Leonardo Paat vs. Court of Appeals, et. Al.
PAAT v CA
GR No. 111107, 10 January 1997
266 SCRA 167
FACTS
The truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman was seized by
the DENR personnel while on its way to Bulacan because the driver could
not produce the required documents for the forest product found
concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, CENRO ordered the
confiscation of the truck and required the owner to explain. Private
respondents failed to submit required explanation. The DENR Regional
Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan sustained Layugans action for
confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck. Private respondents
brought the case to the DENR Secretary. Pending appeal, private
respondents filed a replevin case before the RTC against petitioner
Layugan and Baggayan. RTC granted the same. Petitioners moved to
dismiss the case contending, inter alia, that private respondents had no
cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The
trial court denied their motion. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioners aver that the trial court could not legally entertain the suit for
replevin because the truck was under administrative seizure proceedings.
ISSUE
Whether or not the instant case falls within the exception of the
doctrine.
HELD
The Court held in the negative. The Court has consistently held
that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a
pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of
administrative processed afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter
that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted
first before courts judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation
of court intervention is fatal to ones cause of action.
The doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the
peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a
case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is violation of due process,
(2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the
administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppels on the part of the administrative
agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the
respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the
President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when
to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable,
(8) when it would amount to nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject
matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does
not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there
are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
A suit for replevin cannot be sustained against the petitioners
for the subject truck taken and retained by them for administrative
forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Sections 68-A of OD 705, as
amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view
of the private respondents failure to exhaust administrative remedies
should have been the proper course of action by the lower court instead
of assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ
ordering the return of the truck.
G.R. No. 111107
January 10, 1997
FACTS:
On May 19, 1989 when the truck of private respondent Victoria de
Guzman while on its way to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan,
was seized by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR, for brevity) personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya because the driver
could not produce the required documents for the forest products found
concealed in the truck.
LOWER COURTS:
* CENRO: Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) in Aritao, Cagayan, issued on May
23, 1989 an order of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner thereof
fifteen (15) days within which to submit an explanation why the truck
should not be forfeited. Private respondents, however, failed to submit the
required explanation.
* RED- DENR: On June 22, 1989,i[1] Regional Executive Director Rogelio
Baggayan of DENR sustained petitioner Layugan's action of confiscation
and ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of
Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No.
277. Private respondents filed a letter of reconsideration dated June 28,
1989 of the June 22, 1989 order of Executive Director Baggayan, which
was, however, denied in a subsequent order of July 12, 1989.ii[2]
* DENR-SECRETARY (Pending resolution)
* RTC (action for replevin): denied motion to dismiss by Paat (DENR-RED)
* CA (review): denied, has legal questions involved.
ISSUES & RULINGS:
(1) Without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
may an action for replevin prosper to recover a movable property which is
the subject matter of an administrative forfeiture proceeding in the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources pursuant to Section
68-A of P. D. 705, as amended, entitled The Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines?
NO, before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a
pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter
that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted
first before court's judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation
of court's intervention is fatal to one's cause of action.
(2) Are the Secretary of DENR and his representatives empowered to
confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal forest
products in favor of the government?
YES.
SECTION 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly
Authorized Representative To Order Confiscation. In all cases of violation
of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department
Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of
any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or
abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the
commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with
pertinent laws, regulations and policies on the matter. (Underline ours)
It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his
duly authorized representatives are given the authority to confiscate and
forfeit any conveyances utilized in violating the Code or other forest laws,
rules and regulations. The phrase to dispose of the same is broad
enough to cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the
government. The only limitation is that it should be made in accordance
with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.
SECTION 68. xxx
xxx
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of
the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or
possessed, as well as the machinery, equipments, implements and tools
illegaly [sic] used in the area where the timber or forest products are
found. (Underline ours)
A reading, however, of the law persuades us not to go along with private
respondents' thinking not only because the aforequoted provision
apparently does not mention nor include conveyances that can be the
subject of confiscation by the courts, but to a large extent, due to the fact
that private respondents' interpretation of the subject provision unduly
restricts the clear intention of the law and inevitably reduces the other
provision of Section 68-A.
It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is a new provision authorizing the
DENR to confiscate, not only conveyances,' but forest products as well.
On the other hand, confiscation of forest products by the court' in a
criminal action has long been provided for in Section 68. If as private
respondents insist, the power on confiscation cannot be exercised except
only through the court under Section 68, then Section 68-A would have no
purpose at all.
it is clear that a suit for replevin can not be sustained against the
petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained by them for
administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Section 68-A of the P.
D. 705, as amended.
Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended, unquestionably warrants the
confiscation as well as the disposition by the Secretary of DENR or his
duly authorized representatives of the conveyances used in violating the
provision of forestry laws. Evidently, the continued possession or
detention of the truck by the petitioners for administrative forfeiture
proceeding is legally permissible, hence , no wrongful detention exists in
the case at bar.
OBITER DICTA:
(1) the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested by a
battery of cases is not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and
its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual
and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded
(1) when there is a violation of due process,
(2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question,
(3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction,
(4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency
concerned,
(5) when there is irreparable injury,
(6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter
ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter,
(7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be
unreasonable,
(8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim,
(9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings,
(10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy,
and
(11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention.
(2) the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the
protection, development and management of forest lands fall within the
primary and special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources.
(3) The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or
as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's
side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all
instances essential. The requirements are satisfied when the parties are
afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice
or hearing.
G.R. No. 95694 October 9, 1997VICENTE VILLAFLOR, substituted by
his heirs, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and NASIPIT LUMBER CO., INC.,
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The case is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal
of the CAs order affirming the dismissal by the lower court of
petitioners complaint against Private Respondent Nasipit Lumber Co.,
Incorporated. The synopsis of the case is as follows:
The Petitioner bought a large tract of land containing one hundred forty
(140) hectares to four (4) different owners in 1940. The land
was part of the public domain, but the petitioners predecessor in
interest over which he acquired the property, have been in open, exclusive
and notorious possession of the same for sometime. After acquisition,
petitioner asserts exclusive rights thereof for more than fifty (50) years. In 1946, petitioner
entered into a lease agreement with respondent Nasipit Lumber Co. Inc.
However, an Agreement for the Relinquishment of Rights
was entered into by both parties in 1950. The respondent
having complied all the requirements agreed upon, assumed
ownership and possession of the property since then.
Respondent corporation likewise filed a sales application in 1950 over
the property to bolster his claim which the Bureau of Land
otherwise granted on the same year as proof of an Order of
Award issued. In 1974 or twenty four (24) years had passed, when petitioner,
questioned and made several collateral and extraneous claims against the
respondent. However, the Bureau of Lands dismissed the claim,
arguing that petitioner no longer has any substantial rights
to question the validity of acquisition of the respondent
and the subsequent issuance of free patent by the Bureau of Lands.
Unperturbed, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration at
the Ministry of NaturalResources which likewise dismissed
the petition. On July 6, 1978, petitioner filed a complaint in
the trial court for Declaration of Nullity of Contract (Deed of
Relinquishment of Rights), Recovery of Possession (of two parcels
of land subject of the contract), and Damages" at about the same time that
he appealed the decision of the minister of natural resources to the Office of the
President. On January 28, 1983, petitioner died. Petitioners heir substituted in his behalf to
pursue the claim. Thetrial court in Butuan City who initially take cognizance of the case ordered
the case dismissed, on the grounds that: (1) petitioner admitted the due
execution and genuineness of the contract and was estopped from proving
its nullity, (2) the verbal
ease agreements were unenforceable under Article 1403 (2) (e) of the
Civil Code, and(3) his causes of action were barred by extinctive
prescription and/or laches. The heirs appealed to the CA which
likewise rendered judgment of dismissal by upholding the lower
courts ruling. Not satisfied, petitioner's heirs filed the instant
petition for review which the court granted, hence this petition.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner still has cause
of action to pursue claim of ownership over
the property since his rights thereon was
already transferred and relinquished to the
respondent by virtue of the Deed executed
thereon;
(2) Whether or not the private respondent cor
p o r a t i o n i s q u a l i f i e d t o a c q u i r e ownership over the
land of public domain.
Ruling: The petition is bereft of merit. The court ruled that the petitioner no
longer has a causeof action to demand declaration of nullity over the rights conferred to
respondents sincehis claimed thereof was merely based on speculations,
surmises and conjectures. Thepetitioners claim of ownership and rights
over the property was negated by proof thathe ceded the same to the respondent
by virtue of an Agreement on the Relinquishmentof Rights which they have
executed. The petitioner insistence that the court erred inaffirming his
cause is misplaced. The finding of the court and the agency which
acquireprimary jurisdiction over the petition, was accorded great weight by the court. As
to the prohibition that xxxx
corporation or association may not hold alienable land o f p u b l i c
domain except for lease not to exceed one thousand
hectares
, that court declared that xxx where the applicant had, before
the Constitution took effect, fully complied with all this
obligations under the Public Land Act in order to entitle him
to a Sales patent, there would be no legal or equitable
justification for refusing to issue or release the sales patent.
The requirements for a sales application under the Public
Land Act for a corporation to acquire ownership of public
domain, was essentially complied upon by the respondent,
hence no disqualification exist not to extend and validly
issued the confirmation of title over the
land in question to the respondent corporation.
