Education Fuels National Divisions in Post-War Bosnia

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Education in Post-war Bosnia: The

Nexus of Societal Security, Identity and
Nationalism
a
Safia Swimelar
a
Elon University , USA
Published online: 05 Mar 2012.
To cite this article: Safia Swimelar (2013) Education in Post-war Bosnia: The Nexus of Societal
Security, Identity and Nationalism, Ethnopolitics: Formerly Global Review of Ethnopolitics, 12:2,
161-182, DOI: 10.1080/17449057.2012.656839
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Education in Post-war Bosnia:

The Nexus of Societal Security, Identity
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and Nationalism
SAFIA SWIMELAR
Elon University, USA
ABSTRACT The notion of security in international relations has been broadened and
reconceptualized and now rightly includes an understanding of education as a potential security
threat, not just a socializing tool. In post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina, the education system is
decentralized, politicized and nationalistic, and promotes competing visions and identities of
Bosnia. Some students attend segregated schools, while almost all study only with others from
their same ethnonational group and learn from a mono-ethnic curriculum that does not foster
understanding or tolerance of others, but breeds suspicion. This paper argues that these
educational practices constitute a societal security dilemma. Many Bosnian Muslims, Croats and
Serbs use the education system to gain rights and security for their group, which is viewed by
others as a potential threat to their own security and identity within a fractured state. This paper
shows that while these attempts to reinforce group security and identity (and increase power) may
be beneficial to the group and nationalist leaders themselves, they paradoxically may have
negative consequences for the security of other groups and for the security and stability of the
Bosnian state itself, understood in terms of national cohesiveness and territorial integrity.
Introduction
Although the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina may have ended 15 years ago, the constructed
use of nationalism that led to it remains central to Bosnian politics, public discourse
and public education. The three main nationalist ethnic-based parties that claim to rep-
resent the three main constituent groups in Bosnia (Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats) have been
ruling for 13 of the past 15 years and the elections of October 2010 appear to have con-
tinued the trend of nationalist division and political instability, although it is too early
for a full analysis.1 Contemporary Bosnia is divided geographically, politically and cultu-
rally along ethnonational lines. Observers and scholars are not optimistic about a return to
a more multi-ethnic, civic society (e.g. Mujkic, 2008). Many sources raise questions
regarding the future stability of a state that comprises two distinct ethno-territorial entities
(Ashdown & Holbrooke, 2008; McMahon & Western, 2009; Rettman, 2010).
Correspondence Address: Safia Swimelar, Department of Political Science, Elon University, Campus Box 2333,
Elon, NC 27244, USA. Email: sswimelar@elon.edu
# 2013 The Editor of Ethnopolitics

162 S. Swimelar
The public education system represents one key arena in which nationalism and ethnic
division are visible. Ethno-territorial division means that one ethnic group dominates the
majority of schools, including the curriculum. In some cases where municipalities are
more heterogeneous, the phenomenon of two schools under one roof entails that students
have little to no contact with those from a different group. They learn almost exclusively
about their dominant groups narrative, history, culture and religion to the general exclu-
sion of the other groups in Bosnia. Moreover, education policy is decentralized and has
been politicized by nationalist leaders and parents who privilege the interests of their
sub-ethnonational group, not the larger Bosnian society or state. So while after the war
education was seen as an apolitical social arena, in fact, it is highly politicized and relevant
to security.
This paper examines post-war Bosnian education through the lens of a societal security
dilemma. Specifically, I argue that this dilemma appears when the attempts of one group to
attain societal security and promote its identity through cultural and rhetorical means lead
to perceptions of insecurity by another group, which then attempts also to support its iden-
tity and gain security through similar means. These cultural means can be the call for
human rights within education, such as the right to learn in ones own language and
from ones own cultural perspective.2 I illustrate, with details from the Bosnian case,
the paradox of how this dilemma can be both alleviated and exacerbated by ethnonation-
alism and group rights within the educational system. While these dual attempts to pre-
serve group security and identity may be beneficial to the group itself, they may have
negative consequences for other groups and for the security of the Bosnian state itself,
understood in traditional terms of cohesiveness and territorial integrity.
This research provides added value to our understanding of security and nationalism in
the Balkans not only by applying new concepts of security to the contemporary post-war
Bosnian state (as opposed to wartime former Yugoslavia), but also by: (1) analyzing the
interaction effects between different levels of securityindividuals and groups (intrastate)
and of the state itself; (2) illustrating how education can be a central arena for a societal
security dilemma to play out; and (3) showing how societal insecurity can be exacerbated
by group rights linked to ethnonationalism. The glue that holds together these three con-
cepts is identity (both sub-state and national/state identity). While a few scholars have
done well to examine the troubled Bosnian education system and have shown how it
impedes reconciliation, their work does not focus on security concerns (if at all), is primar-
ily descriptive and/or proscriptive of the problem, and is not explicitly theoretical (e.g.
Russo, 2000; Low-Beer, 2001; Perry, 2003; Bozic, 2006; Nellis, 2006; Pasalic Kreso,
2008; Hromadzic, 2009; Torsti, 2009; Clark, 2010). This article seeks to extend our under-
standing not just of education in Bosnia, but of the societal security dilemma concept and
the contradictions at the intersection of identity, rights and security. The portrait that
emerges from this analysis is of a divided and nationalistic education system within a
weak, fractured, post-war Balkan state, which has important implications for multiple
types of security and for the enjoyment or violation of human rights in heterogeneous
fragile societies.
Background on Bosnia and its Education System

