TATEL V.

MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC

Facts:
Based on complaints received by the residents of barrio Sta. Elena against the disturbance caused by the
operation of the abaca bailing machine inside Tatels warehouse, Resolution 291 was enacted by the Municipal
Council of Virac declaring Tatels warehouse a public nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the Civil
Code and directing the petitioner to remove and transfer said warehouse to a more suitable place within two
months from receipt of the said resolution. The municipal officials contend that petitioner's warehouse was
constructed in violation of Ordinance 13, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses
either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of
houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. Tatel contends that said ordinance is
unconstitutional, contrary to the due process and equal protection clause of the Constitution and null and void
for not having been passed in accordance with law.

Issue: 1. WON Ordinance No. 13 is unconstitutional. NO

Ordinance 13, was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is a settled
principle of law that municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of
local self-government and as such are endowed with the police powers in order to effectively accomplish and
carry out the declared objects of their creation.

Its authority emanates from the general welfare clause under the Administrative Code, which reads: The
municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be
necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall
seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals,
peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the
protection of property therein.

For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the municipality to enact but
must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law.

These principles require that a municipal ordinance (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute (2)
must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may
regulate trade (5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and (6) must not be unreasonable.
Ordinance 13 meets these criteria.

In spite of its fractured syntax, what is regulated by the ordinance is the construction of warehouses wherein
inflammable materials are stored where such warehouses are located at a distance of 200 meters from a block
of houses and not the construction per se of a warehouse. The purpose is to avoid the loss of life and property
in case of fire which is one of the primordial obligation of the government.

The objections interposed by the petitioner to the validity of the ordinance have not been substantiated. Its
purpose is well within the objectives of sound government. No undue restraint is placed upon the petitioner
or for anybody to engage in trade but merely a prohibition from storing inflammable products in the warehouse
because of the danger of fire to the lives and properties of the people residing in the vicinity. As far as public
policy is concerned, there can be no better policy than what has been conceived by the municipal government.

MAYOR OSCAR DE LOS REYES, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, THIRD DIVISION, and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:

The significance of the minutes taken during the session of a local legislative assembly is the determinant issue
in this present petition.

Petitioner, along with two others, was charged with the crime of falsification of a public document, specifically
Resolution No. 57-S-92 dated July 27, 1992 of the Municipal Council of Mariveles, Bataan. The complaint[1]
alleged that the resolution, appropriating the amount of P8,500.00 for the payment of the terminal leave of
two municipal employees, was anomalous for not having been approved by the said Council, as the minutes of
the proceedings therein made no reference to the supposed approval thereof. It contended that its seeming
passage was carried out by petitioner in connivance with Sangguniang Bayan (SB) Member Jesse Concepcion
and SB Secretary Antonio Zurita.

After preliminary investigation, the deputized prosecutor of Balanga, Bataan recommended the filing of an
information[2] for Falsification of Public Document against petitioner and Concepcion, excluding Zurita who
died during the pendency hereof.

On September 21, 1994, the information filed before the Sandiganbayan reads as follows:

That on or about July 27, 1992 or sometimes (sic) prior or subsequent thereto, in Mariveles, Bataan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, OSCAR DELOS REYES and JESSE CONCEPCION, both public
officers, being Municipal Mayor of Mariveles, Bataan and Member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mariveles,
Bataan, passed and approved the said resolution appropriating the amount of P8,500.00 for payment of the
terminal leave of two (2) employees of the municipality, when in truth and in fact as both accused knew well
the same is false and incorrect as the said resolution was not approved by the aforesaid Sangguniang Bayan
for which both accused has the obligation to disclose the truth.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

On October 14, 1994, prior to his arraignment, petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation arguing, among
other things, that the Ombudsman previously dismissed a similar complaint against him involving the same
factual setting.[4]

Likewise adduced in the motion is the joint affidavit of the other members of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Mariveles attesting to the actual passage and approval of Resolution No. 57-S-92.

In a resolution dated December 29, 1994, respondent Sandiganbayan denied the Motion for Reinvestigation,
the pertinent portion of which reads:

Acting on accused Mayor Oscar delos Reyes Motion for Reinvestigation and accused Jesse Concepcions
Manifestation, the same are hereby DENIED, being without merit and the prosecution having vigorously
opposed the Motion. The allegations of fact and the arguments of counsel are best taken up in the trial on the
merits. As found by the prosecution, a prima facie case exists.