All told, the only disqualification that can be imputed to private responde
nt is theprohibition in the 1973 Constitution against the holding of alienable
lands of the public domain by corporations. However, this Court
settled the matter, declaring that said constitutional prohibition
had no retroactive effect and could not prevail over a vested right t o t h e
land. Application for patent for and in behalf of
N a s i p i t h a s c l e a r l y n o impediment, for they have proven
satisfactory compliance of the requirements of the law.
Petition is DISMISSED.
- administrative agency would further prejudice respondent. In addition, the
Discuss the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction (or Prior Resort).
Held: Courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a
question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal,
especially where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact.
In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply this doctrine
to cases involving matters that demand the special competence of
administrative agencies even if the question involved is also judicial in
character. It applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts,
and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the
resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed
within the special competence of an administrative body; in such case, the
judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the
administrative body for its view.
In cases where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is clearly applicable, the
court cannot arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the
jurisdiction over which is lodged with an administrative body of special
competence. (Villaflor v. CA, 280 SCRA 297, Oct. 9, 1992, 3rd Div.
[Panganiban])
GREGORIO R. VIGILAR, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH), DPWH
UNDERSECRETARIES TEODORO E. ENCARNACION AND
EDMUNDO E. ENCARNACION AND EDMUNDO V. MIR, DPWH
ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOEL L. ALTEA, DPWH REGIONAL
DIRECTOR VICENTE B. LOPEZ, DPWH DISTRICT ENGINEER
ANGELITO M. TWAO, FELIX A. DESIERTO OF THE TECHNICAL
WORKING GROUP VALIDATION AND AUDITING TEAM, AND
LEONARDO ALVARO, ROMEO N. SUPAN, VICTORINO C. SANTOS
OF THE DPWH PAMPANGA 2ND ENGINEERING
DISTRICT,Petitioners vs. ARNULFO D. AQUINO,Respondent
SERENO, J.:
FACTS: Respondent was invited to bid for a dike project in Pampanga.
Respondent eventually won the bid, and finished constructing the dike.
However, petitioners, government officials of the DPWH, refused to pay
petitioner the contract price. Petitioners refuse because the contract is
void for violation of P.D. 1445, for absence of an appropriation.
Respondent brought suit in the RTC, which petitioners sought to dismiss,
raising the non-suability of the state, as well as non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies. The lower court ruled for the validity of the
contract and ordered payment for the project. Upon appeal, the Court of
Appeals reversed the ruling of the lower court and declared the contract
invalid. However, the CA ordered the Commission on Audit to determine
the value of the services rendered by respondent, and compensate him
based on quantum meruit.
ISSUES: Whether or not the case should have been dismissed for failure
to exhaust administrative remedies. Whether or not the case should have
been dismissed as it is a suit against the State, and the State may not be
sued. Whether or not it was proper for the CA to order payment for
respondent.
HELD: The petition is without merit.
Remedial Law: The rule for exhaustion of all administrative remedies
admits of several exceptions. Some of these obtain in the case at hand.
The further delay of respondent compensation will work injustice against
him, as the government and public has derived benefit from the dike
constructed for almost two decades already. Remanding the case to an
issue at hand is the validity of the contract, which is purely a question of
law. As such, only the courts may address the issue directly.
Civil Law: The non-suability of the State also admits of exceptions. In this
case, upholding such would lead to the State unjust enrichment, and
would work injustice against the respondent. The Court will not allow such
to occur. The CA was correct in declaring the contract void, but ordering
payment based on quantum meruit. The contract is illegal due to violations
of requirements of P.D. 1445. However, it is not illegal per se. As such, it
is only proper that respondent be compensated as the completed project
has already benefited the State and the public. Such a ruling is supported
by a long line of Jurisprudence.
- smuggling in Hong Kong. One person in the name of Joseph Abaca was
VIGILAR VS AQUINO
Facts: Angelito M. Twano, petitioner, the OIC District Engr. of DPWH
2nd Engineering District of Pampanga sent an Invitation to bid to
respondent Arnulfo D. Aquino (owner if AD Aquino Construction and
supplies). The bidding was for the construction of a dike by bull-dozing a
part of the Porac River. On July 7, 1992, the project was awarded to
respondent and a "Contract Agreement" has been executed with amount
of Php 1,873,790.69, to cover the project cost. On. July 9, 1992, the project
was completed. Respondent Aquino, however claimed that
Php1,262,696.20 was still due to him, but petitioners refused to pay. He
then, filed a complaint fort the collection of sum of money with damages
before RTC of Guagua. Petitioners has the following contentions, that the
Complaint was a suit against the State, respondent failed to exhaust
administrative remedies, Contract of Agreement was void for violating PD
1445 (Government Auditing Code)- appropriation and Certificate of
Availability of Funds.
On November 28, 2003, lower court ruled in favor of the respondent. The
lower court ordered DPWH to play Aquino the amount for the completion
of the project, Php 50,000 attorney's fees and cost if thus unit. On appeal,
CA reversed and set aside the decision. It said that Contract Agreement
is declared null and void. Dissatisfied with the Decision the Court of
Appeals, petitioners are seeking for the reversal of the appellate court's
decision and dismissal of the Complaint in civil case.
Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not dismissing the
complaint for failure or respondent to exhaust all administrative remedies
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the COA to allow payment
to Respondent on a Quantum Meruit Basis despite the latter's failure to
comply with the requirements of PD 1445Whether state immunity from suit
could be invoked by petitioners.
Held: The one involved in the case is the validity and enforceability of
the contract of agreement which are questions purely of law and clearly
beyond expertise of COA or DPWH. The Final Decision on the matter rests
not with them but with the courts of justice. Exhaustion of Administrative
remedies does not apply, because nothing of an administrative nature is
to be or can be done. The issue does not require technical knowledge and
experience but one that would involve the interpretation and application of
law. Even if the contracts were void for failing to meet requirements
mandated by law, the respondent should be compensated for services
rendered and work done. In the case of Eslao it was stated that "to deny
the payment to the contractor of the two buildings which were are almost
fully completed and presently occupied by the university would be to allow
the government to unjustly enrich itself at the expense of another. Justice
and equity demand compensation on the basis of quantum merut.
"Niether, can the petitioners escape the obligation to compensate
respondent for services rendered and work done by invoking state's
immunity from suit. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit
cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen.
Justice and equity sternly demand that the State's cloak of invincibility
against suit be shred in this particular instance and that the contractors be
duly compensated. WHERFORE, PETITION DENIED FOR LACK OF
MERIT.
PAL vs NLRC 1998
Facts: Private respondents (Ferdinand Pineda and Godofredo
Cabling) are flight stewards of the petitioner. Both were dismissed from
the service for their alleged involvement in the April 3, 1993currency
intercepted at theairport carrying a bag containing 2.5 million pesos who
allegedly found said plastic bag at the Skybedsection of arrival flight
PR300/03 where private respondents served as flight attendants. After
having been implicated by Abaca in the incident before the respondents
disciplinary board, it is was Abaca himself who gave exculpating
statements to the same board and declared that the private respondents
were not the owners of the said currencies. that just as petitioners thought
that they were already fully cleared of the charges, as they no longer
received any summons/notices on the intended additional hearings
mandated by the Disciplinary Board, that they were already fully cleared
of the charges, as they no longer received any summons/notices on the
intended additional hearings mandated by the Disciplinary Board, they
were surprised to find out that they were terminated by PAL.
Aggrieved by said dismissal, private respondents filed with the NLRC a
petition for injunction praying that: "I. Upon filing of this Petition, a
temporary restraining order be issued, prohibiting respondents (petitioner
herein) from effecting or enforcing the Decision dated Feb. 22, 1995, or
to reinstate petitioners temporarily while a hearing on the propriety of the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is being undertaken;
"II. After hearing, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction be issued
ordering respondent to reinstate petitioners to their former positions
pending the hearing of this case, or, prohibiting respondent from enforcing
its Decision dated February 22,1995 while this case is pending
adjudication;
"III. After hearing, that the writ of preliminary injunction as to the reliefs
sought for be made permanent, that petitioners be awarded full
backwages, moral damages of PHP 500,000.00 each and exemplary
damages of PHP 500,000.00 each, attorneys fees equivalent to ten
percent of whatever amount is awarded, and the costs of suit."
The NLRC issued the writ of injunction. PAL moved for reconsideration on
the ground that has no jurisdiction to issue an injunction or restraining
order since this may be issued only under Article 218 ofthe Labor Code if
the case involves or arises from labor disputes and thereby divesting the
labor arbiter ofits original and exclusive jurisdiction over illegal
dismissal cases .
Issue: W/N the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion on issuing
the writ of injunction.
Ruling: Yes.
Fabian vs Desierto
Facts: Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and president of
PROMAT Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was
engaged in the construction business with a certain Nestor Agustin.
Agustin was the incumbent District Engineer of the First Metro Manila
Engineering District (FMED).
Misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between Fabian
and Agustin. Fabian tried to terminate their relationship, but Agustin
refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts
of harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually filed
an administrative case against Agustin which eventually led an appeal to
the Ombudsman but the Ombudsman, Aniano Desierto, inhibited himself.
But the case was later referred to the deputy Ombudsman, Jesus
Guerrero.
The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the decision is final and
executory. Fabian appealed the case to the Supreme Court. She averred
that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989)
pertinently provides that:
In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing
a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice
of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for
reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act is valid.
HELD: No. It is invalid for it illegally expanded the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court. Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an
appeal to the SC from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription
in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases
the Appellate jurisdiction of the SC. No countervailing argument has been
cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional
prohibition. That constitutional provision was intended to give the SC a
measure of control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction.
Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its
appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the SC.
Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution is clear when it states that the
appellate jurisdiction of the SC contemplated therein is to be exercised
over final judgments and orders of lower courts, that is, the courts
composing the integrated judicial system. It does not include the quasi-
judicial bodies or agencies.
But what is the proper remedy?
Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are
now required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition
for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a
uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.
- spare parts of DPWH service vehicles in 2001.
FABIAN VS DESIERTO, AGUSTIN EN BANC
G.R. No. 129742. September 16, 1998 [Express Limitations to Power of
Legislation; Appellate Jurisdiction of the Court]
FACTS:
PROMAT participated in the bidding for government construction project
including those under the FMED. Later, misunderstanding and unpleasant
incidents developed between the parties. Fabian tried to terminate their
relationship but Agustin refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the
extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. She
eventually filed the aforementioned administrative case against him in a
letter-complaint dated July 24, 1995.
A complaint sought the dismissal of Agustin for violation of Section 19,
R.A. No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) and Section 36 of P.D. No. 807
(Civil Service Decree), with an ancillary prayer for his preventive
suspension. The case later led to an appeal to the Ombudsman - who
inhibited himself - and transferred the case to the Deputy Ombudsman.
The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and in the order exonerated the
private respondents from the administrative charges.
Fabian elevated the case to the SC, arguing that Section 27 of Republic
Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) that all administrative disciplinary
cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may
be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within
ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or
decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the
Supreme Court.
RULING:
No. Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an
appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription
in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases
the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has
been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional
prohibition which, as correctly explained in First Leparto Ceramics, Inc. vs.
The Court of Appeals, et al. was intended to give this Court a measure of
control over cases placed under its appellate Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the
indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction
would unnecessarily burden the Court.
Quarto v. Ombudsman Mandamus G.R. No. 169042
October 5, 2011
Brion, J:
Doctrine:
Manadamus cannot be used if there is other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law
Facts:
Petitioner Quarto is the Chief of the Central Equipment and Spare Parts
Division (CESPD), Bureau of Equipment (BOE), DPWH, Port
Area, Manila. As CESPD Chief, he is also the Head of the Special
Inspectorate Team (SIT) of the DPWH. The respondents are members of
the SIT.
DPWH Secretary Simeon Datumanong created a committee to investigate
alleged anomalous transactions involving the repairs and/or purchase of
DPWH-IAS learned that the emergency repairs and/or purchase of spare
parts of DPWH service did not actually take place, resulting in government
losses of approximately P143 million for this ten-month period alone.
DPWH-IAS filed before the Office of the Ombudsman a Complaint-
Affidavit charging several high-ranking DPWH officials and employees
including the petitioner, the respondents, and other private individuals who
purportedly benefited from the anomalous transactions with Plunder,
Money Laundering, Malversation, and violations of RA No. 3019 and the
Administrative Code.
Petitioner Quarto denied the allegations claiming that he merely relied on
his subordinates when he signed the job orders and the inspection
reports. In contrast, the respondents admitted the existence of
irregularities and offered to testify and to provide evidence against the
DPWH officials and employees involved in the anomaly in exchange for
their immunity from prosecution.
After conducting preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman filed with the
Sandiganbayan charging a number of DPWH officials and employees with
plunder, estafa through falsification of official/commercial documents and
violation of Section 3(e), RA No. 3019.Furthermore, the Ombudsman
granted the respondents request for immunity in exchange for their
testimonies and cooperation in the prosecution of the cases filed.
The petitioner initially filed a certiorari petition with the Sandiganbayan,
questioning the Ombudsmans grant of immunity in the respondents favor.
However, the Sandiganbayan, however, dismissed the petition for lack of
jurisdiction and advised the petitioner to instead question the
Ombudsmans actions before this Court. Hence, this present petition.
In the petition, the petitioner argues that the Ombudsman should have
included the respondents in the informations since it was their
inspection reports that actually paved the way for the commission of
the alleged irregularities. By excluding the respondents in the
informations, the Ombudsman is engaged in selective prosecution which
is a clear case of grave abuse of discretion. Thus, there should be absolute
necessity for the testimony of the proposed witness and that he/she should
not appear to be the most guilty. The petitioner claims that the
respondents failed to comply with these conditions as the Ombudsmans
evidence.
Issues: Whether or not petition for certiorari and mandamus is filed
correctly?
Whether or not an immunity statute does not, and cannot, rule
out a review by the Supreme Court of the Ombudsmans exercise of
discretion?
Held: No, petition for certiorari and mandamus is not filed correctly.
In this case, yes, an immunity statute does not, and cannot, rule out a
review by the Supreme Court of the Ombudsmans exercise of discretion
Ratio: As extraordinary writs, both Sections 1 (certiorari) and 3
(mandamus), Rule 65 of the Rules of Court require, as a pre-condition for
these remedies, that there be no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. In the present case, the petitioner
has not shown that he moved for a reconsideration of the assailed
resolutions based substantially on the same grounds stated in this present
petition. Petitioner did not file a motion for the inclusion of the respondents
in the informations before filing the present petition. These are adequate
remedies that the petitioner chose to forego and proceed to exercise
certiorari.
Likewise, the petitioner has not shown that he filed the present petition
with this Court within the sixty-day reglementary period from notice of the
assailed Ombudsmans resolutions. He did not do so, of course, since he
initially and erroneously filed a certiorari petition with the
Sandiganbayan. We remind the petitioner that the remedy from the
Ombudsmans orders or resolutions in criminal cases is to file a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65with this Court.
Mandamus is the proper remedy to compel the performance of a
ministerial duty imposed by law upon the respondent. In matters involving
the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus may only be resorted
to, to compel the respondent to take action. It cannot be used to direct the
manner or the particular way discretion is to be exercised.
In the exercise of his investigatory and prosecutorial powers, the
Ombudsman is generally no different from an ordinary prosecutor in
determining who must be charged. He also enjoys the same latitude
of discretion in determining what constitutes sufficient evidence to
support a finding of probable cause (that must be established for the
filing of an information in court) and the degree of participation of
those involved or the lack thereof. His findings and conclusions on
these matters are not ordinarily subject to review by the courts except
when he gravely abuses his discretion, which is when his action amounts
to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or when he acts outside the contemplation of law.
Like all other officials under our constitutional scheme of government, all
their acts must adhere to the Constitution. The parameters of the Supreme
Court, however, are narrow. In the first place, what the Supreme Court
reviews are executive acts of a constitutionally independent
Ombudsman. Also, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Since the
determination of the requirements under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules
of Court is highly factual in nature, the Court must thus generally defer to
the judgment of the Ombudsman who is in a better position (than the
Sandiganbayan or the defense) to know the relative strength and/or
weakness of the evidence presently in his possession and the kind, tenor
and source of testimony he needs to enable him to prove his case. It
should not be forgotten, too, that the grant of immunity effectively but
conditionally results in the extinction of the criminal liability the accused-
witnesses might have incurred, as defined in the terms of the grant. This
point is no less important as the grant directly affects the individual and
enforces his right against self-incrimination. These dynamics should be a
constant reminder to the Supreme Court to tread softly, but not any less
critically, in its review of the Ombudsmans grant of immunity. The
Supreme Courts room for intervention only occurs when a clear and grave
abuse of the exercise of discretion is shown
St. Martin Funeral vs. NLRC
G.R. 130866 September 16, 1998 295
SCRA 494
Regalado, J.:
FACTS: Private respondent alleges that he started working as
Operations Manager of petitioner St. Martin Funeral Home on
February 6, 1995. However, there was no contract of
employment executed between him and petitioner nor was his name
included in the semi-monthly payroll. On January 22, 1996, he was
dismissed from his employment for allegedly misappropriating
P38,000.00. Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent
was not its employee but only the uncle of Amelita Malabed, the owner of
petitioner St. Martins Funeral Home and in January 1996, the mother of
Amelita passed away, so the latter took over the management of the
business. Amelita made some changes in the business operation and
private respondent and his wife were no longer allowed to
participate in the management thereof. As a consequence,
the latter filed a complaint charging that petitioner had
illegally terminated his employment. The labor arbiter rendered a
decision in favor of petitioner declaring that no employer-employee
relationship existed between the parties and therefore his office had no
jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE: WON the decision of the NLRC are appealable to the Court of
Appeals.
RULING: Yes. NLRC decisions are appealable to the Court of Appeals.
First established in 1972, decisions of NLRC were declared to be
appealable to the Secretary of labor and, ultimately to the President. But
under the present state law, there is no provision for appeals from NLRC
decisions. The court held that there is an underlying power of the courts
to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction
even though not right of review is given by statute, that the purpose of
jurisdiction review is to keep the administrative agency within its
jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights of the parties; and that is part
of the checks and balances which restricts the separation of powers and
forestalls arbitrary and unjust jurisdictions.

Subsequently under RA 7902, effective March 1995, the mode for judicial
review over NLRC decisions in that of a petition for Certiorari under Rule
65. The same confuses by declaring that the CA has no appellate
jurisdiction over decisions falling within the appellate jurisdiction of SC,
including the NLRC decisions.
Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of BP 129 to supposed
appeals from NLRC to SC are interpreted and hereby declared to mean
and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. All such petitions should
henceforth be initially filed in the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as
appropriate forum for the relief desired. Case remanded to CA.
