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Peter Osborne. Anywhere or Not at All: Philosophy of Contemporary Art. London:
Verso, 2013, 282 pp. ISBN 978-1-78168-094-0

What makes Osbornes approach Adornian, then, are the following philosophical
presuppositions he shares with the German philosopher:

(1) Any philosophy of art must start from reflecting on the historical and social nature of
the categories used to understand, classify, and appreciate works of art in a given
cultural setting. Or, to use Osbornes terms, an ontology of art must be a historical

(2) One cannot properly understand the situation of art in post-industrial, or late-
capitalist, societies without appreciating the continued relevance of the categories
and conceptions developed in German aesthetics in the period between the
publication of Kants Critique of Judgement and Hegels Berlin Lectures on Aesthetics.

(4) Art is one of the privileged means (if not the privileged means) of societys self-
reflection. Given the social condition of the present, such art cannot but be critical.

(5) Art is both autonomous and a social fact. The tension between the two
characteristics grounds its critical potential.

(6) Art is not the sole domain of the aesthetic, and concepts are not foreign to art. The
aesthetic is a necessary but not sufficient condition of art.

(7) The aesthetic singularity of a work of art is mediated by social categories (a

collective dimension of [artworks] potential meanings, p. 85).

Osborne contends that contemporary art is still best understood as modernist art.
Modernism means to him a collective affirmation of the modern, that is, an affirmation
of the new as something that gives historical meaning to the present. Art remains
modernist in so far as it is appropriate to the qualitative novelty of the historical present
itself (p. 74).

the obvious drawbacks (namely, the necessarily speculative nature of isolating the
historical present and the heavy metaphysical burden put on expression), this position
allows Osborne to interpret contemporary art as a normative concept: art that is in
critical contact with the historical present is contemporary.

borne opposes his brand of philosophical art criticism to other approaches which in his
view fail to capture the critical aspect of contemporary art (if they take it seriously at all).
While he welcomes the recent aesthetic revival in art theory (to a large extent indebted
to the influential work of Jacques Rancire), praising it for rehabilitating the question
after the specificity of art (pp. 78), he criticizes it for conservatively tying this
specificity to the aesthetic and for neglecting the historical and conceptual
aspects of arts autonomy (p. 10).

But he also distances himself from Thierry de Duves reinstating the question of
judgement at the centre of art theory. For de Duve, this is art has, in the post-
Duchampian context, taken the place of the traditional this is beautiful. As
Osborne rightly points out, this artistic nominalism liquidates the medium-based
modernism of the Greenbergian variety, but does not provide any other (historically
and socially grounded) mediating categories that would place the individual work
within the realm of art (pp. 8184)

Thus interpreted, the Early Romantic idea of art indeed looks very similar to Sol LeWitts
vision of Conceptual Art as laid out in his Sentences and Paragraphs. Osborne
sketches a genealogy of the Romantic legacy via Hegels socialization and
historicization of the conditions of art production, Soviet Constructivism, Conceptual Art,
through contemporary postconceptualism. He traces in this tradition the emergence of
the idea of art as a self-conscious illusion of an autonomous production of meaning.
Arts autonomy is mediated by heteronomous social categories and thus is illusionary.

One way of rendering the tension between autonomy and heteronomy is to understand
it as a tension between aesthetic particularity and conceptual generality. This was the
tension that Conceptual Art in the 1960s tackled, though it favoured conceptual
generality against aesthetic particularity

But while in the former case the power of judgement employs the minds conceptual
abilities (aesthetic pleasure accompanies the harmonious interplay between imagination
and understanding, that is, the conceptual apparatus of the mind) the latter case
involves only the temporal and spatial dimensions as transcendental conditions of our
sensuous perception

Osborne is well aware of the difference, and he proposes that neither of the two
meanings is able to capture the ontological specificity of art (p. 49

Contemporaneity has the character of a disjunctive unity of different socially conditioned

experiences of time.

the postulate of a universal unity of temporal experiences may lure us into believing that
there is a real, conjunctive global temporal unity, propagated in fact by global
capitalism (a branch of which is the international art trade). According to Osborne, this
illusion is implicit in the way the term Contemporary Art is increasingly being used in
the art world today. The label Contemporary Art helps to legitimize international art
exhibited at various biennials, art fairs, and other grand-scale global art events, serving
as a periodic category that comes after Postmodern Art (which in turn came after
Modernism and the avant-gardes).

For Osborne, art that wants to maintain its critical distance in

such an environment must confront this simplistic idea of the
contemporary with the idea of the irreducible disjunctive
contemporaneity of socially determined spacetimes. Only thus
can contemporary art be art critical of the contemporary.

According to Osborne, the productive tension between the heteronomy of the social
categories making possible the practice of art and arts claim to autonomy reveals itself
in the need of contemporary art to produce art-spaces as non-places, that is, as spaces
that enable it to stand out as art all the while remaining attached to its environment,
which is most often urban (p. 140)

Osborne contends that the white cube as a universal non-place isolating an art-space
from the spatiotemporal axes of the everyday has run its course and can by itself hardly
serve as a productive site of art; as such it only serves the illusion of a unified global
spatio-temporal experience
Architecturalization prefigured in the sketches of LeWitt and Mel Bochner, and
developed in the art projects of Dan Graham, Robert Smithson, and Gordon Matta-Clark
amounts to the creation of ideal spaces determined by specified relations, but
unrestrained by a single site, thus realizable in potentially infinite series.

Alliez, . (2006) Capitalism and Schizophrenia and Consensus: Of the Relational

Aesthetic. EN O'Sullivan, S. D. (2010). Deleuze and contemporary art. Edingburgh
University Press.

Reading over this equally descrip-

tive and prescriptive discourse when it affirms that "anyhow,
the liveliest factor that is played out on the chessboard of
art has to do with interactive, user-friendly and relational concepts (Bourriaud, 2002, p.

The argument in Nicolas Bourriaud's book-manifesto

on the art of the nineties, that contemporary art would not know how to engage in
current relations "to society, to history, to culture" without this rupture (relational one) ,
possesses a double and paradoxical characteristic: I
t cannot in fact conform to the "relational" perspective of an aesthetic characterised by
categories of consensus-to restore the lost sense of community by repairing social
divisions, patiently weaving a "relational fabric", returning spaces of conviviality,
searching for forms of sustainable development and consumption, low energies able to
infiltrate the cracks within existing images, etc. - other than by discharging the force
of the most innova- tive theoretical and artistic practices of the sixties and seventies into
modest forms, in the "modest connections" of a micropolitics of intersubjectivity.

Capitalism and
Schizophrenia from an earlier time could account for the
obstinate recuperation of Deleuze and Guattari that takes
place through the relational aesthetic: it participates in fact
isation of postmodernity dependant on the spectacular
dematerialization and re-symbolisation of art as the continu-
ation of the "transversalist" political experience of the
protest years

Bishop, C. (2004). Antagonism and relational aesthetics. OCTOBER 110, Fall 2004,
pp. 5179. 2004 October Magazine, Ltd. and Massachusetts Institute of

Lewis Kachur has described as the ideological exhibitions of the historical avant-
garde: in these exhibitions (such as the 1920 International Dada Fair and the 1938
International Surrealist Exhibition) the hang sought to reinforce or epito-
mize the ideas contained within the work p.52

adopt this curatorial modus operandi as a direct reaction to the type of art produced in
the 1990s: work that is open- ended, interactive, and resistant to closure, often
appearing to be work-in-progress rather than a completed object

Such work seems to derive from a creative misreading of poststructuralist theory: rather
than the interpreta- tions of a work of art being open to continual reassessment, the
work of art itself is argued to be in perpetual flux.

One could argue that in this context, project-based works-in-progress and artists-in-
residence begin to dovetail with an experience economy, the marketing strategy that
seeks to replace goods and services with scripted and staged personal experiences.

Yet what the viewer is supposed to garner from such an experience of creativity, which
is essentially institutionalized studio activity, is often unclear

An effect of this insistent promotion of these ideas of artist-as-designer, function over

contemplation, and open-endedness over aesthetic resolution is often ultimately to
enhance the status of the curator, who gains credit for stage-managing the
overall laboratory experience. As Hal Foster warned in the mid-1990s, the institution
may overshadow the work that it otherwise highlights: it becomes the spectacle, it
collects the cultural capital, and the director-curator becomes the star.

Bourriaud 1997 esthtique rlationnel collection of essays

he attempts to characterize artistic practice of the nineties

It also comes at a time when many academics in Britain and the U.S. seem reluctant to
move on from the politicized agendas and intellectual battles of 1980s art (indeed, for
many, of 1960s art), and condemn everything from installation art to ironic painting as a
depoliticized celebration of surface, complicitous with consumer spectacle
Bourriaud seeks to offer new criteria by which to approach these often rather opaque
works of art, while also claiming that they are no less politicized than their sixties

Rather than a discrete, portable, autonomous work of art that transcends its context,
relational art is entirely beholden to the contingencies of its environment and audience

It is important to emphasize, however, that Bourriaud does not regard rela- tional
aesthetics to be simply a theory of interactive art. He considers it to be a means of
locating contemporary practice within the culture at large: relational art is seen as a
direct response to the shift from a goods to a service-based economy.p.4

This emphasis on immediacy is familiar to us from the 1960s, recalling the premium
placed by performance art on the authenticity of our first-hand encounter with the artists
body. But Bourriaud is at pains to distance contempo- rary work from that of previous
generations. The main difference, as he sees it, is the shift in attitude toward social
change: instead of a utopian agenda, todays artists seek only to find provisional
solutions in the here and now; p54

t is basically installation art in format, but this is a term that many of its practitioners
would resist; rather than forming a coherent and distinctive transformation of space (in
the manner of Ilya Kabakovs total installation, a theatrical mise-en-scne), relational
art works insist upon use rather than contemplation.11

Tiravanija as a commodity

The artist, repositioned as both the source and arbiter of meaning, is embraced as the
pure embodiment of his/her sexual, cultural, or ethnic identity, guaran- teeing both the
authenticity and political efficacity of his/her work

dematerialized projects revive strategies of critique from the 1960s and 70s, it is
arguable that in the context of todays dominant economic model of globalization,
Tiravanijas itinerant ubiquity does not self-reflexively question this logic, but merely
reproduces it. p.58

Liam Gillick

A prevailing theme throughout his work in all media is the production of relationships
(particularly social relationships) through our environment. His early work investigated
the space between sculpture and functional design.
Gillicks work differs from that of his art historical
predecessors: whereas Judds mod- ular boxes made the
viewer aware of his/her physical movement around the work,
while also drawing attention to the space in which these were
Rather than having the viewer complete the work, in the manner of
Bruce Naumans corridors or Grahams video installations of the
1970s, Gillick seeks a perpetual open-endedness in which his art is a
backdrop to activity.

These corporate allusions clearly dis- tance the work from that of Graham, who exposed
how apparently neutral architectural materials (such as glass, mirror, and steel) are
used by the state and commerce to exercise political control.p.60

This idea of considering the work of art as a potential trigger for participation is hardly
newthink of Happenings, Fluxus instructions, 1970s performance art, and Joseph
Beuyss declaration that everyone is an artist. Each was accompanied by a rhetoric of
democracy and emancipation that is very similar to Bourriauds

The poetics of the work in movement (and partly that of the open work) sets in
motion a new cycle of relations between the artist and his audience, a new mechanics
of aesthetic perception, a different status for the artistic product in contemporary society.
It opens a new page in sociology and in pedagogy, as well as a new chapter in the
history of art. It poses new practical problems by organizing new communicative
situations. In short, it installs a new relationship between the contemplation and the
utilization of a work of art.28 Umberto eco

27. Beuys is mentioned infrequently in Relational Aesthetics, and on one

occasion is specifically invoked to sever any connection between social
sculpture and relational aesthetics (p. 30).
28. Umberto Eco, The Poetics of the Open Work (1962), in Eco, The Open Work
(Boston: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 2223.
29. Eco cites Merleau-Ponty in The Phenomenology of Perception: How can
anything ever present itself truly to us since its synthesis is never completed?
How could I gain the experience of the world, as I would of an individual actuating
his own existence, since none of the views or perceptions I have of it can exhaust
it and the horizons remain forever open?. . . This ambiguousness does not
represent an imperfection in the nature of existence or in that of consciousness;
it is its very definition (Eco, The Poetics of the Open Work, p. 17).

Bourriaud misinterprets these arguments by applying them to a specific type of work
(those that require literal interaction) and thereby redirects the argument back to artis-
tic intentionality rather than issues of reception.p.12

His position also differs from Eco in one other important respect: Eco regarded the work
of art as a reflection of the conditions of our existence in a fragmented modern culture,
while Bourriaud sees the work of art producing these conditions. The interactivity of
relational art is therefore superior to optical contemplation of an object, which is
assumed to be passive and disengaged, because the work of art is a social form
capable of produc- ing positive human relationships. As a consequence, the work is
automatically political in implication and emancipatory in effect.

Lucy Lippard has noted, it was in form (rather than content) that much art of the late
1960s aspired to a democratic outreach; the insight of Althussers essay heralded
recognition that a critique of institutions by circumventing them had to be refined p.63
Althusser culture as an apparatus

Rosalyn Deutsche usefully summa- rizes this shift in her book Evictions: Art and Spatial
Politics (1996) when she compares Hans Haacke to the subsequent generation of
artists that included Cindy Sherman, Barbara Kruger, and Sherrie Levine. Haackes
work, she writes, invited viewers to decipher relations and find content already
inscribed in images but did not ask them to examine their own role and investments in
producing images.32 By contrast, the subsequent generation of artists treated the
image itself as a social relationship and the viewer as a subject constructed by the very
object from which it formerly claimed detachment.p.63

In the meantime it is necessary to observe that it is only a short step from regarding the
image as a social relationship to Bourriauds argument that the structure of an art work
produces a social relationship.p.63
what is the structure of relational art work?

installation art has been frequently deni- grated as just one more form of postmodern
spectacle. For some critics, notably Rosalind Krauss, installation arts use of diverse
media divorces it from a medium- specific tradition; it therefore has no inherent
conventions against which it may self-reflexively operate, nor criteria against which we
may evaluate its success.

I have suggested elsewhere that the viewers presence might be one way to envisage
the medium of installation art, but Bourriaud complicates this assertion.35 He argues
that the criteria we should use to evaluate open-ended, participatory art works are not
just aesthetic, but political and even ethi- cal: we must judge the relations that are
produced by relational art works.

For example, what Tiravanija cooks, how and for whom, are less impor- tant to
Bourriaud than the fact that he gives away the results of his cooking for free

(The owner is at liberty to modify these various elements at any given time according to
personal tastes and current events.)

For Bourriaud, the structure is the subject matterand in this he is far more
formalist than he acknowledges. Unhinged both from artistic intentionality and
consideration of the broader context in which they operate, relational art works become
a constantly changing portrait of the heterogeneity of everyday life, and do not examine
their relation- ship to it. p.65

We need to ask, as Group Material did in the 1980s, Who is the public? How is a
culture made, and who is it for?

I am simply wondering how we decide what the structure of a relational art work
comprises, and whether this is so detachable from the works ostensible subject matter
or permeable with its context.

Bourriaud wants to equate aesthetic judgment with an ethicopolitical judgment of the

relationships produced by a work of art. But how do we measure or compare these
relationships? The quality of the relationships in relational aesthetics are never
examined or called into question.
But what does democracy really mean in this
context? If relational art produces human relations,
then the next logical question to ask is what types of
relations are being produced, for whom, and why?

Rosalyn Deutsche identification

Rosalyn Deutsche has argued that the public sphere remains democratic only insofar as
its naturalized exclusions are taken into account and made open to contestation:
Conflict, division, and instability, then, do not ruin the democratic public sphere; they
are conditions of its existence.

The first of these ideas is the concept of antagonism. Laclau and Mouffe argue that a
fully functioning democratic society is not one in which all antago- nisms have
disappeared, but one in which new political frontiers are constantly being drawn and
brought into debatein other words, a democratic society is one in which relations
of conflict are sustained, not erased

aWithout antagonism there is only the imposed consensus of authoritarian ordera

total suppression of debate and discussion, which is inimical to democracy.

Laclau and Mouffes theory of subjectivity. Following Lacan, they argue that subjectivity
is not a self- transparent, rational, and pure presence, but is irremediably decentered
and incomplete.38

Laclau argues that this conflict is false, because the subject is neither entirely
decentered (which would imply psychosis) nor entirely unified (i.e., the absolute
subject). Following Lacan, he argues that we have a failed structural identity, and are
therefore dependent on identification in order to proceed.39

La subjetividad es irremediablemente incompleta y sin centros, porque la subjetividad

es el proceso de identificacin,somos necesariamente entidades incompletas. El
antagonismo es entonces la relacin que emerge entre esas entidades incompletas.

Because subjectivity is this process of identification, we are necessarily incomplete

entities p.66

antagonism therefore is the relationship that emerges between such

incomplete entities

because it concerns full identities, it results in colli- sionlike a car crash or the war
against terrorism. In the case of antagonism, argue Laclau and Mouffe, we are
confronted with a different situation: the pres- ence of the Other prevents me from
being totally myself.

I dwell on this theory in order to suggest that the relations set up by relational
aesthetics are not intrinsically democratic, as Bourriaud suggests, since they rest
too comfortably within an ideal of subjectivity as whole and of community as
immanent togetherness.

Tiravanijas intervention is considered good because it permits networking among a

group of art dealers and like-minded art lovers, and because it evokes the atmos- phere
of a late-night bar.
about tiravanija reviews of visits

Such communication is fine to an extent, but it is not in and of itself emblematic of

democracy. To be fair, I think that Bourriaud recognizes this problembut he does not
raise it in relation to the artists he promotes

communicative experience, he says, What for? If you forget the what for? Im afraid
youre left with simple Nokia artproducing interpersonal relations for their own sake
and never addressing their political aspects.

47. Jean-Luc Nancys critique of the Marxist idea of community as communion in The
Inoperative Community (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991) has been
crucial to my consideration of a counter-model to relational aesthetics. Since the
mid-1990s, Nancys text has become an increasingly important reference point for
writers on contemporary art

Tiravanijas microtopia gives up on the idea of transformation in public culture and

reduces its scope to the pleasures of a private group who identify with one another as

Bourriaud ignored the Swiss artist Thomas Hirschhorn and the Spanish Santiago Sierra
These artists set up relationships that emphasize the role of dialogue and negotiation
in their art, but do so without collapsing these relationships into the works content.

because the work acknowledges the impossibility of a micro- topia and instead
sustains a tension among viewers, participants, and context. An integral part of this
tension is the introduction of collaborators from diverse eco- nomic backgrounds, which
in turn serves to challenge contemporary arts self-perception as a domain that
embraces other social and political structures.

About santiago sierra

160 cm Line Tattooed on Four People (2000), A Person Paid for 360 Continuous
Working Hours (2000), and Ten People Paid to Masturbate (2000). These ephemeral
actions are documented in casual black-and-white photographs, a short text, and
occasionally video. This mode of documentation appears to be a legacy of 1970s
Conceptual and body art

His work can be seen as a grim meditation on the social and political conditions that
permit disparities in peoples prices to emerge.

It is worth bearing in mind that, since the 1970s, older avant-garde rhetorics of
opposition and transformation have been frequently replaced by strategies of complicity;
what matters is not the complicity, but how we receive it.
It is precisely this act of exclusion that is disavowed in relational arts preference for

It is important that Sierras work did not achieve a harmonious reconciliation between
the two systems, but sustained the tension between them.

Thomas Hirschhorn is well-known for his assertion that he does not make political art,
but makes art

of the presumptions underlying Relational Aesthetics is the ideaintroduced by the

historical avant-garde and reiterated ever sincethat art should not be a privi- leged
and independent sphere but instead fused with life.

To make art politically means to choose materials that do not intimi- date, a format that
doesnt dominate, a device that does not seduce. To make art politically is not to submit
to an ideology or to denounce the system, in opposition to so-called political art. It is to
work with the fullest energy against the principle of quality.61

about his work in documenta

Even more dis- ruptively, in light of the international art worlds intellectual pretensions,
Hirschhorns Monument took the local inhabitants seriously as potential Bataille read-

the Bataille Monument served to destabilize (and therefore potentially liberate) any
notion of community identity or what it might mean to be a fan of art and philosophy.

is no longer required to participate literally (i.e., to eat noodles, or to activate a

sculpture), but is asked only to be a thoughtful and reflective visitor:

arte que hace pensar sea lo que sea formalmente

Likewise, the viewer is no longer coerced into fulfilling the artists interactive
requirements, but is presupposed as a subject of independent thought, which is the
essential prerequisite for political action: having reflections and critical thoughts is to
get active, posing questions is to come to life.

My interest in the work of Thomas Hirschhorn and Santiago

Sierra derives not only from their tougher, more disruptive
approach to relations than that proposed by Bourriaud, but
also from their remoteness from the socially engaged public
art projects that have sprung up since the 1980s under the
aegis of new genre public art.

the work Bourriaud considers exemplary of relational aesthetics wishes to be

considered politically, then we must address this proposition seriously

There is now a long tradition of viewer participation and activated spectatorship in works
of art across many mediafrom experimental German theater of the 1920s to new-
wave film and the nouveau roman of the 1960s, from Minimalist sculpture to post-
Minimalist installation art in the 1970s, from Beuyss social sculpture to 1980s socially
engaged performance art

even the most open- endeddetermines in advance the depth of participation that the
viewer may have with it.

The tasks facing us today are to analyze how contempo- rary art addresses the viewer
and to assess the quality of the audience relations it produces: the subject position that
any work presupposes and the democratic notions it upholds, and how these are
manifested in our experience of the work.