Consequently, let the arraignment of the above entitled case be set on March 03, 1995, at 8:30 A.M.[5]

After the motion for reconsideration was denied on May 24, 1995, petitioner filed this instant petition for
certiorari. On September 18, 1995, the Court resolved to issue the temporary restraining order prayed for by
petitioner.

The order of respondent Sandiganbayan must be sustained.

In an effort to exonerate himself from the charge, petitioner argues that the deliberations undertaken and the
consequent passage of Resolution No. 57-S-92 are legislative in nature. He adds that as local chief executive,
he has neither the official custody of nor the duty to prepare said resolution; hence, he could not have taken
advantage of his official position in committing the crime of falsification as defined and punished under Article
171[6] of the Revised Penal Code.

Petitioner would like to impress upon this Court that the final step in the approval of an ordinance or resolution,
where the local chief executive affixes his signature, is purely a ministerial act. This view is erroneous. Article
109(b) of the Local Government Code outlines the veto power of the Local Chief Executive which provides:

Article 109 (b) The local chief executive, except the punong barangay shall have the power to veto any
particular item or items of an appropriations ordinance, an ordinance or resolution adopting a local
development plan and public investment program or an ordinance directing the payment of money or creating
liability. x x x. (Underscoring supplied)

Contrary to petitioners belief, the grant of the veto power confers authority beyond the simple mechanical act
of signing an ordinance or resolution, as a requisite to its enforceability. Such power accords the local chief
executive the discretion to sustain a resolution or ordinance in the first instance or to veto it and return it with
his objections to the Sanggunian, which may proceed to reconsider the same. The Sanggunian concerned,
however, may override the veto by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its members thereby making the ordinance or
resolution effective for all legal intents and purposes. It is clear, therefore, that the concurrence of a local chief
executive in the enactment of an ordinance or resolution requires, not only a flourish of the pen, but the
application of judgment after meticulous analysis and intelligence as well.

Petitioners other contention that the Ombudsman should have dismissed the present case in view of a previous
dismissal of a similar complaint involving the same factual context is likewise misplaced.

As explained by Deputy Special Prosecutor Leonardo P. Tamayo in his comment, the other case relied upon by
petitioner has no relation whatsoever with the one in question. Notably, the former case was subject of a
separate complaint and preliminary investigation, hence, the findings and records therein could not be made
part of the case under consideration.[7]

It must be stressed that the Ombudsman correctly relied on the minutes taken during the session of the
Sangguniang Bayan held last July 27, 1992, which petitioner regards as inconclusive evidence of what actually
transpired therein. In a long line of cases, the Court, in resolving conflicting assertions of the protagonists in a
case, has placed reliance on the minutes or the transcribed stenographic notes to ascertain the truth of the
proceedings therein.

The following cases illustrate the importance of the minutes:

It was held that contrary to petitioners claim, what the minutes only show is that on August 12, 1994 the
Sanggunian took a vote on the administrative case of respondent Mayor and not that it then rendered a
decision as required by Section 66(a) of the Local Government Code.[8]

With the same factual context as in the case at bar, petitioners herein were accused of having falsified or
caused the falsification of the excerpts of the minutes of the regular sessions of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of Quirino province on August 15, 1988 and September 19, 1988. x x x.[9]

In his resolution, Secretary Drilon declared that there were no written notices of public hearings on the
proposed Manila Revenue Code that were sent to interested parties as required by Article 276(b) of the
Implementing Rules of the Local Government Code nor were copies of the proposed ordinance published in
three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation pursuant to Article 276(a). No minutes were
submitted to show that the obligatory public hearings had been held.[10]

It appears from the minutes of the board meeting of February 28, 1958 that the names of the members present
as well those who were absent have been recorded, and that all those present took active part in the debates
and deliberations. At the end of the session, when the presiding officer asked the members if there were any
objections to the approval of the proposed budget, only one councilor raised an objection. The minutes,
therefore, could readily show who of the members present in the deliberations voted pro and who voted
con.[11]

The certification of the election registrar relied upon by the petitioner is correct as far as it goes. Only 80 votes
appear to have voted according to the precinct book in the sense that only 80 voters affixed their signatures
thereon after voting. But this does not necessarily mean that no other voters cast their ballots in the questioned
precinct: there were 279 in all, according to the minutes of voting, although only 80 of them signed the precinct
book.[12]

