
about this kind of contingency because it is useless for inquiries.284
He promises to speak about the other kind of contingency because
there are many arts which are conjectural285 and deduce something
under consideration on the basis of what is contingent in this way,
for example, medicine, navigation, gymnastics. But also, in general, 10
things based on deliberation are proved by means of this kind of
contingency. For example, if someone were to inquire whether he
ought to sail now and he argued as follows: when the winds have been
judged favourable, those who sail get through safely for the most part;
now the winds have been judged favourable; therefore those who sail
now will get through safely for the most part. He says that a syllogism
is demonstrative if a person who wished to prove something would 15
use it.
104 Translation
<32b23-37 Two readings of It is contingent; transition to the

treatment of pairs of premisses>
32b23 These things will be made more precise in what follows.

[Let us now say when there will be a syllogism from contingent
premisses, how it will be, and what it will be.]
He says that in the sequel he will make a determination about the
fact that in the case of contingent propositions an affirmative converts
with a negative, and about how it converts, and that contingency is
twofold, and that the indefinite is useless for present inquiries.286 He
20 adds what he says now about combinations of contingent premisses
in each figure which are syllogistic and non-syllogistic.
32b25287 It is possible to take It is contingent that A holds of B

in two ways, [namely, as either It is contingent that A holds of
that of which B holds or It is contingent that A holds of that of
which it is contingent that B holds; for the expression It is
contingent that A holds of that of which B is said means either
of these things: It is contingent that A holds of that of which B
is said or It is contingent that A holds of that of which it is
contingent that B is said.]
25 He says that it is possible to understand the proposition which says
that it is contingent that A holds of all B in two ways. For sometimes
one can understand the person who says this as saying that it is
contingent that A holds of all of that of which B holds, and sometimes
one can understand him as saying that it is contingent that A holds
of all of that of which it is contingent that B holds. He shows that the
proposition which says that it is contingent that A holds of all B can
mean each of these things, but transforms it into the proposition
30 which says that it is contingent that A holds of that of which B is
166,1 said.288 Having shown that it is possible to understand this proposi-
tion as either It is contingent that A holds of that of which B is in fact
said or as It is contingent that A holds of that of which it is contingent
that B is said, he then adds:
32b29 There is no difference between It is contingent that A

holds of that of which B is said and It is contingent that289 A
holds of all B. [So it is evident that It is contingent that A holds
of all B can mean two different things.
32b32 Let us then first say what syllogism and what sort of
syllogism there will be if it is contingent that B holds of that of
which C is said and that A holds of that of which B is said. For
Translation 105
in this way both premisses are taken as contingent. But when
it is contingent that A holds of that of which B is said <and B
holds of that of which C is said>, then one premiss is unquali-
fied, the other contingent. Consequently, we should begin with
premisses similar in form, as in the other cases.]
Consequently It is contingent that A holds of all B can also mean two 5
things. But when the proposition means the first one mentioned, the
premisses are not both contingent; rather the minor is unqualified,
the major contingent, and such a combination is mixed. When the
proposition means the second, both premisses are contingent. Since,
then, he always discusses combinations with premisses similar in
form before mixed combinations, he says that it is first necessary to 10
discuss combinations with both premisses contingent.
In the proof that It is contingent that A holds of all B has two
meanings he used the formulation It is contingent that A holds of
that of which B is said. He now indicates <by saying So it is evident
that It is contingent that A holds of all B can mean two different
things> that he has not proved anything other than what he pro-
posed to prove. For It is contingent that A holds of that of which B is
said means the same thing as It is contingent that A holds of all B,
as we have said. For X is said of Y indicates universality and that X
is said of all Y. Thus if It is contingent that A is said of all of that of 15
which B is said has two meanings, It is contingent that A holds of
all B will have the same two meanings. It is through these things
that he shows that the premiss which is expressed prosleptically290
has the same meaning as the affirmative premiss.
But if It is contingent that A holds of that of which B is said has
two meanings, so will By necessity A holds of that of which B is said 20
have two meanings; for it will mean either A holds by necessity of all
of that of which B is said unqualifiedly or A holds by necessity of all
of that of which B is said by necessity. But if this is true, it will not
be the case that A is said of all B by necessity is equivalent to A is
said by necessity of all of that of which B is said, as is said by some
of those291 who show that it is true that the conclusion of a necessary
major and an unqualified minor <in the first figure> is necessary. 25
32b32 Let us then first say [what syllogism and what sort of
syllogism there will be] if it is contingent that B holds of that of
which C is said and that A holds of that of which B is said. [For
in this way both premisses are taken as contingent. But when
it is contingent that A holds of that of which B is said <and B
holds of that of which C is said>, then one premiss is unquali-
fied, the other contingent. Consequently, it is necessary to begin
with premisses similar in form, as in the other cases.]
106 Translation
He says that it is first necessary to discuss the combination of two
contingent premisses. Since he assumes that X holds of that of which
30 Y is said is equivalent to X is said of all Y, he takes the premiss It
is contingent that B holds of all C because it means the same thing
as the following: it is contingent that B holds of that of which C is
167,1 said. Similarly in the case of A holds of that of which B is said; for
this is equivalent to A is said of all B.
He says that it is necessary to begin first from <premisses> similar
in form, and adds as in the other cases.292 For in treating the
unqualified and the necessary he first spoke about each on its own
5 and about premisses similar in form in their case, and then about
mixtures. He proposes to do the same thing and will do it in the case
of the contingent.
*
219,33 1.17, 36b35-37a31 Failure of EE-conversion for contingent
propositions293
36b35 It should first be shown that a privative contingent294

proposition does not convert; [that is, if it is contingent that A
holds of no B, it is not necessary that it is also contingent that
B holds of no A.
36b37295 For let this be assumed and let it be contingent that
B holds of no A. Then, since contingent affirmations convert
with negations both contraries and opposites and it is
contingent that B holds of no A, it is evident that it will also be
contingent that B holds of all A. But this is false. For it is not
the case that if it is contingent that X holds of all Y, it is
necessary that it be contingent that Y holds of all X. So the
privative does not convert.
37a4 Furthermore nothing prevents it being contingent that
A holds of no B, although B does not hold of some A by necessity.
For example, it is contingent that white does not hold of any
human being for it is also contingent that it holds of every
human being , but it is not true to say that it is contingent that
human holds of nothing white. For it does not hold of many
white things by necessity, but what is necessary is not contin-
gent.]
35 When he discussed propositional conversions and showed which
propositions convert with which,296 he said that a universal negative
220,1 contingent proposition does not convert with itself, but he postponed
giving the reason until later. He shows this now, as the situation
demands because syllogistic combinations in the second and third
figure require conversions. Since he is going to show that there is no
syllogism from contingent premisses in the second figure, and since
Translation 107
he is also going to make use of the fact that a universal negative 5
contingent proposition does not convert with itself, he proves this
first.
By setting down terms he indicates what kind of conversion he is
talking about viz., the interchange of terms and not the transfor-
mation of a negative proposition to an affirmative one; for it is
assumed to convert to that.297 However, as we mentioned at the
beginning,298 Theophrastus and Eudemus say that the universal
<contingent> negative also converts with itself just as both the 10
unqualified and the necessary universal negative do. They show that
it converts in the following way. If it is contingent that A holds of no
B, it is also contingent that B holds of no A. For since it is contingent
that A holds of no B, when it is contingent that it holds of none, it is
then contingent that A is disjoined from all the things of B.299 But if
this is so, B will then also have been disjoined from A, and, if this is 15
so, it is also contingent that B holds of no A.
It seems that Aristotle expresses a better view than they do when
he says that a universal negative which is contingent in the way
specified does not convert with itself. For if X is disjoined from Y it is
not thereby contingently disjoined from it. Consequently it is not
sufficient to show that when it is contingent that A is disjoined from 20
B, then B is also disjoined from A; in addition <one must show> that
B is contingently disjoined from A. But if this is not shown, then it
has not been shown that a contingent proposition converts, since
what is separated from something by necessity is also disjoined from
it, but not contingently.
(36b37) Aristotle shows that there is no conversion using reductio
ad impossibile.300 For, if possible, let it be assumed that there is
conversion, and if it is contingent that A holds of no B, let it also be 25
contingent that B holds of no A. However, we are assuming that
negative contingent propositions also convert with respect to affirm-
ative contingent ones. But it is assumed that it is contingent that B
holds of no A. So it is clear that it is also contingent that it holds of
all A. But this is false. For it is not the case that, if it is contingent
that A holds of all B for the reason that it is assumed contingent that
it holds of none, it is necessary that it is also contingent that B holds 30
of all A. For if it is the case, it results that a universal affirmative
contingent proposition converts with itself, which isnt true even
according to them.301 For notice that it is contingent that white holds
of every human since it is also contingent that it holds of none ,
but it is not contingent that human holds of everything white; for it
does not hold of some white things, e.g., swan, snow, and many other
things, by necessity. But if it is false that it is contingent that human 35
holds of everything white, it is also false that it is contingent that it
holds of nothing white. Consequently, it is not the case that if it is
108 Translation
221,1 contingent that A holds of no B, it will also be contingent that B holds
of no A. For what holds of nothing does not thereby contingently not
hold. But they maintain consistency by saying that the universal
negative converts with respect to terms and also denying that an
affirmative contingent proposition converts with a contingent nega-
tive one. The latter conversion is not possible because according to
5 them contingency in the way specified is not the only contingency.302
303
He has said Furthermore nothing prevents instead of For
nothing prevents. For, as is apparent from what is said, there is no
other proof that things are this way than the one from the construc-
tion just described.304 Or perhaps he first showed this by contingent
negative propositions being transformed into affirmative ones, af-
10 firmative contingent universal propositions being assumed not to
convert with themselves; and now he gives a proof with respect to
negative contingent universal propositions themselves, setting down
terms and showing through them that the propositions do not con-
vert. If this were so this proof would be different from the one before
it. But he says:
36b38 ... since contingent affirmations convert with negations

15 both contraries and opposites [and it is contingent that B
holds of no A, it is evident that it will also be contingent that B
holds of all A. But this is false. For it is not the case that if it is
contingent that X holds of all Y, it is necessary that it be
contingent that Y holds of all X. So the privative does not
convert.
37a4 Furthermore nothing prevents it being contingent that
A holds of no B, although B does not hold of some A by necessity.
For example, it is contingent that white does not hold of any
human being for it is also contingent that it holds of every
human being , but it is not true to say that it is contingent that
human holds of nothing white. For it does not hold of many
white things by necessity, but what is necessary is not contin-
gent.]
305
He calls the universal propositions It is contingent that X holds of
all Y and It is contingent that X holds of no Y contraries; and he calls
the universal propositions It is contingent that X holds of all Y and
It is contingent that X holds of no Y opposites of the particular
propositions It is contingent that X holds of not all Y and It is
contingent that X holds of some Y. But he does not do so because
these are genuine contraries or opposites of each other. How could
20 they be if they are true together? Rather, he does so because these
propositions are related verbally to one another in the same way as
contraries are related to one another in the case of necessary and
Translation 109
unqualified propositions. For the proposition which says that X holds
of all Y by necessity is contrary to X holds of no Y by necessity, and
X holds of all Y is contrary to X holds of no Y. And as far as what is
implied by the words, It is contingent that X holds of all Y is also
contrary to It is contingent that X holds of no Y; and again X holds
of all Y is the opposite of the proposition which says that X holds of 25
not all Y, and It is not the case that X holds of all Y by necessity306
is the opposite of X holds of all Y by necessity. And it seems that It
is contingent that X holds of all Y is similarly related to It is
contingent that X does not hold of all Y. This is why he also calls these
propositions contraries and opposites.
307
However, he would not say that the particular propositions are
true together with the universal ones to which they seem to be
opposite. For it is not the case that if It is contingent that X holds of
some Y is true, It is contingent that X holds of no Y is thereby also
true. However, he would say that the propositions which seem to be 30
opposite to the universal ones i.e., the particular ones, whether
affirmative or negative, do convert with one another: the universal
propositions convert with one another and again the particular
propositions which appear to be opposite to the universal ones con-
vert with one another.
He also says this in De Interpretatione; for in speaking about
contraries he says Therefore these cannot both be true at the same 222,1
time, and adds But it is possible308 for their opposites to be true with
respect to the same thing.309 And it is also possible that he has said
that particular propositions are opposite to one another when they
are taken with respect to the same subject as having their subject
determinate. Or is this not a peculiar feature of opposites?
310
Perhaps he is saying that particular contingent propositions 5
convert from those universal contingent ones which seem to be
opposite to them, but not saying that the universal propositions
convert from the particular contingent ones.
(37a4) He shows in a clear way using material terms that univer-
sal negative propositions which are contingent in the way specified
do not convert with respect to terms. For it is contingent that white
(and similarly walking and also being asleep) holds of no human, but
it is not contingent that human holds of nothing white (or walking or 10
asleep), because it is not also contingent that it holds of all; for human
necessarily does not hold of some things which are asleep or white. It
is even more evident that it is contingent that moving holds of no
human because it is contingent that it holds of every human, but it
is not contingent that human holds of nothing that moves because it
is not also contingent that it holds of all that moves; for it is not
contingent that human holds of the rotating body,311 since it does not 15
hold of that by necessity.
110 Translation
312
Someone might ask about the conversion of contingent affirm-
ative propositions with respect to negative ones whether perhaps the
contingent propositions do not convert with one another, but do
convert with unqualified ones. For if propositions about the future
are contingent in the strict sense, then it is clear that, if a contingent
20 affirmative is true, it is true that what was assumed to be contingent
does not yet hold. Consequently It is contingent that X holds of no Y
said of what does not hold now would convert with respect to It
is contingent that X holds of all Y. (The latter proposition is true
because what it says will hold.) The same thing can be said of the
contingent negative proposition since the affirmation <It is contin-
gent that X holds of all Y said> of what holds converts with It is
contingent that X holds of no Y, which is true. For it is not the case
25 that what is going to hold is also going not to hold, since it already
doesnt hold.
But perhaps even if the thing which the affirmation says is contin-
gent most definitely does not now hold, nevertheless it is contingent
that it later does not hold; for even if P is said to be contingent and P
does not come about, it remains the case that it is contingent that P
not hold again later. And if it is said that it is contingent that P holds
and P does come about again, it would remain the case that it was
30 contingent that P not hold at the time when it was also contingent
that P would hold. For if it is true to say of a person that it is
contingent that he walk tomorrow, it is true to say of him that it is
contingent that he not walk tomorrow. Thus, since a proposition
about the future is contingent, it is necessary to take both proposi-
tions in relation to the future. For even if it is true that the
unqualified is the opposite of the contingent, it is not assumed to
35 convert with respect to it.
223,1 37a9313 Moreover, it will not be proved from impossibility that

there is conversion either, [for example, if someone were to
maintain that since it is false that it is contingent that B holds
of no A, it is true that it is not contingent that it holds of none
this is a case of affirmation and negation , and if this is so, then
it is true that B holds of some A by necessity; consequently A
also holds of some B <by necessity>, but this is impossible.
37a14 For it is not the case that if it is not contingent that B
holds of no A, it is necessary that B holds of some A. For It is
not contingent that B holds of no A is said in two ways; it is said
if B holds of some A by necessity and if it does not hold of some
by necessity. For if B does not hold of some A by necessity, it is
not true to say that it is contingent that it does not hold of all,
just as if B does hold of some A by necessity, it is not true to say
Translation 111
that it is contingent that it holds of all. So, if someone were to
maintain that, since it is not contingent that C holds of all D, it
does not hold of some by necessity, he would take things falsely.
For it holds of all, but we say that it is not contingent that it
holds of all because it holds of certain of them by necessity.
Consequently both X holds of some Y by necessity and X does
not hold of some Y by necessity are opposite to It is contingent
that X holds of all Y. And similarly in the case of It is contingent
that X holds of no Y.
37a26 It is clear then that with respect to things which are
contingent and not contingent in the way which we have speci-
fied initially it is necessary to take B does not hold of some A
by necessity and not B holds of some A by necessity. But if this
is taken, nothing impossible results, so there is no syllogism.
Thus it is evident from what has been said that a privative
<contingent universal> proposition does not convert.]
Someone might think that it is at least possible for it to be proved
that a universal negative contingent proposition converts by reductio
ad impossibile. And his associates314 have used this same proof. For,
<they say,> if it is contingent that A holds of no B, it is also contingent 5
that B holds of no A. For if this is false, the opposite is true, but the
opposite of It is contingent that B holds of no A is It is not contingent
that B holds of no A, which is thought to be equivalent to B holds of
some A by necessity. Therefore, B holds of some A by necessity. But
since a particular necessary affirmative proposition converts, A also
holds of some B by necessity, which is impossible, since it was 10
hypothesized that it is contingent (in the way specified) that A holds
of no B. Accordingly, if this is impossible, so is the hypothesis from
which it followed, namely B holds of some A by necessity, which was
obtained by transforming It is not contingent that B holds of no A.
Therefore, the opposite, It is contingent that B holds of no A is true.
(37a14) Aristotle rejects this proof as not being sound. Having set 15
out the proof and being about to refute it, he does not first say This
is false or something of that kind; rather he turns directly to showing
that such a proof has not proceeded correctly. Consequently what is
said seems in a way rather obscure. For he says for it is not the case
that if it is not contingent that B holds of no A, it is necessary that B
holds of some A. With these words he censures the transformation of 20
It is not contingent that B holds of no A (which is the opposite of It
is contingent that B holds of no A) into B holds of some A by
necessity as unsound. For it is not at all the case that if It is not
contingent that B holds of no A is true, thereby and as a result it is
true that B holds of some A by necessity. For the proposition which
says It is not contingent that B holds of no A is also true if B does 25
112 Translation
not hold of some A by necessity. And the reason is that It is contin-
gent that B holds of all A converts with It is contingent that B holds
of no A; and the following are uniquely opposite to them:315
(i) B does not hold of some A by necessity

to
(ii) It is contingent that B holds of all A;
and
(iii) B holds of some A by necessity

to
(iv) It is contingent that B holds of no A.
Either (i) or (iii) will do away with both (ii) and (iv); at least if (ii) and
30 (iv) are equivalent to one another and convert with one another, each
of (i) and (iii) does away with both (ii) and (iv); and when one of (ii) or
(iv) is done away with the other is. Consequently (iii) and (i) do away
with (iv), and (iii) does so per se, (i) accidentally (since it does away
35 with (ii) and thereby also does away with (iv)). But, if this is so, the
224,1 negation of (iv), It is not contingent that B holds of no A, will be true
not only because (iii) is true but because (i) is. For both do away with
the opposite of this, (iv), since (iv) cannot be true when (i) is. Conse-
5 quently the person who hypothesizes It is not contingent that B holds
of no A does not always hypothesize it because (iii) holds, but also
because (i) does. So, if, given the hypothesis that it is not contingent
that B holds of no A, someone transforms it into (i) which is no less
a consequence of the hypothesis than (iii) ,316 nothing impossible will
10 follow.317 For it is not the case that if B does not hold of some A by
necessity, thereby A will not also hold of some B by necessity. For a
particular negative necessary proposition does not convert.
This being so, nothing is proved by reductio ad impossibile. For if
animal is divided into rational and irrational and there are rational
and irrational animals and someone were to assume the existence of
an animal and say absolutely that it is irrational, he would say what
15 is absurd and not true, since it is contingent that it is rational when
rational is posited to be a consequence of animal no less than irra-
tional is; so too, if someone were to assume that It is not contingent
that B holds of no A and say that it signifies (iii) only, he would say
what is absurd, since it is also possible318 that (i) is true.
319
And also it seems that only when (i) holds does the contingent
negative <universal> proposition not convert. For although it is
20 contingent that white holds of no human, it is not true that it is
contingent that human holds of nothing white. However, It is not
contingent that human holds of nothing white is true not because
Translation 113
human holds of something white by necessity (since it wouldnt be
contingent that white holds of every human if it held of some human
by necessity) but because human does not hold of something white by
necessity. Therefore in the case of conversions from It is not contin- 25
gent that B holds of no A to (iii) the transformation would not be
proper when the negation is not true because of (iii) but because of (i).
37a17 For if B does not hold of some A320 by necessity, it is not

true to say that it is contingent that it does not hold of all, [just
as if B does hold of some A by necessity, it is not true to say that
it is contingent that it holds of all. So, if someone were to
maintain that, since it is not contingent that C holds of all D, it
does not hold of some by necessity, he would take things falsely.
For it holds of all, but we say that it is not contingent that it
holds of all because it holds of certain of them by necessity.
Consequently both X holds of some Y by necessity and X does
not hold of some Y by necessity are opposite to It is contingent
that X holds of all Y. And similarly in the case of It is contingent
that X holds of no Y.]
He says It is contingent that it does not hold of all instead of It is 30
contingent that it holds of none.
Taking it that (i) follows from It is not contingent that B holds of
no A,321 he shows how it follows. For It is not contingent that B holds
of no A is true when (i) holds and when (iii) does. For example, if (i),
it is not then true that it is contingent that B holds of no A. For, as I
said, he takes It is contingent that it does not hold of all instead of 35
It is contingent that it holds of none, which also makes what he says 225,1
less clear. And if (iv) is not true when (i) is true, it is clear that the
negation of (iv) which says that it is not contingent that B holds of no
A is true then.
He also shows that this is how things are because of the fact that
again the affirmation (ii) is false not only if (i) is true but also if (iii) 5
is. For if (iii) holds, (ii) is false, since it is not contingent that B holds
of that of which it holds by necessity. And (iii) is related to (ii) in the
same way as (i) is to (iv). So (iv) will not be true when (i) is,322 since 10
it is not true that it is contingent that B does not hold of that of which
it does not hold by necessity. Therefore, the negation of (iv), It is not
contingent that B holds of no A, will be true when (i) is. So It is not
contingent that B holds of no A is true not just when (iii) is, but also 15
when (i) is, since both (iii) and (i) do away with each of the universal
contingent propositions (ii) and (iv). So the negation of either (ii) or
(iv) is true no matter which of (i) and (iii) is.
114 Translation
37a20 So, if someone were to maintain that since it is not

20 contingent that C holds of all D, it does not hold of some by
necessity, he would take things falsely. [For it holds of all,323 but
we say that it is not contingent that it holds of all because it
holds of certain of them by necessity. Consequently both X
holds of some Y by necessity and X does not hold of some Y by
necessity are opposite to It is contingent that X holds of all Y.
And similarly in the case of It is contingent that X holds of
no Y.]
Taking it that (ii) does not follow from (i) but that it is clear that its
negation It is not contingent that B holds of all A does, he uses this
fact to make it evident that It is not contingent that B holds of all A
25 is not always true because (i) is. For it has been shown that it is also
true because (iii) is. Consequently the two particular necessary af-
firmative and negative propositions <(i) and (iii)> will be opposites of
(iv). So, if it is hypothesized that C holds of all D and of some of D by
necessity, the proposition which says that it is contingent that C holds
of all D is not then true. The reason is not that C does not hold of some
30 D by necessity for that isnt true but that it holds of some by
necessity.
There is a reason why he takes it that C holds of all D and of some
D by necessity and that consequently the proposition which says that
it is contingent that C holds of all D is false; for by means of this he
says that the contingent negative proposition which is taken in the
35 conversion, namely (iv), is false because B holds of no A and does not
226,1 hold of some by necessity. For just as (ii) is false if B holds of all A
and of some A by necessity, so too (iv) is false if B holds of no A and
does not hold of some by necessity. Not just (i) but also (iii) does away
5 with (ii), as has been shown. But if both (i) and (iii) do away with (ii),
both of them not just (iii) but also (i) will do away with (iv), which
is equivalent to (ii) and converts with it. But since (iv) is equivalent
to (ii) and it has been shown that both (i) and (iii) do away with (ii),
10 it is clear that the same two will do away with (iv).
37a26 It is clear then that with respect to things which are

