COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
discretion on the part of the CA.
Section 1
Cayetano v. Monsod 201 SCRA 210
FACTS:
Christian Monsod was nominated by President
Aquino as Chairman of the COMELEC.
The Commission on Appointments confirmed
the appointment despite Cayetanos objection,
based on alleged lack of the required
qualification of 10 years of law practice.
Cayetano filed this certiorari and prohibition.
ISSUE: Whether Monsod has been engaged in
the practice of law for 10 years?
HELD: YES. The practice of law is not limited to
the conduct of cases or litigation in court. It
embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such action
and proceedings on behalf of clients, and other
works where the work done involves the
determination of trained legal mind of the legal
effect of facts and conditions. Monsod passed
the bar in 1960, worked with the World Bank
Group from 1963-1970, then worked for an
investment bank until 1986, became member
of Constitutional Commission in 1986, and also
became a member of the Davide Commission
in 1990, can be considered to have been
engaged in the practice of law as lawyer-
economist, lawyer-manager, and lawyer-
entrepreneur.
ISSUE: Whether the Commission on
Appointments (CA) committed grave abuse of
discretion in confirming Monsods appointment?
HELD: NO. The power of the CA to give
consent to the nomination of the COMELEC
Chairman by the president is mandated by the
constitution. The power of appointment is
essentially within the discretion of whom it is
so vested subject to the condition that the
appointee should possess the qualification
required by law. From the evidence, there is no
occasion for the SC to exercise its corrective
power since there is no such grave abuse of
Brillantes v Yorac 192 SCRA 358
FACTS: Associate Commissioner Haydee Yorac
was appointed by President Aquino as Acting
Chairman of the COMELEC, in place of
Chairman Hilario Davide, who had been named
chairman of the fact finding commission to
investigate the December 1989 coup d'etat
attempt.
ISSUE: Whether the appointment is
unconstitutional.
HELD: NO. Sec 1 (2) Art IX-C provides that
xxx In no case shall any Member [COMELEC]
be appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity
Lindo vs Comelec
FACTS: Petitioner Conrado Lindo and private
respondent Octavio Velasco were candidates
for the position of municipal mayor of Ternate,
Cavite, in the January 1988 local elections.
After canvass, the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Ternate proclaimed petitioner
Lindo as elected mayor. On March 22, 1988
Velasco filed an election protest with the RTC
of Trece Martires City protesting the results of
the election in seventeen (17) of the twenty
two (22) precincts in the municipality. After
hearing of testimonies, the trial court issued an
order excluding the balots from these precincts
from there vision. Velaso filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order which was denied
on December 9, 1988. On appeal by Velasco,
the COMELEC en banc, set aside the order of
the trial court where it likewise directed the
trial court to proceed with the revision of the
ballots from the four controverted precincts. A
petition for certiorari was later filed by Lindo
impugning the order of the COMELEC and was
dismissed and affirmed the decision of the
COMELEC. On February 6, 1990, the trial court
rendered a decision proclaiming Lindo the
winner with a plurality of twenty nine (29)
votes. On February 12, 1990, counsel for
Lindo, Atty. Montajo, was served a copy of the
decision while attending the hearing of another
case. Velasco's counsel was also served a copy
of the decision by mail which he received on
February 16, 1990.Velasco filed a Notice of
Appeal to the COMELEC on February 17, 1990.
He argued that the winner in an election
protest case should be determined not only on
the basis of the results obtained from the
contested precincts but from the results of
both the contested and uncontested precincts.
Lindo filed a Notice of Appeal on February 26,
1990, claiming that he knew of the decision
only on February 22, 1990.The trial court gave
due course to the appeal of Velasco and denied
due course to Lindo's appeal on the ground
that it was filed out of time. A month after the
trial court denied due course to his notice of
appeal, Lindo filed a motion with the COMELEC
praying that respondent trial court's order
denying due course to his notice of appeal be
set aside. Velasco's appeal and Lindo's motion
were consolidated. On June 6, 1990,after
hearing the arguments of the parties,
COMELEC (First Division) rendered a decision
in favor of Octavio Velasco and declared
that he is the duly elected mayor.
Lindo moved for reconsideration. COMELEC en
banc promulgated a resolution affirming in toto
the decision of the COMELEC (First Division).
Lindo filed this petition for certiorari with a
prayer for temporary restraining order.
ISSUE:1. Whether the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in disregarding its
own Rule 32, Sec.3 and Rule 35, Sec. 20 and
22; and
2. Whether petioner was effectively denied due
process when his notice of appeal was
consideredfiled out of time and therefore
has lost his standing to question a decision
which, as to him, had become final and beyond
the remedy of appeal notwithstanding that,
the petitioner has filed his notice of appeal
even before any promulgation was ever
made as required by the COMELEC rules.
HELD: Rule 35, Sec 20 (Promulgation and
Finality of Decision), promulgation is the
process by which a decision is published,
officially announced, made known to the public
or delivered to the clerk of court for filing,
coupled with notice to the parties of their
counsel. It petitioner's contention that the act
of merely furnishing the parties with a copy of
the decision violated the COMELEC rules and
did not constitute a valid promulgation, hence
the five (5) day period within which the
decision should be appealed to the COMELEC
did not commence to run is untenable. What
was wanting and what the petitioner
apparently objected to was not the
promulgation of the decision but the failure of
the trial court to serve notice in advance of the
promulgation of the decision as required by the
COMELEC rules. A mere procedural lapse does
not make the proceedings null and void. The
COMELEC did not abuse its discretion when it
affirmed the order of the trial court denying
due course to petitioner's notice of appeal.
Section 2
Gallardo v Judge Tabamo 218 SCRA 253
FACTS: Cong. Pedro P. Romualdo and Gov.
Antonio R. Gallardo were both candidates in
the May 11, 1992 elections for the positions of
congressmen and governor, respectively, of
Camiguin. They belonged to opposing political
factions and were in a bitter electoral battle.
On April 10, 1992 or about a month before the
elections, Cong. Romualdo filed a petition
docketed as Special Civil Action No. 465 before
the RTC of Camiguin (Br. 28) presided over by
respondent Judge Tabamo against Gov.
Gallardo, the Provincial Treasurer, the
Provincial Auditor, the Provincial Engineer,and
the Provincial Budget Officer as respondents.
In this petition Cong. Romualdo sought to
prohibit and restrain the respondents from
undertaking and/or pursuing certain
public works projects and from
disbursing, releasing, and/or spending public
funds for said projects, allegedly because,
among other reasons, said projects were
undertaken in violation of the 45-day ban on
public works imposed by the Omnibus Election
Code (B.P. Blg. 881). On the same day, Judge
Tabamo issued a temporary restraining order
and required the petitioner to answer the
petition within 10 days from receipt. The
petitioner received the copy of the restraining
order, (being a lawyer) saw that it is not within
the jurisdiction of the RTC. Hence this instant
case, questioning the issuance of the
temporary restraining order and the jurisdiction
of the court over Special Civil Action No. 465.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over
cases involving violations of the Omnibus
Election Code?
HELD: No. The COMELEC is vested by the
Constitution (Art IX-C, Sec 2(2)) with the
exclusive [original jurisdiction] charge of the
enforcement of all laws relative to the conduct
of elections, the assumption of jurisdiction by
the trial court over a case involving the
enforcement of the Election Code.
Relampagos v Cumba 243 SCRA 690
FACTS: A special civil action under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court (grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction)
revives the issue of whether the Commission
on Election (COMELEC) has jurisdiction over
petitions for, certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus in election cases where it has
exclusive appellate jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Does the COMELEC have jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto or habeas corpus?
HELD: Yes it does, but only in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction over election protest
cases involving elective municipal officials
decided by courts of general jurisdiction, as
provided for in Article IX(C),Section 2 of the
1987 Constitution. It has concurrent
jurisdiction with that of the Supreme Court.
Edding v COMELEC 246 SCRA 502
FACTS: During the May 1992 elections,
petitioner Edding and private respondent
Bernardo were among the candidates for the
office of municipal mayor of Sibuco Zamboanga
del Norte. After the canvassing of the election
returns, Bernardo was declared winner over
Edding by 212 votes. Unconvinced and alleging
massive election fraud, Edding filed an election
protest with the RTC. The RTC rendered
judgment proclaiming Edding as the winner of
the election. Bernardo filed a Notice of Appeal
while Edding moved for the immediate
execution of the decision. RTC granted both
the Notice of Appeal and Motion for Immediate
Execution. Edding assumed office while
Bernardo filed with the COMELEC a petition for
certiorari with application for preliminary
injunctions and for the issuance of TRO. The
petition were granted hence this petition
before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC have jurisdiction
to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quowarranto or habeas corpus?
HELD: Yes the COMELEC has the authority to
issue the extraordinary writs but only in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction over election protest
cases involving elective municipal officials
decided by courts of general jurisdiction, as
provided for in Article IX(C), Section 2 of the
1987 Constitution. It has concurrent
jurisdiction with that of the Supreme Court.
Arroyo v. DOJ, et al. (2013)
G.R. No. 199082 : July 23, 2013
JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO, Petitioner,v.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS; HON. LEILA DE LIMA, in her
capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Justice; HON. SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., in his
capacity as Chairperson of the Commission on
Elections; and the JOINT DOJ-COMELEC
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE
and FACT-FINDING TEAM, Respondents.
FACTS: On August 15, 2011, the Comelec and
the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011
creating and constituting a Joint Committee