As found by the trial court, the said minutes of the meeting of the Sangguniang Bayan do not mention the
execution of any deed to perfect the agreement. An engineer was appointed to survey the old abandoned road,
but this act does not in any manner convey title over the abandoned road to the Pansacola spouses nor
extinguishes their ownership over the land traversed by the new provincial highway.[13]

In the case at bar, the minutes of the session reveal that petitioner attended the session of the Sangguniang
Bayan on July 27, 1992. It is evident, therefore, that petitioner approved the subject resolution knowing fully
well that the subject matter treated therein was neither taken up and discussed nor passed upon by the
Sangguniang Bayan during the legislative session.[14]

Thus, the Court accords full recognition to the minutes as the official repository of what actually transpires in
every proceeding. It has happened that the minutes may be corrected to reflect the true account of a
proceeding, thus giving the Court more reason to accord them great weight for such subsequent corrections,
if any, are made precisely to preserve the accuracy of the records. In light of the conflicting claims of the parties
in the case at bar, the Court, without resorting to the minutes, will encounter difficulty in resolving the dispute
at hand.

With regard to the joint affidavit of some members of the Sangguniang Bayan attesting to the actual passage
and approval of Resolution No. 57-S-92, the Court finds the same to have been belatedly submitted as a last
minute attempt to bolster petitioners position, and, therefore, could not in any way aid the latters cause.

Indeed, the arguments raised by petitioners counsel are best taken up in the trial on the merits.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The assailed resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan dated December 29, 1994, and May 24, 1995, are hereby AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining
order issued by this Court on September 18, 1995, is hereby LIFTED.

The Sandiganbayan is DIRECTED to set Criminal Case No. 21073 for arraignment and trial.

SO ORDERED.

MODAY VS CA

Percival Moday is a landowner in Bunawan, Agusan del Sur. In 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of Bunawan passed
a resolution authorizing the mayor to initiate an expropriation case against a 1 hectare portion of Modays
land. Purpose of which was to erect a gymnasium and other public buildings. The mayor approved the
resolution and the resolution was transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan which disapproved the said
resolution ruling that the expropriation is not necessary because there are other lots owned by Bunawan that
can be used for such purpose. The mayor pushed through with the expropriation nonetheless.

ISSUE: Whether or not a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal resolution
which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

HELD: Yes. Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant case, is a
fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is governments right to appropriate, in the
nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose. Inherently possessed by
the national legislature, the power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local governments, other
public entities and public utilities. For the taking of private property by the government to be valid, the taking
must be for public use and there must be just compensation. The only ground upon which a provincial board
may declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, or order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order
is beyond the powers conferred upon the council or president making the same. This was not the case in the
case at bar as the SP merely stated that there are other available lands for the purpose sought, the SP did not
even bother to declare the SB resolution as invalid. Hence, the expropriation case is valid.

IV. Legislation
Malonzo v. Zamora
323 SCRA 875
FACTS: A supplemental budget was passed by the councilors upon three readings held on the same day. They
were charged with misconduct.

HELD: There is no law prohibiting the holding of the three readings of a proposed ordinance in one session
day.

DECISION
ROMERO, J.:

Consistent with the doctrine that local government does not mean the creation of imperium in imperii or a
state within a State, the Constitution has vested the President of the Philippines the power of general
supervision over local government units.[1] Such grant of power includes the power of discipline over local
officials, keeping them accountable to the public, and seeing to it that their acts are kept within the bounds of
law. Needless to say, this awesome supervisory power, however, must be exercised judiciously and with utmost
circumspection so as not to transgress the avowed constitutional policy of local autonomy. As the facts unfold,
the issue that obtrudes in our minds is: Should the national government be too strong vis--vis its local
counterpart to the point of subverting the principle of local autonomy enshrined and zealously protected under
the Constitution? It is in this light that the instant case shall now be resolved.

