Assigned Cases: #254 Bonifacio vs People - #264 People vs.

Reyes

CRISANTA B. BONIFACIO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. [G.R.

No. 153198, July 11, 2006]

FACTS:

On March 21, 1996, Ofelia Santos, a businesswoman and a buy-and-sell agent of

jewelry, gave petitioner, Crisanta Bonifacio, several jewelry pieces and signed a document
acknowledging receipt of the jewelry and agreed to sell the items on commission basis. She
also promised to remit the proceeds of the sale or return the unsold items to Santos within 15
days.

Petitioner failed to turn over the proceeds of the sale within the given period. She
accumulated unpaid and unreturned items on two other instances totaling P244,500. Santos
then demanded the petitioner for the payment of the amount thru a letter dated July 25, 1996.
Petitioner then gave Santos two checks amounting to P30,000 as partial payment, which was
later on bounced for being drawn against insufficient funds and against a closed account.
Petitioner was thereafter charged with the crime of estafa under Article 315 (1)(b) of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) in an Information filed before the Regional Trial Court.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found the petitioner guilty for the crime of estafa under
Article 315 (1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code. Upon appeal, the court affirmed the RTC decision
with modification as to the penalty. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
maintaining that the element of misappropriation or conversion was not proved, thus her liability
should only be civil in nature. The motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the petition for
certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether the failure to return the pieces of jewelry already constitutes misappropriation or
conversion in the crime of estafa?

HELD:

The Supreme Court found no merit in the petition. The essence of estafa under Art. 315
(1)(b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received, to the
prejudice of the owner. The words convert and misappropriate connote an act of using or
disposing of anothers property as if it were ones own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use
different from that agreed upon.

Being bound by the agency for the sale of jewelry, the demand for the return of the thing
delivered in trust and the failure of the petitioner to account for it are circumstantial evidence of
misappropriation. The petitioner admitted that she received the pieces of jewelry on commission
and likewise admitted that she failed to return the items or their value on Santos demand.

The petition was denied by the Supreme Court and affirmed the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
JOY LEE RECUERDO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. [G.R. No.
168217, June 27, 2006]

FACTS:

Sometime in December 1993, Joy Lee Recuerdo, petitioner, purchased 2.19 carat
diamond round stone in white gold setting amounting to P220,000 and one piece of loose 1.55
carat marquez diamond with a value of P130,000 from Yolanda Floro, engaged in the buying
and selling of jewelry. The petitioner then and there issued ten post-dated checks each in the
amount of P22,000 against Unitrust Development Bank and ten post-dated checks in the
amount of P13,000 drawn against PCI Bank. Once again, Recuerdo purchased another set of
jewelries worth P768,000 by issuing another seven postdated checks as down payment and six
post dated checks drawn against Prudential Bank representing the balance.

Upon presentment for encashment, the six Prudential Bank checks were all dishonored
for having drawn against closed accounts. Floro then made formal demands requiring petitioner
to pay the amounts represented by the dishonored checks, to which Recuerdo continuously
refused to pay the value of the purchased jewelries. Complainant then filed a case against
petitioner.

The trial court convicted the petitioner of two counts of estafa under Art. 315 (2)(d) of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC). Upon appeal, the court affirmed with modification the decision of
the trial court. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration contending that she acted in good
faith contrary to the finding of the trial court and the appellate courts that she acted with deceit
when she drew and delivered the checks in payment of the jewelries. The Court of Appeals (CA)
denied the motion.

The petitioner filed an instant petition with the Supreme Court contending that she acted
in good faith and exerted her utmost efforts to confer with the private complainant to settle her
obligations. She points out that she made monthly cash payments to lessen her civil liability and
continued to make payments even during the pendency of the case in the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether good faith could be raised as a defense in the crime of estafa?

HELD:

The crime of estafa under Art. 315 (2)(d) of the RPC has the following essential
elements: (1) a check is postdated or issued in payment of an obligation contracted at the time it
is issued; (2) lack of insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3) damage to the payee
thereof. It is criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check which is made punishable and
not the non-payment of a debt.

Estafa is a felony committed with dolo (with malice). Under Art 315 (2)(d) of the RPC,
malice and specific intent to defraud are required. There can be no estafa if the accused acted
in good faith because good faith negates malice and deceit. Good faith is a defense to a charge
of estafa by postdating a check.