--
ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and BIENVENIDO
ARICAYOS, respondents.
FACTS: Private respondent alleges that he started working as
Operations Manager of petitioner St. Martin Funeral Home on February 6,
1995. However, there was no contract of employment executed between
him and petitioner nor was his name included in the semi-monthly payroll.
On January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his employment for allegedly
misappropriating P38,000.00 which was intended for payment by
petitioner of its value added tax (VAT) to the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR).
Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent was not its
employee but only the uncle of Amelita Malabed, the owner of petitioner
St. Martins Funeral Home. Sometime in 1995, private respondent, who
was formerly working as an overseas contract worker, asked for financial
assistance from the mother of Amelita. Since then, as an indication of
gratitude, private respondent voluntarily helped the mother of Amelita in
overseeing the business.
January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed away, so the latter then took
over the management of the business. She then discovered that there
were arrears in the payment of taxes and other government fees, although
the records purported to show that the same were already paid. Amelita
then made some changes in the business operation and private
respondent and his wife were no longer allowed to participate in the
management thereof. As a consequence, the latter filed a complaint
charging that petitioner had illegally terminated his employment.
the labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of petitioner on October 25,
1996 declaring that no employer-employee relationship existed between
the parties and, therefore, his office had no jurisdiction over the case.
private respondent appealed to the NLRC. NLRC remanded the case to
LA. MR was filed by the petitioner which was denied.
RULING:
1) HISTORY: the legal history of the NLRC. It was first established in the
Department of Labor by P.D. No. 21 on October 14, 1972, and its
decisions were expressly declared to be appealable to the Secretary of
Labor and, ultimately, to the President of the Philippines.
May 1, 1974, P.D. No. 442 enacted the Labor Code of the Philippines, the
same to take effect six months after its promulgation. 8 Created and
regulated therein is the present NLRC which was attached to the
Department of Labor and Employment for program and policy coordination
only. 9 Initially, Article 302 (now, Article 223) thereof also granted an
aggrieved party the remedy of appeal from the decision of the NLRC to
the Secretary of Labor, but P.D. No. 1391 subsequently amended said
provision and abolished such appeals. No appellate review has since then
been provided for.
the argument that this Court has no jurisdiction to review the decisions of
the NLRC, and formerly of the Secretary of Labor, since there is no legal
provision for appellate review thereof, the Court nevertheless rejected that
thesis. It held that there is an underlying power of the courts to scrutinize
the acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though
no right of review is given by statute; that the purpose of judicial review is
to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect the
substantial rights of the parties; and that it is that part of the checks and
balances which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary
and unjust adjudications.
the remedy of the aggrieved party is to timely file a motion for
reconsideration as a precondition for any further or subsequent remedy,
12 and then seasonably avail of the special civil action of certiorari under
Rule 65, 13 for which said Rule has now fixed the reglementary period of
sixty days from notice of the decision. Curiously, although the 10-day
period for finality of the decision of the NLRC may already have lapsed as
contemplated in Section 223 of the Labor Code, it has been held that this
Court may still take cognizance of the petition for certiorari on jurisdictional
and due process considerations if filed within the reglementary period
under Rule 65.
The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that ever since appeals
from the NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative
intendment was that the special civil action of certiorari was and still is the
proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the NLRC. The use of the
word appeal in relation thereto and in the instances we have noted could
have been a lapsus plumae because appeals by certiorari and the original
action for certiorari are both modes of judicial review addressed to the
appellate courts. The important distinction between them, however, and
with which the Court is particularly concerned here is that the special civil
action of certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this Court
and the Court of Appeals; 23 whereas to indulge in the assumption that
appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court are allowed would not
subserve, but would subvert, the intention of Congress as expressed in
the sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No. 1495.
2) Appeal.
-review of NLRC Decision is through Rule 65.
-jurisdiction: SC AND CA
-by way of hierarchy: the review shall be initially filed before CA.
G.R. No. 161596 : February 20, 2013
ROBERTO BORDOMEO, JAYME SARMIENTO and GREGORIO
BARREDO, Petitioners, v .COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SECRETARY
OF LABOR, and INTERNATIONAL PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.,
Respondents.
BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS:
In 1989, the IPI Employees Union-Associated Labor Union (Union),
representing the workers, had a bargaining deadlock with the IPI
management. This deadlock resulted in the Union staging a strike and IPI
ordering a lockout.
On December 26, 1990, after assuming jurisdiction over the dispute,
DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres found the IPI Employees Union-ALU as
the exclusive bargaining agent of all rank and file employees of ALU
including sales personnel; dismissed the complaints for ULP against the
company; dismissed the Company petition to declare the strike illegal;
ordering the reinstatement with full backwages of 45 employees and
ordering the reinstatement of another 5 employees.
IPI assailed the issuances of Secretary Torres directly in this Court
through a petition for certiorari but the Court dismissed its petition on
October 14, 1992 on the ground that no grave abuse of discretion had
attended the issuance of the assailed decisions. Considering that IPI did
not seek the reconsideration of the dismissal of its petition, the entry of
judgment issued in due course on January 19, 1994.
With the finality of the December 26, 1990 and December 5, 1991 orders
of the DOLE Secretary, the Union, represented by the Seno, Mendoza and
Associates Law Office, moved in the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board in DOLE, Region VII on June 8, 1994 for their execution. On
November 21, 1994, one Atty. Audie C. Arnado, who had meanwhile
entered his appearance on October 4, 1994 as the counsel of 15 out of
the 50 employees named likewise filed a so-called Urgent Motion for
Execution. Both motions were granted.
On July 11, 1995, IPI challenged the May 24, 1995 writ of execution issued
in favor of the 15 employees by filing its Appeal and Prohibition with Prayer
for Temporary Restraining Order in the Office of then DOLE
Undersecretary Cresenciano Trajano.
On December 22, 1995,Acting DOLE Secretary Jose Brillantes, acting on
IPI appeal, recalled and quashed the May 24, 1995 writ of execution, and
declared and considered the case closed and terminated.
Aggrieved, the 15 employees sought the reconsideration of the December
22, 1995 Order of Acting DOLE Secretary Brillantes.
On August 27, 1996, DOLE Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing granted
the Motion for Reconsideration, and reinstated the May 24, 1995 writ of
execution, subject to the deduction of the sum of P745,959.39 already
paid pursuant to quitclaims from the award of P4,162,361.50. Secretary
Quisumbing declared the quitclaims executed by the employees on
December 2, 3, and 17, 1993 without the assistance of the proper office
of the DOLE unconscionable for having been entered into under
circumstances showing vitiation of consent; and ruled that the execution
of the quitclaims should not prevent the employees from recovering their
monetary claims under the final and executory decisions dated December
26, 1990 and December 5, 1991, less the amounts received under the
quitclaims.
On September 3, 1996, and pending resolution of IPI motion for
reconsideration, Regional Director Macarayaissued a writ of execution in
favor of the 15 employees represented by Atty. Arnado to recover
P3,416,402.10pursuant to the order dated August 27, 1996 of Secretary
Quisumbing. Thereafter, the sheriff garnished the amount of
P3,416,402.10 out of the funds of IPI with China Banking Corporation,
which released the amount. Hence, on September 11, 1996, the 15
employees represented by Atty. Arnado executed a Satisfaction of
Judgment and Quitclaim/Release upon receipt of their respective portions
of the award, subject to the reservation of their right to claim "unsatisfied
amounts of separation pay as well as backwages reckoned from the date
after 15 March 1995 and up to the present, or until separation pay is fully
paid."
Notwithstanding the execution of the satisfaction of judgment and
quitclaim/release, Atty. Arnado still filed an omnibus motion not only in
behalf of the 15 employees but also in behalf of other employees named
in the notice of computation/execution, with the exception of the second
group, seeking another writ of execution to recover the further sum of
P58,546,767.83.
On December 24, 1997, Secretary Quisumbing, affirming his August 27,
1996 order, denied IPI Motion for Reconsideration for being rendered
moot and academic by the full satisfaction of the May 24, 1995 writ of
execution. He also denied Atty. Arnado omnibus motion for lack of merit;
and dealt with the issue involving the June 5, 1995 writ of execution issued
in favor of the second group of employees, which the Court eventually
resolved in the decision promulgated in G.R. No. 164633.
Ultimately, on July 4, 2001, DOLE Secretary Patricia Sto. Tomas declaring
that the full execution of the case "completely CLOSED and
TERMINATED."
Only herein petitioners Roberto Bordomeo, Anecito Cupta, Jaime
Sarmiento and Virgilio Saragena assailed the July 4, 2001 order of
Secretary Sto. Tomas by petition for certiorari in the CA. The CA denied
the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in denying the petition for certiorari.
HELD:
REMEDIAL LAW
An appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, to be taken to the Supreme Court within 15 days from notice of
the judgment or final order raising only questions of law, was the proper
remedy available to the petitioners. Hence, their filing of the petition for
certiorari on January 9, 2004 to assail the CA May 30, 2003 decision and
October 30, 2003 resolution in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 65970 upon their
allegation of grave abuse of discretion committed by the CA was improper.
The averment therein that the CA gravely abused its discretion did not
warrant the filing of the petition for certiorari, unless the petition further
showed how an appeal in due course under Rule 45 was not an adequate
remedy for them. By virtue of its being an extraordinary remedy, certiorari
cannot replace or substitute an adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law, like an appeal in due course.
