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Operational Liaison Meeting Fly-By-Wire Aircraft 2004

TCAS
Recommendations

Customer Services
Contents

Introduction

TCAS Presentation

Resolution Advisory

Review of TCAS Events

Recurrent TCAS Questions


AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

Future TCAS Developments

Conclusion

TCAS - Recommendations Page 2


Introduction
Each year, numerous reports reveal that mid-air collisions are
avoided by a whisker.

Air Traffic Controllers (on ground) strive to avoid such events.

The onboard Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)


was developed to prevent mid-air collision, particularly
in case Air Traffic Controller guidance is incorrect.

TCAS II has become mandatory:


AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

4Since 1986, in the US


4Since 2000, in Europe

TCAS II has a worldwide ICAO mandate as January 1st, 2003.

TCAS - Recommendations Page 3


Contents

Introduction

TCAS Presentation

Resolution Advisory

Review of TCAS Events

Recurrent TCAS Questions


AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

Future TCAS Developments

Conclusion

TCAS - Recommendations Page 4


TCAS Presentation

Basic TCAS Principles


TCAS:

Detects any nearby aircraft that is equipped with an


ATC Transponder.

Displays potential collision targets.


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Triggers vertical orders to avoid conflict.

TCAS - Recommendations Page 5


TCAS Presentation

Basic TCAS Principles

Interrogation
MODE S
TCAS II XPDR
Reply
Mode S Address - Altitude
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Interrogation
MODE S TCAS II
XPDR
Reply
Mode S Address - Altitude

TCAS - Recommendations Page 6


TCAS Presentation

Basic TCAS Principles


TCAS calculates the:

Bearing (based on the direction of the received signal)

Range (based on the time that the signal was received)

Trajectory and speed (based on intruder position evolution)


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Relative Altitude (based on the signal received)

TCAS - Recommendations Page 7


TCAS Presentation

Basic TCAS Principles


OTHER VOLUME
PA VOLUME

TA VOLUME

RA VOLUME
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TCAS - Recommendations Page 8


TCAS Presentation

TCAS Display

RA located 300 feet


above and descending +3

-5

TA located 500 feet


below and climbing
+12

PROXIMATE located
-15
1200 feet above and
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descending

OTHER located 1500


feet below and climbing

TCAS - Recommendations Page 9


Contents

Introduction

TCAS Presentation

Resolution Advisory

Review of TCAS Events

Recurrent TCAS Questions


AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

Future TCAS Developments

Conclusion

TCAS - Recommendations Page 10


Resolution Advisory

Background
Amidst all the TCAS information, the
most important
involves Resolution Advisories.

TCAS calculates two types of


Resolution Advisories (RA):
4Preventive Advisory ( MAINTAIN
VERTICAL SPEED MAINTAIN):
Red sector appears on V/S scale, the
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V/S needle is in the grey area.


The red square is displayed on the
Navigation Display.
No pilot action on the sidestick (maintain
the current vertical speed).

TCAS - Recommendations Page 11


Resolution Advisory

Background
4Corrective Advisory:
The vertical speed needle is in the red
area.
The red square is displayed on the
Navigation Display

4Follow aural warnings.

4Follow vertical speed green


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sector on the PFD.

TCAS - Recommendations Page 12


Resolution Advisory

Background
4Corrective Advisory (e.g. ADJUST VERTICAL SPEED,
ADJUST):

TCAS computes the best avoidance maneuver according to a model:

Assumes pilots reaction within 5 seconds and accelerates with


0.25g in climb or descent until +/-1500 ft/min is reached
V/S must be maintained until clear of conflict.
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Smoothly and firmly follow green sector within


5 seconds

TCAS - Recommendations Page 13


Resolution Advisory

Background
4Corrective Advisory
TAU TAU

Vertical miss distance

ADJUST VERTICAL
SPEED, ADJUST

CPA
(Closest Point of
Approach)
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Generally:
Deviation caused by a RA maneuver is between 300 and 500 ft
Vertical miss distance at the Closest Point of Approach is around 400 ft

TCAS - Recommendations Page 14


Resolution Advisory

Background
4Corrective Advisory
TAU TAU

Relative altitude

ADJUST VERTICAL
SPEED, ADJUST

CPA
(Closest Point of
Approach)
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Do not overreact
Do not disregard a weakening RA
It could create another conflict with another aircraft
TCAS - Recommendations Page 15
Resolution Advisory

Background
4Additional Corrective Advisory (E.g.: INCREASE DESCENT)

TCAS computes the best avoidance maneuver according to a model:

Assumes pilots reaction within 2.5 seconds and accelerates with


0.35g in climb or descent until +/-2500 ft/min is reached
V/S must be maintained until clear of conflict.
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Firmly follow green sector within 2.5 seconds