In the present case, the petitioners insistence of her good faith was raised as a mere
afterthought in a last ditch effort to secure her acquittal. It was the specter of long prison term
which jolted petitioner into making remittances to the private complainant, after the CA affirmed
the decision of the trial court and increased the penalty meted on her, and not because she had
acted in good faith in her transactions with the private complainant.

The reimbursement or restitution of the offended party of the sums swindled by the
petitioner does not extinguish the criminal liability of the latter. It only extinguishes pro tanto the
civil liability. Moreover, estafa is a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the
State on its own motion even though complete reparation had been made for the loss or
damage suffered by the offended party. Subsequent payments do not obliterate the criminal
liability incurred.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.

ANICIA RAMOS-ANDAN, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. [G.R.

No. 136388, March 14, 2006]

FACTS:

Petitioner and Potenciana Nieto approached Elizabeth Calderon and offered to buy the
latters diamond ring, to which she agreed to sell the ring. In turn, Potenciana gave her three
postdated checks, as evidenced by the signed receipts as full payment of the said jewelry.
When Calderon deposited the checks upon maturity, they bounced for the reason Account
Closed. She then sent Potenciana a demand letter but she refused.

The petitioner maintained that she signed the receipt and the checks merely as witness
to the transaction between Elizabeth and Potenciana. The trial court found the petitioner guilty
and held that while Potenciana who issued the checks, nonetheless, it was petitioner who
induced Elizabeth to accept them and who endorsed the same, thus, she cannot escape liability.
On appeal, The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC. Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration, but this was denied by the Appellate Court. Hence, this instant petition with
the Supreme Court. Petitioner contends that not being the drawer of the checks, she cannot be
held criminally liable.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner, not being the drawer of the checks, cannot be held criminally
liable?

HELD:

Potenciana was the drawer of the checks; however, it was petitioner who directly and
personally negotiated the same. It was she who signed the receipt evidencing the sale and
handed the checks to Elizabeth and endorsed them as payment for the ring. It is thus clear that
petitioner and Potenciana acted in concert for the purpose of inducing and defrauding Elizabeth
to part with her jewelry.

The elements of the offense defined and penalized by Art 315 (2)(d) of the Revised
Penal Code are: (1) postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at
the time the check was issued; (2) lack of insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3) the
payee was not informed by the offender and the payee did not know that the offender had no
funds or insufficient funds. All these elements are present in this case.

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the assailed decision.

ANITA CHUA, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent [G.R. Nos. 150926
and 30, March 6, 2006]

FACTS:

On November 25, 1982, petitioner Anita Chua issued to Araceli Estigoy, complainant,
five postdated checks drawn against Pacific Bank in payment of imported items. Petitioner went
again to Estigoys house to purchase some imported items and issued eight postdated checks
drawn against the same bank. On their due dates, complainant deposited the checks but the
same were dishonored. She then notified the petitioner and demanded payment, to which the
petitioner failed to redeem or pay the amounts of the checks.

Appellant admitted using the checks but interposed the defense that she issued the
checks as collateral and by way of accommodation of the complainant who requested for the
checks.

The trial court found the petitioner guilty for the crime of estafa. On appeal to the Court
of Appeals (CA) the petitioner contended that her liability was purely civil because her
transaction with private complainant merely involved an accounting and liquidation of civil
obligations. The CA affirmed with modification as to the penalty imposed.

ISSUE:

Whether issuance of unfunded checks as collateral or security for the goods does not
constitute estafa under Art 315 (2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)?

HELD:

The elements of estafa under Art. 315 (2) (d) of the RPC are: (1) that the offender
postdated or issued a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time of the postdating
or issuance; (2) that at the time of the issuance of the check, the offender had no funds in the
bank or the funds deposited were insufficient to cover the amount of the check; and (3) that the
payee has been defrauded.

All the elements of estafa are present in this case. Petitioners defense is not worthy of
credence. Trial court correctly found and affirmed by CA clearly showed that they were intended
as payments for the items she obtained from complainant. Complainant would not have parted
with his goods in exchange of bum checks. It is likewise contrary to ordinary human experience
and to sound business practice for petitioner to issue so many unfunded checks as collateral
or by way of accommodation. As an experienced businesswoman, petitioner could not have
been so nave as not to know that she could be held criminally liable for issuing unfunded
checks.