Under Titos socialist Yugoslavia, education played a pivotal role in both creating and
solidifying a Yugoslav identity, but also in respecting ethnic differences (Russo, 2000;
Education in Post-war Bosnia 163
Perry, 2003). Education was thus one tool among many in socialist Yugoslavia to reduce
ethnic or national disparities and prevent nationalistic sentiments; thus, it represented an
equalizing force.
While some scholars argue that pre-war education had already started to reflect nation-
alist division (Perry, 2003; Nellis, 2006), it is more likely that the political impact on
schools and curricula occurred just on the eve of the war and more during the war. In
the early 1990s, education reform in Bosnia led to a move away from centralized education
and curriculum; once the war started, ethnonational divisions became more pronounced
and consequently three subsystems of education based on the three constituent groups
emerged, thus shattering the pre-war curriculum that stressed Yugoslav identity. The
war crested more pronounced differentiationsincluding who could attend classes, the
language of instruction, and the content of the curriculumdepending upon which of
the three constituent national groups predominated in a region (Russo, 2000, p. 122).
Post-war Bosnian education is politicized, fragmented and infused with ethnonationalist
sentiment (Russo, 2000; Bozic, 2006; Nellis, 2006; Clark, 2010), which are characteristics
that also reflect the ethnically divided and decentralized political system itself. The
Bosnian constitution based upon the Dayton Peace Agreement, or DPA, that ended the
war in 1995 has been widely regarded by policymakers and scholars as successful in
ending the hostilities in 1995 and promoting relative peace, but it did not create a workable
political system; some argue that it has since become a hindrance to democratic political
cooperation and eventual European integration (Bose, 2002; Curak, 2004; Mujkic, 2008).3
The DPA created a weak Bosnian state that is comprised of two nearly ethnically clean
entities, the Republika Srpska (RS) or Serb Republic with a dominant Serb population and
the Bosniak-Croat Federation.4 The Federation is subdivided further into 10 cantons, most
of which are dominated by one group or the other.5 Each entity has its own constitution,
president, prime minister, parliament and numerous ministries; therefore, there is overlap-
ping of responsibility in multiple policy areas, including education. The constitutions and
attendant institutions have a consociational and group rights aspectwith a tripartite rotat-
ing presidency (reflecting the three constituent ethnonational peoples) and ethnic quotas
and veto powers by each group in the House of Peoples.
Although the Bosnian federal level (the ministries of education and civil affairs) has the
responsibility for education policy and reform, in practice the entities and the cantons have
ultimate authority over implementation of educational policy. That 13 education ministries
exist within a small country of 3.8 million illustrates the complicated nature of education
reform in Bosnia. This division creates a paradoxical situation in which the Ministry of
Civil Affairs is required to carry out its legal obligations in the field of education, but it
does not have authority vis-a-vis the cantons.6 The Minister of Civil Affairs could coordi-
nate with lower level ministries, but even here there is no political will to persuade and
elicit support from lower-level authorities to cooperate or comply.7
Many proponents of group rights and scholars of education recognize that decentraliza-
tion and autonomy for local authorities could be a positive force for allowing groups to
practice their religion, speak their native language and in general protect their identity
(Kymlicka, 1995a; Smith & Vauz, 2002). In the Bosnian case, however, decentralization
has meant greater power for local nationalists and authorities and less involvement
by school personnel, parents and students (Fischer, 2006, p. 301). Or in many cases,
parents are pressured and/or manipulated by administrators and authorities or they them-
selves push for educational segregation.8
164 S. Swimelar
While the motivation for devolving authority over education to the cantonal level was
meant to reduce conflict between Bosniaks and Croats near the end of the war (and thus
reduce insecurity or achieve security), this system has paradoxically served to solidify
and recreate ethnic segregation during the war and limit inter-group cooperation and
long-term accommodation. Even in cantons that are not dominated by one ethnic group
(e.g. Zenica-Doboj, Central Bosnia and Hercegovina-Neretva), authority has been
localized even further so as to preserve a mono-ethnic context and curricula (Fischer,
2006, p. 301).
The international community (IC) has played a central role in Bosnian politics and society
since 1995.9 The DPA created the Office of the High Representative (OHR), which is
responsible for the implementation of the civilian aspects of Dayton and has veto power
over political decisions and laws. The High Representatives have all been foreign (Euro-
pean) diplomats, including the current one, Valentin Inzko, who is also the European
Union (EU) Special Representative in Bosnia. The IC was, for obvious reasons just after
the war, concerned with traditional security threats such as disarmament of the population,
inter-entity border security and police reform, in addition to political reconstruction and
democratization (e.g. elections). Beyond the rebuilding of schools and access, the IC did
not see education as a politicized and securitized sphere. Many of the ICs policies were
short-sighted, thus the potential long-term consequences of politicized and exclusionary
education were neglected. It was easy for local nationalist politicians, municipal-level
bureaucrats and parents to take the lead on education reform early on.
Finally, in about 2001 the linkage between education and security was made when the
consequences of neglect became clearer; at least 11 major conferences and reports focus-
ing on education reform occurred at about his time. Former High Representative Paddy
Ashdown publicly stated that, The current state of education in Bosnia and Herzegovina
represents a serious obstacle to stability, security, reconciliation, institution-building, sus-
tainable refugee returns, and economic recovery (Blackwell, 2004, p. 4; OSCE, 2002).
The international community and specifically the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have been working with locals to develop curricula that
meet international standards and contribute to tolerance and stability (Perry, 2003,
p. 45; Fischer, 2006, p. 303). Bosnia currently has a European Partnership with the EU
with a goal towards realizing the countrys European perspective,10 that is, likely event-
ual EU membership (see Solioz, 2007, on EU integration). The EU recognizes the
deficiencies in Bosnias divided primary and secondary education process and reinforces
the education reform activities of other organizations in the country, even though they
have not taken an active role in this area.11 In short, educational concerns that are tied
to a fractured and disunified Bosnian state and society have direct implications for the
future of Bosnia within Europe.
Understanding Security
In the last couple of decades, the concept of security within international relations has
undergone conceptual and practical evolution. No longer purely defined in the neorealist
sense of national security or interstate security, critical security scholars also examine,
inter alia, human security and societal securitythat is, they analyze how threats to indi-
viduals and groups (including to their identity) within states should also be seen through
the lens of security and insecurity (Lapid & Kratochwil, 1996; McSweeney, 1999; Paris,
2001; Booth, 2005; Fierke, 2007). The concept of human security was elaborated and pro-
moted in the 1994 UN Human Development Report where seven components of human
security were outlined including threats to survival (food security) and to culture (commu-
nity security).12 This article uses the concept of societal security as one aspect of human
security that fits most closely with community security (survival of cultures and ethnic
groups, including their physical security) where the common referent is the individual or
groups, not just the state.
The concept of societal security and a societal security dilemma has as its progenitor the
traditional security dilemma, one of the most fundamental concepts in international
relations dating to John Herzs 1951 work Political Realism and Political Idealism. The
dilemma is essentially a situation in which one states actions to increase its security
will cause another state in the system to feel less secure and to take actions to increase
its security, and consequently decrease the security of the first state. When one state
takes steps to increase its security, this may be perceived by other states as a potentially
offensive move, even if the initial action had defensive motives (Jervis, 1978).
After the end of the Cold War, scholars such as Barry Posen (1993) and Stuart Kaufman
(1996) applied the security dilemma concept to ethnic conflict, thus speaking of an intra-
state ethnic security dilemma (particularly used to explain the wars in the former Yugo-
slavia), but not centrally focused on culture or identity. Posen (1993), for instance,
argues that when empires or states break down, an emerging anarchy ensues; ethnic
groups may not feel protected by a higher power. In particular, Posen and Kaufman use
the ethnic security dilemma concept to explain the outbreak of war between Serbs and
Croats in the early 1990s.
Societal Security
Posens analysis, however, like neorealists, is structural and still focuses on traditional
understandings of security (e.g. territory), traditional military means and a wartime
environment. Therefore, a struggle over identity in a post-war condition of relative
peace is not considered; hence, societal security has filled a gap. Societal security
was first articulated by Barry Buzan in his 1991 People, States, and Fear as one sector
among others (e.g. environmental, military) where the state could be threatened. Buzan
and scholars of the Copenhagen School reconceptualized the notion of security and elev-
ated the societal component as an object of security in its own right (Waever et al., 1993),
focusing on groups, intrastate conflict, and non-military threats and means of defending
security. This created a duality of state security and societal security, the former
having sovereignty as its ultimate criterion, and the latter being held together by concerns
about identity (Waever et al., 1993, p. 25). Societal security then is defined as:
[T]he ability of a society to persist under changing conditions and possible and
actual threats. More specifically, it is about the sustainability within acceptable con-
ditions for the evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and
religious and national identity and custom. (Waever, quoted in Roe, 2007, p. 48)
Societal security is the survival and maintenance of society understood as politically sig-
nificant ethnonational and religious groups (Waever et al., 1993, p. 6). Survival and secur-
ity for a society in particular is a question of identity because this is the way a society talks
166 S. Swimelar
about existential threats: if this happens, we will no longer be able to live as us