and Fact-Finding Team (referred to as Joint
Panel) on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections
electoral fraud and manipulation cases.
In its Initial Report, the Fact-Finding Team
concluded that manipulation of the results in
the May 14, 2007 senatorial elections in the
provinces of North and South Cotabato, and
Maguindanao was indeed perpetrated. The
Fact-Finding Team recommended, among
others, that petitioner Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr.
(Abalos) be subjected to preliminary
investigation for electoral sabotage for
conspiring to manipulate the election results in
North and South Cotabato; that GMA and
Abalos be subjected to another preliminary
investigation for manipulating the election
results in Maguindanao; and, that Mike Arroyo
be subjected to further investigation. The case
was docketed as DOJ-Comelec Case No. 001-
2011.
Senator Pimentel filed a Complaint Affidavit for
Electoral Sabotage against petitioners and
twelve others, and several John Does and Jane
Does. The case was docketed as DOJ-Comelec
Case No. 002-2011. Thereafter, petitioners
filed before the Court separate Petitions for
Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
assailing the creation of the Joint Panel.
The Joint Committee promulgated a Joint
Resolution which was later indorsed to the
Comelec. The Comelec en banc issued a
Resolution approving and adopting the Joint
Resolution subject to modifications. The
Comelec resolved, among others, that an
information for electoral sabotage be filed
against GMA and Abalos, while the charges
against Mike Arroyo be dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence.
The RTC issued a Warrant for GMAs arrest
which was duly served. GMA was later
arraigned and she entered a plea of "not
guilty." She was, for some time, on hospital
arrest but was able to obtain temporary liberty
when her motion for bail was granted. At
present, she is again on hospital arrest by
virtue of a warrant issued in another criminal
case.
The Court denied the petitions and
supplemental petitions of herein petitioners.
Hence, this motion for reconsideration. Mike
Arroyo reiterates his arguments on the
independence of the Comelec as basis in
nullifying the subject joint DOJ-Comelec
resolutions. Mike Arroyo also maintains that
the DOJ should conduct preliminary
investigation only when deputized by the
Comelec but not exercise concurrent
jurisdiction. Finally, as has been repeatedly
pointed out in his earlier pleadings before the
Court, Mike Arroyo claims that the proceedings
involving the electoral sabotage case were
rushed because of pressures from the
executive branch of the government.
ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of Joint
Panel is valid
HELD: Yes.
Political Law- Power of the COMELEC to
investigate and prosecute cases
This is not the first time that the Court is
confronted with the issue of whether the
Comelec has the exclusive power to investigate
and prosecute cases of violations of election
laws. In Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency (BANAT)
Party-List v. Commission on Elections, the
constitutionality of Section 43 of RA 9369 had
already been raised by petitioners therein and
addressed by the Court. While recognizing the
Comelecs exclusive power to investigate and
prosecute cases under Batas Pambansa Bilang
881 or the Omnibus Election Code, the Court
pointed out that the framers of the 1987
Constitution did not have such intention. This
exclusivity is thus a legislative enactment that
can very well be amended by Section 43 of RA
9369. Therefore, under the present law, the
Comelec and other prosecuting arms of the
government, such as the DOJ, now exercise
concurrent jurisdiction in the investigation and
prosecution of election offenses.
Indeed, as aptly pointed out by GMA, there is a
discrepancy between Comelec Resolution No.
3467 dated January 12, 2001 and Joint Order
No. 001-2011, dated August 15, 2011, creating
and constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-
Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National
Elections electoral fraud and manipulation
cases. However, GMA seemed to miss the date
when these two resolutions were promulgated
by the Comelec.
It is noteworthy that Comelec Resolution No.
3467 was issued when Section 265 of the
Omnibus Election Code was still effective, while
Joint Order No. 001-2011 as well as Comelec
Resolution Nos. 8733and 9057mentioned in the
assailed decision but missed out by GMA in her
motion, were issued during the effectivity of
Section 43 of RA 9369, giving the Comelec and
other prosecuting arms of the government the
concurrent jurisdiction to investigate and
prosecute election offenses. This amendment
paved the way for the discrepancy.
In Comelec Resolution No. 3467, the Comelec
maintained the continuing deputation of
prosecutors and the Comelec Law Department
was tasked to supervise the investigatory and
prosecutory functions of the task force
pursuant to the mandate of the Omnibus
Election Code. However, with the amendment,
the Comelec likewise changed the tenor of the
later resolutions to reflect the new mandate of
the Comelec and other prosecuting arms of the
government now exercising concurrent
jurisdiction. Thus, the Comelec Law
Department and the Office of the Chief State
Prosecutor of the DOJ were tasked to jointly
supervise the investigatory and prosecutory
functions of the Comelec-DOJ Task Force.
Notwithstanding the grant of concurrent
jurisdiction, the Comelec and the DOJ
nevertheless included a provision in the
assailed Joint Order whereby the resolutions of
the Joint Committee finding probable cause for
election offenses shall still be approved by the
Comelec in accordance with the Comelec Rules
of Procedure. With more reason, therefore,
that we cannot consider the creation of the
Joint Committee as an abdication of the
Comelecs independence enshrined in the 1987
Constitution.
Motion for Reconsideration DENIED.
Salic Dumarpa vs. Comelec April 2, 2013
G.R. No. 192249 : April 2, 2013
FACTS: Dumarpa was a congressional
candidate for the 1st District of Lanao del Sur
at the 10 May 2010 elections. The COMELEC
declared a total failure of elections in seven (7)
municipalities, including the three (3)
Municipalities of Masiu, Lumba Bayabao and
Kapai, which are situated in the 1st
Congressional District of Province of Lanao del
Sur. The conduct of special elections in the
seven (7) Lanao del Sur municipalities was
originally scheduled for 29 May 2010.
On 25 May 2010, COMELEC issued Resolution
No. 8946, resetting the special elections to 3
June 2010. Subsequently, COMELEC issued the
herein assailed resolution which provided,
among others, the constitution of Special Board
of Election Inspectors (SBEI) in Section 4 and
Clustering of Precincts in Section 12.
Dumarpa filed a Motion for Reconsideration
concerning only Sections 4 and 12 thereof as it
may apply to the Municipality of Masiu, Lanao
del Sur. The COMELEC did not act on
Dumarpas motion.
A day before the scheduled special elections,
on 2 June 2010, Dumarpa filed the instant
petition alleging that "both provisions on Re-
clustering of Precincts (Section 12) and
constitution of SBEIs [Special Board of Election
Inspectors] (Section 4) affect the Municipality
of Masiu, Lanao del Sur, and will definitely
doom petitioner to certain defeat, if its
implementation is not restrained or prohibited
by the Honorable Supreme Court."
Parenthetically, at the time of the filing of this
petition, Dumarpa was leading by a slim
margin over his opponent Hussin
Pangandaman in the canvassed votes for the
areas which are part of the 1st Congressional
District of Lanao del Sur where there was no
failure of elections.
A temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction was not issued. Thus,
the special elections on 3 June 2010 proceeded
as scheduled.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition has
become moot and academic
HELD: Yes.
Political law- COMELEC's power to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election
COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution, in the
exercise of its plenary powers in the conduct of
elections enshrined in the Constitution and
statute. Thus, it brooks no argument that the
COMELEC's broad power to "enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum and recall, carries with it all
necessary and incidental powers for it to
achieve the objective of holding free, orderly,
honest, peaceful and credible elections.
The Commission on Elections, by constitutional
mandate, must do everything in its power to
secure a fair and honest canvass of the votes
cast in the elections. In the performance of its
duties, the Commission must be given a
considerable latitude in adopting means and
methods that will insure the accomplishment of
the great objective for which it was created -
to promote free, orderly, and honest elections.
The choice of means taken by the Commission
on Elections, unless they are clearly illegal or
constitute grave abuse of discretion, should not
be interfered with.
Dumarpas objections conveniently fail to take
into account that COMELEC Resolution No.
8965, containing the assailed provisions on re-
clustering of the precincts and the designation
of special board of election inspectors, was
issued precisely because of the total failure of
elections in seven (7) Municipalities in the
Province of Lanao del Sur, a total of fifteen
(15) Municipalities where there was a failure of
elections. Notably, the COMELEC's declaration
of a failure of elections is not being questioned
by Dumarpa. In fact, he confines his objections
on the re-clustering of precincts, and only as
regards the Municipality of Masiu.
Plainly, it is precisely to prevent another
occurrence of a failure of elections in the
fifteen (15) municipalities in the province of
Lanao del Sur that the COMELEC issued the
assailed Resolution No. 8965. The COMELEC,
through its deputized officials in the field, is in
the best position to assess the actual condition
prevailing in that area and to make judgment
calls based thereon. Too often, COMELEC has
to make snap judgments to meet unforeseen
circumstances that threaten to subvert the will
of our voters. In the process, the actions of
COMELEC may not be impeccable, indeed, may
even be debatable. We cannot, however,
engage in an academic criticism of these
actions often taken under very difficult
circumstances.
Petition dismissed.
Marc Douglas Cagas vs Comelec, October
25, 2013
Comelec vs Judge Silva et. Al. 286 SCRA
177
Torres V. Comelec 270 SCRA 583
Section 3
Sarmiento v COMELEC 212 SCRA 307
FACTS: The COMELEC, sitting en banc, took
cognizance of and decided the appeals (Special
Cases),without first referring them to any of its
Divisions.
ISSUE: Whether COMELEC has committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it took cognizance
of and decided the appeals of special cases
without first referring them to any of its
Divisions?
HELD: YES. The COMELEC en banc acted
without jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion, when it resolved the appeals of the
petitioners in the said special cases without
first referring them to any of its Divisions.
Section 3, subdivision C, Article IX of the 1987
Constitution expressly provides: Sec. 3. The
Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in
two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules
of procedure in order to expedite
disposition of election cases, including
pre-proclamation controversies. All such
election cases shall be heard and decided in
division, provided that motions for
reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by
the Commission en banc.
Reyes v RTC of Oriental Mindoro 244
SCRA 41
FACTS: Petitioner Aquiles Reyes and private
respondent Adolfo Comia were candidates for
the position of Sanggunian Bayan of Naujan,
Oriental Mindoro in the May 11, 1992 elections.
On May 13, 1992, during the proceedings of
the Municipal Board of Canvassers, private
respondent moved for the exclusion of certain
election returns, on the ground of serious
irregularity in the counting in favor of
petitioner Aquiles Reyes votes for Reyes only,
considering that the was another candidate
(Epitacio Reyes) bearing the same surname.
Without resolving his petition, the Municipal
Board of Canvassers proclaimed on the same
day petitioner as the eight winning candidate.
On June 1, 1992, private respondent filed an
election protest before the trial court. Municipal
Board of Canvassers file its answer in which it
admitted that it had made a mistake in
crediting private respondent with only 858
votes when he was entitled to 915 votes in the
Statement of Votes. On June 23, 1992, trial
court rendered its decision annulling the
proclamation of petitioner and declaring private
respondent as the eight winning candidate for
the position of councilor. Petitioner filed a
notice of appeal to the COMELEC and in
addition filed a petition for mandamus and
prohibition in the CA. The CA dismissed the
petition because of the petitioner's pending
appeal in the COMELEC. On the other hand,
the COMELEC's First Division dismissed the
petitioner's appeal on the ground that he had
failed to pay the appeal fee within the
prescribed period. Hence this instant petition,
petitioner contends that the COMELEC's First
Division committed grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE: Whether this petition for certiorari
would prosper?
HELD:NO. The filing of the present petition,
without petitioner first filing a motion for
reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc,
violates Art. IX, A, Sec 7 of the Constitution
because under this provision only decisions of
the COMELEC en banc may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari.
Section 4
National Press Club v COMELEC 207 SCRA
1
FACTS: Petitioners herein were representatives
of mass media which were prevented from
selling and donating space or air time for
political advertisement under RA 6646.
ISSUE: Whether RA 6646 constitutes a
violation of the constitutional right of freedom
of expression?
HELD: NO. The COMELEC has been expressly
authorized by the Constitution to supervise or
regulate the enjoyment or utilization of the
franchises or permits for the operation of
media of communication and information. The
fundamental purposes of such power are to
ensure equal opportunity, time, and space,
and the right to reply, as well as uniform and
reasonable rates of charges for the use of such
media facilities, in connection with public
information campaigns and forums among
candidates. Of course, the law limits the right
of free speech and of access to mass media of
the candidates themselves. The limitation
however, bears a clear and reasonable
connection with the objective set out in the
Constitution. For it is precisely in the unlimited
purchase of print space and radio and
television time that the resources of the
financially affluent candidates are likely to
make a crucial difference.
Telecommunications & Broadcast
Attorneys of the Philippines v GMA 289
SCRA 337
FACTS: The petitioner questions the validity of
Sec 92 of BP 881 against claims that the
requirement that radio and television time be
given free takes property without due process
of law. Petitioners contend that (1) it is
violative of the eminent domain clause of the
Constitution which provides for the payment of
just compensation (2) it denies broadcast
media the equal protection of laws and (3)
that it is in excess of the power given to the
COMELEC to supervise or regulate the
operation of media communication and
information during the election period.
ISSUE: Whether Sec 92 of BP 881 is (1) it is
violative of the eminent domain clause of the
Constitution which provides for the payment of
just compensation (2) it denies broadcast
media the equal protection of laws and (3)
that it is in excess of the power given to the
COMELEC to supervise or regulate the
operation of media communication and
information during the election period.
HELD: NO. All broadcasting, whether by radio
or by television stations, is licensed by the
government. Airwave frequencies have to be
allocated as there are more individuals who
want to broadcast than there are frequences to
assign. A franchise is thus a privilege subject to
amended by Congress in accordance with the
constitutional provisions that any such
franchise or right granted shall be subject to
amendment, alteration or repeal by the
Congress when the common good so requires
it. The free time for the benefit not only of
one candidates but even more of the public,
particularly, the voters, so that they will be
fully informed of the issues in an election? It
is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the
right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.
NO. What the COMELEC is authorized to
supervise or regulate by Art. IX-C, Sec 4 of
the Constitution, among other things, is the
use by media of information of their franchises
or permits, while what Congress (not the
COMELEC) prohibits is the sale or donation of
print space or air time for political ads.
Adiong v COMELEC 207 SCRA 712
FACTS: Petitioner Adiong, a 1992 senatorial
candidate, assails COMELEC Resolution No.
2347 insofar as it provides the posting of
decals and stickers on mobile places, public or
private, and limits their location or publication
to authorized posting areas.
ISSUE: Whether the resolution is
constitutional?
HELD: NO. The prohibition unduly infringes on
the citizen's fundamental right of free speech.
There is no public interest substantial enough
to warrant the kind of restriction involved in
this case. The posting of decals and stickers in
mobile places does not endanger any
substantial government or public interest.
Under the clear and present danger rule, not
only must the danger be patently clear and
pressingly present but the evil sought to be
avoided, must be so substantive as to justify a
clamp over one's mouth or writing instrument
to be stilled. Significantly, the freedom of
expression curtailed by the prohibition is not so
much that of the candidate of the political
party. The regulation of strike at the freedom
of an individual to express his preference and,
by displaying it on his car, to convince others
to agree with him. A sticker may be furnished
by a candidate but once the car owner agrees
to have it place on his private vehicle, the
expression becomes a statement by the owner,
primarily his own and not of anybody else.
Moreover, the restriction is so broad that it
encompasses even the citizen's private
property, which in this case is a privately
owned vehicle. In consequence of this
prohibition, another cardinal right guaranteed
under the Constitution is violated which is that
no person shall be deprived of his property
without due process of law.
Sanidad v COMELEC 181 SCRA 529
FACTS: On the occasion of the ratification
campaign for the Autonomy Act of Cordillera,
the COMELEC, issued a resolution prohibiting
columnists, commentators, and announcers
from using their columns or radio or television
time to campaign for or against the plebiscite
during the period of the campaign. Reliance
was made on the Election Code and on Article
IX-C, Sec 4 of the Constitution authorizing the
COMELEC to supervise or regulate the
enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or
permits for the operation of media
communication or information. Sanidad, a
columnist, challenged the validity of there
solution as a violation of freedom of
expression.
ISSUE: Whether the resolution issued by the
COMELEC is unconstitutional?
HELD: Yes. The resolution is unconstitutional.
The authority given by the Constitution is over
holders of franchises. The purpose is to assure
candidates equal opportunity and equal access
to media. Sanidad is not a candidate and in
fact in a plebiscite there are no candidates.
Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern
and the people's right to be informed must be
preserved. Morever, the people's choice of
forum for discussion should not be restricted.
Social Weather Stations v COMELEC (May
5, 2001)
FACTS: Petitioner, Social Weather Stations,
Inc. (SWS), is a private non-stock, non-profit
social research institution conducting surveys
in various fields, including economics, politics,
demography, and social development, and
thereafter processing, analyzing, and publicly
reporting the results thereof. On the other
hand, petitioner Kamahalan Publishing
Corporation publishes the Manila Standard, a
newspaper of general circulation, which
features news- worthy items of information
including election surveys. Petitioners brought
this action for prohibition to enjoin the
Commission on Elections from enforcing Sec
5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act) which
prohibits the publication of elections surveys 15
days and 7 days before election, for national
and local candidates. Petitioner SWS states
that it wishes to conduct an election survey
throughout the period of the elections both at
the national and local levels and release to the
media the results of such survey as well as
publish them directly. Petitioner Kamahalan
Publishing Corporation, on the other hand,
states that it intends to publish election survey
results up to the last day of the elections on
May 14,2001.
ISSUE:Whether Sec 5.4 of RA 9006 is valid?
HELD: We hold that 5.4 is invalid because (1)
it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of
expression, (2)it is a direct and total
suppression of a category of expression even
though such suppression is only for a limited
period, and (3) the governmental interest
sought to be promoted can be achieved by
means other than suppression of freedom of
speech.
Mitmug v COMELEC 230 SCRA 54 mean that a hearing on the case will be held
before COMELEC will act on it. The verified
FACTS: The turn-out of votes during the May petition must still show on its face that the
11, 1992 election in Lumba-Bayabao, Lanao del conditions to declare a failure to elect are
Sur, was abnormally low. As a result, several present. In the absence thereof, the petition
petitions were filed seeking the declaration of must be denied outright.
failure of election in precincts where less than
25% of the electorate managed to cast their
votes. But a special election was ordered in
precincts where no voting actually took place.
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruled
that for as long as the precincts functioned and
conducted actual voting during election day,
low voter turnout would not justify a
declaration of failure of election.