The Supreme Court denied the petition for lack of merit.

BIENVENIDO GONZALUDO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
[G.R. No. 150910, February 6, 2006]

FACTS:

When Ulysses Viillafor died, his mistress, Rosemarie Gelogo, offered to sell the 2-storey
house of the former to Bienvenido Gonzaludo, petitioner, for a cheap price. For lack of funds,
petitioner then convinced spouses Gregg Canlas and Melba Canlas, to buy the same despite
knowledge that Gelogo was not the lawful owner of the house.

On January 20, 1993, Gelogo and Gregg Canlas, executed a Deed of Sale and signed
as Rosemarie Villaflor and represented herself to be the lawful wife of the deceased. Canlas
then acquired all of Rosemaries rights and interest on the subject house.

Anita Manlangit, lawful wife of the deceased then sued Gelogo, Gonzaludo and Canlas
spouses for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document in the Regional
Trail Court. For Gelogo remained at large, the spouses were acquitted and the petitioner was
convicted for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents. On appeal,
the appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of merit and affirmed the trial courts judgment.
The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals, hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the defendant could still be separately convicted of other offense when there is
failure to support the charge of one of the component offenses?

HELD:

To secure conviction for estafa under Article 315 (2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), the following requisites must concur: (1)that the accused made false pretenses or
fraudulent representations as to his power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions; (2)that such false pretenses or fraudulent representations
were made prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud.; (3)that such false
pretenses and fraudulent representations constitute the very cause which induced the offended
party to part with his money or property; and (4)that as a result thereof, the offended party
suffered damage.

While it may be said that there was fraud or deceit committed by Rosemarie in this case,
such fraud or deceit was employed upon the Canlas spouses who where the one who parted
with their money when they purchased the house. Since the deceit or fraud was not the efficient
cause and did not induce Anita Manlangit to part with her property in this case, Rosemarie
cannot be held liable for estafa.

For an accused to be convicted of the complex crime of estafa through falsification of

public document, all the elements of the two crimes of estafa and falsification of public
document must exist.

The Supreme Court acquitted the petitioner for the complex crime of Estafa through
Falsification of Public Document but found guilty of the crime of Falsification of Public
Document.
SYLVIA PEREZ, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
[G.R. No. 150443, January 20, 2006]

FACTS:

The accused, Sylvia Perez was employed in Storck Products Inc. as an Accounts
Receivable and Recording Clerk. She was in charged with the receipt of cash replacement after
a check collected by a salesman, bounces and then turns over the cash replacement to the
treasurer.

Sometime during the period in October 1990 to September 1993, Perez received the
cash amount of P148,160.35 as collection from the company salesman, with intent to defraud,
unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
misappropriate, misapply and convert the same to her own personal use and benefit, and
despite demands to turn over and remit the said amount, she failed and refused to the damage
and prejudice of the company.

After confrontation with the manager, Baretto, and Perez, the former received a
promissory note from Perezs husband requesting that the company allow petitioner to return
the money on installment. Baretto advised Perez and her husband to execute an affidavit of
undertaking that she would return the money to Storck. Perez also paid P20,000 as initial
payment. However, petitioner did not make any further payment prompting Storck to file the
complaint for estafa in the trial court.

The trial court found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa.
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) held that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable
doubt that Perez received the cash replacements from Storck salesmen and that she failed to
turn over the money to Storcks treasurer. Perezs failure to turn over the money she received
constituted misappropriation of the money for her own benefit to Storcks damage and prejudice.

ISSUE:

Whether the first element of the crime of estafa was present?

HELD:

The elements of estafa under paragraph 1(b), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
are: (1) the offender receives the money, goods or other personal property in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver or
to return the same; (2) the offender misappropriates or converts such money or property or
denies receiving such money or property; (3) the misappropriation or conversion or denial is to
the prejudice of another; and (4) the offended party demands that the offender return the money
or property.

Ventonilla, Santiago and Sincero confirmed that the salesman would turn over cash
replacements of bounced checks to Perez. Perezs responsibility was to turn over the cash
replacements to the treasurer. However, Perez failed to turn over the cash replacements to the
treasurer.