(Waever, in Aggestam & Hyde-Price, 2000, p. 28). This might be referred to as a societys
security requirements. Where the state and society overlap, the security of both may
support each other; but if there are strong sub-state ethnic groups that challenge a
unitary state, as the Bosnian case clearly shows, they could oppose each other.
The dilemma occurs when attempts by one group to increase its societal security and
protect its identity lead to actions and reactions in a second group to do the same and
thus make the first group feel insecure. As Waever et al. suggest, For threatened societies,
one obvious line of defensive response is to strengthen societal identity. This can be done
through cultural means to reinforce societal cohesion and distinctiveness, and to ensure
that society reproduces itself correctly (Waever et al., 1993, p. 191); but the societal
security requirements are more contextual and varied compared with traditional state
security. For one group, the focus may be language rights and education; in other cases
the security requirements may be tied to territory or religious concerns. The Bosnian
context illustrates all of these concerns.13
Another related concept that is useful to this analysis, also put forth by the Copenhagen
School, is securitization (Buzan et al., 1997). Issues can become securitized when actors
socially construct them as a security threat against a valued referent object, which in this
case could be identity. The securitization of an issue takes it out of the realm of politics; it
constitutes a failure of the normal politics of engagement and dialogue. When an issue is
securitized, it can give license for even greater state control (Buzan et al., 1997), which can
mean giving nationalist leaders more authority over education. Scholars have analyzed
how issues such as HIV/AIDS, immigration, transnational crime, aspects of the war on
terror and minority rights have become securitized (McDonald, 2008).
The case study below illustrates how education, specifically in a post-war state such as
Bosnia, is an important arena for a societal security dilemma and how the issue has been
securitized by political actors, both local and international.
Education, Conflict and Security

Education and conflict have always had a double-edged relationship. Education can be a
tool in the hands of nationalists of multiple stripes to foment inter-ethnic tension and vio-
lence (e.g. 1990s Yugoslavia and Rwanda) or to forge a collective national identity
(e.g. Titos Yugoslavia, nineteenth century France). Related to the latter, it also has the
potential to promote inter-ethnic accommodation, spread norms of human rights and tol-
erance, and thus increase long-term social stability and security (Fischer, 2006; Becker-
man & McGlynn, 2007; McGlynn et al., 2009). Education can be seen as both
constructive and destructive, hence the two faces of education (Bush & Saltarelli,
2000). When the case is education in a multicultural, yet segregated (or divided) environ-
ment after or during protracted conflict as in the case of Bosnia, then the linkages between
education, peace and security are even more pronounced (Clarke-Habibi, 2005).
While some international relations scholars accept that problems such as human traf-
ficking or ethnic conflict can be security threats, the linkage between education and secur-
ity has been less acknowledged (Nellis, 2006, p. 29). Educators and politicians have long
recognized and debated educations role in socialization, identity formation and the pro-
motion of peaceful relations, but international relations scholars seem surprised that edu-
cation might be an important non-traditional security issue (Nellis, 2006, p. 29).14 To be
sure, however, the UNESCO Charter of 1946 recognized that wars begin in minds as well
as from ignorance of each others ways and lives, thus it is through education that defenses
of peace must be built.15 In a post-war environment in particular, education can be an
important community-building tool used to promote and facilitate recovery and reconci-
liation (Perry, 2003, p. 15; World Bank, 2005; Nellis, 2006). Non-discriminatory edu-
cation and peace and human rights education can have a positive effect on conflict
prevention and reconciliation in divided post-war societies (Gallagher, 2005; Beckerman
& McGlynn, 2007; McGlynn et al., 2009).

Now we turn to the triad of education, nationalism and group rights that sits at the center
of a societal security dilemma in post-war Bosnia. I extend the argument made at the outset
by showing how attempts to promote ethnonationalism and group rights within the edu-
cation system have had contradictory consequences for security at multiple levels
societal security and the security of the Bosnian state.
The Societal Security Dilemma: Nationalism, Group Rights, and Segregated and
Mono-ethnic Education
Education in Bosnia is characterized by separate and often conflicting nationalisms of the
three ethnonational groups or constituent peoples: Bosniaks, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian
Serbs. Nationalism is often manifested as a call for human rights, specifically invoked in
their particular context as cultural or group rights, such as the right of a group to be edu-
cated in its own language, to have public support for its cultural preservation, and the right
to cultural autonomy; in short protection of a groups identity. The education system is a
prime arena where these rights may be claimed and where groups may seek cultural and
even political power relative to other groups. This is bolstered through attempts to control
the narratives of the past (e.g. through curriculum, history textbooks, street names/signs
and public symbols) (Low-Beer, 2001; Torsti, 2004, 2009). In short, education should
be seen as an arena where both cultural and ethnopolitical projects can be pursued.
Well-known Bosnian intellectual and writer Ivan Lovrenovic argues that politicians
only see education as having symbolic value; that is, In Bosnia, education is just a
means of realizing a certain party and nationalist politics as such does not have auton-
omous value [e.g. humanitarian or social value] (Lovrenovic, 2005).16
Illustrating the societal security dilemma, one of the key goals of the three ethnonational
groups in Bosnia is to preserve their separate languages and linguistic communities via the
educational system. The differences between the post-war languages of Croatian, Bosnian
and Serbian (all of which were once called Serbo-Croatian before the war) are very small
(Greenberg, 2008); linguists have estimated that the difference between them, in terms of
vocabulary and grammar, is less than 5%, even closer than the difference between Amer-
ican English and British English (Fischer, 2006, p. 313). Numerous scholars have exam-
ined the contentious politics of language in post-war Yugoslavia (Pupavac, 2003, 2006;
Bugarski & Hawkesworth, 2004; Greenberg, 2008). One linguist illustrates the political
use of language this way: The citizens of these [post-conflict] societies are discovering
that the language you speak defines your place in a society and marks your ethnic identity
and even your political orientation (Greenberg, 2008, p. 159). Scholars have made the
explicit link between language rights, separate linguistic identities, and ethnic division
and conflict:
168 S. Swimelar
Language is seen as an essential part of a communitys identity and self-esteem,