In this light, the motif of obstruction or blockade so frequently found in Sierras works is
less a return to modernist refusal as advocated by Theodor Adorno than an expression
of the boundaries of both the social and the aesthetic after a century of attempts to fuse

In such works, Sierra seems to argue that the phenomenological body of Minimalism is
politicized precisely through the quality of its relationshipor lack of relationship to
other people.

about tiravanija and Gillick project

In such a cozy situation, art does not feel the need to defend itself, and it collapses into
compensatory (and self-congratulatory) entertainment.

about Sierra and Hirschhorn

The model of subjectivity that underpins their practice is not the fictitious whole sub- ject
of harmonious community, but a divided subject of partial identifications open to
constant flux. If relational aesthetics requires a unified subject as a pre- requisite for
community-as-togetherness, then Hirschhorn and Sierra provide a mode of artistic
experience more adequate to the divided and incomplete subject of today.

Candlin, F. (2004). Dont touch! Hands off! Art, blindness and the conservation of
expertise. Body & Society, 10(1), 71-90.

Eva Hesse show at Tate

The impetus behind this sensory shift is highly over-determined. Embodiment theorists
have convincingly argued that knowledge is not detached from the body, suggesting
instead that the body is the ground of culture and thought p.71
(Csordas, 1994; Lingis, 1994; Merleau-Ponty, 2000) and similarly concepts of physical
intelligence and bodily learning have become accepted within educational theory
(Gardner, 1993).

handling material is used to demonstrate that the museum is accessible to blind people
without impinging upon the museums remit to preserve the collections. p72
Handling is one area where the right of the individual to learn from and enjoy public
collections is in tension with the duty of the museum to care for its objects in perpetuity

I begin by arguing that the emphasis upon conservation can serve to legitimate a
different kind of contain- ment, namely that of lay challenges to expert territory. This is
not a straight- forward conflict over what kinds of knowledge are permissible within the
museum, or a clear-cut division between experts and lay commentators with
conservation and optic, disembodied knowledge on one side and haptic, embodied
knowledge and greater access on the other.

that resistance to touch is as closely connected to the conser- vation of territory as it is

to the preservation of objects

A focus on who touches hopefully takes the discussion past its current stale- mate
where conservation is always the contrary of access and the only way for the museum
to encompass touch is to change beyond all recognition. This has implications for blind
peoples access, for how museum practice is conceptual- ized, and is thus of
consequence for all museum visitors, for how they under- stand the collections and
quite literally articulate that knowledge. p.3

conservation and art through touch

Touch involves the interrelation of rhythm, movement, contact, proprioception (postural

or bodily awareness), articulation and pressure and with it we can grasp shape, space,
size, texture, temperature, vibration and response (Heller, 2000)

Whatever their level of skill, touch formed a primary means of learning about art objects
and artefacts. On the one hand, touch supplemented poor sight and confirmed or
contradicted ambiguous visual inputs.

You dont just look at shape and form, you look at the texture of things, temperature.
You are sensing all of it . . . cold for bronze work, maybe if it is inlaid the different grains.
(Recorded group discussion, 2002)

Thus, the opportunity for blind people to learn through touch is ostensibly in tension with
the preservation of art objects. Yet on closer examin- ation the case is not as clear-cut
as it might first appear.

David Rice, the chairman of Arts Through Touch argued that:

Being totally blind the only way I can appreciate the national heritage is by touch. You
keep saying its being saved for future generations, well Im sorry but this is my
generation and I need to appreciate my national heritage. (31/6/01)

At Kettles Yard the emphasis is on preserving the accessibility and original ambience of
this domestic collection.p.6

Moreover, whereas art objects are often unique and therefore irreplaceable, museums
often have many versions of the same object held in reserve collections, some of which
could be, and occasionally are, designated handling material.3 The damage that might
be done to objects by blind people thus seems disproportionate to the resistance it
elicits. Why then, this anxiety about blind people learning through touch?p.7

Dirk vom Lehn (2010) Discovering Experience-ables: Socially including visually

impaired people in art museums, Journal of Marketing Management, 26:7-8,
749-769, DOI: 10.1080/02672571003780155

In the literature, social inclusion is principally conceived of as a social-policy approach

designed to widen access to societys resources and to encourage and enable all parts
of the population to participate in society, science, education, art, and culture (cf.
Hooper-Greenhill et al., 2000; Sandell, 1998; Social Exclusion Unit, 2003).

Hawkins, H. (2010). The argument of the eye? The cultural geographies of

installation art. cultural geographies, 17(3), 321-340.

installation art and its development throughout the decades since the 1960s is to
engage with a critique of the ocular-centric understanding of art and representation and
to witness the emerging dialogics between artist, viewer and artwork.12 Moreover, and
importantly for this essay, installa- tions history is one of a twining of artistic practice
with close readings of phenomenological texts and embodied arguments which mirror
the methods and conceptual frameworks of many contem- porary geographers.1 p.324

Paterson, M. (2009). Haptic geographies: ethnography, haptic knowledges and

sensuous dispositions. Progress in Human Geography, 33(6), 766-788.

I prefer the collective term somatic senses as it acknowledges the multiplicity and the
interaction between different intern- ally felt and outwardly orientated senses.
Mountcastle (2005: 2) for example notes that somatic sensibility and somesthesis are
equivalent terms, and so the different somatic senses collectively help constitute the
underexplored background feelings of embodiment, he self-perception of inner bodily

Kinaesthesia is a sense of movement that utilizes a range of nerve information, in-

cluding that of muscular tension and balance. Husserl (1970) writes about kinaesthesia
as a background to embodied experience (discussed further in Paterson, 2007: 2735).
Usually working in conjunction, kinaesthesia and proprioception are invoked in areas
such as dance research, performance studies and anthropology

After this brief excursus into the physi- ology of the haptic system, the lesson here is
simple. While there are clearly specialized receptors for exteroceptive senses such as
sight and audition, there is no such one-to-one correlation between receptors and
organs for the somatic senses. This applies similarly to touch which is itself a
combination of data primarily from receptors responding to pressure
(mechanoreceptors), temperature (thermoreceptors) and pain (nociceptors), as we have

Geurts (2002) mono- graph Culture and the senses: bodily ways of knowing in an
African community

Geurts achieves this through Bourdieus notion of habitus and works to see how
sensory schemas are, appropriating Csordas phrase, perfor- matively elaborated ... in
the habitus of the Anlo, since sensory experiences are pivotal in the formation of
identity and cultural difference (Geurts, 2002: 69).

Classens (2005) work on the alternative sensory hierarchies of three geographically

diverse peoples
shows how the sensory order is simultaneously a social order and a cosmological order.

we can firmly differentiate sensations (that is, information routed via

dis- tributed nerves and sense-system clusters) from sensuous
dispositions (the sociohistoric- al construction of the sensorium, its
repro- duction over time and its alteration through contexts and
technologies). This distinction highlights the importance not only of the immediacy of
conscious sensation and cuta- neous contact, then, but also the historically sedimented
bodily dispositions and patterns of haptic experience that become habituated over time.
ejemplo metodolgico
What follows then is a sample of geographical work that directly addresses the shifting,
multiple, mutable sensorium within different fieldwork settings, variously dealing with
spaces of immediacy, proximity and distance:

The sensuous envelope of skin

The ongoing and multifarious nature of tangible interactions with the world open up the
haptic beyond cutaneous sensation (prosaic tactility), beyond the subjectively coherent
felt interaction of dispersed sensory systems (Gibsons haptic system), to include
sensuous dispositions that exceed anything we might posit as a subjectively felt body-
space with a distinct interiority and exter- iority. This must be borne in mind when we
consider the remaining examples of this section: first, acts of touching material ob- jects
that collapse subject-object and inside- outside distinctions, and then perceiving and
interacting with landscape as an aesthetic (feeling) body p.15

Merleau-Ponty (2000: 133) puts it, becoming a tangible being as a form of muscular
con- sciousness (Bachelard, in Ingold, 2004: 333)


Proximal and distal touch

Haptic knowledges are particularly signific- ant in thinking about spatial experiences of
the blind and visually impaired

(eg, Butler and Bowlby, 1997; Paterson, 2006b; 2006c). estudios con ciegos

Hetheringtons (2002; 2003) research on visually impaired visitors to museums, one

aspect in particular that emerges from inter- view data includes the contention that place
and touch can be understood as proximal nonrepresentational forms of
knowledge (Hetherington, 2003: 1938)

Hetherington sees tactility as a performative rather than representational form of

knowledge since it is more proximal, opening out tactility from this centred (hu- manist)
subject (p. 1934).

The historical em- phasis on sight and the optic solidifies perceptual self/other
boundaries between my body and others based on visual feed- back and clearly
identifiable visual representa- tions, and entails distal rather than proximal
knowledges. Therefore the troubling of sight

and the understanding of the interaction be- tween remaining senses alters the
available perceptual feedback, significantly modifying our experiences of place. To de-
emphasize the optic and the centrality of sight in favour of reasserting the haptic is to
validate other forms of knowledge, and while we remember the popular expression
seeing is believing, a forgotten corollary is but feelings the truth, as Thomas Fuller
reminds us in Gnomologia (Fuller, 1732: 174; see also Bronner, 1982: 352, on haptic

For sighted and non- sighted alike, this opening out of tactility effectively asks how
geographical knowledge might understand place as a
proximal construction of touch (Hetherington, 2003: 1936).
Something of the experience of mingl- ing, of collapsing self and other, interiority and
exteriority, making the distanced more proximate (and vice versa

The experience of space can thereby be understood as a decentred and partially con-
nected experience of the performing (and performed) body (p. 1935). As we have seen,
haptic knowledges involve multiple relation- ships between the visual, the non-visual
and the somatic senses. For Hetherington, touch is only one possible focus for proximal
and performative forms of knowledge in the making of place (p. 1936), and he similarly
ac- knowledges the importance of kinaesthesia

(although see Seremetakis, 1994).

Wylie(2002; 2005)
specific walking corporealities and sensibilities that accommodate affects along with
sensations (p. 236),

that gap between experiencing the feeling body and expressing it, this is an appropriate
point to ask how exactly can researchers attend to haptic geographies, to take account
of somatic senses such as kinaesthesia, for example, and write about it?

good to remember...
the real problem here is the assumption that there are identifiable sensations out
there (or, conversely, felt in here) reportable in this way. As discussed previously, the
internal/ external spatial differentiation of the body is not always so simple.

Crouch, D. 2001: Spatialities and the feeling of doing.

Social and Cultural Geography 21, 6175.

Jones, C.A., editor 2007: Sensorium: embodied

experience, technology, and contemporary art. London:
MIT Press.

McCormack, D.P. 2002: A paper with an interest in rhythm. Geoforum 33, 46985.

Macpherson, H.M. 2009: Touch in the countryside: memory and visualization through
the feet. The Senses and Society 33, in press.

Paterson, M. 2006b: Seeing with the hands: blindness, touch and the Enlightenment
spatial imaginary. British Journal of Visual Impairment 242, 5260.

2006c: Seeing with the hands, touching with the eyes: vision, touch and the
Enlightenment spatial imaginary. The Senses and Society 12, 22442.

Paterson, M. 2007: The senses of touch: haptics, affects and technologies. Oxford:

Rodaway, P. 1994: Sensuous geographies: body, sense and place. London: Routledge.

Seremetakis, N. 1994: The senses still: perception and

memory as material culture in modernity. Oxford:
Westview Press

Guba, E. & Lincoln, Y.S. (1994). PARADIGMAS QUE COMPITEN EN LA

INVESTIGACION CUALITATIVA. Handbook of Qualitative Research, Thousand
Oaks, Ca., Sage. Traduccin: Anthony Sampson.

until recently competed,

for acceptance as the paradigm of choice in
informing and guiding inquiry, especially qualitative
inquiry: positivism, postpositivism, critical theory
and related ideological positions, and constructivism

We acknowledge at once our own commitment

to constructivism (which we earlier called "naturalistic
inquiry"; Lincoln & Guba, 1985);
it became clear that the metaphysical assumptions
undergirding the conventional paradigm (the "received
view") must be seriously questioned. Thus
the emphasis of this chapter is on paradigms, their
assumptions, and the implications of those assumptions
for a variety of research issues, not on the
relative utility of qualitative versus quantitative

Disjunction of grand theories with local contexts:

The eticlemic dilemma. The etic (outsider)
theory brought to bear on an inquiry by an investigator
(or the hypotheses proposed to be tested)
may have little or no meaning within the emic
(insider) view of studied individuals, groups, societies,
or cultures. Qualitative data, it is affirmed,
are useful for uncovering emic views; theories, to
be valid, should be qualitatively grounded (Glaser
& Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990)

La disyuncin de las grandes teoras respecto a los contextos locales: el dilema etic-
emic. La teora etic (del forastero) que un investigador aplica en una investigacin (o
las hiptesis que se quieren verificar) pueden tener poco o ningn significado dentro de
la visin emic (del nativo) de los individuos, grupos, sociedades o culturas estudiadas.
Se afirma que los datos cualitativos son tiles para descubrir las visiones emic; para
ser vlidas, las teoras deben estar fundadas cualitativamente (Glaser y Strauss, 1967;
Strauss y Corbin, 1990).

But an even weightier challenge

has been mounted by critics who have
proposed alternative paradigms that involve not
only qualification of approaches but fundamental
adjustments in the basic assumptions that guide
inquiry altogether. Their rejection of the received
view can be justified on a number of grounds
(Bernstein, 1988; Guba, 1990; Hesse, 1980; Lincoln
& Guba, 1985; Reason & Rowan, 1981

crticas externas extraparadigmticas

ahora est establecido ms all de la objetividad que las teoras y los hechos son
relativamente interdependientes, es decir, que los hechos son hechos slo
dentro de algn marco terico
problema de la induccin diferentes ventanas de teoras estn soportadas en la
misma conjunto de hechos

la nocin de que los hallazgos, conclusiones son creadas a travs de la

interaccin entre el investigador y el fenmeno (unidad de realidad) es
ciertamente plausible sobre una creencia que la realidad va a conocerse como es
y funciona.

But evidence such as

the Heisenberg uncertainty principle and the Bohr
complementarity principle have shattered that ideal
in the hard sciences (Lincoln & Guba, 1985); even
greater skepticism must exist for the social sciences.
Indeed, the notion that findings are created
through the interaction of inquirer and phenomenon

La inaplicabilidad de los datos generales a los casos individuales

los datos cualitativos evitan ambiguedades

Paradigms as Basic Belief Systems

Based on Ontological, Epistemological,
and Methodological Assumptions

a paradigm a set of basic beliefs

It represents a worldview that
defines, for its holder, the nature of the "world,"
the individual's place in it, and the range of possible
relationships to that world and its part

un paradigma es una coleccin de creencias bsicas que representa la visin del

mundo y define para su dueo, la naturaleza del mundo, el lugar del individuo all y el
rango de posibles relaciones con ese mundo y sus partes.

three fundamental questions,

which are interconnected in such a way that
the answer given to anyone question, taken in any
order, constrains how the others may be answered

the ontological question

The ontological question. What is the form
and nature of reality and, therefore, what is
there that canbe known aboutit?

2. The epistemological question.

What is the
nature of the relationship between the knower
or would-be knower and what can be known?

3. 3. The methodological question. How can the

inquirer (would-be knower) go about finding
out whatever he orshe believes can be known?

In our opinion,
any given paradigm represents simply the
most informed and sophisticated view that its
proponents have been able to devise, given the
way they have chosen to respond to the three
defining questions. And, we argue, the sets of
answers given are in all cases human constructions;
that is, they are all inventions of the human
mind and hence subject to human error. No construction
is or can be incontrovertibly right; advocates
of any particular construction must rely
on persuasiveness and utility rather than proof in
arguing their position.

critical theory may itself

usefully be divided' into three substrands: poststructuralism,
postmodernism, and a blending of
these two.

denotes an alternative paradigm whose breakaway
assumption is the move from ontological
realism to ontological relativism. T

Ontology: realism (commonly called "naive realism").
deterministic and reductionist

Epistemology: Dualist and objectivist. The investigator

and the investigated "object" are assumed to
be independent entities. Replicable
findings are, in fact, "true."
Methodology: Experimental and manipulative. (prevent outcomes controlling.)

Ontology: Critical realism
. Reality is assumed to
exist but to be only imperfectly apprehendable
Ontology: Critical realism. Reality is assumed to
exist but to be only imperfectly apprehendable.

epist. objectivity remains a "regulatory ideal";

special emphasis is placed on external "guardians"
of objectivity

Methodology: Modified experimentaVmanipulative.

Emphasis is placed on "critical multiplism"

doing inquiry in more natural settings, collecting

more situational information, and reintroducing
discovery as an element in inquiry, and, in the
social sciences particularly, soliciting emic viewpoints
to assist in determining the meanings and
purposes that people ascribe to their actions, as
well as to contribute to "grounded theory" (Glaser
& Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990)

: Critical Theory
and Related Ideological Positions

Ontology: Historical realism

A reality is assumed
to be apprehendable that was once plastic,
but that was, over time, shaped by a congeries of
social, political, cultural, economic, ethnic, and
gender factors, and then crystallized (reified) into a series of
structures that are now (inappropriately)
taken as "real," that is, natural and immutable.
For all practical purposes the structures are
"real," a virtual or historical reality

Epistemology: Transactional and subjectivist

The investigator and the investigated object are assumed to be interactively linked,
with the values of the investigator (and of situated "others")
inevitably influencing the inquiry. Findings are therefore value mediated. Note that
this posture
effectively challenges the traditional distinction
between ontology and epistemology; what can be
known is inextricably intertwined with the interaction
between a particular investigator and a
particular object or group. T

Methodology: Dialogic and dialectical.transformative intellectuals

Ontology: Relativist.

Realities are apprehendable

in the form of multiple, intangible mental
constructions, socially and experientially based,
local and specific in nature
Constructions are alterable, as are their
associated "realities." T

Epistemology: Transactional and subjectivist

the "findings" are literally created as the investigation
proceeds. disappears again the distinction

Methodology: Hermeneutical and dialectical

individual constructions
can be elicited and refined only through
interaction between and among investigator and
respondents. These varying constructions are interpreted
using conventional hermeneutical techniques,
and are compared and contrasted through
a dialectical interchange.
The final aim is to distill a consensus construction

Cross-Paradigm Analyses

Positivism assuming
an objective external reality upon
which inquiry can converge; to postpostivism asume una realidad objetiva pero
asegura que puede ser solo aprehendida imperfectamente y a la teora crtica
donde se asume que la realidad aprehensible est determinada por estructuras
histricamente situadas (condiciones econmicas, sociales, polticas, tnicas, de
gnero) asumidas hoy como reales pero dignas de ser evaluadas y el
constructivismo asume mltiples realidades, a veces en conflicto, todas producto
del intelecto humano y fruto de la interaccin entre los constructores. a medida
que se informa se sofistica la unidad de realidad.

la relacin del investigador con el objeto de estudio
positivimso dualista el investigador asume objetivamente que puede determinar
cmo son realmente las cosas y cmo funcionan
el postpositivismo dualista modificado es posible aproximarse a la realidad pero
imposible conocerla
la teora crtica transaccional y subjetivista el conocimiento es un valor mediado
y por tanto depdendiente
al constructivismo transaccinal/subjetivista amplio espectro el conocimento es
creado en la interaccin entre investigador y encuestado

el positivismo aplica mtodos experimentales/manipulativo y se enfoca en la
verficacin de la hiptesis
postpositivismo experimental modificado/metodologa manipulada se enfoca en
la falsificacin de la hiptesis multiplicidad crtica
a la teora crtica metodologa dialgica/dialctica cuyo objetivo la reconstruccin
de construcciones previamente generalizadas y el constructivismo metodologia
hermenutico/dialctica cuyo objetivo es la reconstruccin de construcciones
previamente generalizadas

Implications of
Each Paradigm's Position
on Selected Practical Issues

implicaciones en el conducto prctico de la pregunta as como en la

interpretacin de los s resultados hallazgos y decisiones normativas
propsito de la pregunta
naturaleza del conocimiento, conocimiento acumulado y cualidad del criterio
especialmente importantes para los positivistas y postpositivistas los valores y la
tica son asuntos tomados seriamente por todos los paradigmas

teora crtica el conocimiento no se acumula crece y cambia a travs de un

proceso dialctico de revisin histrica pretende se compromete con
percepciones mayor informadas
la generalizacin puede ocurrir cuando la mezcla de todas las estructuras o
condiciones sea similar
constructivismo el conocimiento se acumula de manera relativa, por medio de la
formacin de construcciones mejor informadas y sofisticadas a travs del
proceso hermenutico dialctico mientras las construcciones individuales son

cules son los criterios apropiados para juzgar la calidad de la investigacin

el positivismo y postpositivismo aplican la validez interna encontrando datos
similares bajo un control neutro y la validez externa generalizando los datos.

la objetividad no puede ser alcanzada porque no hay nada de lo que uno pueda
estar distante

la teora crtica los criterios apropiados son los que corresponden al lugar
histrico de la pregunta que toma en cuenta todos los factores ,,,

la legitimidad autntica de los
autenticidad ontolgica reconocimiento y ampliacin de diferentes construcciones
autenticidad educativa conlleva a mejorar la comprensin de los fenmenos
empodera la accin

cul es el rol de los valores en la investigacin

en el positivismo y post los valores son excludos, aunque se jacta de estar libre de
valores por su objetividad

en el constructivismo son ineludibles en la creacin de los resultados de la

el investigador es un facilitador de la construccin del conocimiento la teora crtica
tiende a dar un rol ms autoritario al investigador

cul es el lugar de la tica en la investigacin

positivismo la tica es extrnseca al proceso de investigacin mismo sin embargo cierto

comportamiento tico es puesto en prctica como cdigos profesionales de conducta y
convenciones sectoriales

la tica es intrnseca al paradigma de la teora crtica cuando se compromete a tener en

cuenta el completo lugar histrico de la pregunta y el problema tinte moral del
investigador revelar a partir de la informacin rigurosa

constructivismo la tica es intrnseca al proceso de investigacin especialmente por la

inclusin de los valores y construcciones del participante en el desarrollo, adems de
trabajar juntos para construir mejor informados

en la teora crtica la voz del investigador es la del intelectural transformador Giroux

quien ha expandido la consciencia del lugar de la realidad que estudia y por tanto est
en la posicin de confrontar la ignorancia e incomprensin

en el constructivismo la voz del investigador es la del participante apasionado Lincoln,

1991), quien est activamente comprometido en facilitar las mltiples voces a travs de
reconstrucciones y nuevas construcciones de unidades de realidad

la resolucin de las diferencias entre paradigmas tendr lugar cuando un nuevo

paradigma emerja de la mejor informacin y sofisticacin de alguno existente. si los
proponentes de los diferentes puntos de vista se reunieran a dismacutir sus diferencias

Griswold, W., Mangione, G., & McDonnell, T. E. (2013). Objects, words, and bodies
in space: Bringing materiality into cultural analysis. Qualitative sociology, 36(4),

When conceptual artists were investigating the experience of the body and its relation to
the external world in the late 1960s, Bruce Nauman became interested in placing bodies
in conditions that altered sensory experience of that world. His Green Light Corridor

he causal power of physical objects and bodies in interaction.