The Court found no reason to deviate from the factual findings of the trial court and the
CA. It is a settled rule that factual findings of the trial courts, are entitled to great weight and
respect by the Court, particularly when the CA affirmed the findings. Trial Courts are in the best
position to assess the witnesses credibility and to appreciate their truthfulness, honesty and
candor. Further, it is unlikely that Perez would pay P20,000 and undertake to pay the remaining
balance if she did not really receive the money from the salesmen. Perezs incredible claims
only strengthen the case against her.

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court of
Appeals.

ROMEO G. LORENZO, Petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

[G.R. No. 152335 December 19, 2005]

FACTS:

On September 21, 1992, petitioner Romeo Lorenzo offered to sell to Myrla Minngoy a
house for P150,000. Then she went to petitioners house to inspect the property. Petitioner then
told Minggoy that the property was mortgaged with the GSIS and if she agreed to buy the
property, she would have to continue making the mortgage payments. Upon seeing the
statement of account, Minggoy then agreed to buy the house and then promised to pay him on
January 14, 1993. On said date, Minggoy paid petitioner the amount of P150,000 in return for
the Special Power of Attorney, Deed of Transfer of Rights, Waiver of Rights, Deed of Absolute
Sale and Sinumpaang Salaysay of petitioner. However, when Minggoy sought to occupy the
property, petitioner refused to leave the house. After failed efforts, Minggoy filed a case against
petitioner and his wife.

The trial court convicted the accused of estafa under Article 315, Paragraph 2(a) of the
Revised Penal Code. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the trial courts decision in
toto and denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner. The aggrieved party then
filed a petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether accused is guilty of the crime of estafa when there was absence of deceit in the
commission of the offense?

HELD:

To convict petitioner of the crime of estafa, the following elements must be present: (1)
there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; (2) such false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud; (3) the offended party must have relied on the false pretense,
fraudulent act, or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property
because of the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means; and (4) as a result thereof,
the offended party suffered damage.
 The evidence on record plainly shows that the elements of the offense are present in the
case. Petitioner fraudulently offered to sell to private complainant his rights over the subject
property although such rights had been lost by virtue of the cancellation of his Deed of
Conditional Sale with the GSIS. Relying on petitioners misrepresentations, private complainant
paid him P150,000.00 as consideration but she was never able to gain possession of the
property given petitioners refusal to vacate the same. Clearly, petitioner is guilty of the offense.

The Supreme Court granted in part the petition and modified the CAs decision affirming
in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court by deleting order of indemnification of P150,000.

AMELITA DELA CRUZ, Petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. [G.R.
No. 150439, July 29, 2005]

FACTS:
Amelita Dela Cruz, petitioner is a secretary and payroll clerk at Mandarin Seafood
Village, Inc. since 1989. Her duty was to compute the payroll based on the time card, request
the treasurer for the issuance and enhancement of the corresponding checks, place the money
on the pay slip together with two other persons, and afterwards distribute the same to the
employees.

The president then ordered an audit due to the receipt to information about the lifestyle
of the petitioner, she was able to buy a car and build her own house. The personnel manager,
Manuel Matammu, then computed the total acknowledged pay slips and compared it with the
total amount of the checks withdrawn, he found out that there was an overdrawn amount of
P352,427.31. After discovering the discrepancy he immediately reported the same to the
Administration and submitted the report therein instructed. Petitioner was not able to explain the
mistake in the payroll computation to Mr Matammu because the brother of her husband died
and she was not able to return for work afterwards because she became ill. Mr. Matammu then
recommended that the proper complaint be filed in court and in turn he was instructed to make
further audit.

The trial court relied on circumstantial evidence as proved by prosecution and found the
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa in the amount of P352,427.31.
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision in toto. Petitioner claims the CA
erred when if affirmed in toto the decision knowing the said decision is contrary to law and
jurisprudence, and that the evidence presented is not sufficient to convict her beyond
reasonable doubt. Hence, this petition to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether over-computation of the payroll was committed with a view to misappropriate to

hold the petitioner guilty of the crime of estafa?

HELD:

The crime of estafa through misappropriation or conversion as defined in and penalized

under Article 315, paragraph 1(b), of the Revised Penal Code. The elements of the said crime
are: 1) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on
commission or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of, or to return, the same; 2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such
money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; 3) that such
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and 4) that there is a
demand made by the offended party on the offender.

