INTRO
1. Cariaga v. People gr 180010
2. Hector Trenas v. People gr 195002
Facts: A criminal case for estafa was filed against Atty. Treas before the RTC of Makati City. Elizabeth
alleged that she entrusted to Atty. Treas an amount for the titling of a property. For failure to transfer
the title of the property, Atty. Treas issued to Elizabeth a check for refund. When the said check was
deposited at Equitable PCI Bank dela Rosa-Rada Branch at Makati City, the same was dishonored by
the drawee bank. Petitioner asserts that the prosecution witness failed to allege that the acts
material to estafa had occurred in Makati City, that nowhere in the evidence presented by the
prosecution does it show the money was given to and received by petitioner in Makati City, that the
Deed of Sale prepared by petitioner was signed and notarized in Iloilo City and that the only time
Makati City was mentioned was with respect to the time when the check provided by petitioner was
dishonored by Equitable-PCI Bank in its dela Rosa-Rada Branch in Makati. Petitioner contends that
the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case.
Issue: Whether the RTC of Makati City had jurisdiction over the estafa case
Ruling: No. A court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense committed
outside its limited territory. Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case cannot be
conferred upon the court by the accused, by express waiver or otherwise. That jurisdiction is
conferred by the sovereign authority that organized the court and is given only by law in the manner
and form prescribed by law. Although the prosecution alleged that the check issued by petitioner
was dishonored in a bank in Makati, such dishonor is not an element of estafa under Art. 315, par. 1
(b) of the RPC. There being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati, the RTC of
that city has no jurisdiction over the case.
3. Garcia v. Sandiganbayan gr 165835
Petition for certiorari: Forfeiture of Ill-gotten/unexplained wealth
4. Cojuangco jr. v. Sandiganbayan gr 134307
No search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon a probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized. The clause unequivocally means that the judge must make his own
determination independent of that of the prosecutor of whether there is probable cause to
issue a warrant of arrest, based on the complainant's and his witnesses' accounts, if any.
Supporting evidence other than the report and recommendation of the investigators and the
special prosecutor should be examined by the court
FACTS: January 12, 1990, a complaint was filed by the Office of the Solicitor General before the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), petitioner,
former Administrator of the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA), and the former members of the
PCA Governing Board, petitioner among them, for violation of Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act for having conspired and confederated together and taking undue
advantage of their public positions and/or using their powers; authority, influence, connections or
relationship with the former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and former First Lady, Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos without authority, granted a donation in the amount of Two Million
Pesos (P2,000,000.00) to the Philippine Coconut Producers Federation (COCOFED), a private entity,
using PCA special fund, thereby giving COCOFED unwarranted benefits, advantage and
preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence to the
grave (sic) and prejudice of the Filipino people and to the Republic of the Philippines.
Subsequently, however, the Court ruled that all proceedings in the preliminary investigation
conducted by the PCGG were null and void and the PCGG was directed to transmit the complaints
and records of the case to the Office of the Ombudsman for appropriate action.
In a Resolution dated June 2, 1992, the panel of investigators recommended the filling of an
Information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
Resolution dated June 2, 1992 was referred by Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr. to
the Office of the Special Prosecutor for review and if warranted, for the preparation of the criminal
information.
In a memorandum dated July l5, 1992 the Office of the Special Prosecutor affirmed the
recommendation as contained in the Resolution dated June 2,1992.
August 19, 1992 then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez ordered the panel
of investigators to discuss the merits of the prejudicial question posed by respondent Lobregat.
In a Memorandum dated December 1, 1993 the panel of investigators recommended that the
motion to suspend proceedings be granted.
On December 3, 1993 then Ombudsman Vasquez referred for comment to the Office of the Special
Prosecutors the Memorandum dated December 1, 1993 of the panel of investigators on the issue of
the existence of prejudicial question.
On February 17, 1995, an order for the arrest of petitioner was issued by the respondent
Sandiganbayan.
On February 22, 1995, petitioner posted bail. On the same day he likewise filed, through counsel, a
Manifestation stating that he was posting bail without prejudice to the Opposition To Issuance of
Warrant of Arrest with Motion For Leave To File a Motion For Reconsideration of the Ombudsman's
Resolution which he filed.
In a Resolution dated February 20, 1995, the respondent Sandiganbayan barred petitioner from
leaving the country except upon approval of the court.
On May 25, 1995, petitioner was conditionally arraigned pleading not guilty to the Information.
In the meantime, in a Memorandum dated October 22, 1995, Special Prosecution Officer Victorio U.
Tabanguil found no probable cause to warrant the filing against petitioner and recommended the
dismissal of the case. The recommendation for dismissal was approved by the Honorable
Ombudsman on November 15, 1996.
On December 13, 1996 petitioner filed an Urgent Motion To Dismiss alleging that with the reversal
of the earlier findings of the Ombudsman of probable cause, there was therefore nothing on record
before the respondent Sandiganbayan which would warrant the issuance of a warrant of arrest and
the assumption of jurisdiction over the instant case.
ISSUES:
1.WON the warrant of arrest issued by respondent Sandiganbayan is null and
void, or should now be lifted if initially valid? YES
2.WON the Sandiganbayan still acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner? YES
RATIO:
1. Sandiganbayan had two pieces of documents to consider when it resolved to
issue the warrant of arrest against the accused:
a. the Resolution dated June 2, 1992 of the Panel of Investigators of the Office of the Ombudsman
recommending the filing of the Information and
b. the Memorandum dated June 16, 1995 of the Office of the Special Prosecutor denying the
existence of a prejudicial question which will warrant the suspension of the criminal case. The
Sandiganbayan had nothing more to support its resolution.
2.The Sandiganbayan failed to abide by the constitutional mandate of personally determining the
existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest. The 2 cited document above were
the product of somebody elses determination, insufficient to support a finding of probable cause by
the Sandiganbayan.
3.In Roberts vs. Court of Appeals, the Court struck down as invalid an order for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest which were based only on "the information, amended information and Joint
Resolution", without the benefit of the records or evidence supporting the prosecutor's finding of
probable cause.