We propose that meaning-making is a function of position and location. Both are

aspects of place, but they refer to different aspects of emplacement. Position is the
geometric set of physical relationships between objects and bodies in a particular

in analyzing the art museum as a distinct object-setting (McDonnell 2010), we

introduce three mechanismsdistance, legibility, and orientationthrough which
position can precede and set possibilities for location within the museum.

Any number of socially structured presuppositions might alter how one interprets an art
They facilitate cognition and meaning-making by aligning shared ways of understanding
across art producers and receivers.
Actor-network theorists argue for a generalized symmetry principle (Law 1987) in
which action results from the relations of human and non-human agents in a network
that reduces neither to a simple consequence of the other. Power is distributed among
them, and all can be conceived as actants, defined as anything that can be said to act
or to shift action (Akrich and Latour 1992, 259). Agency, of people or of objects, is a
relational rather than intentional concept, a role that emerges through interaction

For Latour (2005) and others, explaining action through cognitive concepts effectively
turns these actions into a black box (Whitley 1972) powered by abstract social forces.

In this paper, we work to find a middle ground between internal subjectivities and
external actants.

The material and symbolic qualities of objects interact with the physical and cognitive
capacities of people to produce meaning (Gomart and Hennion 1999).

Therefore interpreting an art object involves the cognitive awareness of audiences and
the interaction between materiality of the object and surrounding environmental
conditions (McDonnell 2010, 1820)

Position and location

position is physical. It refers to the characteristics of and relationships among material
actants, which we have categorized as objects, words, and bodies.

Location is cognitive. It refers to the schemas and conventions that are triggered by the
position of objects, words, and bodies and through which people interpret what they

This happens through three distinct mechanisms mediating the interplay between
position and location: 1) distance, the distance or intimacy between audiences and art
objects, 2) legibility, how the legibility of objects interacts with the position of labels and
audiences, and 3) orientation, how bodies are oriented to experience and move through
exhibition spaces. Through these, position guides location, and location guides
meaning-making within the space of the art museum.

nteractive works create a different set of physical relationships, or positions, among

bodies and objects in the galleries, which challenges pre-existing conventional
expectations and allow for new understandings of what museums made possible in the
encounter of artworks.p.11
Legibility is the capacity for an audience to read the intended meaning of the
object (McDonnell 2010), and it happens when the objects material and symbolic
affordances align with peoples cognitive schema.p14

The SAGE Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods Given_2008_.pdf

Thus, the interactionist sees humans as active, creative par- ticipants who construct
their social world, not as pas- sive, conforming objects of socialization.
Methodological Considerations
Methodologically, one can suggest a variety of tradi- tional data collection technologies
used by an assort- ment of social science disciplines; among the more common are
biographical and autobiographical meth- ods, case studies, participant observation,
interviewing, oral histories and historical tracing, grounded theory approaches, and
phenomenological discovery. p.857

The extent to which any particular study is orienta- tional is a matter of degree.
Ethnographic studies can be viewed as orientational to the extent that they pre- sume
the centrality of culture in explaining human experience. Critical ethnography combines
a focus on culture with commitment to use findings for change. Symbolic
interactionism is orientational in that it focuses on the importance of the meanings
that emerge as people define situations through interper- sonal interaction p.616

Symbolic interactionism provides the essential episte- mological source of sensitizing

concepts. Herbert G. Blumers Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method deals
with sensitizing concepts. Based on approaches by pragmatist philosophers, such as
James Dewey, symbolic interactionism highlights experience and interaction in
particular. In understanding this expe- rience, the researcher must grasp the meaning
with which the social actors infuse their understandings and actions. Sensitizing
concepts are a logical and even an essential methodological consequence of this

Carmona. J. (2008) El prosumidor. El actor comunicativo de la sociedad de la
ubicuidad. Palabra Clave. 11 (1) 29-39. Consultado 10 de agosto de 2017: http://

Palabras clave: Internet, medios de comunicacin, impacto de

la comunicacin, cambio tecnolgico, proceso de comunicacin.
(Fuente: Tesauro de la UNESCO).

De acuerdo con Neil

Postman, el objeto de estudio de la ecologa de
medios es el siguiente:
La ecologa de los medios analiza como los
medios de comunicacin afectan la opinin humana,
la comprensin, la sensacin, y el valor; y cmo nuestra interaccin con los medios
o impide nuestras posibilidades de supervivencia.
La palabra ecologa implica el estudio
de ambientes: su estructura, contenido e impacto
en la gente2

En la ecologa de medios ese proceso

es conocido como remediacin. El proceso de
remediacin de los medios de comunicacin es
el resultado de la adecuacin dialctica que permite
transformarlos hasta convertirlos en lgicas
extensiones de nuestras facultades, rganos

Jay Bolter y Richard Grusin emplean el concepto

remediacin para describir las relaciones
formales de interdependencia cultural que existen
entre dos o varios medios

Internet es un medio remediador,

pues asimila a los medios que le antecedieron.

La sociedad de la ubicuidad: el nuevo

ambiente comunicativo al cual nos
conducirn las comunicaciones
digitales mviles

Neil postman five thing we should know

1. La cultura siempre paga el precio de la
2. Siempre hay ganadores y perdedores en el
cambio tecnolgico.
3. Toda la tecnologa tiene una fi losofa.
4. El cambio tecnolgico no es aditivo; es
5. Los medios de comunicacin tienden a
convertirse en mticos.
El trmino sociedad
de la ubicuidad, afi rma Nakamura, designa a
una sociedad en la que cualquier persona puede
disfrutar, en cualquier momento y en cualquier
lugar, de una amplia gama de servicios de informacin
a travs de diversos dispositivos terminales
y redes de banda ancha.

anywhere anytime anyone

El prosumidor. El actor comunicativo

de la sociedad de la ubicuidad

La palabra prosumidor en ingls, prosumer,

es un acrnimo que procede de la fusin de dos
palabras: producer (productor) y consumer
(consumidor). El concepto prosumidor fue
anticipado por Marshall McLuhan y Barrington
Nevitt, quienes en el libro Take Today (1972),
afi rmaron que la tecnologa electrnica permitira
al consumidor asumir simultneamente los
roles de productor y consumidor de contenidos

Efectivamente, para comprender el impacto de
YouTube en la ecologa cultural de la industria
de la televisin, resulta indispensable reparar
en el comportamiento de los prosumidores, tal
como destacan Alvin y Heidi Toffl er en el libro
La revolucin de la riqueza (2006, p. 99):
En palabras de Betsy Frank, vicepresidenta ejecutiva
de investigacin y planifi cacin de MTV
Networks, se trata de un pblico que desea hacer
su propia programacin.

Los prosumidores han empezado a asumir roles

de liderazgo en la llamada sociedad-red. Las
multitudes inteligentes (smart mobs) que refi ere
Howard Rheingold son posibles gracias a la
formidable capacidad de convocatoria que han
alcanzado algunos prosumidores.
Conclusin. La contribucin de los

Societies have always been shaped more by

the nature of the media by which men communicate
than the content of the communication
(McLuhan, 1967, p. 8).

Alfons Cornella y Sergi Rucabado

destacan el x-casting. El x-casting designa
un fenmeno recurrente en el imaginario de
la sociedad de la ubicuidad: toda persona en
cualquier momento y en cualquier lugar puede
introducir informacin a Internet.

encuentra en Google o en Internet: y que todo
se reduce a que los expertos en tecnologa vayan
simplifi cando la manera de acceder a ella, cada
vez con menos pasos () La democratizacin
de la informacin est teniendo un impacto profundo
en la sociedad

internet medio que defi nitivamente

admite ser comprendido como lgica
extensin de la inteligencia humana.

prosumers en la remediacin de

Benko. G. (2015) Estrategias de comunicacin y marketing urbano. EURE:

Santiago. 26 (79). Consultado 10 de agosto de 2017:

El marketing territorial es un fenmeno antiguo, pero despus de los aos 80
experimenta una intensificacin. La rivalidad y la competencia se hacen patentes entre
las ciudades y las regiones. La renovacin de las estrategias de comunicacin y de los
fundamentos econmicos y sociales: la mun- dializacin y la extensin de la
competencia; la puesta en valor de lo local; la evolucin rpida de las herramientas de
comunicacin y finalmente la evolucin misma del marketing. Este artculo analiza este
nuevo campo de estudio que est ligado a la representacin de los espacios y a sus
propios mtodos.

Palabras claves: Marketing Territorial, Ciudades, Comunicacin

1. Los fundamentos econmicos y sociales

De manera esquemtica, se puede decir que cuatro factores han contribuido en forma
paralela a la emergencia del marketing de los diferentes espacios (ciudades y

1.1. Mundializacin y ampliacin de la competencia

1.2. La puesta en valor de lo local
1.3. La rpida evolucin de las herramientas de comunicacin

3. Las etapas de una estrategia de marketing aplicado a la ciudad

3.1. El diagnstico competitivo de la ciudad
3.1.1. La eleccin de un posicionamiento
3.1.2. La elaboracin de un mix-territoria
a) La localizacin
b) La oferta territoria
c) Precio de los espacios y de los servicios
d) La comunicacin territorial
e) Responsables territoriales y opinin pblica

<4. Los territorios en la mundializacin

4. Los territorios en la mundializacin

Desde su aparicin en 1975 (Wieviorka, 1975), el marketing territorial ha evolucionado

notoriamente en la teora y sobre todo en las prcticas. En el transcurso de los aos 80,
el contexto econmico fue favorable a su expansin. Primero, porque la mundializacin
de la economa ha extendido los espacios competitivos. De tal forma, los territorios
(ciudades y regiones) se vieron obligados ha posicionarse con relacin a los otros en la
competicin internacional. Luego, la valorizacin de los actores locales (desarrollo
local, descentralizacin administrativa, etc.) obliga a los responsables a valorar su
espacio y as a desmarcarse de los competidores. La especificidad territorial (la
afirmacin de la diferencia) deviene en un triunfo econmico (cualitativo) que los
responsable locales comunican de buen grado. Adems, en las sociedades
occidentales la vida econmica y la estrategia de comunicacin se han vuelto
inseparables. Se habla a menudo de "sociedad de la comunicacin" en razn de la
rpida evolucin de las tecnologas y de las prcticas en este terreno. El marketing
forma parte del campo de la comunicacin.

Y finalmente, el mismo marketing ha conocido una rpida mutacin en el curso de su

breve historia (Cochoy, 1999). En su evolucin y su controversia, esta "ciencia" entre la
oferta y la demanda ha ocupado nuevos campos de aplicacin: ciudades, regiones y
otras escalas espaciales. El marketing territorial se ha convertido en una realidad de la
vida econmica, poltica y social. Ha comenzado a alterar la representacin espacial y
ha influido as nuestra percepcin de la realidad geogrfica.

Bishop, C. (2012). Artificial hells: Participatory art and the politics of

spectatorship. Verso Books.

All artists are alike. They dream of doing something thats more social, more collab-
orative, and more real than art.
Dan Graham

This book is therefore organised around a definition of participation in which people

constitute the central artistic medium and material, in the manner of theatre and

n truth, however, many of the projects that formed the impetus for this book have
emerged in the wake of Relational Aesthetics and the debates that it occasioned; the
artists I discuss below are less interested in a relational aesthetic than in the creative
rewards of participation as a politicised working process

Although these practices have had, for the most part, a relatively weak profile in the
commercial art world collective projects are more difficult to market than works by
individual artists, and less likely to be works than a fragmented array of social events,
publications, work- shops or performances they nevertheless occupy a prominent
place in the public sector: in public commissions, biennials and politically themed
exhibitions. Although I will occasionally refer to contemporary examples from non-
western contexts

To put it simply: the artist is conceived less as an individual producer of discrete objects
than as a collaborator and producer of situations; the work of art as a finite, portable,
commodifiable product is reconceived as an ongoing or long-term project with an
unclear beginning and end; while the audience, previously conceived as a viewer or
beholder, is now reposi- tioned as a co-producer or participant.
From a Western European perspective, the social turn in contemporary art can be
contextualised by two previous historical moments, both synony- mous with political
upheaval and movements for social change: the historic avant-garde in Europe circa
1917, and the so-called neo avant-garde lead- ing to 1968. The conspicuous
resurgence of participatory art in the 1990s leads me to posit the fall of communism in
1989 as a third point of transfor- mation. Triangulated, these three dates form a
narrative of the triumph, heroic last stand and collapse of a collectivist vision of society.5
Each phase has been accompanied by a utopian rethinking of arts relationship to the
social and of its political potential manifested in a reconsideration of the ways in which
art is produced, consumed and debated.

Some of the key themes to emerge throughout these chapters are the tensions between
quality and equality, singular and collective authorship, and the ongoing struggle to find
artistic equivalents for political positions.

It is hoped that these chapters might give momentum to rethinking the history of twenti-
eth-century art through the lens of theatre rather than painting (as in the Greenbergian
narrative) or the ready-made (as in Krauss, Bois, Buchloh and Fosters Art Since 1900,
2005). Further sub-themes include education and therapy: both are process-based
experiences that rely on intersubjec- tive exchange, and indeed they converge with
theatre and performance at several moments in the chapters that follow.

Some of the best conceptual and performance art in the 1960s and 70s similarly sought
to refute the commodity-object in favour of an elusive experience.

By contrast, todays participatory art is often at pains to emphasise process over a

definitive image, concept or object. It tends to value what is invisible: a group dynamic,
a social situation, a change of energy, a raised consciousness.

By this I mean that an analysis of this art must necessarily engage with concepts that
have traditionally had more currency within the social sciences than in the humanities:
community, society, empowerment, agency. As a result of artists expanding curiosity in
participation, specific vocabularies of social organisation and models of democracy
have come to assume a new relevance for the analysis of contemporary art. But since
participatory art is not only a social activity but also a symbolic one, both embedded in
the world and at one remove from it,

Participatory art demands that we find new ways of analysing art that are no longer
linked solely to visuality, even though form remains a crucial vessel for communicating
meaning. In order to analyse the works discussed in this book, theories and terms have
been imported from political philosophy, but also from theatre history and performance
studies, cultural policy and architecture

There is an urgent need to restore attention to the modes of conceptual and affective
complexity generated by socially oriented art projects, particularly to those that claim to
reject aesthetic quality, in order to render them more powerful and grant them a place in
history. After all, aesthetic refusals have happened many times before. Just as we have
come to recognise Dada cabaret, Situationist dtournement, or dematerialised
conceptual and performance art as having their own aesthetics of produc- tion and
circulation, so too do the often formless-looking photo-documents of participatory
projects have their own experiential regime. The point is not to regard these anti-
aesthetic visual phenomena (reading areas, self- published newspapers, parades,
demonstrations, ubiquitous plywood platforms, endless photographs of people) as
objects of a new formalism, but to analyse how these contribute to and reinforce the
social and artistic experience being generated.

s Roland Barthes reminded us in 1968, authorships (of all kinds)

are multiple and continually indebted to others. What matters are
the ideas, experiences and possibilities that result from these

The central project of this book is to find ways of accounting for participatory art that
focus on the meaning of what it produces, rather than attending solely to process. This
result the mediating object, concept, image or story is the necessary link between
the artist and a secondary audience (you and I, and everyone else who didnt
participate); the historical fact of our ineradicable presence requires an analysis of the
politics of spectatorship, even and especially when participatory art wishes to
disavow this.

KEVIN PATERSON & BILL HUGHES (1999) Disability Studies and

Phenomenology: The carnal politics of everyday life, Disability & Society, 14:5,
597-610, DOI: 10.1080/09687599925966

Disability studies reliance on traditional Cartesian modes of thinking ignores the fact
that in `somatic society (Turner, 1992) the modernist separation of the body from
politics is in the process of dissolving.

In our view it is society which disables physically impaired people. Disability (emphasis added)
is something imposed on top of our impairments by the way we are unnecessarily isolated and
excluded from full participation in society. Disabled people are therefore an oppressed group in
society (UPIAS 1976: 14).

The UPIAS analysis of the disabling society is built on a clear distinction between the biological
(impairment) and the social (disability)

Moreover, this re-interpretation of disability has facilitated the construction of a social

model (Oliver, 1983) or social barriers model of disability (Finkelstein, 1991).

This approach focuses on the various barriers: economic, political and cultural, encountered by
people with accredited impairments

disability as a subordinate culture

within the context of disability culture there is an acceptance of impairment as a symbol of

difference rather than shame, and recognition of the significance and value of a disabled
Barnes, C. (2003, May). Effecting

s This may be achieved by adopting the perspective that impairment is social and
disability is embodied. Certainly, disability studies had recognised the social nature of
impairment (Abberley, 1987; Shakespeare & Watson, 1995a/b), but this recognition
stops short of theoretical development. It lacks the conceptual tools to trace the patterns
of embodiment as they are lived through the mutually incorpor- ated experiences of
impairment and disability.

Politics today, is as much about aesthetics (formed and forming bodies) as it is about
economic and public life.

To argue that the impaired body has disappeared from disability studies does not
register a failure to recognise a whole body of work where disabled people have
discussed their experience of impairment (see, for example, Campling, 1981; Oliver et
al., 1988; Morris, 1989; Hales, 1996). Yet within disability studies, the term `body tends
to be used without much sense of bodiliness as if the body were little more than esh
and bones. This tendency carries the danger of objectifying bodies as things devoid of
intentionality and intersubjectivity (Csordas, 1994). Such ten- dencies miss `the
opportunity to add sentience and sensibility to our notions of self and person, and to
insert an added dimension of materiality to our notions of culture and history (Csordas,
1994, p. 4)

A sociology of impairment that is phenomenolog- ical would facilitate the scholarly task
of illustrating that the impaired body has a history and is as much a cultural
phenomenon as it it is a biological entity

It suggests that research should be concerned with spotlighting the ways in

which society disables people with impairments rather than the effects on
individuals (Oliver, 1992, Zarb, 1992). Here, the everyday reality of lived
experience is neglected in favour of a purely structural analysis of disability
(Shake- speare, in Shakespeare & Watson, 1995b). Indeed, the critique of
interactionism from the perspective of the social model of disability (Oliver, 1990)
is limited by its structuralist xation.

Abberley (1987) recognises that any systematic study of the importance of the body in
Western society has been absent (with the exception of feminist literature) until recently.
`For disabled people the body is the site of oppression, both in form, and in what is
done with it (Abberley, 1987, p. 14). The impaired body is depicted here as a passive
recipient of social forces. But what about the body as agency and activity? As Imrie
(1996, p. 145) points out, disabled people are `not merely passive recipients of the built
environment, but actively seek to challenge and change it. New social movements are
moving away from theoretical perspectives which regard the body as a thing subjected
to forces in which it has no formative role (Lyon & Barbalet, 1994). Disability studies
must also address the fundamental issue of bodily agency. As Crossley (1995, p. 60)
states, `To be a body is to be both a locus of action and a focus of power.

One can argue that all pain is subjectively and, therefore, culturally meaningful. There is
no pain that is exclusively biological. Pain always has meaning, is always `socially
informed (Csordas, 1993, p. 3) and it informs the social. Thus, pain should not be
regarded as physical sensation with additions of meaning, but as permeated with
meaning permeated with culture (Jackson, 1994) and as a state of embodi- ment
which `produces culture. A far more sophisticated alternative to the biomed- ical model
of pain is needed; one which locates it within its social and cultural contexts, which
allows for the inclusion of feelings and emotions (Bendolow & Williams, 1995) and
which captures the complex ways in which pain, as a carnal property, is culturally
produced and productive.

The case for a sociology of impairment follows similar reasoning. Disability studies has
failed to incorporate impairment into its public political analysis, regard- ing it as a
private issue (Crow, 1996). The social model has to be reworked to incorporate all the
complexities of being disabled. Giving impairment a sociological agenda as a culturally
informed and meaningful quality of existence is important in this respect.
For example, in the context of the ubiquitous disabling barriers of the spatial
environment, ones impaired body `dys-appears is made present as a thematic focus
of attention. When one is confronted by social and physical inaccessibility one is
simultaneously confronted by oneself; the external and the internal collide in a moment
of simultaneous recognition.

A non-ambulent person (literally) bumps into disabling barriers because her carnal
information was omitted from the blueprint that fashioned the (walkers) world. Exclusion
is everywhere and each time it is experienced, it is experienced in the form of carnal
self-recognition or `dys-appearance.

The aim of a carnal sociology of impairment is twofold: Firstly, to bring to disability

studies a sense of embodiment in the lebenswelt and, secondly, to counter,
simultaneously, phenomenologys `undersocialised approach to disability and dis-
ability studies `oversocialised approach to the experience of disability (Williams, 1996).

It is import- ant to note that norms of communication and norms of intercorporeal

interaction are a product and re ection of the carnal needs of non-disabled actors.

In the context of a social environment saturated with disablist images, attitudes and
behaviour and devoid of carnal information that re ects my corporeal status, I am
perpetually `reminded of my body.

It is often suggested that disabled people are `hyper-sensitive about non- disabled
peoples responses, reading disablism in social interactions where there may not be.
Disabled people may be `hyper-sensitive about discrimination and preju- dice, but this
is precisely because of their lived experience of a world, which does not carry their
carnal information.