An appeal may also avail to review and correct any grave abuse of
discretion committed by an inferior court, provided it will be adequate for
that purpose.
It is the adequacy of a remedy in the ordinary course of law that
determines whether a special civil action forcertiorari can be a proper
alternative remedy. In Heirs of Spouses Teofilo M. Reterta and Elisa
Reterta v. Spouses Lorenzo Mores and Virginia Lopez, the Court held:
Specifically, the Court has held that the availability of appeal as a remedy
does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent or preclude a party from
making use of certiorari if appeal is not an adequate remedy, or an equally
beneficial, or speedy remedy. It is inadequacy, not the mere absence of
all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ,
that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari. A remedy is plain,
speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the
injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or
agency. It is understood, then, that a litigant need not mark time by
resorting to the less speedy remedy of appeal in order to have an order
annulled and set aside for being patently void for failure of the trial court
to comply with the Rules of Court.
Nor should the petitioner be denied the recourse despite certiorari not
being available as a proper remedy against an assailed order, because it
is better on balance to look beyond procedural requirements and to
overcome the ordinary disinclination to exercise supervisory powers in
order that a void order of a lower court may be controlled to make it
conformable to law and justice. Verily, the instances in which certiorari will
issue cannot be defined, because to do so is to destroy the
comprehensiveness and usefulness of the extraordinary writ. The wide
breadth and range of the discretion of the court are such that authority is
not wanting to show that certiorari is more discretionary than either
prohibition or mandamus, and that in the exercise of superintending
control over inferior courts, a superior court is to be guided by all the
circumstances of each particular case "as the ends of justice may require."
Thus, the writ will be granted whenever necessary to prevent a substantial
wrong or to do substantial justice.
Even so, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court still requires the petition for
certiorari to comply with the following requisites, namely: (1) the writ of
certiorari is directed against a tribunal, a board, or an officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board, or officer has
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Jurisprudence recognizes certain situations when the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari may be deemed proper, such as: (a) when it is
necessary to prevent irreparable damages and injury to a party; (b) where
the trial judge capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment; (c)
where there may be danger of a failure of justice; (d) where an appeal
would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient; (e) where the issue raised is
one purely of law; (f) where public interest is involved; and (g) in case of
urgency.Yet, a reading of the petition for certiorari and its annexes reveals
that the petition does not come under any of the situations. Specifically,
the petitioners have not shown that the grant of the writ of certiorari will be
necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice to
them.
In dismissing the petitionerspetition for certiorari, the CA in effect upheld
the Secretary of Labor declaration in her assailed July 4, 2001 decision
that the full satisfaction of the writs of execution had completely closed
and terminated the labor dispute.
Yet, the petitioners have ascribed grave abuse of discretion to the CA for
doing so.There is no just cause to now issue the writ of certiorari in order
to set aside the CA assailed May 30, 2003 decision. There is nothing on
the records to support the allegation of petitioners that the Secretary of
Labor and Employment abused her discretion.
LABOR LAW
The records contradict the petitioners insistence that the two writs of
execution to enforce the December 26, 1990 and December 5, 1991
orders of the DOLE Secretary were only partially satisfied. To recall, the
two writs of execution issued were the one for P4,162,361.50, later
reduced to P3,416,402.10, in favor of the 15 employees represented by
Atty. Arnado, and that for P1,200,378.92 in favor of the second group of
employees led by Banquerigo.
There is no question that the 15 employees represented by Atty. Arnado,
inclusive of the petitioners, received their portion of the award covered by
the September 3, 1996 writ of execution for the amount ofP3,416,402.10
through the release of the garnished deposit of IPI at China Banking
Corporation. That was why they then executed the satisfaction of
judgment and quitclaim/release, the basis for the DOLE Secretary to
expressly declare in her July 4, 2001 decision that the full satisfaction of
the writ of execution "completely CLOSED and TERMINATED this case."
Still, the 15 employees demand payment of their separation pay and
backwages from March 16, 1995 onwards pursuant to their reservation
reflected in the satisfaction of judgment and quitclaim/release they
executed on September 11, 1996.
The demand lacked legal basis. Although the decision of the DOLE
Secretary had required IPI to reinstate the affected workers to their former
positions with full backwages reckoned from December 8, 1989 until
actually reinstated without loss of seniority rights and other benefits, the
reinstatement thus decreed was no longer possible. Hence, separation
pay was instead paid to them. This alternative was sustained in law and
jurisprudence, for "separation pay may avail in lieu of reinstatement if
reinstatement is no longer practical or in the best interest of the parties.
Separation pay in lieu of reinstatement may likewise be awarded if the
employee decides not to be reinstated."
Under the circumstances, the employment of the 15 employees or the
possibility of their reinstatement terminated by March 15, 1995.
Thereafter, their claim for separation pay and backwages beyond March
15, 1995 would be unwarranted. The computation of separation pay and
backwages due to illegally dismissed employees should not go beyond
the date when they were deemed to have been actually separated from
their employment, or beyond the date when their reinstatement was
rendered impossible. Anent this, the Court has observed in Golden Ace
Builders v. Talde:
The basis for the payment of backwages is different from that for the award
of separation pay. Separation pay is granted where reinstatement is no
longer advisable because of strained relations between the employee and
the employer. Backwages represent compensation that should have been
earned but were not collected because of the unjust dismissal. The basis
for computing backwages is usually the length of the employee service
while that for separation pay is the actual period when the employee was
unlawfully prevented from working.
Clearly then, respondent is entitled to backwages and separation pay as
his reinstatement has been rendered impossible due to strained relations.
As correctly held by the appellate court, the backwages due respondent
must be computed from the time he was unjustly dismissed until his actual
reinstatement, or from February 1999 until June 30, 2005 when his
reinstatement was rendered impossible without fault on his part.
DISMISSED.
NEW SUN VALLEY HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,
versus Sangguniang Barangay, Barangay Sun Valley, Paraaque City,
Roberto Guevarra IN HIS CAPACITY AS Punong Barangay and MEMBERS
OF THE SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY, Respondents., G.R. No. 156686,
2011 July
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
against the Decision[1] dated October 16, 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 65559 and
the Resolution[2] dated January 17, 2003, both of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are as follows:
The Sangguniang Barangay of Barangay Sun Valley (the BSV Sangguniang
Barangay) issued BSV Resolution No. 98-096[3] on October 13, 1998,
entitled Directing the New Sun Valley Homeowners Association to Open
Rosemallow and Aster Streets to Vehicular and Pedestrian Traffic, the
pertinent portions of which read as follows:
NOW, THEREFORE, be it resolved as it is hereby resolved by the
Sangguniang Barangay in session assembled that
1. Pursuant to its power and authority under the Local Government Code of
1991 (Rep. Act No. 7160), the New Sun Valley Homeowners Association
(NSVHA) is hereby directed to open Rosemallow and Aster Sts. to vehicular
(private cars only) and pedestrian traffic at all hours daily except from 11 p.m.
to 5 a.m. at which time the said streets may be closed for the sake of the
security of the residents therein.
2. The Barangay government take steps to address the security concerns of
the residents of the area concerned, including the possible assignment of a
barangay tanod or traffic enforcer therein, within the limits of the authority and
financial capability of the Barangay.
3. This Resolution shall become executory within 72 hours upon receipt hereof
by the Association or any of its members.[4]
The New Sun Valley Homeowners Association, Inc. (NSVHAI), represented
by its President, Marita Cortez, filed a Petition[5] for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction/Permanent Injunction with prayer for issuance of TRO with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque City. This was docketed as Civil
Case No. 98-0420. NSVHAI claimed therein that the implementation of BSV
Resolution No. 98-096 would cause grave injustice and irreparable injury as
[the] affected homeowners acquired their properties for strictly residential
purposes;[6] that the subdivision is a place that the homeowners envisioned
would provide them privacy and a peaceful neighborhood, free from the
hassles of public places;[7] and that the passage of the Resolution would
destroy the character of the subdivision. NSVHAI averred that contrary to what
was stated in the BSV Resolution, the opening of the gates of the subdivision
would not in any manner ease the traffic congestion in the area, and that there
were alternative routes available. According to NSVHAI, the opening of the
proposed route to all kinds of vehicles would result in contributing to the traffic
build-up on Doa Soledad Avenue, and that instead of easing the traffic flow,
it would generate a heavier volume of vehicles in an already congested choke
point. NSVHAI went on to state that a deterioration of the peace and order
condition inside the subdivision would be inevitable; that the maintenance of
peace and order in the residential area was one of the reasons why entry and
exit to the subdivision was regulated by the Association and why the passing
through of vehicles was controlled and limited; and that criminal elements
would take advantage of the opening to public use of the roads in question.[8]
NSVHAI further contested the BSV Resolution by submitting the following
arguments to the RTC:
12. The road network inside the subdivision and drainage system is not
designed to withstand the entry of a heavy volume of vehicles especially
delivery vans and trucks. Thus, destruction of the roads and drainage system
will result. The safety, health and well-being of the residents will face
continuous danger to their detriment and prejudice;
13. When the residents bought their residential properties, they also paid
proportionately for the roads and the park in then subdivision. They have
therefore an existing equity on these roads. To open the roads to public use is
a violation of the rights and interests to a secure, peaceful and healthful
environment;
14. Aside from the availability of a better route to be opened, there are other
ways to ease traffic flow. The continuous presence of traffic enforcers on all
identified traffic choke points will prevent snarls which impede smooth travel.