4. In Ho vs. People, the Court the respondent "palpably committed grave abuse of discretion in ipso
facto issuing the challenged warrant of arrest on the sole basis of the prosecutor's findings and
recommendation, and without determining on its own the issue of probable cause based on evidence
other than such bare findings and recommendation.
5.With regards to jurisdiction, the rule is well-settled that the giving or posting of bail by the accused
is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
By posting bail, herein petitioner cannot claim exemption effect of being subject to the jurisdiction
of respondent court. While petitioner has exerted efforts to continue disputing the validity of the
issuance of the warrant of arrest despite his posting bail, his claim has been negated when he himself
invoked the jurisdiction of respondent court through the filing of various motions that sought other
affirmative reliefs.
6. In La Naval Drug vs. CA, Lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either
expressly or impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not to waive this defense, he must do so
seasonably by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court, otherwise, he shall
be deemed to have submitted himself to that jurisdiction. Moreover,"[w]here the appearance is by
motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be for
the sole and separate purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any other
purpose, the defendant is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Such
an appearance gives the court jurisdiction over the person.
PANGANIBAN, J., concurring and dissenting opinion;
As a consequence of the nullity of the warrant of arrest, the Sandiganbayan did notacquire
jurisdiction over the petitioner. The posting of a bail bond by the petitioner despite the nullity or
irregularity of theissuance of the warrant for his arrest should not be equated with
"voluntaryappearance" as to cloak the respondent court with jurisdiction over his person. Truly, his
"appearance" in court was not "voluntary." It should be noted thatimmediately upon learning of the
filling of the Information and the issuance of thewarrant, petitioner filed an "Opposition to [the]
Issuance of [a] Warrant of Arrestwith Motion for Leave to File Motion for Reconsideration of [the]
Ombudsman['s]Resolutions." Said Opposition was based on the inadequacy of the respondentcourt's
basis for determining probable cause.
It was essentially an express andcontinuing objection to the court's jurisdiction over his person. When
petitioner posted his bail bond, he expressly manifested at the same timethat such was "without
prejudice to his Opposition.
RULE 110
1. People v. Pangilinan gr 15662
Facts: Ma. Theresa Pangilinan, the respondent in this instant case allegedly issued 9 checks with the
aggregate amount of P9,658,692 in favor of Virginia Malolos. But, upon Malolos' presentment of the
said checks, they were dishonored. So, on Sept. 16, 1997, Malolos filed an affidavit-complaint for
estafa and violation of BP 22 against Pangilinan. On December 5, 1997, Pangilinan filed a civil case
for accounting, recovery of commercial documents, enforceability and effectivity of contract and
specific performance against Malolos before the RTC of Valenzuela City. Later, Pangilinan also filed
on December 10, 1997, a "Petition to Suspend Proceedings on the Ground of Prejudicial Question".
On March 2, 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor Ruben Catubay recommended Pangilinan's petition
which was approved by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. Malolos, then, raised the matter before
the DOJ. On January 5, 1999, Sec. of Justice Serafin Cuevas reversed the resolution of the City
Prosecutor and ordered the filing of the informations for violation of BP 22 in connection with
Pangilinan's issuance of two checks, the charges involving the other checks were dismissed. So, two
counts of violation for BP 22, both dated Nov. 18, 1999, were filed against Pangilinan on Feb. 3, 2000
before the MeTC of Quezon City. On June 17, 2000, Pangilinan filed an "Omnibus Motion to Quash
the Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon
City, alleging that the criminal liability has been extinguished by reason of prescription. The motion
was granted. Malolos filed a notice of appeal and the RTC reversed the decision of the MeTC.
According to the RTC, the offense has not yet prescribed "considering the appropriate complaint that
started the proceedings having been filed with the Office of the Prosecutor on 16 September 1997".
Dissatisfied, Pangilinan raised the matter to the Supreme Court for review but it was referred to the
CA "for appropriate action". On October 26, 2001, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC and
recognized Feb. 3, 2000 as the date of the filing of the informations.
Issue: Whether or not the filing of the affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22
against respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on 16 September 1997
interrupted the period of prescription of such offense.
Held. Yes. Under Section 1 of Act No. 3326 which is the law applicable to B.P. 22 cases, [v]iolations
penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with
the following rules: after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month,
but less than two years. Under Section 2 of the same Act, [t]he prescription shall be interrupted
when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Since B.P. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days
but not more than one year or by a fine for its violation, it therefore prescribes in four (4) years in
accordance with the aforecited law. The running of the prescriptive period, however, should be tolled
upon the institution of proceedings against the guilty person.
The affidavit-complaints for the violations were filed against respondent on 16 September 1997. The
cases reached the MeTC of Quezon City only on 13 February 2000 because in the meanwhile,
respondent filed a civil case for accounting followed by a petition before the City Prosecutor for
suspension of proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question. The matter was raised before
the Secretary of Justice after the City Prosecutor approved the petition to suspend proceedings. It
was only after the Secretary of Justice so ordered that the informations for the violation of BP Blg.
22 were filed with the MeTC of Quezon City.
Clearly, it was respondents own motion for the suspension of the criminal proceedings, which
motion she predicated on her civil case for accounting, that caused the filing in court of the 1997
initiated proceedings only in 2000.
2. Chua v. Padillo gr 163797
FACTS: Rodrigo Padillo and Marietta Padillo, respondents, are the owners of Padillo Lending Investor
engaged in the money lending business. Their niece, Marissa Padillo-Chua, served as the firms
manager. Marissa is married to Wilson Chua, brother of Renita Chua, herein petitioners.
Sometime in September 1999, a post-audit was conducted. It was found that Marissa was engaged
in illegal activities. Some of the borrowers whose loan applications she recommended for approval
were fictitious and their signatures on the checks were spurious, the cash amounts received were
turned over to Marissa or her husband Wilson for deposit in their personal accounts. To facilitate
encashment, Marissa would sign the check to signify to the bank that she personally knew the
alternative payee. The total amount embezzled reached P7 million.
Respondents filed complaints against petitioners with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Forthwith, the City Prosecutor filed an Information for estafa against Marissa, Wilson, and Renita
Chua.