Oppression and prejudice become embodied and become part of the experience
of everyday life. Oppression is not simply an abstract structure manifest, for
example, in exclusion from the labour market it is felt in the esh and the bones.
It erupts in the body as the body `dys-appears.
The disadvantaged corporeal status of impaired bodies cannot be understood
outwith the wider material and social position of disabled people, but neither can
it be divorced from the painful intimacies of the lebenswelt.

The `social competence of people with impairments is masked, not because of their
carnal performance, but because the conventions and norms of `competence are
devoid of `their carnal information. It is not my performance or the reaction to my
performance, which needs to be modi ed to prevent my exclusion, but the scripts from
which non-disabled people judge and bestow `social competence. Such an approach
suggests a radical praxis of inclusion, a struggle to carnally re-inform the codes of
timing and proprioception which structure participation in the life- world.

They are expected to, as Young (1990) put it, `scale their bodies. Such expectations
are not simple responses to impairment, they also construct it as an embodied
experience. The practices of integration and normalisation are the (kinds of) social
process, which contextualise the ob- jecti cation or dys-appearance of disabled
bodies, but these abstract processes are also felt or experienced as impairment.

The social model tells us little about the ways in which impairment is produced in the
everyday world, how oppression and discrimination become embodied and become part
of everyday reality.

The oppression produced by the norms and conventions of intercorporeal

intersubjective relations is illuminated by a reworking of Leders concept of `dys-
appearance. This provides a means of discussing the embodied experience of
impairment as an intercorporeal phenomenon. Unlike the non-impaired body
which is customarily `unaware of itself until it is confronted by pain, the impaired
body is permanently stunned into its own recognition as a consequence of the
disablism which permeates everyday life.

dCROSSLEY, N. (1995) Merleau-Ponty, the elusive body and carnal

sociology, Body & Society, 1,pp. 43 63.

TURNER, B. (1992) Regulating Bodies: essays in medical sociology

(London, Routledge).
TURNER, T. (1994) Bodies and anti-bodies: esh and fetish in contemporary
social theory, in: T.J.
CSORDAS (Ed.) Embodiment and Experience: the existential ground of
culture and self (Cam-

Hallam, Elizabeth, and Tim Ingold. "Creativity and cultural

improvisation." (2007).

HUGHES, B. (1999) The Constitution of Impairment: Modernity and the

aesthetic of oppression, Disability & Society, 14:2, 155-172, DOI:
his paper argues that impairment is constructed not discovered in the non-disabled
gaze. The invalidation and dis gurement of impaired bodies is, therefore, not simply an
economic and cultural response to them, but also arises in the mode of perception
which visualises and articulates them as strangers.

The argument challenges the contention that the oppression of disabled people is
reducible to social restrictions which are the outcome of a set of structural
determinations. It suggests that the oppression of disabled people is also umbilically
linked to the visual constitution of impairment in the scopic regime of modernity. The
vision of modernity is impaired by the assumption that to see is to know, that is, by its

This position is of particular importance with respect to the current debate within
disability studies about the relevance of impairment and the body, the neglect of which
has been a feature of the social model (Hughes & Paterson, 1997). The body has
become central to contemporary social and philosophical thought (Turner, 1996; Lowe,
1995; Shilling, 1993; Synnott, 1993 ) and its exclusion to date is usually related to the
modernist and enlightenment preoccupation with the ontological supremacy of reason
and cognition.p.3

The oppressiveness of what Sartre (1958), long before Foucault (1973), called `le
regard (the gaze) is part, for sure, of the experience of impairment but it is also
constitutive of it. In short, in this paper, I want to examine with respect to impairment
the ways in which vision is dis guring.p.3

Modernity has a particularly pervasive capacity to produce strangers; people, that is,
who disturb its fragile `cognitive, moral and aesthetic boundaries and challenge its
rather overbearing sense of order. The stranger is constructed by the limits of tolerance
and conformity, and by the tendency of modernity to homogenise and annihilate the
differences it invariably produces. These limits are constituted in both perception
through the gaze and in discourse [2]. Furthermore, the modern disciplines (including
sociology) are, themselves, key players in this game of ex- clusion (Bauman, 1997).
The stranger is conceived as a threat. She is produced by the categorising and
normalising propensities of knowledge (Foucault, 1973), and either condemned to `pass
as normal (Goffman, 1978) or wither in `total institutions (Goffman, 1968); in the, `cities
of the damned which became the modern equivalent of leprosaria.

This binary marking out of the world, rst, in the interests and `innocence of classi
cation and then (inevitably) in the name of moral order, was a key feature of nineteenth
century positive sociology. Normality and abnormality, function and dys-function were
the master categories that provided sociology with its window on the world.

For sociology, the medicalised body was an attractive way of making sense of the social
body. The former was a natural, organic object of analysable, calculable, spatio-
temporal forces and motions, in which the normal and pathologi- cal competed for

As the intellectual expression of the social movement of disabled people, the social
model of disability (Oliver, 1983) proposed a theory of disability praxis and a materialist
model of emancipation which validated and valorised the intellectual and practical
activity of disabled people themselves (Oliver, 1990). Patronage was no longer
acceptable; the stranger through collective action had discovered an autonomous
point of view and set about the task of putting an end to the hegemony of the charitable
gaze of bourgeois paternalism particularly, in its institutional forms. Disability was no
longer conceived as or reduced to (as it had been in reactionary biomedical and naive
sociological terms) a de cit of the body, but reconceptualised as a product of social
organisation or, more speci cally, as a consequence of the social relationships of
production in a capitalist society (Oliver, 1990)

The structuralist emphasis of the social model of disability leaves it poorly placed
to develop a sociological analysis of impairment and the body. The model is
dualistic since it draws a clear distinction between nature and the social, with
impairment consigned to the former domain and disability to the latter

While the production of disability, mapped out in the form of excluded spaces, disabling
barriers (Swain et al., 1993), institutional discrimination (Barnes, 1991) and op- pressive
social relationships provides the theoretical core of the social model, its vision of the
carnal, the lebenswelt and the role of impairment in the constitution of oppression is
limited by the very focus which makes it such a powerful tool of analysis.p.7

The social model does not problematise the senses. It does not problematise the visual.
It employs a correspondence theory of perception in which vision provides immediate
access to the external world. Ideas or mental representations are, thus, an exact re
ection of reality or where Marxist realism is employed to detect the structures and
essences behind phenomenal form, ideas become either scienti c (true) or ideological
(false). It is, however, this very form of knowing which privileges the ocular and the
specular as the roads to truth and assumes the innocence of perception which
underpins the constitution of impairment as invalidation.p.7

That is to say, vision is constitutive of carnal hierarchies. However, we are not dealing
simply with social divisions that are a matter of `pure perception. Vision is an act of
judgement which extends well beyond the sense that grounds it. It is a carnal point of
view which is always simultaneously a cognitive, aesthetic, moral and political point of
view. Perception and discourse are forever imbricated and `any purely aesthetic
discourse cannot itself avoid intermingling with those that it tries to exclude ethical,
cognitive or whatever (Jay, 1994, p. 516). There is no `immacu- late
perception (Nietzsche, 1961, p. 149). Bodies are not simply seen, they are also read,
and read through categories which place them in a hierarchy of bodies p.10

In post-modernity, everyday life has been aestheticised (Featherstone, 1992) to the

extent that beauty has become the template of morality and ethics (Shusterman, 1988)
and, therefore, a primary source of validation and invalidation. This context p13

Vision manipulates by `looking for, by reducing the in nite mallea- bility of the visual
eld to the order it seeks. Vision is an act of domination which seeks to control the chaos
of images. It seeks containment, boundaries, compart- ments, taxonomies of
phenomenal form, angles, homogeneity, stable relationships and, above all, the security
of binary distinctions.p.15

ze, might be the place to begin and end an emancipa- tory theory of impairment. The
vast numbers of disabled people who perished in the holocaust the ultimate example
of the emic disposal of strangers (Bauman, 1991) is testimony, in the extreme, to the
appalling intolerance of modernity, to the ways in which `mythic truths about the moral
order of bodies can be pressed into the service of genocide. The power of the eye, of
ocularcentric modernity, to classify bodies as human or inhuman, reached its nadir the
peak of its indifference to difference in those monuments to Aryan perfection and order
which became known as the gas chambers. p.16

The constitution of impairment as invalidation and dis gurement is reiterated in the

visual dynamics of this milieu and its tyrannies are acted out in the everyday experience
of people with impairments.

BARNES, C. (1996) Theories of disability and the origins of the oppression of

disabled people in western society


Elizabeth Hallam & Tim Ingold (eds.), Creativity and Cultural Improvisation. Berg.
pp. 1--24 (2007)
in our view anthropology can best contribute to debates around creativity by
challenging- rather than reproducing- the polarity between novelty and convention, or
between the innovative dynamic of the present and the traditionalism of the past, that
has long formed such powerful undercurrent to the discourses of modernity

the difference between improvisation and innovation, then, is not that the one work
within established convention while the other breaks with it, but that the former
characterizes creativity by way of its processes, the latter by way of its products

Neither natural selection nor an intelligent designer can build a real organism, any more
than the modern architect can build a real house. The belief that in the building of a
house or the growth of an organism or more generally, in the activities by which living
beings of all kinds, human
and nonhuman, sustain themselves in their environments nothing is created that
was not designed in advance, preexisting in virtual form the processes that give rise
to it, is deeply rooted in modern thought. p.4

However, just as natural selection can no more build a real organism than can an
architect build a real house, so no amount of memejuggling, intentional or otherwise,
can build a real human being. Real people, as the living organisms they are, continually
create themselves and one another, forging their histories and traditions as they go
Improvisation is Relationa p.5

Improvisation is relational, then, because it goes on along ways of life that are as
entangled and mutually responsive as are the paths of pedestrians on the street. And by
the same token, the creativity it manifests is not distributed among all the individuals of
a society as an agency that each is supposed to possess a priori an internal capacity
of mind to come up with intentions and to act upon them, causing effects in the vicinity
(Gell 1999: 16-17) but rather lies in the dynamic potential of an entire field of
relationships to bring forth the persons situated in it

Now in the first sense, the meanings of creativity and agency coincide in the
notion of the doing of the person.

Only when we look back, searching for antecedents for new things, do ideas
appear as the spontaneous creations of an isolated mind encased in a body,
rather than way stations along the trails of living beings, moving through a
122. R315 Z212
194. R315 Z215
306.461 E515


P-creative H-creative

o repeating system in the living world can be perfect, and it is precisely because
imperfections in the system call for continual correction that all repetition involves
improvisation. That is why life is rhythmic rather then metronomic, for the essence of
rhythm, as the philosopher Henri Lefebvre has shown in his essay on Rhythmanalysis,
lies in the movements and differences within repetition, rather than in repetition per se
(Lefebvre 2004: 90) p.10

Our argument that creativity is a process that living beings undergo as they make their
ways through the world carries a corollary of capital importance. It is that this process is
going on, all the time, in the circulations and fluxes of the materials that surround us and
indeed of which we are made of the earth we stand on, the water that allows it to
bear fruit, the air we breathe, and so on. These materials are life giving, and their
movements, mixtures and bindings are creative in themselves. The ancients knew this
when they derived the term material
p._11_from mater, meaning mother (Allen I998: 177). And they knew, too, that even
the generation of ideas involves sweat, blood and tears when they extended the
meaning of the verb to conceive from the development of an embryo in the womb to
that of ideas in the mind.

Our claim is not just that life is unscripted, but more funda- mentally, that it is
unscriptable. Or to put it another way, it cannot be fully codified as the output of any
system of rules and representations. This is because life does not pick its way across
the surface of a world where everything is fixed and in its proper place, but is a
movement through a world that is crescent. To keep on going, it has to be open and
responsive to continually changing environmental conditionsp.12

Rather, each is simultaneously a followingthrough of the one before and a

preparation for the one following. Their order is processional rather than successional
(Ingold 2006a: 67).
about walking

So far we have focused on the ways in which the idea of creativity enters con-
temporary discussions of making and doing things, of innovation and tradition,
and of the generativity of social and cultural processes p.15

As we have already noted, Western views of creativity are associated with modernity,
allowing Liep (2001), for instance, to link intensified interest in forms of creativity with
economic changes that assign high value to innovation in the production of new
commodities. In the context of late modernity Liep defines creativity as a form of cross
fertilization that occurs with the fusion of disparate cultural configurations (ibid.: 12).
Creativity and improvisation have also been interpreted as modes of response to rapid
social and technological change associated with modernization in different contexts (for
example, Volkman l994) p.16

Thus in the medieval popular imagery of the grotesque we find a fusion rather than a
division between the combinatorial assembly of hybrid forms and the processual
generation of a world of movement and becoming. The classical aesthetics of the
Renaissance, however, brought a shift of emphasis in conceptions of the body, away
from principles of flux and generativity, towards a notion of the completed, clearly
bounded body of the individual separated from the world. As Stallybrass and White
(1986) have shown, the canon of the classical body, with stable boundaries, underwrote
the formation of individual identity throughout the seventeenth century p.18
we suggest, be correlated with changing understandings of what it means to create:
from a formulation in which to create is to be part of an ongoing process, to one that
reads back from the finished product to the capacity that produced it. And as this
capacity became more closely associated, in the eighteenth century, with individual
agency and builtin human faculties, a further differentiation took place: anything
defined as truly creative had to be original rather than derivative or copied (Pope
2005). To create, thenceforth, was to orchestrate discontinuity rather than to participate
in a constantly emerging process.

Improvisation and creativity, we contend, are intrinsic to the very processes of social
and cultural life. The chapters that follow highlight the creative dynamic of cultural
processes: the extent to which cultural forms are produced and reproduced, rather than
merely replicated and transmitted, through active and experimental engagement over
time and in the
generation of persons within their social and material environments.p19

Allen, N. (1998), The category of substance: a Maussian theme revisited, in

W. James and N.J. Allen (eds), Marcel Mauss: A Centenary Tribute, New York:
Berghahn Books.
Improvisation and the Art of Making Things Stick Karin Barber

This is not so much (or not only) because, as Bascom thought, performance genres are
a privileged place where there is more innovation and creativity, but because the effort
to give form here has a reflexive, demonstrative dimension in which its own processes
are, as it were, brought to the surface.

Richard Bauman (1977) speaks of the severe limitations a textcentered approach

imposes on the study of oral verbal art. Performance can never be text, in Edward
Schieffelins view, for performativity is located at the creative, improvisatory edge of
practice in the moment it is carried out , whereas texts are changeless and
enduring (Schieffelin 1998: 198-9). Dwight Conquergood elegantly sums up the
opposition as a war
us 97 cc
of vocabulary, where the benign forces of improvisation, flow , process, as cc
participation , embodiment, and dialogue are ranged against the enemy lexicon
fixity, structure, objectification, reification, system, distance, and
detachment (Conquergood 1989). p.29

p. 42****************************************
Introduction Tim Ingold

Thus the creativity of evolution, for Dobzhansky, lay in what he called the antichance
factor of selection, working on the raw material of variation supplied by chance. What
are created, however, are not living organisms, but rather designs for life that are
subsequently realized in the forms we actually observe. Every new form of life that
appears in evolution, writes Dobzhansky, can, with only moderate semantic license, be
regarded as an artistic embodiment of a new concept of living (Dobzhansky 1974: 329).
I return below to the
analogy between the organism and the work of art p.46

For the world we inhabit is not made up of static and discrete bits and pieces that may
be connected up in myriad ways into everchanging patterns. It is rather a movement,
or flow, in which every element we might identify is but a moment. Creativity, for
Whitehead, lay in that very movement of becoming by which the world, as it unfolds,
continually surpasses itself.
to go on creating themselves endlessly (to borrow Bergsons words)

As Bergson said of the work of art, so one could also say of the kampi klam, that it
embodies the process of thinking rather than the detached thought, a consciousness
rather than a conception, life itself rather than a way of living (Ingold 1986: 182).p.49
And so, too, is a calligraphic exemplar every time it is performed with the brush. No
performance can be repeated, yet as a work comprises the accumulating trail of its
performances each one copying the copy of a copy every performance becomes
part and parcel of the ever
evolving work.p.51

This agency could be none other than the generative flux of the world itself in its
continual concrescence, from which persons and things emerge and take the forms they
do for the duration of their existence. Thus the ko'lam is the outline of a movement that
is as much creative of the practitioner as of the pattern, the calligraphic trace captures
the momentary confluence of hair, soot and morning dew in the sweep of a brush, and
in Reite a new song comes to a man through his susceptibility to the generative
power of the ground in a particular place.p.52

More generally, what these chapters show is that humans do not, through their
interventions, transform the world from without, but rather belonging within it
play their part in the world is creative transformation of itself.


Performing the World: Agency, Anticipation and Creativity

Kirsten Hastrup p.193

In this chapter I shall explore a set of theoretical issues related to the way in which
social worlds are performed; by this I mean that social worlds have no existence outside
of practice and performance however much they seem to be systematic in some
sense or other. By their unique and
unrepeatable acts, people actually contribute to a perceived pattern; social life is
routinely choreographed by the ceremonial animal (James 2003)
Agency: The Eventness of Being

df The challenge now is to highlight the occurrence of life and the variety of ways in
which people construct their reality with time in anticipation of an outcome or in the
interest of invention. Social life and individual action are closely intertwined with
anticipation and creativity. Let us start with the observation that living is essentially
unrepeatable; borrowing a term from Mikhail M. Bakhtin (1993), one could claim that the
essence of being is its eventnessp.194

The events exist only in the moment of their realization and our experience

To acknowledge the eventness of being is to acknowledge the undivided experience of

meaning and action as a social fact. The eventness of being gives new substance to the
idea that being is becoming

Ones identity is not dependent on being always the same, but on being consistently
true to oneself and being able to incorporate new experiences (Ricoeur 1992). All of a
persons actions, including those performed against better judgement, contribute to his
or her character. The general point is that the self has no essence, only character,
emerging from ones actions not the other way round (Hastrup 2004a).

The emergent nature of character and the eventness of being shed a peculiar
light on the relationship between self and time, which in a sense are but abstract
notions for agent and action

Agency points to the power to act responsibly within a particular social world certainly
not exclusive to Western subjects with a View to both past and future. p.195

Intentionality has to be separated from agency (Singer 1993: 44ff.). Intentional

subjectivity often resorts to the metaphor of will, which displaces agency from the
social to the individual domain. The agent may refer to intentionality in describing the
action, but it is a description that includes the consequence of the act, and hence
cannot be taken as its cause Attribution of intention provides a justification, while
attribution of agency is an assignment of responsibility (Davidson 1980: 48) p.196

Characterization is secondary to plot because it is included only for the sake of the
actions; in other words, the actions are not there to portray the characters. We cannot
fail to notice the likeness to social life in general: we do not act in our daily lives in order
to portray ourselves, but through our actions our character stands out, more or less

Action is never simply a reaction to what has already happened; it is also a mode of
acting upon anticipation. Agency in this sense, I would argue, is closely tied to a vision
of plot, to the anticipation of a story, a line of future development. It is a profound matter
of responding; response being made within a moral horizon and within a social context
that we interpret and project forward as we go along. Anticipation is also
potentiation (Strathern 1992: l78).p.199

The creative agent is one of those gifted individuals who have bent the culture in the
direction of their own capacities, as Ruth Benedict has phrased it (1932: 26), echoing
Sapir, who suggested that creation is a bending of form to ones will, not the
manufacture of form ex nihilo (Sapir 1924: 418)

Creative agency brings the unprecedented into effect by way of imaginative power and
thus expands the communitys awareness of itself. The expansion is possible due to the
inherent flexibility of the social. Bateson has defined flexibility as uncommitted potential
for change (1972: 497); and I would argue that all social worlds have such uncommitted

such incontinent actions show the potential crack in individual agency and the creative
surplus in any moment. We may add to our understanding of this crack if we consider
the proposition made by Donald Davidson (1980: 43ff.) that the identification of an
action involves a third event which is where irony, individuality and unpredictability
reside. Agency plays accordion between intention and consequence p.201

Once we describe particular events or speak of agency, we incorporate a good many

things that have little to do with the simple bodily act, and much to do with ways of
perceiving oneself in social space in a constant process of reorientation through actual
social performance. I would suggest that creativity resides in the ability to play the
accordion to act without incorporating an anticipated consequence into the
perception of the action, or to make the event break free of the frame while still allowing
it to be recognized. p 201

Imagination: The Link Between Action and History p. 202

Gaston Bachelard suggested that A phenomenology of imagination must do away with

all intermediaries . . . it is not a question of observing but of experiencing being in its
immediacy (Bachelard 1994: xx)p.201

Davidson, D. (1980), Essays on Actions and Events

Sweeney, R. D. (2010). Arts, language and hermeneutical aesthetics: Interview

with Paul Ricoeur (1913-2005). Philosophy & Social Criticism, 36(8), 935-951.

Responding to the interlocutors, Ricoeur, utilizing Kantian aesthetic theory,

addresses the nature of the work of art, its universality and communicability, and
explores its temporality its transhistoricity by utilizing concepts derived from
medieval philosophy, including sempiternality and monstration. He expands on
hermeneutics, defends it against charges of relativism, expatiates on the danger
of aestheticism, and explains the value of mimesis in art. He explores the
different art forms, focusing with Merleau-Ponty on Ce z anne as a model of the
ipseity of the artist; and he dwells particularly on the singularity of music and its
pathic moods. A discussion of literature culminates in an emphasis on the
special importance of Holocaust texts.