which in turn is seen as crucial to securing harmonious interethnic relations and pre-
venting violent conflict. Yet the treatment of Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs as separate
language communities has tended to legitimize ethnic divisions and social exclu-
sion. (Pupavac, 2006, p. 61)
The issue here for Croats in particular (and to some extent for other groups as well) may be
less about the practicality of language use and communication, and more about the sym-
bolic nature of language as a key to ones history and identity, and therefore security, as
argued above. Language rights can support individuals and groups identity, dignity and
security, but at the same time have the potential, as in Bosnia, to draw communities
apart and potentially lead to the very conflict that language rights were supposed to
prevent. For example, the OHR in Bosnia is seeking to support language and cultural
expression, while at the same time promoting inter-ethnic accommodation and social
cohesion. This is a task that one linguist finds impractical and potentially leading to
language apartheid rather than language diversity (Greenberg, 2008, p. 158). For
example, Would Bosniac [sic] parents sincerely hope that their children would learn
Cyrillic or Croatian neologisms in school? Would Serb parents encourage their children
to master the Turkish and Arabic loanwords infused into the new Bosnian standard?
(Greenberg, 2008, p. 158). This illustrates how collective rights that focus on particular-
istic claims and potentially lead to exclusion can work at cross-purposes with universal
human rights that strive for more civic ideals, non-discrimination and inclusion.
The question of language policy in Bosnia today is also complicated by the fact that,
within European institutions and law, linguistic rights have gained more importance in
the last two decades (e.g. the 1992 Charter on Regional and Minority Languages) not
just for identity reasons, but out of the belief that granting linguistic rights to minorities
reduces conflict potential, rather than creating it (Pupavac, 2006, p. 63). This paper argues
that a societal security dilemma is more likely when linguistic rights promote linguistic
division and this is paired with segregated education and a mono-ethnic curriculum, as
seen in contemporary Bosnia.
When two or more sub-state groups use competing nationalisms and group rights to
bolster their identity and security, this can weaken or threaten the identity and security of
other groups and prevent the formation of a common national identity. Furthermore, this
process can threaten the territorial integrity and security of the state itself, in this case
Bosnia, which can be seen as a weak state. Scholars have found that weak states are more
likely to have societal security dilemmas (Roe, 1999, 2007). According to Foreign Policy
and the Fund for Peaces failed state index (a good indicator of weak states), Bosnia ranks
60th in terms of likelihood to fail, moving up from 64th in 2009 (closer to one is higher like-
lihood of failure) (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/failedstates). The three highest indicators
(out of 10) were group grievances (8.7), delegitimization of the state (8) and factionalized
elites (9.2).17
All three of these indicators are directly related to why ethnonational groups have poli-
ticized education and why education is a societal security dilemma. Elites do not agree on
the purposes of education; each group and the elites that claim to represent them have high
grievances against the others and seek to gain power and security through sociocultural
means, particularly in the face of a state that lacks legitimacy. When a group feels insecure
and uses the education system as an arena where this dilemma plays out, then the
fundamental goal of education (to give children opportunities to contribute to society and
to their own well-being) could be subverted for negative political ends. In short, the secur-
ity of the state and of the ethnonational identities within it are in tension, thus leading to
possible insecurity of both, or more interestingly, of one at the expense of the other. Paul
Roe, for instance, explains how this process can lead to security risks:
[T]he lack of domestic legitimacy, and thus the persistence of the security dilemma,
is often addressed through the process of nation-building: the attempt by the state to
create a common overarching identity for its population . . . Rather than creating new
common identities, nation-building can often reinforce ethnic distinctiveness,
pushing the state further away from its intended goal. (Roe, 2007, p. 67)
Evidence from Bosnia reveals that nation building and creating a common national iden-
tity are challenges. While some studies have found that inter-ethnic accommodation has
improved over time (Pickering, 2007), anecdotal evidence and numerous conversations
with Bosnian intellectuals and journalists illustrate that inter-ethnic division has got
worse. Bosnian political scientist Sacir Filandra noted research that the ethnic distance
between groups was actually smaller 10 years ago than today (Filandra, 2008). In a
survey on visions of and for a Bosnian state, a majority of Bosniaks prefer a united
Bosnian state of equal citizens (civic principle), while a majority of Bosnian Serbs
prefer independence of their Serb Republic. Bosnian Croats, unsurprisingly, had
mixed preferences, but at least one-third supported the idea of separate entities because
they would seek a third entity for themselves (Pickering, 2007, p. 140).18 This in part illus-
trates concern by Serbs and Croats of dominance by Bosniaks in a unified state, which goes
back to security and identity fears. The two related examples of segregated education and a
mono-ethnic curriculum reveal how different stakeholders in the systemethnonational
groups (including parents and students), teachers, local leaders and the international com-
munityunderstand the relationship between identity, nationalism, rights and security
broadly defined.
Educational Segregation
The issue that has received the most publicity and that best illustrates the societal security
dilemma is the phenomenon of educational segregation, otherwise known as two schools
under one roof, or 2 in 1 for short.19 The essence is that two different ethnonational
groups of students and teachers share a school building, but do not have contact or inte-
grated classes. In most cases there are separate entrances for the two groups, students
may attend classes at different times, and teachers have separate lounges.20 The Organiz-
ation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (the international organization tasked with
education in Bosnia) states that there have been and still are at least 54 divided schools
in Bosnia that are physically under one roof.
Although these numbers represent a small percentage of all schools, the location of
these schools and potential long-term consequences if they continue are significant.
These schools are located in the few cantons and towns that are ethnically heterogeneous,
that were directly affected by war, ethnic cleansing and in some cases war crimes,21 and
that have a high number of returnees. In one case at least, there has been violence.22 More-
over, their existence is symbolically important for what it says about the norms of equality
170 S. Swimelar
and non-discrimination in a new democracy-seeking post-war inter-ethnic reconciliation