Believing that a more serious offense should have been charged against petitioners, respondents
interposed an appeal to the Secretary of Justice. The Secretary of Justice found that the participation
of Wilson Chua in the commission of the crime was not clearly established by the evidence. As to
Renita Chua, the Secretary of Justice found no proof of conspiracy between her and Marissa.
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied with finality by the Secretary of
Justice.
Respondents then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals. They alleged that the
Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion. They prayed that the Court of Appeals
order the Prosecutor to withdraw the Information and instead, file several Informations against
petitioners. The Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petition, holding that there
was no conspiracy among the petitioners.
Respondents seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration and then the Court of Appeals reverses
itself. The Court of Appeals found that it overlooked certain facts and circumstances which, if
considered, would establish probable cause against Wilson and Renita. The Court of Appeals
identified these facts to be: (1) Marissas consistent practice of depositing checks with altered names
of payees to the respective accounts of Wilson Chua and Renita Chua; (2) considering that Wilson
and Marissa are husband and wife, it can be inferred that one knows the transactions of the other;
and (3) Wilson had full knowledge of the unlawful activities of Marissa. This is supported by the
affidavit of Ernesto Alcantara.
ISSUE: Whether or not Court of Appeals erred in compelling the Secretary of Justice to include in the
Information Wilson and Renita.
HELD: The Court of Appeals did not err in directing the City Prosecutor to include Wilson and Renita
Chua in the Information for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of commercial
documents.
Section 5, Rule 110 of the 200 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, partly provides that "All
criminal actions either commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of a public prosecutor." The rationale for this rule is that since a criminal offense
is an outrage to the sovereignty of the State, it necessarily follows that a representative of the State
shall direct and control the prosecution thereof.. However, that the public prosecutors exercise of
his discretionary powers is not absolute. One of the exceptions is that the Court of Appeals may
review the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on a petition for certiorari on the ground that he
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
As found by the Court of Appeals, the Secretary of Justice either overlooked or patently ignored the
following circumstances: (1) Marissas practice of depositing checks, with altered names of payees,
in the respective accounts of Wilson and Renita Chua; (2) the fact that Wilson and Marissa are
husband and wife makes it difficult to believe that one has no idea of the transactions entered into
by the other; and (3) the affidavit of Ernesto Alcantara confirming that Wilson had knowledge of
Marissas illegal activities. WHEREFORE, the petition is denied and the Amended Decision of the
Court of Appeals is affirmed.
3. Serapio v. Sandiganbayan gr 148468
Facts: Atty. Edward Serapio (petitioner) filed two petitions in the SC; these are: 1. A petition for
certiorari assailing the resolutions of the Third division of the Sandiganbayan denying his petition for
bail, motion for reinvestigation and motion to quash; 2. Petition for Habeas Corpus.
Petitioner was charged with the crime of plunder together with Former President Joseph Estrada and
son Jinggoy Estrada among others. Petitioner was a member of the Board of Trustees and legal
counsel of Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. He allegedly received, on behalf of the said foundation,
millions of pesos coming from illegal activities.
The Ombudsman recommended the filing of a case against him before the Sandiganbayan. A warrant
for his arrest was issued. Upon learning of the said warrant he voluntarily surrendered to the PNP.
Petitioner, thereafter, file an Urgent Motion for Bail but such motion is opposed by the prosecution
for the reason that petitioner should be arraign first before he can avail of Bail. Later on Petitioner
simultaneously filed a motion to quash.
The bail hearing was reset several times due to various pleadings filed by petitioner and the
prosecution.
Due to this, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus for the reason that the prosecution have
waived their right to present evidence in opposition to his petition for bail; the prosecution launched
an endless barrage of obstructive and dilatory moves to prevent the conduct of the bail hearings;
and, on the failure of the People to adduce strong evidence of his guilt. For the said reasons, he is
still being deprived of his liberty.
Petitioner cited also Moncupa vs. Enrile, which in such case the Court held that habeas corpus
extends to instances where detention, while valid from its inception, has later become arbitrary.
Issue: Whether the petition habeas corpus should be granted?
Decision: No. SC finds no basis for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. General rule applies.
Petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy for asserting ones right to bail. It cannot
be availed of where accused is entitled to bail not as a matter of right but on the discretion of the
court and the latter has not abused such discretion in refusing to grant bail, or has not even exercised
said discretion. The proper recourse is to file an application for bail with the court where the criminal
case is pending and to allow hearings thereon to proceed.
Moncupa vs Enrile does not apply in this case because petitioners restraint of liberty did not become
arbitrary. His application for bail has yet to commence (to be heard).
The delay in the hearing of his petition for bail cannot be pinned solely to the Sandiganbayan or on
the prosecution because he himself is partly to be blamed (his actions caused delay too.
As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be restrained
of his liberty in custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which jurisdiction to do so.
In exceptional circumstances, habeas corpus may be granted by the courts even when the person
concerned is detained pursuant to a valid arrest or his voluntary surrender, for this writ of liberty is
recognized as the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and
lawless state action due to its ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes.
ISSUE: WON Sandiganbayan denied the petitioner of his right to due process of the law.
HELD: NO. The right to a preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right, but it is a right
conferred by a statute. Petitioner was afforded the opportunity to answer the charges against him
during the preliminary investigation. Jurisprudence dictates that the court do not interfere with the
discretion of the Ombudsman in its conduct of preliminary investigations. It was enunciated
in Raro v. Sandiganbayan that in the performance of the task to determine probable cause, the
Ombudsman s discretion is paramount. The lack of preliminary investigation does not impair the
validity of the information filed before the court.
The denial of his prayer for a writ of habeas corpus does not deny him of his right to due process
because there is no basis for the issuance of the writ in favor of the petitioner. Petitioner has
voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities. Habeas corpus does not lie because there was no
deprivation of liberty. Also, the delay in the hearing of the bail cannot be solely pinnedupon the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner is also to be blamed. Habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy for
asserting ones right to bail.
4. People v. CA gr 183652
FACTS: Accused-appellants Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola were charged with the crime of rape
of a 16-year old girl. The RTC convicted Carampatana and Oporty guilty as prinicpals and Alquizola
as an accomplice while the CA acquitted them of the crime charged, hence, this present appeal.