The great force of the Kantian solution is to have staked everything on the idea of
communicability. Commu- nicability is the modality of the universal without concepts; it
is a matter of a powder train, of contagion from one case to another. And what is thus
communicated? It is not the rule, nor the case, but the play between understanding and

One could say that the work of art escapes the history of its constitution, and it is this
temporality of a second degree which constitutes the temporality of communicability.
This transhistorical
communicability is the rational equivalent of objectivity, as much in the beautiful as in
the sublime. To continue in this direction would require analysing the specific tempor-
ality of the work of art, which Kant has not done.p.936-2

The medievals had forged, to this effect, the concept of the perennial, of the
sempiternal. Here there is more than an approximation but a kind of profound kinship
with the status of angels in the great medieval tradition but also one which holds for
multiple periods and the idea of a species with one single individual. And in short the
work of art is a species with one single individual.937-3

the connection with an amateur, in the strong sense of the word, for it is on the side of
the receiver of the work of art that there is revealed another historicity, that of the
reception. It is perhaps the historicity of the reception that we can decipher best, thanks
to the constitution of permanences across their historicity: as if the work of art created
for itself a temporally open and indefinite public.

monstration, the fact that a work of art aims, beyond the intentionality of its author, and
insofar as it is a work of art, to be shared, therefore first of all to be shown. One can
then return to the arts one by one in order to show in what way each exhibits its
monstravity, its capacity to be shared between the creator and his public. Then there
would certainly be the need to distinguish, as Henri Gouhier3 has done, between the
arts of one time and the arts of two times, those where the existence of the work
coincides with its creation painting and sculpture, for example and those where the
existence of the work requires a second time, which is that of its re-creation: theatrical
represen- tation, musical execution, choreographic realization

The question that one can ask basically is this: where is the work of art? What is its
ontological place, where does it exist? When there is no reception, when it sleeps
during decades, the work exists, but where?
I would say that it exists only in its capacity for monstration . . .

With respect to your thesis on communicability, one notices from the point of view of
monstration or reception that all the great works of art have been incommunicable in a
certain manner or have not been received at the beginning . . .
Yes, there is a temporal turning point to be introduced, which is the lag in reception; and
there is doubtless something specific to the work of art: its prophetic character, in this
sense that, breaking with the values of utility and commercial values, the transcen-
dence of the work of art is affirmed in opposition to that utility that itself is exhausted in
the historical. It is the capacity to transcend immediate utility that characterizes the work
of art in this capacity for multiple and indefinite reinscription. One could say that in the
arts of two times the moment of the sempiternal is in the withdrawal of the libretto and
the script, but the temporal test is in monstration. The capacity for a monstration
renewed endlessly, as being always other although the same, constitutes the link
between the sem- piternal and the historical; perhaps here is the most pregnant
temporal mark of the work of art.

Are you not then on the way to pointing out the mystery of creation and of arts as
interpretation of the world? One has been able to inerpret the work of art in a reduction-
ist manner as refraction, product, reflex, mimesis, etc., of what exists already, and so we
have all the sociological or anthropological theories which lead the work of art back to
the conditions of its production: the market, habit, the social field, the socio-cultural
environment, impulses, even the air of the time or the style. Thus the work of art would
be the expression of what already exists. There you have archeology. It would seem
that you are rather in the inverse position, that of teleology, where the work of art is an
end, an ahead, a project to make happen in the sense understood by Ernst Bloch.p.5

To return to Kant, it is striking to see that he was very severely at a loss to situate
genius in relation to the beautiful and the sublime, because there always remains some-
thing of the retrospective in the judgment of taste, whereas the beautiful creates anew. I
am interested in this problem, either by way of metaphor8 or else from narrative, within
the theme of semantic innovation. In both cases, the idea emerges of a new meaning
which had not been there. Thus metaphor is the capacity to produce a new meaning, at
the flashpoint where a semantic incompatibility collapses in the confrontation of sev-
eral levels of meaning, to produce a new meaning which exists only in the breaking-up
of the semantic field

To combine multiple events, causalities, finalities and contingencies, is to produce a

new meaning which is the plot.9 Each plot is singular and has exactly the status of the
work of art according to Kant: the singularity capable of being shared.

The Poetics of Aristotle, underscores this: to make metaphors well is to have an insight
into resemblance. This insight into resemblance allows one to read resemblance where
one did not see it. In sum it creates a resemblance which one can no longer not see.p.

On condition of sharply distinguishing mimesis from copy. Here there is, indeed, a
considerable historical weight. Kant himself says it apropos of genius when he distin-
guishes between Nachahmung (imitation) and Folge (following), servile imitation and
exemplary legacy.11 It is not necessary, he says, to repeat the ancients, but to follow
them. We dont have another word for following in French, unless following (suivance) is
opposed to repetition.

In the pages I devoted to the aesthetic experience at the end of Critique and

Here one could take up again the analyses of Merleau-Ponty on Ce zanne.16 In

painting the problem itself is singular: it is the conjunc- tion, in the same quest, of color,
form and light, and this combination is singular each time. What would appear to me to
be ineffable, I would put not in each painting, but in what has provoked it, namely, if we
take the example of Ce zanne, in this constant return to the object of painting, as if there
were something inexhaustible to be said.p.9

Akerman, S., & Ouellette, S. C. (2012). What Ricoeurs hermeneutics reveal about
self and identity and aesthetic experience. Theory & Psychology, 22(4), 383-401.

By analyzing eminent artists depictions of their experiences as taken from too-long-

neglected interviews with Sigmund Koch and juxtaposing these with Ricoeurs
regressive and progressive hermeneutics and contemporary concerns in narrative
psychology, the authors open new avenues of inquiry into self, identity, and art. Using
interviews with Toni Morrison and Arthur Miller, they demonstrate how the creative
process involves a concurrent interrogation and dislocation of the self, as well as a
moral responsibility to a collective other. While the artists engage in regressive and
progressive processes in their art, they also engage in the same processes in telling
about their lives and their art. These enable transformative experiences for an artists
sense of self and identity as well as the genesis of creative work. The regressive and
progressive processes hold true not only for Toni Morrison and Arthur Miller, but also for
other artists and individuals negotiating the long-term tasks of development.

Sigmund Koch in the 1980s, in which he engaged 12 eminent artists in interviews about
their lives, the process and content of their work, and it

While Benson speaks of the perceivers of art, we believe that his point is equally rele-
vant to the creators of art. In the current paper, we argue that the transformative poten-
tial in creative activity demands a conception of self that is at least partially built around
the loss of the self.
we find that artists serve as models for us all as they draw upon the past and transcend
it both to lose and to reconstruct the self and identity.

Understanding the pro- gressive aspect of the method is rooted in phenomenology, in

which the goal is to grasp the subjective meaning of ones experience in the creation of
social or cultural phenom- ena.

, Ricoeur (1970) observes, The work of art is also a fortda, a disappear- ance of the
archaic object as fantasy and its reappearance as a cultural object (p. 314)

What conflicts does the artist address? What events from the earlier part of the artists
life is she or he trying to transform

Henriksson, C., & Saevi, T. (2009). " An Event in Sound" Considerations on the
Ethical-Aesthetic Traits of the Hermeneutic Phenomenological Text.
Phenomenology & Practice, 3(1).

In this article, we discuss some of the linguistic features of hermeneutic-

phenomenological writing and, in so doing, we point to the close connection between
lived experience and the ethical-aesthetic traits of writing the experience. Our
exploration starts by contemplating texts written by the so-called Utrecht School. We
reflect on their orientation as it has been understood, developed, and advocated by Max
van Manen. The literary style of the Utrecht orientation is sometimes misunderstood and
questioned. This article aims to explicate why and how hermeneutic
phenomenology needs an expressive language to write the lived experience
rather than to simply write about the lived experience. Lived experiences are
always past experiences that we try to bring into the present, and so the difference
between recollections and memories are discussed in connection to writing the
experience. We argue that what is being told and not seen is, metaphorically speaking,
an event in sound, which can have ethical and aesthetic virtues of truth and beauty.
Lived experiences, whether written as anecdotes or as other kinds of experiential
accounts, can shine forth through the use of expressive language. But is this kind of
language poetry? Can such an account be regarded as poetic writing? If it is poetic
writing, exactly how does it differ from academic writing? Our exploration of questions
like these leads us to the tentative conclusion that, as hermeneutic phenomenological

We employ the notion of the anecdote when we explore the linguistic features of writing
the experience. When we move from writing the experience to the raw material provided
by informants, we employ the term lived-experience description (van Manen, 1997b)
interchangeably with experiential account

Our endeavor to understand begins in the world of aesthetics.

Even today, the concept of the beautiful has significance for contemporary
methodology of the human sciences. The original Greek word kalon translates to fine,
as in the fine arts. The adjective fine distinguishes these arts from natural sciences
and human sciences. In fine art the art itself is not beautiful, but is called so because it
produces the beautiful, Heidegger claims (2001, p. 35). How does fine art produce
what is beautiful? Heidegger demonstrates to us that a piece of art can bring into
nearness the nature of a thinga pair of shoes, for example (van Gogh, 1885). By
unveiling the shoe-ness of the shoes, the painting, in its beauty, sets to work the truth
about shoes. Under Heidegger's and van Goghs guidance, we perceive a pair of worn-
out shoes, shabby and dirty from daily toil and the workers contact with water, soil and

In the fine arts, beauty is exactly this unconcealedness and disclosure. Its appearance
is related to the idea of shining. The verb to shine requires something to shine upon.
Thus, to shine means to make that on which the light falls appear. Since this light falls in
the realms of both the visible and the intelligible, shining also brings into appearance the
meaning of phenomena upon which this light has fallen (Gadamer, 1985).

A piece of art is not beautiful because it is enjoyable, admirable or precious, but

because of its essential ability to let truth happen, which means to reveal the isness of
what is (2001, p. 79) (HEIDEGGER)

Language speaks in the anecdote

When a well-written phenomenological text establishes a relationship with the reader

language is no longer an instrument, no longer a means. It is a manifestation, a
revelation of intimate being and of the psychic link which unites us to the world and our
fellow men, (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, p. 196). p.4
By linking the poetic word with everyday speech as an intensification of the
latter (Gadamer, 1985, p. 470), hermeneutic phenomenology lets us see the
phenomenon as it shines forth. By interpreting insights, phenomenology serves as a
deeper understanding of meanings. Although phenomenological inquiry, as experience
itself, lacks fulfilment (Kuhns, 1970, p. 68), a systematic and intersubjective
methodological phenomenology concerns itself with the same questions, and also
structures experience in the same way as art. p.7

The experience has meaning for us and we express that meaning in language. Merleau-
Ponty urges us to trust our experience of the worl

The texts written by the Utrecht School could be described as distilled, refined accounts
of lived experiences, and as such, they shine forth by the light of subjectivity. The mere
use of words such as beauty, light, and shine points us to the intrinsic and enigmatic
relation between the experience and the expression of the same, and between
description and interpretation, all of which are embedded in the elusiveness of
language. Gadamer (2002) sees a connection between the concept of intuition and that
of vividness, since intuition (as an aesthetic problem) cannot be understood merely from
an epistemological standpoint. Rather it is related to the free play of imagination and
cognition. Gadamer (2002) asserts: p.9

As a result, phenomenological telling is retrospective, looking beyond or behind what is

currently at hand, distinguishing between appearance and essence, facticities and facts.

The memory, which came through what van den Berg calls a back entrance, did not
come as a temporal single fact or recollection of a time past, it came as a corporeal,
spatial, relational and concentrated lived experience which pervaded his whole being.
The essence of the memory was me, Proust says p.10 8p.44)
o memorize has the original meaning of commit to writing and that is precisely the task
of phenomenology; we ask our informants to memorize, to recall a specific moment, a
moment that we then try to capture in writing.

When a phenomenological text speaks to us, like a poem or a novel does, it is because
it evokes in us recognition or thoughts which are new and at the same time conversant.
Heideggers (2001) persistent experience that language speaks (p. 188) somehow
puts the human being in a position where he or she becomes a witness to the act of
writing. Language calls things into nearness and each thing presents and represents a
whole world of meaning

Phenomenological writing is the practice of going beyond what is immediately apparent

by directing attention to the is-ness of what is there. As such, writing phenomenology is
the approval of perceptive and linguistic non-transparency. Furthermore, writing is the
transitional practice of letting human experience pass beyond the abstract, conceptual,
cognitive condition of a traditional scientific practice in order to let experience
reverberate immediately beyond everything we think we already know.p.20

Wright, C., & Schneider, A. (2010). Introduction. Between art and anthropology:
contemporary ethnographic practice. Berg.

so the contemporary artworld has arguably anaesthetized some of the affects of colour
perceptions within the restricted spaces of artificially white cubes

of course within visual practice and within anthropology there is always the potential to
explore the sensual possibilities of the chosen medium in relation to the affects on
audiences while also being critically aware of the artificial construction of
representations. p.2

The contributions that we have invited for this book address those intenspace: between
art and anthropology with a view to plotting some of the recent interaction: and
appropriations that have moved between the two fields, as well as hopefully suggesting
jumping off points for further work - both practical and academic. Lucy Lippard writes
about artists who work directly with communities and thus directly reflect issues around
the kinds of relations involved in such embedded projects and socially engaged
conversation art, which are significant for future art anthro pology dialogues.p.4

an anthropological practice with artists not of artists

art practice with anthropologist

It is not just that art is one large unco- ordinated research programme but that the
relations between practitioners, and their research partners become the agents and
producers of knowledge. p.12

Surely, then, the whole structure and process of fieldwork and interaction with esearch
subjects in anthropology needs rethinking, and this is where a lot can be earned from
more open- ended,complete procedures in the arts. As it now stands, he formal
requirements push the expression of the alternative discussion of research

Farther afield (Lippard, L. (2010) en [pp-23-

Going in the other direction, the one that interests me, it was really conceptual art in the
mid 1960s that brought social disciplines into high art on a more encompassing level,
leaving objects behind and looking at cultural structures and processes. In the 19703
feminists confronted patriarchal culture by taking conceptual art into the personal
realm.And in the 19805 and 19905, postmodernists picked up the ball, rarely
acknowledging who had passed it to them. p.25
The universality presumed of high art is the opposite of real communityb. works,
Which, as Ferdinand Lewis notes, are made for 21 particular moment, place audience
about how history has shaped a particular population's ability to liv a specific place at a
time ...While all art includes its audience (and critics) subjective experience, arts based
civic dialogue also implicates them? p.28



En este artculo doy cuenta de las representaciones de la Edusex en Colombia durante

la dcada 1990-2000. Este periodo de tiempo es relevante porque en esta lapso de
tiempo la
Edusex surgi en el pas bajo esta denominacin particular y se caracteriz como un
componente propio del mbito educativo; aunque tambin de responsabilidad paternal
y familiar; todo ello en medio de una controversia que determin rutas posibles -e
improbables- para la realizacin misma de la Edusex.

p.2 par.2 la puntuacin es una parte interesante pero la puntuacin creo puede hacerlo

p.4.par.2 noticias con que se acompa


En este artculo relaciono la categora Edusex y sus subcategoras porque lo que

pretendo es dar cuenta del surgimiento de esta nominacin y las caracterizaciones de
sus mismas condiciones de posibilidad

edusex el nacimiento de una contradiccin

70's En estos tres artculos la educacin sexual se relacion como un conocimiento

experto, asignado al campo mdico y demogrfico que incumba al mbito privado de la
vida familiar y en el que la Iglesia Catlica influa

90's Aunque la Edusex an no era un mandato oficial an, en los primeros aos de esta
dcada ya circulaban y se convocaban intereses relacionados con un tipo particular de
formacin sexual que era objeto, adems, de incertidumbre y preocupacin: la
sexualidad de los jvenes.
despus de la sentencia y la competencia educativa
Una de las particularidades de esta posibilidad no solo ampli el espectro de
pertinencia y accin de la Edusex a la sociedad y la direccion sobre nios y jvenes,
sino que convoc una materialidad particular para ejercer su accin: el cuerpo como
agente de interacciones, vinculaciones y probabilidades.
a) Un asunto integral para la formacin de...
b) Un proceso de discernimiento
c) Una responsabilidad de padres
d) Un proyecto educativo

Finalmente, se seal que la institucin escolar es el espacio propicio para que nios y
jvenes reflexionen sobre la sexualidad (El Tiempo, 1999, 5C).

IV. Beneficios: de cuidados morales y corporales a la formacin de los afectos

p.17 Ntese que este posicionamiento favorece derechos fundamentales como la

libertad de pensamiento mientras da respuesta y plantea soluciones a un problema de
desinformacin que tiene repercusiones sociales y personales.

V. Peligro!, para gozar y pasarla bueno?

J. Gary Knowles & Ardra L. Cole. (2012). Arts-Informed Research -In: Handbook
of the Arts in Qualitative Research: Perspectives, Methodologies, Examples, and
Issues. SAGE

we turned our attention to the relationship between art and research and the
possibilities inherent in infusing processes and representational forms of the arts into
social science inquiry

The central purposes of arts- informed research are to enhance understanding of the
human condition through alternative (to conventional) processes and representational
forms of inquiry, and to reach multiple audiences by making scholarship more
accessible. The methodology infuses the languages, processes, and forms of literary,
visual, and performing arts with the expansive possibilities of scholarly inquiry for
purposes of advancing knowledge (Cole, 2001, 2004; Cole & Knowles, 2001;Knowles &
Cole, 2002). Researchers working in this way might explicitly ground the processes and
representational forms in one or several of the arts (see, e.g., Cole, Neilsen, Knowles, &
Luciani, 2004; Knowles, Luciani, Cole, & Neilsen, 2007; Neilsen, Cole, & Knowles,

(see, e.g., Halifax, 2002; Rykov, 2006; Thomas, 2004)

The selected art form or forms serve to frame and define the inquiry process and text.

That is, the processes of art making inform the inquiry in ways congruent with the
artistic sensitivities and technical (artistic) strengths of the researcher in concert with the
overall spirit and purpose of the inquiry.

the centrality of audience engagement. The use of the arts in research is not for art's
sake. It is explicitly tied to moral purposes of social responsibility and epistemological
equity. Thus, the research text is intended to involve the reader/audience in an active
process of meaning making that is likely to have transformative potential. Relying on the
power of art to both inform and engage, the research text is explicitly intended to evoke
and provoke emotion, thought, and action. p.10

The aesthetic element reflects how central principles upheld in a variety of art forms
internal consistency and coherence, clarity and quality, authenticity and sincerity,
evocation and resonancecombine to contribute to the beauty of the work. Attending to
aesthetics of form does not necessarily mean that researchers identify themselves as
artists or have extensive background or experience in arts production. It does mean,
though, that the researcher-as-artist must make a commitment to learning how the
aesthetic elements of an art form can inform a research project.p.11-12

Members of the general public responded through written comments and audiotape-
recorded stories

Nevertheless, like all research, studies following arts-informed research methodology

must be subjected to scrutiny to assess, and perhaps help to explain, their worth or
value as research. A broad assessment is guided by the two general questions: How do
the arts inform the research process, and how do the arts inform the research

1. arts-informed research has both a clear intellectual purpose and moral purpose.
Ultimately, the research must stand for something. Arts-informed research
representations, then, are not intended as titillations but as opportunities for
transformation, revelation, or some other intellectual and moral shift

2. he researcher is present through an explicit reflexive self-accounting; her presence is

also implied and felt, and the research text

3. The power and beauty of her work reflects rigorous attention to the aesthetic qualities
of each art form and, in turn, how the art forms combine in an aesthetic whole. The
quality of the artistic elements of an arts-informed research project is defined by how
well the artistic process and form serve research goals. Attention to the aesthetics of a
particular genre are, therefore, important; aesthetics of form are integrally tied to

4. imbued with an internal consistency and coherence that represents a strong and
seamless relationship between purpose and method (process and form). The research
text also evidences a high level of authenticity that speaks to the truthfulness and
sincerity of the research relationship, process of inquiry, interpretation, and
representational form

5. Research that maximizes its communicative potential addresses concerns about the
accessibility of the research account usually through the form and language in which it
is written, performed, or otherwise presented

6. The knowledge advanced in arts-informed research is generative rather than

propositional and based on assumptions that reflect the multidimensional, complex,
dynamic, intersubjective, and contextual nature of human experience

7. Sound and rigorous arts-informed work has both theoretical potential and
transformative potential. The former acknowledges the centrality of the So What?
question and the power of the inquiry work to provide insights into the human condition,
while the latter urges researchers to imagine new possibilities for those whom the work
is about and for

R. J. Pelias. (2012). Performative Inquiry: Embodiment and Its Challenges. In:

Handbook of the Arts in Qualitative Research: Perspectives, Methodologies,
Examples, and Issues
Edited by: J. Gary Knowles & Ardra L. Cole Pub.


Second, scholars have called upon performance as a generative vocabulary for

understanding human behavior. In this sense, people are best seen not as homo
sapiens or homo luden, but as homo histrioperforming creatures who are created and
maintained through enactment, through doing what they do.

scholars have operated from the assumption that performance itself is a way of
knowing. This claim, axiomatic for performers, rests upon a faith in embodiment, in the
power of giving voice and physicality to words, in the body as a site of knowledge.

It finds its epistemological and ontological heart in performers enacting their own or
others' words on stage. In short, performative inquiry, from this perspective, is an
embodied practicep.2

I trace how embodiment entails a knowing, participatory, empathic, and political

body. Next, I turn to three representative forms (literature in performance, performance
ethnography, and autobiographical performance) to show a range of embodied inquiry
and to point toward their respective methodological demands.

It is useful to remember, however, that not all bodies move through the world in a similar
manner. Some bodies possess limited agility, some not; some live in constant pain,
some not; some feel disassociated from a sense of self, some not; some bodies are
labeled disabled, some not. Regardless of the performer's body, embodied practice calls
upon the performer to employ a knowing, participatory, empathic, and political body.
Each of these bodies is necessarily implicated in any performative act and, hence, is
fundamental to performative inquiry.

the performer relies upon the body as a location of knowledge.

Conquergood's scheme is a reminder that in any act of embodiment there is always a

political body. All performance is ideologically laden. Performers' bodies are not neutral.
They carry, among other markers, their gender, sexuality, ableness, class, race, and
ethnicity with themp.4

Embodiment, then, is an intensely sensuous way of knowing (Conquergood, 1991, p.

180). The experiencing body, situated in culture, is its methodological center.

As Conquergood (1991) puts it, performative inquiry privileges particular, participatory,

dynamic, intimate, precarious, embodied experience grounded in historical process,
contingency, and ideology (p. 187).