contingent and not contingent in the way which we have speci-
fied324 initially [it is necessary to take B does not hold of some
A by necessity and not B holds of some A by necessity. But if
this is taken, nothing impossible results, so there is no syllo-
gism. Thus it is evident from what has been said that a privative
<contingent universal> proposition does not convert.]
Having shown that the two particular necessary and affirmative or
negative propositions <(i) and (iii)> do away with each of the universal
Translation 115
affirmative and negative propositions which are contingent in the
way specified <(ii) and (iv)>, he sets down the purpose for which he 15
proved these things. He says that in the case of the reductio ad
impossibile involving the conversion of a <universal negative> propo-
sition which is contingent in the way specified, it is necessary, having
hypothesized It is not contingent that B holds of no A, to transform
this into (i). For (iv) was not true325 because (i) was, but its negation,
which says It is not contingent that B holds of no A, was true because 20
(i) was. For if It is contingent that A holds of no B is true then the
proposition which says It is contingent that B holds of no A <iv> can
be false only because B does not hold of some A by necessity . For
if it were false because B holds of some A by necessity <iii>, It is
contingent that A holds of no B could not be true. For if B holds of 25
some A by necessity <iii>, A holds of some B by necessity because a
necessary particular affirmative proposition converts. But since the
negation <It is not contingent that B holds of no A> is not trans-
formed into this but into the particular negative necessary
proposition which makes it true <i.e., (i)>, nothing impossible follows
because a negative particular necessary proposition does not convert.
Therefore, a universal negative contingent proposition is not proved 30
or inferred to convert by reductio ad impossibile.
And at the same time from the fact that they are sometimes false
together it is also clear that (iii) is not the opposite of (iv) nor is it
equivalent to the negation of (iv), It is not contingent that B holds of
no A; but the person who wishes to show, using (iii), that a negative
contingent <universal> proposition converts transforms It is not
contingent that B holds of no A into (iii), as if they were equivalent. 35
For, (iv) is also false when B holds of no A by necessity (because then
it is not contingent that B holds of all A), and so is (iii). For it is false 227,1
that it is contingent that irrationality holds of no human and also
false that it holds of some by necessity. For it is not the case that if
the reductio ad impossibile goes through in some cases in which the
negation <It is not contingent that B holds of no A> holds (and it
does go through when (iii) holds) and does not go through in some
(e.g., when (i) holds), then it is any more proved than not proved that 5
a universal negative contingent proposition converts; rather it is not
proved because it is not this way in all cases in which the negation is
true. For it is necessary that what is syllogistic be the same in all
cases, and a counter-example to it is sufficient, even if it is shown to
hold in some case.326
Notes
1. On this chapter see section II.B of the introduction. The most interesting
part of Alexanders commentary concerns the ekthesis arguments, and starts at
121,15.
2. We quote Aristotles text wherever we think it is helpful for understanding
the commentary. Material added in square brackets represents part of the
lemmas not in Alexanders text.
3. A clear expression of the idea that what is contingent does not hold; see
section III.A of the introduction.
4. Aristotle next argues that the same NNN and UUU combinations will be
syllogistic. For an account of the argument see section II.B of the introduction.
5. Baroco2(NNN) NEC(AaB) NEC(AoC) NEC(BoC).
6. Bocardo3(NNN) NEC(AoC) NEC(BaC) NEC(AoB).
7. See sections III.A and D of the introduction.
8. Baroco2(UUU) was justified at 1.5, 27a36-b3, Bocardo3(UUU) at 1.6,
28b17-21.
9. At 29b36.
10. Reading gnrimon t for the gnrimn ti of Wallies.
11. That is, the combinations of premisses with the same modality.
12. Baroco2(NNN) and Bocardo3(NNN).
13. We suspect corruption in this long sentence (121,18-26), but the sense is
clear enough, and what Alexander has in mind is made perfectly clear by the
proofs of Baroco2(NNN) and Bocardo3(NNN) which follow.
14. i.e. the part D of C of which NEC(AeD).
15. We give a representation of Alexanders account of Aristotles proof of:
Let D be a part of C such that NEC(AeD). Then (EE-conversionn) NEC(DeA).
Hence (Celarent1(NNN)) NEC(DeB) and (EE-conversionn) NEC(BeD). But D is
part of C, so that NEC(BoC).
16. Alexander gives the argument for:
Bocardo3(NNN) NEC(AoC) NEC(BaC) NEC(AoB).
Again he takes a part D of C such that NEC(AeD). But since D is a part of C
and NEC(BaC), NEC(BaD) and (AI-conversionn) NEC(DiB). Hence
(Ferio1(NNN)) NEC(AoB).
17. Wallies prints: eilphth palin ti tou G, hi merei autou m huparkhon to
A ex ananks ekeito tini ti G ex ananks m huparkhein, kai est to D. We have
translated eilphth palin ti tou G, hi merei autou m huparkhon to A ex
ananks <to gar A> ekeito tini ti G ex ananks m huparkhein kai est to D
18. In chapter 6, 28a24-6 and 28b14-15, 20-1. What Alexander goes on to say
can be explained by reference to the first of these passages in which Aristotle
offers a proof by what he calls ekthesis for:
Darapti3(UUU) PaS RaS PiR
In it he takes an S (some of S) and asserts that, since both P and R hold of S,
P holds of some R. Alexander does not want this to be understood as a matter
of reducing one case of Darapti3 to another, viz.,
PaS RaS PiR
and so he claims that in this case S is not a subclass of S but an individual,
consideration of which makes evident the coincidence of P and R with respect
to something. He insists that Aristotle is not arguing about S, i.e., performing
logical operations on propositions involving S. (If one takes S as an individual
S and formalizes syllogistic using quantification theory, one will be arguing that
S is P and S is R, so it is both P and R [conjunction introduction], so something
is both P and R [existential quantifier introduction].) See also in An. Pr.
99,16-100,26 and 32,32-34,2 with the notes in Barnes et al.
19. Just what some of the original term is is our very loose paraphrase of
Aristotles terse hoper ekeino ti. Alexander explains this as a part or species of
the original term. Alexanders prose is also terse, and we have inserted letters
from the proof of Bocardo3(NNN) to indicate his meaning.
20. See the Greek-English index under rhthsetai.
21. Alexanders dense explanation of his (minor) point applies most directly
to Bocardo3(NNN). For the ekthesis, he says, Aristotle must take a part D of C
such that NEC(AeD). For then, given NEC(BaC), he can be sure that
NEC(BaD). However, if he had taken a part D of C of which NEC(BaD), he
would have no way of knowing whether or not NEC(AoD), even though
NEC(AoC). The extension of the point to Baroco2(NNN) presupposes only the
equivalence of NEC(AeD) and NEC(DeA).
22. At 1.6, 28b20-1 in connection with Bocardo3(UUU).
23. Alexanders point is that the ekthesis arguments involve transforming
the second-figure Baroco2(NNN) into the second-figure Camestres2(NNN) and
the third-figure Bocardo3(NNN) into the third-figure Felapton3(NNN).
24. This paragraph is Theophrastus 104 FHSG. See section II.B of the
introduction.
25. On Alexanders commentary on this chapter see section II.C of the
introduction. The most interesting part is the beginning discussion of whether
a necessary conclusion can follow from a necessary and an unqualified premiss.
26. Aristotle asserts the validity (completeness) of Barbara1(NUN) and
Celarent1(NUN).
27. Alexander may have read conclusion here; see the note on 128,7.
28. For a textual point see the note on 127,25.
29. i.e. 1. On the term indemonstrable which only occurs here in Alexan-
ders discussion of modal syllogistic, see Barnes et al., p. 21.
30. hoi de ge hetairoi autou hoi peri Eudmon te kai Theophraston. What
follows is Theophrastus 106A FHSG and Eudemus fr. 11a Wehrli. The rest of
the section is concerned with this dispute about the validity of Barbara1(NUN)
and Celarent1(NUN). The same dispute arises for Darii1(NUN) and
Ferio1(NUN), but they are not given an interesting separate consideration. For
discussion of the topic see section II.C of the introduction. Aristotle accepts the
combinations as syllogistic. Theophrastus and Eudemus reject them. Alexan-
der focuses on Barbara1. From his account of the discussion, Theophrastus and
Eudemus would seem to triumph. There is additional material on this subject
at 129,26-130,24, 132,23-34, and 140,14-141,6. See also Philoponus, in An. Pr.
123,12-126,29.
31. This law, according to which the conclusion is as weak as the weakest
premiss in terms of its modality (where necessity is stronger than unqualified-
ness, which in turn is stronger than contingency), quality (where affirmative is
stronger than negative), and quantity (where universality is stronger than
particularity), is sometimes called the peiorem rule. Note that it may be taken
negatively as a way of ruling out claims to validity or positively as a way of
deciding validity for modal versions of unqualified syllogisms. For an applica-
tion of the rule by Theophrastus and Eudemus see 173,32-174,3.
32. Alexander uses the terminology of being disjoined (apozeugnunai) only
in passages in which he is describing or discussing the views of Theophrastus
(and Eudemus). (At 132,23-34 he uses the terminology of separation (khrizein)
in a similar context.) Two of the passages concern their explanation of EE-con-
versionu (31,4-10; 34,14-16), and a third their assertion that EE-conversion
holds for contingent propositions (220,9-23). On the basis of these passages it
seems clear that A is disjoined from B is tantamount to AeB. We have not
found a fully satisfactory reconstruction of the argument sketched by Alexan-
der in the present passage, but it looks to us to start by assuming the premisses
of Barbara1(NU_), NEC(AaB) and BaC, and adding the assumption (legitimate
for the purpose of argument) that NEC(BaC); (i) it then somehow moves from
that to It is contingent that BeC, and then (legitimately) to the claim that B
and C will be totally disjoint at some time, from which it infers (ii) that A and
C will be disjoint at that time, so that NEC(AaC).
There seems to be no way to make (ii) a sound inference; from the fact that
AaB and BeC it does not follow that AeC (or even that AoC). Perhaps we should
understand the future A will also be disjoined as A might also be disjoined,
but justifying the claim that A might be disjoined from C would seem to require
some kind of argument, the simplest of which is the specification of terms.
The best we can do with (i) is to supply the interpretation CON(BaC) for B
holds of all C but not by necessity and then use Aristotelian AE-transforma-
tionc to get CON(BeC).
Philoponus (in An Pr. 124,9-24) gives a more long-winded but not more clear
version of this argument.
33. Philoponus examples (in An Pr. 124,24-8) are moving, walking, human,
and virtue, practical wisdom, human.
34. Other passages which suggest support for Theophrastus and Eudemus
on this issue are 129,26-130,24, 132,23-34. But note that Alexander describes
Aristotles position as reasonable at 129,18-20.
35. Wallies marks a lacuna in the text and suggests supplying It is strange
(atopon). In a parallel passage [Ammonius] (in An. Pr. 39,31-40,2) ascribes to
Herminus the view which Alexander describes in this paragraph, according to
which Aristotle means to say that some instances of a single mood are valid and
some are not. Alexander is right to reject this line of interpretation, but
unfortunately he continues to be unclear about the difference between the false
claim that Every human is a thing that laughs follows from Every human is
an animal and Everything that laughs is an animal and the true one that one
gets true sentences when one takes A as animal, B as human, and C as thing
that laughs in the schema:
AaC AaB CaB.
Alexander will say that the schema is not syllogistic even though in certain
instances the premisses imply the conclusion. We might say that the premisses
dont imply the conclusion because the schema is not syllogistic. See part I of
the introduction. On Herminus, who is said to have been a teacher of Alexander,
see Moraux (1984), pp. 361-98.
36. Wallies text reads eti de ei touto ebouleto dloun, hs edeixen, edeixen an,
eph hs huls touto houts ekhei: if Aristotle wanted to make this point, as he
proved, he would have proved . Since we do not know what to make of as he
proved we suggest that edeixen was written twice and the dittography rectified
by the addition of hs.
37. On this lost work see Sharples (1987), p. 1196. Alexander refers to it
again at 127,15-16, 207,35-6, 213,25-7, 238,37-8, 250,1-2; cf. 188,16-17, and
191,17-18. These passages suggest that Alexander deliberately refrains from
expressing views on certain controversial subjects, possibly on the grounds that
this is not the task of a commentator, i.e, a person who is expounding a text to
students.
38. Alexander now considers Barbara1(NUN).
39. Alexander here quotes his paraphrase of 1.1, 24b29-30. See 24,27-30.
40. 1.8, 30a2-3.
41. The issue raised here concerns the proper interpretation of an unquali-
fied formula. The counter interpretation to Barbara1(NUN) offered by
Theophrastus at 124,24-5 takes Everything moving is a human to be true, but
it is presumably false; the defenders of Aristotle call this kind of proposition a
postulate (aitma) because its use depends on a concession that it might be true
at some time that, e.g. the only moving things are humans. However, Aristotle
himself sometimes takes Every animal is moving to be true (e.g. at 30a28-32).
At 126,17-22 Alexander points out that this line of defense will not work for
Aristotles claim at 30a28-30b2 that Darii1(NUN) and Ferio1(NUN) are valid,
since the non-necessary premiss is particular. At 130,24-5 he says that Aristotle
(at least at 30a28-32) treats an unqualified universal proposition as a hypo-
thesis.
42. en ti huparkhein.
43. Alexander finds this view to be expressed or at least to underlie what
Aristotle says in 1.41, 49b14-32. According to Alexander, although AaB is
equivalent to A holds of all of that of all of which B holds, it is not equivalent
to A holds of all of that of which B holds, which Alexander (mistakenly) thinks
is equivalent to AiB. At 379,9-11 Alexander reports Theophrastus as saying in
On Affirmation that A holds of what B does is equivalent to A holds of all of
that of all of which B holds. On this question see also 1.13, 32b29-37 with
Alexanders discussion at 165,25-166,25. (We thank Robin Smith for help with
this note.)
44. The argument here seems to concern Barbara1(NUN) primarily. It takes
AaB to mean If BaC then AaC, and apparently infers that NEC(AaB) ought to
mean If BaC, then NEC(AaC). If the inference were correct Barbara1(NUN)
would be justified, but one needs an explanation why NEC(AaB) should not be
rendered NEC(if BaC then AaC).
45. The remainder of this section is Theophrastus 106C FHSG. In the first
paragraph Alexander considers an alleged reductio argument for:
Assume NEC(AaC), i.e., CON (AaC), i.e., CON(AoC). But NEC(AaB); so
(Baroco2(NCC)) CON(BoC), but this, it is alleged, conflicts with BaC, so that
NEC(AaC). This reductio is not valid since CON(BoC) and BaC are compatible.
Alexander says nothing about the quality of this argument. Perhaps his words
try to show are a sign that he is sceptical. In any case he follows it with a
devastating argument against Theophrastus. That argument is repeated by
Philoponus (in An. Pr. 123,26-124,1)
At 1.19, 38b27-9 Aristotle rejects Baroco2(NC_). Alexander gives an indirect
reduction of Baroco2(NCCt) to Barbara1(NNN) at 240,32-241,1.
Alexanders invocation of Baroco2(NC_) is the first of many examples of what
we will call a circle argument, an argument which uses a syllogism not yet
established to argue for a syllogism under consideration. Although this proce-
dure does not establish the syllogism under consideration, it can be used to
confirm the coherence of a version of syllogistic.
46. Alexander gives a reductio argument for Barbara1(NUN). Assume
NEC(AaC), i.e., CON (AaC), i.e., CON(AoC). But BaC. Therefore (Bo-
cardo3(CUC)), CON(AoB), contradicting NEC(AaB). Aristotle justifies
Bocardo3(CUC) by a problematic reductio to Barbara1(NUN) in chapter 21 at
39b31-9. See Alexanders commentary on that passage 247,9-248,30. [Am-
monius] (in An. Pr. 39,10-15) ascribes this argument to Alexander. See
Appendix 3 on conditional necessity.
Philoponus (in An. Pr. 124,30-125,18) reports as a response to this defence
of Aristotle the point that the same kind of argument could be used to establish
Barbara1(NUU) and Barbara1(NUCt). If Aristotle were clear about the different
kinds of contingency, neither derivation need have bothered him, since NEC(P)
implies both P and NEC( P).
47. Theophrastus and Eudemus. The claim that Theophrastus accepted
some version of Bocardo3(CUC) (presumably Bocardo3(CtUCt)) is problematic
precisely because it is equivalent to Barbara1(NUN), which Theophrastus
rejected. But the claim is repeated at 248,19-30. In a parallel passage (in An.
Pr. 124,1-4) Philoponus speaks of Aristotle and everyone else accepting Bo-
cardo3(CUC).
48. At 125,30-1.
49. Barbara1(NUN) and Celarent1(NUN).
50. The lemma reads huparkhein m huparkhein to A keitai where Ross
prints huparkhei oukh huparkhei to A.
51. Aristotle accepts Barbara1(UNU), but insists that this pair of premisses
does not yield a necessary conclusion, referring to arguments using the first or
third figure. He offers what we have called an incompatibility rejection argu-
ment. See section II.C of the introduction. Alexanders fullest discussion of the
general form of these arguments starts at 131,8. Alexander takes the third-fig-
ure argument referred to by Aristotle to use Darapti3(NNN), the first-figure
argument to involve the step of reduction of Darapti3(NNN) to Darii1(NNN). We
combine the two arguments as follows: Assume that AaB, NEC(AiB), and
NEC(BaC) these three propositions are compatible. If Barbara1(UNN) were
valid, we could infer NEC(AaC), which with NEC(BaC) would imply
(Darapti3(NNN)) NEC(AiB), which contradicts NEC(AiB). (Alexander places
stress on the consistency of AaB and NEC(AiB).) We might then interpret
Aristotle as arguing that there are interpretations which make AaB and
NEC(BaC) true and something implied by NEC(AaC) and NEC(BaC) false,
hence an interpretation which makes AaB and NEC(BaC) true and NEC(AaC)
false. The terms Aristotle uses will provide such an interpretation if we assume
that it is not necessary that some animal be in motion although in fact all are.
For then all of:
Motion a Animal
NEC(Motion i Animal )
NEC(Animal a Human)
would be true. But
NEC(Motion a Human)
cannot be true in this circumstance because, if it were, so would
NEC(Motion i Animal)
be true, contradicting:
NEC(Motion i Animal)
At 128,31ff. Alexander points out that no similar refutation can be given for
Aristotles Barbara1(NUN). However, he does not point out that once the
complete Darii1(NUN) is available this same method could be used to show that
Barbara1(UNU) is not valid. Indeed, at 133,19-29 Alexander implies that this
method couldnt be used against Barbara1(UNU).
Alexander discusses the method used here again in connection with the next
chapter at 138,5-139,11.
52. endekhetai. For Alexanders text of this line see 128,29 with note and the
next unit of the commentary. We take it that endekhetai is here used informally
rather than as a term of logic and so translate informally in the next stretch of
text.
53. At the beginning of the chapter, 30a15-16. For the reason Alexander, who
substitutes the word conclusion for the syllogism of our text of Aristotle,
makes this point see 125,3-29.
54. Alexanders text of this sentence reads endekhetai de toiouton einai to B,
hi enkhrei to A mdeni huparkhein whereas our manuscripts read endekhetai
gar toiouton einai to B, hi enkhrei to A mdeni huparkhein. See also the
lemma at 129,8 (which reads endekhetai de toiouton ti einai) with Alexanders
discussion.
55. Alexander points out that Aristotle is not claiming that NEC(AiB) is
implied by AaB, only that the two are compatible.
56. Wallies prints all epei m anankaion esti to panti huparkhon euthus en
ti panti huparkhein kai to ex ananks tini auti (auti a; au M) huparkhein
periekhein (periekhei aM). We tentatively propose all epei m anankaion esti to
panti huparkhon <ouk> euthus en ti panti huparkhein kai to ex ananks tini
autou huparkhein periekhetai.
57. See the note on 128,29-30.
58. cf. Denniston (1954), p. 169: de is not infrequently used where the
context admits, or even appears to demand, gar. The Scholia often observe:
ho de anti tou gar.
59. Alexander considers the possibility that the kind of argument Aristotle
has given against Barbara1(UNN) might be applied against the validity of:
He points out that NEC(AaC) and BaC will yield either NEC(AiB) or AiB,
depending on whether or not one accepts Darii1(NUN), neither of which is
incompatible with NEC(AaB). He might also have mentioned that NEC(AaB)
and NEC(AaC) yield nothing at all. Such an argument, which we have called
an incompatibility acceptance argument, does not, of course, establish the
validity of Barbara1(NUN); at most it establishes that its conclusion is compat-
ible with its premisses.
60. Contrast 124,31-2, where the Theophrastean arguments are called rea-
sonable or at least apparently reasonable.
61. Aristotle points out that Barbara1(UNN) is refuted because all humans
are animals by necessity and it might be true that all animals were in motion,
so that all humans were in motion; nevertheless it would not be true that all
humans are in motion by necessity. Alexander recurs to the Theophrastean
counterexample from 124,24 to Barbara1(NUN): even if humans were the only
things in motion at some time, it would not be true that animals are the only
things in motion by necessity. He then gives what looks to be a compelling
justification of the Theophrastean position, but he makes no attempt to corre-
late what he says with Aristotles acceptance of the first-figure NUN cases. This
next section is discussed by Flannery (1995), pp. 86-92.
62. But if Barbara1(NUN) were valid and animal holds of all human is taken
as necessary, it would follow that animal holds of all that moves by necessity.
Perhaps something has dropped out of the text at this point.
63. cf. 126,4.
64. Alexander here substitutes Y being under (hupo) X for what was ex-
pressed as X being said of Y in the previous sentence. He goes on to distinguish
between being under Y in the sense of being a part of the essence of X and being
under X in the general sense of being an X. If we take being under (or something
of) X in the general way as we should Barbara1(NUN) will not be valid.
65. Following the suggestion of an anonymous reader, we retain the manu-
script h where Wallies emends to n and take the words is the following to be
understood.
66. In setting down terms for Barbara1(UN_) in the passage under discus-
sion. Alexander presumably means that a proposition such as All animals are
moving is not really true. On the notion that a universal unqualified proposi-
tion is a hypothesis see 126,9-22.
67. Aristotle rejects:
Celarent1(UNN) AeB NEC(BaC) NEC(AeC)
Alexander gives his apparent reasons. Again he offers a first- and a third-figure
argument, which we combine into the latter and expand. Suppose NEC(AeC).
But NEC(BaC). Therefore (Felapton3(NNN)), NEC(AoB). Alexander asserts
that NEC(AoB) is false. Again, what he means is that AeB and NEC(AoB)
can be true together, but the latter is incompatible with NEC(AoB). See 128,1ff.
with the note on 128,1. We observe that a similar argument cannot be given
against Celarent1(UNU).
68. We adopt Wallies conjecture hupothsometha for the ekthsometha
which he prints.
69. Ferio1(NNN).
70. Felapton3(NNN).
71. Alexander points out that the proofs that the conclusions of Bar-
bara1(UN_) and Celarent1(UN_) are not necessary are not the standard kind of
reductio used to establish that a conclusion follows from a pair of premisses by
showing that the contradictory of the conclusion and one of the premisses are
incompatible with the other premiss.
72. Alexander makes the correct point that, e.g. in the rejection of Bar-
bara1(UNN) NEC(AaC) is not incompatible with the premisses, but
incompatible with them plus something which is compatible with them, namely
CON(AeB).
73. At 30a27: But this is false. Unfortunately this is not a good way of
putting the matter, and Alexander takes it over. Aristotle should say something
like But there are concrete terms which make this false and the other proposi-
tions true.
74. What lies behind this remark is the idea that an impossibility cannot
follow from a possibility, which Aristotle argues for at 1.15, 34a5-33 and uses
in his justification of Barbara1(UCC) at 34a34-35b17; see Alexanders lengthy
discussion starting at 175,22.
75. Another version of the point made at the beginning of the paragraph.
76. i.e. AaB in the case of Barbara1(UNU).
77. This remark is rather surprising. It perhaps reflects Alexanders correct
sense that Aristotles method is very problematic. See section II.C of the
introduction.
78. of Barbara1(UN_) and Celarent1(UN_).
79. Alexander here introduces another way of showing that Barbara1(UNU)
and Celarent1(UNU) are syllogistic, but Barbara1(UNN) and Celarent1(UNN)
are not. Attempt to do a reductio on the premisses and the denial of the
conclusion for each alternative, and show that a contradiction follows when the
unqualified conclusion is denied, but not when the necessary one is. The
method presupposes the validity of modal syllogisms which Aristotle has not
yet discussed; cf. 134,17-20. It is possible that Alexander introduces the method
as one way of dealing with the obscure 30b2-4; see 133,29-134,20. Alexander
uses the method again in his discussion of the next chapter at 139,12-26.
80. We propose khrmenou for the khrmenois printed by Wallies. The
Aldine has khrmenn.
81. Alexander applies his method to justify:
Barbara1(UNU) AaB NEC(BaC) AaC
He assumes (AaC), i.e. AoC, and then applies Bocardo3(UNU) (briefly treated
by Aristotle at 1.11, 31b40-32a1) to get AoB, contradicting AaB. He then argues
that no similar contradiction can be produced for:
Barbara1(UNN) AaB NEC(BaC) NEC(AaC)
For if one assumes NEC(AaC), i.e., CON(AoC), Bocardo3(CNC) yields only
CON(AoB), which is quite compatible with AaB.
Aristotles treatment of Bocardo3(CN_) at 1.22, 40a40-b3 is not crystal clear.
See 252,3ff. with the note on 252,3. One might think of trying to apply
Baroco2(UC_), but Aristotle rejects this combination at 1.18, 37b39-38a2. We
note that this argument may have been unproblematic for Theophrastus,
who we think accepted Bocardo3(CtNCt) and should have rejected
Baroco2(UCtCt).
82. Alexander asserts that his method works for accepting:
Celarent1(UNU) AeB NEC(BaC) AeC
and rejecting:
Celarent1(UNN) AeB NEC(BaC) NEC(AeC)
The argument for the first involves assuming (AeC), i.e., AiC, and applying
Disamis3(UNU) to get AiB, contradicting AeB. For the second, if one assumes
NEC(AeC), i.e., CON(AiC) and applies Disamis3(CNC) there is no contra-
diction. But if one applies Festino2(UCC), one gets CON(BoC), which does
contradict NEC(BaC). So Alexander is incorrect here, and Aristotles modal
logic once again shows its incoherence. Again, this argument would seem to be
all right for Theophrastus, who we believe would have accepted
Disamis3(CtCtCt) and should have rejected Festino2(UCtCt).
83. This last paragraph is Theophrastus 106B FHSG.
84. i.e. Barbara1(UN_).
85. Viz., that Barbara1(NUN) is syllogistic. The text, as it stands, is opaque
here, but that may reflect Alexanders excerpting.
86. Aristotle asserts the completeness of Darii1(NUN) and Ferio1(NUN).
87. Aristotle asserts that an incompatibility rejection argument will work
against Darii1(UNN) and Ferio1(UNN). He then gives terms for rejecting them.
Those terms take as true:
Motion a Animal Motion e Animal
NEC(Animal i White)
NEC(Motion i White)
NEC(Motion o White)
Alexander understands NEC(Animal i White) to be true because, e.g., swans
are white by necessity, a clear de re reading of NEC.
88. The punctuation adopted here corresponds to Alexanders understanding
of the text; see 133,17-19. Ross puts for nothing impossible results in paren-
theses to make just as in the universal syllogisms attach to the conclusion will
not be necessary.
89. hgeitai. Presumably an expression of Alexanders misgivings about
Aristotles position; cf. 42,29, 127,29, 235,21 and 239,12. For similar uses of
dokei see 37,15, 153,10, 236,33, and 242,12.
90. Alexander offers three interpretations of Aristotles brief remarks at
30b2-5, the first at 133,19-29, the second at 133,29-134,20, the third at 134,21-
31.
91. Alexander refers to Aristotles rejections of Barbara1(UNN) at 30a23-8
and Celarent1(UNN) at 30a32-3. Here he implies falsely that Aristotle (or
Alexander himself) showed that a similar argument couldnt be given against
Barbara1(UNU) AaB NEC(BaC) AaC
He sketches an argument, assuming all three propositions and pointing out that
the last two imply (Darapti3(UNU)) AiB, which is implied by AaB. Unfortu-
nately, Aristotle accepts Darapti3(UNN), which yields NEC(AiB), and
NEC(AiB) ought to be compatible with AaB. Again we have a situation in
which Alexander gives an argument which works for Theophrastus but not for
Aristotle.
At 134,32-135,6 and 135,12-19 Alexander shows that on this (probably
correct) understanding of Aristotles words what he says about Darii1 and
Ferio1 is false.
92. cf. 128,31-129,7.
93. Alexanders second interpretation involves the method he himself intro-
duced at 132,5. He offers an indirect circle justification for:
Darii1(UNU) AaB NEC(BiC) AiC
He assumes (AiC), i.e., AeC, and uses Ferison3(UNU) to infer AoB, contra-
dicting AaB. He argues that no such justification can be given for:
Darii1(UNN) AaB NEC(BiC) NEC(AiC)
because if one assumes NEC(AiC), i.e., CON(AeC), Ferison3(CNC) would
yield CON(AoB), which is compatible with AaB. (There is no possibility of
applying Camestres2(UC_) because Aristotle rejects it at 1.18, 37b19-23 and
Theophrastus presumably rejected it as well.) Unfortunately an argument of
the same kind can be given to justify:
Ferio1(UNN) AeB NEC(BiC) NEC(AoC)
For if NEC(AoC), i.e., CON(AaC), then (Cesare2(UCC)) CON(BeC), con-
tradicting NEC(BiC). The method also confirms:
Ferio1(NUN) NEC(AeB) BiC NEC(AoC)
For if NEC(AoC), i.e., CON(AaC), then (Datisi3(CUC)) CON(AiB), contra-
dicting NEC(AeB). Finally we mention that the method also confirms:
Darii1(NUN) NEC(AaB) BiC NEC(AiC)
For if NEC(AiC), i.e., CON(AeC), then (Ferison3(CUC)) CON(AoB), contra-
dicting NEC(AaB). None of these arguments for necessary conclusions will work
in what we take to be the Theophrastean system.
94. The words in parentheses may be an incorrect gloss. Alexander is now
talking about his method of assuming the contradictory of a purported conclu-
sion and trying to derive a contradiction. Nothing was said in his application of
that method about whether something false was generated. That issue is
relevant to the method employed by Aristotle at 30a25-8.
95. At 132,5-23.
96. Alexanders third suggestion is that the words nothing impossible
results somehow apply to the terms which Aristotle supplies to show the
invalidity of Darii1(UNN) and Ferio1(UNN). This makes the most logical sense
of what Aristotle says (cf. Smith (1989) ad 30b4), but Aristotles text suggests
that he sees the specification of terms as an alternative way of showing
invalidity. Alexander seems quite uncertain here.
97. Alexander points out that the method applied by Aristotle at 30a23-8 to
reject Barbara1(UNN) will not work for:
Darii1(UNN) AaB NEC(BiC) NEC(AiC)
since nothing follows from NEC(AiC) and either of the other two premisses. He
indicates that the same thing is true of Ferio1(UNN) at 135,12-19.
98. Alexander now argues that if no difficulty can be produced from the
assertions making up Barbara1(UNU) (or Celarent1(UNU)) none can be pro-
duced from the weaker assertions making up Darii1(UNU) or Ferio1(UNU). The
argument is correct, but the assumption that no difficulty can be derived for
Barbara1(UNU) is wrong. See the note on 133,20. Moreover, showing that no
difficulty follows from, e.g. Darii1(UNU) does not show that Darii1(UNN) is not
valid.
99. Alexander seems to point out that an incompatibility rejection argument
produces no difficulty when applied to any of Darii1(UNU), Darii1(UNN),
Ferio1(UNU) AeB NEC(BiC) AoC
and:
Ferio1(UNN) AeB NEC(BiC) NEC(AoC)
He has given the argument for Darii1(UNN) at 134,32-135,6, and now sketches
the argument for the Ferio1 cases: the conclusion and the minor premiss (or the
minor premiss converted) are both particular, and the conclusion and the major
premiss are both negative.
100. Reading <kai> touto kai for Wallies <> touto, kai.
101. i.e. Ferio1(UNN).
102. Taking off from the valid UUU cases with universal premisses, Aris-
totle asserts that Cesare2(NU_) and Camestres2(UN_) yield a necessary
conclusion, whereas Cesare2(UN_) and Camestres2(NU_) yield only an unquali-
fied one. He takes up the combinations with one particular premiss at 31a1.
What he says in the present passage will carry over to Festino2(NU_) and
Festino2(UN_), but not to Baroco2(UN_) and Baroco2(NU_), which Aristotle will
argue at 31a10-17 both yield only unqualified conclusions. For a minor diver-
gence between the text of the lemma and our text of Aristotle see Appendix 6
(the textual note on 30b7).
103. Baroco2.
104. 31a1. For a minor divergence between this citation and our text of
Aristotle see Appendix 6 (the textual note on this line).
105. i.e. all but Baroco2. What Alexander says here can be understood by
looking at the summary of assertoric syllogistic and seeing that there are no
alternative procedures for directly reducing a second-figure combination to a
first-figure one, and remembering that Aristotle accepts the first-figure NUN
and UNU combinations.
106. Aristotle reduces Cesare2(NUN) to Celarent1(NUN).
107. Aristotle says to A ti B mdeni endekhesth. Alexander points out that
this means the same thing as, e.g. to A ti B mdeni ex ananks huparkhet.
Here and elsewhere we render such phrases as It is not contingent that A holds
of any B.
108. Alexander means the dictum de omni et nullo.
109. Aristotle reduces Camestres2(UNN) to Celarent1(NUN).
110. Cesare2 and Camestres2.
111. We would have thought that Aristotle means only that the conclusion
converts in the same way as the minor premiss.
112. Aristotle now asserts that Camestres2(NU_) and Cesare2(UN_) yield
only unqualified conclusions. He discusses only Camestres2. Alexander takes
up Cesare2 at 141,17. Aristotle first points out that the straightforward reduc-
tion of Camestres2(NU_) is to Celarent1(UNU); he then argues that the
assumption that Camestres2(NUN) holds leads to absurdity, and finally gives
problematic terms for rejecting it. For minor deviations between the lemma and
our text of Aristotle see Appendix 6 (the textual notes on 30b18 and 30b19).
113. Aristotle applies the incompatibility rejection method he introduced in
the previous chapter at 30a23-8. See the note on 128,1, and section II.C of the
introduction. We may express his argument as follows. Assume, as is possible,
that NEC(AaB), AeC and NEC(CoA) (i.e., NEC (CaA), i.e., CON(CaA)).
Then, if Camestres2(NUN) held NEC(BeC), so that NEC(CeB); but also, since
NEC(AaB), (AI-conversion) NEC(BiA), and (Ferio1(NNN)) NEC(CoA), contra-
dicting NEC(CoA). At 138,30 Alexander gives as an example of NEC(CoA)
and AeC, NEC(Moving o Animal) and Animal e Moving, i.e., It is not
necessary that some animal is not moving and Nothing moving is, in fact, an
animal. For a minor deviation between the lemma and our text of Aristotle see
Appendix 6 (the textual note on 30b24-5).
114. At 1.9, 30a23-8.
115. The first of these two conditions is irrelevant to the argument.
116. Alexander takes these terms from 1.9, 30a29-30. Alexander goes on to
argue that if the minor premiss AeC of Camestres2(NU_) is interpreted as No
moving things are animals, it could be true even though It is contingent that
all moving things are animals and It is contingent that all animals are moving
things might both be true.
117. Alexanders use of various terms for expressing possibility is somewhat
loose in this paragraph. We have used contingent whenever he uses a form of
endekhesthai, but all he really means in the present sentence is that it is
possible for AeC and CON(AaC) to both be true.
118. Alexander is here worried about someone saying that the outer heavens
move by necessity, so that there is no possibility that everything moving be an
animal. See 199,1-4.
119. On Alexanders method here see 132,5-23 and section II.C of the
introduction. Alexander gives a circle argument that
Camestres2(NUU) NEC(AaB) AeC BeC
is valid because the combination of NEC(AaB), and the denial, BiC, of its
conclusion implies (Darii1(NUN)) NEC(AiC), which is incompatible with AeC.
On the other hand, he says,
Camestres2(NUN) NEC(AaB) AeC NEC(BeC)
is not valid. He assumes NEC(BeC), i.e., CON(BiC) and uses Darii1(NCC)
to infer CON(AiC), which is perfectly compatible with AeC. However, he does
not consider using Ferison3(UCC) to infer CON(AoB), which is incompatible
with NEC(AaB).
120. This brief passage causes some difficulty. Aristotle wishes to give terms
for rejecting Camestres2(NUN). For his terms to work the following have to be
true:
All humans are animals by necessity,
No white things are animals,
It is not necessary that no white things are human.
The problem with Aristotles choice of terms is that they make the second
premiss false if all swans are necessarily white, as Alexander suggests at
141,8-9. Alexander goes on to suggest substituting moving for white and also
supplies terms which yield:
It is necessary that what walks moves,
No humans are moving,
It is not necessary that no humans are walking.
The third proposition is true if necessity is taken simply, but the proposition
No humans are walking must be true if the premisses are; in Alexanders
phrase (or Theophrastus; see 36,25-8) the No humans are walking is necessary
on a condition (meta diorismou). Alexander takes Aristotle to express this point
when he says the conclusion will be necessary if certain things hold, but it will
not be necessary simply. He takes the opportunity to point out that Aristotle
cannot be talking about necessity on a condition when he takes a conclusion to
be a necessary proposition.
121. As Alexander has done at 138,30ff. and will do again at 141,8ff.
122. On the next two paragraphs see Appendix 3 on conditional necessity.
123. The text of this sentence is corrupt and heavily emended by Wallies.
Alexander is apparently saying that Aristotles denial that the conclusions of
Cesare2(UN_) and Camestres2(NU_) are necessary shows that he does not
mean necessary on a condition when he says a conclusion is necessary.
124. Barbara1(NUN).
125. We read to m hapls auto anankaion ginesthai alla [to] meta dioris-
mou, which we take to be a paraphrase of toutn men ontn anankaion estai to
sumperasma, hapls d ouk anankaion (30b38-40; cf. 32-3)
126. i.e. Theophrastus and Eudemus. 140,14-18 and 141,1-6 constitute
Theophrastus 100D FHSG, 141,1-6 is Eudemus fragment 12 Wehrli.
127. 9.19a23-4.
128. In the remainder of this section Alexander considers:
Cesare2(UN_) AeB NEC(AaC)
in a quite confusing way. He first suggests that there is no incompatibility
rejection argument against the conclusion being NEC(BeC) (141,17-27), and
then gives two (141,27-142,8 and 142,8-14). He concludes by providing terms
for the rejection (142,14-17).
In this first paragraph Alexander says that no incompatibility rejection
argument would seem possible because either we will get two negative pre-
misses or the non-syllogistic combination AE_3(NN_). What he doesnt point out
is that Felapton3(NNN) would give NEC(BoA), but NEC(BoA) is compatible
with AeB. This is the point he makes in the next paragraph, although he carries
out the reduction to Ferio1(NNN).
129. Here and in the next parenthetical remark Alexander refers back to the
rejection of Camestres2(NUN) at 30b24-31.
130. Alexanders formulation is again rather unfortunate. His point is that
It is contingent that CaA is compatible with the minor premiss AeC of
Camestres2(NUN), but NEC(CoA), which could be false when AeC is true, was
derived from the major premiss and conclusion of Camestres2(NUN)
131. At 138,30-139,11.
132. This sentence expresses the idea that BeA and CON(BaA) are compat-
ible.
133. Alexander gives an alternative incompatibility rejection argument for
Cesare2(UNN), converting the purported conclusion to NEC(CeB) and the
minor premiss to NEC(CiA) and using Festino2(NNN) to infer again
NEC(BoA).
134. Aristotle asserts the validity of Festino2(NUN) and denies that of
Baroco2(NUN) and Baroco2(UNN). Alexander appears to take him not to be
considering Baroco2(UNN) and also to be denying the validity of
Festino2(UNN).
135. Aristotle establishes Festino2(NUN) by reduction to Ferio1(NUN).
136. Aristotle asserts the invalidity of Baroco2(NUN) and then of
Baroco2(UNN). For a minor deviation between the lemma and our text of
Aristotle see Appendix 6 (the textual note on 31a10).
137. Alexander discusses a textual issue here starting at 144,4.
138. Alexander first points out that Aristotle does not explain why
Festino2(UNN) is invalid. He points out (in the obscurely formulated second
sentence) that if one tries to follow Aristotles procedure for Festino2(NU_) and
convert the major premiss of Festino2(UN_), one gets a reduction to Ferio1(UN_)
and hence no necessary conclusion. He then gives terms to show the invalidity
of Festino2(UNN), taking as true:
Nothing moving is an animal,
Some white thing is an animal by necessity,
It is not necessary that something white is not moving.
He does not mention that an incompatibility rejection argument will not work
in this case or that his own method could be used to justify:
Festino2(UNN) AeB NEC(AiC) NEC(BoC)
For if NEC(BoC), then (Celarent1(UC N )) NEC (AeC), i.e.,
NEC(AiC), contradicting NEC(AiC).
139. 1.5, 27a36-b1.
140. 1.8, 30a3-14.
141. At 30b33-4. In the passage now under consideration Aristotle appar-
ently takes the following propositions to be true:
(i) All humans are animals by necessity;
(ii) Some white things are not animals;
(iii) It is not necessary that some white thing is not human.
Alexander thinks that (ii) is a necessary rather than an unqualified truth, since,
for example, snow is necessarily not an animal, and that (iii) is false since snow
is necessarily not human. He therefore substitutes his own terms for Aristotles:
(i) All that walk move by necessity;
(ii) Some human is not moving;
(iii) It is not necessary that some human is not walking.