ISSUE: Whether respondent COMELEC

acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying
motu proprio and without due notice and
hearing the petitions seeking to declare a
failure of election in some or all of the
precincts in Lumba-Bayabao, Lanao del Sur.

HELD: Before COMELEC can act on a verified

petition seeking to declare a failure of election,
two (2)conditions must concur: first, no voting
has taken place in the precinct or precincts on
the date fixed by law or, even if there was
voting, the election nevertheless results in
failure to elect; and, second, the votes not cast
would affect the result of the election. It is
indubitable that the votes not cast will
definitely affect the outcome of the election.
But, the first requisite is missing, i.e., that no
actual voting took place, or even if there is, the
results thereon will be tantamount to a failure
to elect. Since actual voting and election by the
registered voters in the questioned precincts
have taken place, the results thereof cannot be
disregarded and excluded. COMELEC therefore
did not commit any abuse of discretion, much
less grave, in denying the petitions outright.
There was no basis for the petitions since the
facts alleged therein did not constitute
sufficient grounds to warrant the relief sought.
For, the language of the law expressly requires
the concurrence of these conditions to justify
the calling of a special election. The fact that a
verified petition is filed does not automatically
Cayetano vs. Monsod
201 SCRA 210 September 1991 (Renato
Cayetano vs Christian Monsod)
Legal Ethics Practice of Law
In 1991, Christian Monsod was appointed as
the Chairman of the Commission on Elections.
His appointment was affirmed by the
Commission on Appointments. Monsods
appointment was opposed by Renato Cayetano
on the ground that he does not qualify for he
failed to meet the Constitutional requirement
which provides that the chairman of the
COMELEC should have been engaged in the
practice law for at least ten years.
Monsods track record as a lawyer:
Passed the bar in 1960 with a rating of
86.55%.
Immediately after passing, worked in his
fathers law firm for one year.
Thereafter, until 1970, he went abroad where
he had a degree in economics and held various
positions in various foreign corporations.
In 1970, he returned to the Philippines and
held executive jobs for various local
corporations until 1986.
In 1986, he became a member of the
Constitutional Commission.
ISSUE: Whether or not Monsod qualifies as
chairman of the COMELEC. What constitutes
practice of law?
HELD: Yes. Atty. Monsods past work
experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-
manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-
legislator of both the rich and the poor verily
more than satisfy the constitutional
requirement that he has been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.
As noted by various authorities, the practice of
law is not limited to court appearances. The
members of the bench and bar and the
informed laymen such as businessmen, know
that in most developed societies today,
substantially more legal work is transacted in
law offices than in the courtrooms. General
practitioners of law who do both litigation and
non-litigation work also know that in most
cases they find themselves spending more time
doing what is loosely described as business
counseling than in trying cases. In the course
of a working day the average general
practitioner wig engage in a number of legal
tasks, each involving different legal doctrines,
legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions,
clients, and other interested parties. Even the
increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized
practice wig usually perform at least some
legal services outside their specialty. By no
means will most of this work involve litigation,
unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare
types a litigator who specializes in this work
to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the
work will require the lawyer to have mastered
the full range of traditional lawyer skills of
client counseling, advice-giving, document
drafting, and negotiation.
Brillantes vs. Yorac
G.R. 93867, 18 December 1990 (Sixto
Brillantes, Jr. vs Haydee Yorac)
192 SCRA 358 Political Law Constitutional
Law Constitutional Commissions The
Commission on Elections COMELECs
Constitutional Independence
Facts: In December 1989, a coup attempt
occurred prompting the president to create a
fact finding commission which would be
chaired by Hilario Davide. Consequently he has
to vacate his chairmanship over the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Haydee
Yorac, an associate commissioner in the
COMELEC, was appointed by then President
Corazon Aquino as a temporary substitute, in
short, she was appointed in an acting capacity.
Sixto Brillantes, Jr. then questioned such
appointment urging that under Art 10-C of the
Constitution in no case shall any member of
the COMELEC be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.
Brillantes further argued that the choice of the
acting chairman should not come from the
President for such is an internal matter that
should be resolved by the members themselves
and that the intrusion of the president violates
the independence of the COMELEC as a
constitutional commission.
ISSUE: Whether or not the designation made
by the president violates the constitutional
independence of the COMELEC.
HELD: Yes. Yoracs designation as acting
chairman is unconstitutional. The Supreme
Court ruled that although all constitutional
commissions are essentially executive in
nature, they are not under the control of the
president in the discharge of their functions.
The designation made by the president has
dubious justification as it was merely grounded
on the quote administrative expediency to
present the functions of the COMELEC. Aside
from such justification, it found no basis on
existing rules on statutes. It is the members of
the COMELEC who should choose whom to sit
temporarily as acting chairman in the absence
of Davide (they normally do that by choosing
the most senior member).
But even though the presidents appointment
of Yorac as acting president is void, the
members of COMELEC can choose to reinstate
Yorac as their acting chairman the point here
is that, it is the members who should elect
their acting chairman pursuant to the principle
that constitutional commissions are
independent bodies.
Lindo vs Comelec
Section 2
Gallardo vs. Tabamo, Jr. January 29, 1993 218
SCRA 253 ANTONIO GALLARDO, ANTONIO
AREVALO, CRESENCIO ECHAVEZ, EMMANUEL
ARANAS, PALERMO SIA,RONNIE RAMBUYAN,
PRIMO NAVARRO and NOEL NAVARRO,
petitioners, vs. HON. SINFOROSO
V.TABAMO, JR., in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of Branch 28 of the
Regional Trial Court of
Mambajao,Camiguin, and PEDRO P.
ROMUALDO, respondents.This is a petition for
certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Petitioners seek
toprohibit, restrain and enjoin respondent
Judge Tabamo from continuing with the
proceedings in a petition forinjunction,
prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction and restraining
order filedas a taxpayers suit.At the time of
filing both the special civil action and the
instant petition, petitioner Antonio Gallardo
was theincumbent Governor of the Province of
Camiguin and was seeking re-election in the
May 11, 1992 synchronizedelections.
Petitioners Arevalo, Echavez, Aranas, and Sia
are the provincial treasurer, provincial auditor,
provincialengineer, and provincial budget
officer of Camiguin. Their co-petitioners
Rambuyon, Primo and Noel Navarro areall
government project laborers. On the other
hand, the private respondent was the
incumbent Congressman ofthe lone
Congressional district of Camiguin, a candidate
for the same office in the said synchronized
elections andthe Regional Chairman of the
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) in
Region X.FACTS:On April 10, 1992, private
respondent filed his Petition (Special Civil
Action No. 465) before the court a quoagainst
petitioners to prohibit and restrain them from
pursuing or prosecuting certain public works
projects as itviolates the 45-day ban on public
works imposed by the Omnibus Election Code
(Batas Pambansa Blg. 881)because although
they were initiated few days before March 27,
1992, the date the ban took effect, they were
notcovered by detailed engineering plans,
specifications or a program of work
which are preconditions for
thecommencement of any public works project.
The questioned projects are classified into two
(2) categories: (a)those that are Locally-
Funded, consisting of 29 different projects for
the maintenance or concreting of variousroads,
the rehabilitation of the Katibawasan Falls
and the construction of the Capitol Building,
and (b) thosedesignated as Foreign-Assisted,
consisting of fifteen (15) projects which
include the construction of
HumanDevelopment Center, various Day Care
cum Production Centers and waterworks
systems; the extension andrenovation of
various buildings; the acquisition of hospital
and laboratory equipment; and the
rehabilitation ofoffice and equipment. On the
same day, respondent Judge issued the
question TRO. In the same order, he directed
the petitioners tofile their Answer within 10
days from receipt of notice and set the hearing
on the application for the issuance of thewrit of
preliminary injunction for April 24, 1992.
Instead of filing the Answer, the petitioners
filed the special civilaction for certiorari and
prohibition, with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restrainingorder. They contend that the case
principally involves an alleged violation of the
Omnibus Election Code thus thejurisdiction is
exclusively vested in the Comelec, not the
Regional Trial Court.ISSUE:Whether or not the
trial court has jurisdiction over the subject
matter of Special Civil Action No.
465.RULING:The material operative facts
alleged in the petition therein inexorably link
the private respondent's principal grievance to
alleged violations of paragraphs (a), (b), (v)
and (w), Section 261 of the Omnibus Election
Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881). There is
particular emphasis on the last two (2)
paragraphs which read:Sec. 261. Prohibited
Acts. The following shall be guilty of an
election offense:(a) Vote-buying and vote-
selling.
xxx xxx xxx(b) Conspiracy to bribe voters.
xxx xxx xxx(v) Prohibition against release,
disbursement or expenditure of public funds.
Any public official or employee including
barangay officials and those of government-
owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries, who, during forty-five days before
a regular election and thirty days before a
special election, releases, disburses or expends
any public funds for:(1) Any and all kinds of
public works, except the following:xxx xxx
xxx(w) Prohibition against construction of
public works, delivery of materials for public
works and issuance of treasury warrants and
similar devices. During the period of forty-
five days preceding a regular election and
thirty days before a special election, any
person who (a) undertakes the construction of
any public works, except for projects or works
exempted in the preceding paragraph; or (b)
issues, uses or avails of treasury warrants or
any device undertaking future delivery of
money, goods or other things of value
chargeable against public funds.The court
ruled that Comelec has jurisdiction to
enforce and administer all laws relative
to the conduct ofelections. The 1987
Constitution implicitly grants the
Commission the power to promulgate
such rules andregulations as provided in
Section 2 of Article IX-C. Moreover, the present
Constitution also invests the Comissionwith the
power to investigate and, where appropriate,
prosecute cases of violations of election law,
including actsor omissions constituting election
frauds, offenses, and malpractices.It is not true
that, as contended by the petitioners, the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court under
the electionlaws is limited to criminal actions
for violations of the Omnibus Election Code.
The Constitution itself grants to itexclusive
original jurisdiction over contests involving
elective municipal officials. Neither can the
Court agree withthe petitioners' assertion that
the Special Civil Action filed in the RTC below
involves the prosecution of electionoffenses;
the said action seeks some reliefs
incident to or in connection with
alleged election offenses;specifically, what is
sought is the prevention of the further
commission of these offenses which, by their
allegednature, are continuing.There is as well
no merit in the petitioners' claim that the
private respondent has no legal standing to
initiate thefiling of a complaint for a violation of
the Omnibus Election Code. There is nothing in
the law to prevent any citizenfrom exposing
the commission of an election offense and from
filing a complaint in connection therewith. On
thecontrary, under the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, initiation of complaints for election
offenses may be donemotu propio by the
Commission on Elections or upon written
complaint by any citizen, candidate or
registeredpolitical party or organization under
the party-list system or any of the accredited
citizens arms of the Commission.However, such
written complaints should be filed with the
"Law Department of the Commission; or with
the officesof the Election Registrars, Provincial
Election Supervisors or Regional Election
Directors, or the State Prosecutor,Provincial
Fiscal or City Fiscal." As earlier intimated, the
private respondent was not seriously
concerned with thecriminal aspect of his
alleged grievances. He merely sought a
stoppage of the public works projects because
oftheir alleged adverse effect on his candidacy.
Indeed, while he may have had reason to fear
and may have evendone the right thing, he
committed a serious procedural misstep and
invoked the wrong authority.The court,
therefore, has no alternative but to grant this
petition on the basis their resolution of the