During the incumbency of then Macario A Asistio, Jr., the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan City passed
Ordinance No. 0168, S. 1994,[2] authorizing the City Mayor to initiate proceedings for the expropriation of Lot
26 of the Maysilo Estate registered in the name of CLT Relaty Development Corporation (CLT). The lot, covering
an area of 799,955 square meters, was intended for low-cost housing and the construction of an integrated
bus terminal, parks and playgrounds, and related support facilities and utilities. For this purpose, the said
ordinance appropriated the amount of P35,997,975.00,[3] representing 15% of the fair market value of Lot 26
that would be required of the city government as a deposit prior to entry into the premises to be expropriated.

It turned out, however, that the Maysilo Estate straddled the City of Caloocan and the Municipality of Malabon,
prompting CLT to file a special civil action[4] for Interpleader with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction on August 6, 1997, before the Caloocan City Regional
Trial Court, branch 124. The complaint specifically sought to restrain the defendants City of Caloocan and
Municipality of Malabon from assessing and collecting real property taxes from CLT and to interplead and
litigate among themselves their conflicting rights to claim such taxes.

On December 11, 1997, the Caloocan City Sangguniang Panlungsod, under the stewardship of incumbent
Mayor Reynaldo O. Malonzo, enacted Ordinance No. 0246, S. 1997,[5] entitled AN ORDINANCE AMENDING
AND SUPPLEMENTING THE PROVISIONS OF CITY ORDINANCE NO. 0168, SERIES OF 1994 AND FOR OTHER
RELATED PURPOSES.[6] Under this ordinance, certain amendments were introduced, foremost of which was
the city councils decision to increase the appropriated amount of P35,997,975.00 in the previous ordinance to
P39,352,047.75, taking into account the subject propertys current fair market value.
After failing to conclude a voluntary sale of Lot 26, the city government commenced on March 23, 1998, a suit
for eminent domain[7] against CLT before the Caloocan City Regional Trial Court, Branch 126, to implement
the subject propertys expropriation. Apparently disturbed by this development, the Caloocan City Legal Officer
informed the City Mayor through a letter-memorandum[8] dated April 7, 1998, of the pending interpleader
case covering Lot 26 and that the same was a Prejudicial Question which must be resolved first by the proper
court in order not to put the expropriation proceedings in question. He therefore recommended that pending
the final determination and resolution of the court on the issue (territorial jurisdiction) raised in Civil Case No.
C-18019 before Branch 124 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, the expropriation of the subject
property be cancelled and/or abandoned.

In the meantime, after the successful re-election bid of Malonzo, Vice-Mayor Oscar G. Malapitan wrote him a
letter[9] dated June 4, 1998, requesting the immediate repair and renovation of the offices of the incoming
councilors, as well as the hiring of additional personnel and the retention of those currently employed in the
offices of the councilors.

Malonzo acted on said letter and endorsed the same to the Office of the City Treasurer. The latter in turn
manifested through a memorandum[10]dated June 26, 1998, that since the expropriation of CLT Property is
discontinued, the appropriation for expropriation of FIFTY MILLION PESOS (P50M)[11] can be reverted for use
in a supplemental budget stating further that he certifies (F)or its reversion since it is not yet obligated, and for
its availability for re-appropriation in a supplemental budget.

Pursuant to the treasurers certification on the availability of funds to accommodate Vice-Mayor Malapitans
request, Malonzo subsequently endorsed to the Sangguniang Panlungsod Supplemental Budget No. 01, Series
of 1998, appropriating the amount of P39,343,028.00. The city council acted favorably on Malonzos
endorsement and, thus, passed Ordinance No. 0254, S. 1998[12] entitled AN ORDINANCE PROVIDING
PAYMENTS FOR APPROVED ITEMS IN THE SUPPLEMENTAL BUDGET NO. 1 CALENDAR YEAR 1998 AND
APPROPRIATING CORRESPONDING AMOUNT WHICH SHALL BE TAKEN FROM THE GENERAL FUND (REVERSION
OF APPROPRIATION-EXPROPRIATION OF PROPERTIES).

Alleging, however, that petitioners conspired and confederated in willfully violating certain provisions of the
Local Government Code of 1991 (hereinafter the "Code") through the passage of Ordinance No. 0254, S. 1998,
a certain Eduardo Tibor, by himself and as a taxpayer, filed on July 15, 1998, an administrative complaint for
Dishonesty, Misconduct in Office, and Abuse of Authority against petitioners before the Office of the President
(OP).[13]

After the complaint was given due course, petitioners filed on October 15, 1998 their Consolidated Answer,[14]
pointing out, among other things, that said complaint constituted collateral attack of a validly enacted
ordinance whose validity should only be determined in a judicial forum. They also claimed that the assailed
ordinance was enacted strictly in accordance with Article 417 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Local Government Code of 1991 (hereinafter, the Rules), as amended by Administrative Order No. 47 dated
April 12, 1993.

