JANUARY

Republic of the Philippines vs Alfredo De Borja

G.R. No. 187448

Jan. 9 2017

Facts: The Republic through the PCGG filed a complaint against De Borja alleging that the latter was the
dummy/agent of Geronimo Velasco the president and chairman of the board of directors of PNOC a
corporation whose function is to charter agreements with vessels and as industry practice the PNOC
should have address commissions. Velasco was accused to have diverted the address commissions to
DRMC a corporation he owns and government funds to buy crude oil

tankers to service PNOC. De Borja was Velascos nephew and was accused to receive the

address commissions for Velasco. The Court asked Verano the witness for the Republic if he knew any
instance that would show that De Borja collects address commissions for Velasco. He stated that there
was a time when Velasco instructed him to deliver an envelope to De Borja but he did not open the said
envelope therefore he did not know what it contains. De Borja filed a demurrer of evidence in 2005
which the Sandigan Bayan granted. It also stated that the Republic was not able to present sufficient
evidence to prove that De Borja is liable

. Issue: Whether or not the Sandigan Bayan erred in granting De Borjas Demurrer to Evidence

Ruling: No according to the Supreme Court the Sandigan Bayan was erroneous in granting the demurrer
of evidence. A motion for a demurrer of evidence is a motion to dismiss a case on the ground that there
is no sufficient evidence to support it. It is a remedy that is available to the defendant that questions
whether or not the plaintiff was able to establish a prima facie case. The Supreme Court ruled on the
merits of the case and found that indeed the Republic was not able to produce any sufficient evidence
that would make De Borja liable for damages since Verano the witness presented by the Republic did not
know the contents of the envelope which Velasco instructed to be delivered to De Borja since Verano did
not open the envelope

Trinidad Gamboa Roces vs Judge Ranhel Perez

A.M. No. MTJ-16-1887

Jan. 9, 2017

Facts: Roces filed a complaint of gross ignorance of the law against Judge Perez for not rendering a
decision in the unlawful detainer and forcible entry cases that she filed. According to Roces Judge Perez
was not able to render a on her unlawful detainer and forcible entry cases within the 30 day period and
10 months has lapsed before Judge Perez rendered a decision. Judge Perez offered his deepest apologies
and reasoned that other matters had distracted him from rendering a decision. The OCA found Judge
Perez guilty of gross ignorance of the law admonished him and gave him a stern warning.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Perez should be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law

. Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court cited Art. 8 Section 15 of the Constitution stating that lower courts
must decide or resolve cases within three months from the date of the submission of the case to the said
courts. Complaints for forcible entry and unlawful detainer have a 30 day period to be decided or
resolved from the date of the submission of the latest position papers or affidavits of the parties
according to Section 10 of the Rules on Summary Procedure. While Sections 2 and 5 of Canon 6 of the
New Judicial Code of Conduct enjoins judges to devote their time for their professional activities and
render decisions fairly, efficiently and with reasonable promptness. The Supreme Court found that Judge
Perez was too flimsy and that his reason of inexperience as a judge is not enough persuasive because it
his duty to decide cases within their reglementary period as mandated by the law. He is then fined with
Php. 10,000 and given a stern warning.

Annaliza Galindo and Evelinda Pinto vs COA

G.R.No. 210788

Jan. 10, 2017

Facts: Galindo and Pinto who were COA personnel in MWSS were found guilty by COA of gross
misconduct and violation of reasonable office rules and regulations. Diosdado M. Allado MWSS
Administrator alleged that Galindo and Pinto had received claims and cash advances amounting to
Php. 1.5 million and Php. 3.5 million put in different checks and was not submitted to the accounting
office. These claims did not also undergo the usual procedure of MWSS. According to COA COA
personnels cannot receive fringe benefits by virtue of COA Memorandum No. 89-954 dated January 9,
1989.

Issue: Whether or not Galindo and Pinto were entitled to their claims

Ruling: No the Supreme Court stated that a petition for the disciplinary action of COA must be
appealed to the Civil Service Commission. The Supreme Court cited the Administrative Code of 1987
specifically Section 47 which provides that the Civil Service Commission may decide upon appeal all
administrative disciplinary cases which have a more than 30 day suspension, dismissal from office or
fine equivalent to salary of 30 days and demotion in rank, office, salary or transfer for their penalty.
The Supreme Court also stated that COA did not commit grave abuse of discretion because it found
prima facie evidence against Galinda and Pinto
Crisanto Rey Aala vs Hon. Rey T. Uy

G.R. No. 202781

Jan. 10, 2017

Facts: Crisanto Aala and Jorge Ferido residents of Tagum City Davao Del Norte opposed an ordinance
which puts new schedule on market values and assessment and classification of real properties in Tagum
City. According to them the ordinance violates the Local Government Code particularly Sections 130(a),
198(a and b), 199(b) and 201. Aala and Ferido alleged that Sections III C (1),(2),(3) and Sections III G 1(b)
and 4(g) divided Tagum City into different zones and assessed market values of real properties without
taking into account their actual use and essential elements. The ordinance also makes the properties
have real estate taxes which Tagum City cannot afford.

Issue: Whether or not the opposition case of Aala and Ferido will prosper

Ruling: No. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. According to the Supreme Court as aggrieved
taxpayers Aala and Ferido must have filed the appeal first to the Secretary of Justice by virtue of Section
187 of the Local Government Code. It states that taxpayers may raise a question of legality or
constitutionality against a local tax ordinance by way of appeal to the Secretary of Justice within 30 days
from the effectivity of the local tax ordinance. The Secretary of Justice is then given 60 days to decide the
case if he does not act on it then the aggrieved taxpayer may go to court. If the Secretary of Justice
decided the case within the prescribed time the taxpayer is then given 30 days to go to court. The appeal
must not suspend the effectivity of the local tax ordinance or the accrual of payments and fees for such.
The Supreme Court emphasized the doctrine of the hierarchy of courts which prevents parties from
resorting to the Supreme Court immediately when relief may be sought to the lower courts the reason
behind this is to prevent unnecessary demands to the Supreme Court's time and devotion which should
be focused to the matters within its exclusive jurisdiction and for the congestion of the court dockets as
well

Cristina Barsolo vs Social Security System

G.R. No. 187950

Jan. 11, 2017

 Facts: Cristina Barsolo alleged that her husband's death is work related and is entitled to death
benefits based P.D No. 626 since he got his illness after he left his work as a seaman in Vela
International Marine Ltd. Barsolo claims it on the SSS which denied the claim because there was no
longer an employer-employee relationship between Barsolo's husband and Vela when he got his
illness. Barsolo appealed to the Employee's Compensation Commission but was denied because she
wasn't able to establish that her husband's illness was gotten during his work with Vela

. Issue: Whether or not Barsolo's husband is entitled to death benefits?