principal issue.Nevertheless, it must be
strongly emphasized that in so holding that the
trial court has no jurisdiction over thesubject
matter of Special Civil Action No. 465
RELAMPAGOS vs. CUMBA Case Digest
RELAMPAGOS vs. CUMBA
243 SCRA 502
Facts: In the elections of 11 May 1992, the
petitioner Relampagos and private respondent
Cumba were candidates for Mayor of
Magallanes, Agusan del Norte. The latter was
proclaimed the winning candidate, with a
margin of twenty-two votes over the former.
Unwilling to accept defeat, the petitioner filed
an election protest with the RTC which found
the petitioner to have won with a margin of six
votes over the private respondent and
rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner.
On 4 July 1994, the private respondent
appealed the decision to the COMELEC. The
petitioner, on 12 July 1994, filed with the trial
court a motion for execution pending appeal,
which the trial court granted On 3 August
1994. The private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order of execution which
was denied on 5 August 1994.
The private respondent then filed with the
respondent COMELEC a petition for certiorari to
annul the aforesaid order of the trial court
granting the motion for execution pending
appeal and the writ of execution. On 9
February 1995, the COMELEC promulgated its
resolution granting the petition. Accordingly,
petitioner was ordered restored to her position
as Municipal Mayor, pending resolution of the
appeal before the Commission. Aggrieved by
the resolution, the petitioner filed this special
civil action.
Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC has
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus in election cases
where it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction?
Held: The Court in concluding that the
aforesaid last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P.
697 has not been repealed by the Omnibus
Election Code, held that the COMELEC has the
authority to issue the extraordinary writs for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
Hence, the trial court acted with palpable and
whimsical abuse of discretion in granting the
petitioners motion for execution pending
appeal and in issuing the writ of execution. Any
motion for execution pending appeal must be
filed before the period for the perfection of the
appeal. Since the motion for execution pending
appeal was filed only on 12 July 1994, or after
the perfection of the appeal, the trial court
could no longer validly act thereon.
COMELEC has jurisdiction, hence, it correctly
set aside the challenged order granting the
motion for execution pending appeal and writ
of execution issued by the trial court.
Edding v. COMELEC 246 scra 502
Regina Ongsiako Reyes vs Comelec, October
22, 2013
Jose Miguel Arroyo vs. DOJ et al, July 23, 2013
Case Digest: Arroyo v. DOJ, et al. (2013)
G.R. No. 199082 : July 23, 2013
JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO, Petitioner,v.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS; HON. LEILA DE LIMA, in her
capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Justice; HON. SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., in his
capacity as Chairperson of the Commission on
Elections; and the JOINT DOJ-COMELEC
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE
and FACT-FINDING TEAM, Respondents.
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
On August 15, 2011, the Comelec and the DOJ
issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and
constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-
Finding Team (referred to as Joint Panel) on
the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral
fraud and manipulation cases.
In its Initial Report, the Fact-Finding Team
concluded that manipulation of the results in
the May 14, 2007 senatorial elections in the
provinces of North and South Cotabato, and
Maguindanao was indeed perpetrated.The
Fact-Finding Team recommended, among
others, that petitioner Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr.
(Abalos) be subjected to preliminary
investigation for electoral sabotage for
conspiring to manipulate the election results in
North and South Cotabato; that GMA and
Abalos be subjected to another preliminary
investigation for manipulating the election
results in Maguindanao; and, that Mike Arroyo
be subjected to further investigation.The case
was docketed as DOJ-Comelec Case No. 001-
2011.
Senator Pimentel filed a Complaint Affidavit for
Electoral Sabotage against petitioners and
twelve others, and several John Does and Jane
Does. The case was docketed as DOJ-Comelec
Case No. 002-2011. Thereafter, petitioners
filed before the Court separate Petitions for
Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
assailing the creation of the Joint Panel.
The Joint Committee promulgated a Joint
Resolution which was later indorsed to the
Comelec. The Comelec en banc issued a
Resolution approving and adopting the Joint
Resolution subject to modifications. The
Comelec resolved, among others, that an
information for electoral sabotage be filed
against GMA and Abalos, while the charges
against Mike Arroyo be dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence.
The RTC issued a Warrant for GMAs arrest
which was duly served. GMA was later
arraigned and she entered a plea of "not
guilty." She was, for some time, on hospital
arrest but was able to obtain temporary liberty
when her motion for bail was granted. At
present, she is again on hospital arrest by
virtue of a warrant issued in another criminal
case.
The Court denied the petitions and
supplemental petitions of herein petitioners.
Hence, this motion for reconsideration. Mike
Arroyo reiterates his arguments on the
independence of the Comelec as basis in
nullifying the subject joint DOJ-Comelec
resolutions. Mike Arroyo also maintains that
the DOJ should conduct preliminary
investigation only when deputized by the
Comelec but not exercise concurrent
jurisdiction. Finally, as has been repeatedly
pointed out in his earlier pleadings before the
Court, Mike Arroyo claims that the proceedings
involving the electoral sabotage case were
rushed because of pressures from the
executive branch of the government.
ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of Joint
Panel is valid
HELD: Yes.
Political Law- Power of the COMELEC to
investigate and prosecute cases
This is not the first time that the Court is
confronted with the issue of whether the
Comelec has the exclusive power to investigate
and prosecute cases of violations of election
laws. In Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency (BANAT)
Party-List v. Commission on Elections, the
constitutionality of Section 43of RA 9369 had
already been raised by petitioners therein and
addressed by the Court. While recognizing the
Comelecs exclusive power to investigate and
prosecute cases under Batas Pambansa Bilang
881 or the Omnibus Election Code, the Court
pointed out that the framers of the 1987
Constitution did not have such intention. This
exclusivity is thus a legislative enactment that
can very well be amended by Section 43 of RA
9369. Therefore, under the present law, the
Comelec and other prosecuting arms of the
government, such as the DOJ, now exercise
concurrent jurisdiction in the investigation and
prosecution of election offenses.
Indeed, as aptly pointed out by GMA, there is a
discrepancy between Comelec Resolution No.
3467 dated January 12, 2001 and Joint Order
No. 001-2011, dated August 15, 2011, creating
and constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-
Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National
Elections electoral fraud and manipulation
cases. However, GMA seemed to miss the date
when these two resolutions were promulgated
by the Comelec.
It is noteworthy that Comelec Resolution No.
3467 was issued when Section 265 of the
Omnibus Election Code was still effective, while
Joint Order No. 001-2011 as well as Comelec
Resolution Nos. 8733and 9057mentioned in the
assailed decision but missed out by GMA in her
motion, were issued during the effectivity of
Section 43 of RA 9369, giving the Comelec and
other prosecuting arms of the government the
concurrent jurisdiction to investigate and
prosecute election offenses. This amendment
paved the way for the discrepancy.
In Comelec Resolution No. 3467, the Comelec
maintained the continuing deputation of
prosecutors and the Comelec Law Department
was tasked to supervise the investigatory and
prosecutory functions of the task force
pursuant to the mandate of the Omnibus
Election Code. However, with the amendment,
the Comelec likewise changed the tenor of the
later resolutions to reflect the new mandate of
the Comelec and other prosecuting arms of the
government now exercising concurrent
jurisdiction. Thus, the Comelec Law
Department and the Office of the Chief State
Prosecutor of the DOJ were tasked to jointly
supervise the investigatory and prosecutory
functions of the Comelec-DOJ Task Force.
Notwithstanding the grant of concurrent
jurisdiction, the Comelec and the DOJ
nevertheless included a provision in the
assailed Joint Order whereby the resolutions of
the Joint Committee finding probable cause for
election offenses shall still be approved by the
Comelec in accordance with the Comelec Rules
of Procedure. With more reason, therefore,
that we cannot consider the creation of the
Joint Committee as an abdication of the
Comelecs independence enshrined in the 1987
Constitution.
Motion for Reconsideration DENIED.
Salic Dumarpa vs. Comelec April 2, 2013
Case Digest: Dumarpa v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 192249 : April 2, 2013
SALIC DUMARPA, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
PEREZ, J.:
FACTS:
Dumarpa was a congressional candidate for
the 1st District of Lanao del Sur at the 10 May
2010 elections. The COMELEC declared a total
failure of elections in seven (7) municipalities,
including the three (3) Municipalities of Masiu,
Lumba Bayabao and Kapai, which are situated
in the 1st Congressional District of Province of
Lanao del Sur. The conduct of special elections
in the seven (7) Lanao del Sur municipalities
was originally scheduled for 29 May 2010.
On 25 May 2010, COMELEC issued Resolution
No. 8946, resetting the special elections to 3
June 2010. Subsequently, COMELEC issued the
herein assailed resolution which provided,
among others, the constitution of Special Board
of Election Inspectors (SBEI) in Section 4 and
Clustering of Precincts in Section 12.
Dumarpa filed a Motion for Reconsideration
concerning only Sections 4 and 12 thereof as it
may apply to the Municipality of Masiu, Lanao
del Sur. The COMELEC did not act on
Dumarpas motion.
A day before the scheduled special elections,
on 2 June 2010, Dumarpa filed the instant
petition alleging that "both provisions on Re-
clustering of Precincts (Section 12) and
constitution of SBEIs [Special Board of Election
Inspectors] (Section 4) affect the Municipality
of Masiu, Lanao del Sur, and will definitely
doom petitioner to certain defeat, if its
implementation is not restrained or prohibited
by the Honorable Supreme Court."
Parenthetically, at the time of the filing of this
petition, Dumarpa was leading by a slim
margin over his opponent Hussin
Pangandaman in the canvassed votes for the
areas which are part of the 1st Congressional
District of Lanao del Sur where there was no
failure of elections.
A temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction was not issued. Thus,
the special elections on 3 June 2010 proceeded
as scheduled.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition has
become moot and academic
HELD: Yes.
Remedial Law- A moot and academic case is
one that ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so
that a declaration thereon would be of no
practical value.
Indeed, the special elections held on 3 June
2010 mooted the issues posed by Dumarpa.
The opponent of Dumarpa, Hussin
Pangandaman, was proclaimed winner in the
1st Congressional District of Lanao del Sur. We
see this as a supervening event which,
additionally, mooted the present petition as the
issues raised herein are resolvable in the
election protest.
In any event, the petition is unmeritorious.
Political law- COMELEC's power to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election
COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution, in the
exercise of its plenary powers in the conduct of
elections enshrined in the Constitution and
statute. Thus, it brooks no argument that the
COMELEC's broad power to "enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum and recall,carries with it all
necessary and incidental powers for it to
achieve the objective of holding free, orderly,
honest, peaceful and credible elections.
The Commission on Elections, by constitutional
mandate, must do everything in its power to
secure a fair and honest canvass of the votes
cast in the elections. In the performance of its
duties, the Commission must be given a
considerable latitude in adopting means and
methods that will insure the accomplishment of
the great objective for which it was created -
to promote free, orderly, and honest elections.
The choice of means taken by the Commission
on Elections, unless they are clearly illegal or
constitute grave abuse of discretion, should not
be interfered with.
Dumarpas objections conveniently fail to take
into account that COMELEC Resolution No.
8965, containing the assailed provisions on re-
clustering of the precincts and the designation
of special board of election inspectors, was
issued precisely because of the total failure of
elections in seven (7) Municipalities in the
Province of Lanao del Sur, a total of fifteen
(15) Municipalities where there was a failure of Facts:
elections. Notably, the COMELEC's declaration
of a failure of elections is not being questioned
by Dumarpa. In fact, he confines his objections
This special civil action for certiorari seek to set
on the re-clustering of precincts, and only as
aside the Resolutions of Respondent
regards the Municipality of Masiu.
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in the
following Special Cases:

Plainly, it is precisely to prevent another

occurrence of a failure of elections in the
1) G.R. No. 105628 SPC No. 92-266
fifteen (15) municipalities in the province of
Lanao del Sur that the COMELEC issued the 2) G.R. No. 105725 SPC No. 92-323
assailed Resolution No. 8965. The COMELEC,
through its deputized officials in the field, is in 3) G.R. No. 105727 SPC No. 92-288
the best position to assess the actual condition
prevailing in that area and to make judgment 4) G.R. No. 105730 SPC No. 92-315
calls based thereon. Too often, COMELEC has
to make snap judgments to meet unforeseen 5) G.R. No. 105771 SPC No. 92-271
circumstances that threaten to subvert the will
of our voters. In the process, the actions of 6) G.R. No. 105778 SPC No. 92-039
COMELEC may not be impeccable, indeed, may
7) G.R. No. 105797 SPC No. 92-153
even be debatable.We cannot, however,
engage in an academic criticism of these 8) G.R. No. 105919 SPC No. 92-293
actions often taken under very difficult
circumstances. 9) G.R. No. 105977 SPC No. 92-087

Petition dismissed. Issue:

Marc Douglas Cagas vs Comelec, October 25,

2013
Whether the challenged Resolutions above
Comelec vs Judge Silva et. Al. 286 SCRA 177 specified (the SPC) as having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion in that, inter alia, the
Torres V. Comelec 270 SCRA 583 Commission, sitting en banc, took cognizance
of and decided the appeals without first
referring them to any of it Divisions.
Section 3