and European integration. The EU has already stated that Bosnia will not be admitted
with a discriminatory and segregated education system (Clark, 2010). Under pressure
from the OHR, cantons have been required to combine these schools administratively,
and there is a long-term reform effort to harmonize the curriculum, but in practice this
has not yet resulted in physical integration or a multi-perspective civic curriculum.
The origins of the two schools phenomenon, paradoxically, came from the inter-
national community itself as it was seeking creative solutions to the lack of educational
access for minority returnee students. Now they are seeking to disband the segregation
practice. The fact that many locals supported the practice illustrates the shared responsi-
bility for this phenomenon. It started in 2000 in the Federation Croat-dominated town of
Stolac, where the World Bank helped build a primary school for 1,500 students, but there
were only 400 Croat children in attendance. About 25 Bosniak minority returnee children
were being schooled in a home just 500 meters away from this primary school that was
horribly equipped and unable to educate properly, according to then OSCE Education
Director Claude Kieffer.23 The Bosniaks had been told by the principal of the Croat-domi-
nated school that they were welcome to attend, provided they accept the Croat curriculum
and the Croat language, which the Bosniak parents refused to do, Kieffer also noted.
The OHR recognized that the Bosniak returnees rights of basic access to education
were being violated and they worked to try and get their needs met in a way that was
acceptable to all sides.24 The solution was to get the Croat-dominated school to allow
them to use four classrooms, to allow teachers to share rooms at different times, and to
allow the Bosniaks to use their own curriculum. Students were not allowed to have the
same breaks and the minority Bosniak students could not use the gym. Bosniak students
in Stolac complained of discrimination in the divided schoolsthat they could not
enter the building before the afternoon even in the rain and that the heating was switched
off for their second shift.25 According to Kieffer, we didnt coin the expression [two
schools under one roof]; we just wanted to make sure that these kids had a normal [edu-
cational] environment.26 This practice was later duplicated in Vitez and Varez (with
Croats being in the minority), but was always seen as a temporary solution to the
problem of minority returnee access to education. Well-known Bosnian political scientist
Sacir Filandra (2008) characterizes the problem this way:
Two schools is a euphemism for segregation and apartheid which in reality seems
unbelievable . . . [the students] can only look at each other in silence and they
have to accept each other like aliens. There cannot be any communication
between them and they cant play soccer together. The ethnic distance is spread
to the same extent as black and white kids in the American South.27
Segregated education illustrates the societal security dilemma well: ethnonational groups
act defensively to strengthen societal identity and social cohesion and at the same time
exclude others, which leads to insecurity by those others who then act similarly. Education
is a crucial socializing tool in society; therefore, a system based on particularistic nation-
alist goals can have critical long-term consequences. When one group, such as the Croats,
sought to restrict Bosniak returnees from their school (or require them to follow the Croat
curriculum), it created a cycle whereby each group felt the only way to maintain both iden-
tity and security (particularly in more conflict-prone areas) was to learn separately. The
Croats relatively smaller numbers within Bosnia also added to their fears of losing politi-
cal and cultural power where other groups were vying equally for power, security and
identity.
Mono-ethnic Curricula
The segregated education phenomenon is closely related to the problem of mono-ethnic
curricula because they both involve mutual separateness and exclusion. That is, even in
the vast majority of schools that are not physically divided, students are still learning pri-
marily with and about their own ethnic group and not others. There have been reform
efforts for at least a decade to create a harmonized common core curriculum (e.g. more
civic than ethnic focused), while at the same time giving groups the right to teach a sep-
arate curriculum in the areas they believe are culturally unique or different, namely,
history, geography, literature and language. Interestingly, these are the very areas that
are at the heart of creating nations and nationalism (Anderson, 1991) and where children
would learn about their co-citizens and their cultures. This practice is not just about cul-
tural identity because it can lead to separate national identities and narratives (especially
since the topic of the war is mostly ignored or heavily one-sided). Laws related to returnee
rights allow parents the possibility to choose a curriculum in the national group of subjects
noted above.28 This illustrates the desire for group rights as a tool to maintain identity and
security and how rights language can be used both for peaceful, but also potentially con-
flictual ends. A principal of a high school that follows the Croat curriculum says that
parents come to him and talk about human rights treaties and their rights in the Bosnian
Constitution and say that they will not let their children study in another language.29
Most schools in both political entities function under a mono-ethnic curriculum given
that most geographical units are themselves mono-ethnic (as a result of ethnic cleansing
in the war, the ethno-territorial division of the country at Dayton, and other political
factors of the returns process). If any minorities are present, their numbers are usually
too small to form their own school. This has a similar effect as the 2 in 1 phenomenon
in that students receive a singular ethnic (and often politicized) education that reinforces
the societal security dilemma. In addition to separate curricula in the areas mentioned,
history textbooks have generally been biased, and (up until recently) for Croat and Serb
students they were imported directly from Croatia and Serbia, respectively, thus present-
ing material from a non-Bosnian perspective (Baranovic, 2001; Low-Beer, 2001; Torsti,
2004, 2009; Bartulovic, 2006). Furthermore, because ethnonational identity is politicized
in most other spheres of society, its existence in education serves to reinforce at an early
age nationalistic and particularistic values, rather than civic, pluralistic ones.
Examples of a mono-ethnic curriculum illustrate the process of erasing others from a
childs imagination and the central absence of particular kinds of knowledge.30 For
example, in the Croat curriculum, a language and literature course means only Croatian
language and literature, with no references to other languages or authors from the area.
This includes limiting the study of Croats who are from Bosnia in favor of Croats from
Croatia proper (Low-Beer, 2001). For example, regarding the Croat curriculum:
One unit contains literature on the theme of the homeland warthe Croat name for
the war. It neglects the history of Bosnia and Hercegovina and its non-Croatian
population. In one unit, Bosnia-Hercegovina is treated as a foreign country like
172 S. Swimelar
Serbia or Macedonia. This is intelligible since the books are published from Zagreb.
In music and the arts, the non-Croat productions from the area are ignored. Indeed
the whole curriculum is constructed from a Croatian perspective with a far-reaching
tendency to ignore the other nationalities of the Balkan area. (Low-Beer, 2001)
History textbooks used in Croat-dominated schools (such as Povijest) defined a clear us

group defined as having Croathood, and a clear sense of the others such as Serbs who
were associated with negative terms such as Great Serbia, Serbian hegemony and
Tsetniks (Torsti, 2007). Similarly, in the Serbian curriculum Serbian textbooks focus
on Serbian sacrifices and symbols, and while they have a somewhat global perspective,
the texts neglect the context of Bosnia (Low-Beer, 2001). In a history book called Istorija
(published in Belgrade) used in the Republika Srpska, the we group of the Serbian
nation had three basic characteristics: war heroism, the idea of being a victim, and
being misunderstood by others. As them, Istorija presented the Albanians and Croats,
who were referred to as ustashas, traitors, and separatists (Torsti, 2007).31 In short,
instead of a curriculum within Bosnia supporting Bosnian national identity, textbooks
often treat the Bosnian state as a foreign entity and privilege subnational ethnonational
identities and cultures, a far cry from a cohesive, stable state.
Confidence building and restoration of relationships, so necessary in post-conflict eth-
nically divided societies, cannot progress in a context of separation and demonization of
others. The well-known contact thesis put forth by Allport (1954), and noted by scholars
of Bosnian education, illustrates the importance of interpersonal contact as a key indicator
for reducing prejudice and building tolerance among young people (Bozic, 2006; Torsti,
2007; Clark, 2010). When young people have contact with one another, barriers may be
broken down. As one young person said: When I started having contact with Croats
through the Youth Centre, I realized that they also suffered during the war and that
there are Croat children who, like me, lost their mothers. So my views of them have
changed. I now have trust in Croats because I have contact with them (Clark, 2010,
p. 351).
Thus, lack of contact may make reconciliation and nation building challenging. For
OSCE Education Director Claude Kieffer, the security implications of politicized, natio-
nalistic and divided education are very clear: If we continue to have three separate edu-
cation systems teaching different histories, narratives, literatures, cultures, and traditions,
without ever allowing them [children] to meet and interact, then we will end up with three
different entities, three countries in one.32 Two years later, Kieffer is not any more posi-
tive about the situation, especially after a violent clash in Mostar in November 2008
between Bosniak and Croat youth where numerous students were injured (OSCE BiH,
2009). In 2010, the OSCE continued to be concerned about the security implications of
divided education, stating that Bosnia will only be as stable as its schools.33
Similar to segregated education, a mono-ethnic curriculum is a useful case study of a
societal security dilemma. Each ethnonational group seeks socializing experiences or a
curriculum that would reproduce the groups culture and define identity in part by what
it is notthe others history, language, culture and presence. These processes promote
and secure their identity within a fractured state where the politics of identity is part of
everyday life. As this paper seeks to show, a mono-ethnic curriculum, for example, has
multiple outcomesthat of promoting group rights and security of one group, creating
insecurity and a similar action by other groups, and in turn creating greater insecurity at
the level of the state. This state-level insecurity stems from the failure of the educational
system (as one arena in society) to promote a unified national identity that would keep in
check divergent subnational identities. The failure to create a cohesive national identity at
the social level is also reinforced at the political level where Croat and Serb nationalists in
Bosnia speak of greater desire for autonomy and decentralization. Just in the past year, the
parliament of the RS passed laws supporting possible referendums on secession and
restricting the authority of national-level institutions such as the State War Crimes
Court and the OHR.34
Societal Security Dilemma: Illustrating Separateness among Ethnonational