142. See 141,6-16.
143. Before discussing Aristotles obscure remark about Baroco2(UNN)
Alexander gives his own terms to show its invalidity. They would make the
following sentences true:
A (i) Everything literate is awake;
(ii) Some human (a sleeping one) is necessarily not awake;
(iii) It is not necessary that some human is not awake.
B (i) All moving things are animals;
(ii) Something white (snow) is necessarily not an animal;
(iii) It is not necessary that some white thing is not moving.
C (i) Everything which is awake is two-footed.
(ii) Some animals are necessarily not two-footed.
(iii) It is not necessary that some animal is not awake.
At 144,15 he opts for B because it involves changing only one of Aristotles terms.
144. We read [horoi] to <gar>. We suspect that horoi is an intrusive gloss.
Or perhaps one should read horoi <egrgorsis grammatikos anthrpos> to
<gar> egrgorenai .
145. i.e. some animal is not awake.
146. The words if just one of them is changed (henos monou metalambano-
menou) do not occur in our texts of Aristotle. We shall interpret what Alexander
says step by step in the following notes.
147. At 30b33-4. Alexander rules out these terms as an interpretation for
rejecting Baroco2(UNN) because they make the first premiss the necessary All
humans are animals. Alexander apparently says that they also make the
second premiss the (allegedly) false It is necessary that some white things are
not animals. This is presumably a careless formulation since at 143,23-5 he
indicated that this proposition is true. (A reader has suggested that this
problem would be avoided if the words we have translated but not (all oukh)
were translated rather than and understood as rather than just.)
148. We do not know whether Alexander just means that it is false that all
white things are animals, or that it is impossible, since, e.g., snow is necessarily
not an animal. We suspect the latter, since he is aware that Aristotle sometimes
interprets unqualified sentences by false but possible propositions. See 130,23-
4. On the other hand, Alexander proceeds to say that All humans are white
will not do as an interpretation for AaB.
149. Note that here Alexander takes it that NEC(Human o Animal).
150. At 141,6-16.
151. That is, with moving substituted for white.
152. We take the remark in parenthesis to be a response to an attempt to
defend Aristotle either by altering the text of 31a17 from dia gar tn autn
horn h apodeixis to dia gar tn autn h apodeixis or interpreting the text to
mean something like The same kind of proof will work. Alexander insists that
horn would have to be understood even if it werent there.
153. Alexander here raises the question why the procedure of ekthesis which
Aristotle invoked at 1.8, 30a6-14 to validate Baroco2(NNN) cannot be applied
to:
Baroco2(UNN) AaB NEC(AoC) NEC(BoC)
He first goes through the proof for Baroco2(NNN) and then adapts it to
Baroco2(UNN). Let D be a part of C such that NEC(AeD). Then (Cames-
tres2(UNN)) NEC(BeD); but D is some of C; so NEC(BoC). Alexanders
argument is longer because he carries out the reduction of Camestres2(UNN)
to Celarent1(NUN).
154. i.e. by necessity.
155. This seems to be a minor slip on Alexanders part since only one of the
premisses is converted. We move from AaB and NEC(AoC), to AaB and
NEC(AeD), to (converting NEC(AeD)) AaB and NEC(DeA), premisses for
Celarent1(NUN). Alexander is presumably looking ahead to the conversion of
the conclusion.
156. Again the questioning of Aristotles treatment of first-figure NUN
cases.
157. In the manuscripts D and A are interchanged; apparently the Aldine
reads D holds of no D by necessity.
158. Alexander confronts the embarrassing fact that Baroco2(NUN) can
apparently be disproved by terms and proved by the same method which
Aristotle used for Baroco2(NNN). For similar difficulties with Bocardo3(NU_)
see the end of the commentary on the next chapter, 150,25-151,30, and for a
related difficulty 238,22-38.
159. The terms given (against Baroco2(NUN)) are not Aristotles, but the
ones Alexander gave at 143,28-144,2.
160. i.e., doing an ekthesis.
161. Alexander defends Aristotles rejection of Baroco2(NUN), claiming that
if the ekthesis proof were correct it would not be possible to give terms to
reject it.
162. In the previous paragraph.
163. Alexander appears to claim that it would not be possible to produce
terms to reject Baroco2(NNN), but he lacks the resources to argue for this claim;
he contents himself with giving three terms which do not invalidate it.
164. Aristotle announces that Darapti3(NU_), Darapti3(UN_), and Felap-
ton3(NU_) have necessary conclusions, but Felapton3(UN_) an unqualified one.
165. Aristotle reduces Darapti3(NUN) to Darii1(NUN).
166. Aristotle reduces Darapti3(UNN) to Darii1(NUN), albeit in a somewhat
sketchy way; Alexander fills in the details and insists that they are necessary,
showing his commitment to the idea that the major term must be the predicate
of the conclusion. [Ammonius] (in An. Pr. 40,9-13) mentions apparently as an
argument of those around Theophrastus that the modality of the conclusion
of Darapti3(UN_) and Darapti3(NU_) would seem to depend on which of the
premisses one chooses to convert for the reduction.
167. Darii1(NUN).
168. Aristotle reduces Felapton3(NUN) to Ferio1(NUN). This is the last
lemma in the Greek text until 149,23.
169. Aristotle now argues that the standard reduction of Felapton3(UN_)
would be to Ferio1(UNU).
170. Aristotle gives terms to show that Felapton3(NU_) yields an unqualified
conclusion. Alexander understands him to be affirming the following:
(i) No horse is good;
(ii) It is necessary that all horses are animals;
(iii) Some animal is not good and it is not necessary that some animal is not
good.
Alexander has some difficulty with Aristotles justifying (i) by saying that it is
contingent that good holds of no horse and (iii) by saying it is contingent that
all are good.
171. Alexander explains Aristotles substitution of being awake (or asleep)
for good by reference to the doxa that some animals are incapable of goodness.
172. Aristotle announces the validity of Disamis3(UNN) and Datisi3(NUN),
and reduces Disamis3(UNN) to Darii1(NUN).
173. Alexander writes esti where our texts of Aristotle have estin.
174. Darii1(NUN)
175. Aristotle remarks that Datisi3(NUN) can also be reduced to
Darii1(NUN). Alexander fills in the details and explains the formal difference
from the previous reduction of Disamis3(UNN).
176. Again Alexander writes esti where our texts of Aristotle have estin.
177. Aristotle argues for the invalidity of Datisi3(UNN), using the same
method which he applied to Felapton3(UNN) at 31a37.
178. Aristotle now rejects Datisi3(UNN) on the grounds that the following
are true:
(i) Awake a Animal
(ii) NEC(Two-footed i Animal)
(iii) NEC(Awake i Two-footed)
Aristotle expresses (i) by saying that it is contingent that A holds of C.
Alexander explains that Aristotle means only to make clear that All animals
are awake holds, but not by necessity. Cf. 147,17-25.
179. For Alexanders text here see 149,7-12.
180. Alexanders point is that if we try converting the universal premiss AaC
of Datisi3(UN_), we will end up with two particular premisses which yield no
conclusion at all.
181. For a minor divergence from our text of Aristotle see Appendix 6 (the
textual note on 31b29).
182. This remark presupposes Alexanders interpretation of 1.3, 25a31-2.
See section III.C of the introduction.
183. Aristotles words at 31b30-1 involve a textual difficulty. One would
expect him to say, It is not necessary that something two-footed be awake. In
Rosss text he says it is not necessary that something two-footed be asleep or
awake (ou gar anank dipoun ti katheudein egrgorenai). As this paragraph
shows, Alexanders text has him saying that it is not necessary that something
two-footed not be asleep (ou gar anank dipoun ti m katheudein). It seems to
us likely that Aristotle inadvertently wrote ou gar anank dipoun ti katheudein
instead of ou gar anank dipoun ti egrgorenai and that this underwent two
different corrections, the one printed by Ross and the one read by Alexander.
However, we are not sure how to construe what is said in this paragraph
about the words It is not necessary that something two-footed not be asleep.
Two suggestions are made, but it is not clear whether each says that the words
may indicate a conjunction of two things or each offers two alternatives for what
the words mean. Moreover, both substitute some animal for something two-
footed and awake for not asleep. The second substitution is a perfectly
reasonable way to bring the words in line with Aristotles terms. We take the
first to be irrelevant. We take each suggestion to be assigning a conjunction to
It is not necessary that some animal be awake. The first offers It is contingent
that some animal be awake and It is contingent that no animal be awake. The
second offers It is contingent that some animal be awake and It is contingent
that some animal not be awake. However, we say all this without much
confidence.
184. Aristotle says that Disamis3(NUN) can be rejected using the same
terms as were just used for Datisi3(NUN). Alexander points out that the order
has to be changed. Instead of: A: being awake: B; two-footed; C: animal, one will
have to assign being awake to B and two-footed to A, so that the propositions
become:
(i) NEC(Two-footed i Animal)
(ii) Awake a Animal
(iii) NEC(Two-footed i Awake)
185. Alexander points out that what Aristotle said about Datisi3(UN_) at
31b20 could be applied to Disamis3(NU_): the standard reduction reduces it to
Darii1(UN_), which has an unqualified, not a necessary conclusion.
186. The brevity of this last section of chapter 11 causes Alexander some
difficulty. Aristotle is considering the four cases Ferison3(NU_), Ferison3(UN_),
Bocardo3(NU_), and Bocardo3(UN_). At 31b33-7 he says that Ferison3(NUN) is
valid; Alexander supplies the argument. At 31b37-40 Aristotle apparently
asserts the non-validity of Ferison3(UNN) and Bocardo3(UNN), adding the
obscure remark that The others are the same as we also said in the case of the
previous ones (ta men gar alla tauta ha kai epi tn proteron eroumen). Alexan-
der interprets these words to mean that only Ferison3(UN_) can be handled
by showing that the standard reduction reduces it to a first-figure UNU
case. Aristotle goes on to give terms purporting to show the invalidity of
Bocardo3(UNN) at 31b40-32a1, of Ferison3(UNN) at 32a1-4, and of Bo-
cardo3(NUN) at 32a4-5. Alexander does the terms for Ferison3(UNN) and then
Bocardo3(UNN) before turning to the difficult case of Bocardo3(NUN).
187. On the text here see 151,14-22.
188. Presumably because of the similarity to Felapton3(NUN).
189. Ferio1(NUN).
190. Alexander gives elaborate abstract descriptions of Ferison3(UN_) and
Bocardo3(UN_).
191. This qualification is important: only Ferison3(UNN) can be shown
invalid by conversion, since Bocardo3 is reduced to the first figure by reductio.
Alexander believes Aristotle is referring only to this case when he says The
others are the same as we also said in the case of the previous ones. See further
150,25ff.
192. See Appendix 6 (the textual note on 31b39) for a slight difference
between Alexanders citation and our text of Aristotle.
193. Alexander treats Aristotles second rejection, that of Ferison3(UNN)
first. In rejecting Ferison3(UNN) Aristotle takes these sentences to be true:
(i) Nothing white is awake;
(ii) Something white is an animal by necessity;
194. Alexander now takes up Aristotles first rejection, that of Bo-
cardo3(UNN). Aristotle takes the following sentences to be true:
(i) Some humans are not awake;
(ii) All humans are animals by necessity;
195. Bocardo3(UN_).
196. Ferison3(UN_).
197. See Appendix 6 (the textual note on 31b39).
198. See Aristotles treatment of Bocardo2 at 1.10, 31a10-17 with Alexan-
ders discussion at 143,4-145,20.
199. At 31b40.
200. We follow the Aldine in omitting autn, which would give using the
same terms.
201. Aristotles assignment of terms for rejecting Bocardo3(NUN) presup-
poses the truth of the following propositions:
(i) Some animal is not two-footed by necessity;
(ii) All animals are moving;
(iii) It is not necessary that some moving thing not be two-footed.
Here animal is taken to be the middle term, but in Alexanders texts
Aristotle says that two-footed is the middle term. Such an assignment would
work only if either Some two-footed thing is not an animal or Some moving
thing is not an animal is a necessary truth. Alexander ascribes the mistake to
a scribe rather than to Aristotle. Philoponus (145,5-6) says that the mistake is
found in some of the older manuscripts. Both readings occur in our manu-
scripts.
202. i.e. NEC(Moving o Two-footed). Alexanders inference is correct, but
the assumed equivalence is not.
203. Accepting Wallies conjecture hup autou for the ep autou which he
prints.
204. i.e. Both NEC(Moving o Two-footed) and NEC(Animal o Two-footed)
are false.
205. Alexander now confronts the fact that Bocardo3(NUN), like
Baroco2(UNN) (see 144,23-145,20), could be validated using the same kind of
ekthesis argument which Aristotle used for Baroco2(NNN) and Bocardo3(NNN)
at 1.8, 30a6-14. Suppose NEC(AoC) and BaC; take some of C, D, such that
NEC(AeD); then, since D is some of C, BaD and (AI-conversionu) DiB; hence
(Ferio1(NUN)), NEC(AoB). Alexander again insists that the setting down of
terms shows the invalidity of Bocardo3(NUN). See also 238,22-38.
206. This brief chapter is notable mainly for its obscurity. We would like to
thank an anonymous reader for greatly improving our understanding of Alex-
anders commentary (which includes an interesting discussion of the notion of
necessity at 155,3-25).
207. Taken as a generalization about N+U syllogistic combinations, this
remark is false since it seems to say (a) that one must have two unqualified
premisses to get an unqualified conclusion and (b) that if just one premiss is
necessary the conclusion will be necessary. If one assumes that Aristotle is
talking about pairs of combinations (e.g. Barbara1(NU_) and Barbara1(UN_)),
then the only exceptions to (b) are Baroco2 and Bocardo3, but the only pair
satisfying (a) is Darapti3. Alexander has already expressed qualms about
Aristotles rejection of Baroco2(UNN) (144,23-145,20) and Bocardo3(NUN)
(151,22-30). His position here on those two cases is not clear to us, but it
appears that he decides that Aristotles remarks are only intended to apply to
Darapti3; see 154,17-22. (For two minor questions about Alexanders text of this
passage see Appendix 6 (the textual notes on 32a7 and 32a8)).
208. Alexander considers taking Aristotle to be referring to the third figure,
which he has most recently been discussing. Alexander first points out that of
third-figure syllogisms with no contingent premisses only Darapti3 yields a
necessary conclusion whenever either premiss is necessary.
209. i.e. although Barbara1(NUN) is valid, Barbara1(UNN) is not.
210. Alexander now points out that Bocardo3 violates Aristotles claim that
one necessary premiss will suffice to yield a necessary conclusion and considers
reading 32a6-7 as if it said It is then evident that there is no syllogism of an
affirmative conclusion unless both premisses are affirmative. As Alexander
indicates, the context makes the interpretation forced.
211. Alexander now considers the suggestion that cases, such as Bar-
bara1(UNU), in which Aristotle holds that an unqualified and a necessary
premiss yield an unqualified conclusion can be made to cohere with his prob-
lematic remark by pointing out that a necessary proposition also holds simply
(or, as we might put it, if NEC(P), then P) and Barbara1(UUU) is valid.
Aristotles remark would then be read as saying something like, whenever
there is an unqualified conclusion, it can be reached with two unqualified
premisses, but a necessary conclusion requires at least one necessary premiss.
Alexander does not comment on this suggestion, which is implausible in itself
and obviously does not help with Aristotles apparent claim that a necessary
premiss and an unqualified one always yields a necessary conclusion.
212. Alexander paraphrases Aristotles ouk esti sullogismos by sullogismos
ou ginetai.
213. Alexander expresses a preference for restricting Aristotles first remark
to Darapti3, a view he confirms at 154,17-22.
214. Alexander appears to affirm Aristotles remark that there is a syllo-
gism of necessity if only one of the premisses is necessary, but proceeds to
question it because of Aristotles belief (which Alexander has questioned in the
case of Baroco2(UN_) and Bocardo3(NU_)) that Baroco2 and Bocardo3 only yield
a necessary conclusion if both premisses are necessary.
215. Darapti3.
216. Here either Aristotles problematic rejection of Baroco2(UNN) is being
overlooked or dismissed, or what is said is only that in each figure there are
some moods in which one necessary premiss suffices to get a necessary conclu-
sion.
217. The principal content of Aristotles statement is clear: in a syllogism if
the conclusion is unqualified, at least one premiss is unqualified, and if it is
necessary, at least one premiss is necessary. Alexander worries mainly about
the meaning of in both, which we take to mean whether the syllogism is of a
necessary or an unqualified conclusion. Before considering this interpretation
Alexander mentions the possibility that in both, when the syllogisms are
affirmative or negative means if the syllogism is of an affirmative or a negative
conclusion.
218. Here Alexander substitutes apophatikos for Aristotles stertikos.
219. Reading kai prostithsin <to heteron>.
220. i.e. if Aristotle is only talking about mixed syllogisms at most one
premiss can be of the same modality as the conclusion.
221. Darapti3 and Felapton3. Alexander goes on to point out that the justifi-
cation of these moods involves a weakening step of AI-conversion.
222. It is now apparently suggested that the words in both means some-
thing like in cases in which there are both necessary and unqualified
premisses.
223. Alexander is thinking specifically of 1.19, 38b14-17.
224. Alexander adds further evidence for restricting the scope of 32a6-8 to
Darapti3.
225. It seems reasonably clear that Aristotle is repeating what he has just
said: a necessary (unqualified) conclusion requires at least one necessary
(unqualified) premiss. Alexander reads into what Aristotle says the idea that
N+U combinations corresponding to syllogistic UU combinations must yield
either a necessary or an unqualified conclusion.
226. e.g. at 1.9, 30a23-8.
227. cf. 172,15-19.
228. Alexander raises the question whether the following example doesnt
show that we can have a necessary conclusion without necessary premisses:
what walks is human; what is human moves; therefore, what walks moves. His
discussion is of some interest although it seems to involve a confusion of two
questions: (i) is it possible for a proposition NEC(P) to follow from two modally
unqualified propositions? (ii) is it possible for a necessary proposition P to follow
from two propositions which are not necessary? The answer to (i) is negative;
Alexanders example shows that the answer to (ii) is positive. Alexander offers
a number of alternative responses without espousing any:
(a) The first (155,8-10) is the correct one if it is interpreted as saying that,
e.g. Barbara1(UUN) is not a valid combination despite the example of true
contingent propositions AaB, BaC, where AaC is necessary.
(b) The second (155,10-12) develops the same point in another way by
suggesting that the issue is not whether particular propositions AaB, BaC
might imply a necessary proposition AaC, but whether they imply NEC(AaC).
(c) Alexanders third suggestion (155,12-15) is that What is human moves
is despite Aristotles use of it a necessary truth, because humans are always
in motion (in the sense of changing in some way). Hence, in an informal sense,
the example is a case of Barbara1(NUN) and not a demonstration that Bar-
bara1(UUN) is valid.
(d) Alexanders fourth suggestion (155,16-20) insists on making precise the
sense of motion involved, pointing out that it is not true that what walks
changes in quality by necessity even if it is assumed that all humans are
changing and all walking things are humans.
(e) The final suggestion (155,20-5) invokes the distinction between simple
necessity and necessity on a condition. What walks moves by necessity is not
true simply, but only on the condition as long as it is walking, i.e., what is
walking might not be walking and so might not be moving, but what walks
moves by necessity as long as it is walking. See Appendix 3 on conditional
necessity.
229. That is, as indicated by the preceding example.
230. This remark does not seem to apply to what Aristotle says in the Prior
Analytics; for the connection between necessity and eternity see Appendix 3 on
conditional necessity. The next sentence may be an insertion designed to
correct this apparently irrelevant remark.
231. Chapter 13 divides into four parts: (i) 32a16-29: The diorismos of
contingency, (ii) 32a29-32b3: Conversion rules, (iii) 32b4-25: What is true for
the most part and the indefinite, (iv) 32b25-37: Two readings of It is contin-
gent; transition to the treatment of pairs of premisses. We have discussed the
first two parts in section III.A of the introduction.
232. legomen. Ross prints legmen, which is also in the Aldine.
233. leg de (d Ross) endekhesthai kai to endekhomenon, hou m ontos
anankaiou tethentos de huparkhein ouden estai dia tout adunaton.
234. See 1.3, 25a38-9 with Alexanders comments at 37,28-38,9.
235. Alexander wants to insist that what is contingent in the strict sense is
neither necessary nor unqualified. See section III.A of the introduction.
236. The third adjunct (prosrhsis) is It is contingent that. See 1.2, 25a2-3
with Alexanders explanation at 26,29-27,1.
237. dunasthai.
238. cf. Ammonius, in Int. 245,1-32. Ammonius distinguishes between what
is contingent in the strict sense (kuris) and what is contingent without
qualification (hapls), the latter being what we represent by NEC .
239. Alexander consistently uses some word for follows or results (here
hepomenon ekhei) in citing the diorismos in which Aristotle says ouden estai dia
tout adunaton. See also 157,6-7, 157,9-10, 158,13-14, 158,19-20, 169,30-2,
174,5-6.
240. This is necessity on a condition; see Appendix 3 on conditional neces-
sity. 156,26-157,2 constitute Theophrastus 100B FHSG.
241. At 1.15, 34a5-33.
242. Since Becker (1933), pp. 11-14, this passage has frequently been treated
as an interpolation because it seems to presuppose Theophrastean contingency
rather than the contingency which Aristotle has just introduced. Alexander
does not show any sense of difficulty with this passage. He understands its
purpose to be a confirmation of the correctness of the clause P is not necessary
in the definition of contingency. According to him, Aristotle confirms the second
clause at 1.15, 34a5-33 by showing that if an impossibility follows from some-
thing it is impossible. Alexander points out that what is said here agrees with
the doctrine of Int. 13 (see Appendix 4 on On Interpretation, chapters 12 and
13), but it is clear from other passages that he recognizes that what is said there
is not compatible with the notion of contingency which is central to Aristotles
modal syllogistic.
243. Most mss. of Aristotle read negations and affirmations.
244. Wallies takes the reference to be to chapter 46. The tautology:
(i) (P Q) ( P Q)
gives a reasonable approximation of what Alexander is talking about, although
he discusses predicational rather than propositional relations. At 1.46, 52a39
ff. Aristotle proves what might be formulated as:
(ii) (P Q) & (Q P) ( Q P) & ( P Q).
His reasoning could obviously be used to establish (i), since in the course of
proving (ii) Aristotle proves what amounts to:
(iii) (P Q) ( Q P).
Aristotle proves what amounts to (iii) again at 2.2, 53b12-16.
245. hn antiphasen ta hetera moria alllois hepetai. toutn tn antiphasen
kai ta loipa moria anank hepesthai alllois Alexander gives another general
formulation at 157,30-2, but the letters in the immediately following text are
his.
246. Alexander here uses the verb akolouthein to express the predication
relation. For such uses in Aristotle, see Bonitz (1870), 26b1-9.
247. Chapter 13.
248. We omit Wallies insertion of apophaseis which indicates that these two
propositions are negations.
249. At 1.15, 34a5-33.
250. See section III.A of the introduction.
251. A contingent negative (endekhomen apophatik) is a proposition of the
form CON(P), where P is a negative proposition; in this case NEC(P) is a
necessary negative (anankaia apophatik). These are not simple negations,
since they are, in fact, affirmations, as opposed to the negations of contingency
(endekhomens apophatik) or necessity (anankaias apophasis), CON(P) and
NEC(P). If P is an affirmation, CON(P) and NEC(P) are called contingent
and necessary affirmations by Alexander. Philoponus, in An. Pr. 53,15-24
rejects the distinctions made by Alexander here. His discussion makes clear
that the distinctions were introduced to explain a perceived discrepancy
between Aristotles treatment of, e.g. CON(P) as a negation of CON(P) in
On Interpretation, chapter 12 and his tendency in the Prior Analytics to speak
as if, e.g. CON(AeB) were a negation. See Appendix 4 on On Interpretation,
chapters 12 and 13.
252. i.e. the negation, and similarly for the next occurrence of negative.
253. Wallies prints kata to smainomenon to keimenon nun lambanomenou
tou endekhomenou. We would prefer kata to smainomenon to [keimenon] nun
lambanomenon tou endekhomenou.
254. tous peri Theophraston. 158,24-5 and 159,8-15 constitute Theophrastus
103A FHSG.
255. See 1.17, 36b35-37a31 with Alexanders discussion at 219,35-227,9.
256. Alexanders point in the next tortured sentence is that when Some B is
A and Some B is not A or Some B is A by necessity and Some B is not A by
necessity are true together, the Bs in question will be different. But It is
contingent that some B is A and It is contingent that some B is not A are true
of the same Bs.
257. Alexander uses dunaton rather than endekhesthai in expressing these
two affirmations. We understand Alexander to be making points about ordinary
expressions not the logic of syllogisms.
258. diorismos. For this use of the term diorismos see 44,26-7 with the note
of Barnes et al. ad loc.
259. On this phrase see 160,28-161,2.
260. logos. The reference is, of course, to 32a18-21.
261. i.e. Theophrastus and Eudemus. See 159,8-15 with notes.
262. Alexander refers to chapter 12 of On Interpretation.
263. Here Alexander refers to 1.3, 25b15-21. Immediately after that passage
Aristotle says for It is contingent that X is ordered in the same way as X
is (25b21-2 to gar endekhetai ti estin homois tattetai). There is no evidence
from the commentary that Alexander had the words for It is contingent that
X is ordered in the same way as X is at 25b21-2, and it seems unlikely that he
would refer the words as was said earlier to On Interpretation if he had them. On
Andronicus rejection of On Interpretation see Moraux (1973), pp. 117-19.
264. Alexander raises a difficulty about the convertibility of CON(P) to
CON( P) on the assumption that CON(P) entails P is not yet the case, that
is, P. Obviously, we cannot assume that CON( P) entails P unless we
are willing to say that contingent propositions are contradictory. Alexander
first suggests that the solution to this problem is to deny that CON( P) is
genuinely contingent.
265. kata ton diorismon, the first of 60-odd occurrences of this way of
referring to the contingency which excludes necessity and simple holding. The
phrase is taken from Aristotle; see 1.14, 33b23, 1.15, 33b28-31 and 34b27.
266. i.e. if CON(P) is understood in the way specified, CON( P) cannot be
so understood.
267. The remainder of this section is difficult. We take Alexander to canvass
three ways out of the problem without opting for any of them. The first is to
deny that Aristotle held that CON(P) excludes P. The second is to say that
CON(P) and CON( P) can be true at different times. This will hardly suffice
for converting one of the propositions into the other. The third alternative is
stated very briefly, and seems to be this. Take CON(P) to mean It is contingent
that P comes about; both It is contingent that P comes about and It is
contingent that P does not come about can be true when P is not true; so
CON(P) and CON( P) can be converted into one another.
With this passage one should compare 222,16-35. Alexander appears to
subscribe to the view that CON(P) is incompatible with P at 174,15-16.
268. At 32a18-20.
269. At 32a20-1.
270. In the next section Aristotle and, following him, Alexander discuss what
we might call a pragmatic issue without clearly separating it from what for us
are more strictly logical questions. Aristotle says that contingency is spoken of
in two ways. If P is contingent, then either:
(i) P for the most part (epi to polu) or usually (epi to pleiston or epi pleiston
or epi pleon),
or:
(ii) P as often as not (ep iss).
Alexander adds a third:
(iii) P infrequently (ep elatton),
but lumps (ii) and (iii) together with Aristotles term indefinite. It is clear that
this distinction of kinds of contingency would be difficult to incorporate into
Aristotles formalism. For, although if P as often as not, then P as often as
not, if P for the most part, then P infrequently and if P infrequently, P for
the most part. Aristotle announces that P for the most part converts to
Notes to pp. 99-104 139
NEC(P) and P indefinitely to No more P than P. Alexander interprets him
as saying that these convert to CON( P). At 32b18 Aristotle says that science
is concerned with (i). Alexanders comment on this remark is of some interest;
it includes an attack on the Stoics.
271. For a minor difference between this lemma and our text of Aristotle see
Appendix 6 (the textual note on 32b4).
272. We have translated these last two sentences in conformity with Alex-
anders understanding of them; see 163,23-164,8. The standard modern
understanding of them is conveyed by the following translation. If P is by
nature it converts because it does not hold by necessity it is contingent for a
person not to turn grey in this sense. But if P is indefinite it converts because
P is no more one way than the other.
273. cf. 165,10-14.
274. to hopoter etukhen.
275. Alexander changes the position of the word kai in Aristotles formula-
tion.
276. e.g. CON(AaB) converts to both CON(AeB) and CON(BiA).
277. For a minor divergence between the lemma and our text of Aristotle see
Appendix 6 (the textual note on 32b19).
278. On the text here see the note on 165,4.
279. sumplk; cf. 169,10. We take the point to be that there are formally
valid combinations which are useless.
280. hoi neteroi, the Stoics; see the note on 3,3 in Barnes et al. Lines
164,27-31 constitute fragment 1169 Hlser (1987-1988) and SVF II.259.
281. Alexander gives the following explanation of duplicated
(diphoroumenoi) and duplicating (adiaphors perainontes) arguments: Accord-
ing to the Stoics, the following sort of thing is a duplicated argument: if it is day,
it is day; but it is day; therefore, it is day. A duplicating argument is one in
which the conclusion is the same as one of the premisses, as in the following
case: either it is day or it light; but it is day; therefore, it is day. (Alexander, in
Top. 10,7-12; the distinguishing feature of a duplicated argument is the occur-
rence of a premiss in which the same sentence (in the example It is day) occurs
twice.)
The second thema is one of the rules which the Stoics used to reduce valid
arguments to the unprovable arguments. Its exact content is uncertain. See
Mates (1961), pp. 77-82 or Frede (1974), pp. 181-90. Nothing is known about
what is called infinite matter (h apeiros hul legomen); see Hlser (1987-
1988), pp. 1622-3.
282. organon.
283. Ross prints ekeinn, but reports two readings of ekeins. Wallies prints
ekeins, noting that Aristotle and the Aldine have ekeinn.
284. At 168,31-169,14 Alexander points out that Aristotle sometimes gets
involved with contingencies which are infrequently true. Indeed, he has to, if
he infers, e.g. CON(AeB) from CON(AaB) and AaB is true for the most part.
285. See 39,30-40,5 with the notes in Barnes et al.
286. Aristotle does not, in fact, speak again about the kinds of contingency
or the uselessness of the indefinite. He takes up AE-transformationc again in
chapter 17. The next sentence appears to be a general characterization of the
remainder of this chapter.
287. This difficult passage has sometimes been taken as Aristotles way of
justifying the claim that the standard first-figure CC combinations are syllogis-
tic, introducing a reading of CON(AaB) as something like What is contingently
140 Notes to pp. 104-107
B is contingently A, so that he can justify Barbara1(CCC) by taking it to infer
What is contingently C is contingently A from What is contingently B is
contingently A and What is contingently C is contingently B. See, e.g. Patter-
son (1995), pp. 141-9. Alexander, for whom the justification of complete
syllogisms always turns on the dictum de omni et nullo, shows no trace of this
idea; see 167,10-168,4 and 169,17-32. He takes Aristotle to be showing that
CON(AaB) has two meanings:
(C*) CON(A holds of that of which B in fact holds)
(C1) CON(A holds of that of which it is contingent that B holds)
or alternatively (see 165,30 with note):
(C*) CON(A holds of that of which B is said)
(C1) CON(A holds of that of which it is contingent that B is said)
At 32b32 Aristotle distinguishes between the mixed syllogistic premisses:
(1) Barbara1(CU_) CON(AaB) BaC
and the unmixed pair:
(2) Barbara1(CC_) CON(AaB) CON(BaC)
and says that as before he will be discussing the unmixed pairs before the mixed.
For Alexander (probably following Theophrastus) the C propositions are
prosleptic, that is, they potentially contain the middle term and so express a
pair of premisses. Alexander assumes (see 166,5-10) naturally and probably
correctly (see 1.14, 32b38-33a1) that (1) is to be correlated with (C*) and (C*),
(2) with (C1) and (C1).
At 166,19-25 Alexander argues that NEC(AaB) admits two analogous inter-
pretations, viz.,
(N*) It is necessary that A holds of that of which B is said
(N1) It is necessary that A holds of that of which B is said by necessity
and says that defenders of Aristotles position on Barbara1(NU_) presuppose
that only (N*) is a correct interpretation. Cf. 126,23-8.
288. Alexander remarks that Aristotle changes from to endekhesthai tode
tide huparkhein at 32b25-6 to kath hou to B, to A endekhesthai at 27-8.
289. Alexanders lemma has endekhesthai whereas our mss. of Aristotle
have enkhrein.
290. On prosleptic assertions see first 378,12-379,11, and other material
gathered as Theophrastus 110A-D FHSG. The crucial point in connection with
what Alexander says here is that the prosleptically formulated major premiss
potentially contains the minor premiss.
291. Defenders of Aristotle.
292. Alexander writes kathaper epi tn alln where our text of Aristotle has
kathaper kai en tois allois.
293. For discussion of this passage see section III.D.2 of the introduction.
294. For a minor divergence from our text of Aristotle see Appendix 6 (the
textual note on 36b35).
295. Aristotle takes for granted the equivalence of CON(AeB) and
CON(AaB) and assumes their compatibility with CON(BaA). But if
CON(AeB) converted with CON(BeA), then since CON(BeA) is equivalent to
CON(BaA), CON(AeB) would imply CON(BaA). So EE-conversionc must fail.
Aristotles example to show that CON(AeB) (and CON(AaB)) is compatible
with CON(BaA) (and CON(BeA)) takes it to be true that it is contingent
that no human is white but necessary that some white things are not human.
296. In chapters 2 and 3. The discussion of universal negatives is at 25b3-25.
297. i.e. Aristotle is taking for granted EA-transformationc and arguing
Notes to pp. 107-109 141
against EE-conversionc. Theophrastus accepts EE-conversionc and rejects EA-
transformationc.
298. At 41,21-4. Note that only Theophrastus was mentioned before, and
that in the present passage the verbs translated say and show are in the
singular in the ms B. (In line 10 Wallies prints phasi with the Aldine instead of
Bs phsi, and in 12 deiknsin against the deiknusin of both the Aldine and B.
220,9-221,5 are Theophrastus 102A FHSG. 220,9-16 are Eudemus fragment 16
Wehrli.) We discuss this argument and Alexanders rejection of it in section
III.D.1 of the introduction. In Theophrastus 102C FHSG this argument is
briefly formulated as what is called an ekthetic argument: If it is contingent
that white is in no man, it is contingent that white is disjoined from all man,
and man will be disjoined from all white. Alexander gives another Theo-
phrastean argument for EE-conversionc at 223,4-14.
299. pantn tn tou B. On the terminology of disjointedness see the note on
124,20.
300. Aristotles argument is not a reductio, but what we have called an
incompatibility rejection argument (introduction, p. 17).
301. Theophrastus and Eudemus.
302. That is to say, NEC (AaB) is not equivalent to NEC (AeB).
303. Alexander shows uncertainty about whether the specification of terms
is a new argument against EE-conversionc or a way of showing that the
compatibility assumption underlying it is correct. For a minor divergence
between the citation and our text of Aristotle see Appendix 6 (the textual note
on 37a4).
304. We read ek ts proeirmens kataskeus with B where Wallies prints [ek]
ts proeirmens kataskeu, following the Aldine.
305. From here to 222,7 Alexander worries about the meaning of contraries
and opposites, first about the fact that Aristotle appears to refer to, e.g.,
CON(AaB) and CON(AeB) as contraries and CON(AaB) and CON(AoB) as
opposites when in fact the pairs can be true together, and then about the
question of which contraries and opposites convert with which. His solution to
the first problem presumably the correct one is that such pairs are verbally
similar to pairs of unqualified or necessary propositions which are genuinely
contraries or opposites. Alexander may raise this issue because in On Interpre-
tation, chapter 12 Aristotle says that, e.g., the opposite of NEC(P) is NEC(P);
cf. Philoponus, in An. Pr. 53,15-56,5 and Ammonius, in Int. 221,11-229,11. See
also Appendix 4 on On Interpretation, chapters 12 and 13.
Alexanders treatment of the second question is more tentative, but in the
course of it all the relevant transformations countenanced by Aristotle (AE-,
EA-, IO-, OI-, AO-, and EI-transformationc) are mentioned positively and the
two not countenanced by him (OA- and IE-transformationc) are mentioned
negatively.
306. ouk ex ananks panti.
307. Alexander now worries about the fact that Aristotles words might be
taken as implying that, e.g., a particular contingent affirmative is transform-
able into a universal contingent negative. He insists that Aristotle only means
to assert AE-, EA-, IO-, and OI-transformationc.
308. endekhetai.
309. 7.17b22-3. Alexander now apparently suggests that Aristotle might be
treating XiY and XoY as opposites only in the case where the Y in question is
the same thing.
142 Notes to pp. 109-114
310. Alexander now suggests that Aristotle is accepting AO-and EI-transfor-
mationc, but not OA-and IE-transformationc.
311. i.e. the heaven.
312. The remainder of this section is very difficult, and we are doubtful that
we have grasped Alexanders meaning entirely. What he says obviously in-
volves his idea, that It is contingent that P means that P does not hold but can
hold in the future. Here Alexander considers a situation in which, say, No X is
Y is true. He says that if someone says, e.g., It is contingent that no X is Y in
this situation, the proposition will convert into It is contingent that all X are
Y, that is to say (we take it), the latter proposition becomes true. But we cannot
transform It is contingent that all X are Y back into It is contingent that no X
is Y; for we cannot say No X is Y will hold since it already does hold. In the
second paragraph Alexander rejects the latter claim apparently with a ques-
tion-begging argument which has an intuitive appeal: roughly, if it is
contingent that P at one time, it is always contingent that P.
313. On this Aristotelian passage see section III.D.2 of the introduction.
314. hoi hetairoi autou, Theophrastus and Eudemus. 223,3-15 are Theo-
phrastus 102B FHSG. Alexander gives a perfectly legitimate argument for
EE-conversion n or even for CON(AeB) NEC (BeA). A somewhat
garbled version of this same argument is ascribed to Theophrastus and Eude-
mus in Theophrastus 102C FHSG.
315. We here make use of numerical indices to avoid Alexanders use of
pronouns and repeated longer explicit formulations of these four propositions.
Most of what Alexander has to say amounts to pointing out that each of (ii)
CON(BaA) and (iv) CON(BeA) imply the negations of each of (iii) NEC(BiA)
and (i) NEC(BoA), so that each of (iii) and (i) imply the negations of (ii) and (iv);
however, the negations of (ii) and (iv) do not imply either (i) or (iii). He is
particularly concerned to point out that the negation of (iv), CON(BeA), does
not imply (iii), NEC(BiA). He develops the point by giving cases in which all of
CON(BeA), NEC(BiA), and NEC(BoA) are true.
316. A better formulation would be that neither (i) nor (iii) is a consequence
of the denial of (iv).
317. In the alleged reductio justification of EE-conversionc.
318. endekhetai.
319. Alexander gives a case where CON(AeB) but CON(BeA) because,
even though NEC(BiA), NEC(BoA). He takes as true CON(White e Human),
NEC(Human i White) (because if NEC(Human i White), NEC(White i
Human), contradicting CON(White e Human)). But also, NEC(Human o
White) (presumably because, e.g., NEC(Human o Swan)). This example illus-
trates the difficulty of reading Alexander in terms of the de re/de dicto
distinction: NEC(Human o White) would seem to be true de re, but then, since
there are white humans, so would NEC(Human i White), but Alexander takes
this to be false.
320. For a minor difference between the lemma and our text of Aristotle see
Appendix 6 (the textual note on 37a18).
321. The correct implication is in the opposite direction, and what Alexander
says establishes the correct implication.
322. We have not translated the words ep ekeinn, which would seem to
mean when either (i) or (iii) is true and hence to render the words when (i) is
true (althous ouss ts ex ananks tini m) redundant.
323. Ross ad loc. takes the sense to be not that C does hold of all D but that
C might hold of all D even though CON(CaD) since CON(CaD) is true just
Notes to pp. 114-115 143
because NEC(CiD). Alexander takes it that Aristotle is assuming CaD and also
CON(CaD) because NEC(CiD).
324. For a minor difference between the lemma and our text of Aristotle see
Appendix 6 (the textual note on 37a27).
325. See 224,18-27.
326. Perhaps Alexanders clearest statement of the point that a logical rule
must be true in every instance.
Appendix 1
The expression by necessity