Performance ethnography places cultural understandings on stage. Performers,

following ethnographic procedures, gather data from the field, but instead of turning that
data into a traditional written report, they script and stage their findings. Informed by the
early work of Turner (1986) and Schechner (1993), performance ethnographers believe
that the rich array of cultural practices can best be represented, not on the page, but
through embodied presentation. By presenting cultural others on stage, performers
display living bodies who participate in the ongoing process of making culture

Autobiographical performance
More often than not, it features texts of exceptional wit, extraordinary events, and/or
oppressed or historical individuals. As for the performance ethnographer, the
autobiographical performer engages in a process of selection and shaping, of deciding
what to share.

This suggests that what the body knows requires critical reflection, a constant ethical
testing, a reflexive turn.

When speaking with, performers engage in a dialogue, an ongoing conversation

between a performer and another, even though the performer may be the only speaker.
Instead of suggesting what is, dialogic performance stages what might be.

Elizabeth de Freitas. (2012). Interrogating Reflexivity: Art, Research, and the

Desire for Presence
In: Handbook of the Arts in Qualitative Research: Perspectives, Methodologies,
Examples, and
Issues Edited by: J. Gary Knowles & Ardra L. Cole SAGE Publications, Inc.

Barndt, D. (2012). Touching Minds and Hearts: Community Arts as Collaborative

In: Handbook of the Arts in Qualitative Research: Perspectives, Methodologies,
Examples, and
Edited by: J. Gary Knowles & Ardra L. Cole Cole SAGE Publications, Inc.

Cancienne, M. B.(20129 From Research Analysis to Performance: The Choreographic
In: Handbook of the Arts in Qualitative Research: Perspectives, Methodologies,
Examples, and

Csordas, T. J. (Ed.). (1994). Embodiment and experience: The existential ground

of culture and self (Vol. 2). Cambridge University Press.

Also, if indeed the body is passing through a critical historical moment, this moment also
offers a critical methodological oppor- tunity to reformulate theories of culture, self, and
experience, with the body at the center of analysis

A premise of much of this literature is what we might call an analytic body that invites a
discrete focus on perception, practice, parts, processes, or products. By perception I
mean the cultural uses and conditioning of the five external senses plus proprioception
(our sense of being in a body and oriented in space), as well what Kant (1978 [1800])
called the inner sense of intuition or sensibility.

This postmodern pro- liferation itself again begs the essentialist question of whether
there is in fact any such thing as the body whether the body is more than the sum of
its topics. The paradoxical truth, in fact, appears to be that if there is an essential
characteristic of embodiment, it is indeterminacy (Merleau-Ponty 1962; Csordas 1993).

Mary Douglas (1973) called attention to the two bodies, referring to the social and
physical aspects of the body. Her distinction roughly reiterates that between mind and
body, culture and biology. More precisely, Douglas differentiates between the use we
make of our bodies and the way our bodies function, and emphasizes the way elements
of physiology and anatomy can be taken up into the symbolic domain. Nancy Scheper-
Hughes and Mar- garet Lock (1987) give us three bodies, including the individual
body, the social body, and the body politic. The first refers to the lived experience of the
body as self, the second to representational uses of the body as a symbol of nature,
society, and culture, and the third to the regulation and control of bodies p.7

In my view this distinction between the body as either empirical thing or analytic theme,
and embodiment as the existential ground of culture and self is critical to capitalizing on
the methodological opportunity identified above. p.8

W/e ust emphatically not conclude here that the body in primitive culture is ecessarily
preobjective while the body in civilized culture is always bjectified. Objectification is the
product of reflective, ideological knowl- dge, whether it be in the form of colonial
Christianity, biological science, i consumer culture. Our lives are not always lived in
objectified bodies, for ur bodies are not originally objects to us. They are instead the
ground of erceptual processes that end in objectification (Merleau-Ponty 1962; sordas
1990, 1993, i994), and the play between preobjective and objecti- ed bodies within our
own culture is precisely what is at issue in many of the onternporary critiques.p.9

\Vhat most clearly distinguishes the concern with

embodiment from the various forms taken by the anthropology of the body is the
methodological and epistemological problematization of a series of interrelated
conceptual qualities, among which that between the preobjective and objectified
is only I e first we have mentioned. Immediately implicated is the conventional
istinction between mind and body, along with a series of derivative distinc- ions
between culture and biology, the mental and the material, culture and tactical

m vilify what is usually called

reason, gender and sex.

Cartesian dualism???
The example from Leenhardt gives us the body as an important site a analyzing the
relationship between the preobiective and the objectifie and Leders analysis shows how
the duality of mind and body calls int question the further distinction between the
experiential and the ontological

Little space remains to problematize the alternative formulation of body as the source of
subjectivity, and mind as the locus of objectification

arguing for the existential immediacy of bodily experience (Bigwood 1991),

or taking issue with the exclusion of identity and agency in the Foucauldian
account of the body (McNay 1991

Paul Ricoeur (1991) examines the bounds of representation in his attempt

to move from a hermeneutics of text to a hermeneutic of action, and from a
semiotic of metaphor to an experiential theory of imagination

He argues that the point of ethnographic discourse is not it make a better

representation, but to avoid representation, suggestin instead that
ethnography would do better to evoke than to represent (ibid.:
205-8).Tyler (1987

df d
.for that purpose suggest being-in-the-world, term from the phenomenological
tradition that captures preciselyithe sens of existential immediacy to which we have
already alluded. This is 1 immediacy in a double sense: not as a synchronic moment of
the ethno graphic present but as temporally/historically informed sensory presenc and
engagement; and not unmediated in the sense of a precultural universa lisrn but in the
sense of the preobjective reservoir of meaning outline above stoller 1989

Representation is fundamentally nominal, and hence we can speak of " representation.

Being-in-the- world is fundamentally conditional, an hence we must speak of existence
and lived experience.p.10

(Ricoeur 1991; Caputo 1986)

The notion that language is itself a modality of being-in-theworld can be traced at

least as far as Herder and Humboldt, and is perhaps best captured in Heideggers
notion that lan- guage not only represents or refers, but discloses our being-inthe-
What about the body as a function of being-in-theworld, as in the work of Merleau
Ponty (1962, 1964), for whom embodiment is the existential con- dition of possibility for
culture and self? In defining this paradigmatic function i-t is useful to recall Barthess
distinction between the work as a material object that occupies space in a bookstore
or on a library shelf, and the text as an indeterminate methodo- logical field that exists
caught up within a discourse and is experienced as activity and
production (1986: 57-58). p.12) Instead of Barthess work and text, I prefer :text and
textuality, and to them I would like to juxtapose the parallelrfigures of the body as a
biological, material entity and embodiment as an indeterminate methodological field
defined by perceptual experience and mode of presence and engagement in the world

That the paradigm of textuality is far ahead of the paradigm of embodiment is without
question (see Hanks 1989), but the formulation of their relation promises the grounds
for future examin- ation of, for example, the relation between the semiotic notion of
inter- textuality and the phenomenological notion of intersubjectivity.p.12

Terence Turner renews the work on bodi- liness he began over a decade ago (Turner
1980), observing that the body in contemporary capitalist society is a site of both social
inequality and per- sonal empowerment. His argument that the appropriation of
bodiliness is
' the fundamental matrix or material infrastructure of the production of personhood and
social identity elaborates the notion of the body as exist- ential ground of culture and
self, and his distinction between the body as a set of individual psychological or
sensuous responses and as a material process of social interaction captures the
distinction between body and
embodiment outlined above (see also Csordas 1990, 1993)

no es un cuerpo nicamente disciplinado mi inters, es un cuerpo como condicin del

estar en el mundo "

enkins and Valiente argue for consideration of the body as a generative source of
culture rather than as a rabula rasa upon which cultural meaning is inscribed

Turner implicitly offers a link between the political economic notion of relations of
production and a phenomenolo- gical notion of intersubjectivity as the interactive
integument of embodied existence, thus taking a step toward Merleau-Pontys (1964:
25) unfinished project of linking perceptual reality with cultural and historical analysis.

Lyon and Barbalet suggest that close attention to the role of emotion in social life can be
a corrective to undue objectification, so long as emotion is construed as both embodied
and social or relational in its origins and its consequences. Building on an account of
emotion in contemporary ethological and evolutionary theory, they empha- size the dual
haptic and affective senses of feeling

They further argue that the interactive and relational character of emotion offers a way
for a phenomenologically grounded approach to embodiment to move beyond
rnicroanalytic, subjective, internal, individualist analysis toward an open horizon in which
social institutions can be understood in terms of their characteristic bodily relations, and
embodied agency can be understood as not only individual but institution-making

ollowing Morleau-Ponty, I would argue that the body is always already cultural, and that
rather than asking how meta- phors instantiate image schemas it is more apt to begin
with the lived experience from which we derive image schemas as abstract products of
analytic reflection.p.20

Bigwood, Carol (1991) Renaturalizing the Body (With a Little Help from Merleau- Ponty)

Caputo, John D. (1986) Husserl, Heidegger, and the Question of Hermeneutic


leder, Drew (1990) The Absent Body. Chicago: University of Chicago

Ricoeur, Paul (1991) From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics

Stoller, Paul (1989) The Taste of Ethnographic Things: The Senses in Anthropology.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Suleiman

Turner, Terence (1980) The Social Skin. In J. Cherfas and R. Lewin, eds., Not Work
Alone. London: Temple Smith. Tyler, Stephen A

Tyler, Stephen A. (1987) The Unspeakable: Discourse, Dialogue and Rhetoric in the
Postmodern World. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Vernant,

McNay, Lois (1991) The Foucauldian Body and the Exclusion of Experience. In
Elizabeth Grosz, ed., Feminism and the Body. Special issue of Hypatia 6 (3): 125-39

Ways of working (Schneider & Wright, 2012).pdf

They are interested i.n longer-term, durational, and cumulative approaches that are
capable of moving beyond the older paradigm of short-term sitespecific interventions
and the reductive understanding of place being linked, or rather fixed, to location. By
working with ideas around social forms of artistic production"Z and networked models
of sociality" [via Ned Rossiterj, they suggest that long-term durational projects have the
potential to counter the society of the spectacle and that the use of social time as a
method in these projects amounts effectively to de-spectacuralization. p.7

grant kester critics when faith Alys

This is a form of collaboration that foregrounds its commitment to local concerns and
voices. No single individual is claiming the work produced as his or her own; the
creativity involved is multiauthored in a very real sense

One problem with collaborations in the vein of relational aesthetics has been that they
have failed to fully acknowledge the power differences that exist within a globally
structured art world and global economic differences at large. It is also obvious that long
term durational work seems to offer quite a different set of issues in terms of
participation than those involved with short-term collaborations p.9

The subversive appropriation approach of The Full Dollar Collection questions ideas of
authenticity and the creation of value in the global art world, as well as Ecuador's own
peripheral status [as a Third World and dollarized economy) within the international
division of labor. Andrade brought the idea of The Full Dollar Collection to Los Angeles,
where in 2012 he was an artist in residence at the Outpost for Contemporary Art. Here,
too, he works with sign-painters to interrogate the boundaries between high and low art
and challenge the contemporary art system with a view from the south (see Plate 4).33
Andrade's approach implies critical collaborations across status and genre bound- aries
in the art world. p.10

Claire Bishop has called for a fuller consideration of the complexities of any
collaborative work as a counter to the solely positive assumptions about collaboration
that inform Bourriaud and as a remedy to the presumption of conviviality that underlines
much artwork that
deals with social encounters

like Bishop, he argues for the essential friction that is necessary for any kind of
genuine democratic or political dialogue?" The work acknowledges the tensions
inherent in social relationships

Bishop points out the difference between par- ticipation and interactivitythe latter
coming from computing and meaning the viewer takes part in the sense of pressing
buttons, and so on- wwhereas for her par- ticipation is a much more socially grounded
undertaking than the physical input of interactivity.

Critics, such as Dave Beech, have pointed out that to enter as a participant in an
artwork is to enter into a set of social re- lationships that often have a very specific form
within which you are required to play a very defined role. The participant is rarely cast
as a subversive element. It is surprising given the extent and amount ofcollaboration
involved in some artworks that the artists continue to be named as the sole authors.

The aim though is not to single out those artists whose use of participation as a feature
of their work is cor- rect or more ethical, but to acknowledge that the role of participant
is always a kind of specific invitationthe broad use of it as a term can mask a really
wide range of actual practices and levels of involvement.

This is, that through performance new materials and qualities are created in relation to
body, time, and space; in other words, these perennial fimdamentals of theater and
performance are rearranged and brought into contact to produce new things,
transcending their previous or original status. This transforrnative potential of
performance can be wel} illustrated with the worlc of Brazilian artist Helio Oiticica
(1937-80). Oiticicas work is remarkable for the number of ways in which the art/
anthropology relationship can be rethought. One is Oiticicas radical reconceptualization
of color, in time, and space, where color becomes both a physical body and [a]
sensorial environment, leading to a dematerialization of color, in what Oiticica called
nonobjects and transobjects. Oiticica also suggested that the conceptual, theoretical,
and sensorial potential of objects had to be revealed and developed from the inside
out-unlil<e in classi- cal, academic painting where the beholder captures the meaning
from the outside in

Worn by the artist, or others, a parangol becomes a habitable and active color-
structure in space that has both a tactile-corporal and a visuai dimension Its purpose is
to be worn by anonymous members of the audience who move to the rhythm of samba.

Oiticica did not conceive of this move out of the studio in terms of an exoticizing
strategy, but rather wanted to Confront his ideas of movement, time, and color with lived
experiences and explore their limits in performance as colors~inaction

Oiticicas work opens a conceptual avenue to "transmateriality," the idea that

ephemeral, transitory phenomena [anything between social actions and extrasenso- rial
experiences] produce and leave material traces that refer back and point for- ward to
similar events not any longer or not yet manifest

Kate Roberston

While having themselves materiality (as photographs] and being representations of

material [i.e., dust), they are also making translucent the actions or events from which
they originate,

Practitioners in our volume often dwell on the aspects of representation and

ethnography, even, and especially, when these are fractured/ ruptured by experimenting
with stylistic and formal means.

Craig Campbell [contributor to this volume and a member of the Ethnographic

Terminalia collec- tive] expressed it: "How things sercndipitously produce meaning in
ways we dont necessarily anticipate

Clarisse Hahn

como pasar del documental y su distribucin en pantalla a la exhibicin en espacios de

donde puede confrontar al beholder con un encuentro fsico para hacer ms elusivo los
pensar en clemencia

Jane and Louise wilson

Craig Campbell [contributor to this volume and a member of the Ethnographic

Terminalia collec- tive] expressed it: "How things sercndipitously produce meaning in
ways we dont necessarily anticipate

his has its counterpart in anthropological concerns over narrative voice and allows two
things to happen. First, it allows an enhanced experimen- tation with form, and in this
sense film is perhaps a misnomer for the kinds of multiple- screen blurring that occurs in
gallery spaces. Second, it also allows for a more haptic cinema and a corporeal
encounter with intended audiences, such as that discussed by Laurent Van Lancker and
Kathryn Rarney in this Volume

This convergence of art and documentary has meant a renewed focus on the aesthetics
of reception by artists using visual and aural media. As with the dis- cussion of
participation and collaboration above, the former schema of
artist, art object, and viewer is complicated by a widening out of work to a broader social
context that has to take into account specificities of cultural setting.

Allen, C. (2004). Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology and the body-in-space

encounters of visually impaired children. Environment and Planning D: Society
and Space 2004, volume 22, pages 719 ^ 735 DOI:10.1068/d303t
Abstract. In this paper I argue that new social geographies of impairment present a
conceptually sophisticated, but limiting, view of the impaired body as a container of
social disadvantage. They say much less about how people with impairments routinely
exercise agency in everyday life vis-a -vis the restrictive sociospatial circumstances in
which they find themselves. I address this problem by developing a phenomenology of
visually impaired children's everyday body-in-space encounters with their home and
urban environments. This illustrates the various and creative ways in which visually
impaired children routinely exercise agency within their home and urban environments.

The manner in which the social model shifted the attention of social geographers onto
the sociospatial conditions that disable people, and thus away from the impaired body,
has recently been subject to intense critique (Corker, 1999; Hughes, 1999; Hughes and
Patterson, 1997; Marks, 1999; Patterson and Hughes, 1999).

The basis of this critique is that the `social model' focus on sociospatial structure has
resulted in the exclusion of the impaired body from sociological and geographical
discourse, and thus allowed medical epistemologies of the `functionally inadequate'
impaired body to predominate, unchallenged (Hughes and Patterson, 1997).

developing sociospatial conceptions of the impaired body-in-space p.719

Although this project to develop a new `social geography of impairment' is now

advancing, I use the first part of this paper to argue that in new social geographical
accounts of the body-in-space the impaired body is understood primarily as constituting
sociospatial (rather than medical) disadvantage, and it is only very recently that the
impaired body-in-space has been conceptualised in terms of its agency to overcome
disadvantages. The agency perspective of the impaired body-in-space can thus be said
to be in the nascent stages of its theoretical and empirical development.

his empirical part of the paper shows how the agency of the impaired body-in-space is a
phenomenal accomplish- ment that is exercised in complex and disparate ways (for
example, cognitively, corporeally) depending on circumstances.

Second, it had conceded the impaired body to the medical discourse of `functional
inadequacy' where it is regarded as ``a dysfunctional, anatomical, corporeal mass, ...
phenomenologically dead, without intentionality or agency'' (Hughes and Patterson,
1997, page 329). For these two reasons, pioneers of `new' social geographies of
disability, such as Parr and Butler (1999, page 11), have called for a phenomenologi- cal
focus on the ``intersections of place, bodies, identities and everyday geographies'', and
therefore the notion of ``body space'' which:
Their call for this phenomenological focus thus reflects the manner in which they view
the impaired body as a social (as well as physiological) phenomenon that is implicated
in (rather than separate from and thus simply the bearer of) the sociospatial production
of disability.

For Hughes, Patterson, Imrie, and Valentine, then, the impaired body is not
``phenomenologically dead, without intentionality or agency'' and thus simply excluded
from public space by sociospatial barriers that stand over it. Conversely, they view the
phenomenal dysappearance of the body-in-space as the impetus for their thinking
subject to make a conscious decision to withdraw from public space.

For geographers such as Imrie, Valentine, and Hall, then, sociostructuralist epistemol-
ogies of exclusion are limited because they are unable to capture the manner in which
the sociospatial exclusion of impaired people is mediated through the phenomenology
of the body-in-space
Nevertheless, although their body ^ space geographical accounts of impairment tell us
something about the embodiment-in-space of impairment and dis- ability (which
contrasts with accounts that present sociospatial structure as `standing over' the body,
denying its intentionality) their primary focus has been on the embodiment of
sociospatial restriction and disadvantage rather than agency.p.5

the body-in-itself.

As the way-finding literature does not give enough attention to the body-in-itself as a
source of spatial knowledge, the explication of agency that it provides (although
immensely valuable, in the light of what has been said so far about the need for a fuller
agency perspective in the literature) concerns the body-in-mind and is thus overly
intellectualist. In the next part of the paper I turn to the work of Merleau-Ponty because
he has developed a perspective of the body-in-itself as the key source of spatial
knowledge, and therefore of agency

how this spatial agency is an accomplishment of the body-in-mind in some

circumstances (as the way- finding literature has already shown) but is also
an achievement of the body-in-itself in other situations p.6

For Merleau-Ponty, then, the mind does not simply map itself onto the body, and is not,
therefore, the medium through which the body, and the movement of the body, can be
understood. Conversely, the body, and the movement of the body, can be understood
only on the preconscious level of corporeality because, for Merleau-Ponty, it is the body
that inhabits spacewhich it therefore comes to know on a corporeal levelbefore the
mind ever does.p.6

The value of Merleau-Ponty, then, is that he constructs a conception of the body as an

agent that actively appropriates (rather than as an object that submits to the geo-
metrical proportions of) space `in the hands' and `in the legs' in order to enable its
navigation of places known to it through experience.p.7

there is a knowledge of place which is reducible to a sort of co-existence with that place

by using research with visually impaired children to develop a phenomenological insight

into how their body- in-space way-finding techniques are an accomplishment of both the
body-in-mind and the body-in-itself. p.7

the visually impaired children studied described themselves as agents within, rather
than victims of,

cognitive mapping was used mainly as a means of reflexively monitoring their

socioenvironmental positioning, in order to exercise spatial agency, either when the
children were in the process of learning aboutp.9

Merleau-Ponty (1962) points out that this is because socio- spatial experiences are
accumulated by the body as an individualised sociospatial history that eventually
becomes `sedimented' within `body techniques' as latent move- ment that is not
reflected upon even though it is meaningful and lived out in the world.p.9

Furthermore, their ability to accomplish this diversified series of movements safely

reflected the level of their cognitive-mapping abilities, and their experiential production
of a corporeal schema, rather than the `good design' of housing and urban

When they were older and able to obtain more freedom from their parents, they refused
to withdraw from the dangers of the urban environment and, instead, devised new
ways to engage sensually with, and therefore exercise agency vis-a-
vis, the speed and intensity of movement within the urban environment. For example,
Anthony described how he politely rejected offers of assistance with walking across
busy roads in favour of taking his time to ``listen to''and therefore negotiatetraffic
flows independently:p.14
The exception to this, of course, is the related but distinct way-finding literature, which
has sought to overcome the ontological problem of the disadvantaged victim by showing
how visually impaired people use their bodies as sources of spatial informa- tion, which
is then developed into knowledge structures (for example, declarative, procedural) to
navigate space. p. 733 p-15

This twin epistemology was useful because it enabled me to show that visually impaired
children exercised agency in disparate and discontinuous ways (that is, by using
`cognitive mapping' and `body techniques') at different times and in different situations,
thus revealing that they frequently did not experience significant problems with the built
environment, whilst also highlighting the limits to their agency when, for example, they
encountered move- ment within it. p.16

Lindseth, A., & Norberg, A. (2004). A phenomenological hermeneutical method for

researching lived experience. Scandinavian journal of caring sciences, 18(2),

As phenomenologists we want to focus on the understandable meaning of these

experiences. When the interviewees experience actions, attitudes, relations or other
human matters as ethically good or bad, we want to understand this good as the
essential meaning of ethically good phenomena (or the essential meaning missing in
ethically bad phenomena).

phenomenological hermeneutics. Essential meaning must be studied and revealed in

the interpretation of text

. To shift to the phenomenological attitude we must refrain from making judgements

about the factual. We must accomplish epoche or bracketing. The easiest and, so to
speak, the natural way of doing this is to narrate from lived experience. Thus narrating,
we naturally refrain from judging and concluding. We are not interested in stating facts,
but in relating what we have experienced p.3

What we put within brackets is our judgements about the factual, about what is the
case, in order to become open to our own experience and to the understandable
meaning implicit in this experience.