Groups
Specific examples from the three ethnonational groups illustrate how segregated and
mono-ethnic education is more likely to lead to a societal security dilemma. As would
be expected from the societal security dilemma, all three ethnonational groups have
similar rationales for using education as a tool towards promoting nationalism and secur-
ing identity, but their particular claims and fears may differ based on their experience
during the war and contemporary political power (or perceptions of power).
Many members of each ethnonational group fear the control of the educational system
and curriculum by the other groups, and consequently control of the cultural and national
memory. This is particularly true for Bosniaks, who suffered the greatest losses during the
war. Their concern is that by participating in a non-Bosniak-dominated curriculum (in RS,
for example), their children will not learn of the suffering and genocide of Bosniaks at the
hands of Bosnian Serbs in Srebrenica in 1995. This is of special concern for children in the
Srebrenica municipality schools under Serb control. For Bosniaks, ignoring this massive
violation of the groups security and identity contributes to tense relations with the
Bosnian Serbs and fears of future oppression. The fact that many Bosnian Serbs still
reject the facts of the crimes committed during the war and remain wedded to a nationalist
narrative of Serb innocence contributes to and reinforces these Bosniak fears (Duijzing,
2007; Wagner, 2008).35
Control of social, political and cultural institutions is equated with greater power and
influence in the state overall, a state in which no one group has a majority, but where Bos-
niaks make up a plurality. Therefore, many Serbs have concerns about identity and secur-
ity in Bosniak-dominated areas. In most parts of Sarajevo where Bosniaks are the majority,
the schools use a Bosniak curriculum (just as in Banja Luka, RS, students learn from the
Serb curriculum). If there are any members of the minority group in these classes, they will
most probably have to learn from the dominant groups curriculum. In some cases, if a
teacher can be found and if there are enough students, then separate classes for the
group of national subjects will be created. Serbs fear that the Bosniak mono-ethnic edu-
cational curriculum will prevent their children from learning the Serbian language (in
Cyrillic script as opposed to Latin) and Orthodox Christianity, will indoctrinate them
towards Islam, and will not teach them the proper history, literature, geography and
culture of the Serbs, or even Serbia (as opposed to Bosnia).
Thus, although Serbs are not prevented from exercising their collective rights or cultural
practices or expressing themselves, and are not forced to study or profess Islam, the mono-
ethnic curriculum in Sarajevo presents a perceived culture and societal threat for many
Bosnian Serbs. It is common that many Bosnian Serb parents living in Sarajevo send
174 S. Swimelar
their children across the inter-entity boundary to the RS so that they can attend a Serb
school, even if the quality is lower and the distance greater (some children have to walk
great distances along highways).36
The case of the Bosnian Croats, who as the group in Bosnia with the smallest popu-
lation37 and who share the entity of the Federation with the largest group, the Bosniaks,
illustrates best the challenges of individual and collective rights related to education within
a post-conflict situation. The Croats, more than other groups, have pressed for linguistic
and cultural rights, that is, the right to speak the Croatian language, to study under a
Croat curriculum, and to preserve their religion and traditions through the educational
system. This is in part due to a resurgence of Croat nationalism (in Croatia and in
Bosnia) during the war and the feeling of being outnumbered in post-war Bosnia.
Research done in Mostar reveals some of the concerns Croats have of a common curri-
culum or a standardized language that revolves around issues of identity and security, two
of the themes of this paper (Freedman et al., 2004; Hromadzic, 2009). In one study, Croat
students said that they did not object to integration among all groups, but that they have the
right to learn in their mother tongue. (This creates a problem for Bosniaks who are seeking
the same for their newly identified language, Bosnian.) In the study, the interviews and
focus groups reveal that language is a significant stumbling block to integration, and
often is used by the Croats as a stand-in for opposing school integration in Mostar (Freed-
man et al., 2004, p. 235).
One justification for the Croatian discourse on language and a separate curriculum is the
fear of assimilation and the loss of national identity. This has been discussed earlier in
terms of the importance of linguistic rights to cultural protection and security. As one
teacher said, Language is part of the being, part of the identity of the people (Freedman
et al., 2004, p. 235). The head of one Croatian Student Council (high school) said I dont
want to share a classroom with students who speak a different language. We just have
different curricula. I think each person is responsible for keeping their culture and
customs.38
While respondents and students should be taken at their word, due to the nationalist pro-
paganda that young people are exposed to, one can argue that many of the claims to group
rights are politically motivated, based on prejudice and/or are claimed just as a matter of
post-war ethnonational habits. The two motivationspolitics and rightsare not
mutually exclusive and fit within the societal security dilemma framework. An interesting
example comes from a Bosniak high-school student in a divided school who states (incor-
rectly) that there are major grammatical differences between Bosnian and Croatian. He
asserts, I dont want to hear Croatian. We should not have to; going to same school
doesnt mean we have to have same language; I dont want to learn a language of a
country I dont live in. In response, the interviewer curiously asks what foreign languages
he is studying and he proudly says English and German, finally realizing the contradiction.
I need English, I dont need Croatian, he says. Finally, the student agrees that if he had to
learn chemistry from a Croat teacher he would understand everything, but the question is,
he asks, would I want to?39
One should keep in mind that parents or administrators resistance to integrated edu-
cation should be seen in the context of the failures of the Yugoslav education system
(replete with the narrative of brotherhood and unity) to stem nationalism and prevent
war. Thus, there is likely skepticism regarding the positive effects of integration given
lived realities. Moreover, parents and students have real concerns that if their children
are a minority in a dominant curriculum, they may very well be discriminated against and
have reduced opportunities for long-term success. Therefore, the problems of education
today should be seen in terms not only of culture and identity, but also more material con-
cerns rooted in the past and in the future.40
At the same time as there are pressures and desires for separateness, there are numer-
ous examples illustrating that students do want to mix and learn about others, but
there are limited opportunities or institutional structures to do so (Hromadzic,
2009).41 This article does not imply that all students and parents support divided edu-
cation. In fact, recent data from the Open Society Institute reveal that a majority of
parents from all ethnic backgrounds support integrated classrooms with a common cur-
riculum, albeit with the allowance to have some separate classes for contested material
(e.g. history, language). However, the data do reveal the desire for group rights, par-
ticularly for the Bosnian Croats, as this paper has argued (Open Society Institute,
2007). Many Bosnian Croats do feel like a national minority in search of protection
and rights.
Even if many citizens favor integration, as discussed earlier, it is often local political
leaders who direct education to nationalist ends. One of Bosnias central human rights
organizations, the Helsinki Committee, has chronicled the detrimental effects of segre-
gated education and agrees that culture, identity and sheer politics are motivations for
divided education: politicians are encouraging it and justifying the fact that there are
two plans [curricula]; the way they justify it gives everyone a right to their own culture
and language (Brakovic, 2008). A Bosniak pedagogue agreed, stating that Parents are
often politically manipulated and their will and needs are hidden; they are experiencing
education through national needs.42 One perspective on the issue that created a lot of
media discussion43 comes from Education Minister Greta Kuna in the mainly Croat
canton of Hercegovacka Neretva, who said in 2007: The two schools under one roof
project will not be suspended because you cant mix apples and pears. Apples with
apples and pears with pears (Alic, 2008).
Many local nationalist elites have thus securitized education by encouraging parents
and students to see separate education as a necessary tool to preserve the security and iden-
tity of the group.44 Bosniak nationalists in particular can call upon the memories of geno-
cide and insecurity to create fear of potential future suffering if the past is not adequately
taught and remembered. As noted earlier, securitization of an issue makes political com-
promise and discussion more difficult because it becomes tied to key questions of survival
and identity. This does not mean, however, that the issue cannot at the same time be used
as a political tool to gain power and support. The securitization of education has reinforced
the societal security dilemma.
As this section has shown, while the motivations provided by each group for separate
and mono-ethnic education (in the form of segregated schools or separate curricula)
may differ, the outcome tends to be the same: children have limited opportunities to inter-
act with and learn about their co-citizens, which presents potential problems for each
groups sense of security and for wider security of the Bosnian state, which for many is
more imagined than real. Moreover, culture, security, nationalism and basic desires for
political power are all justifications and motivations given by supporters of divided edu-
cation nationalism. Thus, while rights and security claims may be more of a tool being
used by nationalist politicians towards an ethnopolitical project, the educational policy
outcomes and security concerns are still the same.
176 S. Swimelar
Conclusion
This paper has examined the interrelationship between education, security, identity and
human rights through an examination of the fragile Bosnian state. Critical security theor-
ists recognize that security threats do not merely come in the form of external threats or
internal uprisings, but that they also come from individual or collective societal insecuri-
ties that relate to ethnic conflict, human rights abuses, and an education system character-
ized by segregation and nationalism.