The strict enforcement of traffic rules and regulations should be done;
15. There are a lot of undisciplined drivers of tricycles, jeepneys, trucks and
delivery [vans], which contribute to the traffic congestion. The barangay should
require these drivers to observe road courtesy and obedience to traffic
rules[.][9]
Executive Judge Helen Bautista-Ricafort of the RTC issued a Temporary
Restraining Order[10] (TRO) in Civil Case No. 98-0420 on October 30,
1998. Said Order provides:
Acting on the Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction/ Permanent
Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, filed by
plaintiff and considering that there is extreme urgency, such that unless the
same is issued, plaintiff would suffer grave injustice and/or irreparable injury,
let a Temporary Restraining Order issue directing the Sangguniang Barangay
as represented by Punong Barangay Roberto Guevarra to cease and desist
from the implementation of Resolution No. 98-096 or otherwise maintain the
status quo until further Orders of this Court.
This Temporary Restraining Order shall be effective for seventy two (72) hours
from issuance hereof, unless extended by another Order of this Court.
Let this case be set for special raffle and conference on November 3, 1998 at
10:30 in the morning.
On November 3, 1998, the RTC issued another Order[11] stating that, by
agreement of the parties, the status quo shall be maintained for seventeen
(17) more days, and that the case was set for hearing on the prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on November 20, 1998 at 8:30 a.m.
NSVHAI submitted an Amended Petition[12] on November 13, 1998, at about
11:10 a.m., wherein it claimed that the BSV Sangguniang Barangay had no
jurisdiction over the opening of Rosemallow and Aster Streets (the subject
roads). NSVHAI likewise attached to its Amended Petition its Position
Paper[13] dated July 21, 1998, which set forth its objection to the opening of
the subject roads for public use and argued that a Barangay Resolution cannot
validly cause the opening of the subject roads because under the law, an
ordinance is required to effect such an act.[14]
The BSV Sangguniang Barangay filed its Motion to Dismiss[15] likewise on
November 13, 1998. The copy provided by petitioner to the Court indicates
the time of receipt by NSVHAI as 11:00 a.m.[16]
The RTC heard the case on November 20, 1998, as scheduled, and thereafter
submitted the matter for decision.[17] On the same date, the RTC issued the
following Order[18]:
Acting on the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction filed by
petitioner, it appearing that petitioner may suffer grave injustice or irreparable
injury, let a writ of preliminary injunction issue prohibiting the Sangguniang
Barangay represented by Punong Barangay Roberto Guevarra from
implementing Resolution no. 98-096 until further orders from this Court.
Petitioner is directed to file a bond in the amount of ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS (sic) to answer for damages to
defendants in the event the Court finds petitioner is not entitled to said
injunction.
The BSV Sangguniang Barangay filed on December 4, 1998 a Motion for
Reconsideration and to Dissolve Preliminary Injunction (with Memorandum of
Authorities).[19]
NSVHAI then filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Expunge on December 10,
1998, moving to declare the above motion of the BSV Sangguniang Barangay
as a mere scrap of paper for being filed out of time and for failure to serve a
copy thereof to the counsel of petitioner.
The RTC subsequently dismissed the case in an Order[20] dated August 17,
1999, stating as follows:
Defendant Barangay Sun Valley moves to dismiss the instant case on the
grounds that the complaint states no cause of action and the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter. In summary, defendant alleges that the
subject streets Aster and Rosemallow inside Sun Valley Subdivision are
owned by the local government. Such streets have long been part of the public
domain and beyond the commerce of man. In support of this, defendant cited
the case of White Plains Association, Inc. vs. Legaspi, 193 SCRA 765 wherein
it was held that road lots of subdivisions constitute a part of the mandatory
open space reserved for public use; ownership of which is automatically
vested in the Republic of the Philippines although it is still registered in the
name of the developer/owner, its donation to the government is a mere
formality. The power or authority to close or open the said streets is vested in
the local government units and not on homeowners associations, pursuant to
Section 21 of the local Government Code (RA 7160) quoted as follows:
Section 21. Closure and Opening of Roads. (a) A local government unit may,
pursuant to an ordinance, permanently or temporarily close or open any local
road, alley, park, or square falling within its jurisdiction x x x. In view thereof,
Resolution No. 98-096 was passed by the Sangguniang Barangay. Hence
there is no right whatsoever on the part of Plaintiff NSVHA entitled to the
protection of the law. Further, defendant contends that petitioner failed to
exhaust administrative remedies as ordained in Sections 32 and 57 of the
Local Government Code giving the city mayor the supervisory power, and the
power of review by the Sangguniang Panlungsod, respectively.
No opposition to the motion to dismiss was filed by the Plaintiff.
Same defendant seeks to reconsider the order granting the issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction alleging that there is a pending motion to dismiss
and Plaintiff has not been able to establish an actually existing right.
Plaintiff has not filed an opposition thereto, instead it filed an urgent ex-parte
motion to expunge the motion for reconsideration on the ground that its
counsel has not been furnished with a copy of the motion for reconsideration,
but the record shows that Maria Cortez (plaintiffs representative) has received
a copy of said motion.
After considering the arguments of the parties in their respective pleadings,
this court hereby resolves as follows:
1. The Motion for Reconsideration and the Urgent Ex-parte Motion to
Expunge (motion for reconsideration) are Denied being devoid of merit; and
2. The Motion to Dismiss is hereby Granted for failure of the plaintiff to
exhaust the administrative remedies under Sections 32 and 57 of the Local
Government Code.
WHEREFORE, let this case be as it is hereby ordered Dismissed. The writ of
preliminary injunction is hereby lifted.[21]
NSVHAI filed a Motion for Reconsideration[22] of the above-quoted Order but
this was denied by the RTC for lack of merit in an Order[23] dated September
21, 1999.
NSVHAI raised the matter to the Court of Appeals and the case was docketed
as CA-G.R. CV No. 65559. NSVHAI alleged that despite the lack of the
required hearing [24] and without any order requiring it to submit its
Comment/Opposition to the BSV Sangguniang Barangays Motion to Dismiss
or that of submitting said Motion for resolution, Judge Bautista-Ricafort issued
an Order which, to NSVHAIs complete surprise, granted the Motion. NSVHAI
argued that the RTC gravely erred in taking cognizance of, and thereafter
ruling on, said Motion and refusing to exercise jurisdiction over the subject
matter of Civil Case No. 98-0420. Petitioner likewise argued that the RTC
committed serious errors which, if not corrected, would cause grave or
irreparable injury to petitioner and cause a violation of law.[25]
The BSV Sangguniang Barangay, Roberto Guevarra in his capacity as
Punong Barangay, and members of the Sangguniang Barangay (hereinafter,
respondents), in their Appellees Brief, argued as follows:
I open space and road lots of Sun Valley Subdivision is already owned by the
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS-
APPELLEES MOTION TO DISMISS DUE TO LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION
AND JURISPRUDENCE OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER AND
APPELLANTS FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES. AS
NOTED BY THE COURT, NO OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION TO DISMISS
WAS EVER FILED BY APPELLANT.
II
THE TRIAL COURTS DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION ASSAILING ITS
SUBJECT-MATTER, BARANGAY RESOLUTION NO. 98-096, CONSISTING
OF A DIRECTIVE OF AN LGU TO A DEFIANT PRIVATE ORGANIZATION
WITHIN ITS JURISDICTION, IS JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF THE SOLE
COMPETENCE AND WISE DISCRETION OF THE BARANGAY OVER A
LOCAL TRAFFIC PROBLEM.
III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ANY SERIOUS ERROR,
PROCEDURAL OR SUBSTANTIVE, AS FOUND BY THE COURT A QUO. IT
IS APPELLANT THAT HAS COMMITTED THE ERROR OF NOT
EXHAUSTING ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES. HENCE, NO GRAVE OR
IRREPARABLE INJURY CAN BE CAUSED TO APPELLANT FOR IT HAS NO
RIGHT TO PROTECT.[26]
Respondents claimed that Barangay Resolution No. 98-096 was simply a
directive to petitioner, a private aggrupation of some self-seeking
homeowners,[27] and was just a measure of internal policy among residents;
that the opening of roads for traffic reasons was within the sole competence
of the barangay to determine;[28] and the Mayor could have chosen, as it was
within his power to do so, to cause the demolition of the gates, which were
illegally built by petitioner and therefore were obstructions on the road, even
without a Barangay resolution. Respondents likewise claimed that the BSVs
action could be considered a political question, which should be essentially
withdrawn from judicial cognizance, and constitutional law doctrine provides
that the courts would not interfere with political issues unless grave abuse of
discretion is shown, of which there was none on the part of the
Barangay. Respondents argued that petitioner did not have any actual legal
right entitled to the protection of the law.[29]
Respondents attached to their Appellees Brief six documents, labeled as
Annexes 2 to 7, all stamped Certified True Copy by a certain Roman E.
Loreto, Legal Officer II of Legal Department.[30] The detailed information
contained in each of the documents that comprise respondents Annexes 2
to 7 is copied below:
1. 1st Indorsement[31] from the Office of the Mayor of Paraaque dated May
20, 1988, signed by Luzviminda A. Concepcion, Administrative Officer II,
stating as follows:
Respectfully indorsed to Atty. Antonio G. Cruz, Municipal Attorney, of this
municipality the herein attached Original Copies of Transfer Certificate of Title
for Sun Valley Open Space and Road Lots with TCT Nos. 133552, 119836,
and 122443 for your appropriate actions.