(i) To be able to understand and, if necessary, to improve our own practice, we have to
start with our lived experience. We have to express it to become aware of its meaning,
and often this awareness itself leads to improvements.

(ii) The meaning we need to reflect on is a meaning we take part in. If we work within
healthcare, we participate in the meaning of healthcare as it manifests itself in many
actions, activities, considerations, helping measures, institutions, buildings, technology
and so on

Thus being touched and moved may reveal the essential meaning of this participation,
this being-in-the-world. Being touched and moved by essential meaning leads us to the
truth, to lived truth as opposed to correctness, and it connects us to the ontological level
of life world.

We organize our experiences so that they answer questions like: what, why, who,
how, with whom, to whom and for whom. A story is a whole, which gives meaning to
particular events, which give meaning to the whole story. A story constitutes a dialectic
between the past, the present and the future (12)p.5

naive understanding
structural analysis

If the structural analysis invalidates the na ve understanding, the

wholetextisreadagainandanewna veunderstandingis formulated and checked by a new
structural analysis

The process of interpreting the text as a whole and arriving at a comprehensive

understanding is the nonmethodic pole of understanding (3). It is not possible to follow
strict methodological rules. Imagination is important. We again come close to the text
and recontextualize it. We try to perceive it in the light of the literature text/texts chosen
and also see the literature text in the light of the interview text. The focus is not on what
the text says but on the possibilities of living in the world that the interview text opens
up. The focus thus is more on the future than on the past. An example of interpreting a
text as a whole is given below:

poetic language makes the words mean as much as they can and creates mood, which
reveals possible ways of being in the world and shows a deeper mode of belonging to
reality (28), while scientific language reduces the polysemy of language (29). Thus
sometimes we use poetic expressions, metaphors or sayings in order to convey the
interpreted meaning.

Dugui, A. (2014). Symbolic Interactionism -The SAGE Encyclopedia of Action

Research. DOI:
Symbolic interactionism is an empirical theory which centralizes the importance of
activity. It holds that people act towards things based on the meaning those things have
for them, that meanings emerge from social interaction and that meanings are modified
by individual interpretation and on-going social exchange. These premises create a
methodologically cohesive frame which informs a distinct process of empirical inquiry.
Founded on the philosophical theorizing of George Herbert Mead and the sociological
work of Hebert Blumer, symbolic interactionism centralizes meaning, interpretation and
social interaction for the emergence, construction and maintenance of language,
understanding and behaviour. In this entry, the philosophical foundations and
methodological root images of symbolic interactionism will be described and related to
action research

Interpretation is not an automatic application of established meanings but is instead a

formative process in which meanings are used and revised as instruments of guidance
and the formation of action. In symbolic interactionism, action centrally implicates the
selfinteraction and reflection of meanings.p.3

This ability to be an object to oneself means that an individual is in continual and

ongoing social communication and construction, allowing for not only changes to
interpretation but also transformation and direction of behaviour. This is radically
different from understanding human beings as merely the behavioural manifestation of
psychological or sociological forces.

Symbolic interactionism is founded on the notion that actors act towards objects in
accordance with the objects' perceived meanings. This means that at any point our
meanings and the meanings of others are open to transformation. As we reflect on our
object of interest and come into contact with others' reflections on the object, our
meaning of that object can change. In and of itself this would be unimportant, but it must
be remembered that symbolic interactionism is predominantly a theory of activity,
activity which occurs in interconnections of actors coming into contact with one anothep.

Travers, M. (2011). Addressing Lived Experience: Symbolic Interactionism and

Ethnography. In: Qualitative Research Through Case Studies. DOI: http:// Print pages: 18-39

la escuela de chicago
Blumer & Pars

The Hobo (1923) by Nels Anderson

Hughes and Blumer, like Park himself, did not conduct many empirical studies. Both
were, however, responsible for creating the intellectual and institutional conditions for
symbolic interactionism to develop as a research tradition. Blumer published a number
of articles during the 1950s, which gave ethnographers a coherent, methodological
basis for doing qualitative research, drawing on the theoretical writings of George
Herbert Mead (1934). I will be looking at Blumer's conception of symbolic interactionism
in the next section. Hughes encouraged a new generation of researchers to conduct
ethnographic projects, particularly by studying work and occupations.p.5

Artworlds (1982), a study which looks at the different occupational groups concerned
with the production and distribution of art. p.6

The Illinois School around Norman Denzin is a postmodern version of symbolic

interactionism. Dramaturgical analysis is another sub-tradition which grows out of the
work of Erving Goffman.

Crang, M. (2003). Qualitative methods: touchy, feely, look-see?. Progress in

human geography, 27(4), 494-504.

I want to suggest that much current work follows through a constructionist agenda in
terms of seeing people discursively creating their worlds, seeing the field as discursively
constructed and indeed both the fieldwork and field worker as socially constructed. That
is, we acknowledge the (co-)construction of the field by researcher and researched
where fieldwork is a discursive process in which the research encounter is structured
by the researcher and the researched (England, 2001: 210)

Berndtsson, I., Claesson, S., Friberg, F., & hln, J. (2007). Issues about thinking
phenomenologically while doing phenomenology. Journal of Phenomenological
Psychology, 38(2), 256-277.

this methodological article explores issues related to having the ontological ground for
phenomenological empirical research present throughout the research process. We
discuss how ontology needs to be taken into consideration regarding the phenomena to
be studied and how ontological aspects of phenomena need to be highlighted during
various data collection and analysis procedures. Here, we discuss how philosophical
works can be used in the context of specific research projects. In illustrating our
statements, we present four empirical examples connected to the themes of life
changes and learning processes with the purpose of exemplifying and discussing how
general lifeworld ontology can be integrated as an active resource in empirical
phenomenological research.

Recent methodological studies in the field of empirical phenome- nology have spanned
across problems concerning how to deal with pre- understanding in the research
process (LeVasseur, 2003), appropriate application of empirical phenomenological
methods (Giorgi, 2000), phases of the interpretive phenomenological process (Crist &
Tanner, 2003), issues of validity (Giorgi, 2002), and accessibility of empirical
phenomenological texts (Halling, 2002). Further, the utilization of lifeworld ontological
concepts in the phenomenological research process has been developed (Ashworth,
2003a, 2003b; van Manen, 1990). Ashworth (2003a) delin- eated specific intertwined
lifeworld constructs, labelled fractions (p. 147), such as embodiment, temporality and
sociality, which are then applied as structures in the process of phenomenological
analysis (Ashworth & Ashworth, 2003; Finlay, 2003)

our goal is to reiterate an unquestioned phenomenological assertion; the significance of

thinking phenomenologically while doing phenomenology.

Here in the Heideggerian tradition of existential phenomenology, we assume

the distinction between the onto- logical as the dimension of Being, and the
ontic as the dimension of entities present to us in our natural attitude
toward the world.

Ontology addresses questions about existence. In everyday language, the

name for everything that exists is reality. In this article, we will concentrate
on ontological aspects relevant to a phenomenological lifeworld approach. e
concept lifeworld is central in many of the phenomenologies developed
over the years. Husserl (1970/1954) introduced central themes of the
lifeworld to the European audience at the beginning of the 20th century.
Heidegger (1993/1927) talked about in-der-Welt-sein (being-in-the- world)
and Merleau-Ponty (1962/1945) used the expression tre au monde (being-
in-the-world), while Schtz (1972/1932) wrote about the everyday
lifeworld. Building on Husserls works, Heidegger, Merleau- Ponty and
others claimed that it is not possible for anyone to transcend the

lifeworld. In the following presentation, we articulate assumptions per-

taining to general lifeworld ontology based primarily on Heideggers (1993),
Merleau-Pontys (1962) and Schtz (1972) philosophy.

e lifeworld, as we understand it, is in its ontological sense the pre- reflective

ground for our being in the world, which is given to us in the natural attitude
and is taken for granted in everyday life
us, the ontology of the lifeworld can neither be diminished to a monism (e.g.
materialism or idealism), nor to dualism (with separation of material and
mental quali- ties). It is an integration of life and world, object and subject,
inner and outer, mind and body, individual and society, etc. At the core of
lifeworld ontology is insight into the interdependence between life and world,
a complex and ambiguous conscious-and-unconscious basis of our experi-
ences and actions.

us, life and world are mutually dependent on each other, and through this
interdependency, the lifeworld is personal as well as shared. e world, as it is
united with a human being, stands out as an open world, always tangible in
special situations. Central lifeworld dimensions such as time and space are
also related to human beings. Time, for example, cannot be said to be either
objective or subjective; instead, it is experienced by human beings as lived
time. Similar statements can be made about lived space. Further, in the lived
space or a room, things are not just materialthey are seen as something
and call for action on our part. A pen is not just a piece of plastic containing
some steel and ink. Normally, one regards it as a pen, which might be useful
if one wants to write. It is not just material or a piece of handicraftit is
primarily a tool (Heidegger, 1993). Such a tool can be an extension of ones
embodied existence as is the white cane for a blind person (Merleau- Ponty,
1962). In this way, tools also express something about the persons using
s human beings, we cannot escape from our being-in-the-world as we are thrown into
and placed in time and space (Heidegger, 1993). e body-subject, or oneself, is both co-
created and dependent on other body subjects (Ricoeur, 1992/1990); we even have
each other in our hands (Lgstrup, 1992). Consequently, the lifeworld stands out as a
social world to a great extent. Other people affect us, and we affect others. Our
respective lifeworlds slip into each other (Merleau-Ponty, 1962), but they still constitute
an open horizon (van Peursen, 1977).
We argue that the way we gain access to various phenomena is through the
interpretation of peoples lived experi- ences (Heidegger, 1993), where understanding
and interpretation are regarded as constitutive parts of the human being (Gadamer,
1995/1960; Heidegger, 1993)

rom this it follows that research within a lifeworld approach means inter-relating with
and, to some extent, sharing other peoples lifeworlds. By meeting people, talking to
them, listening to their narratives, observing their use of tools and the environment, etc.,
we gain access to lifeworld phenomena.

Here, a variety of methods can be chosen, e.g. observations, interviews, narratives,

diaries, biographies and images. Inspired by Merleau-Pontys (1962, p. xx) statement
about phenomenology as disclosure of the world, we illustrate the different approaches
we have employed in our efforts to reflectively apply phenomenological lifeworld
ontology in four empirical examples.

In explicat- ing visual impairment and blindness, Merleau-Pontys (1962) theory of the
lived body was used, in which the functional limitation stands out as a dysfunctional
body, a body which can no longer relate to and act in the world as before. Here, a body-
subject emerges which perceives the sur- roundings in a changed way due to the
changed life-situation. is is a standpoint very different from objective medicine.
Regarding changes in life, the changed body thus implies a changed world. Since
human beings are related to dimensions of time and space, a changed life situation also
implies changes in how people perceive and relate to time and space.

It should also be noted that objects are not detached objects within lifeworld ontology;
instead, they are seen as something and call for action on our part. Here, the white
cane is a good examplelife and world are placed in relation to each other by means of
an object. Further, the social dimensions of the long cane as a symbol of blindness are
central as regards learning processes. experiencias estticas con el arte

Finally, when analysing the field-notes and transcripts of the interviews combined with
the researchers own reflections, a phenomenological her- meneutical attitude was
adopted, in order to try to identify life-world rela- tions and see the world through the
eyes of the participants, p.9

the ontological basis for the study of alleviation of suffering involved the focus on
suffering as a complex, composite and embodied experienceP.14
Such experiences may be voiced by relating tangible situations from life. By viewing the
human subject as embodied, and the body as a body-subject, a change in bodily
functioning (which for people with life-threatening cancer often means a decaying body)
can lead to a changed world for the suffering person.p.14

For instance, the lifeworld dimensions of the lived body, lived time and lived space were
adopted in all the four studies exemplified. However, combining them with other
lifeworld dimensions of particular relevance for each study, such as horizon
(Berndtsson, 2001), directedness (Claesson, 2002) room for learning (Friberg, 2001)
and circularity between body and subject (hln et al., 2002), resulted in various
methodological consequences. In the studies exemplified, we have made use of
individual recurring interviews, narratives, focused life stories, diaries, various kind of
observations, fieldwork, etc.p.17

For example, interviews in combination with observations offer a way of viewing the
lived body acting in the world. us, empirical studies will proceed and be enriched not
only by inter- viewing people. is approach is at the core of what Beekman (1984, p. 16)
calls teilnehmende Erfahrung or participant experience, which means being present,
trying to share and coming close to the participants p17

Accordingly, if the application of ontology to empirical topics ends up with various

lifeworld ontological explications concerning different aspects of the studied
phenomena, these should be seen as inter- twined with one another and with the
research procedures. p.18

Savage, R. W. (2012). Aesthetic experience, mimesis and testimony. tudes

Ricoeuriennes/Ricoeur Studies, 3(1), 172-193.

My wager is that, through following this paradox to its end, the prospective dimension of
the claim that a work makes through aesthetically prefiguring new ways of thinking,
feeling, and acting will overtake the classical conception of truth.

This distance, which originates with the works suspension of the practical order, is
bound up with the works figurative power. Theodor W. Adornos attempt to attribute this
distance to art and musics social emancipation has the advantage of highlighting what
for him was arts first social characteristic.

n his debate with Walter Benjamin over politically committed art, Adorno insisted on
privileging arts aesthetic autonomy over its service to a political agenda. Committed art,
Adorno maintained, is not intended to generate ameliorative measures, legislative acts
or practical institutions.1 Rather its proper function consists in resisting the course of
the world. Art or music accomplishes this through its internal construction, that is, by its
form alone.2
Adornos conviction that arts aesthetic autonomy is the requisite condition of its critical
social truth highlights the aporia in question. On the one hand, art for arts sakethe
hallmark of arts claim to autonomydenies by its absolute claims that ineradicable
connection with reality which is the polemical a priori of the very attempt to make art
autonomous from the real.4 On the other hand, committed art, which is necessarily
detached as art from reality, cancels the distance between the two.5 Only through
constituting itself in relation to what it is not,6 Adorno tells us, can art resist its
assimilation to the existing order of things. Hence the negative dialectical turn: as a
social fact, art is at the same time non-identical with the social totality by reason of the
distancing relation won through its aesthetic autonomy.p.4

This paradoxthat arts constitution in opposition to real social conditions is perhaps

the sole remaining refuge for truthdominates Adornos aesthetic theory. The
impossibility of deriving the aesthetics creative potential from the fact of arts social
emancipation fuels the performative contradiction that, according to Jrgen Habermas,
inheres in a totalizing critique. This contradictionwhich dominates a critique for which
the suspicion of ideology becomes total13insinuates itself in arts melancholic

For Adorno, authentic works militate against the false consciousness of congealed
social contradictions, the untruth of which they expose. Through recalling the
anticipated condition of utopian freedom without betraying it to existence, arts refractory
objectification of the truth of real social conditions operates within the domain of a
critical project haunted by its own relentless negativity.

The presumption of a works capacity to stand over against the practical field of
everyday experiences is indispensable to the idea that music, literature, theatre, dance,
and art can not only resist the course of things, but that they can also propose
imaginative alternatives that in turn can affect the ways in which we inhabit the world.p.6

For Ricur, the distance that a work introduces into the heart of reality is attributable to
the productive imagination. Correlatively, his theory of mimesis has the advantage of
exploding the classical concept of truth. In contrast to this concept of truthwhere the
adequation of concept and thing defines the truth of the representationRicurs
theory ties the claim that a work makes to its ontological vehemence. Imagination,
which is productive only when thought is at work,23 is operative in the distance that a
work takes from the real. This distancewhich each work achieves through placing the
real into suspenseis at the same time the condition for the works redescription of
ways of inhering in the world. Consequently, the epoch that the work introduces into
the heart of reality is also the condition of the works critical bite.p.7

The communicability of an experience that is singularly unique provides a privileged

point of access to the challenge posed by my assertion that the way we think about
music, literature, or arts truth depends upon how we understand its relation to the real.
The question of musics distance from the real, which I took up above, provides a critical
touchstone in this respect. p.7

Ricur points out, is no longer a reduplication of reality but a creative rendering of

it.25 Imagination is therefore at work in a work through producing itself as a world.

how is an experience that is unique to each listener communicable in such a way that it
can, in principle, be shared among all?

As a model for thinking about testimony, the work of arts capacity for discovering
modalities of experience beyond our everyday ways of engaging with the world bears
out the power of imagination. Through exploding the univocity of the classical
conception of truth, this capacity not only distinguishes the truth of art from that of
adequation; transposed laterally onto the ethical and political planes, this capacity also
has its analog in the power to initiate a new course of action in the midst of history. In
the same way that mimesis demands more of our thinking about truth, the testimony of
exemplary lives requires that we acknowledge the communicability of singular acts. If,
as Ricur suggests, we lack a sufficiently multivocal concept of truth . . . that would
fuse, at its margins, with the concept of rightness,85 perhaps it is because we fail to
grasp how, as fitting productions, individual works and acts seek their normativity by
way of the invitation or injunction that is extended to all. Adornos refusal to accept the
risk that this entails relegated music and arts truth to a hibernatory refuge. Conversely,
the exemplification by a work or an act of the response demanded p.16

The solution to the paradox of the works singularity and communicability leads again to
the idea that the capacity for forging new paths is a function of the powers of thought,
imagination, and good judgment in situation. The conjunction of the works singularity
and communicability in aesthetic experience is a model for the search for normativity
that issues from exemplary works and acts. For through summoning its rule, a work
sets the play of imagination and understanding to work. Only this play, as it is
incarnated in the work, is communicable. Hence only this play can be shared. Gadamer
reminds us that, through giving rise to thought, this free play of imagination and
understanding lets us look out beyond everything that is given in experience.86 This
looking out beyond gives the search for normativity its anticipatory structure.
Consequently, the rule that the work summons binds this search to the apprehension
of the fit that the work exemplifies, which in principle is open to everyone

Caputo, J. D. (1984). Husserl, Heidegger and the question of a hermeneutic

phenomenology. Husserl Studies, 1(1), 157-178.
That is the question I want to pose in this paper, and the argument I will make is that
there is already a distinctively hermen- eutic element in pure phenomenological
investigation (even as I would want to insist that there must be a distinctively
phenomenological element in all hermeneutics, lest it fall prey to the textualism of
Derrida and the deconstructionist critics in French and american literary criticism.

The work of phenom- enological reflection then is to make the implicit explicit, to show
the dependence of the thematic object upon the prethematic and implicit components.
In this sense, phenomenology is an ars explicandi.

he task of phenomenological reflection to unfold and elaborate

On the contrary, from the Logical lnvesn'gations on, he held that Anschauung is
Auffassung: s that intuititing is construing, apprehending, even interpreting. To be able
to perceive something demands of the perceiver that he know how to take the
perceptual object, know how to contextualize and situate it, so that it can appear as the
kind of thing which it is.

The forward progress of consciousness is accordingly not a matter of entering a wholly

new world, but rather of f'filing in (Erffillung) a predelineated sketch.p.7

Husserl's point is that intentional life does not consist of atomic, merely present
actualities, but is precisely made possible by the fringe of horizonal potentialities, both
inner and outer, both retained and protended, which belong to its integral structure.p.7

Hermeneutical "interpretation" (Auslegung) has a point of departure in intentional

explication (Auslegung). Hence we want to show that Husserl's phenomenology is at
bottom already a
proto-hermeneutics, already a philosophy of the presuppositions which inf'fltrate and
condition thematic acts

that to understand something is to know how to project it in the fight terms, in the
service of an existential and Kierkegaardian pro- gram: to reverse the movement of
fallenness and to recover Dasein in its authentic Being.

"Projection" (Entwurf) is the fundamental structure of understand- ing (Verstehen ) in

Being and Time: to understand something is to pro- ject it aright, that is, in terms of the
horizon which is appropriate to it.

Anderson, P. S. (1991). Paul Ricoeurs Aesthetics: Tradition and Innovation.

Bulletin de la societe americaine de philosophie de langue francaise, 3(3),

Yet Paul Ricoeur offers what I find to be a bold rehabilitation of Aristotle's

doctrine of mimesis, as weil as a rereading of Imman':1el Kant. My contention is that
Ricoeur aims to restore meaning to aesthetic tradition and, at the same time, to
signify something new in the :pregnant present vis-a-vis the immanent future. I intend to
elucidate .the tensions between tradition and innovation in Ricoeur's hermeneutic order to uncover the precise nature of his aesthetic$.

soi-mme comme une autre

Time and Na"dtive, 1-111 and Soi-meme comme un autre. Ricoeur

To begin I need a frame of reference. It is possible to recognise various

aesthetic theories which have, in the course of Western intellectual history, constituted
different accounts of what it is that all works of art share which gives them their value. In
recent discussions four elements have been distinguished as relevant for assessing a
work of art: the work, the artist, the universe and the audience

Using these elements four main types of theories may be proposed. First, the mimetic
theory is based upon the relation of the work of art to the universe; second, the
expressive theory is based upon the relation of the work to the artist; third, the
pragmatic theory is concerned with the relation of the work to the audience; fourth, the
objective theory is concerned solely with the relation of the work to itself as a purely
autonomous object.

t he mimetic theory explains art as essentially an imitation of aspects of the universe.