(ex ananks)
For the most part Alexanders formulations of propositions involving contin-
gency are not difficult to construe because he uses forms of the verb be
contingent (endekhesthai). His formulations of propositions involving necessity
are often more problematic because, like Aristotle, he usually uses the phrase
by necessity (ex ananks). At 1.15, 33b29-31 Aristotle says of the conclusions
NEC(AiC) and NEC(AaC) of Celarent1(UC N ) and Ferio1(UC N ),
their conclusions will be that something holds of none by necessity or does
not hold of all by necessity (mdeni m panti ex ananks huparkhein). At 1.15,
34b27-8 (cf. 35a1-2) he says of the conclusion of Celarent1(UC N ), Thus
the conclusion of this syllogism is not a proposition which is contingent in
the way specified, but is of none by necessity (mdeni ex ananks) .
Commenting on this passage at 194,14ff. Alexander insists on the distinction
between by necessity of none (ex ananks mdeni) and of none by necessity
(mdeni ex ananks), where the first corresponds to NEC(AeC) and the
second to NEC(AiC), the conclusion of Celarent1(UC N ), apparently
understood as something like Theres no C of which A holds necessarily.
Alexander does not adhere to this distinction uniformly (see, e.g., 131,11-12,
136,25, 202,22), and at 196,28-33 he indicates that of none by necessity (in this
case oudeni ex ananks) is ambiguous. We have not thought it worthwhile to
distinguish these two phrases and others except in cases where it seemed clear
that Alexander wanted to stress a difference. We have instead adopted a
uniform English translation of the four necessary propositions as follows to
render what we take to be Alexanders intentions:
A holds of all B by necessity when we take Alexander to mean NEC(AaB);