2. Letter[32] dated December 27, 1990 from Francisco B. Jose, Jr., Municipal
Attorney of Paraaque, addressed to the Municipal Council Secretary, which
reads:
This has reference to your request dated December 18, 1990 relative to the
letter of inquiry of the Barangay Captain of Barangay Sun Valley dated
December 13, 1990.
We wish to inform you that based on the available records of our office the
Municipal Government of Paraaque as evidenced by TCT NOS. 133552,
119836, and 122443. Copies of which are hereto attached for your ready
reference.
Considering that the Municipality of Paraaque is the registered owner of the
road lots of Sun Valley Subdivision, we are of the opinion that the roads
become public in use and ownership, and therefore, use of the roads by
persons other than residents of the Subdivision can no longer be curtailed.
However, should the Municipal Government decides to delegate its right to
regulate the use of the said roads to the Sun Valley Homeowners Association
or Sun Valley Barangay Council, such right may be exercise[d] by said
association or council.
3. Certification[33] dated October 8, 1990 issued by Francisco B. Jose, Jr.
under the letterhead of the Office of the Municipal Attorney of Paraaque,
which reads:
This is to certify that based on the available records of this Office, the open
space and road lots of Sun Valley Subdivision has been donated and now
owned by the Municipality of Paranaque, as evidenced by TCT Nos. 133552,
119836, and 122443 copies of which are hereto attached.
This certification is being issued upon the request of Mr. Mario Cortez,
President of Sun Valley Homeowners Association.
4. Certification[34] dated June 13, 1994, again signed by Francisco B. Jose,
Jr., of the Office of the Municipal Attorney, providing as follows:
This is to certify that based on the available records of this Office, the only
road lots in Sun Valley Subdivision titled in the name of the Municipality of
Paraaque are those covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 133552
and 122443.
This certification is being issued upon the request of Coun. Manuel T. De Guia.
5. Certification[35] dated March 2, 1995 issued by Rodolfo O. Alora, OIC, Asst.
Municipal Legal Officer, which reads:
This is to certify that based on the available records of this Office, the open
space within Sun Valley Subdivision has already been donated to the
Municipality as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119836, copy of
which is hereto attached.
This certification is being issued upon the request of Atty. Rex G. Rico.
6. Certification[36] dated October 26, 1998 issued by Ma. Riza Pureza
Manalese, Legal Researcher, Office of the Municipal Attorney, Paraaque
City, which reads:
This is to certify that based on the available records of this Office, road lots of
Sun Valley Subdivision have already been donated to the Municipality of
Paranaque as evidenced by TCT NO. 133552, 119836, and 122443.
This certification is being issued upon the request of MR. WILLIAM UY.
The Court of Appeals issued a Decision dated October 16, 2002 denying the
appeal and affirming the Orders of the RTC dated August 17, 1999 and
September 21, 1999. The Court of Appeals likewise denied NSVHAIs Motion
for Partial Reconsideration in its Resolution promulgated on January 17, 2003,
stating that after a thorough study of the Motion for Reconsideration, it found
no sufficient reason to deviate from its findings and conclusion reached in its
decision.
Thus, NSVHAI (hereinafter, petitioner) went to this Court.
Arguments of Petitioner
Petitioner alleges that the decision of the Court of Appeals was based on facts
that [were] outside of the original Petition and Amended Petition and on
supposed findings of facts that are not even evidence offered before the court
a quo.[37] Petitioner likewise alleges that the facts used by the Court of
Appeals in dismissing the case were contrary to the records of Civil Case No.
98-0420.
Petitioner lists the following as its Questions of Law:
A
In sustaining the dismissal of Civil Case No. 98-0420, the Honorable Court of
Appeals sanctioned the departure of the Regional Trial Court from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings
B
Whether or not the issuance of the Resolution promulgated January 17, 2003
and the Decision promulgated October 16, 2002 by the Former 4th Division
and the 4th Division of the Court of Appeals sustaining the validity of dismissal
of Civil Case No. 98-0420 is not in accord with law or with the applicable
decisions of this Honorable Supreme Court
C
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals, with due respect, departed
from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings by making findings
of fact not supported by evidence of record[38]
Petitioner avers that the hearing for the respondents Motion to Dismiss was
set on November 20, 1998, without indication as to time and that during the
hearing on such date, counsel for respondents moved that their Motion to
Dismiss be heard over the objection of counsel for petitioner, who explained
that there was an urgency in ruling on the prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction in view of the expiration of the temporary restraining
order (TRO).[39]
Petitioner quotes the transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) from the
November 20, 1998 hearing before the RTC in the following manner:
Atty. Herrera: Then, Your Honor, I files [sic] a motion petitioning to dismiss this
instant case, which should be resolved first before hearing this case.
Atty. Nuez: Your Honor, please, with due respect to the opposing counsel,
the hearing today is supposed to be on the presentation of petitioners
evidence in support of its prayer for preliminary injunction. In connection with
the amended complaint, I guess it is a matter of right to amend its pleading.
What happened here, the amended petition was filed before this Honorable
Court on November 13 at 11:10 a.m. but I think the motion to dismiss was filed
by the respondent on November 13 at 11:20 a.m.. Therefore, it is the right of
the petitioner insofar as the case is concerned.
And therefore, this Court should proceed with the hearing on the preliminary
injunction instead of entertaining this matter. The temporary restraining order
will expire today and we have the right to be heard.
Court: We will proceed first with the hearing (referring to the scheduled hearing
of the prayer for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction). (Transcript
of Stenographic Notes, November 20, 1998) (Underscoring and explanation
petitioners.)[40]
Petitioner claims that the RTC proceeded to hear the prayer for the issuance
of a preliminary injunction and no hearing was conducted on the Motion to
Dismiss. Petitioner reiterates its earlier claim that it did not receive an order
requiring it to submit its Comment/Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss or
informing it that said Motion had been submitted for resolution.[41]
Petitioner alleges that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 98-0420 arose from the
grant of respondents Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner claims that it filed its
Amended Petition on November 13, 1998 at 11:10 a.m., or before respondents
served any responsive pleading, or before they had filed their Motion to
Dismiss on the same date at about 11:20 a.m.[42] Petitioner avers that the
filing of said Amended Petition was a matter of right under Section 2, Rule 10
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and had the effect of superseding the
original petition dated October 28, 1998. Petitioner concludes that the Motion
to Dismiss was therefore directed against a non-existing Petition.[43]
Petitioner argues that the RTCs ruling on the Motion to Dismiss is contrary to
procedural law because no hearing was conducted on said Motion to Dismiss;
that said motion violated Section 5, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure for failing to set the time of hearing thereof; and that instead of
being resolved, said motion should have been declared as a mere scrap of
worthless paper.[44]
Petitioner claims that during the proceedings before the RTC on November
20, 1998, both parties manifested that the Motion to Dismiss was never set for
hearing, and that when Judge Bautista-Ricafort said, We will proceed first
with the hearing,[45] she was referring to the scheduled hearing of the prayer
for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioner claims that it is
crystal clear that it was deprived due process when a ruling was had on the
Motion to Dismiss despite the clear absence of a hearing. Petitioner
concludes that the Court of Appeals was manifestly mistaken when it ruled
that due process was observed in the issuance of the assailed Orders of Judge
Bautista-Ricafort, despite the lack of opportunity to submit a comment or
opposition to the Motion to Dismiss and the lack of issuance of an order
submitting said motion for resolution. Petitioner alleges that the Court of
Appeals sanctioned the ruling of the RTC that violated both substantial and
procedural law. [46]
Moreover, petitioner avers that contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals,
the RTC had jurisdiction to hear and decide the Amended Petition, and the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not applicable. This is
because, according to petitioner, such doctrine requires that were a remedy
before an administrative agency is provided, relief must first be sought from
the administrative agencies prior to bringing an action before courts of
justice.[47] Petitioner claims that when it filed Civil Case No. 98-08420, it did
not have the luxury of time to elevate the matter to the higher authorities under
Sections 32 and 57 of the Local Government Code. Petitioner alleges that the
tenor of BSV Resolution No. 98-096 necessitated the immediate filing of the
injunction case on October 29, 1998, to forestall the prejudicial effect of said
resolution that was to take effect two days later. Thus, petitioner claims that it
had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy except to file the case.[48]
Anent the question of whether the Sangguniang Barangay should have
passed an ordinance instead of a resolution to open the subject roads,
petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals should not have relied on
respondents claim of ownership, as this led to the erroneous conclusion that
there was no need to pass an ordinance. Petitioner insists that the supposed
titles to the subject roads were never submitted to the RTC, and the
respondents merely attached certifications that the ownership of the subject
roads was already vested in the City Government of Paraaque City as
Annexes to their Appellees Brief before the Court of Appeals. Those
annexes, according to petitioner, were not formally offered as evidence.[49]
Petitioner avers that the records of Civil Case No. 98-0420 clearly show that
there was no proof or evidence on record to support the findings of the Court
of Appeals. This is because, allegedly, the dismissal of said case was due to
the grant of a motion to dismiss, and the case did not go to trial to receive
evidence.[50] Petitioner avers that a motion to dismiss hypothetically admits
the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint.[51] In adopting the annexes as
basis for its findings of fact, the Court of Appeals allegedly disregarded the
rules on Evidence.