This is probably the most primitive aesthetic theory. Yet the mimetic as well as
the expressive approaches to art have been intellectually delegitimated '
by certain contemporary theorists. The deconstructionists insist that allthere is is the
autonomous work, i.e., the text imitates nothing outside itself; other postmodemists
exhibit an overriding pragmatic concern with the affect upon the audience

nota al pie 4 y 5. p.209

From Ricoeurs account of the prefiguration, configuration and refiguration of experience

I would conclude that mimesis is a function of human beings who, as dual-aspect
beings, must mediate passivity and
activity, sensibility and understanding, finitude and infinitude, transience and
"permanence. Foll Following Aristotle mimesis is a natural mode of constructing and
inhabiting the world; yet in more modern terms the threefold mimesis also aims to
mediate time, i.e. historical experience and eternity, i.e. transsignifying possibilities.

Aesthetic judgements are not to be confused or identified with knowledge of the

phenomenal world nor with the activity of pure practical reason. But this does not imply
that such judgements are merely idiosyncratic. They make a definite claim to
universality or, as Ricoeur stresses, communicability:

Kant stresses that "the judgement of taste... is not a cognitive judgement, and so not
logical, but is aesthetic - which means that it is one whose determining ground cannot
be other than subjectivep.211

So conceived Ricoeurs restoration of aesthetic discourse gives value to both the

temporal succession - found in Kants account of human experience - and the dramatic
unity - found in Aristotle's account of emplotment. nota al pie 11 These two accounts
are reflected in the configurational acts which incorporate, as a product of time, the
story of a community. 12

In his preface to Arendts Condition de lhomme modeme Ricocur recognises the value
of her conception of history, action and mimesis. Arendt wants to retain the_ Greek
account of mimesis as a creative imitation of action in its political dimension; Ricocur
extends this mimesis to narrative configuration modelled upon Kants idea of aesthetic
judgement. Furthermore Ricoeur, following Arendt, wants to resist a modern tendency to
replace a concrete political conception of mimesis with a speculative - Hegelian -
conception of history. p.212 nota 15

An alternative reading of Ricoeur is through Husserls later phenomenology, that is,

through locating the knowing subject in the intersubjective relations of the social world.
Here cognition, and hence mimesis, have their roots in what is humanly and socially
shared; there is no symbolic creation which is not in the final analysis rooted in the
common symbolical ground of humanity. And Ricoeur clearly owes a debt to the
phenomenological tradition for elucidating the meaning of the lived experiences of time.
We will see that Ricoeur gives a further function to the imagination: in
phenomenological terms imaginative variations make possible the opening up of actual
and possible worlds.

Time is the form according to which the present changes constantly as to its content... it
is the order of succession of moments... should we say that the marks of subjectivity
attach only to acts bound by the succession? [instead] succession represents the
fundamental bipolarity of human existence... it is undergone and carried on." p.213 nota
For another thing, Ricoeur develops the Husserlian art of imaginative variation. He uses
this art in order to demonstrate the ways in which mimesis offers the possibility of
articulating the relationship between the space of experience and the horizon of
expectation. Narrative identity oscillates between the two extremes of possibility and
actuality, of world of text and world of audience. P.214 nota 19

In other words Kant aims to demonstrate that aesthetic judgements are grounded in
human subjectivity and yet are not merely relative to an individual subject. Taste is
communal. not idiosyncratic.p.216

I believe that a reading of Ricoeur forces us to confront the inconclusive conclusion of

Kants Critique of Judgement. This confrontation might be reduced to two questions:
does the universality of taste, once it is produced, turn out to be a natural and original
property of the human subject? or does the subject to which a universality of taste can
appropriately be attributed turn out to be the product of a process of cultural and
historical unification? And Ricoeur would seem - unwittingly or not - to have a response
to these questions: he creatively preserves the tensions inherent in post-Kantian

On the one hand, with his discussions of prefiguration Ricoeur must admit the
dependency of artistic practices on historically variable social relations conditioning both
the production of works of art and the manner in which they are socially circulated and
received. On the other hand, as seen above the real work lies in elucidating those
aspects of a narrative configuration which liberates the author/reader and makes
possible the formal qualities of the configurating act as a reflective judgement. p.216

We must challenge with equal force the thesis of a narrow structuralism which forbids
moving outside of the text and that of a dogmatic Marxism which merely shifts onto the
social plane the wornout topos of imitatio naturae. lt is on the level of a public's
horizon of expectations that a work exercises... the creative function of the work of
art... If a new work is able to create an aesthetic distance, it is because a prior distance
exists between the whole of literary life and everyday practice. It is a basic characteristic
of the horizon of expectation of an even more basic non coincidence, namely, the
opposition in a given culture between poetic language and practical language,
imaginary world and social reality... What we have just indicated as literature: function
of social creation arises quite precisely at this point of articulation between the
expectations turned toward art and literature and the expectations constitutive of
everyday experience.

Free from the external constraint of documentary proof, fiction is bound internally by the
very thing that it projects outside itself. Free from... artists must still make themselves
free for... If this were not the case, how could we explain the anguish and suffering of
artistic creation as they are attested to by the correspondence and diaries of a van
Gogh or a Cezanne? ...the stringent law of creation, which is to render as perfectly as
posible the vision of the world that inspires the artist, corresponds feature by feature to
the debt of the historian and of the reader of history with respect to the dead... The
freedom of the imaginative variations is communicated only by being cloaked in the
constraining power of a vision of the world. The dialectic between freedom and
constraint. lnternal to the creative process, is thus transmitted throughout the
hermeneutical process. p.217 nota 24

We can see this combination of elements by considering. however

schematically, Ricoeurs account of mimesis 1-3. Mimesisl as the
prefiguration of human action encompasses elements of both the mimetic
and the expressive theories of aesthetics. It involves the structural,
symbolic and temporal resources which make possible the poetic
composition of a work. For instance the semantics of action, norms of
society and circumstances of history would all be constitutive elements of
prefiguratiorrz Mimesis2 as the configuration of experience would seem to
incorporate mimetic theory and objective theory. especially the Aristotelian
and the Kantian conceptions of the work of art. The work imitates human_
reality in such a manner to liberate the reader/audience; the work exhibits
objective/formal qualities which make possible the judgement of its beauty
as communicating an universal delight.3 Mimesis3 as the refiguration of
human praxis brings together the mimetic and the pragmatic theories.
Narrative refiguration, whether historical or fictional, aims to mediate the
world of the text and the world of the reader. Concerning the poetics of
refiguration Ricoeur claims that 9
A new element enriching poetics arises here out of an aesthetlcs'...if we
restore to the term aesthetic the full range of meaning of the Greek word
aisthesis and if we grant to it the task of exploring the multiple ways in
which a work, in acting on a reader, affects that reader. This being
at'fected has the noteworthy quality of combining in an experience of a
particular type passivity and activity.
From Ricoeurs account of the prefiguration, configuration and refiguration
of experience I would conclude that mimesis is a function of human beings
who, as dual-aspect beings, must mediate passivity and activity, sensibility
and understanding, finitude and infinitude, transience and "permanence.
Following Aristotle mimesis is a natural mode of constructing and inhabiting
the world; yet in more modern terms the threefold mimesis also aims to
mediate time, i.e. historical experience and eternity, i.e. transsignifying

Ricoeur, P. (1986). Time and narrative III. pages

Ricoeur, P. (1988). Time and Narrative. 111. traos. Kathleen Blamey and David
Peliauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1988).

pp. 99-102.

The effects of fiction, effects of revelation and transformation, are essentially

effects of
reading.4 It is by way of reading that literature returns to life, that is, to the
practical and affective field of existence. Therefore it is along the pathway of a
theory of reading that we shall seek to determine the relation of application that
constitutes the equivalent of the relation of standing-for in the domain of fiction.

From these intimate exchanges between the historicization of the fictional

narrative and the fictionalization of the historical narrative is born what we call
human time, which is nothing other than narrated time.

Ricoeur, Paul. Time and Narrative, Volume 3 (Time & Narrative) (p. 102). University
of Chicago Press. Edicin de Kindle.

167,173,176, 177, 179, 216-229 246-49 270-274

McNiff, S. (2012). Art-Based Research. In: Handbook of the Arts in Qualitative

Research: Perspectives, Methodologies, Examples, and Issues. Edited by: J. Gary
Knowles & Ardra L. Cole

Art-based research can be defined as the systematic use of the artistic process, the
actual making of artistic expressions in all of the different forms of the arts, as a primary
way of understanding and examining experience by both researchers and the people
that they involve in their studies. These inquiries are distinguished from research
activities where the arts may play a significant role but are essentially used as data for
investigations that take place within academic disciplines that utilize more traditional
scientific, verbal, and mathematic descriptions and analyses of phenomena.

The domain of art-based research, a more focused application of the larger

epistemological process of artistic knowing and inquiry, has come into existence as an
extension of a significant increase of studies researching the nature of the art
experience in higher education and professional practice (McNiff, 1998a

I realized with the assistance of my graduate students that the arts, with their long
legacies of researching experience, could be used as primary modes of inquiry,
especially when it came to exploring the nature of art and its creation.

Gallo, L.E. (2006). El ser-corporal-en-el-mundo como punto de partida en la

fenomenologa de la existencia corprea. Pensamiento educativo, 38, 46-61.

El desarrollo sistem- tico de la fenomenologa del cuerpo, que asume como centro de
reflexin la existencia corprea y el sujeto encarnado, corresponde, entre otros, a
gabriel Marcel, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty y Bernhard Waldenfels.

resignifican la subjetividad y la objetividad en abierta oposicin con la tradicin dualista.

La fenomenologa de la existencia corprea hace del cuerpo nuestro modo-de-ser-en-
el-mundo p.47

el giro que hace Merleau-Ponty es pasar de la fenomenologa de la vida a la

fenomenologa de la carne (Chair), mostrando que la conciencia expresiva y reflexiva
vive corporal y mundanamente. (...) el autor

pretende la superacin del dualismo sujeto y objeto, y del cuerpo propio fenomenal y
cuerpo objetivo

La posicin del cuerpo como trascendente del cuerpo no como objeto, trasciende la
condicin meramente orgnica; que el cuerpo es ms que organismo, se pone de
manifiesto con la nocin de encarnacin, que el ser es ms que organismo ser sujeto
porque se trata de la encarnacin.

La nocin de encarnacin en sentido fenomenolgico no trata entonces el cuerpo como

organismo, perceptible y objetivable como una cosa, sino el cuerpo tal y como es vivido

hay que hacer una salvedad cuando se habla de Leib y de Krper o, como lo
proponen algunos pensadores franceses, de ser-cuerpo y de tener-cuerpo, porque no
se est haciendo referencia a dos fenmenos distintos, sino a dos modos de ser de la
corporalidad (Runge, 2004).

Travers, M. (2001).Varieties of Symbolic Interactionism: Grounded Theory and

Dramaturgical Analysis. In: Qualitative Research Through Case Studies.

Erwin goffman dramaturgical analysis

categoras segn dimensin

Kgle, H-H..(2014). Phenomenology, Hermeneutics, and Ethnomethodology In:

The SAGE Handbook of the Philosophy of Social Sciences. Edited by: Ian C.
Jarvie & Jess Zamora-Bonilla.

we reconstruct the methodological profile of the phenomenologicalhermeneutic

approach (PHA) towards understanding human agency.

The interpretive access to the domain of cultural meanings and practices enables the
reconstruction of the intentional understanding of socially situated agents

(self-understanding of agents -- subjective meaning. (Weber, 1949, 1978)

What is really at stake, to be sure, is a two-fold claim that entails (1) the requirement
that an adequate description of the action must be based on an understanding of the
agent's own comprehension of the situation, and (2) the implication that only an
adequate description adequate in the sense that it includes the reconstruction of the
agent's self- understanding will provide the social scientist with the tools to explain
why the action occurred in the first place.

ontological pre-assumption about the constitution of human agency

In this view, the scientist is to analyze the tools for adequate understanding of the object
domain prior to their application, so as to make sure that they constitute reliable and
adequate venues of gaining explanatory insight. The scientific object is to be kept
distinct from these methodological reflections to not infuse the theory with pre-
assumptions about the object domain that would be detrimental to an unbiased
understanding of the object's nature.

the ontological assumption that human agency is essentially structured by the agent's
self- understanding concretely defines the methodological perspective of
phenomenology and hermeneutics. This can be shown by taking up hermeneutics most
central claim about understanding, the hermeneutic circle (Grondin, 1994; Ormiston
and Schrift, 1990). This term generally suggests that the interpretation of symbolic
expressions and acts is to be distinguished from a subsumption of particular cases
under a general law. Instead, in order to make sense of the intended meaning
of a text, artwork, institution, cultural practice, etc., we need to be able to enter into a to-
and-fro movement between the general thought, intent, or motivation of a human act or
expression, and the particular expressions in which its basic thought or purpose is

The interpreter obviously brings a lot to a symbolic text or social action before he or she
can even begin with the construction of a scientifically elaborate account. Linguistic
knowledge, topical knowledge, a certain pre-understanding of the context, a capacity to
make sense of the references which are mentioned in the text or action that is,
thoughts, facts, institutions, feelings, etc. are necessary to start an explanation

We already saw that such knowledge is considered preliminary because only the
understanding of the text or act itself can enable an interpretation that can be
considered valid

This is so because the relation between the interpreter and her object is considered
unique due to the fact that both are human agents. Interpreter and object are able to
uniquely connect due to the fact that both possess as human agents a unique form
of self-understanding. The methodological uniqueness of the human and social
sciences is thus grounded in the ontological similarity between subject and object in this
domain. This ontological claim has an immediate methodological significance because
the essential feature of human agency is defined as understanding

The object of understanding is thus itself understanding: it is an object that is essentially

defined by being itself interpretive. Thus, capitalizing on the fact that humans
understand themselves leads to a methodological perspective of how we should go
about in
analyzing meaning and action.2

Ontological approach
This puts the concept of intentionality at the center of analysis (Husserl, 1970).
Intentionality is considered to be the basic structure of consciousness and consists of
the directedness of all thought toward something. Husserl's phenomenology sets out to
capture what exactly is involved when subjects understand something as something. p.

He devices the famous phenomenological epoch which consists in bracketing the

assumption of reality with regard to any object of intentional thought (Husserl, 1962,
1991). The upshot of this move bracketing say house in front of me in order to focus
solely on how I perceive/conceive this house, regardless of its real existence is to
illuminate the intrinsic structure of consciousness and all it involves.p.9

Heidegger labels this project hermeneutics of facticity because here, agents are
considered in terms of their existence as full factual selves, as embodied, engaged,
socially connected and practically situated subjects (Heidegger, 1999).

To make clear that this analysis of human intentionality overcomes the Cartesian
conception of a separate mental sphere, Heidegger calls the agent Dasein which
indicates a general understanding of being towards which an agent is always oriented in
some way. But Heidegger similarly introduces the complementary concept Being-in-the

Heidegger's transformation of intentionality thus amounts to a pragmatic and holistic

reconceptualization of its core grounding, since any intentional understanding emerges
from an engaged practical context. Equally important, this practical context is socially
shared since the practical aims and referential contexts are socially typified, disclosed in
socially shared ways, and refer to intersubjective experiences with other agents.

we are faced with two assumptions, two well-grounded premises with regard to human
actions. First, human actions are to an essential extent defined by the self-
understanding of the agents. Second, the contexts in which agents interpret themselves
are not identical, but differ in their internal organization. If we take both assumptions
together, we cannot but acknowledge that in order to understand how actions are
structured in another context, we have to get at the basis of how the actions are
understood in the other context.

Yet if meanings and thus meaningful actions are holistically structured, and if whole
contexts differ from another, we need to develop an understanding of the different
contexts if a respective action is to be understood (Gadamer, 1989; see also Davidson,
2001; Winch, 1991 p.13

f we could drop this assumption that is, that understanding aims at the other's self-
understanding we might simply look how the phenomena that are available to an
interpreter can be best grouped or organized according to a prevalent epistemico-
interpretive scheme. The reference to the self-understanding would be bracketed or
seen as entirely defined by the interpreter's schemes and their respective coherences.
To be sure, if interpretive schemes are in competition as to how to understand a certain
act (or action-sequence, practice, or institution), we cannot just leap over those
competing frameworks to the facts themselves to decide which one is best suited. We
must follow their interpretations internally, always with an eye towards the phenomenon
which involves our own pre-understanding. We thus try to decide which framework best
accounts for the act or expression at stake. Yet we can only try to do so, according to
the hermeneutic conception of dialogical understanding, by reconstructing the other's
perspective and context in comparison and contrast to our own. p.13

The crucial point is that such an interpretive process, while necessarily relating back to
one's own assumptions and practices, has a disclosing power with regard to another
agent's beliefs and backgrounds. It does so because a certain orientation at the other's
self-understanding in the encounter is implied, and is indeed unavoidable if
understanding is to take place. We are forced, if we indeed are oriented at the
understanding of the meaningful action of the other, to take the other's perspective
however mediated by our own into account (Ricoeur, 1992). p.14

et what those meaning-oriented steps have in common is that they consider unearthing
the rationale, the hermeneutic background context or horizon of intelligibility (Taylor
1989) that would give the act plausibility in the eyes of the interpreter, because it had
plausibility in the eyes of the agent. If we are to understand at all, we have to be
oriented at what would make the other's act
meaningful for them.7

PHA shows how the meaningful background of the interpreter plays a crucial role in
understanding the self-understanding of authors and agents. We have seen how this
process of understanding can be modeled as a dialogical encounter in which the
interpreter relates to the intentional perspective of the other, always mediating her own
preconceptions and practices with those that appear on the other side. This approach of
a dialogical realism overcomes the unproductive dilemma between a totally subjectivist
conception of meaning attributions imposed onto the other and the naively objectivist
claim to merely stating social facts


Taken together, the view involves a conception of agency in which situated human
selves are actively involved in constructing their selves (or self-identities) and
environments by developing and articulating the reasons and norms that define their
social worlds (Kgler, 2010).p.17

McAuley, G. (2012). Site-specific performance: place, memory and the creative

agency of the spectator. Arts: The Journal of the Sydney University Arts
Association, 27.

in The Production a/Space, Henri Lefebvre contrasted what he called'dominated'

and'appropriated' space. He defined the former as space transformed and mediated by
technology and controlled by the institutions of political and economic power, while
'appropriated' space is natural space, modified to serve the needs and possibilities of a
particular group in society.

McLeod, J. (2011). Hermeneutics and Phenomenology: The Core of Qualitative

Method In: Qualitative Research in Counselling and Psychotherapy.

The process of knowing involves employing a practical method, that is derived from an
epistemology (theory of knowledge) which is in turn grounded in an ontology (set of
assumptions about the nature of life).

Phenomenology seeks to set aside any assumptions about the object of inquiry, and
build up a thorough and comprehensive description of the thing itself. Phenomenology
is almost a meditative practice, and involves an in-dwelling in the phenomenon until its
essential features reveal themselves

Hermeneutics takes the opposite tack. In hermeneutics, understanding is always from a

perspective, always a matter of interpretation. The researcher can never be free of the
pre-understandings or prejudices that arise from being a member of a culture and a
user of a language. We can never get beyond our language - all the questions we ask
and words we use to articulate our understandings are embedded in culture.

Phenomenology and hermeneutics both assume an active, intentional, construction of a

social world and its meanings by reflexive human beings.

Hermeneutics and phenomenology, by contrast, are concerned with the development of

understandings which may assist people to anticipate events, by sensitising them to

From a hermeneutic perspective, by contrast, the basic argument is that to be human is

to live in an interpreted world, a world in which experience is constructed in terms of
language. For the hermeneutic analyst, an attempt to transcend language merely leads
to another set of statements or propositions that are themselves linguistic and

Bringing together phenomenology and hermeneutics: Heidegger

. In hermeneutic terms, the natural attitude could be understood as the fore-

understanding, the interpretive framework or horizon through which the world was

Heidegger used the concept of everydayness to describe what he was interested in.
Husserl wished to transcend everydayness; Heidegger wished to understand it, to
create a clearing in which the true nature of everyday life could be seen

At the heart of his work was the struggle to make sense of the essential nature of being
itself: what does it mean to be human? If Heidegger were to be successful in this
endeavour, he would be making an enormous contribution to our capacity to make
sense of anything, since what he was aiming to do was to uncover the structure and
qualities of the sense-making (or interpreting) being itself

a purely phenomenological approach to existence would not be capable of dealing with

the realisation that being human is to interpret the world: people are interpreting beings.
Also, it is difficult, within a purely phenomenological approach, to deal with the
realisation that any language used to describe existence carries its own assumptions
about the nature of that to which it refers

analytic strategies heidegger

He began by drawing attention to the very process of questioning itself. As soon as we

ask a question about any aspect of experience we are making some assumptions about
that experience: every seeking gets guided beforehand by what is sought. It is
necessary, therefore, to examine the fore-understanding from which the inquirer
derives his or her questions. This is done by unravelling the meaning of the words that
the inquirer has at his or her disposal for understanding and questioning. What are the
cultural and historical origins of these words? How and why have the meanings of
these words changed? This task requires engaging in a critical deconstruction of
the meaning of the language which constitutes everyday understanding of the topic. It
is then possible to engage in a phenomenological description of the particular aspect of
existence that is being examined. However, here again Heidegger departs from earlier
phenomenological practice by seeking not only to describe the phenomenon, but to
reveal what had previously been hidden in it. Phenomenological seeing, for Heidegger,
is revelatory, it brings into the open new aspects of whatever is being investigated. It
may be necessary to find new, or infrequently used, words in order to convey the
revelatory nature of what has been found. Heidegger himself often used Greek terms to
communicate meanings which he believed were not expressed in his native German.
This whole process is informed by a different understanding of the purpose of the
act of inquiry itself. Rather than seeking to produce an abstract, intellectual /rational
representation of the world, Heidegger saw authentic knowing as connected with, and
intrinsic to, the task of relating to the world within which one finds oneself. Finally, it is
acknowledged that what is being attempted is an interpretation of a being that itself
interprets. Once a discovery is made by a philosopher or researcher, and an aspect of
existence is revealed, this revelation will itself be interpreted and reinterpreted by others
until it becomes part of everyday thinking.