A holds of no B by necessity when we take Alexander to mean NEC(AeB);
A holds of some B by necessity when we take Alexander to mean NEC(AiB);
A does not hold of some B by necessity when we take Alexander to mean
NEC(AoB).
As is indicated by the discussion at the beginning of this appendix, negations of

necessary propositions cause Alexander and consequently us more difficulty.
When Alexander uses something like mdeni ex ananks (which he says at
197,26 is equivalent to ouk ex ananks tini) to express NEC(AiB) (=
NEC (AeB)) we write A holds by necessity of no B.
At 198,5 Alexander takes up the question whether the conclusion of Bar-
bara1(UC_) is CON(AaC) or NEC (AaC), i.e., NEC(AoC). He expresses
this second alternative as oudeni ex ananks ou. We find this expression rather
baffling, and we translate it and its analogues with the equally baffling A does
not hold by necessity of no B.
At 174,13 Alexander indicates that the conclusion of Ferio1(CU N ) is ou
146 Appendix 1
panti ex ananks, for which we use the translation A does not hold by necessity
of all B. Thus we have the correspondences:
A holds by necessity of no B for NEC(AiB) (= NEC (AeB));

A does not hold by necessity of no B for NEC(AoB) (= NEC (AaB));
A does not hold by necessity of all B for NEC(AaB) (= NEC (AoB)).
We have not noticed any passage in which NEC(AeB) (= NEC (AiB))

requires special attention.
Appendix 2
Affirmation and negation

To talk about the quality of propositions Alexander mainly uses the adjectives
affirmative (kataphatikos) and negative (apophatikos) and the nouns affirma-
tion (kataphasis) and negation (apophasis). No problems arise in non-modal
syllogistic where a- and i-propositions are affirmations and affirmative and e-
and o-propositions are negations and negative. The fact that a- and i-proposi-
tions might also be construed as negations of o- and e-propositions is avoided
by talking about contradictories or opposites rather than negations.
At 31,5-6 Alexander informs us that Aristotle calls a universal apophatikos
a universal stertikos. We follow Barnes et al. in translating stertikos priva-
tive. Stertikos is Aristotles word of choice, but almost every occurrence of the
word in this section of the commentary is in a citation or paraphrase of
Aristotle. For reasons which are not clear to us Alexander has a strong prefer-
ence for apophatikos. Alexander also eschews one of Aristotles words for
affirmative, katgorikos (see the Greek-English index.)
What Aristotle says in the course of our text clearly implies that propositions
such as NEC(AeB) and CON(AoB) are both negative (1.15, 35a30-40; 1.18,
38a10-11) and negations (1.17, 36b38-9). This leaves Alexander with a problem
about how to talk about, e.g., NEC(AeB) and CON(AoB). There is no
question that Alexander understands the relevant difference between these
kinds of proposition. At 158,24-159,23 he introduces a distinction between a
contingent or necessary negative (e.g., CON(AoB) or NEC(AeB)) and a nega-
tion of contingency or necessity (e.g., CON(AoB) or NEC(AeB)).
Unfortunately he sometimes calls a proposition like NEC(AeB) an apophasis
by contrast with a kataphasis such as NEC(AaB). In these cases, which are
listed in the Greek-English index, we have opted for the translations negative
proposition and affirmative proposition.
Appendix 3
Conditional necessity
Toward the end of his discussion in On Interpretation of contingent statements
about the future Aristotle writes:
It is necessary that what is is when it is and that what is not is not when
it is not. But it is not necessary that everything which is be nor that what
is not not be. For these are not the same:
(a) everything that is is by necessity when it is;
(b) everything that is is without qualification (hapls) by necessity.
(On Interpretation 9.19a23-6)
It appears that Theophrastus and, following him, the ancient commentators

took Aristotle to be marking here a distinction between (b) necessity without
qualification and (a) a necessity which they typically labelled either on a
hypothesis (ex hupotheses) or on a condition (meta diorismou). Alexander
typically uses the latter expression.1 Ammonius (in Int. 153,13-154,2) explicates
the distinction in terms of affirmative subject-predicate propositions. It is
necessary without qualification that S is P if S cannot exist without being P; it
is necessary on a condition that S is P as long as P holds of S. Ammonius makes
a further distinction between two kinds of necessity without qualification on
the basis of whether or not the subject is eternal.
In his commentary on the Prior Analytics Philoponus invokes the distinction
to defend Aristotles claim that Barbara1(NUN) is valid:
Aristotle says in On Interpretation that necessity is said in two ways: in

the strict sense (kuris) and on a hypothesis. And necessity on a hypothe-
sis is said in two ways: something is said to be necessary as long as the
subject exists (huparkhein); and something is necessary as long as what
is predicated holds (huparkhein). For example, The sun moves is said to
be necessary in the strict sense; Socrates is an animal is said to be
necessary on a hypothesis, <namely, as long as the subject exists>, since
as long as Socrates exists, it is necessary that he is an animal this type
is closer to necessity in the strict sense; and the third sense occurs when
we say that it is necessary that what is seated is seated; for as long as
what is predicated holds, I mean being seated, it necessarily holds of what
is seated in the sense of necessity on a hypothesis.2
Accordingly, we say that the major premiss has been taken as neces-
sary in the strict sense, but the conclusion has been taken as necessary
on a hypothesis, namely as long as what is predicated is the case. For as
long as A holds of C, it holds of it by necessity. And Alexander, explicator
of Aristotle, says in a certain short work (en tini monobibli)3 that his
teacher Sosigenes4 is of the same opinion, namely that here Aristotle
draws a conclusion which is necessary on a hypothesis. For, he says, that
he means this is clear because when the major premiss is unqualified, the
Appendix 3 149
minor premiss necessary, and the conclusion is inferred to be unqualified,
he sets out terms <to show that the conclusion cannot be necessary>, but
when the major premiss is necessary, the minor unqualified, and the
conclusion is inferred to be necessary, he does not manage to set out terms
which imply necessity in the strict sense. Therefore, he says, it is clear
that he also takes the necessity to be on a hypothesis. (in An. Pr. 126,8-29)
The argument about terms is opaque partly because of Philoponus misun-

derstanding of the role interpretations play as counterexamples to alleged
syllogisms, a misunderstanding which we have seen to be Alexanders as well.5
There is absolutely no reason for Aristotle to set out terms in connection with
a premiss combination he deems syllogistic. However, it seems likely that what
underlies the argument is the existence of counter-interpretations for Bara-
bara1(NUN) of the kind which Alexander gives at 124,21-30. The first of these
takes the following proposition to be true:
It is necessary that all humans are animals;

Everything moving is human;
It is not necessary that everything moving is an animal.
It appears that Sosigenes tried to defend Aristotle against such counter-inter-

pretations by pointing out that Everything moving is an animal is necessary on a
hypothesis or condition. On the basis of what is said by Philoponus and Ammonius
one would expect the condition to be that everything moving is an animal, but
because of the necessary first proposition it is also possible to take the condition to
be that everything moving is human. Alexander takes this second option in a
passage which makes it likely that he dissented from the position of Sosigenes. In
the passage Alexander is commenting on Aristotles rejection at 1.10, 30b31-40 of
Camestres2(NUN) on the basis of the following interpretation:
It is necessary that all humans are animals;

Nothing white is an animal;
It is not necessary that nothing white is human.
Aristotle says of the third proposition:
Then, human will also hold of nothing white, but not by necessity; for it
is contingent that a human be white, although not so long as animal
holds of nothing white. So the conclusion will be necessary if certain
things are the case, but it will not be necessary without qualification.
(1.10, 30b36-40)
Alexander says what he takes to be the force of these words:
He indicates that when he says, in connection with mixtures, that the

conclusion is necessary, he means necessary without qualification and
not necessary on a condition, as some of the interpreters of the subject of
mixture of premisses say, thinking that they strengthen his position; they
assert that he does not speak about inferring necessity without qualifica-
tion, but about inferring necessity on a condition. For they say that when
animal holds of every human by necessity and as in the first figure
human of all that moves or walks, the conclusion is necessary on a
150 Appendix 3
condition; for animal holds of all that moves or walks as long as the
middle, human, holds of it. For it is not the case that if the minor premiss
is necessary, the conclusion is necessary; for it is not the case that if
moving holds of every animal and animal of every human by necessity,
moving holds of every human by necessity as long as animal holds of
every human for that is false but for as long as moving holds of every
animal. (140,16-28)6
Alexander goes on to cite Aristotelian passages which suggest very strongly that
the interpretation offered by Sosigenes is untenable.7 Alexander might, of
course, have taken a different position in the certain short work to which
Philoponus refers, but we have no way of knowing this.
Alexander concludes his discussion of Sosigenes position by citing the
passage from On Interpretation with which we began this appendix:
At the same time he has also indicated by the addition <of the words
although not so long as animal holds of nothing white. So the conclusion
will be necessary if certain things are the case, but it will not be necessary
without qualification> that he is aware of the division of necessity which
his associates <Theophrastus and Eudemus> have made, and which he
has also already established in On Interpretation, where, discussing
contradiction of propositions about the future and individual things, he
says, It is necessary that what is is when it is, and that what is not is not
when it is not. For the necessary on a hypothesis is of this kind. (141,1-6)
There are two other passages in the commentary connecting Theophrastus with
necessity on a condition. In the first Alexander offers a possible justification for
the view that, according to the diorismos of contingency, if CON(P), P:
Or does he deny that what is contingent is unqualified by saying if P is

not necessary; for, according to him, necessity is also predicated of the
unqualified; for what holds of something holds of it with necessity, as long
as it holds. At any rate Theophrastus in the first book of his Prior
Analytics, discussing the meanings of necessity, writes the following:
Third, what holds; for when it holds it cannot not hold. (156, 26-157,2)
It seems reasonable to assume that this third sense of necessity is the third
sense of Ammonius and Philoponus, the one according to which S is P by
necessity as long as P holds of S.
In the other passage the connection with the account of Ammonius and
Philoponus is even clearer:
What is necessary is either necesssary without qualification or is called

necessary on a condition, e.g., Human holds of everything literate by
necessity, as long as it is literate. This proposition is not necessary
without qualification. Theophrastus showed the difference between
them; for there are not always literate things, and a human is not always
literate. Since they differ in this way, we must recognize that Aristotle is
now discussing what is called necessity in the strict sense and without
qualification. (36,25-31)8
Although this passage occurs just before the lemma on AI-conversionn, we

Appendix 3 151
believe that Alexander invokes this distinction here in defence of AI-conver-
sionn. His general point seems clear: we cannot convert a proposition like
Human holds of everything literate by necessity to Literate holds of some
human by necessity. But the distinction between the two types of necessity does
not seem to explain the failure of conversion. It only puts a label on the kinds
of a-proposition which are assumed not to convert. However, we can perhaps
see why Philoponus classified propositions with non-eternal subjects as neces-
sary on a hypothesis. For if he did not, he would have to say that human holds
of everything literate by necessity without qualification.9 Pursuit of this line of
reasoning would seem to lead to the conclusion that AI-conversionn holds only
when the subject of the a-proposition is eternal. Alexander never pursues this
point, but it may have been one of the ways in which people tried to make sense
of AI-conversionn.
And the point does come up tacitly at three other places in the commentary
where Alexander invokes necessity on a condition. One such passage concerns
one of Aristotles most striking specification of terms for rejecting a combination
when he takes as true:
It is necessary that every sleeping horse is asleep and it is necessary that

every horse-that-is-awake is awake.
Alexander is certain that these propositions are only necessary on a condition,

that is, hold only as long as the predicate asleep or awake holds, and he is certain
that such propositions are really unqualified. But he is uncertain what to make
of the situation because he is uncertain about the status of the combination
which Aristotle rejects.10 Elsewhere Alexander suggests that What walks
moves is only necessary on a condition:
Or is it the case that even if it is taken that all that walks is human and
all humans move, still the conclusion all that walks moves is not neces-
sary without qualification but with the additional condition as long as it
is walking? For all that walks does not move by necessity, if, indeed, it is
true that what walks does not even walk necessarily except, as I said, on
the condition as long as it is walking. (155,20-5; cf. 201,21-4)
Although the exact construal of these words is uncertain, one plausible reading
would commit Alexander to the view that a necessary truth requires an eternal
subject term. Of course, such a view is not compatible with Aristotles practice
in the Prior Analytics.11
Notes
1. See the entry on meta diorismou (anankaios) in the Greek-English index.
2. We note that Philoponus divides the three kinds of necessity differently
from Ammonius, producing two kinds of necessity on a hypothesis where
Ammonius has two kinds of necessity without qualification. Stephanus (in Int.
38,14-31) agrees with Ammonius. At 162,13-26 Alexander suggests that neces-
sity which is conditional on the existence of a non-eternal subject is not necessity
at all.
3. This is generally thought to be the work on mixtures of premisses; see
125,31 with the note.
152 Appendix 3
4. On Sosigenes, see Moraux (1984), 335-60.
5. See section I of the introduction. We mention here a suggestion of an
anonymous reader, according to which Sosigenes espoused a method of showing
that a pair of premisses assumed to imply a conclusion of one kind does not
imply a stronger one by producing a counter-example rejecting the stronger
conclusion (the method used by Aristotle in connection with first-figure UN
cases). According to this suggestion, when Sosigenes claimed that Aristotle took
the conclusion of, e.g., Barbara1(NU_) to be only necessary on a hypothesis, he
was asked why he didnt produce a counter-example to a strictly necessary
conclusion. Sosigenes answer: Aristotle was not able to produce such terms.
This suggestion has the advantage of providing a reasonably unobjectionable
sense to the notion of providing terms to establish an implication, but we have
not succeeded in working it out fully.
6. We are not certain what to make of this last sentence. The anonymous
reader mentioned in the previous note has argued persuasively that it is part
of the view against which Alexander is arguing, according to which syllogistic
NU cases yield a conclusion which is necessary as long as the minor premiss is
true whereas the corresponding UN cases do not yield a conclusion which is
necessary in any sense.
7. Further evidence that Alexander did not follow Sosigenes on this issue is
provided by the fact that [Ammonius] (in An. Pr. 39,10-25) ascribes to Sosigenes
alone the position that the conclusion of Barbara1(NU_) is necessary on a
condition, while ascribing to Alexander an argument in support of Bar-
bara1(NUN). (For the argument see Alexanders commentary at 127,3-14.)
8. For another (less clear) passage of Alexander (citing Galen) which connects
Theophrastus with a distinction between necessary truths with eternal subjects
and those with perishable ones see Theophrastus 100C FHSG.
9. The fact that Human holds of everything literate is not necessary without
qualification shows that necessity without qualification is not so-called de re
necessity, since it is presumably de re necessary that human hold of everything
literate.
10. See 251,11-252,2.
11. Alexander mentions necessity on a condition one other time in the
commentary (179,31-180,3) in connection with the problematic conditional If
Dion has died, he has died, but he does so in a way which seems marginally
related to the topic of this appendix. He also twice (181,13-17 and 189,2-3) uses
in what seems to be an informal way the standard formula (est an) for
introducing the condition on which something is necessary.
Appendix 4
On Interpretation, chapters
12 and 13
In chapter 12 of On Interpretation Aristotle proposes to investigate how affirma-
tions and negations of the possible to be and the not possible to be and of the
contingent to be and the not contingent to be are related to one another and
about the impossible and the necessary. (21a34-37) In what follows Aristotle
makes no distinction between the possible and the contingent, but since the way
he treats the two notions differs from the way he treats contingency in the way
specified in the Prior Analytics, we shall introduce the operator POS to repre-
sent what he says here. We shall also ignore difficulties in the details of what
Aristotle says. Since It is impossible that and It is necessary that it is not the
case that end up as equivalent, we can formulate what Aristotle says in terms
of possibility and necessity. In chapter 12 the results are:
The negation of POS(P) is POS(P), and it is not POS( P)

The negation of NEC(P) is NEC(P), and it is not NEC( P)
These statements cause Alexander and other commentators some difficulty

because, as indicated in the appendix on affirmation and negation, in the Prior
Analytics Aristotle sometimes speaks as if, e.g., CON(AeB) is a negation.
However, Alexander quite rightly takes the view expressed here as the norm to
which Aristotles apparently discordant statements have to be adjusted (see, for
example, 158,24-159,3 on 32a29, and 221,16-222,4 on 36b38).
In chapter 13 Aristotle seems to come out strongly for Theophrastean
contingency, that is, he seems to hold that:
(i) POS(P) if and only if NEC( P)
Aristotles argumentation is confused, but he clearly commits himself to a

consequence of this equivalence, which is obviously incompatible with the
diorismos of contingency, namely:
(ii) if NEC(P) then POS(P)
At 22b29 he raises the question whether this implication is correct. He uses the
example of being cut to suggest that POS(P) implies POS( P), which, with (ii),
would produce the impossibility that NEC(P) implies POS( P). Aristotles way
out is to speak of different kinds of possibility, only some of which are two-sided;
he also suggests that possibility is homonymous, and introduces a notion which
is something like what we represent by CONu:
For some possibilities are homonymous. For possible is not said in just
one way. But one thing is said to be possible because it is true in the sense
154 Appendix 4
of actually being for example, it is possible for something to walk
because it does walk, and, in general, it is possible for something to be
because it already is in actuality; another thing is said to be possible
because it might be actual, e.g., it is possible for something to walk
because it might walk. (23a6-11)
In his commentary on On Interpretation Ammonius fixes on the homonymy of

possibility. He recognizes that in the Prior Analytics Aristotle denies (i) and (ii)
for contingency in the way specified and that this contingency is the fundamen-
tal notion of possibility in the Prior Analytics, although it rather clearly is not
in On Interpretation. Ammonius (see in Int. 245,1-32) adopts what we think is
a rather unusual expedient to harmonize the two texts. He says that the notion
of contingency in On Interpretation is contingency without qualification (hapls)
whereas contingency in the Prior Analytics is contingency in the strict sense
(kuris). We find no clear trace of this distinction in Alexander, but it is clear
from 37,28-38,10 (quoted in section III.A of the introduction) that Aristotles
discussion in On Interpretation was a primary source of Alexanders view that
contingency is homonymous. Of course, the way Aristotle handles the notion of
contingency in the Prior Analytics could only encourage such a view.
Appendix 5
Weak two-sided Theophrastean

contingency
Aristotle and Alexander are committed to:
CON(P) NEC( P)
Given:
AE-transformationc: CON(AaB) CON(AeB)

EA-transformationc: CON(AeB) CON(AaB)
IO-transformationc: CON(AiB) CON(AoB)
OI-transformationc: CON(AoB) CON(AiB)
they are, indeed, committed to:
CON(AaB) NEC (AaB) & NEC (AeB)

CON(AeB) NEC (AaB) & NEC (AeB)
CON(AiB) NEC (AiB) & NEC (AoB)
CON(AoB) NEC (AiB) & NEC (AoB)
or equivalently to
CON(AaB) NEC(AoB) & NEC(AiB)

CON(AeB) NEC(AoB) & NEC(AiB)
CON(AiB) NEC(AeB) & NEC(AaB)
CON(AoB) NEC(AeB) & NEC(AaB)
In section III.D.2 of the introduction we mentioned equivalents of the first two
of these propositions labelled as NCa and NCe. We here introduce analogous
equivalents of the other two as well:
(NCa) NEC(AoB) v NEC(AiB) CON(AaB)

(NCe) NEC(AoB) v NEC(AiB) CON(AeB)
(NCi) NEC(AeB) v NEC(AaB) CON(AiB)
(NCo) NEC(AeB) v NEC(AaB) CON(AoB)
In section III.D.2 we have sketched some reasons for thinking that Aristotle and
Alexander may have accepted the converses of NCa and NCe:
( CaN) CON(AaB) NEC(AoB) v NEC(AiB)

( CeN) CON(AeB) NEC(AoB) v NEC(AiB)
to which we now add:

156 Appendix 5
( CiN) CON(AiB) NEC(AeB) v NEC(AaB)
( CoN) CON(AoB) NEC(AeB) v NEC(AaB)
Combining these pairs of propositions into equivalences makes explicit what

we shall call weak two-sided Theophrastean contingency:
(2TCa) CONtc(AaB) NEC(AiB) & NEC(AoB)

(2TCe) CONtc(AeB) NEC(AiB) & NEC(AoB)
(2TCi) CONtc(AiB) NEC(AaB) & NEC(AeB)
(2TCo) CONtc(AoB) NEC(AaB) & NEC(AeB)
These equivalences enable one to prove a number of principles which Aristotle
accepts and to block some that he doesnt accept. This is trivially true for
AE-transformationc, EA-transformationc, IO-transformationc, and OI-transfor-
mationc. We give a proof that:
CONtc(AaB) CONtc(AiB)
Suppose CONtc(AaB) and CONtc(AiB). Then NEC(AiB) & NEC(AoB),

and either NEC(AaB) or NEC(AeB). But in either case there is a contradiction
since NEC(AaB) implies NEC(AiB) and NEC(AeB) implies NEC(AoB).
This same proof establishes that:
CONtc(AeB) CONtc(AoB)
On the other hand we can block both EE-conversiontc and OO-conversiontc, that
is, we can show:
CONtc(AeB) does not imply CONtc(BeA)

CONtc(AoB) does not imply CONtc(BoA)
that is
NEC(AiB) & NEC(AoB) does not imply NEC(BiA) & NEC(BoA)

NEC(AaB) & NEC(AeB) does not imply NEC(BaA) & NEC(BeA)
Since NEC(AiB) does imply NEC(BiA) and NEC(AeB) does imply

NEC(BeA), these two claims reduce to the obviously true:
NEC(AoB) does not imply NEC(BoA)

NEC(AaB) does not imply NEC(BaA)
that is
NEC(BoA) does not imply NEC(AoB)

NEC(BaA) does not imply NEC(AaB)
These arguments are, of course, also arguments against AA-conversiontc and

II-conversiontc, that is, they show:
CONtc(AaB) does not imply CONtc(BaA)

CONtc(AiB) does not imply CONtc(BiA)
Appendix 5 157
The failure of II-conversiontc means that CiN would have to be rejected by
Aristotle and presumably by Alexander. We have found no evidence that either
one accepts it or CoN. In addition one might expect Alexander to be suspicious
of CaN and CeN, since they are incompatible with his apparent belief that
if CON(P), P does not hold now. However, there are passages which suggest
that Alexander did accept these principles. The strongest is perhaps his pres-
entation at 211,2-17 of a proof of what he asserts to be:
Celarent1(CNC) CON(AeB) NEC(BaC) CON(AeC)
He assumes CON(AeC) and transforms it into NEC(AiC). But NEC(BaC), so

that (Disamis3(NNN)) NEC(AiB), contradicting CON(AeB). Alexander insists
that in this case the conclusion really is CON(AeC) and not NEC(AiC), since
he can also rule out NEC(AoC); for NEC(AoC) and NEC(BaC) imply (Bo-
cardo3(NNN)) NEC(AoB), which is incompatible with CON(AeB). This
inference obviously only makes sense if Alexander is assuming ( CeN).
This argument throws light on a difficult passage in which Alexander is
discussing:
Celarent1(UC N ) AeB CON(BaC) NEC (AeC)
which Aristotle established indirectly by refuting NEC(AiC). In his comment