Ruling: No. The SC stated that Annex A of the Amended Rules on Employee Compensation sets the
standards for the giving of death benefits. The illness must be listed as an occupational disease, the
work of the employee muat involve the risks of getting the illness, the illness was caused by the
employee's exposure to the said risks, such exposure was during the time that it was necessary and
there was no negligence on the part of the employee. Barsolo's husband died of cardio vascular
disease therefore the disease must be known during employment and that the strain of work has
brought about the disease, the strain must cause a severe attack, it must be followed within 24 hours
of cardiac assault to constitute causal relationship and if the employee was asymptomatic before
doing the work and showed signs of cardiac injury while doing his work there may be causal
relationship. Barsolo was not able present sufficient evidence to satisfy the standards set by the rules
on employment compensation

People of the Philippines vs Jeffrey Hirang

G.R. No. 223528

Jan. 11 2017

Facts: Hirang was accused of qualified trafficking by transporting and providing into large scale, minors
for prostitution. The prosecution stated that the minors were invited by Hirang for a good time and good
earning. The NBI had a raid in the ChowKing restaurant where Hirang and some of his korean friends to
whom Hirang was trading the minors, were meeting. Hirang denied being involved in sexual trade.

Issue: Whether or not Hirang committed qualified trafficking

Ruling: Yes according to the Sc Hirang committed qualified trafficking based on Sec. 6 of RA 9208. The
law defines trafficking of person as the transportation, receipt or harboring of persons without the
person's consent by the use of force, fraud, coercion, deception, abuse of power or position and taking
advantage of the vulnerabilty of the person. In the case at bar Hirang took advantage of the vulnerability
of the minors through the guarantee of good time and financial gain.
Heirs of Pablo Feliciano Jr. vs Land Bank of the Philippines

G.R. No. 215290

Jan. 11, 2017

Facts: The Feliciano heirs are co-owners of a 300 ha parcel of land in Camarines Sur. The other 135 ha
portion of the land was classified as un-irrigated rice land. It was subjected to P.D 27 and a certificate of
land transfer was given to 84 tenant beneficiaries in 1973 and were issued emancipation patents in 1989
the Land Bank received the covering the 135 ha land from DAR. DAR valued the land with 1.3 m which
the Feliciano heirs rejected. Proceedings from the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform up to the RTC
were held for the valuation of the 135 ha land. The RTC valued the land with 7.7 m and that Land Bank
must pay the Feliciano heirs. The CA amended the RTC ruling stating that Land must only pay the
Feliciano heirs 1.8 m since it has already paid the heirs before

. Issue: Whether or not the 135 ha land must be valued as such.

Ruling: No, The SC stated that the Rtc and the Ca should have computed the just compensation of the
subject land in accordance to RA. 6657 the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. It states that the land
must have a just compensation that is valued according to its character from the time of the taking or
the time when the landowner was deprived of its benefit. Further the Land Bank received the claim
folder for the land during 1997 prior to July 1 2009 in accordance to DAR AO 2 the SC stated that RA
6657 should be applied. The SC directed the RTC and the CA to compute the just compensation must be
valued at the time of the taking, the just compensation must arrive in accordance with RA 6657, the
interest may be computed as warranted by the circumstances of the case in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence

Land Bank of the Philippines vs Heirs of Lorenzo Taada and Expedita Ebarle

G.R. No. 170506

Jan 11, 2017

Facts: The heirs were owners of parcels of land that were included in the land reform program. The Land
Bank put a value of 223,837 and 192,610 on the subject lands. The heirs alleged that the value was too
low. The RTC then valued the land as 150,000 per hectare.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC used the correct method in computing the just compensation for the land.

Ruling: No, the SC stated that sec. 17 of R.A 6657 provides guidelines for computing just compensation
the factors that should be followed should be the acquisition cost of the land, the current value of the
properties, its nature, actual use and income, tax declarations, the assessment made by the assessors,
social economic benefits of farmers and government property and non payment of taxes and loans
secured from any government financing institution. DAR provided for a formula to follow in DAR
Administrative Order no. 6 series 1992 wherein the land value = (capitalized net income x 0.6) +
(comparable sales 0.3) + (market value x 0.1) if comparable sales is not present then land value =
(capitalized net income x 0.9) + (market value x 0.1) if capitalized net income is not present then land
value= (comparable sales x 0.9) + (market value x 0.1) if both capitalized net income and comparable
sales are not present then land value= market value 2. The RTC is mandated to follow the rules set by
DAR for the valuation of properties

Eduardo R. Alicias jr. vs Attys Myrna V. Macatangay, Karin Litz Zerma, Ariel G. Ronquillo, and Cesar D.
Buenaflor

A.C No. 7478

Jan. 11, 2017

Facts:

Alicias a professor in U.P filed a complaint against Dean Leticia P. Ho in the CSC for the violation of R.A
6713 which was dismissed by the CSC. Alicias filed for resolution but did not receive the copy of its
decision even though he notified the CSC of his new residence. The CSC therefore resolved the case
without notifying Alicias. Alicias then filed a complaint of violating the lawyer's oath or code of
professional responsibility, gross neglect of duty and gross ignorance of the law against the attorneys
who all became directors of the CSC-OLA. He stated that they did not conduct full evaluation of the
records, did not hear the arguments of both parties, ignored his evidence, erroneously applied
jurisprudence, denied him due process by not giving him the copy of CSC's comment and willfully did not
give him the copy of his resolution. The IBP decided in favor of the attorneys stating that Alicias'
evidence was not enough.

Issue:

Whether or not the IBP's decision was correct

Ruling:

No, The SC stated that IBP does not have the jurisdiction to decide the case since it is administrative. R.A
No. 6770 Section 15 states that the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction and powers to investigate and
prosecute complaints by any person against an ac, public officer or agency when their act is illegal, unjust
or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizant of the Sandiganbayan. The Constitution
gives the Ombudsman administrative authority to investigate or prosecute complaints about the unjust,
illegal or inefficient acts of any government official.
Rodolfo Laygo and Willie Laygo vs Municipal Mayor of Solano Nueva Viscaya

G.R. No. 188488

Jan. 11, 2017

Facts: Aniza Bandrang a sublessee in two market stalls of Rodolfo Laygo and Willie Laygo got evicted
therefore she complained to the Sanggunian and to Mayor Dickson the Municipal Mayor of Solano about
her illegal sublease with the Laygos. The Laygos leased the market stalls from the municipal government.
It is illegal according to Bandrang because of the resolution 183-2004 passed by the Sanggunian which
prevents the sublease on Laygo's lease contract. The Sanggunian referred the matter to Mayor Dickson
stating that it already falls under his jurisdiction by virtue of a resolution the Sanggunian had passed.
Mayor Dickson failed to act on Bandrang's complaint leading Bandrang to file a writ of mandamus
against Mayor Dickson which the RTC granted.

