Civil Law Review 2 Case Digest

1 |Civil Law Review 2 Case Digest
ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

Menlo St., cor. Taft Avenue, Pasay City
In Partial fulfillment of the requirements in
CIVIL LAW REVIEW II
WEDNESDAY 1:00-5:00PM
PROF. ATTY. CRISOSTOMO URIBE
SUBMITTED BY:
ALVAREZ, CARLO JAY F.

2013-0467
May 2016
2nd Semester
____________________________________________________________
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PART ONE: Obligations and Contracts

CASES PAGE
NISSAN CAR LEASE PHILS., INC., vs. LICA MANAGEMENT, INC. and
5
PROTON PILIPINAS, INC. G.R. No. 176986, January 13, 2016
Tomas P. Tan vs. Jose G. Hosana G.R. No. 190846, February 3, 2016 6
SPOUSES JAIME AND MATILDE POON vs. PRIME SAVINGS BANK
REPRESENTED BY THE PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION AS STATUTORY LIQUIDATOR 7
G.R. No. 183794, June 13, 2016

CORPORATION AS STATUTORY LIQUIDATOR 9
G.R. No. 183794, June 13, 2016

UCPB GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. vs. HUGHES
ELECTRONICS CORPORATION 11
G.R. No. 190385, November 16, 2016
RAMON PACON, THROUGH HIS WIFE FELINA PACON, ANTONIO
PACON, THROUGH HIS WIFE NENITA PACON, EULOGIO PACON,
THROUGH HIS SON JORGE PACON, LEONARDO PACON, MANUEL 13
IGOS, JOSE COLORES, LOLITA COLORES, AND ESTANISLAO
BUENDIA, vs. BENJAMIN TAN
G.R. No. 185365, March 02, 2016
FLORANTE VITUG vs. EVANGELINE A. ABUDA
G.R. No. 201264, January 11, 2016 15
ROSALINA CARODAN, PETITIONER, VS. CHINA BANKING
CORPORATION, RESPONDENT. 17
G.R. No. 210542, February 24, 2016
PART TWO: SALES
CASES PAGE
HELEN B. LUKBAN vs. OPTIMUM DEVELOPMENT BANK
19
January 20, 2016 G.R. No. 205785
SPOUSES ROBERTO and ADELAIDA PEN vs SPOUSES SANTOS and
21
LINDA JULIAN G.R. No. 160408, January 11, 2016
Timoteo Bacalso and Diosdada Bacalso vs Gregoria B. Aca-a, Eutiquia B.
Aguila, Julian Bacus, Evelyn Sychangco G.R. No. 172919, January 13, 2016 23
JOEY R. PEA vs. JESUS DELOS SANTOS AND THE HEIRS OF ROSITA
25
DELOS SANTOS FLORES G.R.. No. 202223, March 02, 2016
JOEL CARDENAS, HEIR OF THE LATE ELINAIDA L. ALCANTARA,
REPRESENTED BY ANTONIO IGNACIO, JR., Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF
THE LATE SPOUSES SIMPLICIA P. AGUILAR AND MAXIMO V.
27
AGUILAR AND ATTY. NORMAN R. BUENO
G.R. No. 191079, March 02, 2016

ROSARIO VICTORIA AND ELMA PIDLAOAN vs. NORMITA JACOB

PIDLAOAN, HERMINIGILDA PIDLAOAN AND EUFEMIA PIDLAOAN 29
G.R. No. 196470, April 20, 2016
MELECIO DOMINGO, vs. SPOUSES GENARO MOLINA and ELENA B.
31
MOLINA, substituted by ESTER MOLINA G.R. No. 200274, April 20, 2016
ARTURO C. ALBA, JR., DULY REPRESENTED BY HIS ATTORNEYS-
IN-FACT, ARNULFO B. ALBA AND ALEXANDER C. ALBA, vs.
RAYMUND D. MALAPAJO, RAMIL D. MALAPAJO AND THE
33
REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE CITY OF ROXAS
G.R. No. 198752, January 13, 2016
PART THREE: PARTNERSHIP, AGENCY AND & TRUST

CASES PAGE
Dra. Mercedes Oliver vs. Philippine Savings Bank, Lilia Castro
35
GR. No. 214567, April 4, 2016
MICHAEL C. GUY vs. ATTY. GLENN C. GACOTT
36
G.R. No. 206147, January 13, 2016
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS AND FGU INSURANCE
CORPORATION (PRESENTLY KNOWN AS BPI/MS INSURANCE
CORPORATION) vs. YOLANDA LAINGO 38
G.R. No. 205206, March 16, 2016

MAGELLAN AEROSPACE CORPORATION vs. PHILIPPINE AIR
41
FORCE G.R. No. 216566, February 24, 2016
PART FOUR: CREDITS TRANSACTION

IBM PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. PRIME SYSTEMS PLUS, INC.
43
G.R. No. 203192, August 15, 2016
ROSALIE SY AYSON, vs. FIL-ESTATE PROPERTIES, INC., and
FAIRWAYS AND BLUEWATER RESORT AND COUNTRY CLUB, INC. 44
G.R. No. 223254. December 1, 2016
PART FOUR: TORTS AND DAMAGES
CASES PAGE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. WILLY VALLAR, HERACLEO

VALLAR, JR. (a.k.a. ORACLEO VALLAR, JR.) DANNY VALLAR, AND 46
EDGARDO MABELIN,G.R. No. 196256. December 5, 2016
PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION vs. SPOUSES SOTERO

OCTOBRE, JR. and HENRISSA A. OCTOBRE, and CHINA BANKING 48
CORPORATION G.R. No. 186976. December 7, 2016
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY vs. MANILA SEEDLING BANK
51
FOUNDATION, INC. G.R. No. 183543, June 20, 2016
CORPORATION AS STATUTORY LIQUIDATOR G.R. No. 183794, June 53
13, 2016
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, vs. HEIRS OF BENEDICTO AND

AZUCENA ALONDAY, 55
G.R. No. 171865, October 12, 2016

ROSITA B. LIM, ON HER BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF HER (THEN)
MINOR CHILDREN NAMELY, JENNIFER, LYSANDER AND
BEVERLIE, vs .LUIS TAN, ALFONSO TAN, EUSEBIO TAN, WILLIAM 57
TAN, VICENTE TAN, JOAQUIN TAN, ANG TIAT CHUAN,
G.R. No. 177250, November 28, 2016

MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY
vs. RICHARD E. UNCHUAN 59
G.R. No. 182537, June 01, 2016

WILLIAM ENRIQUEZ AND NELIA-VELA ENRIQUEZ, vs. ISAROG
LINE TRANSPORT, INC. AND VICTOR SEDENIO 61
G.R. No. 212008, November 16, 2016
NISSAN CAR LEASE PHILS., INC., vs. LICA MANAGEMENT, INC. and PROTON
PILIPINAS, INC.
G.R. No. 176986, January 13, 2016
FACTS
LMI is the absolute owner of a property located at 2326 Pasong Tamo Extension, Makati
City with a total area of approximately 2,860 square meters. LMI entered into a contract with
NCLPI for the latter to lease the property for a term of ten (10) years an annual escalation rate of
ten percent (10%). Sometime in September 1994, NCLPI, with LMIs consent, allowed its
subsidiary Nissan Smartfix Corporation (NSC) to use the leased premises.
Subsequently, NCLPI became delinquent in paying the monthly rent. In May 1996,
Nissan and LMI verbally agreed to convert the arrearages into a debt to be covered by a
promissory note and twelve (12) postdated checks, payments starting June 1996 until May 1997.
While NCLPI was able to deliver the postdated checks per its verbal agreement with
LMI, it failed to sign the promissory note and pay the checks for June to October 1996. Thus, in
a letter dated October 16, 1996, which was sent on October 18, 1996 by registered mail, LMI
informed NCLPI that it was terminating their Contract of Lease due to arrears in the payment of
rentals. It also demanded that NCLPI to pay for unpaid rentals and vacate the premises within
five (5) days from receipt of the notice.
RTC ruled in favor of LMI. CA affirmed the decision of RTC.
ISSUE
May a contract be rescinded extrajudicially despite the absence of a special contractual

stipulation therefore.
RULING
No. Art. 1191 provides that the power to rescind is implied in reciprocal obligations, in
cases where one of the obligors should fail to comply with what is incumbent upon him.
Otherwise stated, an aggrieved party is not prevented from extrajudicially rescinding a contract
to protect its interests, even in the absence of any provision expressly providing for such right.
The Contract of Lease shows that the parties did not stipulate an applicable interest rate
in case of default in the payment of rentals. Thus, and following this Courts ruling in Nacar v.
Gallery Frames,82 the foregoing amount of rental arrearages shall earn interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum computed from October 18, 1996, the date of LMIs extrajudicial
demand,83 until the date of finality of this judgment. The total amount shall thereafter earn
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from such finality of judgment until its
satisfaction.
Tomas P. Tan vs. Jose G. Hosana
G.R. No. 190846, February 3, 2016
FACTS
The respondent Jose G. Hosana (Jose) married Milagros C. Hosana (Milagros) on

January 14, 1979.4During their marriage, Jose and Milagros bought a house and lot located at
Tinago, Naga City, which lot was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 21229.
On January 13, 1998, Milagros sold to the petitioner Tomas P. Tan, Jr. (Tomas) the
subject property, as evidenced by a deed of sale executed by Milagros herself and as attorney-in-
fact of Jose, by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by Jose in her favor.6 The
Deed of Sale stated that the purchase price for the lot was P200,000.00.7 After the sale, TCT No.
21229 was cancelled and a new TCT was issued in the name of Tomas.
On October 19, 2001, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale/Cancellation of

Title/Reconveyance and Damages against Milagros, Tomas, and the Register of Deeds of Naga
City. The complaint was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 62, Naga City. In
the complaint, Jose averred that while he was working in Japan, Milagros, without his consent
and knowledge, conspired with Tomas to execute the SPA by forging Jose's signature making it
appear that Jose had authorized Milagros to sell the subject property to Tomas.
RTC decided in favor of Jose and nullified the sale of the subject property to Tomas. The
RTC held that the SPA dated June 10, 1996, wherein Jose supposedly appointed Milagros as his
attorney-in-fact, was actually null and void.
CA affirmed the RTC ruling that the deed of sale and the SPA were void.
ISSUE
Whether the deed of sale can be used as the basis for the amount of consideration paid
RULING
Yes. The deed of sale as documentary evidence may be used as a means to ascertain the
truthfulness of the consideration stated and its actual payment. The purpose of introducing the
deed of sale as evidence is not to enforce the terms written in the contract, which is an obligatory
force and effect of a valid contract. The deed of sale, rather, is used as a means to determine
matters that occurred in the execution of such contract, i.e., the determination of what each party
has given under the void contract to allow restitution and prevent unjust enrichment.
The deed of sale was declared null and void by a positive provision of law requiring the
consent of both spouses for the sale of conjugal property. There is, however, no question on the
presence of the consideration of the sale, except with respect to the actual amount paid. While
the deed of sale has no force and effect as a contract, it remains prima facie evidence of the
actual consideration paid.
SPOUSES JAIME AND MATILDE POON vs. PRIME SAVINGS BANK REPRESENTED
BY THE PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION AS STATUTORY
LIQUIDATOR
G.R. No. 183794, June 13, 2016
FACTS
Spouses Jaime and Matilde Poon (Petitioners) owned a commercial building in Naga
City, which they used for their bakery business. On 3 November 2006, Matilde Poon and
respondent Prime Savings Bank (Bank) executed a 10-year Contract of Lease (Contract) over the
building for the latter's use as its branch office in Naga City where they agreed to a fixed
monthly rental of P60,000, with an advance payment of the rentals for the first 100 months in the
amount of P6,000,000. As agreed, the advance payment was to be applied immediately, while
the rentals for the remaining period of the Contract were to be paid on a monthly basis. In
addition, in paragraph 24 of the Contract it provides that should the leased premises be closed,
deserted or vacated by the LESSEE, the LESSOR shall have the right to terminate the lease
without the necessity of serving a court order and to immediately repossess the leased premises.
Thereafter the LESSOR shall open and enter the leased premises in the presence of a
representative of the LESSEE (or of the proper authorities) for the purpose of taking a complete
inventory of all furniture, fixtures, equipment and/or other materials or property found within the
leased premises. Furthermore the LESSOR shall thereupon have the right to enter into a new
contract with another party. All advanced rentals shall be forfeited in favor of the LESSOR.
On 12 May 2000, respondent vacated the leased premises and surrendered them to
petitioners. Subsequently, the PDIC issued petitioners a demand letter asking for the return of the
unused advance rental amounting to P3,480,000 on the ground that paragraph 24 of the lease
agreement had become inoperative, because respondent's closure constituted force majeure. The
PDIC likewise invoked the principle of rebus sic stantibus under Article 1267 of Republic Act
No. 386 (Civil Code) as alternative legal basis for demanding the refund which the petitioners
refused to comply.
RTC ruled in favor of the Bank directing the defendant-spouses Poon to return and refund
to the plaintiff one-half of the unused portion of the advance rentals and they respectively filed
for damages and that the second clause in paragraph 24 of the Contract was penal in nature, and
that the clause was a valid contractual agreement.
CA affirmed RTC but the court ruled that the closure of respondent's business was not a
fortuitous event. In the instant case respondent was found to have committed fraudulent acts and
transactions. Lacking, therefore, was the first requisite of a fortuitous event, i.e, that the cause of
the breach of obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent may be released from its contractual obligations to