Alexander invokes NCe:
He himself indicates by what he says that it is necessary to transform It

is not contingent that A holds of no C < CON(AeC)> in this combination
into a particular affirmative necessary proposition <NEC(AiC)>. For It
is not contingent that A holds of no C is no less true when the particular
negative necessary proposition is, but the proof goes through in the case
of the former. (195,6-10)
What Alexander says suggests that the only reason Aristotle didnt make
NEC(AoC) the hypothesis for reductio is that it would not enable him to derive
a contradiction. He does not make clear what sense he would make of a
justification of EAA1(UC N ). In the light of the passage we have just
discussed it seems to us likely that underlying Alexanders remark here is the
idea that the conclusion of Celarent1(UC_) is not CON(AeC) because the
premisses do not imply NEC(AoC). This idea obviously presupposes ( CeN);
cf. 197,12-22, 198,9-11, 205,29-30, 207,9-11.
Other passages suggest the same thing but not so decisively. For example,
Alexander writes:
A holds of some C by necessity is not equivalent to It is not contingent

that A holds of no C, which was transformed into it. For It is not
contingent that A holds of no C is also true when A does not hold of some
C by necessity; for it is true that it is not contingent that walking holds of
no animal, but not because it holds of some animal by necessity, but
because it does not hold of some by necessity. (194,25-9)
This suggests that CON(AeC) means that either NEC(AiC) or NEC(AoC)

( CeN). But everything Alexander says here is compatible with his accepting
only NCe. He can deny the equivalence of CON(AeC) and NEC(AiC) simply
158 Appendix 5
on the grounds that NEC(AoC) alone implies CON(AeC). Unfortunately
Alexander says nothing to make explicit this idea (see also 205,16206,11).
However, the question whether Alexander recognizes CeN or CaN is
made more difficult by the way in which he searches for terms to confirm the
difference between, say, CON(P) and NEC( P). He does this for
CON(AaC) and NEC(AoC) at 198,13-199,4. Obviously, he could simply verify
NEC(AaC) and thus verify CON(AaC) and falsify NEC(AoC), but he chooses
to verify CON(AaC), NEC(AoC), and NEC(AiC). Again, however, we are
not forced to conclude that he is presupposing CaN, and, indeed, we suspect
that he adopts his method because he is discussing Barbara1(UCC), and he
does not want terms which would falsify the possible conclusion which he is
considering at the moment, viz. NEC(AoC) (= NEC (AaC)).
Appendix 6
Textual notes
In this appendix we indicate places where Alexanders text may have been
different from that printed by Ross. Places where we have not followed the text
printed by Wallies are listed on p. 52 above.
Aristotle
26a17 Ei d ho men (Ross); hotan ho men (citation, 252,8 (Wallies,

following the Aldine); the lemma at 58,24 has Ei d ho men)
30a15 ton sullogismon (Ross); to sumperasma (citation, 128,6-7; the
lemma at 123,26 has ton sullogismon)
30a21-2 huparkhei oukh huparkhei to A (Ross); huparkhein m
huparkhein to A keitai (lemma, 127,25-6).
30a27 gar (Ross); de (citation, 128,29;129,9; lemma, 129,8).
30a27 toiouton (Ross); toiouton ti (lemma, 129,8, but toiouton in the
citation at 128,29.
30b7 de tou deuterou (Ross); de deuterou (lemma, 135,20).
30b18 de h (Ross); d h (lemma, 137,22).
30b19 ouk estai to sumperasma anankaion (Ross and the Aldine of
Alexander); to sumperasma ouk estai anankaion (lemma,
137,22-3).
30b24-5 eti d ei (Ross); eti ei (lemma, 138,3).
31a1 d hexei (Ross); de hexei (citation, 135,29, but the lemma at 142,18
has d hexei).
31a10 te kai (Ross); kai (lemma, 143,3).
31a17 Alexander reports (144,4-5) that some copies have henos monou
metalambanomenou after h apodeixis.
31b17 estin (Ross); esti (citation, 148,10).
31b20 estin (Ross); esti (citation, 148,24).
31b29 to de A (Ross); to A (citation, 149,4).
31b31 dipoun ti katheudein egrgorenai (Ross); dipoun ti m
katheudein (citations, 149,8 and 10-11).
31b39 tauta (Ross); ta auta (citation 150,12; at 150,30 Wallies follows
the Aldine in printing tauta where B and M have panta).
32a5 zion, meson zion (Ross); zion, dipoun meson (treated as a
scribal blunder, 151,14-16).
32a7 ean (Ross); an (lemma 151,32, but ean in the citation at 153,4).
32a8 monon (Ross); mons citation, 153,2; the mss. divide on the
citation at 152,26 and on the lemma at 151,33).
32a17 legmen (Ross and the Aldine of Alexander); legomen (lemma,
156,1 and some mss. of Aristotle).
32a18 d endekhesthai (Ross); de endekhesthai (lemma, 156,8).
32a22 apophasen kai tn kataphasen (Ross); kataphasen kai tn
apophasen (lemma, 157,11).
160 Appendix 6
32b4 de (Ross); d (lemma, 161,27. Both Ross and Wallies print
legmen in this line, although the mss. of Aristotle which Ross
cites and the Aldine of Alexander have legomen).
32b19 esti (Ross); estin (lemma, 164,16).
32b21 ekeinn (Ross); ekeins (citation, 165,4).
32b30 enkhrein (Ross); endekhesthai (lemma, 166,4 and following
citations).
32b37 kathaper kai en tois allois (Ross); kathaper epi tn alln (citation,
167,3-4).
33a1 elegomen (Ross); legomen (citation, 167,27).
33a4 m endekhesthai (Ross); endekhesthai (citation 168,4).
33a21 Ean (Ross); An (lemma, 169,15).
33b4 hout (Ross); houts (lemma, 171,14).
33b8 touton ton tropon ekhontn tn horn hoti oudeis (Ross); hoti
touton ton tropon ekhontn tn horn oudeis (lemma, 172,6-7).
33b27 tesontai pantes (Ross); te pantes esontai (citation, 245,23).
33b28-9 to elatton (Ross); ton elattona (citation, 245,24).
33b34 huparkhein (Ross); huparkhon (lemma, 174,32).
34a2 d enantis (Ross); de enantis (lemma, 175,7).
34a4 kai hoti ateleis (Ross); hoti kai ateleis (citation, 175,16 [aB (d);
hoti ateleis M]).
34a6-7 estai kai to B (Ross; kai omitted in three main manuscripts); kai
to B estai (lemma, 175,20).
34a8-10 to men dunaton, hote dunaton einai, genoit an, to d adunaton,
hote adunaton, ouk an genoito (Ross); to men [A] dunaton, hot
dunaton, genoit an, to de [B] adunaton, hote adunaton, ouk an
genoito (citation, 177,4-6).
34a10-11 hama d ei to A dunaton kai to B adunaton, endekhoit an to A
genesthai aneu tou B (Ross; the mss have ei for ei); the lemma at
177,1-2 reads hama d ei to A dunaton kai to B adunaton,
endekhoit an genesthai to A aneu tou B. At 177,8 Alexander cites
the lines as hama de endekhoit an genesthai to A aneu tou B.
34a12 to adunaton kai dunaton (Ross); to dunaton kai adunaton
(lemma, 182,20-1).
34a32 dunaton estai to auto (Ross); to auto estai dunaton (citation,
185,27).
34a38 panti ti G (Ross); ti G (citation, 185,15 and most mss. of
Aristotle).
34b3 thentas (Ross); thenta (lemma, 187,10).
34b7 huparkhon (Ross); huparkhein (lemma, 188,18 and one of the
mss. of Aristotle cited by Ross).
34b40-1 The words kai ouk estai to sumperasma anankaion were not
known to Alexander (citation, 200,6-7).
35a9-10 The word endekesthai was not read by Alexander (citations,
200,24-5, 27-8).
35b1 kai dia ts antistrophs (Ross); di antistrophs (citation, 202,11).
35b8-9 hotan de to m huparkhein lambani h kata meros tetheisa
(Ross); Hotan de to m huparkhein tini lambani (complete
lemma 203,10).
35b11 adioristou (Ross); aoristou (citation, 203,16 and some mss. of
Aristotle).
Appendix 6 161
35b12 to elattona akron (Ross and the Aldine of Alexander); ton elattona
akron (lemma, 204,1).
35b17 hper kapi (Ross); h kai epi (citation, 204,21-2).
35b23 Hotan d h men ex ananks huparkhein h d endekhesthai
(Ross); Hotan d h men ex ananks huparkhein m huparkhein
h d endekhesthai (lemma, 204,30-1).
35b32-3 to d endekhesthai (Ross); to de endekhesthai m huparkhein
(citation, 205,21-2).
35b34 tou d ex (Ross); tou de ex (citation, 207,34).
35b35 heteron gar to m ex ananks huparkhein (Ross); heteron gar esti
to m huparkhein ex ananks (citation, 206,16-17).
36a11 huparkhein (Ross); huparkhon (citation, 208,22 and one ms. of
Aristotle reported by Ross).
36a14 hst oudeni ou panti ti G to B endekhoit an huparkhein (Ross);
hst ou panti ti G to B endekhetai huparkhein (citation, 209,22,
on which see the note).
36a17 kataphatik (Ross); katgorik (lemma, 209,33, although
Alexander uses kataphatik in the commentary at 209,36).
36a23 to A ti G tini huparkhein (Ross). The mss read to A ti G mdeni
huparkhein, and Alexander clearly did as well (210,21-34). But he
indicates (30-1) that some manuscripts read to A ti G tini [m]
huparkhein (m bracketed by Wallies, following Waitz).
36a32 kapi (Ross); kai epi (citation, 212,3).
36b1 to en ti katgoriki (Ross); en ti katgoriki (citation, 213,30 and
the majority of the Greek mss. used by Ross).
36b16 apsukhi tini (Ross); tini apsukhi (lemma, 215,19).
36b19 Phaneron (Ross); Dlon (lemma, 215,29).
36b26 lambansin (Ross and most mss.); lambanntai (lemma, 217,29).
36b35 endekhesthai (Ross and the Aldine of Alexander); endekhomeni
(lemma, 219,34).
37a4 d ouden (Ross); de ouden (citation, 221,6).
37a18 tini tn A (Ross); tini ti A (lemma, 224,8).
37a27 dirisamen (Ross); dirikamen (lemma, 226,12).
37a35-6 tethentos gar tou B <m> panti ti G endekhesthai <m>
huparkhein (Ross); Alexander (citations, 227,27-8; 228,20-1 and
25-6) does not have the inserted words, but he mentions
(228,25-6) the possibility of reading tethentos gar tou B panti ti
G endekhesthai <m> huparkhein
37a38 endekhesthai (Ross); endekhomenou (lemma, 229,1).
37b19 smainei (Ross with most manuscripts and the Aldine of
Alexander); smainoi (lemma, 230,25).
37b30 d h (Ross); de h (lemma, 233,13).
38a17 gar (Ross): oun (lemma, 235,3).
38a22 oud huparxei (Ross); oukh huparkhei (citation, 235,9 and some
mss. of Aristotle).
38a25 kai (Ross); kan (lemma, 235,31).
38b10 oun (Ross); goun (citation, 239,13).
38b24 kapi (Ross); kai epi (lemma, 240,12)
38b32 anankaia h (Ross); anankaia i h (lemma, 241,11; Alexander
also cites (241,16) the text printed by Ross, although Wallies
prints anankaia h because of the lemma.
162 Appendix 6
38b39 ts katholou (Ross); katholou (lemma, 242,6 and one ms. of
Aristotle reported by Ross).
39a29 esti (Ross); estin (citation, 244,27, but the lemma at 39a28 has
esti).
39a30 te kai (Ross); kai (citation, 244,29).
39b7 Ean (Ross); An (lemma, 245,1).
40a2 proteron (Ross); katholou (citation, 249,3, and all mss. of
Aristotle).
40a8-9 endekhesthai kai (Ross); endekhesthai m huparkhein kai
(citation, 249,11 and the major manuscripts of Aristotle).
40a39 ei ho (Ross); ei d ho (citation, 252,4)
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English-Greek Glossary
This glossary lists most of the terms in the Greek-English index (which should
be consulted in connection with this glossary), but eliminates some which occur
infrequently and includes some not there when they are sometimes used to
translate an English word in this glossary.
absolutely: pants; hapls congruous: katalllos

absurd: atopos conjectural: stokhastikos
accident: sumbebkos consequent: hepomenon; lgon
accidentally: kata sumbebkos consideration, under: ekkeimenos,
additional condition: prosdiorismos prokeimenos, keimenos
affirm (v.): kataphaskein contain (v.): periekhein
affirmation: kataphasis contingent, be (v.): endekhesthai
affirmative: kataphatikos; contingent in the way specified: kata
katgorikos ton diorismon endekhomenon
affirmative proposition: kataphasis contradiction: antiphasis
agree (v.): homologein; sunkhrein contradictory (adj.): antiphatikos
alter (v.): allassein contradictory (n.): antiphasis
alteration: parallag contrary: enantios
anaphoric reference (or use): conversely: anapalin
anaphora convert (v.): antistrephein
antecedent: hgoumenon co-predicate (v.): proskatgorein
antithesis: antithesis correct: alths; orthos
ask (v.): epiztein; episkeptein counter-example: enstasis
assertion: phasis; legomenon; counterpredicate (v.): antikatgorein
eirmenon
assume in advance (v.): deduce (v.): sullogizein
prolambanein define (v.) horizein
assumed, be (v.): keisthai definition: horismos; horos
demand (v.): apaitein
categorical: katgorikos demonstration: apodeixis
cause: aition demonstrative: apodeiktikos
censure (v.): aitiasthai denial: arsis
clear: dlos; enargs deny (v.): anairein; apophanai;
combination: suzugia; sumplok apophaskein
complete: teleios destroy (v.): anairein; phtheirein
complete (v.): teleioun destruction: anairesis
completion: teleisis destructive: anairetikos
conclusion: sumperasma; determinate: dirismenos
sunagomenon determination: diorismos
condition: diorismos determine (v.): horizein
conditional: sunmmenon differ (v.): diapherein
confirm (v.): pistousthai difference: diaphora
conflict (v.): makhesthai different: diaphoros
166 English-Greek Glossary
directly: autothen; euthus indefinite: aoristos
disjoin (v.): apozeugnunai indemonstrable: anapodeiktos
dissimilar in form: anomoioskhmn indeterminate: adioristos
divide (v.): diairein indicate (v.): dloun; deiknunai;
division: diairesis endeiknunai; epismainein
do away with (v.): anairein; also do indication: smeion
away with (v.): sunanairein individual: atomos; kath hekaston
induction: epagg
ekthesis: ekthesis inference: sunagg
encompass (v.): perilambanein infrequent: ep elatton
equally: ep iss; homois inquire (v.): ztein
equivalent, be (v.): antakolouthein; instrument: organon
isodunamein; ison dunasthai; interchange (n.): hupallag
ison smainein; isos einai. interchange (v.): metatithenai;
establish (v.): kataskeuazein; allattein
elenkhein; deiknunai investigate (v.): episkeptein
evident: phaneros investigation: exetasis
extension, of wider: epi pleon ipso facto: hd
extension, have a greater (v.):
huperteinein justification: pistis
external: ektos; exthen
extreme: akros keep, keep fixed (v.): trein
known: gnrimos
fall (outside) (v.): piptein (ektos) last (term): eskhatos
falling under: hupo major: meizon
false: pseuds material terms: hul
figure: skhma mean (v.): smainein
find (v.): heuriskein minor: elattn
follow (v.): akolouthein; hepesthai; mixture: mixis
sunagesthai modality: tropos
for the most part: epi to polu
name (n.): onoma
genus: genos name (v.): onomazein
go through (said of a proof) (v.): necessary: anankaios (be necessary
proeinai; proerkhesthai; sometimes represents dei)
prokhrein necessity: anank
negation: apophasis
hold (of) (v.): huparkhein negative proposition: apophasis
hold fixed (v.): phullattein negative: apophatikos
holding: huparxis; huparkhein non-syllogistic: asullogistos
hypothesis: hupothesis
hypothesize (v.): hupokeisthai objection: enstasis
oppose (v.): antidiastellein
immediately: euthes opposite (be the opposite of) (v.):
imply (v.): sunagein antikeisthai
implication: akolouthia; akolouthsis part: meros; morion
impossible: adunatos particular: en merei; kata meros; epi
in general: hols; katholou at 164,31 merous
and 180,4 peculiar feature: idion
in itself: hapls peculiarly qualified (individual):
incomplete: atels idis pois
incongruous: akatalllos per se: kath hauto
English-Greek Glossary 167
posit (v.): tithenai species: eidos
possible, be (v.): dunasthai specification: diorismos
possible: dunatos specified, contingent in the way:
potentially: dunamei kata ton diorismon endekhomenon
predicate (v.): katgorein specify further (v.): prosdiorizein
predication: katgorma statement: axima
premiss: protasis straightforwardly: antikrus
preserve (v.): phullattein; trein; strict sense, in the: kuris
szein subject (logical): hupokeimenon
privative: stretikos subject (of study): pragmateia
proof: deixis substance: ousia
proposed (conclusion): prokeimenos syllogism: sullogismos
proposition: protasis syllogistic: sullogistikos
prove (v.): deiknunai
provide (terms) (v.): euporein take (v.): lambanein
put together, be (v.) sunkeisthai term: horos
thereby: hd
quality: poion; poiots transform (v.): metalambanein
transformation: metalpsis
reason: aitia, aition. true: alths (be true may represent
reasonable: eikos; eikots; eulogs altheusthai)
reduce (v.): anagein true together, be (v.) sunaltheuein
reductio ad impossibile: eis
adunaton apagg under consideration: prokeimenos
reduction: anagg. understand (v.): eidenai; akouein;
refer (v.): deiknunai; semainein exakouein; prosexakouein;
reference: deixis prosupakouein; hupakouein.
refutation: elenkhos understandable: gnrimos
refutation, dialectical: epikheiresis understood: gnrimos
refute (v.): elenkhein; epikheirein unique opposite, be the (v.): idis
reject (v.): diaballein; paraiteisthai antikeisthai; idiai antikeisthai
remain, remain fixed (v.): menein universal: katholou (katholikos at
restrict (v.): horizein 125,27)
result (v.): sumbainein; gignesthai unqualified: huparkhn
unqualifiedly: huparkhonts
separate (v.) khrizein usual: epi to pleiston
set down (v.): paratithenai
setting down: parathesis view (outlook): doxa
show (v.): deiknunai
signify (v.): smainein weaker: kheirn
similar in form: homoioskhmn whole: holos
simple: haplos without condition: adiorists
simply: hapls (kata psiln at 184,7) without qualification: hapls
sound: hugis
yield a conclusion (v.): sunagein
Greek-English Index
This index refers to the page and line numbers of the CAG text and covers
Alexanders commentary on Aristotles Prior Analytics 1.8-22, translated in this
series in two volumes, of which this is the first. The index includes a range of
logical and philosophical terms and a few commentators expressions used by
Alexander. Only the first few occurrences (followed by etc.) of the most common
terms are given. We have sometimes left out of account non-technical uses of a
word, and we do not cite occurrences in the lemmas or in Alexanders quotations
of Aristotle. The translations indicated are our usual but not invariant ones.
adiaphoros, duplicating (in the akolouthein, to follow, 130,8;