TCAS - Recommendations Page 16


Resolution Advisory

Evolution of RA Alerts
The following diagram illustrates the number and
evolution of RA alerts since 1999 ( Based on Eurocontrol source) :

3500
3000
2500
2000
RAs alerts
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1500
1000
500
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
TCAS - Recommendations Page 17
Resolution Advisory

Evolution of RA Alerts
Statistics in Europe for 2000 ( Based on Eurocontrol source)

35 %

30

25

20
RAs repartition
15
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10

0
Takeoff Climb Cruise Descent HLD Approach Final
Approach
TCAS - Recommendations Page 18
Resolution Advisory

Evolution of RA Alerts
Statistics in Europe for 2000 ( Based on Eurocontrol source)
4Pilots followed RA in 95% of reported cases
4Decision not to follow an RA was based on additional
information:
Intruder visually acquired
Traffic information and/or ATC avoidance being issued by
ATC.
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TCAS - Recommendations Page 19


Resolution Advisory

Evolution of RA Alerts
2003 results are incomplete:
4Still missing information from some countries

Globally, however, the number of alerts is decreasing:


4Less reports from pilots
4The introduction of TCAS Change 7 reduces the number
of RAs by a factor of 2.
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

However, since there are still a significant number of RAs:

Pilots must be well-trained and informed on how


to react when faced with an RA TCAS order.
TCAS - Recommendations Page 20
Contents

Introduction

TCAS Presentation

Resolution Advisory

Review of TCAS Events

Recurrent TCAS Questions


AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

Future TCAS Developments

Conclusion

TCAS - Recommendations Page 21


Review of TCAS Events

Background

The previously-shown TCAS figures, includes cases where


TCAS RA orders were not always followed.

Some such cases have been reported, and include:


4Various missed mid-air collisions.
4The tragic Constance Lake event of July 1st 2003.
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Always follow TCAS RA orders,


even if not in accordance with ATC orders.

TCAS - Recommendations Page 22


Review of TCAS Events

Event N 1
Aircraft 1 and Aircraft 2 were both at FL 70.
Aircraft 2 was instructed, late, to descend to FL60.
The distance between Aircraft 1 and Aircraft 2 is 5 NM
The TCAS triggered coordinated RAs:
4DESCEND, DESCEND RA order for Aircraft 1
4CLIMB, CLIMB RA order for Aircraft 2

Aircraft 2
4Followed the ATC order (Descend to FL 60)
4But, NOT the TCAS order.
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Aircraft 1
4Followed the INCREASE DESCENT, INCREASE DESCENT
TCAS order.
This induced a new TCAS conflict with Aircraft 3 at FL 50 .

TCAS - Recommendations Page 23


Review of TCAS Events

Event N 1 CLIMB,
CLIMB
RA

FL 70 AIRCRAFT 1
DESCEND, AIRCRAFT 2
DESCEND
RA INCREASE
DESCENT,
INCREASE
DESCENT
RA

FL 50 AIRCRAFT 3
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AIRCRAFT 2
Simultaneous descend
FL 60.
vertical and horizontal
crossing at less than 1 NM

TCAS - Recommendations Page 24


Review of TCAS Events

FCOM Update
The FCOM has been slightly revised to further emphasize
the fact that pilots must follow the TCAS order:

The previous FCOM 3.04.34 page:


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New FCOM 3.04.34 page (January Revision):

TCAS - Recommendations Page 25


Review of TCAS Events

Event N2
Aircraft 1: Was approaching FL 260
Aircraft 2: Was cruising at FL 270
Aircraft 1:
4Received an ADJUST VERTICAL SPEED, ADJUST RA.
4Reacted by increasing, rather than decreasing, the
vertical speed.
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4Reached FL 271, before returning to FL 260

Aircraft 2:
4Received and followed a CLIMB, CLIMB RA.

TCAS - Recommendations Page 26


Review of TCAS Events
Event N2

CLIMB,
CLIMB
RA
FL 270
AIRCRAFT 2

AIRCRAFT 1

ADJUST
VERTICAL SPEED, FL 260
ADJUST RA
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Minimum crossing margin:


300 feet, 0.8 NM!!!
TCAS - Recommendations Page 27
Review of TCAS Events

FCOM Update
Following this event, the FCOM was revised to further clarify the
ADJUST VERTICAL SPEED, ADJUST RA:

Previous FCOM 1.34.80 page:


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New FCOM 1.34.80 page (March Revision):

TCAS - Recommendations Page 28


Review of TCAS Events

Event N3
Aircraft 1: Was cleared to FL 370.
Aircraft 2: Was also cleared to FL 370 by mistake.
Controller discovered the mistake and instructed
Aircraft 2 to descend to FL 350.