After attending a graduation dinner party, AAA, together with her friends, went to Alsons Palace for
a drinking session to celebrate their graduation. During such session, they shared their problems with
each other. AAA became emotional and started crying, prompting her to take her first shot of
Emperador Brandy. After consuming more or less five glasses of drinks, she felt dizzy so she laid her
head down on Oportos lap. Oporto then started kissing her head and they would remove her
baseball cap. This angered her so she told them to stop, and simply tried to hide her face with the
cap. The group just laughed at her and still made her drink more. She fell asleep but was woken up
so that she could drink the remaining liquor inside the Brandy bottle. She refused but they insisted
so she drank. Again, AAA fell asleep.
When she regained consciousness, she saw that she was already at the Alquizola Lodging House. She
recognized that place because she had been there before. She would thereafter fall back asleep and
wake up again. And during one of the times that she was conscious, she saw Oporto on top of her,
kissing her on different parts of her body, and having intercourse with her. At one point, AAA woke
up while Carampatana was inserting his penis into her private organ. Alquizola then joined and
started to kiss her. For the last time, she fell unconscious.
Private respondents aver that a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory and that
the prosecution cannot appeal the acquittal because of the constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy.
ISSUE: Did the Court of Appeals act with grave abuse of discretion in acquitting the private
respondents?
HELD: YES, the Court of Appeals erred in acquitting private respondents. As a general rule, the
prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a judgment rendered in favor of the
defendant in a criminal case. If there is grave abuse of discretion, however, granting petitioners
prayer is not tantamount to putting private respondents in double jeopardy.
The petitioner has sufficiently discharged the burden of proving that the respondent appellate court
committed grave abuse of discretion in acquitting private respondents. It appears that in reaching
its judgment, the CA merely relied on the evidence presented by the defense and utterly disregarded
that of the prosecution. A more careful perusal will reveal that it was simply lifted, if not altogether
parroted, from the testimonies of the accused, especially that of Oporto, Carampatana,and Alquizola.
It presented the private respondents account and allegations as though these were the established
facts of the case, which it later conveniently utilized to support its ruling of acquittal.
The elements of rape are: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was
accomplished through force or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; or when the victim is under twelve years of age. Here, the accused intentionally made
AAA consume hard liquor more than she could handle. They still forced her to drink even when she
was already obviously inebriated. They never denied having sexual intercourse with AAA, but the
latter was clearly deprived of reason or unconscious at the time the private respondents ravished
her.
Moreover, Alquizola should not only be deemed as an accomplice but a principal as well by virtue of
conspiracy. As the caretaker of the Alquizola Lodging House, he provided a room so the rape could
be accomplished with ease and furtiveness. He was likewise inside the room, intently watching, while
Oporto and Carampatana sexually abused AAA and did not do anything to stop the bestial acts of his
companions. He even admitted to kissing AAAs lips, breasts, and other parts of her body.
Indubitably, there was conspiracy among Carampatana, Oporto, and Alquizola to sexually abuse AAA.
Hence, the act of any one was the act of all, and each of them, Alquizola including, is equally guilty
of the crime of rape.
5. People v. Madali gr 126050
This is an appeal from the decision of the RTC finding accused-appellants Eleazar M. Madali,
Eustaquio V. Rogero, and Randy M. Rubio, all members of the Philippine National Police, guilty of the
murder of Reynaldo M. Abrenica and sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua. Accused-
appellants were also ordered jointly and severally to pay the heirs of the deceased. In accordance
with Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code, accused-appellants preventive imprisonment was ordered
credited in their favor.
On February 4, 1992, at around 11 p.m., Reynaldo Abrenica and his wife Helen came home at the
house of Harry Mindo in Romblon, Romblon where Reynaldo had some drinks. Helen went to bed
ahead of her husband in their bedroom on the second floor of their house. When Helen woke up at
around 1 a.m., she found that her husband was not beside her. She looked for him, on the landing
of the stairs, she found her husband lying. Helen did not find any trace of blood on the body of her
husband nor in the place where it lay. When she touched her husband she found he was dead. Helen
became hysterical and went outside the house for help. After it was dressed, Reynaldos body was
loaded in a jeep so that it could be taken to the hospital but found that its headlights were not
functioning. They went to the municipal building to look for another vehicle and found a tricycle to
guide the jeep. Accused-appellant Eleazar M. Madali, who was on duty at that time, drove the
tricycle. However, Reynaldo was declared dead on arrival in the hospital. An autopsy conducted
Cause of death is Intracranial hemorrhage as a result of traumatic head injury.
Three years after the death of Reynaldo Abrenica, this case was filed, after an alleged eyewitness,
Mercy Villamor, surfaced and implicated accused-appellants in the death of Reynaldo. The
information against accused-appellants alleged that above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating with each other, with intent to kill, and with treachery and evident premeditation, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously inflict mortal wounds upon the person of one
Reynaldo M. Abrenica thereby causing the latters death. The court finds the accused (1) SR. POLICE
OFFICER II ELEAZAR M. MADALI, (2) SR. POLICE OFFICER II EUSTAQUIO V. ROGERO and (3) SR. POLICE
OFFICER I RANDY M. RUBIO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder under the
Information, dated December 1, 1995, and sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
The accused-appellants, in their appeal, alleged that the trial court erred in failing to resolve doubts
and discrepancies in its findings of fact in favor of the accused and that the court erred in finding
credible the testimonies of Mercy Villamor and Dr. Villasenor.
The complainant filed a Motion for Time to File Brief separate from that which the OSG could file, by
way of an answer to the brief of accused-appellants. This motion as denied. The OSG subsequently
filed a Manifestation recommending the acquittal of accused-appellants. In view of the position
taken by the OSG, complainant filed a Memorandum for the Private Complainant (after filing a
Manifestation and Motion to File Brief) which was noted by the Court.
Ruling and Reasoning:
Rule 133, Sec.1 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that any party may appeal from
a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy. It has been held
that the word party in the provision includes not only the government and the accused but other
persons who may be affected by the judgment.
The complainant has an interest in the civil liability arising from the crime. Hence, in the
prosecution of the offense, the complainants role is that of a witness for the prosecution.