petitioners on grounds of fortuitous event under Article 1174 of the Civil Code and
unforeseen event under Article 1267 of the Civil Code
RULING
No. In this case petitioners' claim that respondent had no cause of action for rescission,
because this case does not fall under any of the circumstances enumerated in Articles 1381 and
1382 of the Civil Code.
The legal remedy of rescission, however, is by no means limited to the situations covered
by the above provisions. The Civil Code uses rescission in two different contexts, namely: (1)
rescission on account of breach of contract under Article 1191; and (2) rescission by reason of
lesion or economic prejudice under Article 1381. While the term "rescission" is used in Article
1191, "resolution" was the original term used in the old Civil Code, on which the article was
based. Resolution is a principal action based on a breach by a party, while rescission under
Article 1383 is a subsidiary action limited to cases of rescission for lesion under Article 1381 of
the New Civil Code.
It is clear from the allegations in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the Complaint that respondent's
right of action rested on the alleged abuse by petitioners of their right under paragraph 24 of the
Contract. Respondent's theory before the trial court was that the tenacious enforcement by
petitioners of their right to forfeit the advance rentals was tainted with bad faith, because they
knew that respondent was already insolvent. In other words, the action instituted by respondent
was for the rescission of reciprocal obligations under Article 1191. The lower courts, therefore,
correctly ruled that Articles 1381 and 1382 were inapposite.
The closure of respondent's business was neither a fortuitous nor an unforeseen event
that rendered the lease agreement functus officio.
Respondent posits that it should be released from its contract with petitioners, because the
closure of its business upon the BSP's order constituted a fortuitous event as the Court held
in Provident Savings Bank.
LIQUIDATOR
G.R. No. 183794, June 13, 2016
FACTS
the rentals for the remaining period of the Contract were to be paid on a monthly basis.
In addition, in paragraph 24 of the Contract it provides that should the leased premises be
closed, deserted or vacated by the LESSEE, the LESSOR shall have the right to terminate the
lease without the necessity of serving a court order and to immediately repossess the leased
premises.
The LESSOR shall thereupon have the right to enter into a new contract with another
party. All advanced rentals shall be forfeited in favor of the
LESSOR.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Barely three years later, however, the BSP placed respondent under the receivership of
the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) by virtue of BSP Monetary Board
refused to comply.
CA sustained the trial court's interpretation of the proviso on the forfeiture of advance
rentals as a penal clause and the consequent application of Article 1229. The appellate court
found that the forfeiture clause in the Contract was intended to prevent respondent from
defaulting on the latter's obligation to finish the term of the lease.
ISSUE
Whether or not the proviso in the parties Contract allowing forfeiture of advance rentals
was a penal clause
RULING
Yes. The forfeiture clause in the Contract is penal in nature. Petitioners claim that
paragraph 24 was not intended as a penal clause. They add that respondent has not even
presented any proof of that intent. It was, therefore, a reversible error on the part of the CA to
construe its forfeiture provision of the Contract as penal in nature.
It is settled that a provision is a penal clause if it calls for the forfeiture of any remaining
deposit still in the possession of the lessor, without prejudice to any other obligation still owing,
in the event of the termination or cancellation of the agreement by reason of the lessee's violation
of any of the terms and conditions thereof. This kind of agreement may be validly entered into by
the parties. The clause is an accessory obligation meant to ensure the performance of the
principal obligation by imposing on the debtor a special prestation in case of nonperformance or
inadequate performance of the principal obligation.
It is evident from the above-quoted testimony of Jaime Poon that the stipulation on the
forfeiture of advance rentals under paragraph 24 is a penal clause in the sense that it provides for
liquidated damages.
The forfeiture clauses of the Contract, therefore, served the two functions of a penal
clause, i.e., (1) to provide for liquidated damages and (2) to strengthen the coercive force of the
obligation by the threat of greater responsibility in case of breach.47 As the CA correctly found,
the prestation secured by those clauses was the parties' mutual obligation to observe the fixed
term of the lease. For this reason, We sustain the lower courts' finding that the forfeiture clause
in paragraph 24 is a penal clause, even if it is not expressly labelled as such.
UCPB GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. vs. HUGHES ELECTRONICS CORPORATION
G.R. No. 190385, November 16, 2016
FACTS
On 30 September 1998, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) issued

Resolution No. 1438 approving the use in its lottery operations a facility called Very Small
Aperture Terminal lines (VSAT lines) being offered by domestic corporation One Virtual
Corporation (OVC), then called as Sun-O-Telecom.
Hughes Electronics, upon acquiring knowledge of PCSO's resolution, offered OVC its
VSAT equipment and services. To formalize their transaction, Hughes Electronics and OVC, on
March 26, 1999, entered into a contract whereby Hughes Electronics agreed to provide the latter
with the equipment and services necessary to establish, install and commission a Ku-band
Satellite Communication Network (the Integrated Satellite Business Network or J.SBN)
consisting of a hub earth station, hub baseband equipment and Buyer-specified number of
Personal Earth Stations (PESs). The ISBN will consist of all hardware, software and services
required to establish a complete operational system that meets the technical and functional
specifications set forth in the Technical Specifications to the contract. By way of payment,
Hughes Electronics and OVC agreed that the consideration will be US$743,457.95 secured by
OVC's standby letter of credit issued in favor of Hughes Electronics.
On 26 March 1999, the terms of payment were modified upon issuance of a surety bond
with OVC as principal and UCPB Insurance as surety in favor of Hughes Electronics. The surety
bond guaranteed the payment of 95% of the purchase price of the ISBN. To further secure the
payment, Mel V. Velarde, the Chairman and CEO of OVC, executed an Agreement of Counter-
Guaranty8 in his personal capacity in favor of UCPB Insurance. In the said counter-guaranty, he
and OVC jointly and severally undertook to indemnify UCPB Insurance for any damages,
prejudice, loss, cost, payment advances and expenses of whatever kind and nature, including a
twelve percent interest (12%) per annum from judicial or extra-judicial demand and attorney's
fees which the latter may, at any time, sustain or incur as a consequence of having executed said
surety bond. The said indemnity will be paid to UCPB Insurance as soon as demand is received
from the obligee, or as soon as it becomes liable to make payment of any sum under the terms of
the surety bond.
By way of down payment, OVC paid Hughes Electronics the amount of US$60,000.00.
However, subsequent schedules of payment were not complied with.
On 7 October 1999, OVC requested for a revision of the terms of payment which Hughes
Electronics granted subject to the condition that the revised terms would become effective upon
issuance of a revised surety bond. On 25 October 1999, UCPB Insurance sent a letter to Hughes
Electronics manifesting its conformity with the revised terms.
On 21 December 1999, before the expiration of the warranties in the contract, OVC
informed Hughes Electronics that the ISBN system currently installed at its Napa hub facility did
not support the Burroughs poll/select protocol. Thus, it demanded from Hughes Electronics an
explanation and immediate solution of the problem.
Meanwhile, OVC failed to pay Hughes Electronics in accordance with the revised
payment terms. As a result, Hughes Electronics sent a letter to UCPB Insurance on 11 October
2000, demanding for the value of surety bond which, less the down payment of US$60,000.00
amounting to US$683,457.95. Upon failure to heed its demand, Hughes Electronics sent another
demand letter to UCPB Insurance on 17 October 2000.
Still, upon OVC's failure to pay, Hughes Electronics, on November 10, 2000, filed a
Complaint for Sum of Money with Damages against OVC as the principal and UCPB Insurance
based on the surety bond it issued to guaranty the payment of the obligation of the principal
OVC.
RTC rendered its decision in favor of Hughes Electronics.
CA affirms the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE
Whether or not the arbitration clause in a contract is a condition precedent to be complied

with before resort to legal action by virtue of Article 1370 and 1374
RULING
Yes. It is standing jurisprudence that in interpreting a contract, its provisions should not
be read in isolation but in relation to each other and in their entirety so as to render them
effective, having in mind the intention of the parties and the purpose to be achieved. The various
stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense
which may result from all of them taken jointly.
This principle aptly applies the provisions on interpretation of contract in the Civil Code.
Art. 1370 of the Code states that if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the
intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control. However,
it is clearly added that if the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the parties,
the latter shall prevail over the former. Further on this, Art. 1374 states that the various
stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense
which may result from all of them taken jointly.
The important task in contract interpretation is always the ascertainment of the intention
of the contracting parties and that task is, of course, to be discharged by looking to the words
they used to project that intention in their contract, all the words not just a particular word or
two, and words in context not words standing alone.
RAMON PACON, THROUGH HIS WIFE FELINA PACON, ANTONIO PACON,

THROUGH HIS WIFE NENITA PACON, EULOGIO PACON, THROUGH HIS SON
JORGE PACON, LEONARDO PACON, MANUEL IGOS, JOSE COLORES, LOLITA
COLORES, AND ESTANISLAO BUENDIA, vs. BENJAMIN TAN
G.R. No. 185365, March 02, 2016
FACTS
Respondent Benjamin Tan ("Tan") is a registered co-owner of a parcel of land located in
Gaognan-Tara, Sipocot, Camarines Sur, with an area of 302,302 square meters covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 3958 issued by the Registry of Deeds for the Province of
Camarines Sur along with co-owners filed several complaints for ejectment against petitioners,
who they claim were occupying approximately four (4) hectares of the property. They claim
among others that t petitioners have sold and encumbered their rights to third persons who are
now in actual possession of their portion of the property.
Provincial Adjudicator Alberto found that petitioners "have substantially delivered the
landowner's share" as admitted by respondent Tan in an affidavit dated July 24, 1997. In the
affidavit, Tan allegedly declared that petitioners have made "irregular and meager remittances"
representing the landowner's share of the produce. According to Provincial Adjudicator Alberto,
although Tan, et al. questioned the authenticity of the receipts presented by petitioners, "still by
such statement or admission in the aforesaid affidavit, they can not say that petitioners were
completely remissed in their obligation to deliver the landowner's share."
DARAB denied Tan, et al.'s appeals.
The Court of Appeals granted Tan's petition. Reversing both the Provincial Adjudicator
and the DARAB, the Court of Appeals found that petitioners failed to substantiate their claim of
payment, whether partially or in full, of the landowners' share. It did not give weight to the rental
receipts presented by petitioners, stating that the presentation of the same does not conclusively
establish the fact of payment or confirm receipt by Tan (or his co-owners) of the amounts stated
therein.
ISSUE
Whether or not failure to pay lease rentals is indeed a ground for the dispossession of a
tenant or termination of the tenancy relationship, the non-payment of lease rentals must be
shown to be deliberate and intentional.
RULING
No. No showing was made in this case. The petitioners should have endeavored to fully
substantiate their claim of payment considering that [Tan] disputes or fails to acknowledge the
fact of payment. Well-settled is the rule that one who pleads payment has the burden of proving
it. Even where the plaintiff must allege non-payment, the general rule is that the burden rests on
the defendant to prove non-payment. The debtor has the burden of showing with legal certainty
that the obligation has been discharged by payment.
In this case, [petitioners] failed to discharge their burden. They failed to prove the fact of
payment. No evidence was presented showing receipt and acknowledgement by [Tan, et al.] of
payment of rentals or their rightful share in the harvest/produce. xxx.
In fact, the very disposition of the agency below ordering [petitioners] to render an
accounting of the harvest from 1995 to 1998 and to deliver arrearages as well as [Tan's] share in
the harvest from 1998 only underscores the non-payment by [petitioners] of the landowners'
share in the harvest.
Reynalda and the Tan Heirs failed to agree on a lawful lease rental. Accordingly, the
DAR must first fix the provisional lease rental payable by Reynalda to the Tan Heirs pursuant to
the second paragraph of Section 34 of RA 3844 as amended. Until the DAR has fixed the
provisional lease rental, Reynalda cannot be in default in the payment of lease rental since such
amount is not yet determined. There can be no delay in the payment of an undetermined lease
rental because it is impossible to pay an undetermined amount. That Reynalda is not yet in
default in the payment of the lease rental is a basic reason why she cannot be lawfully ejected
from the Land for non-payment of rental. (Citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring
supplied.)
We thus reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals and uphold the dismissal of the
complaint for ejectment filed against petitioners. In view of our ruling, we see no need to
resolve, at this time, the issues relative to petitioners' defense of payment.
To be clear, petitioners are not excused from the payment of the proper lease rentals. For
as long as the tenancy relationship subsists, petitioners must continue paying rentals. Absent any
agreement between the parties providing for a lawful lease rental amount, the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR), following this Court's ruling in Heirs of Enrique Tan, Sr. v. Pollescas,
must first fix the amount of the provisional lease rental. Once determined, petitioners must
thereafter pay rentals, without prejudice to any defenses petitioners or respondent may raise.
FLORANTE VITUG vs. EVANGELINE A. ABUDA
G.R. No. 201264, January 11, 2016
FACTS
Abuda loaned P250,000.00 to Vitug and his wife, Narcisa Vitug. As security for the loan,
Vitug mortgaged to Abuda his property in Tondo Foreshore along R-10, Block A-50-3, Del Pan
to Kagitingan Streets, Tondo, Manila. The property was then subject of a conditional Contract to
Sell between the National Housing Authority and Vitug.
That, Mortgagor, is the owner, holder of a Conditional Contract to Sell of the National
Housing Authority (NHA) over a piece of property located at the Tondo Foreshore along R-10,
Block "A-50-3, Delpan to Kagitingan Streets in the district of Tondo, Manila. Spouses Vitug
failed to pay their loans despite Abuda's demands. Abuda filed a Complaint for Foreclosure of
Property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
RTC promulgated a Decision in favor of Abud and against the defendant, Ordering the
defendant to pay unto the court and/or to the judgment debtor within the reglementary period of
Ninety (90) days. Vitug appealed, He contended that the real estate mortgage contract he and
Abuda entered into was void on the grounds of fraud and lack of consent under Articles 1318,
1319, and 1332 of the Civil Code.
CA found that the interest rates imposed on Vitug's loan were "iniquitous,
unconscionable, and exorbitant." It instead ruled that a legal interest of 1% per month or 12% per
annum should apply from the judicial demand on November 21, 2003.
ISSUE
Whether petitioner Vitug may raise that National Housing Authority's alleged lack of
consent to the mortgage, as well as the exemption of his property from execution
RULING
No. These claims were already found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals to be
unsupported by evidence. Petitioner's consent to the mortgage contract dated November 17, 1997
was not vitiated. He voluntarily signed it in the presence of a notary public, his wife, and other
witnesses.
The National Housing Authority's restrictions were provisions in a contract it executed

with petitioner. This contract bound petitioner to certain conditions before transferring or
encumbering the property. Specifically, when the National Housing Authority sold the property
to petitioner, petitioner became obligated not to sell, encumber, mortgage, lease, sublease, alter,
or dispose the property without the National Housing Authority's consent.
Assuming there was non-compliance with the conditions set forth in the Permit, petitioner cannot
blame respondent. The restrictions were part of the contract between the National Housing
Authority and petitioner. It was petitioner, not respondent, who had the obligation to notify and
obtain the National Housing Authority's consent within the prescribed period before sale or
encumbrance of the property.
Art. 2085. The following requisites are essential to contracts of pledge and mortgage
(1) That they be constituted to secure the fulfillment of a principal obligation;
(2) That the pledgor or mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing pledged or mortgaged;
(3) That the persons constituting the pledge or mortgage have the free disposal of their
property, and in the absence thereof, that they be legally authorized for the purpose. Petitioner,
who held under his name a transfer certificate of title to the property, mortgaged the property to
respondent to secure the payment of his loan of P600,000.00.
Petitioner's undisputed title to and ownership of the property is sufficient to give him free
disposal of it. As owner of the property, he has the right to enjoy all attributes of ownership
including jus disponendi or the right to encumber, alienate, or dispose his property "without
other limitations than those established by law."
Petitioner's claim that he lacks free disposal of the property stems from the existence of the
restrictions imposed on his title by the National Housing Authority.
ROSALINA CARODAN, PETITIONER, VS. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION,

RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 210542, February 24, 2016
FACTS
Barbara and Rebecca failed to pay their loan obligation despite repeated demands from
China Bank. Their failure to pay prompted the bank institute extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings on the mortgaged property on 26 November 1999. From the extrajudicial sale, it
realized only PI.5 million as evidenced by a Certificate of Sale. This amount, when applied to the
total outstanding loan obligation of PI,865,345.77, would still leave a deficiency of P365,345.77.
For that reason, the bank prayed that the court order the payment of the deficiency amount with
interest at 12% per annum computed from 13 January 2000; attorney's fees equal to 10% of the
deficiency amount; and litigation expenses and costs of suit.
Barbara and Rebecca filed their Answer interposing the defense that although they both
stood as principal borrowers, they had entered into an oral agreement with Madeline and
Rosalina. Under that agreement which was witnessed by China Bank's loan officer and branch
manager, they would equally split both the proceeds of the loan and the corresponding obligation
and interest pertaining thereto, and they would secure the loan with the properties belonging to
them. Barbara and Rebecca used as security their real properties, while Rosalina and Madeline
used for the same purpose the former's property.
Barbara and Rebecca further alleged that while Rosalina and Madeline obtained their
share of P1.4 million of the loan amount, the latter two never complied with their obligation to
pay interest. It was only Rebecca's account with China Bank that was automatically debited in
the total amount of P1,002,735.54. Barbara and Rebecca asked China Bank for the computation
of their total obligation, for which they paid P1.5 million aside from the interest payments, and
respondent bank thereafter released the Real Estate Mortgage over their properties.
By way of crossclaim, Barbara and Rebecca asked Rosalina and Madeline to pay half of
P1,002,735.54 as interest payments, as well as the deficiency amount plus 12% interest per
annum and attorney's fees, the total amount of which pertained to the loan obligation of the latter
two. By way of counterclaim, Barbara and Rebecca also asked China Bank to pay P1million as
moral damages, P500,000 as exemplary damages, plus attorney's fees and costs of suit.
China Bank claimed that equal sharing of the proceeds of the loan was "a bat at
misrepresentation" and "a self-serving prevarication," because what was clearly written on the
note was that Rebecca and Barbara were the principal debtors. It reiterated that the two were
liable for the full payment of the principal amount plus the agreed interest, charges, penalties and
attorney's fees, with recourse to reimbursement from Rosalina and Madeline.
The RTC ruled that although no sufficient proof was adduced to show that Rosalina had
obtained any pecuniary benefit from the loan agreement between Rebecca and Barbara and
China Bank, the mortgage between Rosalina and China Bank was still valid. The trial court
declared that respondent bank had therefore lawfully foreclosed the mortgage over the property
of Rosalina, even if she was a mere accommodation mortgagor.
ISSUE
Whether petitioner Rosalina is liable jointly and severally with Barbara and Rebecca for
the payment of respondent China Bank's claims.
RULING
Yes. An accommodation mortgage is not necessarily void simply because the

accommodation mortgagor did not benefit from the same. The validity of an accommodation
mortgage is allowed under Article 2085 of the New Civil Code which provides that third persons
who are not parties to the principal obligation may secure the latter by pledging or mortgaging
their own property. An accommodation mortgagor, ordinarily, is not himself a recipient of the
loan, otherwise that would be contrary to his designation as such.
Apart from being an accommodation mortgagor, Rosalina is also a surety, defined under
Article 2047 of the Civil Code in this wise:
Art. 2047. By guaranty a person, called a guarantor, binds himself to the creditor to fulfill the
obligation of the principal debtor in case the latter should fail to do so.
If a person binds himself solidarity with the principal debtor, the provisions of Section 4,
Chapter 3, Title 1 of this Book shall be observed. In such case the contract is called a suretyship.
A contract of suretyship (second paragraph of Article 2047) has been juxtaposed against
a contract of guaranty (first paragraph of Article 2047) as follows:
A surety is an insurer of the debt, whereas a guarantor is an insurer of the solvency of the
debtor. A suretyship is an undertaking that the debt shall be paid; a guaranty, an undertaking that
the debtor shall pay. Stated differently, a surety promises to pay the principal's debt if the
principal will not pay, while a guarantor agrees that the creditor, after proceeding against the
principal, may proceed against the guarantor if the principal is unable to pay. A surety binds
himself to perform if the principal does not, without regard to his ability to do so. A guarantor,
on the other hand, does not contract that the principal will pay, but simply that he is able to do
so. In other words, a surety undertakes directly for the payment and is so responsible at once if
the principal debtor makes default, while a guarantor contracts to pay if, by the use of due
diligence, the debt cannot be made out of the principal debtor.
When Rosalina affixed her signature to the Real Estate Mortgage as mortgagor and to the
Surety Agreement as surety which covered the loan transaction represented by the Promissory
Note, she thereby bound herself to be liable to China Bank in case the principal debtors, Barbara
and Rebecca, failed to pay. She consequently became liable to respondent bank for the payment
of the debt of Barbara and Rebecca when the latter two actually did not pay.
HELEN B. LUKBAN vs. OPTIMUM DEVELOPMENT BANK
January 20, 2016 G.R. No. 205785
FACTS
On 18 August 2005, the City Treasurer's Office of Marikina (City Treasurer) conducted
an auction sale of tax delinquent real properties, which included the real property of Melba T.
Atienza (Atienza) under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 234408
Petitioner Helen B. Lukban (Lukban) was the highest and winning bidder of the property
during the public auction. She paid the amount of P47,265.604 inclusive of penalties and
publication fees. On 25 August 2005, the City Treasurer issued Lukban a Certificate of Sale of
Delinquent Real Property to Purchaser, acknowledging receipt of her payment. Lukban then paid
the realty taxes, capital gains tax, documentary stamp tax, and all other internal revenue taxes
due on the property.
On 10 June 2008, Lukban filed a petition for the cancellation of TCT No. 234408 and the
issuance by the Register of Deeds of Marikina City (Marikina Register of Deeds) of a new TCT
in her favor. The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch 272 (trial
court). In an Order dated 22 July 2008, the trial court found that there was an entry on TCT No.
234408 annotating a prior Notice of Levy in favor of Capitol Bank. It was annotated more than
12 years ahead of the Notice of Levy for tax delinquency. The trial court noted that there was a
possibility that the owners duplicate certificate of title was not with Atienza but with Capitol
Bank. The trial court further noted that while Lukban provided it with Atienzas address, she did
not furnish the trial court with Capitol Banks address. The trial court ordered Lukban to provide
it with Capitol Banks correct address so that it could be notified of the case as a party in interest.
Lukban sought the help of the Marikina Register of Deeds but it could not provide her with
Capitol Banks address.
On 23 October 2008, Atty. Aleta I. Lopez (Atty. Lopez) appeared as counsel of Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and manifested that RCBC had acquired a portion of
the shares of Capitol Bank. Atty. Lopez further manifested that RCBC did not have the TCT of
the property in its possession. Atty. Lopez informed the trial court that Capitol Bank already
changed its name to Optimum Development Bank (Optimum Bank). During the hearing, Atty.
Felix S. Caballes, Lukbans counsel, moved for the marking of exhibits to establish jurisdictional
requirements.
After the termination of the lone witness testimony but before Lukbans offer of
evidence, Optimum Bank filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Admit as well as its
Opposition to Lukbans petition on the ground that its rights would be affected should the
petition be granted. Optimum Bank alleged that while it was the registered mortgagee of the
property, it was not aware that it was sold by the City Treasurer in a public auction and that
Lukban was the highest bidder. Optimum Bank further alleged that the bid was too low
compared to the actual market value of the property and the mortgage debt amounting to
P340,000. Optimum Bank manifested that it had the original duplicate title of the property in its
possession. Optimum Bank also reserved its right to present documentary evidence of its rights
as mortgagee.
RTC ruled that Lukban was able to satisfactorily prove that she acquired the property
from a public auction sale, that the one-year redemption period lapsed without Atienza
redeeming the property, and that a Final Deed of Sale was issued in her favor. The trial court
noted that the City of Marikina complied with the requirements of notice and publication
CA ruled in favor of Atienza reversing the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE
Whether or not there was a valid notice of auction sales
RULING
Yes. Although it may be shown in the records that the copies of the Order and the
Petition sent to Atienza remained unserved despite several attempts to serve them on her, the law
is clear on the publication and publication of the notice on the said auction sale.
Section 260. Advertisement and Sale. - x x x.
Within thirty (30) days after the sale, the local treasurer or his deputy shall make a report
of the sale to the sanggunian concerned, and which shall form part of his records. The local
treasurer shall likewise prepare and deliver to the purchaser a certificate of sale which shall
contain the name of the purchaser, a description of the property sold, the amount of the
delinquent tax, the interest due thereon, the expenses of sale and a brief description of the
proceedings: Provided, however, That proceeds of the sale in excess of the delinquent tax, the
interest due thereon, and the expenses of sale shall be remitted to the owner of the real property
or person having legal interest therein.
xxxx
Clearly, only the registered owner is entitled to the Notice of Sale.

SPOUSES ROBERTO and ADELAIDA PEN vs SPOUSES SANTOS and LINDA JULIAN
G.R. No. 160408, January 11, 2016
FACTS
On April 9, 1986, the appellees (the Julians) obtained a loan from appellant Adelaida
Pen. On May 23, 1986 and on the May 27, 1986, they were again extended loans by appellant
Adelaida. The initial interests were deducted by appellant Adelaida. Two (2) promissory notes
were executed by the appellees in favor of Adelaida to evidence the foregoing loans, one dated
April 9, 1986 and payable on June 15, 1986 and another dated May 22, 1986 payable on July 22,
1986. Both Joans were charged interest at 6% per month. As security, on May 23, 1986, the
appellees executed a Real Estate Mortgage over their property registered under the name of
appellee Santos Julian, Jr. The owner's duplicate of title was delivered to the appellants. But the
Appellants version is that when the loans became due and demandable, appellees failed to pay
despite several demands. Appellant Adelaida decided to institute foreclosure proceedings.
However, she was prevailed upon by appellee Linda not to foreclose the property because of the
cost of litigation and since it would cause her embarrassment as the proceedings will be
announced in public places at the City Hall, where she has many friends. Instead, appellee Linda
offered their mortgaged property as payment in kind. Thereafter, on October 22, 1986 appellee
executed a two (2) page Deed of Sale duly signed by her.
On July 1989, appellants allege that appellee Linda offered numerously to repurchase the
said property. The offer was rejected by appellant Adelaida. The latter held the money only for
safekeeping upon the pleading of appellee Linda which was contested later in the version of the
appellee claiming that there was no consideration agreed upon by the parties.
RTC ruled in favor of the respondents where it states that the parties did not agree as to
the consideration for the sale that they signed in the Deed of Sale, having no consideration where
it lacks one of the essential requisites of a valid contract.
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC but with modification that it is not because of the
lacking of consideration in the contract of sale but when the Deed of Sale was executed at the
same time as the real estate mortgage which is a prohibited sale pactum commissorium.
ISSUE
Whether or not there was valid Deed of Sale.
RULING
No. Court ruled affirming the decision rendered by the CA. Article 2088 of the Civil
Code prohibits the creditor from appropriating the things given by way of pledge or mortgage, or
from disposing of them; any stipulation to the contrary is null and void. The elements for pactum
commissorium to exist are as follows, to wit: (a) that there should be a pledge or mortgage
wherein property is pledged or mortgaged by way of security for the payment of the principal
obligation; and (b) that there should be a stipulation for an automatic appropriation by the
creditor of the thing pledged or mortgaged in the event of non-payment of the principal
obligation within the stipulated period. The first element was present considering that the
property of the respondents was mortgaged by Linda in favor of Adelaida as security for the
farmer's indebtedness. As to the second, the authorization for Adelaida to appropriate the
property subject of the mortgage upon Linda's default was implied from Linda's having signed
the blank deed of sale simultaneously with her signing of the real estate mortgage. The haste
with which the transfer of property was made upon the default by Linda on her obligation, and
the eventual transfer of the property in a manner not in the form of a valid dacion en
pago ultimately confirmed the nature of the transaction as a pactum commissorium.
Lindas Deed of Sale had been executed simultaneously with the real estate mortgage.
According to Article 1318 of the Civil Code, the requisites for any contract to be valid are,
namely: (a) the consent of the contracting parties; (b) the object; and (c) the consideration. There
is a perfection of a contract when there is a meeting of the minds of the parties on each of these
requisites.
Timoteo Bacalso and Diosdada Bacalso vs Gregoria B. Aca-a, Eutiquia B. Aguila, Julian
Bacus, Evelyn Sychangco
G.R. No. 172919, January 13, 2016
FACTS
The Bacus siblings were the registered owners of a parcel of land located in San Roque,
Talisay, Cebu with an area of 1,200 square meter. The Bacus siblings inherited the said property
from their mother Matea Bacalso (Matea).
On October 15, 1987, the Bacus siblings executed a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying a
portion of the said lot with an area of 271 sqm, in favor of their cousin, Timoteo for and in
consideration of the amount of P8,000.00.
On March 4, 1988, however, Timoteo, together with his sisters Lucena and Victoria and
some of his cousins filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of documents, certificates of title,
reconveyance of real property and damages against the Bacus siblings and four other persons
before the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 12. They claimed that they are co-owners of the three-
fourths portion of the said lot as Matea had paid for the said property for and in behalf of her
brother Alejandro (father of petitioner Timoteo) and sisters Perpetua and Liberata, all surnamed
Bacalso.
RTC ruled that Matea was the sole owner of the lot and affirmed the validity of the
conveyances of portions of said lot made by her children. CA affirmed the decision of RTC.
Timoteo and Diosdada Bacalso (petitioners) filed on October 26, 1995, a complaint for
declaration of nullity of contract and certificates of title, reconveyance and damages against the
Bacus siblings, this time claiming ownership over Lot No. 1809-G-2-C by virtue of the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated October 15, 1987. They claimed, however, that the Bacus siblings reneged
on their promise to cause the issuance of a new TCT in the name of the petitioners.
Moreover, the petitioners alleged that the Bacus siblings have caused the subdivision of
the lot into four lots. After subdividing the property, the Bacus siblings, on February 11, 1992,
without knowledge of the petitioners, sold a portion of the lot again to respondent Evelyn
Sychangco (Sychangco) and that TCT No. 74687 covering the same property was issued in her
name.9
Bacus siblings denied the allegations of the petitioners and claimed that the alleged sale
of lot in favor of the petitioners did not push through because the petitioners failed to pay the
purchase price thereof.
Sychangco averred that she is a buyer in good faith and for value as she relied on what
appeared in the certificate of title of the property which appeared to be a clean title as no lien or
encumbrance was annotated therein.
RTC issued a Decision declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 15, 1987 void
for want of consideration after finding that the petitioners failed to pay the price of the subject
property. Moreover, the RTC held that even granting that the sale between the Bacus siblings
and the petitioners was valid, the petitioners still cannot ask for the rescission of the sale of the
disputed portion to Sychangco as the latter was a buyer in good faith, thus has a better right to
the property.
CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC.