The Court found that the circumstantial evidence present in the case at bar are grossly
insufficient to sustain a conviction. Based on the testimonies, it is noteworthy that the petitioner
had no hand in the actual issuance of the checks, and more importantly, with the withdrawal of
the money from the bank. While it was the accused who computed the payroll of the employees,
nevertheless, she was not the only person who had access to the money. Also, there has been
no complaint emanating from the employees regarding the salaries they have been receiving.

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and acquitted the
petitioner on the ground of reasonable doubt.

PABLITO MURAO and NELIO HUERTAZUELA, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent. [G.R. No. 141485, June 30, 2005]

FACTS:

Petitioner Pablito Amurao, sole owner of Lorna Murao Industrial Commercial Enterprises
(LMICE), a company engaged in the business of selling and refilling fire extinguishers. Petitioner
Nelio Huertazuela is the branch manager of LMICE in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan.

On September 1, 1994 entered into a Dealership Agreement with Chito Federico for the
marketing, distribution and refilling fire extinguishers. Failing to comply with the conditions of
said agreement, Federico was still allowed to act as part-time sales agent for LMICE entitled to
a percentage commission from the sale of fire extinguishers. Federico claimed that he was
entitled to a commission equivalent to 50% of the gross sales he had made on behalf of LMICE
while petitioners maintained that he should receive only 30% of the net sales.

Federico then facilitated the transaction with the City Government of Puerto Princesa for
the refill of 202 fire extinguishers, 99 of which was undertaken in the first purchase order. Upon
receipt of check as payment for the first purchase amounting to P300,572, Huertazuela then
deposited it to the current account of LMICE with PCIBank. Federico then demanded the
amount of P154,500 as his commission from the payment of the first purchase order to which
Huertazuela refused to pay since both of them could not agree on the proper amount thereof.
Federico then filed a case against the petitioners for the crime of estafa with the Regional Trial
Court.

The trial court found the petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals of
the crime of estafa defined in Article 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code. Upon appeal, the
Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with the modification as to the penalty. When the CA denied the
Motion for Reconsideration, the petitioners filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:

Whether the first essential element of crime of estafa includes the relation of agent and
principal?

HELD:

The Court held that two essential elements of the crime of estafa by misappropriation or
conversion under Article 315(1)(b) are absent, namely: (1) that money, goods or other personal
property be received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under
any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same; and (2) that
there be a misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender.

The right to a commission does not make private complainant Federico a joint owner of
the money paid to LMICE but establishes the relation of agent and principal. All profits made
and any advantage gained by an agent in the execution of his agency should belong to the
principal. Since LMICE was the rightful owner of the entire proceeds of the check payment from
the City Government of Puerto Princesa, then the petitioners who collected the payment on
behalf of LMICE did not receive the same or any part thereof in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return,
the same to Federico, thus there is no fiduciary relationship existed between the petitioners and
Federico. A fiduciary relationship is an essential element of estafa by misappropriation or
conversion, without which the accused could not have committed estafa.

The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals and
thereby acquitted the petitioners for their actions did not constitute the crime of estafa by
conversion or misappropriation under Article 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code.

ROBERT CRISANTO D. LEE, Petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ATOZ
TRADING CORPORATION, Respondents. [G.R. No. 157781, April 11, 2005]

FACTS:

Atoz Trading Corporation is a stock corporation engaged in the trading of animal feeds,
feed supplements, raw materials and ingredients for feed mills. Petitioner Robert Lee,
corporations sales manager, is in charged to handle the Ocean Feed Mills account since he
was able to bring the said company as one of Atozs clients. Transactions between the two
companies were coursed though the petitioner and payments to Atoz were addressed to Lee
through telegraphic transfers to either Atoz Trading and/or Robert Lee.

When petitioner ceased reporting for work, Atoz audited some of the accounts handled
by him. It was then discovered that Ocean Feed Mills unpaid account in the amount of
P318,672 thus notified Ocean Feed Mills that petitioner was no longer connected with the
corporation, and advised it to verify its accounts. Ocean Feed Mills then notified the company
that they have already fully settled their accounts and even made overpayments.