After several exchanges of pleadings,[15] petitioners, citing Section 326 of the Code and Article 422, Rule XXXIV
of the Rules, filed on February 7, 1999, a Motion to Refer the Case to the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) on the ground that the DBM has been granted power under the Code to review ordinances
authorizing the annual or supplemental appropriations of, among other things, highly urbanized cities such as
Caloocan City. This motion, however, remained unresolved.

Two days later, after learning that a certain Teotimo de Guzman Gajudo had filed an action for the Decalaration
of Nullity of Ordinance No. 0254, Series of 1998, before the Caloocan City Regional Trial Court,[16] petitioners
filed with the OP a Manifestation and Very Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings on the ground that the
determination of the validity of said ordinance was a prejudicial question. Likewise, this motion was not acted
upon by the OP.
Thus, without resolving the foregoing motions of petitioners, the OP rendered its assailed judgment[17] on
March 15, 1999, the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, herein respondents Mayor Reynaldo Malonzo, Vice-mayor Oscar G. Malapitan and Councilors
Chito Abel, Benjamin Manlapig, Edgar Erice, Dennis Padilla, Zaldy Dolatre, Susana Punzalan, Henry Camayo,
and Luis Tito Varela, all of Caloocan City, are hereby adjudged guilty of misconduct and each is meted the
penalty of SUSPENSION[18] from office for a period of three (3) months without pay to commence upon receipt
of this Decision. This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

CASE DIGEST : Lino Vs Pano

HON. JOSE D. LINA, JR., SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF LAGUNA, and HON.CALIXTO CATAQUIZ,
petitioners, vs
. HON. FRANCISCO DIZON PAO and TONYCALVENTO,
respondents
.
G.R. No. 129093

FACTS:On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto
Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayors permit to open the lotto outlet. This was denied by Mayor
Cataquiz in a letter dated February 19, 1996. The ground for said denial was an ordinance passed by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995which was issued on September 18,
1995.As a result of this resolution of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory relief with
prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. In the said complaint, respondent Calvento
asked the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 93, for the following reliefs: (1) a preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order, ordering the defendants to refrain from implementing or enforcing
Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995; (2) an order requiring Hon. Municipal Mayor Calixto R. Cataquiz to issue a
business permit for the operation of a lotto outlet; and (3) an order annulling or declaring as invalid
Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.On February 10, 1997, the respondent judge, Francisco Dizon Pao, promulgated
his decision enjoining the petitioners from implementing or enforcing resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T.
1995.

ISSUE: WON Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 is valid

HELD: As a policy statement expressing the local governments objection to the lotto, such resolution is valid.
This is part of the local governments autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that of the national
governments. However, this freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local governments may
actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress. Given this premise, the assailed
resolution in this case could not and should not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the
operation of lotto.n our system of government, the power of local government units to legislate and enact
ordinances and resolutions is merely a delegated power coming from Congress. As held in Tatel vs. Virac,
ordinances should not contravene an existing statute enacted by Congress. The reasons for this is obvious, as
elucidated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp.

White Light Corporation vs City of Manila

G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009
Petitioner: White Light Corporation, Titanium Corporation and Sta. Mesa Tourist & Development Corporation
Respondent: City of Manila

Facts: On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into a law Manila City Ordinance No. 7774
entitled An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate
Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of
Manila. On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint
for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO)
impleading as defendant, herein respondent City of Manila represented by Mayor Lim with the prayer that the
Ordinance be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa
Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-
intervention on the ground that the Ordinance directly affects their business interests as operators of drive-in-
hotels and motels in Manila. The RTC issued a TRO directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the
Ordinance. The City alleges that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power. On October 20, 1993,
the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void. On a petition for review on certiorari, the
Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance.