ISSUE
Whether or not theres a valid Deed of Sale
RULING
No. This is not merely a case of failure to pay the purchase price which can only amount
to a breach of obligation with rescission as the proper remedy. As correctly observed by the
RTC, the disputed sale produces no effect and is considered void ab initio for failure to or want
of consideration since the petitioner failed to pay the consideration stipulated in the Deed of
Absolute Sale. The trial court's discussion on the said issue, as affirmed by the CA.
It is evident from all the circumstances that there was a failure to or want of consideration
of the supposed sale of the land in question to the petitioners on October 15, 1987. Article 1352
of the New Civil Code of the Philippines provides that contracts without cause produce no effect
whatsoever. If there is no cause, the contract is void. x x x There being no price paid, there is no
cause or consideration; hence, the contract is void as a sale. x x x
JOEY R. PEA vs. JESUS DELOS SANTOS AND THE HEIRS OF ROSITA DELOS
SANTOS FLORES
G.R. No. 202223, March 02, 2016
FACTS
Jesus Delos Santos (Jesus) and Rosita Delos Santos Flores (Rosita) were the judgment
awardees of the two-thirds portion or 9,915 square meters of four adjoining lots located in
Boracay Island, Malay, Aldan. The award was embodied in the Decision dated April 29, 1996 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan.
The losing parties in the case, Vicente Delos Santos, et al. (plaintiffs) and Spouses Fred
and Joan Elizalde (appellants), appealed the foregoing judgment to the CA thru petitions.
Atty. Romeo Robiso (Atty. Robiso) later on sold both lots to Pea on December 15, 2006
thru a Deed of Absolute Sale. The tax declarations over the said portions were subsequently
registered in Pea's name.
The plaintiffs opposed Pea's motion claiming that the conveyance made by Jesus and
Rosita in favor of Atty. Robiso was null and void for being a prohibited transaction because the
latter was their counsel in the case.
Pea averred that he is the transferee of Jesus and Rosita's adjudged allotments over the
subject lots. He claimed that he bought the same from Atty. Robiso who in turn, acquired the
properties from Jesus and Rosita through assignment and sale as evidenced by the following
documents.
Apparently, Atty. Robiso was engaged by Jesus and Rosita to be their counsel virtue of
an Attorney's Agreement and Undertaking dated July 11, 1998. Under the agreement, Atty.
Robiso bound himself to render his legal services in connection with Jesus and Rosita's
involvement as party-litigants in and to any proceedings that may arise in connection therewith
before the CA and this Court. Atty. Robiso undertook to advance his own funds for all expenses
and costs he may incur in relation to the case. In consideration thereof, Jesus and Rosita obliged
themselves to give or pay to him as contingent professional fees, 2,000 sq m of any and all lands
that the courts will award to them in the case.
RTC ruled partially granting Pea's motion and ruled that Jesus and Rosita lost their
standing in the case upon the conveyance of their adjudged 2,000 sq m portion in favor of Atty.
Robiso whose ownership rights were afterwards acquired by Pea.
CA reversed the ruling of the RTC and ruled that the conveyance made by Jesus and
Rosita in favor of Atty. Robiso was null and void because it is a prohibited transaction under
Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code.
ISSUE
Whether or not the contingency fee contract entered into by Jesus and Rosita to Atty.
Robiso is allowed by virtue of Article 1492 (5) of the Civil Code
RULING
No. Because the lots were transferred to Penas predecessor-in-interest, Atty. Robiso,
through a prohibited sale transaction. Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code expressly prohibits
lawyers from acquiring property or rights that may be the object of any litigation in which they
may take part by virtue of their profession, thus:
Art. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial
auction, either in person or through the mediation of another:
xxxx
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and
other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights
in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory
they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by
assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the
object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession.
The rationale advanced for the prohibition in Article 1491(5) is that public policy
disallows the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved, i.e., the relation of trust
and confidence and the peculiar control exercised by these persons. It is founded on public policy
because, by virtue of his office, an attorney may easily take advantage of the credulity and
ignorance of his client and unduly enrich himself at the expense of his client. The principle of
estoppel runs counter to this policy and to apply it in this case will be tantamount to sanctioning
a prohibited and void transaction.
The other issues raised by Pea are merely procedural in nature and are too
inconsequential to override the fundamental considerations of public policy underlying the
prohibition set forth in Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code.
JOEL CARDENAS, HEIR OF THE LATE ELINAIDA L. ALCANTARA,

REPRESENTED BY ANTONIO IGNACIO, JR. vs. HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES
SIMPLICIA P. AGUILAR AND MAXIMO V. AGUILAR AND ATTY. NORMAN R.
BUENO
G.R. No. 191079, March 02, 2016
FACTS
On 8 November 2000, Elinaida L. Alcantara (Alcantara) obtained a loan from the

Spouses Maximo and Simplicia Aguilar (Spouses Aguilar) in the amount of P3,000,000.00 with
fixed interest of P720,000.00. As a security for the said obligation, Alcantara executed an
agreement denominated as Venta con Pacto de Retro (Sale With Right to Repurchase) in favor of
the Spouses Domingo over a parcel of land with an area of 410 square meters under her name
(subject property). It was agreed by the parties that the term of the loan shall be one year from
the date of the execution of the contract on 8 November 2000 with a grace period of six months.
After Alcantara failed to repurchase the subject property within the stipulated period, she sought
for the extension of the period to exercise her right to repurchase which was granted by Melba A.
Clavo de Comer, daughter of the Spouses Domingo, as shown in a letter 6 June 2002.
In December 2002, Joel A. Cardenas (Cardenas), son of Alcantara, sought to exercise for
himself, and on behalf of his mother, the redemption of the subject property by offering to pay
the entire amount of the loan including the interest thereon, but it was refused by the Spouses
Aguilar.
Alcantara initiated a Civil Case for the Reformation of Instrument and Specific
Performance against the Spouses Aguilar, their daughter, Melba A. Clavo de Comer and her
husband, Dan Clavo de Comer (Spouses de Comer) and Antonio Malinao, in his capacity as
Register of Deeds of Las Pias City.
Plaintiff sought that the instrument denominated as Venta con Pacto de Retro be declared
as equitable mortgage and to direct defendants Spouses Aguilar and Spouses de Comer to accept
her offer to pay the loan and to release the mortgage constituted on the subject property.
Both parties died and were succeeded by their compulsory heirs respectively.
RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the plaintiffs and declared that the contract entered
into by the parties is equitable mortgage and not a sale with a right to repurchase.
ISSUE
Whether or not the contract entered into by parties is which an equitable mortgage and not
a pacto de retro sale
RULING
Yes. We affirm the decision of the RTC in declaring that the contract entered into by the
parties is an equitable mortgage and not a sale with a right to repurchase.
After perusing the arguments of the parties, we find it perplexing why the petitioner, after
going thru the process of filing the complaint and actively pursuing the case, and, eventually
securing a favorable judgment, refused to have the said decision executed. After all, the reliefs
mainly sought by the petitioner in his complaint, (i.e., to declare the contract of sale with a right
to repurchase as equitable mortgage and to direct the defendants to release the mortgage
constituted on the property), were all granted by the court a quo as shown in its 27 February
2009 Decision.
ROSARIO VICTORIA AND ELMA PIDLAOAN vs. NORMITA JACOB PIDLAOAN,

HERMINIGILDA PIDLAOAN AND EUFEMIA PIDLAOAN
G.R. No. 196470, April 20, 2016
FACTS
Elma bought a parcel of land with an area of 201 square meters in Lucena City. When
Rosario came home, she caused the construction of a house on the lot but she left immediately
after the construction of the house finished.
Elma allegedly mortgaged the house and lot to a certain Thi Hong Villanueva in 1989.
When the properties were about to be foreclosed, Elma allegedly asked for help from her sister-
in-law, Eufemia Pidlaoan, to redeem the property. On her part, Eufemia called her daughter
abroad, Normita, to lend money to Elma. Normita agreed to provide the funds. Elma allegedly
sought to sell the land. When she failed to find a buyer, she offered to sell it to Eufemia or her
daughter. Elma executed a deed of sale entitled "Panananto ng Pagkatanggap ng Kahustuhang
Bayad" transferring the ownership of the lot to Normita.
The last provision in the deed of sale provides that Elma shall eject the person who
erected the house and deliver the lot to Normita. The document was signed by Elma, Normita,
and two witnesses but it was not notarized.
When Elma and Normita were about to have the document notarized, the notary public
advised them to donate the lot instead to avoid capital gains tax. On the next day, Elma executed
a deed of donation in Normita's favor and had it notarized. TCT No. T-50282 was cancelled and
TCT No. T-70990 was issued in Normita's name. Since then, Normita had been paying the real
property taxes over the lot but Elma continued to occupy the house.
The RTC ruled that Rosario and Elma co-owned the lot and the house. Elma can only
donate her one-half share in the lot.
CA reversed the RTC's decision and dismissed the petitioners' complaint. The CA also
held that the deed of donation was not simulated. It was voluntarily executed by Elma out of
gratitude to Normita who rescued her by preventing the foreclosure of the lot.
ISSUE
Whether the deed of donation was simulated and the parties real intent was to enter into a
sale.
RULING
Yes. The deed of donation was simulated and the parties' real intent was to enter into a
sale.
We first dwell on the genuineness of the deed of donation. There are two types of
simulated documents - absolute and relative. A document is absolutely simulated when the
parties have no intent to bind themselves at all, while it is relatively simulated when the parties
concealed their true agreement. The true nature of a contract is determined by the parties'
intention, which can be ascertained from their contemporaneous and subsequent acts.
In the present case, Elma and Normita's contemporaneous and subsequent acts show that
they were about to have the contract of sale notarized but the notary public ill-advised them to
execute a deed of donation instead. Following this advice, they returned the next day to have a
deed of donation notarized. Clearly, Elma and Normita intended to enter into a sale that would
transfer the ownership of the subject matter of their contract but disguised it as a donation. Thus,
the deed of donation subsequently executed by them was only relatively simulated.
The CA upheld the deed of donation's validity based on the principle that a notarized
document enjoys the presumption of regularity. This presumption, however, is overthrown in this
case by the respondents' own admission in their answer that the deed of donation was simulated.
Judicial admissions made by a party in the course of the proceedings are conclusive and
do not require proof. Notably, the respondents explicitly recognized in their answer that the deed
of donation was simulated upon the notary public's advice and that both parties intended a sale.
Having admitted the simulation, the respondents can no longer deny it at this stage. The
CA erred in disregarding this admission and upholding the validity of the deed of donation.
Considering that the deed of donation was relatively simulated, the parties are bound to
their real agreement. The records show that the parties intended to transfer the ownership of the
property to Normita by absolute sale. This intention is reflected in the un-notarized document
entitled "Panananto ng Pagkatanggap ng Kahustuhang Bayad."
We have discussed that the transaction was definitely not one of donation. Next, we determine
whether the parties' real transaction was a sale or an equitable mortgage.
MELECIO DOMINGO, vs. SPOUSES GENARO MOLINA and ELENA B. MOLINA,

substituted by ESTER MOLINA
G.R. No. 200274, April 20, 2016
FACTS
In June 15, 1951, the spouses Anastacio and Flora Domingo bought a property in
Camiling, Tarlac, consisting of a one-half undivided portion over an 18,164 square meter parcel
of land. The sale was annotated on the Original Certificate of Title covering the subject property.
During his lifetime, Anastacio borrowed money from the respondent spouses Genaro and Elena
Molina.
On September 10, 1978 or 10 years after Floras death, Anastacio sold his interest over
the land to the spouses Molina to answer for his debts. The sale to the spouses Molina was
annotated at the OCT of the subject property. In 1986, Anastacio died.
In May 19, 1995, the sale of Anastacios interest was registered and transferred the entire
one-half undivided portion of the land to the spouses Molina. Melecio, one of the children of
Anastacio and Flora, learned of the transfer and filed a Complaint for Annulment of Title and
Recovery of Ownership against the spouses Molina on May 17, 1999.
Jaime testified that Elena Molina permitted him to build a house on the subject property
in 1993. Jaime, together with the other tenants, planted fruit bearing trees on the subject property
and gave portions of their harvest to Elena Molina without any complaint from Melecio. Jaime
further testified that Melecio never lived on the subject property and that only George Domingo,
as the caretaker of the spouses Molina, has a hut on the property.
RTC dismissed the case because Melecio failed to establish his claim that Anastacio did
not sell the property to the spouses Molina. The RTC also held that Anastacio could dispose of
conjugal property without Floras consent since the sale was necessary to answer for conjugal
liabilities.
CA held that Melecio failed to prove by preponderant evidence that there was fraud in the
conveyance of the property to the spouses Molina.
ISSUE
Whether the sale of the subject property to the spouses Molina was not attended with
fraud.
RULING
No. The sale of the subject property to the spouses Molina was not attended with fraud.
On the issue of fraud, the lower courts found that there was no fraud in the sale of the disputed
property to the spouses Molina.
The issue of fraud would require the Court to inquire into the weight of evidentiary
matters to determine the merits of the petition and is essentially factual in nature. It is basic that
factual questions cannot be cannot be entertained in a Rule 45 petition, unless it falls under any
of the recognized exceptions found in jurisprudence. The present petition does not show that it
falls under any of the exceptions allowing factual review.
Melecio' s argument that no document was executed for the sale is negated by the CA
finding that there was a notarized deed of conveyance executed between Anastacio and the
spouses Molina, as annotated on the OCT of the disputed property.
Melecio's belief that Anastacio could not have sold the property without his knowledge
cannot be considered as proof of fraud to invalidate the spouses Molina's registered title over the
subject property.
ARTURO C. ALBA, JR., DULY REPRESENTED BY HIS ATTORNEYS-IN-FACT,

ARNULFO B. ALBA AND ALEXANDER C. ALBA, vs. RAYMUND D. MALAPAJO,
RAMIL D. MALAPAJO AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE CITY OF ROXAS
G.R. No. 198752, January 13, 2016
FACTS
Petitioner Arturo C. Alba, Jr., duly represented by his attorneys-in-fact, Arnulfo B. Alba
and Alexander C. Alba, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, Branch 15, a
Complaint against respondents Raymund D. Malapajo, Ramil D. Malapajo and the Register of
Deeds of Roxas City for recovery of ownership and/or declaration of nullity or cancellation of
title and damages alleging, among others, that he was the previous registered owner of a parcel
of land consisting of 98,146 square meters situated in Bolo, Roxas City, covered by TCT No. T-
22345; that his title was subsequently canceled by virtue of a deed of sale he allegedly executed
in favor of respondents Malapajo for a consideration of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00); that new TCT No. T-56840 was issued in the name of respondents Malapajo; that
the deed of sale was a forged document which respondents Malapajo were the co-authors of.
Respondents Malapajo filed their Answer with Counterclaim contending that they were
innocent purchasers for value and that the deed was a unilateral document which was presented
to them already prepared and notarized; that before the sale, petitioner had, on separate
occasions, obtained loans from them and their mother which were secured by separate real estate
mortgages covering the subject property; that the two real estate mortgages had never been
discharged.
Respondents counterclaimed for damages and for reimbursement of petitioner's loan from
them plus the agreed monthly interest in the event that the deed of sale is declared null and void
on the ground of forgery.
RTC issued an Order denying petitioner's motion finding that respondents' counterclaims
are compulsory. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order dated September
30, 2010.
CA affirmed the decision of RTC.
ISSUE
Whether the deed of absolute sale is declared null and void on the ground of forgery, then
the plaintiff should reimburse the defendants the loan he obtained from them.
RULING
Yes. The Deed of Absolute Sale is a unilateral instrument, i.e., it was signed only by the
vendor, who is the plaintiff in this case and his instrumental witnesses, who are his parents in this
case. It was presented to defendants already completely prepared, accomplished and notarized.
Defendants had no hand in its preparation, accomplishment and notarization.
While the plaintiff claims that his signature on the instrument is forged, he never
questioned the genuineness of the signatures of his instrumental witnesses, his parents Arturo P.
Alba, Sr. and Norma C. Alba, who signed the said instrument below the words "SIGNED IN
THE PRESENCE OF" and above the words "Father" and "Mother," respectively.
Furthermore, plaintiff acknowledged in par. 7 of his Complaint that the stated

consideration in the Deed of Absolute Sale is P500,000.00 and he never categorically denied
having received the same.
Before the plaintiff sold the property to the defendants, he secured a loan from them in the sum
of Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P600,000.00) payable on or before November 10, 2008. The
loan is evidenced by a Promissory Note and secured by a Real Estate Mortgage dated September
11, 2008, both executed by him, covering the parcel of land subject of this case, Lot 2332-D, Psd
06-000738. Like the Deed of Absolute Sale, the Real Estate Mortgage is a unilateral instrument,
was signed solely by the plaintiff, and furthermore, his parents affixed their signatures thereon
under the heading "WITH MY PARENTAL CONSENT", and above the words, "Father" and
"Mother," respectively.
Prior to this, or as early as July 25, 2008, the plaintiff also obtained a loan payable on or
before September 6, 2008 from defendants' mother. Alma D. David, and already mortgaged to
her Lot 2332-D, Psd 06-000738. The loan is evidenced by a Promissory Note and a Real Estate
Mortgage, both of which were executed by plaintiff. Again, the Real Estate Mortgage is an
unilateral instrument, was signed solely by the plaintiff and furthermore, his parents also affixed
their signatures thereon under the heading, "WITH MY PARENTAL CONSENT " and above the
words, "Father" and "Mother," respectively.
In both instances, the plaintiff was always represented by his parents, who always
manifested their authority to transact in behalf of / their son the plaintiff.
As in the case with the Deed of Absolute Sale, the defendants or their mother did not
have any hand in the preparation, accomplishment or notarization of the two Promissory Notes
with accompanying Real Estate Mortgages, xxx
Neither of the two Real Estate Mortgages have been discharged or extinguished.
Considering the foregoing, the plaintiffs allegation that his signature on the Deed of
Absolute Sale was forged, and that the defendants are the "co-authors" of the said forgery, are
absolutely false and baseless.
If the Deed of Absolute Sale is declared null and void on the ground of forgery, then the
plaintiff should reimburse the defendants the loan he obtained from them, which he did not deny
having obtained, plus the agreed monthly interest.
Dra. Mercedes Oliver vs. Philippine Savings Bank, Lilia Castro