Issue: Whether or not Mayor Dickson should act on the complaint of Bandrang based on the writ of
Mandamus and whether or not the agreement of the Laygos and the municipal government is a lease
contract

. Ruling: No, the Supreme Court stated that Mandamus is not proper because the privilege of operating a
market stall is under the dicretionary power of the city government. Mandamus is applicable when the
act that is sought for is mandated by the law to be done by the person, corporation or government
agency. The Laygos agreement with the municipal government is a lease contract making it fall under
resolution 183-2004 therefore it cannot be subleased

January 18, 2017

G.R. No. 219829

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
MONIR JAAFAR y TAMBUYONG, Accused-Appellant

Facts:

On September 10, 2009, a male civilian informant reported to Chief of Police, Police Superintendent
Alberto Capacio Larubis (Chief Larubis) that a certain "Mana" was selling methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu) at the port area barangay located just beside the police station. 5

Chief Larubis instructed SP04 Enrico Morales (SPO4 Morales) to form a team composed of SPO3
Tabunyag, PO3 Perez, P03 Hasim, PO2 Canete, PO2 Bobby Rey Bucoy (PO2 Bucoy), POl Insang,
and PO1 Marlon Takazi M. Look (PO1 Look) and to schedule a buy-bust operation the next day.
Jaafar met PO1 Look and the informant at the door of his house and asked them if they were buying
shabu. PO1 Look answered in the affirmative and gave Jaafar a marked 500.00 bill. Jaafar called
11 12

for Gani inside the house. Gani came out and handed Jaafar a sachet containing shabu. Jaafar
13 14

gave the sachet to PO1 Look, who immediately lit a cigarette-the pre-arranged signal agreed upon
by the buy-bust team. 15

The police officers rushed to arrest Jaafar, but he managed to escape. Jaafar threw away the
16

marked P500.00 bill as he ran. Eventually, the arresting officers caught up with him 30 meters away
17

from his house. 18

Meanwhile, Jaafar testified that he was at the internet cafe at 12:00 m.n. on September 11, 2009,
watching people play video games. He left after two (2) hours and made his way home. Upon
28 29

entering an alley, Jaafar saw six (6) persons headed towards him. One of them pointed a gun at
30

him and told him not to run. Out of fear, he ran towards the main road. However, the six (6)
31

persons, who turned out to be police officers, caught up with him. They conducted a body search
32

but found nothing since Jaafar was only wearing boxer shorts and at-shirt. Jaafar was detained after
his arrest and brought to the Office of the City Prosecutor at the City Hall of Isabela the next day. 33

The Regional Trial Court found that the prosecution clearly established all the elements of the crime
of illegal sale of drugs. Although the chain of custody rule was not strictly complied with, the trial
34

court ruled that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated shabu sachet had been duly
preserved. It applied the legal resumption of regularity in the performance of duties by the police
35

officers

In its Decision dated May 15, 2012, the Regional Trial Court convicted Jaafar for violation of Article
42

II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165. However, it acquitted Gani for insufficiency of evidence.

Jaafar filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals and raised the following errors: (1) the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (2) the arresting team violated the
chain of custody rule under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. Court of Appeals affirmed the
44

Regional Trial Court Decision

Issue:

whether the guilt of accusedappellant was proven beyond reasonable doubt despite the non-
observance of the required procedure under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165.

Ruling:

Court grants the appeal and acquits accused-appellant Monir Jaafar y Tambuyong.

In all prosecutions for violations of Republic Act No. 9165, the corpus delicti is the dangerous drug
itself. Its existence is essential to a judgment of conviction. Hence, the identity of the dangerous
54 55

drug must be clearly established.

The Court cannot merely gloss over the glaring procedural lapses committed by the police
officers, especially when what had been allegedly seized from accused-appellant was only
0.0604 grams of shabu. Recent cases have highlighted the need to ensure the integrity of
72 73
seized drugs in the chain of custody when only a miniscule amount of drugs had been
allegedly seized from the accused.

In People v. Holgado, this Court held that "[c]ourts must employ heightened scrutiny,
74

consistent with the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt, in evaluating cases
involving miniscule amounts of drugs . . . [as] they can be readily planted and tampered." 75

Non-observance of the mandatory requirements under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165
casts doubt on the integrity of the shabu supposedly seized from accused-appellant. This
creates reasonable doubt in the conviction of accused-appellant for violation of Article II,
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165.

FEBRUARY

Sps. Fernando vs. Northwest Airlines, Inc. G.R. No. 212038, February 08, 2017

Facts

Spouses Jesus and Elizabeth S. Fernando (Fernandos) are frequent flyers of Northwest
Airlines, Inc. and are holders of Elite Platinum World Perks Card, the highest category given
to frequent flyers of the carrier. They are known in the musical instruments and sports
equipments industry in the Philippines being the owners of JB Music and JB Sports with
outlets all over the country. They likewise own the five (5) star Hotel Elizabeth in Baguio City
and Cebu City, and the chain of Fersal Hotels and Apartelles in the country.

The Fernandos initiated the filing of the instant case which arose from two (2) separate
incidents: first, when Jesus Fernando arrived at Los Angeles (LA) Airport on December 20,
2001; second, when the Fernandos were to depart from the LA Airport on January 29, 2002.
The factual antecedents are as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarya

Arrival at Los Angeles Airport on December 20, 2001

Jesus Fernando arrived at the LA Airport via Northwest Airlines Flight No. NW02 to join his
family for Christmas, however upon arrival at the airport it was found out that his documents
reflect his return ticket as August 2001. So he approached a Northwest personnel who was
later identified as Linda Puntawongdaycha, but the latter merely glanced at his ticket without
checking its status with the computer and peremptorily said that the ticket has been used
and could not be considered as valid. He then explained to the personnel that he was about
to use the said ticket on August 20 or 21, 2001 on his way back to Manila from LA but he
could not book any seat because of some ticket restrictions so he, instead, purchased new
business class ticket on the said date. Hence, the ticket remains unused and perfectly valid.
The Immigration Officer brought Jesus Fernando to the interrogation room of the Immigration
and Naturalization Services (INS) where he was asked humiliating questions for more than
two (2) hours. When he was finally cleared by the Immigration Officer, he was granted only a
twelve (12)-day stay in the United States (US), instead of the usual six (6) months.