Sarmiento v. Comelec 212 SCRA 307

Held:
Sarmiento vs. COMELEC

212 SCRA 307

The COMELEC en banc acted without
August 6, 1992 jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion,
when it resolved the appeals of petitioners in
the above mentioned Special Cases without
first referring them to any of its Divisions.
Section 3, subdivision C, Article IX of the 1987
Constitution expressly provides:
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit
en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to
expedite disposition of election cases, including
pre-proclamation controversies. All such
election cases shall be heard and decided in
division, provided that motions for
reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by
the Commission en banc.
Said Resolutions are therefore, null and void
and must be set aside. Consequently, the
appeals are deemed pending before the
Commission for proper referral to a Division.
A resolution directing the COMELEC to assign
said Special Cases to the Divisions pursuant to
Section 8, Rule 3 of its Rules on assignment of
cases would, logically, be in order. However,
Section 16 of R.A. No. 7166 6 provides that all
pre-proclamation cases pending before it shall
be deemed terminated at the beginning of the
term of the office involved. The terms of the
offices involved in the Special Cases subject of
these petitions commenced at noon of June 30
1992. These cases have thus been rendered
moot and such a resolution would only be an
exercise in futility.
Therefore, the instant petitions are DISMISSED
but without prejudice to the filing by
petitioners of regular elections protests. If the
winning candidates for the positions involved in
the Special Cases subject of these petitions
have already been proclaimed, the running of
the period to file the protests shall be deemed
suspended by the pendency of such cases
before the COMELEC and of these petitions
before this Court.
Notes:
1) G.R. No. 105628 SPC No. 92-266 granting
the appeal from the ruling of the Municipal
Board of Canvassers of Virac, Catanduanes
which ordered the exclusion from the canvass
of one (1) election return;
2) G.R. No. 105725 SPC No. 92-323
reversing the ruling of the City Board of
Canvassers of Iriga City which ordered the
exclusion from the canvass of six (6) election
returns and in UND No. 92-243 ordering the
said Board of Canvassers to include in the
canvass the election returns involved therein;
3) G.R. No. 105727 SPC No. 92-288
dismissing the appeal of petitioner from the
ruling of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Catanduanes which ordered the inclusion in the
canvass the certificate of canvass for the
municipality of Virac, excluding the returns
from 48 precincts;
4) G.R. No. 105730 SPC No. 92-315
affirming the ruling of the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Jose Panganiban, Camarines
Norte which dismissed petitioner's opposition
to the composition of the said Municipal Board
of Canvassers;
5) G.R. No. 105771 SPC No. 92-271
affirming the ruling of the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Cabusao, Camarines Sur which,
among others, rejected petitioner's objection to
certain election returns;
6) G.R. No. 105778 SPC No. 92-039
dismissing said case for non-compliance with
Section 20 of R.A. No. 7166;
7) G.R. No. 105797 SPC No. 92-153
affirming the rulings of the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Davao Oriental which rejected
petitioner's objections to the canvass of some
certificates of canvass;
8) G.R. No. 105919 SPC No. 92-293
dismissing petitioner's appeal from the ruling of
the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Upi Nuro,
Maguindanao;
9) G.R. No. 105977 SPC No. 92-087 denying
the amended pre-proclamation petition, which
is an appeal from the rulings of the Municipal
Board of Canvassers of Ternate, Cavite, and
denying a subsequent motion to resolve the
issues raised in said amended petition.
Reyes v RTC of Oriental Mindoro 244 SCRA 41
Sec 4
National Press Club v Comelec 207 SCRA 41
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB VS. COMELEC [201
SCRA 1; G.R. NO. 1026653; 5 MAR 1992]
Sunday, February 08, 2009 Posted by
Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Petitioners in these cases consist of
representatives of the mass media which are
prevented from selling or donating space and
time for political advertisements; two (2)
individuals who are candidates for office (one
for national and the other for provincial office)
in the coming May 1992 elections; and
taxpayers and voters who claim that their right
to be informed of election Issue and of
credentials of the candidates is being curtailed.
It is principally argued by petitioners that
Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 66461
invades and violates the constitutional
guarantees comprising freedom of expression.
Petitioners maintain that the prohibition
imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to
censorship, because it selects and singles out
for suppression and repression with criminal
sanctions, only publications of a particular
content, namely, media-based election or
political propaganda during the election period
of 1992. It is asserted that the prohibition is in
derogation of media's role, function and duty
to provide adequate channels of public
information and public opinion relevant to
election Issue. Further, petitioners contend
that Section 11 (b) abridges the freedom of
speech of candidates, and that the suppression
of media-based campaign or political
propaganda except those appearing in the
Comelec space of the newspapers and on
Comelec time of radio and television
broadcasts, would bring about a substantial
reduction in the quantity or volume of
information concerning candidates and Issue in
the election thereby curtailing and limiting the
right of voters to information and opinion.
Issue: Whether or Not Section 11 (b) of
Republic Act No. 6646 constitutional.
Held: Yes. It seems a modest proposition that
the provision of the Bill of Rights which
enshrines freedom of speech, freedom of
expression and freedom of the press has to be
taken in conjunction with Article IX (C) (4)
which may be seen to be a special provision
applicable during a specific limited period
i.e., "during the election period." In our own
society, equality of opportunity to proffer
oneself for public office, without regard to the
level of financial resources that one may have
at one's disposal, is clearly an important value.
One of the basic state policies given
constitutional rank by Article II, Section 26 of
the Constitution is the egalitarian demand that
"the State shall guarantee equal access to
opportunities for public service and prohibit
political dynasties as may be defined by law."
The essential question is whether or not the
assailed legislative or administrative provisions
constitute a permissible exercise of the power
of supervision or regulation of the operations
of communication and information enterprises
during an election period, or whether such act
has gone beyond permissible supervision or
regulation of media operations so as to
constitute unconstitutional repression of
freedom of speech and freedom of the press.
The Court considers that Section 11 (b) has not
gone outside the permissible bounds of
supervision or regulation of media operations
during election periods.
Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its
applicability and enforceability. By virtue of the
operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the
Constitution, Section 11 (b) is limited in its
applicability in time to election periods. Section
11 (b) does not purport in any way to restrict
the reporting by newspapers or radio or
television stations of news or news-worthy
events relating to candidates, their
qualifications, political parties and programs of
government. Moreover, Section 11 (b) does
not reach commentaries and expressions of
belief or opinion by reporters or broadcasters
or editors or commentators or columnists in
respect of candidates, their qualifications, and
programs and so forth, so long at least as such
comments, opinions and beliefs are not in fact
advertisements for particular candidates
covertly paid for. In sum, Section 11 (b) is not
to be read as reaching any report or
commentary other coverage that, in
responsible media, is not paid for by
candidates for political office. Section 11 (b) as
designed to cover only paid political
advertisements of particular candidates.
The limiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon the
right to free speech of the candidates
themselves is not unduly repressive or
unreasonable.
Telecommunications & Broadcast Attorneys of
the Phils. vsGMA 289 Scra 337
Adiong vs Comelec
Sanidad vs Comelec
Social Weather Stations vs COMELEC May 5,
2001
Mitmug vs COMELEC 230 SCRA 54
COA
Sec 2
Guevarra vs Gimenez 6 SCRA 813
Guevarra v Gimenez 6 SCRA 813
FACTS:In 1954, the District Engineer of
Sorsogon prepared a program of work and
detailed estimate for thereconstruction of the
Sorsogon Central School building.
Specifications consisting of five pages were
likewise prepared. The Cost of painting was left
out in the detailed estimate and specifications.
The papers weresubmitted to the Division
Engineer in Lucena, Quezon, who returned
them duly approved with an
authorizedappropriation of P40,000.00
"provided that painting shall be included"
. Whereupon, the specification for painting
was accordingly made and appended to the
specifications as page six.In August 1954 the
District Engineer advertised an invitation to bid
for furnishing of all materials, labor and plant,
for reconstruction project. Fernando
Guevarra's bid of P37,500 was declared lowest
and the contractwas awarded to him. Eighty
five days after completion of the project,
Guevarra file with the Director of PublicWorks a
written claim for the payment of P4,620.00
representing cost of painting not covered by
the contract.After hearing, Secretary of Public
Works and Communications denied the claim
and two motion for reconsideration were also
denied. On appeal,the Auditor General also
denied the claim. Guevarra appealed tothe
Supreme Court pursuant to CA
327.ISSUE:Whether the contract for the
reconstruction of the school building included
the painting.HELD:Yes. Testimonies of the
employees' should be given more weight than
those of the contractors. Thesegovernment
employees testified as to what transpired in
the performance of their duties. The
presumption is thatofficial duty has been
regularly performed.[Note:The main issue of
the case has nothing to do with COA. However,
note that, claims anddisbursements of public
funds should have be coursed to COA]
Orocio v COA 213 SCRA 109
FACTS:On accident occurred at the Malaya
Power Plant of the National Power Corporation
(NPC) where twoindividuals suffered injury
Ernesto Pumaloy, an NPC employee, and
Domingo Abodizo, a casual employeeOPLGS,
the janitorial contractor of the NPC. The two
injured personnel were brought to the hospital.
NPC initially advanced the amount for
hospitalization expenses for the treatment of
Abodizo, and set upthis as an account
receivable from OPLGS deducted on a
staggared basis from the latter's billing against
the NPC util the same was fully satisfied.
Subsequently, OPLGS requested a refund of
the total amount deductedfrom their billings
representing payment of the advances made
by the NPC. In the light of the
favorablerecommendation of the NPC legal
counsel, the amount of hospitalization
expenses was refunded to thecontractor
OPLGS.The Unit Auditor of the Commission on
Audit disallowed the refund of the
hospitalizattion expenses of Abodizo
contending that under the contract, there is no
employee-employer relation between the NPC
and theOPLGS employees. Hence,NPC is not
answerable for such expenses. General
Counsel asked for areconsideration of the said
disallowance denied. The COA Regional
Director, herein respondent, confirmed
thedisallowance. NPC General Counself
submitted a second request for reconsideration
and justifies that his legalopinion is based on
Sec 15-A of RA 6395 (NPC Charter) which
provides that ... all legal matters shall
behandled by the General Counsel of the
Corporation...ISSUE:Whether the
disbursement on the basis of the legal opinion
of the legal counsel of the NPC (quasi- judicial
function) is within the scope of the auditing
power of the COA?HELD:The Constitution
grants the COA the power, authority and duty
to examine, audit and settle all accounts
pertaining to the expenditures or uses of funds
and property pertaining to the Government or
any of itssubdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities,
including government-owned or controlled
corporations
. Thematter of allowing in audit a disbursement
account is not a ministerial function, but one
which necessitates theexercise of discretion.
Besides, the OPLGS, Abodizo's employer,
admitted that the incident was purely
Orocio vs COA 213 SCRA 109
Osmena v. COA 238 SCRA 463
Sambeli v. Province of Isabela 201 SCRA 80
Sec 3
PAL vs COA 245 SCRA 39
Philippine Air Lines vs. Court of Appeals
GR 120262, 17 July 1997)
FACTS:
On 23 October 1988, Leovigildo A. Pantejo,
then City Fiscal of Surigao City, boarded a PAL
plane in Manila and disembarked in Cebu City
where he was supposed to take his connecting
flight to Surigao City. However, due to typhoon
Osang, the connecting flight to Surigao City
was cancelled. To accommodate the needs of
its stranded passengers, PAL initially gave out
cash assistance of P 100.00 and, the next day,
P200.00, for their expected stay of 2 days in
Cebu. Pantejo requested instead that he be
billeted in a hotel at the PALs expense because
he did not have cash with him at that time, but
PAL refused. Thus, Pantejo was forced to seek
and accept the generosity of a co-passenger,
an engineer named Andoni Dumlao, and he
shared a room with the latter at Sky View Hotel
with the promise to pay his share of the
expenses upon reaching Surigao. On 25
October 1988 when the flight for Surigao was
resumed, Pantejo came to know that the hotel
expenses of his co-passengers, one
Superintendent Ernesto Gonzales and a certain
Mrs. Gloria Rocha, an Auditor of the Philippine
National Bank, were reimbursed by PAL. At this
point, Pantejo informed Oscar Jereza, PALs
Manager for Departure Services at Mactan
Airport and who was in charge of cancelled
flights, that he was going to sue the airline for
discriminating against him. It was only then
that Jereza offered to pay Pantejo P300.00
which, due to the ordeal and anguish he had
undergone, the latter declined.
Pantejo filed a suit for damages against PAL
with the RTC of Surigao City which, after trial,
rendered judgment, ordering PAL to pay
Pantejo P300.00 for actual damages,
P150,000.00 as moral damages, P100,000.00
as exemplary damages, P15,000.00 as