GR. No. 214567, April 4, 2016
FACTS
Petitioner Dra. Mercedes Oliver (oliver) was a depositor of respondent Philippine

Savings Bank (PSBank). Respondent Lilia Castro (Castro) was the Assistant Vice President of
PSBank and the Acting Branch Manager.
Oliver alleged that she made an initial deposit of P12 million into her PSBank account
and during that time Castro convinced her to loan out her deposit as interim or bridge financing
for the approved loans of bank borrowers who were waiting for the actual release of their loan
proceeds.
Under this arrangement, Castro would first show the approved loan documents to Oliver.
Thereafter, Castro would withdraw the amount needed from Olivers account. This setup of their
arrangement went on for months and due to the frequency of bank transactions, Oliver entrusted
her passbook to Castro. Since the Oliver earned substantial profit, she was further convinced by
Castro to avail additional credit line in the amount of P10 million which was secured by a real
estate mortgage.
Sometime in September 1998, Castro stopped rendering accounting for Oliver, which
prompted the latter to demand for the return of her passbook. When Castro returned the
passbook, Oliver noticed that there are numerous erasures and superimpositions. Oliver received
two collection letters from PSBank referring to the non-payment of loans, where the petitioner
protesting that she neither availed of the said loans nor authorized the withdrawal of P7 million
from her account and that her P10 million loan from credit line was already paid in full.
RTC ruled in favor of petitioner in its motion for reconsideration where Court of Appeals
reversed the ruling of RTC ruling in favor of respondent bank and private respondent Castro.
ISSUE
Whether or not there exist an implied Agency between Oliver and Castro.
RULING
Yes. There was an implied agency between Oliver and Castro, the loans were properly
acquired. A contract of agency may be inferred from all the dealings between Oliver and Castro.
Agency can be express or implied from the cts of the principal, from his silence or lack of action,
or his failure to repudiate the agency knowing that another person is acting on his behalf without
authority.
Oliver and Castro had business agreement wherein Oliver would obtain loans from the
bank, through the help of Castro as its branch manager; and after acquiring the loan proceeds,
Castro would lend the acquired amount to prospective borrowers who were waiting for the actual
release of their loan proceeds. For months the agency between Oliver and Castro benefited both
parties. Oliver through Castros representations, was able to obtain loans, relend them to
borrowers, and earn interests.
The laws on agency apply to their relationship. Article 1881 of the Civil Code provides
that the agent must act within the scope of his authority. As long as the agent acts within the
scope of the authority given by his principal, the actions of the Agent shall bind the Principal.
MICHAEL C. GUY vs. ATTY. GLENN C. GACOTT
G.R. No. 206147, January 13, 2016
FACTS
Atty. Glenn Gacott (Gacott) herein respondent purchased two brand new transreceivers
from Quantech Systems Corporation (QSC) in Manila through its employee Rey
Medestomas (Medestomas), amounting to a total of P18,000.00. On May 10, 1997, due to major
defects, respondent personally returned the transreceivers to QSC and requested that they be
replaced. Medestomas received the returned transreceivers and promised to send him the
replacement units within two weeks.
Time passed and respondent did not receive the replacement units as promised. QSC
informed him that there were no available units and that it could not refund the purchased price.
Despite several demands, both oral and written, respondent was never given a replacement or a
refund. The demands caused the respondent to incur expenses in the total amount of P40,936.44.
Thus, respondent filed a complaint for damages.
Respondent later on found out that QSC is not a corporation but a partnership and
Michael Guy was appointed general manager of the said partnership and moved to have Guys
property attached to the complaint.
ISSUE
Whether or not Guy may be held solidarily liable with the partnership being a general
manager.
RULING
No. Although a partnership is based on delectus personae or mutual agency, whereby any
partner can generally represent the partnership in its business affairs, it is non sequitur that a suit
against the partnership is necessarily a suit impleading each and every partner. It must be
remembered that a partnership is a juridical entity that has a distinct and separate personality
from the persons composing it.28
In relation to the rules of civil procedure, it is elementary that a judgment of a court is

conclusive and binding only upon the parties and their successors-in-interest after the
commencement of the action in court.29 A decision rendered on a complaint in a civil action or
proceeding does not bind or prejudice a person not impleaded therein, for no person shall be
adversely affected by the outcome of a civil action or proceeding in which he is not a party. 30The
principle that a person cannot be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in
which he has not been made a party conforms to the constitutional guarantee of due process of
law.31
In Muoz v. Yabut, Jr.,32 the Court declared that a person not impleaded and given the
opportunity to take part in the proceedings was not bound by the decision declaring as null and
void the title from which his title to the property had been derived. The effect of a judgment
could not be extended to non-parties by simply issuing an alias writ of execution against them,
for no man should be prejudiced by any proceeding to which he was a stranger.
Here, Guy was never made a party to the case. He did not have any participation in the
entire proceeding until his vehicle was levied upon and he suddenly became QSCs co-
defendant debtor during the judgment execution stage. It is a basic principle of law that money
judgments are enforceable only against the property incontrovertibly belonging to the judgment
debtor.35 Indeed, the power of the court in executing judgments extends only to properties
unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone. An execution can be issued only against
a party and not against one who did not have his day in court. The duty of the sheriff is to levy
the property of the judgment debtor not that of a third person. For, as the saying goes, one man's
goods shall not be sold for another man's debts.36
Article 1824. All partners are liable solidarily with the partnership for everything
chargeable to the partnership under Articles 1822 and 1823.
[Emphases Supplied]
In essence, these provisions articulate that it is the act of a partner which caused loss or
injury to a third person that makes all other partners solidarily liable with the partnership because
of the words "any wrongful act or omission of any partner acting in the ordinary course of the
business," "one partner acting within the scope of his apparent authority" and "misapplied
by any partner while it is in the custody of the partnership." The obligation is solidary because
the law protects the third person, who in good faith relied upon the authority of a partner,
whether such authority is real or apparent.40
In the case at bench, it was not shown that Guy or the other partners did a wrongful act or
misapplied the money or property he or the partnership received from Gacott. A third person
who transacted with said partnership can hold the partners solidarily liable for the whole
obligation if the case of the third person falls under Articles 1822 or 1823.41 Gacotts claim
stemmed from the alleged defective transreceivers he bought from QSC, through the latter's
employee, Medestomas. It was for a breach of warranty in a contractual obligation entered into
in the name and for the account of QSC, not due to the acts of any of the partners. For said
reason, it is the general rule under Article 1816 that governs the joint liability of such breach, and
not the exceptions under Articles 1822 to 1824. Thus, it was improper to hold Guy solidarily
liable for the obligation of the partnership.
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS AND FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION

(PRESENTLY KNOWN AS BPI/MS INSURANCE CORPORATION) vs. YOLANDA
LAINGO,
G.R. No. 205206, March 16, 2016
FACTS
On 20 July 1999, Rheozel Laingo (Rheozel), the son of respondent Yolanda Laingo
(Laingo), opened a "Platinum 2-in-1 Savings and Insurance" account with petitioner Bank of the
Philippine Islands (BPI) in its Claveria, Davao City branch. The Platinum 2-in-1 Savings and
Insurance account is a savings account where depositors are automatically covered by an
insurance policy against disability or death issued by petitioner FGU Insurance Corporation
(FGU Insurance), now known as BPI/MS Insurance Corporation. BPI issued Passbook to
Rheozel. A Personal Accident Insurance Coverage Certificate was also issued by FGU Insurance
in the name of Rheozel with Laingo as his named beneficiary.
Rheozel died due to a vehicular accident, since Rheozel came from a reputable and
affluent family, the Daily Mirror headlined the story in its newspaper on 26 September 2000.
On 27 September 2000, Laingo instructed the family's personal secretary, Alice Torbanos
(Alice) to go to BPI, Davao City branch and inquire about the savings account of Rheozel.
Laingo wanted to use the money in the savings account for Rheozel's burial and funeral
expenses.
Alice went to BPI and talked to Jaime Ibe Rodriguez, BPI's Branch Manager regarding
Laingo's request. Due to Laingo's credit standing and relationship with BPI, BPI accommodated
Laingo who was allowed to withdraw P995,000 from the account of Rheozel. A certain Ms.
Laura Cabico, an employee of BPI, went to Rheozel's wake at the Cosmopolitan Funeral Parlor
to verify some information from Alice and brought with her a number of documents for Laingo
to sign for the withdrawal of the P995,000.
More than two years later or on 21 January 2003, Rheozel's sister, Rhealyn Laingo-
Concepcion, while arranging Rheozel's personal things in his room at their residence in Davao
City, found the Personal Accident Insurance Coverage Certificate issued by FGU Insurance.
Rhealyn immediately conveyed the information to Laingo.
Laingo sent two letters dated 11 September 2003 and 7 November 2003 to BPI and FGU
Insurance requesting them to process her claim as beneficiary of Rheozel's insurance policy. On
19 February 2004, FGU Insurance sent a reply-letter to Laingo denying her claim. FGU
Insurance stated that Laingo should have filed the claim within three calendar months from the
death of Rheozel as required under Paragraph 15 of the Personal Accident Certificate of
Insurance
On 20 February 2004, Laingo filed a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages
and Attorney's Fees with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City against BPI and FGU
Insurance.
RTC ruled that the prescriptive period of 90 days shall commence from the time of death
of the insured and not from the knowledge of the beneficiary dismissing the complaint filed by
Laingo.
CA reversed the ruling of RTC ruling that Laingo could not be expected to do an
obligation which she did not know existed. The appellate court added that Laingo was not a party
to the insurance contract entered into between Rheozel and petitioners and she could not be
bound by the 90-day stipulation.
ISSUE
Whether or not Laingo, as named beneficiary who had no knowledge of the