Issue: Whether Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power

Ruling: Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in general terms to
underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible
response as the conditions warrant. Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its
corresponding right to protect itself and its people. Police power has been used as justification for numerous
and varied actions by the State. The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of
the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are
unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these
ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution,
and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the people.
That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners
of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police
power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that
no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More
importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed
for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those
pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. Lacking a concurrence of these
requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. As held in Morfe
v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power is subject to judicial review when life, liberty or property is affected.
However, this is not in any way meant to take it away from the vastness of State police power whose exercise
enjoys the presumption of validity. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

LA CARLOTA CITY VS ROJO

This petition for review assails the 14 September 2007 Decision1 and the 18 January 2008 Resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01377. The Court of Appeals affirmed Resolution Nos. 0506543 and
0516464 of the Civil Service Commission, which affirmed the Decision dated 20 September 2004 of the Civil
Service Commission Regional Office (CSCRO) No. VI, Iloilo City, approving the appointment of respondent Atty.
Rex G. Rojo (respondent) as Sangguniang Panlungsod Secretary under a permanent status.

The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:

On March 18, 2004, [the] then Vice-Mayor Rex R. Jalandoon of La Carlota City, Negros Occidental appointed
Atty. Rex G. Rojo (or Rojo) who had just tendered his resignation as member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
the day preceding such appointment, as Sangguniang Panlungsod Secretary. The status of the appointment
was permanent. The next day, March 19, 2004, the Vice-Mayor submitted Rojos appointment papers to the
Civil Service Commission Negros Occidental Field Office (CSCFO-Negros Occidental) for attestation. In a Letter
dated March 24, 2004, the said CSCFO wrote Jalandoon to inform him of the infirmities the office found on the
appointment documents, i.e. the Chairman of the Personnel Selection Board and the Human Resource
Management Officer did not sign the certifications, the latter relative to the completeness of the documents
as well as to the publication requirement. In view of the failure of the appointing authority to comply with the
directive, the said CSCFO considered the appointment of Rojo permanently recalled or withdrawn, in a
subsequent Letter to Jalandoon dated April 14, 2004.

Jalandoon deemed the recall a disapproval of the appointment, hence, he brought the matter to the CSC
Regional Office No. 6 in Iloilo City, by way of an appeal. He averred that the Human Resource Management
Officer of La Carlota City refused to affix his signature on Rojos appointment documents but nonetheless
transmitted them to the CSCFO. Such transmittal, according to Jalandoon, should be construed that the
appointment was complete and regular and that it complied with the pertinent requirements of a valid
appointment. Before the said CSC Regional Office No. 6 [could resolve the appeal], the City of La Carlota
represented by the newly elected mayor, Hon. Jeffrey P. Ferrer and the Sangguniang Panlungsod represented
by the newly elected Vice-Mayor, Hon. Demie John C. Honrado, collectively, the petitioners herein, intervened.
They argued that Jalandoon is not the real party in interest in the appeal but Rojo who, by his inaction, should
be considered to have waived his right to appeal from the disapproval of his appointment; that the
appointment was made within the period of the election ban prior to the May 14, 2004 national and local
elections, and finally, that the resignation of Rojo as member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod is ineffective
having not complied with the provision on quorum under Section 82(d) of R.A. No. 7160.

In a Decision dated September 20, 2004, the CSC Regional Office No. 6 reversed and set aside the CSCFOs
earlier ruling. On the argument of the intervenors that the former Vice-Mayor lacked legal personality to
elevate the case on appeal, the regional office cited settled jurisprudence that the disapproval of an
appointment affects the discretionary authority of the appointing authority. Hence, he alone may request for
reconsideration of or appeal the disapproval of an appointment. The regional office likewise ruled that Rojos
appointment on March 18, 2004 was made outside the period of the election ban from March 26 to May 9,
2004, and that his resignation from the Sangguniang Panlungsod was valid having been tendered with the
majority of the council members in attendance (seven (7) out of the thirteen councilors were present).
Considering that the appointment of Rojo sufficiently complied with the publication requirement, deliberation
by the Personnel Selection Board, certification that it was issued in accordance with the limitations provided
for under Section 325 of R.A. 7160 and that appropriations or funds are available for said position, the regional
office approved the same. x x x

Mayor Ferrer and Vice-Mayor Honrado appealed the foregoing Decision of the CSC Regional Office No. 6 to
the Civil Service Commission (or Commission). On May 17, 2005, the Commission dismissed said appeal on the
ground that the appellants were not the appointing authority and were therefore improper parties to the
appeal. Despite its ruling of dismissal, the Commission went on to reiterate CSC Regional Offices discussion on
the appointing authoritys compliance with the certification and deliberation requirements, as well as the
validity of appointees tender of resignation. x x x