The company president Johhny Jaotegan went to the petitioners house and tried to
locate the petitioner and thereupon demanded him to remit the payments made by Ocean Feed
Mills to Aroz. The company then filed a case against the petitioner for the crime of estafa as
defined under Art. 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code.

The trial court found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of nine counts of the
crime of estafa. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal and affirmed the
assailed decision. Petitioner contends that he could not be convicted of the crime of estafa since
the element of formal demand before the filing of the cases against him is lacking, hence the
filing of the petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether demand must be made formally as required in the 4th essential element of
crime of estafa?

HELD:

The fourth element of estafa under Article 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code, that
demand was made by the offended party, was made by the offended party. The respondent
companys President Jaotegan along with his counsel and some policemen, went to petitioners
house and there he was asked to remit said sums of money and to return the company car and
a cellular phone. Earlier, they encountered difficulty in locating petitioner after his continued
failure to report for work.

Prior demand need not be made formally. It may be verbal. Demand is not an element of
the felony or a condition precedent to the filing of a criminal complaint for estafa. In a
prosecution for estafa, demand is not necessary where there is evidence of misappropriation or
conversion. However, failure to account upon demand, for funds or property held in trust, is
circumstantial evidence of misappropriation.

It must be noted that the specific word "demand" need not be used to show that
demand had, indeed, been made upon the person charged of the offense. A query as to the
whereabouts of the money, such as the one proven in the case at bench, is tantamount to a
demand.

The Supreme Court denied the petition for lack of merit.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. aloma reyes and trichia mae reyes (AT
LARGE), accused. ALOMA REYES, Appellant. [G.R. No. 154159, March 31, 2005]

FACTS:

Petitioner, engaged in wholesale of softdrinks, started borrowing money from private

complainant. Whenever she borrowed money, she replaced it with checks. However, she
suffered business reverses and closed shop.
 To pay her outstanding obligations with private complainant, the latter made her issue 16
Negotiable Order to Withdraw (NOW) checks as installment payments. The last installment was
to fall on March 31, 1998. None of the checks were supposed to exceed the amount of P13,000
each.

Private complainant then deposited the NOW check dated August 31, 1997 to his
Metrobank account on September 1, 1997. On September 2, 1997, Metrobank returned the
instrument with the notation Account Closed.

Sometime in February 1998, petitioners came to the complainant and discounted their
personal check amounting to P280,000 dated March 31, 1998. The NOW check was then
presented for payment on April 2, 1998 but was returned to Metrobank on April 3, 1998 for the
reason account closed. He immediately notified appellant but the latter allegedly refused to
replace it with cash. He sent a demand letter by registered mail but appellant did not heed his
demand. He thus filed the instant case.

The court a quo convicted petitioner upon finding that the prosecution had sufficiently
proven the essential elements of estafa. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether the knowledge on the insufficiency of funds negates the element of deceit in
estafa through bouncing checks?

HELD:

In the case of Pacheco v. Court of Appeals, it was held that there is no estafa through
bouncing checks when it is shown that private complainant knew that the drawer did not have
sufficient funds in the bank at the time the check was issued to him. Such knowledge negates
the element of deceit and constitutes a defense in estafa through bouncing checks.

In the case at bar, private complainant knew that appellant did not only have insufficient
funds; he knew her NOW account was closed at the time he allegedly discounted the subject
check. The evidence on record shows that private complainant deposited the NOW check dated
August 31, 1997 to his Metrobank account on September 1, 1997. On the next day, Metrobank
returned the instrument with the notation Account Closed. Hence, as early as September 2,
1997 private complainant already knew that appellants NOW Account had been closed.

If the subject check was issued to him in February 1998, as he alleges, at the time he
already knew that the NOW account where the subject NOW check is charged was closed. The
NOW checks on record are irrefragable pieces of evidence that private complainant knew the
NOW account was closed.

Appellant issued the subject check in payment of a pre-existing obligation. When the
NOW account was closed on March 26, 1997, private complainant already had in his
possession the NOW check in question. It was one of the 16 NOW checks previously issued by
private complainant before the closure of the NOW account. No deceit or damage attended the
transaction. There being none in the case at bar, there can be no estafa.
 The Supreme Court acquitted Aloma Reyes of estafa. The assailed sentence of the
Regional Trial Court was reversed and set aside. The case was remanded to the court a quo for
the determination of appellants civil liability.

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