existence of the insurance contract, is bound by the three calendar month deadline for
filing a written notice of claim upon the death of the insured.
RULING
No. In this case, since the Platinum 2-in-1 Savings and Insurance account was BPI's
commercial product, offering the insurance coverage for free for every deposit account opened,
Rheozel directly communicated with BPI, the agent of FGU Insurance. BPI not only facilitated
the processing of the deposit account and the collection of necessary documents but also the
necessary endorsement for the prompt approval of the insurance coverage without any other
action on Rheozel's part. Rheozel did not interact with FGU Insurance directly and every
transaction was coursed through BPI.
In Eurotech Industrial Technologies, Inc. v. Cuizon,10 we held that when an agency
relationship is established, the agent acts for the principal insofar as the world is concerned.
Consequently, the acts of the agent on behalf of the principal within the scope of the delegated
authority have the same legal effect and consequence as though the principal had been the one so
acting in the given situation.
BPI, as agent of FGU Insurance, had the primary responsibility to ensure that the 2-in-1
account be reasonably carried out with full disclosure to the parties concerned, particularly the
beneficiaries. Thus, it was incumbent upon BPI to give proper notice of the existence of the
insurance coverage and the stipulation in the insurance contract for filing a claim to Laingo, as
Rheozel's beneficiary, upon the latter's death.
Articles 1884 and 1887 of the Civil Code state:
Art. 1884. The agent is bound by his acceptance to carry out the agency and is liable for the
damages which, through his non-performance, the principal may suffer.
He must also finish the business already begun on the death of the principal, should delay
entail any danger.
Art. 1887. In the execution of the agency, the agent shall act in accordance with the
instructions of the principal.
In default, thereof, he shall do all that a good father of a family would do, as required by
the nature of the business.
The provision is clear that an agent is bound to carry out the agency. The relationship
existing between principal and agent is a fiduciary one, demanding conditions of trust and
confidence. It is the duty of the agent to act in good faith for the advancement of the interests of
the principal. In this case, BPI had the obligation to carry out the agency by informing the
beneficiary, who appeared before BPI to withdraw funds of the insured who was BPI's depositor,
not only of the existence of the insurance contract but also the accompanying terms and
conditions of the insurance policy in order for the beneficiary to be able to properly and timely
claim the benefit.
Upon Rheozel's death, which was properly communicated to BPI by his mother Laingo,
BPI, in turn, should have fulfilled its duty, as agent of FGU Insurance, of advising Laingo that
there was an added benefit of insurance coverage in Rheozel's savings account. An insurance
company has the duty to communicate with the beneficiary upon receipt of notice of the death of
the insured. This notification is how a good father of a family should have acted within the scope
of its business dealings with its clients. BPI is expected not only to provide utmost customer
satisfaction in terms of its own products and services but also to give assurance that its business
concerns with its partner entities are implemented accordingly.
Since BPI, as agent of FGU Insurance, fell short in notifying Laingo of the existence of
the insurance policy, Laingo had no means to ascertain that she was entitled to the insurance
claim. It would be unfair for Laingo to shoulder the burden of loss when BPI was remiss in its
duty to properly notify her that she was a beneficiary.
MAGELLAN AEROSPACE CORPORATION vs. PHILIPPINE AIR FORCE
G.R. No. 216566, February 24, 2016
FACTS
Magellan Aerospace Corp. (MAC) demanded from Chervin the payment of US$264,577.00
representing the balance of the contract price. In a letter to the Trade Commission of the
Canadian Embassy, dated December 21, 2009, PAF confirmed that it had already released to
Chervin the amount of P23,760,000.00, on November 7, 2008, as partial payment for the
overhaul service, and that it withheld the amount of P2,376,000.00 as retention fund.
Notwithstanding the release of funds to Chervin, MAC was not paid for the services
rendered despite several demands. Unpaid, MAC demanded from PAF the release of the retained
amount. In a letter, dated March 3, 2010, however, PAF rejected the demand and informed MAC
that the amount could not be released as it was being held in trust for Chervin.
On July 6, 2010, MAC filed a complaint for sum of money before the RTC against Chervin
together with its Managing Director, Elvi T. Sosing, and the PAF. It prayed that Chervin be
ordered to pay the amount of US$264,577.00, plus 12% legal interest from January 15, 2009
until full payment; that in the event of failure of Chervin to pay the amount claimed, PAF be
ordered to pay the said amount with interest and to release the retained amount of P2,376,000.00
plus attorneys fees and litigation expenses amounting to P500,000.00; and that the defendants
pay the costs of suit. MAC alleged that Chervin merely acted as an agent of PAF.
On August 24, 2010, PAF moved to dismiss the complaint averring that its contract with
Chervin was one for repair and overhaul and not for agency; that it was never privy to any
contract between Chervin and MAC; and that it already paid Chervin on January 22, 2009, and
on July 13, 2010 in full settlement of its obligations.
Chervin also asked the RTC to dismiss the complaint against them asserting that MAC
had no capacity to sue because of its status as a nonresident doing business in the Philippines
without the required license, and that no disclosure was made that it was suing on an isolated
transaction which would mean that the real party-in-interest was not MAC, but NFSI.
RTC granted both motions to dismiss and ordered the dismissal of the complaint filed by
MAC.
CA partly granted MAC's appeal by reversing the RTC order of dismissal of the
complaint against Chervin and Sosing. It, however, affirmed the dismissal of the complaint
against PAF. Explaining that MAC failed to show that PAF had a correlative duty of paying
under the overhauling contract as it was obvious that the contract was executed only between
MAC and Chervin.
ISSUE
Whether the principal Philipping Air Force must comply with all the obligations which its
agent have
RULING
As defendants Chervin's and Sosing's principal, defendant PAF must comply with all the
obligations which its agents, defendants Chervin and Sosing, may have contracted within the
scope of their authority (Article 1910, Civil Code of the Philippines). These obligations include
paying plaintiff in full for the overhaul and repair services performed on defendant PAF's aircraft
engines, which services were commissioned by defendants Chervin and Sosing for and on behalf
of defendant PAF.
Hence, as the principal of defendants Chervin and Sosing, and the beneficiary of
plaintiffs overhaul and repair services, defendant PAF must be made answerable for defendants
Chervin's and Sosing's failure to pay plaintiff. Therefore, as an alternative cause of action in the
event that the First Cause of Action is not and/or cannot be fully satisfied by defendants Chervin
and Sosing, defendant PAF must be held liable for the outstanding amount of Two Hundred
Sixty Four Thousand Five Hundred Seventy Seven US Dollars (US$264,577.00), plus 12% legal
interest thereon from 15 January 2009 until full payment is received.
In this case, the averment that Chervin acted as PAF's mere agents in subsequently
contracting MAC to perform the overhauling services is not an ultimate fact. Nothing can be
found in the complaint that can serve as a premise of PAF's status as the principal in the contract
between Chervin and MAC. No factual circumstances were alleged that could plausibly convince
the Court that PAF was a party to the subsequent outsourcing of the overhauling services. Not
even in the annexes can the Court find any plausible basis for the assertion of MAC on PAF's
status as a principal. Had MAC went beyond barren words and included in the complaint
essential supporting details, though not required to be overly specific, this would have permitted
MAC to substantiate its claims during the trial and survive the Rule 16 challenge. In short,
factual circumstances serving as predicates were not provided, to add to MAC's barren statement
concerning PAF's liability.
IBM PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. PRIME SYSTEMS PLUS, INC.
G.R. No. 203192, August 15, 2016
FACTS
Petitioner entered into an agreement with respondent whereby the former will deliver 45
automated teller machines (ATMs) and several computer hardware to respondent's customers for
the total price of P24,743,610.43. On September 9, 2002, petitioner instituted a Complaint for
sum of money, attorney's fees, costs of litigation with application for the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Attachment against respondent. In the said Complaint, petitioner sought to have
respondent pay the former P45,997,266.22 representing respondent's unpaid obligation with 3%
monthly interest.
In its Answer dated June 17, 2003, respondent denied the allegations in the Complaint
Respondent also alleged that "[it] (had) folly paid for the fifty six (56) ATMs it purchased from
[petitioner] during the period covering December 1997 to February 1998."
RTC ruled ordering respondent to pay the sum of money with interest at 6% per annum
from March 15, 2006 and attorney's fees in the amount of P1,000,000.00.
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC but with modification on the value and omission of
attorneys fees.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner's imposition of 3% monthly interest constitute a written

stipulation under Article 1956 of the Civil Code
RULING
No. It has been a long-standing rule that for interest to become due and demandable, two
requisites must be present: (1) that there must be an express stipulation for the payment of
interest and (2) the agreement to pay interest is reduced in writing.
Here, petitioner insists that there was an express agreement for a 3% monthly interest,
which petitioner placed in writing in its letter dated December 29, 1997. Petitioner's conclusion
that respondent agreed to the 3% monthly interest was based on the following events/evidence.
Court finds that the evidence points to respondent's lack of consent to a 3% monthly
interest. Petitioner adamantly claims that respondent's act of requesting for a lower interest rate
shows the latter's agreement to a 3% monthly interest. In the absence of agreement as to the exact
rate of interest, the C A properly applied the legal rate of 6% annual interest
ROSALIE SY AYSON, vs. FIL-ESTATE PROPERTIES, INC., and FAIRWAYS

AND BLUEWATER RESORT AND COUNTRY CLUB, INC.
G.R. No. 223254. December 1, 2016
FIL-ESTATE PROPERTIES, INC., and FAIRWAYS & BLUEWATER RESORT &

COUNTRY CLUB, INC., vs. ROSALIE SY AYSON,
G.R. No. 223269. December 1, 2016
FACTS
Rosalue Sy Ayson (Ayson) filed a Complaint for recovery of possession and damages
against Fil-Estate and Fairways before the Regional Trial Court, alleging that she is the
registered owner of a 1,000-square meter parcel of land, located in Yapak, Malay, Aklan, i.e.,
the northwestern area of Boracay Island.
Sometime in June 1997, she discovered that Fil-Estate and Fairways illegally entered
into the subject land and included it in the construction of its golf course without her prior
consent and authorization. Despite receipt of a Notice to Cease and Desist from Ayson, Fil-
Estate and Fairways continued their encroachment and development of the subject land making
it a part of the entire golf course.
Fil-Estate and Fairways on defense that the subject land was formerly owned by one
Divina Marte Villanueva (Villanueva), with whom they entered into a Joint Venture
Agreement (JVA) for the development of the Fairways and Bluewater Resort Golf and Country
Club. Fil-Estate and Fairways explained that prior to the JVA, Villanueva sold portions of her
property to various buyers, including Ayson, with the caveat that such portions may be used in
a development project.
Fil-Estate and Fairways commenced construction on the subject land, allegedly relying
in good faith upon Villanueva's assurance that her other former buyers, e.g., Ayson, would
eventually agree with the land swap agreements. According to Fil-Estate and Fairways, Ayson
only signified her objection to the inclusion of the subject land in the development project
when construction was almost finished.
RTC ruled in favor of Ayson.
CA affirmed the decision of RTC in favor of Ayson but with modification on the
amount of damages.
ISSUE
Whether or not Ayson is entitled to Damages
RULING
Yes. Essentially, Fil-Estate and Fairways contend that there is no basis to award moral
damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees to Ayson as they were in good faith in
relying on Villanueva's assurances that Ayson will agree on the land swap arrangement before
they proceeded with the golf course development project. They likewise contend that Ayson
never objected to the construction on the subject land until after the golf course had been
completed.
On the other hand, Ayson disputes the reduction of the amounts of moral damages,
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees awarded to her, justifying the RTC's higher awards as
just, proper, and equitable in light of Fil-Estate's gross and utter bad faith in entering into her
property and making it a part of its golf course without her knowledge and consent. In the same
vein, Ayson assails CA's reduced valuation of the subject land as well as the monthly rent
therefor, maintaining that the RTC correctly took judicial notice of the rapid valuation of
properties in Boracay Island.
The courts a quo further found that since such acts were without Ayson's knowledge and
consent, she, thus: (a) suffered sleepless nights and mental anguish knowing that the property she
and her husband had invested for their future retirement had been utilized by Fil-Estate and
Fairways for their own sake; and (b) had to seek legal remedies to vindicate her rights. Thus,
both lower courts concluded that Fil-Estate and Fairways' acts were done in bad faith and
resulted in injury to Ayson; hence, they are liable for, inter alia, moral damages, exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. WILLY VALLAR, HERACLEO VALLAR, JR.

(a.k.a. ORACLEO VALLAR, JR.) DANNY VALLAR, AND EDGARDO MABELIN,
G.R. No. 196256. December 5, 2016
FACTS
That on or about the 21st day of June 1989, at more or less 7:00 o'clock in the evening, at
San Isidro, Malibud, Gingoog City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one
another, armed with high powered firearms and bladed weapon with which the accused were
conveniently provided, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by means of
violence, with intent of gain and against the consent of the owner, take, steal and carry away cash
money worth Fifteen Thousand (P15,000.00) Pesos belonging to Eugracia Bagabaldo, to the
damage and prejudice of the said owner in the aforementioned sum of P15,000.00, Philippine
currency, and that on the occasion of said robbery, the said accused in pursuance of their
conspiracy, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously with treachery and evident
premeditation, taking advantage of their superior number and strength, treacherously attack
assault, shoot and stab the person of Cipriano Opiso, thereby wounding him on the epigastric
area penetrating abdominal cavity and other parts of his body, and perform all acts of execution
which would have killed said Cipriano Opiso as a consequence thereof, but nevertheless did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused that is because of the timely
and able medical attendance given to Opiso which prevented his death, and also the said accused
in pursuance of their conspiracy, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously with treachery
and evident premeditation, taking advantage of their superior number and strength, treacherously
attack, shoot, assault and violate the person of Eufracio Bagabaldo, without giving Bagabaldo the
chance to defend himself, inflicting upon Bagabaldo gunshot wounds on the left auxiliary region,
left side of the face and other parts of his body resulting to the instantaneous death of Eufracio
Bagabaldo. That the offense was committed with the aggravating circumstances of nighttime,
band, evident premeditation, use of disguise, taking advantage of treachery and superior strength
to facilitate the commission of the crime.
During trial, Opiso claimed that though the other accused wore masks, he was able to
recognize their identity because he had known them personally for twenty years from the time
that they were still students. Omac testified that he clearly saw Willy's face; recognized Danny
based on his stature, voice and mannerism; and was very familiar with the Vallar brothers,
because they were residents of Malibud. Meanwhile, Candelaria Solijon testified that on the day
of the incident, at around six o'clock in the afternoon, she saw the four accused walking together.
For his defense, Willy denied committing the crime and claimed that he was working as a
farmer at the time of the incident. Danny also denied any involvement, explaining that he was
with his family inside their house at that time. Meanwhile, Edgardo testified that during the date
and time of the incident, he was in Cagayan de Oro City busy tending the farmland owned by
one Oscar Ramos.
Oracleo likewise invoked the defenses of denial and alibi, averring that he was at the
Gingoog City Junior College attending his classes, at around 5:30 and 7:30 p.m. on the date of
the incident. He further asserted that after his last class on that day, he accompanied his
girlfriend-classmate to her residence in Recurro, Gingoog City, and even met another classmate
named Cecilia Bitangcor (Bitangcor) on the way. He further alleged that after conducting his
girlfriend to her house, he proceeded to his residence at Lapak, Gingoog City. To corroborate his
story, he presented his teacher Sheila Daapong (Daapong) who claimed that Oracleo attended
both classes and even took the quizzes scheduled at 5:30 to 6:30 and at 6:30 to 7:30 p.m.
Bitangcor also testified that she met Oracleo and his girlfriend at around eight o'clock on the date
of the incident on Motoomull Street, Gingoog City.
RTC found Willy, Danny, Oracleo, and Edgardo guilty of the crime of robbery with
homicide and frustrated homicide attended by the aggravating circumstance of employment of
disguise and commission of the crime by a band. Appellants were sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the offended parties Pedrita in the amounts of P100,000
as moral damages and P50,000 as compensatory damages; and to Opiso the amount of P50,000
for actual expenses and P30,000 for moral damages.
CA affirmed RTCs decision but with modification on the amount of damages to be

awarded.
ISSUE
Whether or not Pedrita and Opiso are entitled to damages
RULING
Yes. In robbery with homicide, civil indemnity and moral damages are awarded
automatically without need of allegation and evidence other than the death of the victim owing to
the crime. The CA was correct in granting these awards, except that for Pedrita, the amount that
should be granted is P100,000 in conformity with prevailing jurisprudence. Opiso, as a victim
who suffered mortal or fatal wounds and could have died if not for timely medical intervention,
is also entitled to civil indemnity and moral damages in the amount of P75,000.
The CA further awarded exemplary damages in view of the two aggravating

circumstances of disguise and abuse of superior strength. We, however, modify the amount that
should be awarded from P25,000 to P100,000 for Pedrita, and P25,000 to P75,000 for Opiso. As
for temperate damages, the CA awarded Pedrita and Opiso temperate damages in the amount of
P25,000 in lieu of actual damages, it having been shown that she suffered some pecuniary losses,
though its amount could not be proven with certainty. In line with prevailing jurisprudence, We
increase Pedrita's award of temperate damages to P50,000.
PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION vs. SPOUSES SOTERO OCTOBRE, JR. and