Departure from the LA Airport on January 29, 2002

When the Fernandos reached the gate area where boarding passes need to be presented,
Northwest supervisor Linda Tang stopped them and demanded for the presentation of their
paper tickets (coupon type). They failed to present the same since, according to them,
Northwest issued electronic tickets (attached to the boarding passes) which they showed to
the supervisor. In the presence of the other passengers, Linda Tang rudely pulled them out of
the queue. Elizabeth Fernando explained to Linda Tang that the matter could be sorted out by
simply verifying their electronic tickets in her computer and all she had to do was click and
punch in their Elite Platinum World Perks Card number. But Linda Tang arrogantly told them
that if they wanted to board the plane, they should produce their credit cards and pay for
their new tickets, otherwise Northwest would order their luggage off-loaded from the plane.
Exasperated and pressed for time, the Fernandos rushed to the Northwest Airline Ticket
counter to clarify the matter. They were assisted by Northwest personnel Jeanne Meyer who
retrieved their control number from her computer and was able to ascertain that the
Fernandos electronic tickets were valid and they were confirmed passengers on both NW
Flight No. 001 for Narita Japan and NW 029 for Manila on that day. To ensure that the
Fernandos would no longer encounter any problem with Linda Tang, Jeanne Meyer printed
coupon tickets for them who were then advised to rush back to the boarding gates since the
plane was about to depart. But when the Fernandos reached the boarding gate, the plane had
already departed. They were able to depart, instead, the day after, or on January 30, 2002, and
arrived in the Philippines on January 31, 2002.

Northwest airlines employees on the other hand claim that they were courteous and was
very kind enough to assist them. Meyer verified their bookings and printed paper tickets
for them. Unfortunately, when they went back to the boarding gate, the plane had departed.
Northwest offered alternative arrangements for them to be transported to Manila on the same
day on another airline, either through Philippine Airlines or Cathay Pacific Airways, but they
refused. Northwest also offered them free hotel accommodations but they, again, rejected the
offer Northwest then made arrangements for the transportation of the Fernandos from the
airport to their house in LA, and booked the Fernandos on a Northwest flight that would leave
the next day, January 30, 2002. On January 30, 2002, the Fernandos flew to Manila on
business class seats.

The Fernandos filed a claim for damages. RTC ruled in favour of Plainitiffs which was
affirmed by the CA.
Issues

(1) whether or not there was breach of contract of carriage and whether it was done In a
wanton, malevolent or reckless manner amounting to bad faith;

(2) whether or not Northwest is liable for the payment of moral damages and attorneys fees
and whether it is liable to pay more than that awarded by the RTC;

(3) whether or not Northwest is liable for the payment of exemplary damages; and

(4) whether or not Northwest Airlines is entitled to recover on its counterclaim.

Ruling

Yes. The Fernandos cause of action against Northwest stemmed from a breach of contract of
carriage. A contract is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one agrees to give
something or render some service to another for a consideration. There is no contract unless
the following requisites concur: (1) consent of the contracting parties; (2) an object certain
which is the subject of the contract; and (3) the cause of the obligation which is established.

A contract of carriage is defined as one whereby a certain person or association of persons

obligate themselves to transport persons, things, or goods from one place to another for a
fixed price.

Under Article 1732 of the Civil Code, this persons, corporations, firms, or associations
engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land,
water, or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public is called a common
carrier. Undoubtedly, a contract of carriage existed between Northwest and the Fernandos.
They voluntarily and freely gave their consent to an agreement whose object was the
transportation of the Fernandos from LA to Manila, and whose cause or consideration was
the fare paid by the Fernandos to Northwest.32

In Alitalia Airways v. CA, et al.,33 We held that when an airline issues a ticket to a passenger
confirmed for a particular flight on a certain date, a contract of carriage arises. The
passenger then has every right to expect that he would fly on that flight and on that date. If
he does not, then the carrier opens itself to a suit for breach of contract of carnage.
When Northwest confirmed the reservations of the Fernandos, it bound itself to transport the
Fernandos on their flight on 29 January 2002. We note that the witness of Northwest admitted
on cross-examination that based on the documents submitted by the Fernandos, they were
confirmed passengers on the January 29, 2002 flight.

In an action based on a breach of contract of carriage, the aggrieved party does not have to
prove that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent. All that he has to prove is the
existence of the contract and the fact of its non-performance by the carrier. As the aggrieved
party, the Fernandos only had to prove the existence of the contract and the fact of its non-
performance by Northwest, as carrier, in order to be awarded compensatory and actual
damages.

Therefore, having proven the existence of a contract of carriage between Northwest and the
Fernandos, and the fact of non-performance by Northwest of its obligation as a common
carrier, it is clear that Northwest breached its contract of carriage with the Fernandos. Thus,
Northwest opened itself to claims for compensatory, actual, moral and exemplary damages,
attorneys fees and costs of suit.39

Moreover, Article 1733 of the New Civil Code provides that common carriers, from the nature
of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by
them, according to all the circumstances of each case. Also, Article 1755 of the same Code
states that a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care
and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due
regard for all the circumstances

Yes. Northwest is in bad faith. While We agree that the discrepancy between the date of
actual travel and the date appearing on the tickets of the Fernandos called for some
verification, however, the Northwest personnel failed to exercise the utmost diligence in
assisting the Fernandos. The actuations of Northwest personnel in both subject incidents are
constitutive of bad faith.

On the first incident, Jesus Fernando even gave the Northwest personnel the number of his
Elite Platinum World Perks Card for the latter to access the ticket control record with the
airlines computer for her to see that the ticket is still valid. But Linda Puntawongdaycha
refused to check the validity of the ticket in the computer. As a result, the Immigration Officer
brought Jesus Fernando to the interrogation room of the INS where he was interrogated for
more than two (2) hours. When he was finally cleared by the Immigration Officer, he was
granted only a twelve (12)-day stay in the United States (US), instead of the usual six (6)
months.40

In ignoring Jesus Fernandos pleas to check the validity of the tickets in the computer, the
Northwest personnel exhibited an indifferent attitude without due regard for the
inconvenience and anxiety Jesus Fernando might have experienced.

Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the
carriers employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are
entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and
abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of
employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier.
In requiring compliance with the standard of extraordinary diligence, a Standard which is, in
fact, that of the highest possible degree of diligence, from common carriers and in creating a
presumption of negligence against them, the law seeks to compel them to control their
employees, to tame their reckless instincts and to force them to take adequate care of human
beings and their property.

Notably, after the incident, the Fernandos proceeded to a Northwest Ticket counter to verify
the status of the ticket and they were assured that the ticked remained unused and perfectly
valid. And, to avoid any future problems that may be encountered on the validity of the ticket,
a new ticket was issued to Jesus Fernando. The failure to promptly verify the validity of the
ticket connotes bad faith on the part of Northwest.

Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence. It imports a dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong. It means breach of a
known duty through some motive, interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. A
finding of bad faith entitles the offended party to moral damages.

As to the second incident, there was likewise fraud or bad faith on the part of Northwest
when it did not allow the Fernandos to board their flight for Manila on January 29, 2002, in
spite of confirmed tickets. We need to stress that they have confirmed bookings on
Northwest Airlines NW Flight No. 001 for Narita, Japan and NW 029 for Manila. They checked
in with their luggage at LA Airport and were given their respective boarding passes for
business class seats and claim stubs for six (6) pieces of luggage. With boarding passes and
electronic tickets, apparently, they were allowed entry to the departure area; and, they
eventually joined the long queue of business class passengers along with their business
associates.