It likewise denied the motion for reconsideration thereafter filed by the petitioners in a Resolution dated
November 8, 2005.5

Petitioners filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. On 14 September 2007, the Court of Appeals
denied the petition, and affirmed Resolution Nos. 050654 and 051646 of the Civil Service Commission, dated
17 May 2005 and 8 November 2005, respectively. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the
Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution dated 18 January 2008.
Hence, this petition for review.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Citing Section 9(h), Article V of Presidential Decree No. 8076 or the Civil Service Decree, the Court of Appeals
held that in the attestation of an appointment made by a head of agency, the duty of the Civil Service
Commission does not go beyond ascertaining whether the appointee possesses the appropriate civil service
eligibility and the minimum statutory qualifications.7 In this case, the Court of Appeals found that respondent
met the minimum qualifications for the position of Secretary of the Sanggunian, as enumerated under Section
469(b), Article I, Title V of the Local Government Code.8 In fact, the Court of Appeals held that respondent is
more than qualified for the position considering that respondent is a lawyer and an active member of the bar.
Furthermore, the requirements for the appointment of respondent have been substantially complied with: (a)
publication; (b) Personnel Selection Board deliberation; and (c) certification from the appropriate offices that
appropriations or funds are available for the position. Thus, the Court of Appeals ruled that there was no
sufficient reason for the Commission to disapprove respondents appointment.

On the issue of the lack of signature of the Human Resource Management Officer of La Carlota City on
respondents appointment papers, the Court of Appeals held that such refusal of the officer to affix his signature
should not affect the validity of the appointment. Otherwise, it would be tantamount to putting the appointing
power under the mercy of a department head who may without reason refuse to perform a ministerial
function, as what happened in the instant case.9

The Court of Appeals also found that the appointment of respondent on 18 March 2004 did not violate the
election ban period which was from 26 March to 9 May 2004. Furthermore, there was no substantial evidence
to show that the appointment was a midnight appointment.

Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that since respondent possessed the minimum qualifications for the
position of Sangguniang Panlungsod Secretary, and the appointing authority has adequately complied with the
other requirements for a valid appointment, then the Civil Service Commissions approval of the appointment
was only proper.

ARNOLD VICENCIO v HON. HEYNALOO A. VILLAR,et al.

G.R. No. 182069, 3 July 2012,
(Sereno, J .)
The mandate of the Commission on Audit is to observe the policy that government funds and property should
be fully protected and conserved; and that irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures or
uses of such funds and property should be prevented.
The City Council or the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Malabon (SPM), presided by Hon. Benjamin Galauran,
then acting Vice-Mayor, adopted and approved City Ordinance No. 15-2003, entitled An Ordinance Granting
Authority to the City Vice-Mayor, Hon. Jay Jay Yambao, to Negotiate and Enter into Contract for Consultancy
Services for Consultants in the Sanggunian Secretariat Tasked to Function in their Respective Areas of Concern.
Arnold Vicencio was elected City Vice-Mayor of Malabon. By virtue of this office, he also became the Presiding
Officer of the SPM and, at the same time, the head of the Sanggunian
Secretariat. Vicencio, representing the City Government of Malabon City, entered into Contracts for
Consultancy Services. After the signing of their respective contracts, the three consultants rendered
consultancy services to the SPM. Thereafter, the three consultants were correspondingly paid for their services
pursuant to the contracts therefor. However, an Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) was issued
disallowing the amount for being political law

an improper disbursement. Aggrieved by the disallowance, Vicencio appealed it to the Adjudication and
Settlement Board (ASB) of the Commission on Audit (COA) which subsequently denied it.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Commission on Audit committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of or excess of jurisdiction when it affirmed ASBs decision relative to the disallowance of disbursements
concerning the services rendered by hired consultants for the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Malabon