While the granting of education and language group rights to Bosniaks, Croats and
Serbs in Bosnia could lead to protection of group identity (and dignity) and thus a sense
of security among individual groups, the potential exists that these very measures have
created insecurity for other groups (and their own attempts to gain security) and insecurity
at the level of the Bosnian state (in terms of national cohesiveness and territorial integrity).
This is the societal security dilemma in present-day Bosnia, a weak and divided state
whose long-term security is in question. The failed state index shows that on three impor-
tant indicators that relate to nation building and education, Bosnia scores almost the
maximum.
This societal security dilemma is not just about culture and nationalism; it is also the
result of the instrumentalist use of culture by nationalist political parties and leaders for
short-term political gain. An OSCE representative said, Education is one of the last
areas where politicians still have a strong grip and they dont want to let go (cited in
Clark, 2010, p. 350). Election campaigns are dominated by ethnic messages that encourage
the public to fear domination by one or more of the other groups, which contributes to the
societal security dilemma (Pickering, 2007). Many educators and bureaucrats involved
have also cited another roadblock linked to basic self-interest: if divided schools and cur-
ricula are integrated and harmonized, key teacher and staff positions would have to be
cut.45
This paper has aimed to contribute to our understanding of security and identity by ana-
lyzing the relationship between different levels of securityindividuals and groups
(intrastate) and of the state itselfby illustrating how a societal security dilemma can
stem from the education arena (an underappreciated policy area) and by showing how
societal insecurity is exacerbated by competing notions of human rights often linked to
cultural nationalism. This paper has not made any causal claims that the contemporary
state of education in Bosnia will lead to internal conflict or that it is the main force that
would do so; but it has made the case for seeing the tensions between rights and education
in a fragile multi-ethnic post-war environment as a contributing factor to continued and
increased societal and political tensions at multiple levels. As Kieffer has said: In the
longer term, this may contribute to the breakup of the country.46 At the same time, para-
doxically, I have also shown how divided education can contribute to a sense of security
for groups. Thus, the question of security or insecurity hinges upon which level of security
one prioritizes and the relationships between the different levels.
Bosnias future also depends on what kind of countervailing forces are at work to use
education for constructive purposes. International actors seek to influence reform in
numerous sectors, including education. While European actors may seek to promote uni-
versal and individual human rights norms, they are also aware of the importance of cultural
rights and local empowerment. Bosnias decentralization (and divided education as an
example) still presents a roadblock to European integration. Other important forces
include the countless programs and efforts by local civil society to reform education
towards positive, peaceful ends and the numerous schools who have shown that integrated
education towards inter-ethnic reconciliation and security on many levels is possible.47
Notes
1. Most observers of the Bosnian national elections of 3 October 2010 have concluded that an ethnonational
divide still exists and political compromise will be difficult. The election resulted in a tripartite presi-
dency that now includes a Serb representative who is set on greater separation and decentralization
(Nebojsa Radmanovic), while the moderate Bosniak (Bakir Izetbegovic) and the re-elected Croat repre-
sentative (Zeljko Komsic) are more supportive of unity. For recent articles and analysis on the election
results, see Bilefsky (2010), Hadzovic (2010), and Tanner (2010).
2. To simplify the arguments, I shall use the term human rights because it is the more accessible term in the
literature and can be considered broadly to include rights that members of groups may call for, called
group, collective, or minority rights; these distinctions will be noted later, but are generally beyond
the scope of this paper. See Kymlicka (1995a, 1995b) and Shapiro & Kymlicka (1997); cf. Parekh
(1997). See also Donnelly (2002). The protection of group (or collective) rights can aid in the prevention
of conflict and promotion of security broadly conceivedat the individual, group, domestic and inter-
state levels. See Chandler (1999) and Swimelar (2001).
3. See also: International Crisis Group (2009).
4. The Federation is primarily comprised of Croats (Catholic) and Bosniaks. Bosniaks is the generally
acceptable term for Bosnian Muslims, although it is still contested by some secular Bosnians who are
not of Serb or Croat background because the appellation has a religious connotation.
5. The district of Brcko is under its own control and has its own international supervisor. Its education
system and population is much more multi-ethnic than in the entities. Nevertheless, there have been pro-
blems with segregation there as well. See, for example, Perry (2003).
6. Author interview, Claude Kieffer, January 2007, Sarajevo, Bosnia.
7. Ibid.
8. From the documentary Two Schools Under One Roof, produced by Stiftung Schuler Helfen Leben in
Sarajevo, Bosnia, 2009.
9. The international community represents the numerous states (as part of the Peace Implementation
Council) and international organizations that govern Bosnia. This article will not examine the extensive
role of the IC in education; a separate article will examine this aspect.
10. http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/enlargement/western_balkans/r18012_en.htm
11. See European Commission Progress Report on Bosnia, 2009, available online at: http://ec.europa.eu/
enlargement/press_corner/key-documents/reports_oct_2009_en.htm
12. See United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report, p. 24, available online at:
http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr1994/
13. Regarding the former Yugoslavia in particular, scholars have looked at different sociocultural arenas, in
addition to education, that have security implications. For example, Sabrina Ramet has examined how
religious institutions and leaders from all ethnonational groups were instrumental in promoting nation-
alism at the start of the war, whether it be prohibitions on integrating or, more directly, the physical
destruction of houses of worship. Music was also an arena for reinforcing identity claims and promoting
nationalism. See Ramet (1999, chapters 5, 6, 7, 11). Others examine how tensions over cultural and
public symbols (e.g. street names), national symbols (e.g. flags), language and the teaching of history
have security and identity-related goals. See Torsti (2004).
14. Links between education and security have clearly been made recently in terms of the management of
race/ethnic relations and terrorism. As noted above in relation to socialist Yugoslavia, education has