attorneys fees, and 6% interest from the time
of the filing of the complaint until said amounts
shall have been fully paid, plus costs of suit.
On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the
decision of the court a quo, but with the
exclusion of the award of attorneys fees and
litigation expenses.
The Supreme Court affirmed the challenged
judgment of Court of Appeals, subject to the
modification regarding the computation of the
6% legal rate of interest on the monetary
awards granted therein to Pantejo.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner airlines acted in bad faith
when it failed and refused to provide hotel
accommodations for respondent Pantejo or to
reimburse him for hotel expenses incurred by
reason of the cancellation of its connecting
flight to Surigao City due to force majeur.
HELD:
A contract to transport passengers is quite
different in kind and degree from any other
contractual relation, and this is because of the
relation which an air carrier sustains with the
public. Its business is mainly with the travelling
public. It invites people to avail of the comforts
and advantages it offers. The contract of air
carriage, therefore, generates a relation
attended with a public duty. Neglect or
malfeasance of the carriers employees
naturally could give ground for an action for
damages.
The discriminatory act of PAL against Pantejo
ineludibly makes the former liable for moral
damages under Article 21 in relation to Article
2219 (10) of the Civil Code. As held in Alitalia
Airways vs. CA, et al., such inattention to and
lack of care by the airline for the interest of its
passengers who are entitled to its utmost
consideration, particularly as to their
convenience, amount to bad faith which
entitles the passenger to the award of moral
damages.
Moral damages are emphatically not intended
to enrich a plaintiff at the expense of the
defendant. They are awarded only to allow the
former to obtain means, diversion, or
amusements that will serve to alleviate the
moral suffering he has undergone due to the
defendants culpable action and must, perforce,
be proportional to the suffering inflicted.
However, substantial damages do not translate
into excessive damages. Herein, except for
attorneys fees and costs of suit, it will be
noted that the Courts of Appeals affirmed point
by point the factual findings of the lower court
upon which the award of damages had been
based.
The interest of 6% imposed by the court
should be computed from the date of rendition
of judgment and not from the filing of the
complaint.
The rule has been laid down in Eastern
Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et. al.
that when an obligation, not constituting a
loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an
interest on the amount of damages awarded
may be imposed at the discretion of the court
at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest,
however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated
claims or damages except when or until the
demand can be established with reasonable
certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is
established with reasonable certainty, the
interest shall begin to run from the time the
claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art.
1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty
cannot be so reasonably established at the
time the demand is made, the interest shall
begin to run only from the date the judgment
of the court is made (at which time the
quantification of damages may be deemed to
have been reasonably ascertained). The actual
base for the computation of legal interest shall,
in any case, be on the amount finally
adjudged. This is because at the time of the
filling of the complaint, the amount of the
damages to which Pantejo may be entitled
remains unliquidated and not known, until it is
definitely ascertained, assessed and
determined by the court, and only after the
presentation of proof thereon.
Bagatsing v Committee on Privitization 246
SCRA 334
Accountability of Public Officers
Nunez v. Sandiganbayan 111 SCRA 433
Equal Protection Creation of the
Sandiganbayan
Nuez assails the validity of the PD 1486
creating the Sandiganbayan as amended by PD
1606. He was accused before the
Sandiganbayan of estafa through falsification
of public and commercial documents
committed in connivance with his other co-
accused, all public officials, in several cases. It
is the claim of Nuez that PD1486, as
amended, is violative of the due process,
equal protection, and ex post facto clauses of
the Constitution. He claims that the
Sandiganbayan proceedings violates Nuezs
right to equal protection, because appeal as
a matter of right became minimized into a
mere matter of discretion; appeal likewise
was shrunk and limited only to questions of
law, excluding a review of the facts and trial
evidence; and there is only one chance to
appeal conviction, by certiorari to the SC,
instead of the traditional two chances; while all
other estafa indictees are entitled to appeal as
a matter of right covering both law and facts
and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the CA
and thereafter to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of
Sandiganbayan violates equal protection
insofar as appeals would be concerned.
HELD: The SC ruled against Nuez. The 1973
Constitution had provided for the creation of a
special court that shall have original jurisdiction
over cases involving public officials charged
with graft and corruption. The constitution
specifically makes mention of the creation of a
special court, the Sandiganbayan, precisely in
response to a problem, the urgency of which
cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the
public service. It follows that those who may
thereafter be tried by such court ought to have
been aware as far back as January 17, 1973,
when the present Constitution came into force,
that a different procedure for the accused
therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner
is or a public official, is not necessarily
offensive to the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. Further, the classification therein
set forth met the standard requiring that it
must be based on substantial distinctions
which make real differences; it must be
germane to the purposes of the law; it must
not be limited to existing conditions only, and
must apply equally to each member of the
class. Further still, decisions in the
Sandiganbayan are reached by a unanimous
decision from 3 justices a showing that
decisions therein are more conceivably
carefully reached than other trial courts.
RA 6770
Garcia v. Mojica 314 SCRA 207
. Garcia v. Mojica 314 SCRA 207 Facts : On
May 7, 1988, Cebu city mayor Alvin Garcia
signed a contract with F.E. Zuellig for the
supply of asphalt to the city, 4 days later
national elections were held and Mayor Garcia
won reelection contract, in the other hand,
took effect on September 1998. On march,
1999, news reports came out that the said
purchase of asphalt was anomalous
investigation but the special prosecution officer
of the office of the Ombudsman revealed that
(1) the contract for supply of asphalt to Cebu
city was designed to favor F.E. Zuellig, (2) the
amount quoted on the contract was too
expensive compared for the amount for which
asphalt may be bought from local suppliers
such as Shell and Petron, particularly
considering that the amount was fixed in
dollars and was payable in pesos, thus
exposing the city government to the risk
attendance to a fluctuating exchange rate, and
(3) the interest of the city under the
administrative cases be filed against Mayo
Garcia. The deputy Ombudsman handled
Garcias case and recommended 6 moths
preventive suspension against the latter the
maximum imposable under RA 6770, the
Ombudsman Law. Garcia now raises the
following issues: 1. What is the effect of the
reelection of the petitioner on the investigation
of acts done before his reelection? Did the
Ombudsman for Visayas gravely abuse his
discretion in conducting the investigation of
petitioner and ordering his preventive
suspension? 2. Assuming that the ombudsman
properly took cognizance of the case, what law
should apply to the investigation being
conducted by him, the LGC R.A 7160 of the
ombudsman law (R.A 6770)? Was the
procedure in the law properly observed? 3.
Assuming further that the ombudsman has
jurisdiction, is the preventive suspension of the
petitioner based on strong evidence as
required by law? Held : The answers are: 1.
Garcia cannot anymore be held administratively
liable for an act committed during a previous
term. The meeting of minds to the contract,
especially with regards to the stipulation
deemed prejudicial to the city has already
occurred during the mayors previous term. It
hardly matters that the benefits of the contract
are to be delivered during Garcias current
term. However, the ombudsman did not
commit the grave abuse of discretion. It was
Garcias misfortune that the office of the
ombudsman, as empowered by the
constitution, decided to investigate his case on
its own initiative (Article XI, Sec. 13 1987
Constitution). The ombudsman derives his
authority to assume jurisdiction over Garcias
case under the constitution and RA 6670, the
ombudsman law. And the power of the
ombudsman to preventively suspend an official
subject to its administrative investigation is
expressly provided by RA 6670 as well. 2.
Either law can apply to Garcias case but since
the ombudsman decided, its own initiative, to
investigate Garcia, RA 6670 must prevail.
There is no violation of the LGC of 1991
because RA 6670 is a special law distinct from
that
Santiago v Sandiganbayan 356 SCRA 636
356 SCRA 636 Political Law The Legislative
Department Suspension of a Member of
Congress Violations of RA 3019
In October 1988, Miriam Defensor Santiago,
who was the then Commissioner of the
Commission of Immigration and Deportation
(CID), approved the application for legalization
of the stay of about 32 aliens. Her act was said
to be illegal and was tainted with bad faith and
it ran counter against Republic Act No. 3019
(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The
legalization of such is also a violation of
Executive Order No. 324 which prohibits the
legalization of disqualified aliens. The aliens
legalized by Santiago were allegedly known by
her to be disqualified. Two other criminal cases
were filed against Santiago. Pursuant to this
information, Francis Garchitorena, a presiding
Justice of the Sandiganbayan, issued a warrant
of arrest against Santiago. Santiago petitioned
for provisional liberty since she was just
recovering from a car accident which was
approved. In 1995, a motion was filed with the
Sandiganbayan for the suspension of Santiago,
who was already a senator by then. The
Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate President
(Maceda) to suspend Santiago from office for
90 days.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan can
order suspension of a member of the Senate
without violating the Constitution.
HELD: Yes. it is true that the Constitution
provides that each house may determine
the rules of its proceedings, punish its
Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the
concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members,
suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of
suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed
sixty days.
But on the other hand, Section 13 of RA 3019
provides:
Suspension and loss of benefits. any
incumbent public officer against whom any
criminal prosecution under a valid information
under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code or for any offense
involving fraud upon government or public
funds or property whether as a simple or as a
complex offense and in whatever stage of
execution and mode of participation, is pending
in court, shall be suspended from office.
Should he be convicted by final judgment, he
shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits
under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall
be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries
and benefits which he failed to receive during
suspension, unless in the meantime
administrative proceedings have been filed
against him.
In here, the order of suspension prescribed by
RA. 3019 is distinct from the power of
Congress to discipline its own ranks under the
Constitution. The suspension contemplated in
the above constitutional provision is a punitive
measure that is imposed upon determination
by the Senate or the Lower House, as the case
may be, upon an erring member. This is quite
distinct from the suspension spoken of in
Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty
but a preliminary, preventive measure,
prescinding from the fact that the latter is not
being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as
a Member of the Senate.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from
its coverage the members of Congress and
that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err
in thus decreeing the assailed preventive
suspension order.
before the court could have a valid basis in
decreeing preventive suspension pending the
trial of the case. All it secures to the accused
is adequate opportunity to challenge the
validity or regularity of the proceedings against
him, such as, that he has not been afforded
the right to due preliminary investigation, that
the acts imputed to him do not constitute a
specific crime warranting his mandatory
suspension from office under Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information
is subject to quashal on any of the grounds set
out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules
on Criminal procedure.

But Santiago committed the said act when she

was still the CID commissioner, can she still be
suspended as a senator?

Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not

state that the public officer concerned must be
suspended only in the office where he is
alleged to have committed the acts with which
he has been charged. Thus, it has been held
that the use of the word office would indicate
that it applies to any office which the officer
charged may be holding, and not only the
particular office under which he stands
accused.

Santiago has not yet been convicted of the

alleged crime, can she still be suspended?

The law does not require that the guilt of the

accused must be established in a pre-
suspension proceeding before trial on the
merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a
proceeding to determine (1) the strength of
the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the
gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether
or not his continuance in office could influence
the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety
and integrity of the records another evidence