Aircraft 1:
4Incorrectly interpreted the clearance which was not
applicable to its aircraft
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4Started to descend.
4TCAS issued a CLIMB, CLIMB RA.
4Did not follow the CLIMB, CLIMB RA, as it had visual
acquisition of Aircraft 2.

TCAS - Recommendations Page 29


Review of TCAS Events

Event N3
Aircraft 2:
4Received a coordinated DESCEND, DESCEND RA
4Followed the RA
4Stopped descending, when it noticed that
Aircraft 1 was also descending.

At the very last moment, Aircraft 1:


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Performed a sudden and violent escape maneuver, that


resulted in injury to flight attendants and passengers.

TCAS - Recommendations Page 30


Review of TCAS Events

Event N3

FL 370 CLIMB,
DESCEND,
DESCEND
CLIMB RA RA
AIRCRAFT 2

Order
incorrectly
interpreted by
AIRCRAFT 1

AIRCRAFT 1
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AIRCRAFT 2
Descend
to FL 350.
AIRCRAFT 1 passes slightly below
AIRCRAFT 2, with no lateral
separation !!!

TCAS - Recommendations Page 31


Review of TCAS Events

FCOM Update
For TCAS RA orders, the FCOM 3.04.34 was revised to delete
the visual acquisition of the intruder line.
Previous FCOM 3.04.34 page:

New FCOM 3.04.34 page (January Revision):


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For RA Alerts, the FCOM 3.02.34 and QRH TCAS


procedures were also revised by deleting the
Attempt to see reported traffic line.
TCAS - Recommendations Page 32
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. Review of TCAS Events

Previous FCOM 3.02.34 page New FCOM 3.02.34 page


TCAS - Recommendations Page 33
Review of TCAS Events

Additional information
ATC versus TCAS information:

ATC Radar:
4An update rate of several seconds (from 4 to 10).
4Altitude data in 100-foot increments.
4Sudden vertical maneuvers are not immediately displayed.
TCAS:
4Interrogatesall surrounded transponders every second.
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4Mode S-equipped aircraft provide TCAS information in 25-foot


increments.
TCAS Information is:
- Updated 4 to 10 times faster
- 4 times more accurate
TCAS - Recommendations Page 34
Review of TCAS Events

Additional information
Visual acquisition limitations:

At high altitudes, it is difficult to assess:


4The range
4The heading
4The relative height

At low altitudes, it is difficult to assess :


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4Whether the aircraft is climbing or descending.


The traffic in contact MAY NOT BE the one that causes
the RA to trigger.

TCAS - Recommendations Page 35


Review of TCAS Events

Conclusions
Other, more or less, serious events have occurred due to
the fact that the crew did not follow TCAS orders.

All such events emphasize the importance of the following:

- Always follow TCAS RA orders.


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- Do not try to visually acquire intruders,


in case of RA orders.

TCAS - Recommendations Page 36


Contents

Introduction

TCAS Presentation

Resolution Advisory

Review of TCAS Events

Recurrent TCAS Questions


AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

Future TCAS Developments

Conclusion

TCAS - Recommendations Page 37


Recurrent TCAS Questions

Background
As of today, the following cases require TA mode selection:
4Engine failure
4Dispatch with landing gear down
4Known nearby traffic, which is in visual contact
4Closely-spaced runways, converging runways,
low terrain along the final approach

Recurring questions concerning TA mode selection:


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4Emergency descent
4Engine failure
4Aircraft at its maximum ceiling altitude

TCAS - Recommendations Page 38


Recurrent TCAS Questions

Emergency Descent
Most often due to rapid decompression.

Performing an emergency descent in a busy airspace


increases the risk of generating traffic conflict.

A CLIMB, CLIMB RA order is not always requested:


4An ADJUST VERTICAL SPEED, ADJUST RA
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can be triggered (decrease the V/S).

TCAS - Recommendations Page 39


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TCAS - Recommendations
Emergency Descent
Recurrent TCAS Questions

Page 40
Recurrent TCAS Questions
Emergency Descent

ADJUST
VERTICAL
SPEED,
ADJUST
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DESCEND,
DESCEND

TCAS - Recommendations Page 41


Recurrent TCAS Questions
Emergency Descent
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In case of an emergency descent,


Airbus does not recommend selecting TA mode.

TCAS - Recommendations Page 42


Recurrent TCAS Questions

Engine Failure
In case one engine fails, the TCAS must be set to TA mode to comply
with AC 20-131:

After an engine failure, aircraft performance is degraded.