Ordinarily, the appeal of the criminal cases involves as parties only the accused, as
appellants, and the State, represented by the Sol. Gen, as the appellee. The participation
of the private offended party could be a mere surplusage if the State were simply to seek
affirmation of a judgment of conviction. However, where the OSG takes a contrary position
and recommends, as in this case, the acquittal of the accused, the complainants right to
be heard as regards indemnity and damages arises.
Nevertheless, the evidence is insufficient to sustain the accused-appellants conviction. Mercy
Villamors testimony is riddled with inconsistencies, improbabilities and uncertainties which relate
to material points. Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness but must itself be credible.
6. Lavides v. CA ge 129670
FACTS: On 3 April 1997, the parents of Lorelie San Miguel reported to the police that their daughter,
then 16 years old, had been contacted by Manolet Lavides for an assignation that night at Lavides'
room at the Metropolitan Hotel in Diliman, Quezon City. Apparently, this was not the first time the
police received reports of Lavides' activities. An entrapment operation was therefore set in motion.
At around 8:20 p.m. of the same date, the police knocked at the door of Room 308 of the
Metropolitan Hotel where Lavides was staying. When Lavides opened the door, the police saw him
with Lorelie, who was wearing only a t-shirt and an underwear, whereupon they arrested him. Based
on the sworn statement of Lorelie and the affidavits of the arresting officers, which were submitted
at the inquest, an information for violation of Article III, 5(b) of RA 7610 (An Act Providing for
Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination,
Providing Penalties for its Violation, and other Purposes) was filed on 7 April 1997 against Lavides in
the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City (Criminal Case Q-97-70550). On 10 April 1997, Lavides filed an
"Omnibus Motion (1) For Judicial Determination of Probable Cause; (2) For the Immediate Release
of the Accused Unlawfully Detained on an Unlawful Warrantless Arrest; and (3) In the Event of
Adverse Resolution of the Above Incident, Herein Accused be Allowed to Bail as a Matter of Right
under the Law on Which He is Charged." On 29 April 1997, 9 more informations for child abuse were
filed against Lavides by Lorelie San Miguel, and by three other minor children, Mary Ann Tardesilla,
Jennifer Catarman, and Annalyn Talinting (Criminal Case Q-97-70866 to Q-97-70874). In all the cases,
it was alleged that, on various dates mentioned in the informations, Lavides had sexual intercourse
with complainants who had been "exploited in prostitution and given money as payment for the said
acts of sexual intercourse." No bail was recommended. Nonetheless, Lavides filed separate
applications for bail in the 9 cases. On 16 May 1997, the trial court issued an order resolving Lavides'
Omnibus Motion. finding that, in Criminal Case Q-97-70550, there is probable cause to hold the
accused under detention, his arrest having been made in accordance with the Rules, and thus he
must therefore remain under detention until further order of the Court; and that the accused is
entitled to bail in all the case, and that he is granted the right to post bail in the amount of P80,000.00
for each case or a total of P800,000.00 for all the cases under certain conditions. On 20 May 1997,
Lavides filed a motion to quash the informations against him, except those filed in Criminal Case Q-
97-70550 or Q-97-70866. Pending resolution of his motion, he asked the trial court to suspend the
arraignment scheduled on 23 May 1997. Then on 22 May 1997, he filed a motion in which he prayed
that the amounts of bail bonds be reduced to P40,000.00 for each case and that the same be done
prior to his arraignment. On 23 May 1997, the trial court, in separate orders, denied Lavides' motions
to reduce bail bonds, to quash the informations, and to suspend arraignment. Accordingly, Lavides
was arraigned during which he pleaded not guilty to the charges against him and then ordered him
released upon posting bail bonds in the total amount of P800,000.00, subject to the conditions in the
16 May 1997 order and the "hold-departure" order of 10 April 1997. The pre-trial conference was
set on 7 June 1997. On 2 June 1997, Lavides filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals,
assailing the trial court's order, dated 16 May 1997, and its two orders, dated 23 May 1997, denying
his motion to quash and maintaining the conditions set forth in its order of 16 May 1997, respectively.
While the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 3 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) case was pending in the Court
of Appeals, two more informations were filed against Lavides, bringing the total number of cases
against him to 12, which were all consolidated. On 30 June 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered its
decision, invalidating the first two conditions under 16 May 1997 order -- i.e. that (1) the accused
shall not be entitled to a waiver of appearance during the trial of these cases. He shall and must
always be present at the hearings of these cases; and (2) In the event that he shall not be able to do
so, his bail bonds shall be automatically cancelled and forfeited, warrants for his arrest shall be
immediately issued and the cases shall proceed to trial in absentia -- and maintained the orders in
all other respects. Lavides filed the petition for review with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether the court should impose the condition that the accused shall ensure his presence
during the trial of these cases before the bail can be granted.
RULING: In cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the
accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if the information is quashed and the
case is dismissed, there would then be no need for the arraignment of the accused. Further, the trial
court could ensure Lavides' presence at the arraignment precisely by granting bail and ordering his
presence at any stage of the proceedings, such as arraignment. Under Rule 114, 2(b) of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure, one of the conditions of bail is that "the accused shall appear before the
proper court whenever so required by the court or these Rules," while under Rule 116, 1(b) the
presence of the accused at the arraignment is required. To condition the grant of bail to an accused
on his arraignment would be to place him in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a
motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved,
his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be
arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. These scenarios certainly undermine the
accused's constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon valid complaint or information
sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail. The court's strategy to ensure the Lavides'
7. Jose Pacoy v. Hon. Cajigal gr 157472
Facts: An information was filed against Pacoy for the crime of homicide, shooting his commanding
officer 2Lt. Frederick Escueta with his armalite with aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank.
On arraignment, Pacoy pleaded not guilty. However, after arraignment, Cajigal ordered the
prosecutor to correct and amend the information to murder in view of the aggravating circumstance
of disregard of rank alleged in the information. Prosec entered his amendment by crossing out the
word homicide and instead wrote the word murder in the caption and in the opening paragraph
of the information. The accusatory portion remained the same except with the correction of the
spelling of the victims name from Escuita to Escueta .