However, in the presence of the other passengers, Northwest personnel Linda Tang pulled
the Fernandos out of the queue and asked for paper tickets (coupon type). Elizabeth
Fernando explained to Linda Tang that the matter could be sorted out by simply verifying
their electronic tickets in her computer and all she had to do was click and punch in their
Elite Platinum World Perks Card number. Again, the Northwest personnel refused to do so;
she, instead, told them to pay for new tickets so they could board the plane. Hence, the
Fernandos rushed to the Northwest Airline Ticket counter to clarify the matter. They were
assisted by Northwest personnel Jeanne Meyer who retrieved their control number from her
computer and was able to ascertain that the Fernandos electronic tickets were valid, and
they were confirmed passengers on both NW Flight No. 001 for Narita Japan and NW 029 for
Manila on that day.

In Ortigas, Jr. v. Lufthansa German Airlines,45 this Court declared that (i)n contracts of
common carriage, in attention and lack of care on the part of the carrier resulting in the
failure of the passenger to be accommodated in the class contracted for amounts to bad faith
or fraud which entitles the passengers to the award of moral damages in accordance with
Article 2220 of the Civil Code.

In Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, where a would-be
passenger had the necessary ticket, baggage claim and clearance from immigration, all
clearly and unmistakably showing that she was, in fact, included in the passenger manifest of
said flight, and yet was denied accommodation in said flight, this Court did not hesitate to
affirm the lower courts finding awarding her damages on the ground that the breach of
contract of carriage amounted to bad faith. For the indignity and inconvenience of being
refused a confirmed seat on the last minute, said passenger is entitled to an award of moral
damages.

In this case, We need to stress that the personnel who assisted the Fernandos even printed
coupon tickets for them and advised them to rush back to the boarding gates since the plane
was about to depart. But when the Fernandos reached the boarding gate, the plane had
already departed. They were able to depart, instead, the day after, or on January 30, 2002.

In Japan Airlines v. Jesus Simangan,49 this Court held that the acts committed by Japan
Airlines against Jesus Simangan amounted to bad faith, thus:

x x x JAL did not allow respondent to fly. It informed respondent that there was a need to first
check the authenticity of his travel documents with the U.S. Embassy. As admitted by JAL,
the flight could not wait for Mr. Simangan because it was ready to depart.

Since JAL definitely declared that the flight could not wait for respondent, it gave respondent
no choice but to be left behind. The latter was unceremoniously bumped off despite his
protestations and valid travel documents and notwithstanding his contract of carriage with
JAL. Damage had already been done when respondent was offered to fly the next day on July
30, 1992. Said offer did not cure JALs default.

Similarly, in Korean Airlines Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals,51 where private respondent was
not allowed to board the plane because her seat had already been given to another
passenger even before the allowable period for passengers to check in had lapsed despite
the fact that she had a confirmed ticket and she had arrived on time, this Court held that
petitioner airline acted in bad faith in violating private respondents rights under their
contract of carriage and is, therefore, liable for the injuries she has sustained as a result.

Under Article 2220 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an award of moral damages, in
breaches of contract, is in order upon a showing that the defendant acted fraudulently or in
bad faith. Clearly, in this case, the Femandos are entitled to an award of moral damages. The
purpose of awarding moral damages is to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion
or amusement that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone by reason of
defendants culpable action.

They own hotels and a chain of apartelles in the country, and a parking garage building in
Indiana, USA. From this perspective, We adopt the said view. We, thus, increase the award of
moral damages to the Fernandos in the amount of P3,000,000.00.

As held in Kierulf v. Court of Appeals,57 the social and financial standing of a claimant may
be considered if he or she was subjected to contemptuous conduct despite the offenders
knowledge of his or her social and financial standing.

In Trans World Airlines v. Court of Appeals,58 this Court considered the social standing of the
aggrieved passenger:

At the time of this unfortunate incident, the private respondent was a practicing lawyer, a
senior partner of a big law firm in Manila. He was a director of several companies and was
active in civic and social organizations in the Philippines. Considering the circumstances of
this case and the social standing of private respondent in the community, he is entitled to the
award of moral and exemplary damages. x x x This award should be reasonably sufficient to
indemnify private respondent for the humiliation and embarrassment that he suffered and to
serve as an example to discourage the repetition of similar oppressive and discriminatory
acts.

Yes. The Fernandos are entitled to exemplary damages, which are awarded by way of
example or correction for the public good, may be recovered in contractual obligations, if
defendant acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner. They are
designed by our civil law to permit the courts to reshape behavior that is socially deleterious
in its consequence by creating negative incentives or deterrents against such behavior.61
Hence, given the facts and circumstances of this case, We hold Northwest liable for the
payment of exemplary damages in the amount of P2,000,000.00.

In the case of Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Chiong,Chiong was given the run-around at the
Northwest check-in counter, instructed to deal with a man in barong to obtain a boarding
pass, and eventually barred from boarding a Northwest flight to accommodate an American
passenger whose name was merely inserted in the Flight Manifest, and did not even
personally check-in at the counter. Under the foregoing circumstances, the award of moral
and exemplary damages was given by this Court.

Time and again, We have declared that a contract of carriage, in this case, air transport, is
primarily intended to serve the traveling public and thus, imbued with public interest. The law
governing common carriers consequently imposes an exacting standard of conduct. A
contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other
contractual relation because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its
business is mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and
advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with
a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carriers employees, naturally, could give ground
for an action for damages.

As to the payment of attorneys fees, We sustain the award thereof on the ground that the
Fernandos were ultimately compelled to litigate and incurred expenses to protect their rights
and interests, and because the Fernandos are entitled to an award for exemplary damages.
Pursuant to Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorneys fees may be awarded when exemplary
damages are awarded, or a party is compelled to litigate or incur expenses to protect his
interest, or where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the
plaintiffs plainly valid, just and demandable claim.

Records show that the Fernandos demanded payment for damages from Northwest even
before the filing of this case in court. Clearly, the Fernandos were forced to obtain the
services of counsel to enforce a just claim, for which they should be awarded attorneys
fees.65 We deem it just and equitable to grant an award of attorneys fees equivalent to 10%
of the damages awarded.

4. No. This compulsory counterclaim of Northwest arising from the filing of the complaint
may not be granted inasmuch as the complaint against it is obviously not malicious or
unfounded. It was filed by the Fernandos precisely to claim their right to damages against
Northwest. Well-settled is the rule that the commencement of an action does not per se make
the action wrongful and subject the action to damages, for the law could not have meant to
impose a penalty on the right to litigate

PP vs. Camargo, G.R. No. 217979, February 22, 2017

Facts

Accused was charged in two separate Informations charging him for violation of R.A. 9165
for the sell to a poseur buyer one (1) matchbox of dried marijuana leaves, stalks and seeds
containing a net weight of 4.24 grams, a dangerous drug and possession of seven (7)
matchboxes of dried marijuana, leaves, stalks and seeds containing a total weight of 29.36
grams, a dangerous drug.