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When TA is selected:
4Affected aircraft not requested to perform an RA maneuver.
4No additional stress generated by a TCAS alarm
in a stressful environment.
TCAS - Recommendations Page 43
Recurrent TCAS Questions
Engine Failure
Airlines often complain that TA mode is sometimes too
restrictive, in particular for the A340-500/600, which is a:
4 Powerful aircraft
4 Fly-by-wire aircraft, not subject to stall in normal law.

For the following reasons, it is not recommended to


maintain TA/RA, in case of an engine failure:
4To have a common procedure for all aircraft
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4If the intruder is TCAS-equipped:


They will see that you are in TA mode.
They will perform an RA maneuver.

TCAS - Recommendations Page 44


Recurrent TCAS Questions
Engine Failure
In addition:
4The ECAMs ENG SHUT DOWN Procedure requests the crew to
select TA TCAS mode.
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4Airworthiness Authorities have approved this TA mode


selection, in case of an engine failure.

Airbus recommends the selection of TA mode,


in case of an engine failure.
TCAS - Recommendations Page 45
Recurrent TCAS Questions
Aircraft at its Maximum Ceiling Altitude

AC 20-131A defines the maneuvers that the


aircraft must be able to perform.

In particular, the aircraft must prove that it can


respond to a TCAS RA CLIMB order, even when
it is at its maximum altitude.
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TCAS - Recommendations Page 46


Recurrent TCAS Questions
Aircraft at its Maximum Ceiling Altitude
Speed (knots)

Time (s)
V/S (feet/minute)
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Time (s)
TCAS - Recommendations Page 47
Recurrent TCAS Questions
Aircraft at its Maximum Ceiling Altitude
These graphs show that the aircraft can follow:
4A CLIMB, CLIMB TCAS RA order (1500 feet/minute)
4An INCREASE CLIMB, INCREASE CLIMB TCAS RA order
(2500 feet/minute).

Always below VMO/MMO and above VLS:


4A330 aircraft, at 41000 feet, initial speed is M 0.82 (243 knots)
The maximum weight is 177 tons.
4The Final Speed is 228 knots
(Buffet Speed is 212 knots at 42000 feet)
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RA climb orders can be followed.

Airbus does not recommend selecting TA mode,


when the aircraft is at its maximum ceiling altitude.

TCAS - Recommendations Page 48


Contents

Introduction

TCAS Presentation

Resolution Advisory

Review of TCAS Events

Recurrent TCAS Questions


AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

Future TCAS Developments

Conclusion

TCAS - Recommendations Page 49


Future TCAS Developments
Background
Most vertical deviations for each aircraft (following a
TCAS RA order) are often greater than 300 feet.

Very large altitude changes often lead to conflict


with other aircraft in a busy airspace.

Due to excessive pilot reaction, uncomfortable


load factors are reached.
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TCAS - Recommendations Page 50


Future TCAS Developments
Background

1000 feet
REAL PATH
IDEAL PATH

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 seconds
3500 3800 2000
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0
-700
1 2 3 4
CLIMB, CLIMB, MONITOR MONITOR CLEAR OF
CLIMB CLIMB VERTICAL SPEED VERTICAL SPEED CONFLICT
TCAS - Recommendations Page 51
Future TCAS Developments
Background
In addition, some operators have reported difficulty in
distinguishing the V/S needle, when it is red and in the red
vertical speed sector (mainly on EIS1 screens).
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Improvements are anticipated in this


area to help apply a TCAS RA order.

TCAS - Recommendations Page 52


Future TCAS Developments
Planned Improvements
To facilitate QUICK RESPONSE to TCAS RA orders.
To help AVOID OVERREACTION.
To develop an awareness to maneuver only to the extent
necessary to avoid intruder aircraft.

Improvements are currently being reviewed and developed.


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Will provide pilots with pitch attitude information.


For long range aircraft, improvement is anticipated for 2006.

TCAS - Recommendations Page 53


Contents

Introduction

TCAS Presentation

Resolution Advisory

Review of TCAS Events

Recurrent TCAS Questions


AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

Future TCAS Developments

Conclusion

TCAS - Recommendations Page 54


Conclusion

4Even if the number of TCAS alerts decreases,


there are still missed mid-air collisions each year.

4 Pilots must always follow TCAS RA orders.

4Some improvements are envisaged and are being


developed to further assist pilots in effectively
responding to TCAS warnings.
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

TCAS - Recommendations Page 55


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property of AIRBUS S.A.S. No intellectual property rights are
granted by the delivery of this document or the disclosure of
its content. This document shall not be reproduced or
disclosed to a third party without the express written consent
of AIRBUS S.A.S. This document and its content shall not be
used for any purpose other than that for which it is supplied.

The statements made herein do not constitute an offer. They


are based on the mentioned assumptions and are expressed
in good faith. Where the supporting grounds for these
statements are not shown, AIRBUS S.A.S. will be pleased to
explain the basis thereof.
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