phrase adiaphors perainontes, a 131,17; 133,14; 135,30; 138,28,
kind of argument considered by etc. We note two occurrences at
the Stoics), 164,30 157,29 which express the
adioristos, indeterminate (said of relationship of predicate to
propositions which do not specify subject and have been translated
quantity), 159,22; 160,22; 170,29; apply to, and an occurrence at
215,4; 234,22; 241,21; 244,32; 235,21 which we have translated
248,31; 254,8. The adverb cohere. See also epakolouthein
adiorists is translated without akolouthia, implication, 158,18;
condition at 179,32 and as in an 176,2(2).24; 178,13.22;
indeterminate way at 215,17 (a 182,10.23.29; 183,8.13.14;
difficult passage). See also 184,22.25; 185,1.12.26.33. We
dirismenos note three difficult occurrences:
adunatos, impossible. We give a 161,18; 177,6 and 221,24
few of the many occurrences not akolouthsis, implication, 184,26
in the phrase apagg eis akros, extreme (term), 124,31;
adunaton, 128,32; 125,20; 148,12; 164,22; 171,19.23;
131,13.14(2).17(2), etc. 188,21; 189,6.15; 231,19; 237,4;
aitma, postulate, 126,11 239,9; 246,7; 253,33. There are
aitia, reason, 130,6; 133,18; 148,23; more occurrences of this word in
160,16; 162,14.23; 164,22; 170,31; Aristotles presentation of modal
171,19; 202,10; 220,1; 253,12. Cf. logic than in Alexanders
aition commentary on it (excluding
aitiasthai, to censure, 223,30; quotations). Only at 171,23 does
232,27 Alexander clearly use the neuter
aition, reason, 120,13; 144,13; substantive to horon; all other
149,28; 159,10; 188,25; 194,19; occurrences can or must be read
211,24; 218,3; 223,26; 251,38; as masculine with an explicit or
253,30. We have translated aition implicit horos; by contrast
cause at 163,14 and 178,31. Cf. Aristotle would seem to use the
aitia neuter substantive uniformly.
akatalllos, incongruous, 250,24 (The entry akron in the
170 Greek-English Index
Greek-English index of Barnes et ananks)), 119,11; 121,25.26.27.
al. should be corrected.) At 29(2).31.32.33, etc. Reasonably
36a21-2 Aristotle refers to a rare otherwise and usually in
major premiss as the premiss apo quotation or paraphrase of
(relating to) the major extreme. Aristotle, it occurs only in the
In the last two uses of akron nominative and is often
Alexander characterizes a translated It is necessary.
conclusion in which the minor 131,19.30; 157,17; 158,29-31(4),
term is the predicate as apo the etc.
minor extreme anankaios, necessary,
alths, true, correct, 119,24.25; 119,9.10.14.19.23, etc.
126,10.11(2).12, etc. anankais, necessarily, 119,22.23;
altheuesthai, to be true, 174,14; 130,8.9.18; 143,30; 149,5;
183,2.4.12; 198,30; 203,20; 205,37; 155,7.24; 197,1; 207,25; 222,11
206,5; 211,13.15; 231,36; 233,8. anapalin, conversely. Alexander
We wish to call attention to the uses this adverb when features of
italicized passages in which two propositions are
Alexander uses the expression interchanged, modality (146,12;
altheuesthai kata such and such 187,16; 232,24), quality (229,33;
to mean something like to be true 230,18; cf. 37b11), or both
in the case of. In 233,8 Alexander (238,11.17; cf. 37b11). At 182,14
uses the preposition epi to the he applies the adverb to the
same effect interchange of antecedent and
anagein, to reduce (one syllogism to consequent
another), 136,3; 137,4.26; 145,28; anaphora, anaphoric reference or
149,21; 151,3; 242,26; 243,15; use. Four occurrences in 179,20-9.
247,11; 252,19 The word is used non-technically
anagg, reduction (of one at 165,5, where we translate
syllogism to another), 123,17; application
136,11.16; 138,5; 145,26; 154,9; anapodeiktikos, indemonstrable,
219,22; 242,22; 246,4 used at 124,6 to refer to a
anairein, to do away with, to complete syllogism. See the note
destroy, 131,19; 139,8; 171,26; ad loc.
172,27, etc. We have rendered anomoioskhmn, dissimilar in
anairesis (182,16; 188,10; 192,32; form (= quality), 170,28; 254,9.
198,1; 223,31) and anairetikos Cf. homoioskhmn
(172,11.23.26; 195,2, etc.) antakolouthein, to be equivalent,
accordingly. Barnes et al. give to 158,24; 159,4.23.25.31;
destroy, to reject, to cancel for 160,15.17.23.25; 223,29. See also
anairein and rejection for isos einai
anairesis. (At 174,17; anti, instead of; to stand for. We
196,28.29.35; 197,2.6; and 198,29 mention this term because
we translate anairein deny.) Alexander uses it in phrases such
analutika, Analytics. Occurs in as Aristotle says a instead of b.
references to Theophrastus Prior These phrases can sometimes
Analytics at 123,19 and 156,29. mean something like the
Otherwise there are no expression a means b, and
occurrences of forms of analuein, sometimes they seem to mean
analusis, or analutikos in this something like he says a, but he
section of the commentary means b, and sometimes it is
anank, necessity (ubiquitous in hard to tell what exactly
the phrase by necessity (ex Alexander has in mind. The
following are the relevant it is converted (136,2-20(8), etc.)
occurrences. 127,28; 129,9; or that a person converts it
144,21; 147,27; 149,6; 152,20.23; (122,13; 130,30; 135,4; 137,15;
161,24; 180,28; 184,31(2); 185,5; 142,9, etc.). In discussing
186,24.34; 200,2; 203,4; relations between propositions P
210,28.30; 221,6; 224,30.35; and Q he can say that P and Q
227,28; 228,24; 228,29; 242,23.24; convert, that they convert with
249,1; 254,13 (dative) each other, that P
antidiastellein, to oppose, 152,24 converts with (dative) Q, that P
antikatgorein, to converts pros Q, and that P
counterpredicate, 252,12 converts eis (into; 168,25; 201,34;
antikeisthai, to be the opposite of, 203,8; 211,21; 245,11; cf. 239,14)
121,4.5; 126,33; 127,7, etc. Q. For the most part it is
Normally it is clear that the impossible to tell whether saying
opposite of a proposition is what that P converts with Q is also
we would call its contradictory. saying that Q converts with P. In
But sometimes Alexander five cases (222,5.7; 232,7; 236,11;
underlines this fact by speaking 243,16) the relation does not
of the contradictory opposite appear to be symmetric, and we
(antiphatiks antikeisthai; 187,8; have translated the dative by
188,4; 199,22; 208,24; 237,25; from. Pros has caused us the
238,4). The unique (or unique and most difficulty; we have chosen to
proper) opposite (idis (kai translate with respect to. In two
oikeis) antikeisthai; 197,24; cases (128,16 and 160,13) from
199,13; 207,4; 211,16), or the seems correct (cf. the lexicon in
opposite in the strict sense Barnes et al.), but in the
(kuris antikeisthai; 198,24). At remaining cases (220,27;
237,22-37 Alexander is driven by 222,17.21.35; 232,6) to or with
an obscure remark of Aristotles (symmetric) seems likely. See
to consider including contraries also antistroph and horos
among opposites. Cf. antiphasis antistroph, conversion,
antikrus, straightforwardly, 197,8 120,16.23.25; 121,23; 122,1, etc.
(equivalent); 216,11 (contingent); Alexander twice (200,25 and
216,12 (unqualified) 224,25) speaks of conversion of
antiphasis, contradictory one proposition into (eis) another,
(157,16-30(5); 158,5; 159,29.30; but otherwise he just speaks of
188,1; 196,15.25); contradiction conversion or of conversion of a
(141,4; 187,28; 195,20). Alexander proposition. See antistrephein
prefers antikeimenon, which we and horos
have translated opposite, to antithesis, antithesis, 160,5. Used
antiphasis; see antikeisthai by Aristotle at 32a32 in a passage
antiphatikos, contradictory, quoted once by Alexander (159,17)
157,20; 237,30. Alexander uses aoristos, indefinite (a kind of
the adverb antiphatiks with contingency mentioned by
antikeisthai at 187,8; 188,4; Aristotle at 32b10-11). The word
195,21; 208,24; 237,26.34; 238,4; occurs 11 times between 163,1
we have translated be the and 165,18 and again at 169,5
contradictory opposite and 183,31. Alexander uses the
antistrephein, to convert. noun aoristia at 164,21. At 203,16
Alexander can say that a and 21 he uses the word in
proposition converts (120,20.22; connection with 35b11
126,7; 138,13; 139,4, etc) or that apagg, reductio. Except at 216,16
this word occurs only in the 157,20-30(8), etc.); negative
phrase h eis adunaton apagg, proposition (138,22; 158,25;
which we translate reductio ad 159,28; 160,23.27; 161,12.30;
impossibile. 120,28; 121,3; 123,22; 229,29; 237,20.23.28.33; 238,6.8;
126,29; 127,4, etc. There are very 243,33; 245,31, 251,23). See the
occasional variants, h di appendix on affirmation and
adunatou deixis, translated proof negation
by impossibility (134,17; 189,36; apophanai, to deny, 156,23.25.26
191,25; 248,1. Cf. h deixis h eis apophaskein, to deny, 138,31;
adunaton at 175,24, and dia tou 195,22; 218,22
adunatou, translated by means of apophatikos, negative,
the impossible (175,14-17 (3 120,22.26.27; 121,5.15.17, etc. At
times; cf. 34a20), 202,11 (cf. 159,21 and 218,21 Alexander uses
35a40)). Alexander once uses the the term to apophatikon to refer
phrase apagein eis adunaton to what we might call the
(216,14) negation operator; there we have
apaitein, to demand, 220,2 translated what negates. See the
apo. Alexander uses this preposition appendix on affirmation and
only 14 times in this section of negation
the commentary. The interesting apozeugnunai, to disjoin,
occurrences are at 246,7 and 124,19(2).20; 220,14-21(7)
253,32 where Alexander arkh. In this section of the
characterizes a conclusion as apo commentary the word is used
tou elattonos akrou, and we only in its ordinary sense of
translate with the minor extreme beginning (151,16; 168,33;
as predicate 195,14; 200,31; 216,12; 220,9) or
apodeiktikos, demonstrative. This idiomatically in the phrase tn
word is used only at 164,15 arkhn (at all 152,12; 169,33;
(lemma) and 165,14 (explanation 234,10). Similarly for arkhesthai
of the occurrence in Aristotle). Cf. (167,3; 232,3)
apodeixis arsis, denial, 131,20
apodeixis, demonstration. In this asullogistos, non-syllogistic
section of the commentary all but (adjective applied to a pair of
one occurrence of this word is in a premisses which do not yield a
quotation of Aristotle or conclusion). 125,18; 135,2;
explanation of a quotation in 141,25.27; 165,22, etc. See also
which it occurs. 130,26; sullogistikos
144,4.21(2); 203,17; 204,12; atels, incomplete, 173,2.14.18;
204,21; 230,34; 241,22; 249,1.2. At 174,10; 202,9.10; 206,25; 217,25;
164,19 and 29 Alexander uses it 242,21(2); 254,15. Cf. teleios
in connection with a passage in atomos, individual, 122,32.36. The
which Aristotle speaks of an word is translated uncut at
apodeiktikos syllogism. The term 184,9-17 (5 occurrences)
apodeiknunai (demonstrate) does atopos, absurd, 177,6; 178,25;
not occur in this section of the 218,13; 224,14.17
commentary. Alexander prefers axima, statement (all occurrences
deixis (proof) and deiknunai in this part of the commentary
(prove) reflect Stoic usage), 177,31;
apodidonai, to give (the reason or 179,32; 180,2.13; 181,4.32
definition), 160,17; 167,30; autothen, directly, 169,22; 174,7;
170,31; 174,15; 175,28; 182,29 245,32
apophasis, negation (136,24.26;
deiknunai (1), to prove, to show. 223,15; 232,23; 238,20.34.36;
Alexander uses this verb and the 249,35. Alexander uses the
noun deixis (proof) with very adjectival form adiabltos at
great frequency mainly in 238,35
connection with Aristotles diabol, showing false, 178,9
validation or rejection of diapherein, to differ, be different,
combinations of premisses, make a difference, 119,14; 135,8;
120,15.16.18.25.30, etc. 155,29; 156,18; 158,27; 189,30;
Sometimes prove or even show 198,14; 206,14; 214,4; 245,30
seemed too strong. We have diaphora, difference,
translated deiknunai indicate at 119,13.18(2).25; 124,1; 125,30;
128,5; 147,19.20; 148,25; 129,19; 135,12; 137,6; 185,13;
149,7.11; 150,11; 158,18; 165,2. 194,33; 216,2
Other variants of no real diaphoros, different, 170,28
significance are establish at diairesis, division, 141,1; 161,32.33
141,3, 156,4, 159,8 and 238,16, to diairein, to divide, 224,13
yield conclusions at 165,11, deal dirismenos, determinate (opposite
at 200,23, argue at 200,18 and of adioristos), 159,24; 160,23;
203,25 222,3. This is the only form of
deiknunai (2), to refer, 177,28; diorizein used by Alexander in
178,6.17(2); 179,14.24; 180,33; this section of the commentary
181,4.7.11.12; 182,6. deixis (2), diorismos, specification,
reference. 177,32.33; 178,18.19; determination, condition.
179,26; 181,20. These passages Alexanders main uses of
all occur in the context of a diorismos are given under kata
discussion of Chrysippus use of ton diorismon and meta
propositions such as If Dion has diorismou. At 156,3 he refers to
died, he has died. In the first and the modal operators as diorismoi
last of the passages Alexander (specifications); at 160,9 and 22
speaks of the referent as he speaks of the quantifiers as
receiving (anadekhesthai) a deixis diorismoi (quantitative
deiktikos, 122,26; 146,9; 147,20; determinations); and at 189,31
149,7.11; 191,17; 215,6; 230,14; he speaks of adding a temporal
238,16; 250,21. We have diorismos (specification) to a
translated with forms of prove, proposition. At 159,24 and 160,23
show, and indicate; see he refers to quantitatively
deiknunai (1) definite propositions as
dlos, clear, 119,12.25; 120,30; dirismenos
139,16; 143,1, etc. diphoroumenos, duplicated (a kind
dlotikos, see dloun, 125,12; of argument considered by the
137,18; 154,11; 159,17; 166,15; Stoics), 164,29
167,15; 192,35; 204,22; 208,16; doxa, view, position, 126,9; 127,15;
247,5 140,19; 247,39
dloun, to indicate (119,18.23; dunamei, potentially, 154,8; 179,15;
120,3; 122,7, etc.); make clear 218,23.33. At 184,26 we have
(154,8; 163,29; 175,28; 220,7; rendered dunamei with the word
232,29). This verb is translated meaning. This is the only form of
show at 151,17 and express at dunamis in this section of the
200,24. See also dlotikos commentary
diaballein, to reject (a proof, a dunasthai, to be possible
combination, a method of proof; (sometimes translated by can),
Barnes et al. render to disprove). 123,7; 125,28; 129,28; 130,4;
134,21, etc. 121,16; 122,19.27.29; 123,12.14;
dunatos, possible (sometimes 227,14 (technical uses only)
translated by can). Over 90% of elattn (elassn at 231,24), minor
the occurrences of dunatos are in (usually said of a premiss,
the commentary on chapter 15. sometimes of a term), 120,26;
We list the few which are not: 124,23.31.32; 125,10, etc. We
139,3; 157,8; 160,8(2); 168,13; have translated less at 124,12
220,24; 224,4; 229,9.10 and 17, where it is used as a
synonym of weaker (kheiron) in a
d. Alexander uses this word in its description of the peiorem rule
ordinary sense of already, e.g. at elenkhein, elenkhos In this section
141,2. But he also uses it to of the commentary Alexander
convey a notion of implication and mainly uses these words in
non-implication; for example he connection with the use of terms
might say something like Just as counterexamples. Sometimes
because P, not d Q. We have we have used refute or
frequently translated this d as refutation to render elenkhein
thereby, but we have also used (129,23; 134,27; 204,11) and
ipso facto, in fact, and other elenkhos (171,22; 229,36; 238,13).
terms. Examples of this use at But sometimes we have
119,24; 125,23; 131,19; 140,10; translated the former as
and 156,22 establish (126,13; 129,27; 211,29;
eidos, species, 122,28; 162,1 215,28; 230,6) or show (139,9)
eikos, reasonable, 129,28; 160,20. and the latter as way of
See also eikots and eulogs establishing (204,23). At 221,12
eikots, reasonable, reasonably, we have translated elenkhn kai
122,25; 123,3; 124,31; 160,20; deiknus as showing
174,18; 197,23; 203,12. See also en merei, particular, 148,2; 149,27;
eikos and eulogs 150,4; 170,3.6; 203,11.19; 214,29;
ekkeimenos, under consideration 215,24; 219,1; 230,3(2); 233,32;
(usually applied to a premiss 234,11; 241,2; 242,9; 251,37;
combination), 121,18; 126,31; 252,36. See also kata meros and
128,23; 137,27; 138,27; 175,30; epi merous
187,23; 199,19; 201,13; 227,17; enallax, in alternation; in this
229,4.6.13; 230,5.7.11; 236,11.37; section of the commentary the
237,16; 248,1. The word is applied word occurs only in a quotation of
to the setting out of terms at Aristotle at 204,9. At 230,4
237,18. This is the only form of Alexander uses the participle
ekkeisthai used by Alexander in enllagmenos
this section of the commentary. enantios, contrary, 159,29.30;
See also keisthai and prokeimenos 221,16-34(6); 227,30.34. At 251,25
(2) Alexander uses the term loosely,
ekthesis, ekthesis (a method or and we have translated opposite
methods of proof used by enargs, clear, 171,21
Aristotle), 122,17.24.28.31; endeiknunai, to indicate, 128,30;
123,4.9.20; 143,14; 144,25.33; 164,25; 165,2; 233,20
151,26). The term is applied to endein, to be missing (from the
the setting down of terms at 173,8 text), 239,1
and to a combination being endeixis occurs just once (133,32) in
considered at 176,7 (cf. the commentary, with the sense
ekkeimenos) of proof
ektithenai, set out (cf. ekthesis), endekhesthai, to be contingent
(exceptions noted in translation), close to 300 times. Many of the
119,10.12.19.24; 120,3, etc. 30-odd occurrences of en merei
endekhomens, contingently, are in quotations or paraphrases
147,19; 149,10; 167,19.22; 192,34; of Aristotle
194,17; 210,2; 220,18.21.23; epi to pleiston, usually
221,2; 241,28 (synonymous with epi to polu),
enkhrein, may, might, 128,29; 162,9.13.28; 163,1.4.11.24.32.33;
138,32; 154,2; 160,20; 165,4; 164,2; 168,32; 169,1(2).7; 183,30.
185,17. This word occurs more At 163,5 Alexander uses epi
often in Aristotles discussion of pleiston with the same sense, and
modal logic than in Alexanders at 163,17 he uses epi pleiston in a
enstasis, counter-example (227,8); more general sense
objection (247,30). The verb epi pleon, of wider extension (of
enistasthai does not occur in this terms, 178,17 (pleion).21.32;
section of the commentary 188,25; 190,21. Cf. 125,20 where
ep elatton, infrequent, ep iss is translated
163,5.7.10.13.18.22; 169,2.4; co-extensive); true in more cases
183,31 (of propositions, 178,10; 179,7;
ep iss. Alexander uses this phrase 263,17); at greater length (of
four times (163,2.9.18.29) to discussions [non-technical]),
describe a proposition which is as 188,17; 207,35; 249,38; 150,1).
often true as it is false (by See also huperteinein
contrast with what is epi to polu epi to polu, for the most part
or ep elatton; in those places we (synonymous with epi to pleiston,
translate it equally balanced. In which we translate usually),
the same context (164,1) he 162,2.6.7.12.30; 163,23; 165,13.14
speaks of two propositions being epikheirein, refute, 180,12
ep iss (equally) true. At 125,20 epikheirsis, dialectical refutation,
he speaks of two terms being ep 180,9
iss (co-extensive). At 163,23 and epipherein. Alexander usually uses
28 Alexander refers to equal this word to introduce what
balance as to hopoter etukhen and Aristotle goes on to say; in these
to hs hopoter etukhe cases we have translated it to
<endekhomenon> add (125,14; 137,16; 140,7;
epagg, induction, 159,31 152,25; 153,30; 163,30; 166,2;
epakolouthein, to follow, 129,33; 222,1; 243,6). In three passages
196,17; 208,24 (124,32.33; 174,25) Alexander
epharmozein, to apply to, 125,28; uses it for the relation of
157,5; 161,32; see also harmozein predicate to subject in a
epi merous, particular (of i- and conclusion; there we have
o-propositions and of syllogisms translated it to apply
with such conclusions), 120,26.27; epistm, knowledge, science.
121,5.15.20.22, etc. See also kata Aristotle uses the word at 32b18
meros and en merei, which we and Alexander repeats it at
also translate particular. In the 164,18. Otherwise epistm occurs
modal logic chapters Aristotle only as a term in
uses epi merous once, kata meros counterexamples at 124,26-7;
12 times, and en merei 45 times. 195,31-2; 199,24-5
In his commentary on that text epiztein, to ask, 131,29; 144,23;
Alexander uses kata meros once. 155,3; 213,11; 217,8; 218,7;
His overwhelming preference is 222,16; 232,10; 240,4; 244,26;
for epi merous, which he uses 249,34; 253,17
eskhatos, last (term), 124,33; consequence), 156,20; 157,7;
125,1-2(4); 171,23; 189,14; 165,16; 176,24.31, etc. Cf. lgon
191,6.11.16; 202,3; 237,3; 251,14 heuriskein, to find, 125,19; 131,28;
eulogs, reasonable, 119,9; 144,23; 145,11.15.16; 155,17; 186,35;
158,19; 163,18; 217,8; 218,16; 190,30; 197,22; 198,15; 205,30;
239,21. See also eikos and eikots 230,12; 236,23; 248,26
euporein, to provide, 231,13 holos, whole, 121,32; 126,8; 158,32;
euthus/euthes, directly, 162,1; 196,21; 248,36
immediately, 129,3; 134,29; 223,17 hols, in general (oud hols, never,
exetasis, investigation, 125,29; not at all), 119,21; 125,8; 155,15;
145,9; 232,32 163,15; 165,10; 171,12; 184,13;
exthen, external, from outside, 185,17; 218,24; 229,5; 236,34;
132,2; 174,27; 175,17; 181,27; 238,10; 239,21
184,8; 187,22; 202,5 homoioskhmn, similar in form,
166,9; 167,3.5; 170,27. Aristotle
genesis, coming to be (163,20; uses homoioskhmn six times in
182,27(2).31.32; 183,25.31); the Prior Anaytics to apply to the
production (136,1) premisses in a combination. In
genos, genus, 161,33 five of them (27b11 and 34;
gnrimos, known (121,9; 123,23; 33a37; 36a7; 38b6) it means
136,24; 143,5; 149,32; 170,20; having the same quality, but at
174,9; 210,27; 227,17; 233,34; 32b37 it means having the same
254,9); understandable modality. In commenting on this
(157,14.32); understood (228,31) passage at 166,5ff. Alexander
gnsis, understanding, 120,32 uses the term in the same way,
once (166,9) applying it to
haplos, simple, 121,10; 184,26; combinations rather than their
219,23. Cf. hapls premisses; there we have
hapls, simply (frequently = translated it with premisses
huparchonts), 122,19; similar in form. Cf.
128,20.27.28; 130,23; 131,1; 139,9; anomoioskhmn. See also 86,12
140,3; 142,5.13; 143,23.23; 150,25; with the note in Barnes et al.
152,28; 248,19. Without homologein, to agree, accept,
qualification (often contrasted 176,12; 181,32; 212,20; 218,25;
with meta diorismou; see 247,29
139,27-141,7). 151,34; 155,22; horismos, definition. Aristotle uses
169,10; 179,32.33.34(2); 180,1; this word at 32b40 and 33a25,
185,30; 191,22; 201,21; 246,13; and it occurs in the commentary
251,20. In itself, 158,32; 159,2; on the relevant passages
218,21. Absolutely, 217,25. Cf. (167,17-30(4) and 169,27-30(3)).
haplos Otherwise it occurs at 158,19;
harmozein, to fit (135,18; 185,1); to 170,19; 174,15.33; 175,6.28;
apply to (150,29); to verify 177,12
(230,5); see also epharmozein horizein, to define (156,12-13(3);
hgoumenon, antecedent, 176,3.31; 157,13; 161,3.12; 172,28), to
177,21.22.29, etc. At 178,31 restrict (temporally)
Alexander uses the verb hgesthai (188,21-193,15(22); 217,19;
to mean to be the antecedent 232,20; 233,5); to determine
hepesthai, to follow (see also (163,16.17); to specify (161,31)
hepomenon), 129,11; 131,17.23; horos, term, 120,1.4; 124,32; 125,21;
133,20.23, etc. 127,30, etc. We note five places in
hepomenon, consequent (sometimes which Alexander distinguishes
ordinary conversion, which 149,3.19; 155,7; 166,21; 232,14
involves interchanging subject huparkhn, unqualified, 119,18.22;
and predicate terms, from such 120,3.5.7.14, etc.
things as AE-transformationc, huparxis, holding, 184,23.24;
159,14 (antistroph kata tous 185,11; 197,2(2)
horous); 164,14 (h tn horn huperteinein, to have a greater
hupallag); 173,23 (antistroph extension (of terms), 170,32.35;
kata tous horous); 221,3 171,19; 190,30.32; 191,3
(antistrephein tois horois); 222,7 hupokeisthai, to hypothesize,
(antistrephein kata tous horous). 127,2; 131,1; 133,26; 176,25;
We have translated horos 184,18, etc. Cf. hupotithenai. We
definition at 182,28 have translated hupokeimenos as
hugis, sound. This is usually a subject at 122,25; 126,5; 129,34;
fairly general word of 138,31; 184,7; 222,3.4; 252,11
commendation for a statement or hupothesis, hypothesis, 126,10;
piece of reasoning (122,16(2); 130,24; 131,16; 134,11.14, etc.
125,33; 127,3.15(2); 139,9 (wrong, See also hupotithenai and
ouk hugis); 144,17; 147,23; hupokeisthai
155,3.4; 157,30 (true); 159,9; hupotithenai (We use hypothesize
176,11; 177,27; 178,8; 196,20 or some closely related expression
(wrong, ouk hugis); 209,6; 216,7; for this verb, which Alexander
223,15.21). It is applied to consistently uses in connection
conditionals or implications at with arguments by reductio and
178,13-29(3) and 196,12 arguments resembling them),
hul. We have signalled occurrences 121,6; 131,10.12.14; 132,3, etc.
of this word (standardly One problematic exception is at
translated matter) with the 228,4 where we have used
phrase material terms. It occurs suppose. See also hupokeisthai
most commonly with the and hupothesis
preposition epi, which we have
usually rendered with some form idion, peculiar feature (Barnes et
of the verb to use. 124,21; al. use proper characteristic),
125,4.16.19.23.25; 126,13; 152,13; 157,2.5.8; 158,24; 159,33;
145,9.15.16; 198,16; 198,29; 161,7.14; 168,27; 222,4. There are
203,34; 204,22; 208,18; 215,24; informal uses of idis at 152,27
222,8; 236,26; 237,3.28.32. The (just) and 214,11 (properly) and
occurrences without the idiai at 167,4 (on its own)
preposition epi are 125,28; 190,8; idis poios, peculiarly qualified
215,15.23; 238,36. At 164,30 (individual), 179,11.12; 180,34;
Alexander refers to an obscure 181,17.18.26.30. For a discussion
Stoic argument called apeiros of this Stoic notion see Long and
hul (infinite matter) Sedley (1987), vol. I, pp. 166-79
hupallag, interchange (of terms in idis antikeisthai, to oppose
conversion, 164,13; 220,7; of the uniquely (i.e., be the
modalities of two premisses, contradictory of), 197,23.26;
175,13) 198,11; 199,12; 207,4; 211,16. Cf.
huparkhein, to hold (of), 223,26 (idiai antikeisthai) and
119,11(2).12.22.23(2).24, etc. 214,11 (idis sunagomenon)
huparkhonts, unqualifiedly, isodunamein, to be equivalent to,
124,27; 129,25; 130,16.18.20; 160,7; 205,36; 234,18. See also
132,8; 133,24; 134,29.31; 143,30; isos einai
144,9.18; 145,2; 146,6; 147,24.28; ison dunasthai, to be equivalent to
(with dative), 136,26; 140,9; 196,30.31; 206,2; 207,1; 218,24;
196,15.27; 197,8.32; 200,3; 222,24.26; 229,18). Affirmative
205,25.32; 214,9; 218,7.8; 223,7; proposition (158,25.28; 160,23.27;
226,8; 228,27; 229,18; 239,25; 161,29; 218,26; 220,8; 229,28;
243,33. See also isos einai 237,25.30.31.33; 238,6.7;
ison smainein, to be equivalent, 239,34.37; 251,24). See the
151,12. Cf. 166,31 ison kai tauton appendix on affirmation and
smainein, to mean the same negation
thing as. See also isos einai kataphaskein, to affirm, 218,22
isos einai, to be equivalent to (with kataphatikos, affirmative,
dative), 122,26; 136,28; 147,22; 120,21(2); 121,7-8(3), etc. See the
160,3; 164,10 etc. See also appendix on affirmation and
isodunamein, ison dunasthai, negation
ison smainein, isos kai autos. kataskeuazein, to establish,
isos is translated equal only at 131,18; 134,1.8; 176,11; 182,13;
163,10.23 and 178,33-5. The 188,11; 195,11; 197,27; 198,12.
phrase ep iss is translated The noun kataskeu occurs at
co-extensive at 125,20 184,5 and 221,8
isos kai autos, equivalent to and katgorein, to predicate, 126,4;
the same as (with dative), 194,22; 130,2-21(10); 146,17.24;
195,13; 197,15. See also isos einai 156,15.27; 160,26.30; 170,34;
173,5; 178,3-5(3); 180,30; 181,21;
kata meros, particular, 230,1 (said 186,34; 188,27.29; 190,31; 205,20;
of a conclusion). See also epi 209,2; 231,34; 234,6; 236,4; 238,3;
merous and en merei 242,13; 249,13; 251,33;
kata sumbebkos, accidentally, 252,6.7.10.11. We note an
163,14; 223,33 unusual use at 228,19
kata ton diorismon katgorma, predication, 180,30
(endekhomenon), (contingent) in katgorikos, affirmative (136,14;
the way specified. Alexanders 166,19; 173,1; 213,30); categorical
way of referring to contingency as (119,16), This word is much more
characterized by Aristotle at common in Aristotle than in
32a18-20. We list all the Alexander, who prefers
occurrences of this stock phrase, kataphatikos. For Aristotelian
excluding those in quotations of uses of this word to mean
Aristotle: 161,5.11; 174,5.12.30; affirmative see, e.g. 1.9, 30a36.
190,29; 191,9; 194,12; Barnes et al. translate
196,7.13.20.25; 197,3; 198,6.15.20; katgorikos predicative
199,5.8.12; 200,35; 205,8.20; kath hauto (hautn), per se,
208,5; 209,10; 210,3.7; 211,9; 163,15; 203,29; 223,33
212,34; 216,6.8.10; 219,28; 220,18; kath hekaston, individual, 141,4;
221,5; 222,8; 226,13.17; 231,35; 160,4.24; 162,16. The expression
232,2.37; 233,2.18; 234,3.5.33.35; is used non-technically at,
235,8.10; 236,7; 239,7.11; 240,23; 120,8.10; 121,16; 123,29.31;
242,10; 243,1.4.10; 245,5.35; 165,21
246,23.34; 249,12; 250,22.23.38; katholikos, universal, 125,27
253,27; 254,21. We note also katholou, universal,
endekhomenon ek tou diorismou 121,7.8(2).21.23.24.30, etc.
at 223,11 keisthai, to be assumed, 122,10;
katalllos, congruous, 129,9; 250,25 123,5.6; 126,33; 127,11, etc.
kataphasis, affirmation (157,19- Alexander frequently uses the
160,30(14); 164,7; 168,28; participle keimenos to refer to a
premiss; in these cases we have translated it at 165,11; 188,15.16;
translated assumed premiss. 210,36; 224,14.16; 236,36. Other
124,12; 131,27; 132,27; 135,2; variations occur at 141,22 (to
145,20.27; 168,24.26; add), 152,24 (to use), 158,18;
169,3.13.23(2); 170,18.23; 175,16; 232,35.36 (to consider), 159,27
185,25; 187,22; 200,19.29; 210,9; and 161,12 (to assert), 196,2 (to
216,1; 231,32; 243,22; 246,14.26; get), 229,10 (to obtain). See also
251,4. In some cases the word hupokeisthai, keisthai, tithenai
seems to mean something closer lgon, consequent (Stoic term; see
to to be established, but, even Philoponus, in APr. 243,1-10),
then, we have stuck with to be 177,21; 178,28; 179,34. Cf.
assumed; see, for example, hepomenon
211,24 and 217,28. There is an lexis is used to refer to the text or
interesting use of keimenon to verbal formulation. We have
refer to the proposition P in the translated it as, e.g. text, what
proposition NEC(P) at 196,28-30. is said, what he says, words,
Other less significant exceptions 129,9; 167,31; 169,26; 170,15;
to our practice are 125,7 (to 186,30; 195,7; 200,8; 204,27;
apply), 132,13, 139,21, 170,16 and 210,21; 221,7.20.24; 225,1;
202,35 (to be under consideration; 228,24; 239,2.27; 249,1; 250,25;
cf. 215,24 and ekkeimenos), 254,22. Barnes et al. translate
158,19 (to lay down), 164,12 (to be expression. See also phni
placed), 205,4(2) (to play a role; logikos. This word occurs three
cf. 216,1). See also hupokeisthai, times in each of two brief
lambanein, tithenai passages (198,32-199,1 and
kheirn, weaker (universal 224,13-15) as an example, where
proposition than particular, it is translated rational. At 250,2
negative than affirmative, there is a controversial reference
necessary than unqualified than to a work called logical notes
contingent), 124,12; 174,2. See (scholia logika). Finally at 180,12
also elattn Alexander characterizes an
khrizein, to separate, 130,4; argument he is about to give as
132,26(2).27.29(2); 220,23. These more logikos; there we have
are the cases with a logical sense. translated dialectical
The word is applied to the logos is of no particular interest. We
separation of soul and body five have translated it most often as
times between 180,28 and 181,23 argument or discussion, 121,28;
koinos, general, common, 130,10; 122,18; 123,21; 124,17; 125,27;
152,27; 215,5 133,15; 134,10.20; 135,29; 149,27;
kuris, in the strict sense (applied 157,19; 164,30; 165,3.6; 166,10;
to contingency at 156,19-21(2), 180,8; 181,16; 184,5; 191,21;
and 222,18, and to the opposition 197,27; 214,6; 219,35; 222,23;
of propositions at 158,31-159,2(2), 232,3. It is translated account at
and 198,24) 119,9 and 157,5, and definition
at 160,19
lambanein. We have translated
this frequently occurring word as makhesthai, conflict with (with
to take as often as seemed at dative), 152,1
least minimally feasible, 120,14; meizon, major, used of a premiss
121,20-30(3); 122,9-36(9), etc. It (120,27; 124,5.22; 126,19.35, etc.) or
frequently means something like a term (124,31.33(2); 125,1.2, etc.)
to assume and we have so menein, to remain, remain fixed,
136,10.13; 150,1; 181,28; contradiction, meaning one of a
189,19.29.34; 192,9.12.29; 200,15; pair of contradictory propositions.
203,13; 211,27; 217,21; 222,28; See also meros
234,7; 251,9.39
meros, part, 122,10.12.28; 123,5.8; oikeios, appropriate, proper, 119,28;
130,3; 162,1. At 157,30-2 we have 199,13
paraphrased a sentence in which onoma, name. This word occurs six
Alexander refers to a part of a times in a discussion of Stoic
contradiction, meaning one of a ideas (178,17-18(2) and
pair of contradictory propositions. 179,11-16(4)), where the name in
See also en merei, epi merous, question is Dion and once at
kata meros, para meros, morion 238,3, where Alexander says that
meta diorismou (anankaios), Aristotle applies the name phasis
(necessary) on a condition, to protaseis
140,18.21.23.34; 155,25; 180,1; onomazein, to name, 179,14
202,22; 251,22. We note also organon, instrument, 164,31; 165,1
anankaios meta prosdiorismou at ousia, substance, 130,4.11
155,22 and the one occurrence of
ex hupotheses anankaios at para meros, at alternating times,
141,6. See Appendix 3 on 161,21
conditional necessity paradeigma, example, 177,27;
metabol, change, 193,17 183,25
metalambanein, to transform. The paraiteisthai, to reject, decline,
word is applied particularly to 121,12; 125,28.29; 164,23.27;
what are sometimes called 165,3.8
complementary conversions of parallag, alteration, 181,26.27
contingent propositions, e.g., at parathesis, setting down, 129,30;
168,13-31(7). Examples of other 139,30; 143,18; 144,22; 149,1, etc.
uses of the word are at 121,22 (to See also paratithenai
transform), 131,26 and 141,7 (to paratithenai, to set down, 130,24;
take instead), 143,11 (to turn to 134,29; 135,18; 138,30; 147,12,
(a subject)), and 144,20 and etc. Normally it is terms which
147,26 (to change (terms)) are set down as an interpretation
metalpsis, transformation, of propositions, but Alexander
169,3.14; 175,32; 176,19; 191,26, speaks four times (230,22.23;
etc. See metalambanein 237,21.28) of setting down a
metapiptein, to change, 190,10; conclusion or the setting down
192,31; 193,1.2.16(3).18 (parathesis) of a conclusion
metaptsis, change, 193,16(2) (meaning giving terms which
metatithenai, to interchange make it true)
(applied to the assignment of perainein, to conclude. The word
terms to letters at 144,9.10; occurs only at 164,30 in the
149,16; and to the modalities of phrase adiaphors perainontes, a
two premisses at 202,6) kind of argument considered by
mixis, mixture (a combination of the Stoics
two premisses of different periekhein, to contain, 129,4;
modalities), 121,9; 179,15; 191,7. At 184,10
123,23(2).30.32, etc. periekhontn is translated
morion, part, 121,26.31; 122,15; surroundings
123,5. At 157,16-18 we have perilambanein, to encompass, 179,3
paraphrased a sentence in which phaneros, evident, 122,21; 132,26;
Alexander refers to a part of a 141,7; 153,5; 157,15, etc.
phasis, assertion, 238,1-3(3). The 214,18; 228,22; 251,35.36. See
words apophansis, apophainein, also the more general uses of this
and apophantikos do not occur in word at 165,9, 175,24 and 186,2
this part of the commentary and the use of prokeisthai at
phni, verbally, 198,14 (only 144,8. And see ekkeimenos
occurrence of the noun) prokhrein, to go through (said of a
phullattein, to preserve, hold fixed, proof), 135,16; 195,10; 235,25. See
161,5; 168,12.32; 193,9. See also also proeinai and proerkhesthai
szein and trein prolambanein, to assume in
piptein (ektos), to fall (outside), advance, 157,15; 192,29; 193,4
189,14 prosdiorismos, additional
pistis, credibility (125,32); condition, 155,22
justification (135,7) prosdiorizein, to specify further,
pistousthai, to confirm, 125,5; 127,3 155,17
poion, quality (the quality of a proskatgorein, to co-predicate,
proposition is its being 119,28
affirmative or negative), 123,32; proskeisthai, to be added or
170,27-8(2); 172,33; 215,5; 234,23. attached, 144,5; 151,15; 154,15;
See also poiots and idis poios 155,12; 159,21; 205,14; 218,22
poiots, quality, 233,23; 241,21. See proslambanein, to add (as a
also poion premiss), 121,6; 128,24;
pragmateia, subject (of study), 132,3.10.14; 134,1.5.12; 139,24;
164,25 170,4.6.11; 188,9; 197,17; 206,32;
prodlos, prima facie clear, 123,22; 208,26; 209,30; 210,18.29.35;
142,14; 188,2; 237,13 214,14; 216,35
proeinai, to go through (said of a proslpsis. This word occurs in the
proof), 210,21; 234,15; 247,39. See phrase kata proslpsin at 166,18;
also proerkhesthai and prokhrein see the note ad loc
progoumens, primarily, 190,27 prosrhesis, adjunct, 156,17
proerkhesthai, to go through (said prosthk, addition. Alexander
of a proof), 134,10; 227,3. See also refers to the addition of a modal
proeinai and prokhrein operator at 119,27 and at
prokeimenos. (1) Alexander uses to 155,11-12(2); for its non-technical
prokeimenon to refer to what we sense see prostithenai
call the proposed conclusion. prostithenai, to add. Alexander
Some of his uses of this term mainly uses this word to remark
occur in discussions which show that Aristotle adds something to
the importance he attaches to the what he has already said. He
order of terms in a conclusion; applies it to adding a premiss or a
see, e.g., 146,23; 148,13; 234,6; diorismos at 189,28-190,31(5),
244,8; 251,3; other occurrences at and at 155,11 he speaks of adding
122,4; 131,18; 137,7; 141,27; a modal operator. Cf. prosthk.
174,7; 231,31; 235,35; 236,9.13; The word prosthesis does not
244,26; 246,9.19; 252,34. Cf. 188,9 occur in this part of the
and four occurrences of commentary
protithenai at 166,13; 167,6; protasis, proposition
199,24 (2). We also translate this (119,10.12.19.26.26, etc.) or
word under consideration when premiss (120,10.29; 121,3.6.15
it is applied to combinations of etc.). Note that we have often
premisses. 123,20; 144,8; 167,15; supplied the word proposition or
172,8.17; 186,35; 188,20; 195,15; premiss where Alexander simply
208,34; 211,11; 212,6.23; 213,34; has a nominalization of feminine
or neuter adjectives; for example szein, to preserve, 189,36, see also
where he speaks of a combination phullattein and trein
of a contingent and a necessary, stretikos, privative,
we will translate a contingent 135,23-136,4(4), etc. See the
and a necessary premiss appendix on affirmation and
pseuds, false (sometimes negation
falsification), 119,25; 126,13; stokhastikos, conjectural, 165,9
128,10.20.27, etc. The word is sullogismos, syllogism,
translated fallacious at 196,22 119,9.13.14.16.17.26.27, etc.
sullogistikos, syllogistic (adjective
rhthsetai, will be said. At applied to a pair of premisses
24,27-30 Alexander paraphrases which yield a conclusion), 120,12;
Aristotles formulation of the 121,2.24.33; 123,20, etc. See also
dictum de omni et nullo by asullogistos
substitution of rhthsetai for sullogistiks, syllogistically.
lekhthsetai. We only wish to Normally used with sunagein
signal this fact, since Alexander (141,29; 168,13; 230,32.34;
consistently uses the verb he 231,11; 232,11; 237,37; 239,33;
substitutes when he cites the 240,5.33; 241,6; 242,33), once
dictum, and he uses it in the with akolouthein (229,8), once
same way twice in a discussion of with deiknunai (243,22). There
ekthesis. We suggest that insofar are two other occurrences at
as rhthsetai is a technical word 124,10 and 185,3
for Alexander it is used to express sullogizein occurs only at 165,9
the relation of predication where it is translated deduce
between a universal and a sumbainein, to result. Alexander
particular under it as opposed to rarely uses this word except when
the relationship of two universals. quoting or paraphrasing
We give the relevant passages, Aristotle. The following are
24,30.33; 25,2.19; 32,18; passages where he uses it more or
54,7.15.18; 55,5.6.10; 60,24.25.29; less on his own: 123,22; 157,10;
61,26; 122,33; 123,1; 126,5; 130,1; 177,13.14; 198,10; 216,28; 217,11;
167,18; 169,26; 174,24 (technical 236,39; 248,17
uses only) sumbebkos, accident, 181,27
sumperasma, conclusion (an
smainein, to mean (150,18; 151,12; extremely common word in the
152,29; 157,1, etc.); to signify commentary), 121,5; 122,5;
(126,27; 129,33; 140,6; 155,11; 123,32; 124,3.4, etc.
157,1, etc.); to refer (150,12; sumplok, combination (of two
205,14 (only occurrence of premisses; Barnes et al. translate
smantikos)) conjunction). In general there
smeion, indication (134,28; 145,8; seems to be no difference between
190,13; 198,1; 236,23); sign sumplok and suzugia. But we
(179,16) note two occurrences of sumplok
smeiteon, it should be noted, where it seems to mean
122,17; 128,32; 149,5; 168,28; something like formal validity,
240,32. Barnes et al. translate 164,27 and 169,10. Standard
Note! Their entry under occurrences, 120,10; 121,7.24, etc.
smeioun is incorrect Alexander occasionally uses
skhma, figure (of a syllogism), participles of the verb sumplekein
120,8-26(6), etc. The word is to the same effect (155,29; 156,5.6)
translated form at 190,9 sunagein. This is Alexanders usual
term for expressing the relation 139,5.6; 248,13
of implication (Barnes et al. sunmmenon, conditional (a
translate it to deduce). We have proposition of the form if P then
usually translated the active Q). The word occurs 18 times in
forms as yield a conclusion (e.g., this section of the commentary,
120,18; 125,19; 135,8; 142,19; all between 176,4-182,18 (on
208,10) or imply (e.g., 125,21; 34a5-12)
127,1.10; 128,26; 138,7) and the suntattein, to co-ordinate with,
passive ones as follow (e.g., 159,19; 189,32; 190,36
121,9; 123,24; 124,14; sustasis, construction, 119,15.16
125,11.23(2)). But sometimes we suzugia, combination (of two
have used be inferred (e.g., premisses). Apparently
131,10; 134,6.10; 138,25.26) for interchangeable with sumplok,
the passive forms, and sometimes but more common. 120,12;
we have simply spoken of a 121,18-21(3), etc.
conclusion (e.g., 132,1; 167,31;
176,10; 186,20) taxis, order, ordering, 149,16; 241,27
sunagg, inference (Barnes et al. tekhn, art, 165,8; 169,8
translate deduction). 122,21; teleios, complete (Barnes et al.
137,7; 167,25; 202,5; 231,31; translate perfect), 169,13;
232,14.19; 242,4 173,1.13.17; 174,6.9.20.27.29.34;
sunaktikos, yielding a conclusion 175,9.15.16; 186,7; 202,3.4.32;
(Barnes et al. translate 205,4; 206,26.29; 208,4; 210,2.6;
deductive), 217,27; 227,23 245,23; 250,12.19
sunaltheuein, to be true together teleisis, completion (Barnes et al.
with, 157,31(2); 159,29; 160,2.21; translate perfection), 242,24
164,7; 168,26.28; 197,8; teleioun, to complete (Barnes et al.
221,20.29. On sunaltheuein see translate to perfect), 217,27;
Lee (1984), pp. 88-92 242,22.26; 253,13; 254,10.12.15
sunanairein, to also do away with trein, to keep, keep fixed, preserve,
(Barnes et al. translate to reject 146,1; 148,8.31; 154,16; 189,9;
together with), 182,15; 223,34. 192,22.25; 193,6; 207,20; 217,12;
See anairein 246,19; 250,28; 254,32. See also
sunaptein, to attach, 125,2 phullattein and szein
sunekhs, continuous, 162,25 thesis, positing, 178,25. See tithenai
(picking up on 32b8) tithenai, to posit, 130,13; 131,20;
suntheia, custom, 179,23 132,6.19; 133,31, etc. This word is
sunths, customarily, 155,14 used with more frequency by
sunistasthai, to compose, 121,18 Aristotle than by Alexander. We
sunkeisthai, sunthesis, have translated it to assign at
suntithenai. Six of the 150,15, to place at 208,15, and
occurrences of these three words to classify at 245,32. Like
are at 181,4-16, and refer to keisthai it sometimes seems to
either the conjunction of soul and mean something more like to
body or the closing together of establish than to assume; see,
fingers to make a fist. The e.g., 199,14 and 249,31. See also
remaining occurrences are, for thesis, hupokeisthai, and
sunkeisthai (to be put together), lambanein
124,10; 177,27; 212,13; and, for tropos, modality (rather than the
suntithenai (to compose, to standard mode, adopted by
conjoin), 121,10 and 217,12 Barnes et al.), 119,17.26(2).28;
sunkhrein, to agree, 129,15; 132,7; 120,21.24; 154,13; 155,11.17;
159,21; 160,30; 172,5; 197,2; 161,3; 165,6.11; 188,17; 196,12;
202,6; 218,21 (technical uses only) 206,12; 207,35; 213,26; 218,14;
247,22; 249,37
ztein, to inquire, investigate, seek, ztsis, inquiry, 165,7.19
Subject Index
a(-proposition), 4 conversion, 7-8, 102; see also