The accused has likewise been found positive for the use of methamphetamine, a dangerous
drug, as reflected in Chemistry Report No. CDT-057-10.

In defense, appellant denied having sold and possessed marijuana. He denied having used
shabu. According to appellant, he was sitting and drinking at the dike of Daang Taytayan at
Purok Mansanitas at around 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of 05 August 2010, when PO1
Maquinta and an asset arrested him and, without any provocation, started beating him.
Done with the maltreatment, these two persons brought him to the upper portion of the dike,
where a neighbor Damang Poblacion who was handcuffed was sitting down along with SPO2
Paquera. Five (5) minutes later, the policemen brought out several matchboxes containing
marijuana. Afterwards, he was subjected to a body search, and his money amounting to more
than P400 was confiscated. He was then brought to the police station, along with Damang
Poblacion. He later learned that Damang Poblacion was released for reasons unknown to him

RTC

Found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of
R.A. 9165.

CA

On appeal the accused alleged that trial court erred (1) in giving credence to the incredible
and inconsistent testimonies of the prosecution witnesses; and (2) in convicting him of the
crimes charged despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. CA affirmed the RTC decision.

Issue

Whether or not the RTC and CA erred in finding the accused guilty

Ruling

No. In every prosecution for the illegal sale of marijuana, the following elements must be
proved: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller; (2) the object and the consideration; and
(3) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
On the other hand, in a prosecution for the illegal possession of marijuana, the following
elements must be proved: (1) that the accused was in possession of the object identified as a
prohibited or regulated drug; (2) that the drug possession was not authorized by law; and (3)
that the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.

For both offenses, it is crucial that the prosecution establishes the identity of the seized
dangerous drugs in a way that their integrity is well preserved from the time of seizure or
confiscation from the accused until the time of presentation as evidence in court. The fact
that the substance said to have been illegally sold or possessed was the very same
substance offered in court as exhibit must be established.

A careful scrutiny of the evidence presented by the prosecution convincingly establishes

beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of accused-appellant and the law enforcers compliance
with the rule on the preservation of the integrity of the seized dangerous drugs.

The poseur-buyer, PO1 Maquinta, testified that the sale of marijuana took place, that
accused-appellant was the seller, and that the latter was also illegally in possession of
marijuana upon being apprehended.

Accused-appellant nonetheless points to inconsistencies in the testimonies of the

prosecution witnesses. First, he cites the conflicting testimonies of PO1 Maguinta and PO1
Buquiran, which pertain to who made the inventory of the confiscated items. Then he refers
to PO1 Maquintas two inconsistent statements. Initially, the latter allegedly said he had made
the inventory and marking after the arrest, but subsequently claimed to have bodily searched
accused-appellant after the arrest. Accused-appellant also points out that PO1 Maquinta at
first claimed to have immediately arrested the former, but later claimed to have examined
the contents of the seven matchboxes before the arrest. Finally, accused-appellant argues
that the photographs do not show whether the matchboxes indeed contained marijuana.

Still, we reiterate what we have held regarding inconsistencies in the testimonies of

witnesses. When inconsistencies refer only to minor details and collateral matters, they do
not affect the substance or the veracity of the declarations, or the weight of the testimonies.
Nor do they impair the credibility of the witnesses, especially where there is consistency in
the latters narration of the principal occurrence and positive identification of the culprit.

In the instant case, when accused-appe1lant was arrested for selling one matchbox of
marijuana, PO1 Maquinta marked the item ACA BB/08/05/10. Upon arrest, accused-
appellant was also found to be in possession of 7 more matchboxes of marijuana. For illegal
possession of the illegal drug, he was again arrested by PO1 Maquinta. The latter also
immediately marked the seized items ACA-P1 08/05/10 to ACA-P7 08/05/10. After marking
them, PO1 Maquinta made an inventory and took photographs of the items in the presence
of the accused and the representatives of the media, the DOJ, and PDEA, as well as a
barangay official. The Certificate of Inventory was thereafter signed by PO1 Maquinta, along
with PO1 Buquiran and the witnesses.

Accused-appellant further casts doubt on the presence of the four identified witnesses at the
time of the inventory and marking. But this attempt is untenable in light of his admission
during the supposed presentation of the following prosecution witnesses: DOJ employee
Anthony Chilius Benlot, media practitioner Reysan Elloren, Kagawad Ronnie Pasunting of
Barangay Calindagan in Dumaguete City, and PDEA Special Investigator Ivy Claire Oledan.
Both the prosecution and the defense stipulated that these individuals were present during
the inventory of the seized items as reflected in the RTC Order dated 25 October 2012
MARCH

Flordeliza Llanes Grande vs. Philippine Nautical Training

G.R. No. 213137

01 Mar 2017

Peralta, J.

Facts:

Philippine Nautical Training College (PNTC) is a private entity engaged in the business of providing
maritime training and education.

In 1988, PNTC employed Grande as Instructor for medical courses such as Elementary First Aid and
Medical Emergency. Later on, she became the Course Director of the Safety Department and in 2002
as Course Director for the Training Department.

In November 2007, she resigned to pursue graduate studies and carried on to immigrate to Canada. In
May 2009, Grande was again invited by PNTC to resume teaching since it intended to offer BS Nursing
and other courses.

In July 2009, she was again hired as Director for Research and Course Department. She was also given
the additional post of Assistant Vice President for Training Department. For this she was given a salary
of 30K and 20K.

In February 2011, several employees were suspended including Grande for alleged anomalies in the
enlistment of students. On March 1, 2011, VP for Corporate Affairs Pios called Grande for a meeting. In
the said meeting, Pios relayed to Grande the message of the President Fabia for her to tender her
resignation and assured her of absolution from the alleged anomaly. Grande then prepared a
resignation letter and filed it to the President. The respondent then accomplished for her the
necessary exit clearance. In the evening, Grande filed a criminal case for unjust vexation against Pios.
The next day, Grande filed a labor case for illegal dismissal. She alleged that she was forced to resign
from her employment.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring Grande was forced to resign from employment. NLRC
and Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. However, upon Motion for Reconsideration, the CA
reversed its ruling and dismissed the complainant of Grande since she alleged voluntarily resigned.
Issue: Whether or not Grande was illegally dismissed.

Ruling:

Grande was forced to resign, hence, was illegally dismissed. In voluntary resignation, the employee is
compelled by personal reasons to disassociate himself from employment. It is done with the intention
of relinquishing an office, accompanied by the act of abandonment.

To determine whether the employee indeed intended to relinquish such employment, the act of the
employee before and after the alleged resignation must be considered. We concur with the findings of
the NLRC that the acts of petitioner before and after she tendered her resignation would show that
undue force was exerted upon petitioner:

(l) the resignation letter of petitioner was terse and curt, giving the impression that it was hurriedly
and grudgingly written;

(2) she was in the thick of preparation for an upcoming visit and inspection from the Maritime Training
Council; it was also around that time that she had just requested for the acquisition of textbooks and
teaching aids, a fact which is incongruent with her sudden resignation from work;

(3) in the evening, she filed an incident report/police blotter before the Intramuros Police Station; and

(4) the following day she filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.