When Pacoy was to be re-arraigned for the crime of murder, Pacoy objected on ground that he
would be placed in double jeopardy, considering that his case for homicide has been terminated
without his express consent, resulting in the dismissal of the case. So, Pacoy refused to enter his plea
on the amended information, the court entered a plea of not guilty for him.
Pacoy filed a motion to quash on ground of double jeopardy.
Cajigal denied the motion to quash. Pacoy then filed a motion to inhibit with attached MR. His motion
to inhibit alleges that Cajigal exercised jurisdiction in an arbitrary, capricious and partial manner in
ordering the amendment of the information. His MR alleged that the case of homicide was dismissed
without his express consent which constituted a ground to quash the information for murder and
that to try him again constitutes double jeopardy.
Pacoy argued that the amendment was substantial and under sec. 14, rule 110, this cannot be done
because Pacoy had already been arraigned and he would be placed in double jeopardy. Cajigal denied
the motion to inhibit and granted the MR on ground that the disregard of rank is merely a generic
aggravating circumstance. Pacoy filed a petition for certiorari.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General argues that the respondent judge's Order reinstating the
Information to Homicide after initially Motu proprio ordering its amendment to Murder renders
herein petition moot and academic; that petitioner failed to establish the fourth element of double
jeopardy, i.e., the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his consent; that petitioner confuses amendment with substitution of
Information; that the respondent judge's Order dated September 12, 2002 mandated an amendment
of the Information as provided under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure;
and that amendments do not entail dismissal or termination of the previous case.
Issue: WON the amendment in the information would result to the dismissal of the case.
Held: Petitioner confuses the procedure and effects of amendment or substitution under Section 14,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in
substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and
during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done
without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
xxx
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one
charging the proper offense in accordance with Rule 119, Section 11, provided the accused would
not be placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may also require the witnesses to give bail for their
appearance at the trial.
I n the present case, the change of the offense charged from Homicide to Murder is merely a formal
amendment and not a substantial amendment or a substitution as defined in
Teehankee. While the amended Information was for Murder, a reading of the Information shows
that the only change made was in the caption of the case; and in the opening paragraph or preamble
of the
Information, with the crossing out of word Homicide and its replacement by the word Murder.
There was no change in the recital of facts constituting the offense charged or in the determination
of the jurisdiction of the court. The averments in the amended Information for Murder are exactly
the same as those already alleged in the original Information for Homicide, as there was not at all
any change in the act imputed to petitioner, i.e., the killing of 2Lt.Escueta without any qualifying
circumstance. Thus, we find that the amendment made in the caption and preamble from
Homicide to Murder as purely formal. accused might have would be inapplicable to the complaint or information. Since the facts alleged in
Section 14, Rule 110 also provides that in allowing formal amendments in cases in which the accused
has already pleaded, it is necessary that the amendments do not prejudice the rights of the accused.
The test of whether the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or
information is whether a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would
no longer be available after the amendment is made; and when any evidence the accused might
have would be inapplicable to the complaint or information. Since the facts alleged in the accusatory
portion of the amended Information are identical with those of the original Information for Homicide,
there could not be any effect on the prosecution's theory of the case; neither would there be any
possible prejudice to the rights or defense of petitioner.
While the respondent judge erroneously thought that disrespect on account of rank qualified the
crime to murder, as the same was only a generic aggravating circumstance, we do not find that he
committed any grave abuse of discretion in ordering the amendment of the Information after
petitioner had already pleaded not guilty to the charge of Homicide, since the amendment made
was only formal and did not adversely affect any substantial right of petitioner.
_________________________________
FACTS: Jose Pacoy seeks to annul the order of Presiding Judge Cajigal of Regional Trial Court 68 of
Camiling Tarlac. On July 4, 2002, an information for Homicide was filed in the RTC against petitioner
for shooting and killing his commanding officer, 2Lt. Frederick Esquita with an armalite rifle. Upon
arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty.
However, on the same day and after the arraignment, the respondent judge issued another Order,
likewise dated September 12, 2002, directing the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the
Information to Murder in view of the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank alleged in the
Information which public respondent registered as having qualified the crime to Murder. The
prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the word Homicide and instead wrote the word
Murder in the caption and in the opening paragraph of the Information. The accusatory portion
remained exactly the same as that of the original Information for Homicide, with the correction of
the spelling of the victims name from Escuita to Escueta. Petitioner was to be re-arraigned for the
crime of Murder. Counsel for petitioner objected on the ground that the latter would be placed in
double jeopardy, considering that his Homicide case had been terminated without his express
consent, resulting in the dismissal of the case. As petitioner refused to enter his plea on the amended
Information for Murder, the public respondent entered for him a plea of not guilty. Respondent
judge denied the Motion to Quash. The Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied. Thus,
petitioner went straight to Supreme Court and filed a petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: WON respondent judge erred in amending the Information after petitioner had already
entered in plea to the charge of information for homicide.
RULING: No. Section 14, Rule 110 also provides that in allowing formal amendments in cases in which
the accused has already pleaded, it is necessary that the amendments do not prejudice the rights of
the accused. The test of whether the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a
complaint or information is whether a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally
stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made; and when any evidence the
the accusatory portion of the amended Information are identical with those of the original
Information for Homicide, there
could not be any effect on the prosecutions theory of the case; neither would there be any pos
sible prejudice to the rights or defense of petitioner.

RULE 111
1. Lee Pue Liong v. Chua Pue Chin Lee gr 181658
FACTS: Thist is a petition1 for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the May 31, 2007
Decision2 and the January 31, 2008 Resolution3 of the CA. The CA affirmed the Orders4 dated August
15, 2003 and November 5, 2003 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila denying (a) the
Omnibus Motion5 for the exclusion of a private prosecutor in the two criminal cases for
perjury pending before the MeTC, and (b) the Motion for Reconsideration6 of the said order denying
the Omnibus Motion, respectively.
Petitioner claims that the crime of perjury, a crime against public interest, does not offend any
private party but is a crime which only offends the public interest in the fair and orderly
administration of laws. He opines that perjury is a felony where no civil liability arises on the part of
the offender because there are no damages to be compensated and that there is no private person
injured by the crime.