AE-transformationc, 21-2, 40, 96, AI-conversion, EE-conversion,
98-9, 107-10; App. 5, see also and II-conversion
waste cases
affirmation, affirmative, 64-5, 108-9, Darii1(NC_), 74-5
App. 2, App. 4 (p.153) Darii1(NU_), see NU first-figure
AI-conversionc, 22, 27-31,40 combinations
AI-conversionn, 10, 27, 40 Darii1(UN_), 16-18
AI-conversionu, 8, 39 de re/de dicto distinction, 14-15, 22-3,
Andronicus, 98 36 n.22, 52, 124 n.87, 142 n.319
AO-transformationc, 109 dictum de omni et nullo, 6, 11, 15-16,
57-8, 60-1, 71, 139 n.287
Barbara1(NU_), see NU first-figure diorismos of contingency, 20-1, 93-5;
combinations see also contingency in the way
Barbara1(UN_), 13-18, 62-5, 68 specified
Baroco2(NC_), 61
Baroco2(NNN), 12-13, 54-8 e(-proposition), 4
Baroco2(NU_), 78-81 EA-transformationc, 21-2, 40, 95-7,
Baroco2(UC_), 124 n.81 App. 5; see also waste cases
Baroco2(UN_), 13-14, 79-81, 91-2 EE-conversionc, 25, 27-34, 106-15,
Bocardo3(CN_), 66-7 App. 5
Bocardo3(CU_), 61-2 (see n. 46) EE-conversionn, 9-10, 25-7, 40
Bocardo3(NNN), 12-13, 54-8 EE-conversionu, 8, 39
Bocardo3(NU_), 13-14, 87-8 ekthesis, 13, 56-8, 79-81, 88
Eudemus, 15-16, 29, 58-62, 76
Camestres2(NU_), 72-7 extreme, 4
Celarent1(NU_), see NU first-figure
combinations Ferio1(NU_) see NU first-figure
Celarent1(UN_), 17-18, 65-7 combinations
Cesare2(UN_), 75-7 Ferio1(UN_), 24-6 n.93, 22-5, App. 1
circle argument, 61, 66-7, 68-9, 74-5 figure, 4
combination, 4
complete, 5-6; see dictum de omni et Herminus, 119 n.35
nullo
completion, 7-8 i(-proposition), 4
contingency in the way specified, II-conversionc, 10-11, 22, 28-31, 40
19-21 II-conversionn, 10, 27, 40
contingency, 9, 12-13, 19-34, 53-4, II-conversionu, 8, 39
93-107, 108-10 incompatibility acceptance
contingently (holding), 20, 29-31 argument, 17-18; see also
contradictories, 7, 94-7 incompatibility rejection
contraries, 7, 97, 108-10 argument
186 Subject Index
incompatibility rejection argument, peiorem rule, 15-16, 59
17-18, 32, 62-4, 67-70, 73-4, 76-7, premiss, 4
106-8 propositions, 4
interpretations, 6-7, 32, 59-60, 64-5, prosleptic propositions, 105
69, 74-81, 83-4, 85-8, 107, 109, quality, 4
112, 121 n.51 quantity, 4
IO-transformationc, 21-22, 40, 97,
108-10, App. 5; see also waste reductio ad impossibile, 8, 55, 58,
cases 61-2, 65-7, 68-70, 74-5, 110-15
reduction, 77-8
major, 4
major term must be predicate of Sosigenes, App. 3
conclusion, 81-2 Stoics, 103
middle, 4
minor, 4 temporal interpretation of modality,
necessarily (holding), 29-30 23-5, 27-31
necessity, 59-60, 71, 75-7, 89-90, terms, 4; see interpretations
91-2, 93-5, 100-1, 105, App. 1, Theophrastus, 3, 15-6, 29, 58-62, 67,
App. 3 76, 96, 98, 107, 111, 122 nn.60 &
negation, negative, 96, App. 2, App. 61, 124 nn.81-3, 125 n.91, 93, 127
4 (p. 153) n.120, 131 n.166, 139 n.287, App.
non-syllogistic combinations, 6-7 3
NU first-figure combinations (i.e., transformation, 56 n.38
Barbara1(NU_), Celarent1(NU_),
Darii1(NU_), Ferio1(NU_)), 13-18, universal (propositions), 14, 30-1, 61,
58-67, 70-1, 75-6, 105, 125 n.93 64-5
unqualified, 9
o(-proposition), 4 unqualifiedly (holding), 29-31
OI-transformationc, 21-2, 40, 97,
108-10, App. 5; see also waste waste cases, 21-2
cases weak two-sided Theophrastean
OO-conversionc, 31-2 contingency, 32-4, 111-15, App. 5
opposites, 55, 65-6, 68-9, 96-7, 100-2,
111-15
Index Locorum
Bold type is used for references to the pages, notes and appendixes of this book
ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS ARISTOTLE

in An. Pr. An. Pr. (outside 29b29-40b15)
24,27-30, 120 n.39 24b22-4, 6
25,26-26,14, 23-5 24b26-30, 6
26,29-27,1, 36 n.33 24b29-30, 120 n.39
31,5-6, App. 2 25a1-2, 23
32,32-34,2, 117 n.18 25a2-3, 36 n.33
36,7-25, 25-6 25a27-36, 10-11, 25-7
36,25-8, 127 n.120 25a31-2, 85, 132 n.182
36,25-31, App. 3 25a29-32, 10, 25
37,3-13, 27 25a32-4, 10
37,14-17, 27 25a37-9, 19
37,17-21, 26 25a37-b3, 21-2, 28
37,28-38,10, 19, App. 4 (p. 154) 25b3-14, 31
39,4-11, 31 25b3-25, 106
39,19-23, 20 25b14-15, 19
41,21-4, 107 25b14-19, 32
44,26-7, 38 n.258 25b15-22, 138 n.263
54,12-18, 6 27a36-b1, 129 n.139
60,27-61,1, 6 28a24-6, 117 n.18
99,16-100,26, 117 n.18 28b14-15, 117 n.18
378,12-379,11, 140 n.290 28b20-1, 117 n.18, 118 n.22
379,9-11, 120 n.43 49b14-32, 120 n.43
in Top. 52a39-b34, 137 n.244
10,7-12, 139 n.281 53b12-16, 137 n.244
On the difference between Aristotle Int.
and his associates concerning 19a23-4, 76
mixtures 19a23-6, App. 3
62, 120 n.37 23a6-11, App. 4 (pp.153-4)
AMMONIUS 23a7-20, 19
in Int. chs. 12 and 13, App. 4
153,13-154,2, App. 3 EUDEMUS (fragments, ed. Wehrli)
221,11-229,11, 141 n.305 12, 128 n.126
245,1-32, 136 n.238, App. 4 16, 141 n.298
[AMMONIUS] PHILOPONUS
In An.Pr. in An. Pr.
39,10-15, 121 n.46 53,15-24, 137 n.251
39,10-25, App. 3 n.7 53,15-56,5, 141 n.305
39,31-40,2, 119 n.35 123,12-126,29, 118 n.30
40,9-13, 131 n.166 123,26-124,1, 120 n.45
188 Index Locorum
124,1-4, 121 n.47 THEOPHRASTUS (fragments, FHSG)
124,9-24, 119 n.32 100B, 136 n.240
124,24-8, 119 n.33 100C, App. 3 n.8
124,30-125,18, 121 n.46 100D, 128 n.126
126,8-29, App. 3 102A, 141 n.298
145,5-6, 133 n.201 102B, 142 n.314
STEPHANUS 102C, 141 n.298
in Int. 103A, 137 n.254
38,14-31, App. 3 n.2 104, 118 n.24
STOICS (dialectic fragments, ed. 106A, 118 n.30
Hlser) 106B, 124 n.83
1169, 139 n.280 106C, 120 n.45
SVF (von Arnim) 110A, 120 n.43, 140 n.290
II.259, 139 n.281 110A-D, 140 n.290

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Alexander of Aphrodisias

On Aristotle Prior Analytics 1.8-13

Translated by Ian Mueller with

Introduction, Notes and

LON DON N E W DE L H I N E W YOR K SY DN EY

50 Bedford Square 1385 Broadway

First published in 1999 by Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd.

Ian Mueller, 1999

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publicataion Data

ISBN HB: 978-0-7156-2855-3

Typeset by Ray Davies

Editors Note vii

Translation: The commentary

This text, translated in two volumes, is a very important one because

December 1998 R.R.K.S.

December 1998 I.M.

We offer here a translation of Alexander of Aphrodisias commentary on

In both cases the conclusion proved is a particular negative necessary

In both cases the conclusion proved is a particular negative necessary

There is in general no way for a reader to tell whether, e.g., the

1.1-3 Introductory material

I. Assertoric syllogistic (1.1, 2, 4-7)

A. Terms are capital letters from the beginning of the alphabet: A, B, C,

B. Propositions. There are four types of propositions:

XaY (read X holds of all Y or All Y are X)

C. Pairs of propositions with one common term are called combinations,

As members of combinations propositions are called premisses. In the

D. The major problem for Aristotle is to determine which combinations

1. AaB BaC AaC (1.4, 25b37-40)

As a preliminary notation for these syllogisms (which will be compli-

to represent the pair

Aristotle calls these four syllogisms complete (teleios, rendered perfect

For one thing to be in another as in a whole and for the other to be

Alexander understands this passage to be saying something like:

XaY if and only if it is not possible to take any Y which is not an X;

Alexanders treatment of Barbara1 and Ferio1 show how he invokes the

If something of C is in B as in a whole,8 and B is in no A, then A will not

E. At this point it is convenient to describe the principal procedure by

a. XaY and XoY are contradictories, i.e.,

Given these relationships, an interpretation making XaZ true rules out

F. Aristotle shows that second- and third-figure assertoric combinations

Aristotle uses terms to reject the possibility of any kind of O -conversion

1. Cesare2 AeB AaC BeC (1.5, 27a5-9)

G. Aristotle seems to assume the completeness of his reduction proce-

II. Modal syllogistic without contingency

and the assertoric combination AE_1 becomes:

The following examples should make the notation to be employed clear:

Barbara1(NUN) NEC(AaB) BaC NEC(AaC)

II.A. Conversion of necessary propositions (1.3, 25a27-36)

To justify EE-conversionn Aristotle writes,

If it is necessary that A holds of no B, it is necessary that B holds of no A;

Aristotle here appears to reduce EE-conversionn to:

II-conversionc: CON(XiY) CON(YiX)

If A holds of all or some B by necessity, it is necessary that B holds of some

apparently taking for granted that

which, if it is not just another formulation of II-conversionn itself, would

(i) NEC(P) CON( P) (N C)

(ii) CON(XeY) CON(YeX) (EE-conversionc)

So CON(AeB), and since:

(iii) CON(P) NEC( P) (C N )

NEC(AiB), contradicting NEC(AiB).

which is equivalent to (i). Aristotle is, however, committed to C

Since we cannot hope to clarify this situation without looking at Aris-