HELD:
Under Section 456 of R.A. 7160, or the Local Government Code, there is no inherent authority on the part of
the city vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of the local government unit, unlike that provided for the
city mayor. Thus, the authority of the vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of the city was strictly
circumscribed by the ordinance granting it. Ordinance No. 15-2003 specifially authorized Vice-Mayor Yambao
to enter into contracts for consultancy services. As this is not a power or duty given under the law to the Office
of
the Vice-Mayor, Ordinance No. 15-2003 cannot be construed as a continuing
authority for any person who enters the Of ce of the Vice-Mayor to enter into
subsequent, albeit similar, contracts. The COAs assailed Decision was made in faithful compliance with its
mandate and in judicious exercise of its general audit power as conferred on it
by the Constitution. The COA was merely ful lling its mandate in observing
the policy that government funds and property should be fully protected and conserved; and that irregular,
unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures or uses of such funds and property should be prevented.
Thus, no grave abuse of discretion may be imputed to the COA

Drilon vs Lim
GR No. 112497
August 4, 1994
The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local Government Code. The
Secretary of Justice (on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer) declared Ordinance No. 7794
(Manila Revenue Code) null and void for non-compliance with the procedure in the enactment of tax
ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy.

RTCs Ruling:

1. The RTC revoked the Secretarys resolution and sustained the ordinance. It declared Sec 187 of the LGC as
unconstitutional because it vests on the Secretary the power of control over LGUs in violation of the policy of
local autonomy mandated in the Constitution.

Petitioners Argument:

1. The annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax
ordinances as specified in the Local Government Code had indeed not been observed. (Petition originally
dismissed by the Court due to failure to submit certified true copy of the decision, but reinstated it anyway.)
2. Grounds of non-compliance of procedure
a. No written notices as required by Art 276 of Rules of Local Government Code
b. Not published
c. Not translated to tagalog
Supreme Courts Argument:
1. Section 187 authorizes the petitioner to review only the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinance. What
he found only was that it was illegal. That act is not control but supervision.
2. Control lays down the rules in the doing of act and if not followed order the act undone or re-done.
Supervision sees to it that the rules are followed.
3. Two grounds of declaring Manila Revenue Code null and void (1) inclusion of certain ultra vires provisions
(2) non-compliance with prescribed procedure in its enactment but were followed.
The requirements are upon approval of local development plans and public investment programs of LGU not
to tax ordinances.
National Liga ng mga Barangay vs. Paredes, 439 SCRA 130

Posted by Pius Morados on November 13, 2011

(Admin Law, DILG-Liga ng mga Barangay, quasi-legislative power)

Facts: DILG, appointed as interim caretaker to administer and manage the affairs of the Liga ng mga Barangay
in giving remedy to alleged violations made by the incumbent officer of the Liga in the conduct of their
elections, issued 2 memorandum circulars which alter, modify, nullify or set aside the actions of the Liga.

Petitioner contends that DILGs appointment constitutes undue interference in the internal affairs of the Liga,
since the latter is not subject to DILG control and supervision. Respondent judge contends that DILG exercises
general supervisory jurisdiction over LGUs including the different leagues based on sec. 1 of Admin. Order No.
267 providing for a broad premise of the supervisory power of the DILG.

Issue: WON DILG Secretary as alter-ego of the President has power of control over the Liga ng mga Barangay.

Held: No. Sec. 4, Art. X of the Constitution provides that the President of the Philippines shall exercise general
supervision over local government, which exclude the power of control. As the entity exercising supervision
over the Liga, the DILGs authority is limited to seeing to it that the rules are followed, but it cannot lay down
such rules itself nor does it have the discretion to modify or replace the same.

ANDAYA V. RTC

FACTS:

There was a vacancy in the position of chief of police in Cebu. The regional director of the Cebu police Andaya
submitted a list of 5 eligible appointees to the position to the mayor of Cebu. However, the mayor refused to
appoint one because he wanted a certain Sarmiento, who was not on the list due to being disqualified. RTC
ruled in favor of the mayor, granting the appointment of Sarmiento.

ISSUE:

Whether the mayor can require the Regional Director to include the mayors protg in the list?

HELD

NO. The mayor has only the power to choose from the list. It its the prerogative of the regional director of the
police to choose the eligible person who should be included in the list without intervention from local
executives based on the National Police Commission (NPC) memorandum, which provides the qualifications
of a chief of police. In case of disagreement, the issue should be elevated to the regional director of the NPC
who shall resolve the issue within 5 working days.
The authority of the mayor is limited, no power to appoint but basically power to choose from the list. The
purpose is to enhance professionalism and isolate police service from political domination