always been key for authoritarian regimes to maintain power.
15. Constitution of UNESCO, available online at: http://www.icomos.org/unesco/unesco_constitution.html
16. Translation by author.
17. See the failed state index, available online at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/2010_
failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_rankings
18. Furthermore, the percentage of Bosnian Serbs agreeing with the statement that All groups can live
peacefully together was 31% in 2001 (up from 13% in 1995), while 62% of Croats and 94% of Bosniaks
178 S. Swimelar
agreed with the statement (Pickering, 2007, p. 140), which is surprising since Bosniaks were the most
victimized by the war, but not surprising since Serbs and to a lesser extent Croats are most intent on pre-
serving a separate ethnonational identity at the expense of a Bosnian identity.
19. This phenomenon occurs in the decentralized Federation, but not in Republika Srpska because it is one
governing unit. However, the use of a mono-ethnic curriculum occurs across the country, not just in the
Federation.
20. Report by the Working Group for Analysis of the Two Schools Under One Roof Phenomenon, April
2009 (in possession of author, from OSCE). This report shows many different variations of thissome
aspects of learning together, some separate, some schools legally unified and separate, some legally
separate.
21. The three cantons in the Federation where two schools under one roof is prevalent are Central Bosnia,
Hercegovina-Neretva and Zenica-Doboj. There are some distinctions and differences between so-called
segregated schools. For more information, see the Report by the Working Group for Analysis of the
Two Schools Under One Roof Phenomenon, April 2009 (in possession of author, from OSCE). See
also Clark (2010).
22. In one school in Doboj, the front door was set on fire to protest about the mandated administrative uni-
fication of the school. See Bozic (2006, p. 328).
23. Author interview with Claude Kieffer, OSCE Education Director, in January 2007, Sarajevo, Bosnia.
24. The linkage between the right to return and the right to education is important because sustainable return
can be accomplished only if families return and are invested in the communities and in the school system.
25. MSNBC News (2009) A generation of ethnically overfed pupils, 23 August, available online at: http://
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/32527058/
26. Ibid.
27. Translation by author. In fact, at the request of the American Embassy, Martin Luther King Jrs son,
Martin Luther King III, visited a classroom in Stolac to talk about segregation and human rights;
Croat students sat in front, while Bosniaks sat at the back. A generation of ethnically overfed pupils
MSNBC (23 August 2009), available online at: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/32527058/ns/world_
news-europe/t/generation-ethnically-overfed-pupils/ (accessed 27 January 2012).
28. The international community along with local authorities agreed on a curriculum that is 70% in common
with 30% reserved for the different national or non-contentious subjects. However, in practice many
of the 2 in 1 schools have all subjects and classes separated. See OSCE (2005).
29. From the documentary Two Schools Under One Roof (2009).
30. The Bosnian political structure and constitution are centrally concerned with the three constituent
peoples, thus minority groups and mixed identity individuals are considered others. A recent European
Court of Human Rights ruling requires this discrimination to be rectified. While the Roma, in particular,
have clearly suffered socio-economic deprivation and discrimination in Bosnia, their main educational
concern appears to be access. Their concerns do not fit with the societal security dilemma examined here.
On the Roma and education, see Edwards (2005).
31. Torsti, History Textbooks and the Everyday Dealing with a Past Full of Conflict: Some Experiences of
Young Bosnians, available online at: www.eustory.de/root/img/pool/.../EUSTORY_AGA_2002_
Torsti.pdf (part of dissertation).
32. Author interview with Claude Kieffer, OSCE Education Director, in January 2007, Sarajevo, Bosnia.
33. From author communication with Sanna Heikkinen of the OSCE Education Department in Sarajevo,
Bosnia (3 September 2010).
34. Bosnia Serb Government Rapped Over Referendum Push, RFE/RL News, 27 January 2010, available
online at: http://www.rferl.org/content/Bosnia_Serb_Government_Rapped_Over_Referendum_Push/
1941320.html; Bosnian Serb MPs Approve Vote on Scrapping State Court, Balkan Insight, 14 April
2011, available online at: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosnian-serb-mps-ok-referendum-
on-scrapping-war-crimes-court
35. See also TV debate condemns Bosnian Serb genocide rhetoric, BBC News, 20 July 2009.
36. Stated by Kieffer in OSCE BiH (2009). Also from numerous comments made during the authors field-
work in Bosnia.
37. While there has been no official census in Bosnia since the end of the war, the estimate according to the
US CIA Factbook states that Croats make up 14%, Bosniaks 48% and Serbs 37%, in addition to small
numbers of minorities.
39. Ibid.
40. I thank an anonymous reviewer for stressing the points in this paragraph.
41. In Srebrenica, for example, Prijatelji Srebrenice is a group of multi-ethnic youths working together on
numerous community projects.
43. See, for example, S. Sehercehajic (2007), br. 10, str. 40, 11 October.
44. Scope and space prevent me from exploring how the international community has perhaps, through their
rhetoric and actions after 2001, securitized education and how this has interacted with the local environ-
ment and local leaders. This idea will be explored in future related research.
45. This is difficult politically, especially in a country with an official 40% unemployment rate. From the
documentary Two Schools Under One Roof (2009).
46. Kieffer in OSCE BiH (2009). Also from numerous comments made during the authors fieldwork in
Bosnia.
47. Space and the scope of this particular paper prevent me from examining the dozens of programs, reforms,
initiatives, and more that have helped to make education more constructive. A separate article in progress
examines these efforts, particularly those by the international community. The following citations
provide a varied survey of some of these efforts and examples: Bozic (2006), Clark (2010), Haider
(2009), Sivac-Bryant (2008) and Torsti (2009).
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Education in Post-war Bosnia:

# 2013 The Editor of Ethnopolitics

Background on Bosnia and its Education System

about existential threats: if this happens, we will no longer be able to live as us

Education, Conflict and Security

& McGlynn, 2007; McGlynn et al., 2009).

Language is seen as an essential part of a communitys identity and self-esteem,

and non-discrimination in a new democracy-seeking post-war inter-ethnic reconciliation

History textbooks used in Croat-dominated schools (such as Povijest) defined a clear us

Court and the OHR.34

Societal Security Dilemma: Illustrating Separateness among Ethnonational

ized by segregation and nationalism.

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