HENRISSA A. OCTOBRE, and CHINA BANKING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 186976. December 7, 2016
FACTS
On July 22, 1997, respondent Spouses Sotero Octobre, Jr. and Henrissa A. Octobre
(Spouses Octobre) signed a Reservation Agreement with petitioner Pryce Properties Corporation
(Pryce) for the purchase of two lots with a total of 742 square meters located in Puerto Heights
Village, Puerto Heights, Cagayan de Oro City. 1 The parties subsequently executed a Contract to
Sell over the lot for the price of P2,897,510.00 on January 7, 1998.
On February 4, 2004, Pryce issued a certification that Spouses Octobre had fully paid the
purchase price and amortization interests, as well as the transfer fees and other charges in
relation to the property, amounting to a total of P4,292,297.92. But Pryce had yet to deliver the
certificates of title, which prompted Spouses Octobre to formally demand its delivery. Despite
repeated demands, Pryce failed to comply.
On May 18, 2004, Spouses Octobre filed a complaint before the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB), Regional Office No. 10 for specific performance, revocation of
certificate of registration, refund of payments, damages and attorney's fees.
It appears that the reason why Pryce was unable to deliver the titles to Spouses Octobre is
because it had previously transferred custody of the titles, along with others pertaining to the
same development project, to China Banking Corporation (China Bank) as part of the Deed of
Assignment executed on June 27, 1996. Under this deed, Pryce agreed to assign and transfer its
accounts receivables, in the form of contracts to sell, in the Puerto Heights development project
to China Bank as security for the P200 Million credit facility extended by the latter. Pryce
obligated itself to deliver to China Bank the "contracts to sell and the corresponding owner's
duplicate copies of the transfer certificates of title, tax declaration, real estate tax receipts and all
other documents and papers" relating to the assigned receivables until such receivables are paid
or repurchased by Pryce. The titles to the lots purchased by Spouses Octobre were among those
held in custody by China Bank. When Pryce defaulted in its loan obligations to China Bank
sometime in May 2002, China Bank refused to return the titles to Pryce. For this reason, China
Bank was also impleaded in the HLURB complaint.
The HLURB Arbiter rendered a Decision dated March 31, 2005 finding that Spouses
Octobre had no cause of action against China Bank and rescinding the contract between Pryce
and Spouses Octobre. It ordered Pryce to refund the payments made by the spouses with legal
interest and to pay the latter compensatory damages amounting to P30,000.00, attorney's fees
and costs of suit.
On appeal, the HLURB Board of Commissioners modified the Decision by ordering
Pryce to pay the redemption value to China Bank so that the latter may release the titles covering
the lots purchased by Spouses Octobre. In default thereof, Pryce shall refund the payments with
legal interest. The HLURB Board upheld the grant of compensatory damages, attorney's fees and
costs to Spouses Octobre. Pryce moved for reconsideration and to stay the proceedings on
account of Pryce's ongoing corporate rehabilitation.
Thereafter, Pryce appealed the case to the Office of the President, which affirmed in full
the HLURB Board's Decision. Undeterred, Pryce elevated the case to the Court of Appeals
which denied the petition for review and affirmed the Office of the President's Decision. The
Court of Appeals found that Pryce acted in bad faith because it "did not disclose [that the titles
were in the custody of China Bank] to respondents Spouses Octobre until the latter demanded
delivery of the titles." The Court of Appeals held that Pryce's contractual breach justified the
award of compensatory damages as well as the payment of attorney's fees and costs of suit.
Pryce is now before this Court primarily arguing that the Court of Appeals erred in
upholding the award of compensatory damages because Spouses Octobre failed to present
competent proof of the actual amount of loss. It also questions the award of attorney's fees and
litigation costs because there was allegedly no finding of bad faith. Additionally, as side issues,
Pryce questions the Court of Appeals' finding that the stay order had been reversed and its
decision to uphold the finding by the HLURB Board and Office of the President that the subject
properties were mortgaged to China Bank.
In response, Spouses Octobre maintain that the award of compensatory damages,

attorney's fees and costs were proper because they were forced to litigate to enforce their
contractual right as a result of Pryce's breach. With respect to the stay order, Spouses Octobre
cite this Court's February 4, 2008 Decision in G.R. No. 172302 which affirmed the appellate
court's reversal of the stay order. Finally, Spouses Octobre note that the characterization of the
Deed of Assignment as a mortgage came from Pryce's own appeal memorandum filed with the
HLURB Board, and that, in any event, whether it is an assignment or mortgage, the decisive fact
is that the titles were delivered by Pryce to China Bank
It is clear that the amount paid by Spouses Octobre to Pryce as purchase price for the lots
has been adequately proved. There is no dispute that Spouses Octobre are entitled to such
amount with legal interest. The issue being raised by Pryce is only with respect to the P30,000.00
awarded as compensatory damages.
The records of this case are bereft of any evidentiary basis for the award of P30,000.00
as compensatory damages. When the HLURB Arbiter initially awarded the amount, it merely
mentioned that "[Spouses Octobre] are entitled to compensatory damages, which is just and
equitable in the circumstances, even against an obligor in good faith since said damages are the
natural and probable consequences of the contractual breach committed." On the other hand, the
Court of Appeals justified the award of compensatory damages by stating that "it is undisputed
that petitioner Pryce committed breach of contract in failing to deliver the titles to respondents
[Spouses] Octobre which necessitated the award of compensatory damages." In their comment,
Spouses Octobre emphasized that they were "forced to litigate and seek the intervention of the
courts because of Pryce's failure to comply with its contractual and legal obligation" without so
much as mentioning any proof that would tend to prove any pecuniary loss they suffered.
In the absence of adequate proof, compensatory damages should not have been awarded.
Nonetheless, we find that nominal damages, in lieu of compensatory damages, are proper in this
case. Under Article 2221, nominal damages may be awarded in order that the plaintiff's right,
which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not
for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered. Nominal damages are
"recoverable where a legal right is technically violated and must be vindicated against an
invasion that has produced no actual present loss of any kind or where there has been a breach of
contract and no substantial injury or actual damages whatsoever have been or can be shown." So
long as there is a violation of the right of the plaintiff whether based on law, contract, or other
sources of obligations an award of nominal damages is proper. Proof of bad faith is not
required. The HLURB Arbiter and the Court of Appeals appear to have confused nominal
damages with compensatory damages, since their justifications more closely fit the former.
In fine, contractual breach is sufficient to justify an award for nominal damages but not
compensatory damages.
HLURB Board upheld the grant of compensatory damages, attorney's fees and costs to
Spouses Octobre.
Office of the President affirmed the decision of HLURB
Court of Appeals found that Pryce acted in bad faith because it "did not disclose [that the
titles were in the custody of China Bank] to respondents Spouses Octobre until the latter
demanded delivery of the titles." The Court of Appeals held that Pryce's contractual breach
justified the award of compensatory damages as well as the payment of attorney's fees and costs
of suit.
ISSUE
Whether or not the award of compensatory damages to spouses Octobre as well as nominal
damages and exemplary
RULING
Yes. Compensatory Damages the code provides in Article 2199 of the Civil Code defines
actual or compensatory damages:
Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate

compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such
compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.
When Nominal Damages is to be awarded, Under Article 2221. nominal damages may be
awarded in order that the plaintiff's right, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant,
may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any
loss suffered. Nominal damages are "recoverable where a legal right is technically violated and
must be vindicated against an invasion that has produced no actual present loss of any kind or
where there has been a breach of contract and no substantial injury or actual damages whatsoever
have been or can be shown.
It is undisputed that Pryce failed to deliver the titles to the lots subject of the Contract to
Sell even as Spouses Octobre had already fully settled the purchase price. Its inability to deliver
the titles despite repeated demands undoubtedly constitutes a violation of Spouses Octobre's
right under their contract. That Pryce had transferred custody of the titles to China Bank pursuant
to a Deed of Assignment is irrelevant, considering that Spouses Octobre were not privy to such
agreement.
In fine, contractual breach is sufficient to justify an award for nominal damages but not
compensatory damages.
When Pryce questions the award of attorney's fees and costs of suit because no
exemplary damages were awarded. This contention, however, is clearly unmeritorious because
under Article 2208, the award of exemplary damages is just one of 11 instances where attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation are recoverable.
Article 2208 (2) allows the award of attorney's fees when the defendant's act or omission
has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his
interest.
The Court has interpreted that this provision requires a showing of bad faith and not mere
erroneous conviction of the righteousness of a defendant's cause.
In this case, the Court of Appeals found that Pryce acted in bad faith when it did not
disclose to Spouses Octobre the fact that the certificates of title to the properties purchased were
in the custody of China Bank until Spouses Octobre had fully paid the price and had demanded
delivery of the titles. We agree with this finding and therefore sustain the award of attorney's fees
and costs of suit in favor of Spouses Octobre.
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY vs. MANILA SEEDLING BANK FOUNDATION,

INC.
G.R. No. 183543, June 20, 2016
FACTS
Petitioner is the owner of a 120-hectare piece of government property in Diliman,

Quezon City, reserved for the establishment of the National Government Center.
Respondent occupied a total of 16 hectares and leased the excess to private tenants.
President Corazon Aquino issued Memorandum Order No. 127 revoking the reserved status of
the remaining 50 hectares of the 120-hectare property. Petitioner was expressly authorized to
commercialize the area and sell it to the public through bidding. President Fidel Ramos
subsequently issued Executive Order No. 58 on 15 February 1993 creating an inter-agency
executive committee (Executive Committee) composed of petitioner and other government
agencies to oversee the comprehensive development of the remaining 50 hectares, therein
referred to as the North Triangle Property.
Respondent occupied a prime portion of the North Triangle Property, the Executive
Committee proposed the transfer of respondent to areas more suitable to its operations.
On 12 August 1994, respondent filed before the RTC a Complaint for injunction with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioner. Respondent sought
the protection of its occupancy and possession of the property reserved for it under Proclamation
No. 1670. In its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, petitioner prayed that respondent be
ordered to vacate the seven-hectare area and the excess, and to pay rent therefore on top of
exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses.
RTC reserved the determination of the counterclaim of petitioner as to the excess.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration and respondent's motion for partial reconsideration were
both denied in the RTC Order dated 5 June 1998.
RTC validated the turnover of the excess to petitioner, but disallowed the recovery of
rent, exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
CA affirmed the decision of RTC that petitioner is not entitled to the recovery of rent,
exemplary damages damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses.
The appellate court held that the respondent cannot be considered an officious manager
under the principle of negotiorum gestio, as the latter had not established that the excess was
either abandoned or neglected by the petitioner.
Respondent possessed the excess by tolerance of petitioner, a demand to vacate was

necessary to establish the reckoning point for the filing of an unlawful detainer action, as well as
for the recovery of rent and damages.30 In that case, the CA found that the Executive
Committee's proposal for the transfer of respondent was not a demand in contemplation of the
law.31 According to the appellate court, considering that the excess was eventually surrendered
by respondent to petitioner without any demand, there was no basis for the award of rent and
damages in the absence of bad faith.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to recover rent, exemplary damages, attorney's fees,
and litigation expenses from respondent
RULING
No. The court denied petitioner's prayer for the award of exemplary damages.
It is true that respondent was a possessor in bad faith, but there is no evidence that it
acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.
The award of attorney's fees and litigation expenses to petitioner is also improper. It was
not forced to litigate because of the unfounded claims of respondent. Rather, it was the latter that
initiated the instant proceedings by filing the complaint for injunction before the RTC.
Respondent felt that its rights over the seven-hectare area granted under Proclamation No. 1670
were being threatened by petitioner through the proposal for transfer.
LIQUIDATOR
G.R. No. 183794, June 13, 2016
FACTS
the rentals for the remaining period of the Contract were to be paid on a monthly basis.
In addition, in paragraph 24 of the Contract it provides that should the leased premises be
closed, deserted or vacated by the LESSEE, the LESSOR shall have the right to terminate the
lease without the necessity of serving a court order and to immediately repossess the leased
premises.
The LESSOR shall thereupon have the right to enter into a new contract with another
party. All advanced rentals shall be forfeited in favor of the LESSOR.
Barely three years later, however, the BSP placed respondent under the receivership of
the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) by virtue of BSP Monetary Board
refused to comply.
CA sustained the trial court's interpretation of the proviso on the forfeiture of advance
rentals as a penal clause and the consequent application of Article 1229. The appellate court
found that the forfeiture clause in the Contract was intended to prevent respondent from
defaulting on the latter's obligation to finish the term of the lease.
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent is liable for actual and moral damages
RULING
No. Supreme Court affirms the decision of RTC and CA on denying the claim for actual
and moral damages by the parties base on lack of basis.
Court doesnt not find any error in the trial court's denial of the damages and attorney's
fees claimed by petitioners. No proof of the supposed expenses they have incurred for the
improvement of the leased premises and the payment of respondent's unpaid utility bills can be
found in the records. Actual and compensatory damages must be duly proven with a reasonable
degree of certainty.
To recover moral and exemplary damages where there is a breach of contract, the breach
must be palpably wanton, reckless, malicious, in bad faith, oppressive, or abusive. Attorney's
fees are not awarded even if a claimant is compelled to litigate or to incur expenses where no
sufficient showing of bad faith exists. None of these circumstances have been shown in this case.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. HEIRS OF BENEDICTO AND AZUCENA

ALONDAY
G.R. No. 171865, October 12, 2016
FACTS
On September 26, 1974, the Spouses Benedicto and Azucena Alonday (Spouses
Alonday) obtained an agricultural loan of P28,000.00 from the petitioner at its Digos, Davao del
Sur Branch, and secured the obligation by constituting a real estate mortgage on their parcel of
land situated in Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur registered under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
P-3599 of the Registry of Deeds of Davao del Sur.
On June 11, 1980, the Spouses Alonday obtained a commercial loan for P16,700.00 from
the petitioner's Davao City Branch, and constituted a real estate mortgage over their 598 square
meter residential lot situated in Ulas, Davao City.
On August 6, 1984, respondents Mercy and Alberto Alonday, the children of the Spouses
Alonday, demanded the release of the mortgage over the property covered by TCT No. T-66139.
The petitioner informed them, however, that the mortgage could not be released because the
agricultural loan had not yet been fully paid, and that as the consequence of the failure to pay, it
had foreclosed the mortgage over the property covered by OCT No. P-3599 on August 17, 1984.
It appeared that notwithstanding such foreclosure, a deficiency balance of P91,525.22
remained. Hence, the petitioner applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage on the
property. A notice of extra-judicial sale was issued on August 20, 1984, and the property was
sold on September 28, 1984 to the petitioner in the amount of P29,900.00. Since the Alondays
were unable to redeem the property, the petitioner consolidated its ownership. Later on, the
property was sold for P48,000.00 to one Felix Malmis on November 10, 1989.
According to the petitioner, the deed of mortgage relating to the property included an
"all-embracing clause" whereby the mortgage secured not only the commercial loan contracted
with its Davao City Branch but also the earlier agricultural loan contracted with its Digos
Branch.
RTC observed that if the petitioner had intended to have the second mortgage secure the
pre-existing agricultural loan, it should have made an express reservation to that effect; that
based on the all-embracing clause, the mortgage was a contract of adhesion, and the ambiguities
therein should be construed strictly against the petitioner; that the last sentence of the all-
embracing clause provided that the mortgage would be null and void upon the payment of the
obligations secured by the mortgage; and that the petitioner was guilty of bad faith in refusing to
nullify the mortgage despite full payment of the commercial loan prior to its maturity.
CA affirmed the RTC, observing that the mortgage, being a contract of adhesion, should
be construed strictly against the petitioner as the patty who had drafted the same
ISSUE
Whether or not the mortgage contracts executed by spouses Alonday were contracts of
adhesion exclusively prep red by the petitioner
RULING
Yes. We concur with the CA and the RTC in their holding that the mortgage contracts
executed by the Spouses Alonday were contracts of adhesion exclusively prep red by the
petitioner.
Under Article 1306 of the Civil Code, the contracting parties "may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy." This is an express
recognition by the law of the right of the people to enter into all manner of lawful conventions as
part of their safeguarded liberties.
There is no question, indeed, that all-embracing or dragnet clauses have been recognized
as valid means to secure debts of both future and past origins. Even so, we have likewise
emphasized that such clauses were an exceptional mode of securing obligations, and have held
that obligations could only be deemed secured by the mortgage if they came fairly within the
terms of the mortgage contract. For the all-embracing or dragnet clauses to secure future loans,
therefore, such loans must be sufficiently described in the mortgage contract. If the requirement
could be imposed on a future loan that was uncertain to materialize, there is a greater reason that
it should be applicable to a past loan, which is already subsisting and known to the parties.
Nonetheless, it was undeniable that the petitioner had the opportunity to include some
form of acknowledgement of the previously subsisting agricultural loan in the terms of the
second mortgage contract The mere fact that the mortgage constituted on the property made no
mention of the pre-existing loan could only strongly indicate that each of the loans of the
Spouses Alonday had been treated separately by the parties themselves, and this sufficiently
explained why the loans had been secured by different mortgages.
Another indication that the second mortgage did not extend to the agricultural loan was
the fact that the second mortgage was entered into in connection only with the commercial loan.
ROSITA B. LIM, ON HER BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF HER (THEN) MINOR