By vigorously pursuing the litigation of her action against respondent, petitioner clearly manifested
that she has no intention of relinquishing her employment, which act is wholly incompatible to
respondent's assertion that she voluntarily resigned.

Joaquin Lu vs. Tirso Enopia et al.

G.R. No. 197899

06 Mar 2017

Peralta, J.
Facts:

Tirso Enopia and 34 others were hired from January 20, 1994 to March 20, 1996 as crew members of the
fishing mother boat F/B MG-28 owned by Joaquin "Jake" Lu who is the sole proprietor of Mommy Gina
Tuna Resources based in General Santos City. Lu and Enopia et al had an income-sharing arrangement
wherein 55% goes to Lu, 45% to the crew members, with an additional 4% as "backing incentive. They
also equally share the expenses for the maintenance and repair of the mother boat, and for the
purchase of nets, ropes and payaos.

Sometime in August 1997, Lu proposed the signing of a Joint Venture Fishing Agreement between them,
but Enopia et al refused to sign the same as they opposed the one-year term provided in the agreement.
According to Enopia et al, during their dialogue on August 18, 1997, Lu terminated their services right
there and then because of their refusal to sign the agreement. On the other hand, Lu alleged that the
master fisherman (piado) Ruben Salili informed him that Enopia et al still refused to sign the agreement
and have decided to return the vessel F/B MG-28.

On August 25, 1997, Enopia et al filed their complaint for illegal dismissal, monetary claims and
damages. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint and found that no employer-employee relationship
exists but a joint venture. The NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed the ruling of the NLRC and found that there was an employer-employee relationship since there
was the element of control.

Issue: Whether or not there is an employer-employee relationship between Enopia et al and Lu.

Ruling:

Yes, there is an employer-employee relationship.

In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the following elements are

considered:

(l) the selection and engagement of the workers;

(2) the power to control the worker's conduct;

(3) the payment of wages by whatever means; and

(4) the power of dismissal. All these elements present in this case.
It was shown by the latter's evidence that the employer stated in their Social Security System (SSS)
online inquiry system printouts was MGTR, which is the company of Lu. The coverage of the Social
Security Law is predicated on the existence of an employer-employee relationship.

The 4% backing incentive fee which was divided among the fishermen engaged in the fishing operations
approved by Lu was paid to them after deducting the latter's respective vale or cash advance. Why would
these fishermen obtain vale or cash advance from Lu and not from the piado who allegedly hired and
had control over the fishermen.

Communications were made through radio operators and checkers. Such communication would establish
that he was constantly monitoring or checking the progress of respondents' fishing operations
throughout the duration thereof, which showed their control and supervision over respondents'
activities. Lu also assigned Master Fisherman (Piado) and Assistant master fisherman as well as Checker
and assistant Checker.

Finally, the power of dismissal over the fishermen were shown when Lu dismissed them after they
refused to sign the joint fishing venture agreement.

As to the issue of regular employment, the primary standard for determining regular employment is the
reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the
usual trade or business of the employer.

Respondents' jobs as fishermen-crew members of F/B MG 28 were directly related and necessary to
petitioner's deep-sea fishing business and they had been performing their job for more than one year.

Ernesto Brown vs. Marswan Marketing, Inc. et al.

G.R. No. 206891

15 Mar 2017

Del Castillo, J.
Facts:

On October 5, 2009, Marswan employed Brown as building maintenance/ electrician with a salary of
P500.00 per day; he was assigned at Marswan's warehouse in Valenzuela, and was tasked to maintain its
sanitation and make necessary electrical repairs thereon.

On May 28, 2010, he reported at the Main Office of Marswan, and was told that it was already his last
day of work. Allegedly, he was made to sign a document that he did not understand; and, thereafter he
was no longer admitted back to work. Thus, he insisted that he was terminated without due process of
law. On June 10, 2010, Brown filed a case for illegal dismissal.

On the other hand, On October 4, 2009, according to Marswan, a domestic corporation engaged in
wholesale trade of construction materials, employed Brown as electrician; during his eight-month stay,
Marswan received negative reports anent Brown's work ethics, competence, and efficiency. He alleged
installed jumper in the Warehouse without being told to do so.

On May 28, 2010, they summoned him at its Main Office to purportedly discuss the complaints of the
Warehouse Manager and the Warehouse Supervisor. In the alleged meeting, Brown excused himself
purportedly to get in touch with his wife, however, he never returned and no longer reported to work.

The Labor Arbiter found that Brown was illegally dismissed since there was no complaint of infraction
against him at the time he was alleged dismissed. NLRC affirmed the decision. However, the Court of
Appeals reversed and declared that Brown was legally dismissed since he was not prevented from
returning or was deprived of work.

Issue: Whether or not Brown was illegally dismissed.

Ruling:

Yes, Brown was illegally dismissed by the company.

In order for the employer to discharge its burden to prove that the employee committed abandonment,
which constitutes neglect of duty, and is a just cause, the employer must prove that the employee:

l) failed to report for work or had been absent without valid reason; and

2) had a clear intention to discontinue his or her employment, the second requirement must be
manifested by overt acts and is more determinative in concluding that the employee is guilty of
abandonment.
Apart from the allegation of abandonment, Marswan/Tan presented no evidence proving that Brown
failed to return without justifiable reasons and had clear intentions to discontinue his work.

Marswan also did not specify any overt act on the part of Brown showing that he intended to cease
working for Marswan. At the same time, they did not establish that, on its end, Marswan exerted effort
to convince Brown to return to work, if only to show that Marswan did not dismiss him and it was Brown
who actually refused to work. And neither did Marswan send any notice to Brown to warn him that his
supposed failure to report would be deemed as abandonment

: Silvertex v. Campo (March 16, 2016)

Teodora F. Campo filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and monetary claims against Silvertex Weaving
Corporation (STWC).

Employees Allegations and Position

Campo claimed that STWC employed her as a weaving machine operator beginning June 11, 1999, until
STWC dismissed her on November 21, 2010. Prior to her dismissal, STWC suspended her for one week
beginning November 14, 2010 after a stitching machine that she was operating overheated and emitted
smoke on November 13, 2010. When the respondent tried to report back to work on November 21,
2010, she was denied entry by the STWCs security guard.

Employers Allegations and Position

STWC argued that the Campo voluntarily resigned after STWC reprimanded her for poor job
performance. It submitted a handwritten resignation letter allegedly executed by the Campo on
November 13, 2010, together with the Waiver, Release and Quitclaims Statement that she supposedly
signed following her receipt of 30,000.00 from STWC. Campo denies signing these documents and
receiving the money.

Labor Arbiters Ruling

The LA dismissed the Campos complaint for lack of merit.