Petitioner argues that the CAs invocation of our pronouncement in Lim Tek Goan, cited by Justice
Regalado in his book, is inaccurate since the private offended party must have a civil interest in the
criminal case in order to intervene through a private prosecutor. Dissecting Lim Tek Goan, petitioner
points out that said case involved the crime of grave threats where Lim Tek Goan himself was one of
the offended parties. Thus, even if the crime of grave threats did not have any civil liability to be
satisfied, petitioner claims that Lim Tek Goan, as a matter of right, may still intervene because he
was one of the offended parties.
Petitioner submits that the MeTC erred in allowing the private prosecutor to represent respondent
in this case despite the fact that the latter was not the offended party and did not suffer any damage
as she herself did not allege nor claim in her Complaint-Affidavit and Supplemental Affidavit that she
or CHI suffered any damage that may be satisfied through restitution,37 reparation for the damage
caused38 and indemnification for consequential damages.39 Lastly, petitioner asserts that respondent
is not the proper offended party that may intervene in this case as she was not authorized by CHI.
Thus, he prayed, among others, that Atty. Macam or any private prosecutor for that matter be
excluded from the prosecution of the criminal cases, and that all proceedings undertaken wherein
Atty. Macam intervened be set aside and that the same be taken anew by the public prosecutor
alone.40
On the other hand, respondent counters that the presence and intervention of the private prosecutor
in the perjury cases are not prohibited by the rules, stressing that she is, in fact, an aggrieved party,
being a stockholder, an officer and the treasurer of CHI and the private complainant. Thus, she
submits that pursuant to our ruling in Lim Tek Goan she has the right to intervene even if no civil
liability exists in this case.41
ISSUE:
1. WON CA committed a grave error when it upheld the resolution of the MeTC that there is a private
offended party in the crime of perjury, a crime against public interest.
2. WON CA erred when it upheld the resolutions of the lower court which in turn upheld the right of
respondent, an alleged stockholder of chi, to intervene in the criminal case for perjury as private
complainant on behalf of the corporation without its authority.
HELD: No. The petition has no merit.
Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that
"[e]very person criminally liable x x x is also civilly liable."42 Underlying this legal principle is the
traditional theory that when a person commits a crime, he offends two entities, namely (1) the
society in which he lives in or the political entity, called the State, whose law he has violated; and (2)
the individual member of that society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually
or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission.
Section 1, Rule 111
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted
with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
For the recovery of civil liability in the criminal action, the appearance of a private prosecutor is
allowed under Section 16 of Rule 110:
SEC. 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action.Where the civil action for recovery of
civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may
intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 12, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, defines an offended
party as "the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed." In Garcia
v. Court of Appeals,44 this Court rejected petitioners theory that it is only the State which is the
offended party in public offenses like bigamy. We explained that from the language of Section 12,
Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, it is reasonable to assume that the offended party in the commission
of a crime, public or private, is the party to whom the offender is civilly liable, and therefore the
private individual to whom the offender is civilly liable is the offended party.
In Ramiscal, Jr. v. Hon. Sandiganbayan,45 we also held that:
Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offended party may also
be a private individual whose person, right, house, liberty or property was actually or directly injured
by the same punishable act or omission of the accused, or that corporate entity which is damaged or
injured by the delictual acts complained of. Such party must be one who has a legal right;
a substantial interest in the subject matter of the action as will entitle him to recourse under the
substantive law, to recourse if the evidence is sufficient or that he has the legal right to the demand
and the accused will be protected by the satisfaction of his civil liabilities. Such interest must not be
a mere expectancy, subordinate or inconsequential. The interest of the party must be personal; and
not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and unrelated
party.46 (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, the statement of petitioner regarding his custody of TCT No. 232238 covering CHIs
property and its loss through inadvertence, if found to be perjured is, without doubt, injurious to
respondents personal credibility and reputation insofar as her faithful performance of the duties
and responsibilities of a Board Member and Treasurer of CHI. The potential injury to the corporation
itself is likewise undeniable as the court-ordered issuance of a new owners duplicate of TCT No.
232238 was only averted by respondents timely discovery of the case filed by petitioner in the RTC.
Even assuming that no civil liability was alleged or proved in the perjury case being tried in the MeTC,
this Court declared in the early case of Lim Tek Goan v. Yatco,47 cited by both MeTC and CA, that
whether public or private crimes are involved, it is erroneous for the trial court to consider the
intervention of the offended party by counsel as merely a matter of tolerance. Thus, where the private
prosecution has asserted its right to intervene in the proceedings, that right must be respected. The
right reserved by the Rules to the offended party is that of intervening for the sole purpose of
enforcing the civil liability born of the criminal act and not of demanding punishment of the accused.
Such intervention, moreover, is always subject to the direction and control of the public prosecutor.48
In Chua v. Court of Appeals,49 as a result of the complaint-affidavit filed by private respondent who
is also the corporations Treasurer, four counts of falsification of public documents (Minutes of
Annual Stockholders Meeting)was instituted by the City Prosecutor against petitioner and his wife.
After private respondents testimony was heard during the trial, petitioner moved to exclude her
counsels as private prosecutors on the ground that she failed to allege and prove any civil liability in
the case. The MeTC granted the motion and ordered the exclusion of said private prosecutors. On
certiorari to the RTC, said court reversed the MeTC and ordered the latter to allow the private
prosecutors in the prosecution of the civil aspect of the criminal case. Petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari in the CA which dismissed his petition and affirmed the assailed RTC ruling.
When the case was elevated to this Court, we sustained the CA in allowing the private prosecutors
to actively participate in the trial of the criminal case. Thus:
Petitioner cites the case of Tan, Jr. v. Gallardo, holding that where from the nature of the offense or
where the law defining and punishing the offense charged does not provide for an indemnity, the
offended party may not intervene in the prosecution of the offense.
Petitioners contention lacks merit. Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the
fundamental postulate that every man criminally liable is also civilly liable. When a person commits
a crime he offends two entities namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity called
the State whose law he has violated; and (2) the individual member of the society whose person,
right, honor, chastity or property has been actually or directly injured or damaged by the same
punishable act or omission. An act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives
rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another.