CHILDREN NAMELY, JENNIFER, LYSANDER AND BEVERLIE, vs .LUIS TAN,
ALFONSO TAN, EUSEBIO TAN, WILLIAM TAN, VICENTE TAN, JOAQUIN TAN,
ANG TIAT CHUAN,
G.R. No. 177250, November 28, 2016
FACTS
This case spawned from the death of Florentino Lim (Florentino), a scion of the wealthy
Lim Ket Kai family of Cagayan de Oro City, on August 25, 1973. Upon investigation, Luis Tan
(Luis), William Tan, Joaquin Tan, Vicente Tan, Alfonso Tan and Eusebio Tan (the Tan
brothers), and Ang Tiat Chuan (Chuan), together with eight others, were charged with murder
before Military Commission No. 1.5
In a Decision dated June 10, 1976, the Military Commission found Luis, Chuan, and four
of their co-accused, namely, Mariano Velez, Jr., Antonio Ocasiones, Leopoldo Nicolas, and
Marciano Benemerito, guilty of murder. On the other hand, the other brothers of Luis were
acquitted of the charges and were released on June 11, 1976.6
The said judgment, however, simply concluded the criminal prosecution of those already
haled to court but it did not entomb the indignant feelings instigated by the death of Florentino.
Thus, on February 11, 1983, Rosita B. Lim (Rosita), wife of the deceased Florentino, together
with her then minor children Jennifer, Lysander and Beverlie, all surnamed Lim Ket Kai
(collectively, the petitioners), commenced a civil action for damages in the RTC of Manila,
against all those charged with the slaying of Florentino.
RTC ruled in favor of petitioners ordering the surviving Defendants and the heirs and
successors-in-interest of the deceased Defendants, who have been substituted in their place as
Defendants, to pay to the petitioners, jointly and severally, actual and compensatory, moral,
exemplary and attorneys fees and litigation expenses.
CA modified amount of the damages stated and replaced actual and compensatory
damages with civil indemnity and temperate damages.
ISSUE
Whether or not it is proper to award compensatory, moral, exemplary and attorneys fees
and litigation expenses
RULING
Yes. In the case at bar, the challenge essentially posed is the propriety of the
awarded damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses. To resolve said issue, an
examination of factual circumstances would be necessary, a task that is clearly outside the
province of a petition for review on certiorari. Nevertheless, this case has been dragged
down for ages and the Court would like to put the whole matter to rest; hence, a review is
justified by the need to make a definitive finding on this factual issue in light of the differing
amounts of damages and attorney's fees awarded by the courts below.
After a careful examination of the present case, the Court sustains the awarded
damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses of the appellate court, but modifies the
amount of the civil indemnity awarded to the heirs of Florentino.
"[I]t is jurisprudentially settled that when death occurs due to a crime, the following
may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or
compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees
and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper case."
In imposing the proper amount of damages, the principal consideration is the

penalty provided by law or imposable for the offense because of its heinousness and not
the public penalty actually imposed on the offender. Essentially, despite the fact that the
death penalty cannot be imposed because of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346,14 the imposable
penalty as provided by law for the crime, such as those found in R.A. No. 7569,15 must be
used as the basis for awarding damages and not the actual penalty imposed.
Here, the Court sustains the award of civil indemnity but increases its amount to
P100,000.00 in accordance with recent jurisprudence. "In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity
is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary restitution or compensation to the
victim for the damage or infraction that was done to the latter by the accused, which in a
sense only covers the civil aspect. Thus, in a crime where a person dies, in addition to the
penalty of imprisonment imposed to the offender, the accused is also ordered to pay the
victim a sum of money as restitution."
According to Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages, which are more
than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds
that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the
case, be proved with certainty. Her, there is no doubt that pecuniary expenses were
incurred in the funeral and burial of Florentino and the award of temperate damages shall
answer for the same in the amount of P350,000.00, in consideration to the social status and
reputation of the victim.
MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY vs. RICHARD E.

UNCHUAN
G.R. No. 182537, June 01, 2016
FACTS
Respondent Richard Unchuan (Unchuan) filed a complaint for Partial Declaration of

Nullity of the Deed of Absolute Sale with Plea for Partition, Damages and Attorney's Fees before
the RTC against MCIAA. Unchuan later filed an Amended Complaint for Declaration of Nullity
of Deed of Absolute Sale, Quieting of Title and/or Payment of Just Compensation, Rental and
Damages and Attorney's Fees and hat he was the legal and rightful owner of Lot No. 4810-A,
with an area of 177,176 square meters, and Lot No. 4810-B, with an area of 2,740 square meters,
both located in Barrio Buaya, Lapu-Lapu City, and that the title was registered under the names
of the heirs of Eugenio Godinez, and that he bought the two lots from the surviving heirs of the
registered owners through several deeds of absolute sale, all dated December 7, 1998.
Respondent Unchuan further alleged that he came to know that Atanacio Godinez
(Atanacio), the supposed attorney-in-fact of all the registered owners and their heirs, already sold
both lots to Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), the predecessor of MCIAA and that the
sale covered by the Deed of Absolute Sale, dated April 3, 1958, was null and void because the
registered owners and their heirs did not authorize Atanacio to sell their undivided shares in the
subject lots in favor of CAA as well as no actual consideration was paid to the said registered
owners or their heirs, despite promises that they would be paid; that the deed of absolute sale did
not bear the signature of the CAA representative; that there was no proof that the Secretary of the
Department of Public Works and Highways approved the sale; and that his predecessors-in-
interest merely tolerated the possession by CAA and, later, by MCIAA.
MCIAA filed its answer averring that Anastacio acting as representative of heirs of
Eugenio Godinez who were the registered owners of the lots. Thereafter, CAA took possession
of the said property upon payment of the purchase price. To corroborate the said transaction,
Atanacio, along with other former registered co-owners, signed a deed of partition in favor of the
government and admitted its absolute right over the same and since then the lots had been in the
possession of the Republic and the said real properties were declared by the Republic for
taxation purposes.
RTC ruled in favor of Unchuan, that the deed of sale signed by Anastacio in favor of
Defendants predecessor-in interest VOID and that there was no valid consideration for the
alleged conveyance, Atanacio lacked the authority to alienate the undivided shares of his co-heirs
to CAA, MCIAA's predecessor-in-interest and the lack of signature of the CAA Administrator
was indicative of the lack of consent from him to purchase the lots.
CA affirmed the decision of RTC.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Anastacio is valid
RULING
Yes. The transaction entered into by Atanacio and CAA, however, was not entirely void
because the lack of consent by the other co-owners in the sale was with respect to their shares
only. Article 493 of the New Civil Code expressly provides:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the
effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the
portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
The quoted provision recognizes the absolute right of a co-owner to freely dispose of
his pro indiviso share as well as the fruits and other benefits arising from that share,
independently of the other co-owners. The sale of the subject lots affects only the seller's
share pro indiviso, and the transferee gets only what corresponds to his grantor's share in the
partition of the property owned in common. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided
share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is
not null and void; only the rights of the co-owner/seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer
a co-owner of the property.
In the case at bench, although the sale transaction insofar as the other heirs of the
registered owners was void, the sale insofar as the extent of Atanacio's interest is concerned,
remains valid. Atanacio was one of the registered co-owners of the subject lots, but he was not
clothed with authority to transact for the other co-owners. By signing the deed of sale with the
CAA, Atanacio effectively sold his undivided share in the lots in question. Thus, CAA became a
co-owner of the undivided subject lots. Accordingly, Atanacio's heirs could no longer alienate
anything in favor of Unchuan because he already conveyed his pro indiviso share to CAA.
The Court does not accept either Unchuan's allegation that no payment was received for
the transaction between Atanacio and CAA. Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court identifies
the following as disputable presumptions: (1) private transactions have been fair and regular; (2)
the ordinary course of business has been followed; and (3) there was sufficient consideration for
a contract. A presumption may operate against a challenger who has not presented any proof to
rebut it. "The effect of a legal presumption upon a burden of proof is to create the necessity of
presenting evidence to meet the legal presumption or the prima facie case created thereby, and
which, if no proof to the contrary is presented and offered, will prevail. The burden of proof
remains where it is, but by the presumption, the one who has that burden is relieved for the time
being from introducing evidence in support of the averment, because the presumption stands in
the place of evidence unless rebutted."57 Atanacio, by affixing his signature on the deed of
absolute sale, a disputable presumption arose that consideration was paid. A mere allegation that
no payment was received is not sufficient to dispel such legal presumption. Furthermore, the
record shows an official communication, dated October 8, 1958, from the District Land Office of
Cebu to the Provincial Treasurer of Cebu stating that Provincial Voucher No. 05358 was
disbursed in favor of Atanacio.
WILLIAM ENRIQUEZ AND NELIA-VELA ENRIQUEZ, vs. ISAROG LINE TRANSPORT, INC.
AND VICTOR SEDENIO
G.R. No. 212008, November 16, 2016
FACTS
Sonny Enriquez was a passenger of a bus owned and operated by respondent Isarog Line
Express Transport, Inc. (Isarog Line) driven by Victor Sedenio on July 7, 1998. While traversing
the diversion road at Pagbilao, Quezon, said bus collided with another bus owned by Philtranco
Service Enterprises, Inc. (Philtranco) which was being driven by Primitivo Aya-ay. As a result
of the impact between the two (2) buses, several passengers died, including Sonny, who was
twenty-six (26) years old at that time.
Sonny's parents, petitioners William Enriquez and Nelia Vela-Enriquez (the Spouses
Enriquez), filed a complaint for damages against Isarog Line and Philtranco as well as their
drivers before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Libmanan, Camarines Sur.
RTC rendered a Decision finding Isarog Line, Sedenio, Philtranco, and Aya-ay solidarity
liable for Sonny's death, stating that plaintiffs, William Enriquez and Nelia Vela-Enriquez, and
against defendants Isarog Line Express Transport, Inc., Victor Sedenio, Philtranco Service
Enterprises, Inc., and Primitivo Aya-ay. Said defendants are hereby declared SOLIDARILY
liable to the plaintiffs.
CA affirmed RTC with modifications that the monetary award in the amount of
P1,038,960.00 by way of unrealized income is DELETED; and that Appellant is ordered to pay
Appellees the amount of P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Spouses Enriquez are entitled to the amount of P1,038,960.00 as
damages for their son's loss of earning capacity.
RULING
Yes. Under Article 2206 of the Civil Code, the heirs of the victim are entitled to
indemnity for loss of earning capacity.
Article 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict
shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating
circumstances.
In addition:
The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the
indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be
assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical
disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;
xxx
Compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of earnings, but for loss of
capacity to earn. The indemnification for loss of earning capacity partakes of the nature of
actual damages which must be duly proven by competent proof and the best obtainable
evidence thereof. Thus, as a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to
substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity. By way of exception,
damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence of documentary
evidence when (1) the deceased was self-employed and earning less than the minimum
wage under current labor laws, in which case, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that
in the deceased's line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased
was employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the 'minimum wage under current
labor laws.

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1 |Civil Law Review 2 Case Digest

ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

In Partial fulfillment of the requirements in

CIVIL LAW REVIEW II

PROF. ATTY. CRISOSTOMO URIBE

ALVAREZ, CARLO JAY F.

PART ONE: Obligations and Contracts

G.R. No. 183794, June 13, 2016

G.R. No. 183794, June 13, 2016

PART TWO: SALES

G.R. No. 191079, March 02, 2016

ROSARIO VICTORIA AND ELMA PIDLAOAN vs. NORMITA JACOB

G.R. No. 198752, January 13, 2016

PART THREE: PARTNERSHIP, AGENCY AND & TRUST

G.R. No. 205206, March 16, 2016

PART FOUR: CREDITS TRANSACTION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. WILLY VALLAR, HERACLEO

PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION vs. SPOUSES SOTERO

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, vs. HEIRS OF BENEDICTO AND

G.R. No. 171865, October 12, 2016

G.R. No. 177250, November 28, 2016

G.R. No. 182537, June 01, 2016

G.R. No. 176986, January 13, 2016

RTC ruled in favor of LMI. CA affirmed the decision of RTC.

May a contract be rescinded extrajudicially despite the absence of a special contractual

Tomas P. Tan vs. Jose G. Hosana

G.R. No. 190846, February 3, 2016

The respondent Jose G. Hosana (Jose) married Milagros C. Hosana (Milagros) on

On October 19, 2001, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale/Cancellation of

G.R. No. 183794, June 13, 2016

Whether or not respondent may be released from its contractual obligations to

G.R. No. 183794, June 13, 2016

UCPB GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. vs. HUGHES ELECTRONICS CORPORATION

G.R. No. 190385, November 16, 2016

On 30 September 1998, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) issued

RTC rendered its decision in favor of Hughes Electronics.

CA affirms the decision of the RTC.

Whether or not the arbitration clause in a contract is a condition precedent to be complied

RAMON PACON, THROUGH HIS WIFE FELINA PACON, ANTONIO PACON,

G.R. No. 185365, March 02, 2016

FLORANTE VITUG vs. EVANGELINE A. ABUDA

G.R. No. 201264, January 11, 2016

The National Housing Authority's restrictions were provisions in a contract it executed

ROSALINA CARODAN, PETITIONER, VS. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION,

G.R. No. 210542, February 24, 2016

Yes. An accommodation mortgage is not necessarily void simply because the

HELEN B. LUKBAN vs. OPTIMUM DEVELOPMENT BANK

January 20, 2016 G.R. No. 205785

CA ruled in favor of Atienza reversing the decision of the RTC.

Whether or not there was a valid notice of auction sales

Section 260. Advertisement and Sale. - x x x.

Clearly, only the registered owner is entitled to the Notice of Sale.

G.R. No. 160408, January 11, 2016

Whether or not there was valid Deed of Sale.

G.R. No. 172919, January 13, 2016

CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC.

Whether or not theres a valid Deed of Sale

G.R. No. 202223, March 02, 2016

JOEL CARDENAS, HEIR OF THE LATE ELINAIDA L. ALCANTARA,

G.R. No. 191079, March 02, 2016

On 8 November 2000, Elinaida L. Alcantara (Alcantara) obtained a loan from the

ROSARIO VICTORIA AND ELMA PIDLAOAN vs. NORMITA JACOB PIDLAOAN,

MELECIO DOMINGO, vs. SPOUSES GENARO MOLINA and ELENA B. MOLINA,

G.R. No. 200274, April 20, 2016