The NLRCs Ruling on the Appeal and the MR

Initially, the NLRC found that Campos signature on the documents were mere forgeries. During the
conciliation proceedings, STWC failed to raise the existence of the documents, which leads the NLRC to
believe that the documents were merely fabricated to suit the interests of STWC.

Upon motion for reconsideration, however, the NLRC ruled that Campo was validly dismissed. It relied on
a Questioned Document Report (QDR) from the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, which
allegedly found that the signatures on the resignation letter and quitclaim were written by Campo. The
burden to disprove the authenticity of the submitted documents allegedly fell upon the employee,
through evidence other than a bare denial.

Court of Appeal's Ruling on the Appeal

Campo appealed to the CA, which the latter granted.

Substantive Law Issue

Who has the burden to prove the authenticity of the documents? THE EMPLOYER

Factual and Evidentiary Issue

WON the signatures were authentic NO, HENCE CAMPO WAS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED

Supreme Court's Ratio Decidendi

STWC has the burden to prove the authenticity of the documents

The Court holds that the employer has the burden to prove that the employee was not dismissed, or that
the dismissal was legal. It cites the case of San Miguel Properties Philippines, Inc. v. Gucaban:

In illegal dismissal cases, fundamental is the rule that when an employer interposes the defense of
resignation, on him necessarily rests the burden to prove that the employee indeed voluntarily resigned.
Hence, STWC, not Campo, has the burden to prove that the documents were actually signed by Campo.

The Documents are forged

In contrast to the conclusion of the NLRC, the Court found that the QDR actually found that the
signatures on the documents were not Campos:

The full report of the PNP Crime Laboratory actually indicated that the signature appearing on the
alleged resignation letter did not appear to be written by the same person who signed the several payroll
slips and Philhealth records, respectively marked as S-1 to S-14 and S-15 to S-17, that were
submitted by the petitioners as reference on the respondents true handwriting.

XXXX

Although the same report from the PNP provided that the signature on the resignation letter matched
the supposed handwriting of [Campo] in her bio-data dated April 1, 2009, the conflicting findings and the
fact that only one of the 18 documents used as reference for the examination matched the signature in
the letter only supported [Campos] claim that she did not execute the resignation letter. Furthermore,
there was no showing that the sample signature considered by the PNP Crime Laboratory was a genuine
signature of [Campo], rendering it insufficient basis for the conclusion arrived at by the document
examiner and relied upon by the NLRC.

These observations lead to the conclusion that the documents are not authentic. But even if they were,
the Court adds that the finding of illegal dismissal could still stand, as jurisprudence provides that "[a]n
employee's execution of a final settlement and receipt of amounts agreed upon do not foreclose his right
to pursue a claim for illegal dismissal."

Employees Awards

Reinstatement to her former or substantially equivalent position without loss of seniority rights;

Full backwages: partially computed at P135,672.09

PRO-RATED 13TH Month Pay for 2010: P 9,103.47

SILP for 2009 and 2010: P 3,605.67

Moral Damages: P 50,000.00 (increased by the CA from P 20,000.00)

Attorneys fees: P16,838.12 equivalent to 10% of the total monetary award

The reckoning date for the computation of the awarded interest, however, needs to be modified after
the CA ruled that it should be at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum, to be computed from the date
of dismissal on November 21, 2010 until full payment. To conform with prevailing jurisprudence, interest
on the monetary awards shall only be computed from the date this Supreme Court Resolution becomes
final and executory, until full satisfaction.

Lourdes C. Rodriguez vs. Park N Ride, Inc. et al.

G.R. No. 222980

20 Mar 2017

Leonen, J.

Facts:

On January 30, 1984, Rodriguez was hired as Restaurant Supervisor at Vicest Phils owned by the
respondents. Four (4) years later, the restaurant business closed. Rodriguez was transferred to office
work and became an Administrative and Finance Assistant to Estelita Javier. One of Rodriguez's duties
was to open the office in Makati City at 8:00 a.m. Rodriguez was also required to handle the personnel
and administrative matters of the other companies of the respondents. She likewise took care of the
household concerns of the Javier Spouses, such as preparing payrolls of drivers and helpers, shopping for
household needs, and looking after the spouses' house whenever they travelled abroad.

Sometime in 2000, the Javier Spouses established Park N Ride, a business that provided terminal parking
and leasing. Although the company's main business was in Lawton, Manila, its personnel and
administrative department remained in Makati City. Rodriguez handled the administrative, finance, and
warehousing departments of Park N Ride. On one occasion, Rodriguez asked the Javier Spouses if she
could go home by 10:00 a.m. to attend a family reunion, but her request was denied.
The Javier Spouses' treatment of Rodriguez became unbearable; thus, on March 25, 2009, she filed her
resignation letter effective April 25, 2009. The Javier Spouses allegedly did not accept her resignation and
convinced her to reconsider and stay on. However, her experience became worse. Rodriguez claimed
that toward the end of her employment, Estelita was always unreasonable and hot-headed, and would
belittle and embarrass her in the presence of co-workers.

On September 22, 2009, Rodriguez went on her usual "pamalengke" for the Spouses. Later, she
proceeded to open the Makati office. Estelita was mad at her when they finally talked over the phone,
berating her for opening the office late. She allegedly told her that "Kung ayaw mo na ng ginagawa mo,
we can manage!" Thus, Rodriguez did not report for work the next day, and on September 26, 2009, she
wrote the Javier Spouses a letter expressing her gripes at them. She intimated that they were always
finding fault with her to push her to resign.

On October 6, 2009, the Javier Spouses replied to her letter, allegedly accepting her resignation. On
October 7, 2009, complainant filed a case for constructive dismissal. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the
complainant and deemed he resigned. The NLRC reversed the ruling of the LA. On appeal, the Court of
Appeal reinstated the decision of the Labor Arbiter.

Issue: Whether or not the complainant was constructively dismissed.

Ruling:

No, the complainant was not constructively dismissed.

We have held that the standard for constructive dismissal is "whether a reasonable person in the
employee's position would have felt compelled to give up his employment under the circumstances.

The unreasonably harsh conditions that compel resignation on the part of an employee must be way
beyond the occasional discomforts brought about by the misunderstandings between the employer and
employee. Strong words may sometimes be exchanged as the employer describes her expectations or as
the employee narrates the conditions of her work environment and the obstacles she encounters as she
accomplishes her assigned tasks. As in every human relationship, there are bound to be disagreements.

The resignation letters dated May 1, 2008 and March 25, 2009 contained words of gratitude, which could
hardly come from an employee forced to resign. These letters were reinforced by petitioner's very own
act of not reporting for work despite respondents' directive.
it is a fact that petitioner enjoyed the privilege of working closely with the Javier Spouses and having
their full trust and confidence. Spontaneous expressions of an employer do not automatically render a
hostile work atmosphere. The circumstances in this case negate its presence.