Additionally, what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of everyone
to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, whether
done intentionally or negligently. The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral
part of the penalty imposed by law for the commission of the crime. The civil action involves the civil
liability arising from the offense charged which includes restitution, reparation of the damage
caused, and indemnification for consequential damages.
Under the Rules, where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action
pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense.
Rule 111(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that, "[w]hen a criminal action is instituted,
the civil action arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal
action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately,
or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action."
Private respondent did not waive the civil action, nor did she reserve the right to institute it
separately, nor institute the civil action for damages arising from the offense charged. Thus, we find
that the private prosecutors can intervene in the trial of the criminal action.
Petitioner avers, however, that respondents testimony in the inferior court did not establish nor
prove any damages personally sustained by her as a result of petitioners alleged acts of falsification.
Petitioner adds that since no personal damages were proven therein, then the participation of her
counsel as private prosecutors, who were supposed to pursue the civil aspect of a criminal case, is
not necessary and is without basis.
When the civil action is instituted with the criminal action, evidence should be taken of the damages
claimed and the court should determine who are the persons entitled to such indemnity. The civil
liability arising from the crime may be determined in the criminal proceedings if the offended party
does not waive to have it adjudged or does not reserve the right to institute a separate civil action
against the defendant. Accordingly, if there is no waiver or reservation of civil liability, evidence
should be allowed to establish the extent of injuries suffered.
In the case before us, there was neither a waiver nor a reservation made; nor did the offended party
institute a separate civil action. It follows that evidence should be allowed in the criminal proceedings
to establish the civil liability arising from the offense committed, and the private offended party has
the right to intervene through the private prosecutors.50 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
In the light of the foregoing, we hold that the CA did not err in holding that the MeTC committed no
grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners motion to exclude Atty. Macam as private
prosecutor in Crim. Case Nos. 352270-71 CR.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated May 31, 2007 and
the Resolution dated January 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81510 are hereby
AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
2. Pimentel v. Pimentel gr 172060
DOCTRINE: Annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is not a prejudicial question
in a criminal case for parricide.
FACTS: On 25 October 2004, Maria Pimentel y Lacap(private respondent) filed an action for
frustrated parricide against Joselito Pimentel (petitioner) before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City.
On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo City for the pre-trial and trial of a civil case (Maria Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC
Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since
the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of
the civil case would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.
The RTC Quezon City held that the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial
question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order before the Court of Appeals. However, The Court of Appeals ruled that
even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would be
immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts
constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed.
ISSUE: WON resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that
warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.
HELD: No. Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that elements of a
prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
In the case at bar, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for
frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide,
which punishes any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse. However, the issue in the
annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for
parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the
guilt or innocence of the accused.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether
petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue
in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with
frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have
killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of
causes independent of petitioners will. At the time of the commission of the alleged crime,
petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolutionof their marriage will have no
effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In
short, even if the marriage
between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since
at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.
We cannot accept petitioners reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals that the judicial declaration
of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of
the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned x x x.
First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was no
issue of prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that [t]here is x x x a
recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce
legal consequences. In fact, the Court declared in that case that a declaration of the nullity of the
second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the
States penal laws are concerned.
3. Magestrado v. People gr 157472
Topic: Rule 111; Prejudicial question
FACTS:
Private respondent Elena Librojo filed a criminal complaint of against accused Francisco Magistrado
before the the Office of the Prosecutor of Quezon City. Thereafter the prosecutor recommended the
filing of the complaint against accused. An Information was filed against the accused for perjury
before the MeTC of Quezon City.
The Information alleged that the accused subscribed and swore to an Affidavit of Loss before a notary
public stating that he lost his Owners Duplicate Certificate of TCT. The same affidavit was used to
by accused to support his Petition for Issuance of New Owners Duplicate Copy of Certificate of TCT
filed with the RTC of Quezon City. A verification was again signed and sworn into by the accused
before the notary public. However, the contents of the same affidavit, already known to the accused,
are false. It was later found out that the property subject of the TCT was mortgaged to respondent
Librojo as collateral for a loan. As a result, respondent suffered damages and prejudice due to the
deliberate assertion of falsehoods by the accused.
Subsequently, petitioner-accused Magistrado filed a motion to suspend the proceedings on the
ground of a prejudicial question. Petitioner alleged that two civil cases (for recovery of sum of money
and for cancellation of mortgage) were pending before the RTC of Quezon City, and that they must
be resolved first before the present criminal case. The RTC of Quezon City denied the motion. Hence
this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the two civil cases (for Recovery of Sum of Money and for Cancellation of Mortgage)
constitutes a prejudicial question that would warrant a suspension of the criminal case of perjury
RULING + RATIO:
A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein, and he cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.
Further, a prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court, but the
jurisdiction must be lodged in another court. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate
from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
accused. The Court enumerated the requisites of a prejudicial question that would suspend the
criminal proceedings until final resolution of the civil case:
1. The civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution
would be based;
2. The guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined in resolving the issued
raised in the civil case;
3. Jurisdiction to try the question is lodged in another tribunal.

In concluding the Court stated, it is evident that the civil cases and the criminal cases can proceed
independently of each other. Regardless of the outcome of the two civil cases, it will not establish
the innocence or guilt of the petitioner inf the criminal case of perjury. The purchase by petitioner
of the land or his execution of a real estate mortgage will have no bearing whatsoever on whether
petitioner knowingly and fraudulently executed a false affidavit of loss of the TCT.

RULE 112
1. Callo-Claridad v. Esteban gr 191567
2. People v. borje gr 170046
3. Socrates v. Sandiganbayan 116259-60
4. Ladlad v. Velasco gr 172070-72
5. Lanier v. people gr 189176

RULE 113
1. People v. Villareal gr 201363
2. People v. Laguio Jr. gr 128587

RULE 114
1. David v. Agbay gr 199113
2. Lavides v. CA ge 129670
3. Lachica v. Tormis AM MTJ-05-1609