Petitioner raises the following grounds for the issuance by this Court of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction:
Sangguniang Barangay Resolution No. 98-096 is repugnant to the proprietary
rights of the affected homeowners who are members of petitioner NSVHAI,
such rights undoubtedly protected by the Constitution.
As there is no proof otherwise (except the baseless findings of fact by the
Honorable Court of Appeals) that the streets encompassed by the concerned
subdivision, Sun Valley Subdivision, are all private properties. As such, the
residents of Sun Valley Subdivision have all the right to regulate the roads and
open spaces within their territorial jurisdiction.
This Honorable Supreme Court can take judicial knowledge that criminal
activities such as robbery and kidnappings are becoming daily fares in
Philippine society. Residents have invested their lifetimes savings in private
subdivision since subdivision living afford them privacy, exclusivity and
foremost of all, safety. Living in a subdivision has a premium and such
premium translates into a comparatively more expensive lot because of the
safety, among others, that subdivision lifestyle offers.
But, with the enactment and intended implementation of Sangguniang
Barangay Resolution No. 98-096 to open Rosemallow and Aster Streets for
public use, it is indubitable that, instead of promoting the safety of resident of
Sun Valley Subdivision, respondents are endangering the life and property of
the residents of the said subdivision as they will now be exposed to criminal
and lawless elements.
It is respectfully submitted that Sangguniang Barangay Resolution No. 98-096
has a place only in an authoritarian government where proprietary rights and
privacy are alien concepts. Lest it be forgotten, ours is a democratic society
and therefore, it should not be ruled in a manner befitting of a despotic
government.
Petitioner NSVHAI, in protection of the rights and interest of the residents of
Sun Valley Subdivision and in order to ensure that public officials will not abuse
governmental powers and use them in an oppressive and arbitrary manner,
invokes the judicial power of this Honorable Supreme Court and pray that a
writ of preliminary injunction be issued and, after hearing, be declared
permanent. [52]
A perusal of the documents attached by petitioner as Annexes revealed to the
Court the following, which were not discussed in the body of the petition:
1. A letter[53] dated January 25, 2003 signed by Sonia G. Sison, President of
NSVHAI, to Mayor Joey P. Marquez, the pertinent portions of which provide:
We admit that we erred in not going to you directly because at that time, the
NSVHA received the letter-order of Brgy. Capt. Guevara two days before the
effectivity of the order. Aside from this, there was a long holiday (long
weekend prior to November 1). Thus, the Board of Governors had no other
recourse but to seek a TRO and thereafter a permanent injunction.
We now would like to seek your assistance concerning this urgent
problem. For your information there are already two (2) gates in and out of
Sun Valley Subdivision.
Under P.D. 957, the Homeowners Association is mandated to protect the
interest of the homeowners and residents especially in so far as it affects the
security, comfort and the general welfare of the homeowners.
Thank you and because of the urgency of the matter, we anticipate your
prompt and favorable action. (Emphasis ours.)
2. A letter[54] signed by Paraaque City Mayor Joey Marquez dated January
27, 2003, addressed to Mr. Roberto Guevara, Office of the Barangay Captain,
Barangay Sun Valley, which reads in part:
This refers to your intended implementation of Barangay Sun Valley
Resolution No. 98-096 entitled, A RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE NEW
SUN VALLEY HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION TO OPEN ROSEMALLOW
AND ASTER STREETS TO VEHICULAR AND PEDESTRIAN TRAFFIC.
In this regard and pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 32 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 which vests upon the city mayor the right to
exercise general supervision over component barangays, to ensure that said
barangays act within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions, you
are hereby directed to defer your implementation of the subject ordinance
based on the following grounds:
1. The roads subject of your resolution is a municipal road and not a barangay
road;
2. The opening or closure of any local road may be undertaken by a local
government unit pursuant to an ordinance and not through a mere resolution
as provided under Sec. 21 of the Local Government Code of 1991;
3. There is no more need to order the opening of the aforementioned roads in
view of the fact that Gelia and State Ave., have already been opened by the
subdivision to the general public to accommodate vehicular and pedestrian
traffic in the area;
4. There is a need to conduct public hearings, as in fact we shall be conducting
public hearings, on the matter to enable us to arrive at an intelligent resolution
of the issues involved.
3. A letter[55] dated January 31, 2003 addressed to Mayor Joey Marquez,
signed by counsel for respondents, wherein the latter wrote:
We regret to observe that all the reasons that you have cited in your letter as
grounds for your order of non-implementation of the Barangay Resolution
have been passed upon and decided by the Court of Appeals, which lately
denied the NSVHA Motion for Reconsideration x x x.
xxxx
The Decision of the Court of Appeals is now the subject of an appeal taken by
the NSVHA to the Supreme Court. In deference to the high Court, you would
do well to reconsider your order to the Barangay and not pre-empt the high
Court on its decision. x x x.
Arguments of Respondents
Respondents filed their Comment[56] on July 17, 2003. They manifest that
the petition is substantially a reproduction of petitioners brief filed with the
Court of Appeals, and consists of almost identical issues which have already
been ventilated and decided upon by the said court.
Respondents claim that the hearing held on November 20, 1998, as found by
the Court of Appeals, covered both the injunction and dismissal incidents, and
that the motion to dismiss on issues of jurisdiction was a prejudicial
matter. Respondents confirm that the RTC said it will proceed first with the
hearing, but the lower court did not specify if the hearing was going to take up
the prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction or the motion to
dismiss. Respondents further claim that by the end of the hearing, after Atty.
Florencio R. Herreras manifestation on the donated public roads, counsels for
both parties were asked by the court if they were submitting, and both of them
answered in the affirmative. [57] Respondents aver that petitioners reply to
its charge of misleading the Court was an admission that counsel had
tampered without authority with the TSN, and that the phrase referring to the
scheduled hearing of the prayer for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction[58] was said counsels own mere footnote.
Respondents allege that the issuance of the titles in favor of Paraaque over
all the roads in Sun Valley Subdivision was an official act by the land
registration office of the City of Paraaque, and was perfectly within the judicial
notice of the Courts, pursuant to Rule 129, Section 1 of the Rules of
Court.[59] Respondents likewise allege that the gates were earlier built
illegally on the roads by the Association, and while petitioner may lend a
helping hand to the barangay, it cannot control the latters discretion as to the
wisdom of its traffic policies within the barangay. They maintain that petitioner
had no business putting up road blocks in the first place; that this matter is
purely a local government determination; and that it is even doubtful if courts
would encroach upon this autonomous determination for local constituents of
the Barangay in deference to the doctrine of separation of powers.
Respondents claim that since the subject matter of the case is a directive of
the Barangay to the petitioner, the requirement for an ordinance would not be
necessary, as there was no legislative determination in the Barangay
resolution regarding what class of roads to open or what to close by way of
general policy. [60]
Respondents contend that the Barangay Resolution was internal and
temporary, passed to solve a traffic problem. They propose a reason why
petitioner allegedly wants to control the subject roads, as follows:
The directive of the Barangay is certainly a declaration of an intention
expressed by resolution on complaints of residents for a convenient outlet of
cars and pedestrians during certain hours of the [day] or night. This need not
be the subject of an ordinance. It is addressed to a special group of residents,
and not to the general community. It refers to particular roads and at certain
hours only, not to all the roads and at all hours.
Hence, the Barangay Resolutions (sic) is but temporary in character, being a
solution to a momentary traffic problem then visualized by the Barangay and
encouraged by the MMDA. There is no legal question involved that is of any
concern to the NSVHA. The prevailing reason why the NSVHA desires to
control the roads is the monetary consideration it gains by its unilateral
requirement of car stickers and of substantial fees exacted from delivery vans
and trucks for bringing in cargo into the subdivision. And yet, the residents
who, never gave their consent to this activities (sic), are busy people and have
merely tolerated this for a long time now. This tolerance did not of course give
legality to the illegal act. x x x.[61]
As regards petitioners argument that the BSV Sangguniang Barangay should
have passed an ordinance instead of a resolution, respondents present their
counter-argument as follows:
Hence, even assuming for the sake of argument that a legal question exists
on whether it be a resolution or ordinance that should contain the Barangay
directive, such an issue is of no moment as plaintiff-appellant failed to exhaust
the necessary administrative remedies before resorting to court action, as
found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. Section 32, R.A. 7160 (Local
Government Code of 1991) provides for a remedy from Barangay actions to
the Mayor under the latters power of general supervision.[62]
With regard to the Mayors involvement in this case, respondents have this to
say:
The Mayors act of interfering in Barangay Sun Valley affairs stemmed out of
a long-standing political feud of the Mayor with the Punong Barangay. Its
general supervision did not extend to pure Barangay matters, which the
Barangay would be x x x in a better position to determine.
Furthermore, the general supervision of the Mayor is limited to the overseeing
authority that the Barangays act within the scope of their prescribed powers
and functions. Sadly, there is nothing in this Mayors letter x x x that would as
much as show a deviation by the Barangay Sun Valley from any prescribed
powers or function. The Mayors directive to the Barangay is of doubtful
legality.
It was mainly the mounting traffic problem progressively experienced through
the years that prompted the Barangay to resolve to open Rosemallow and
Aster Streets in accordance with its power under Section 21 of R.A. 7160 to
temporarily open or close any local road falling within its jurisdiction. This
Resolution x x x was decided upon after the Barangay Council made the
necessary investigation and conducted hearings in consultation with affected
residents. In order to maintain some kind of cordial relationship with the
NSVHA, the Barangay by its resolution, opted to give the NSVHA the chance
to open the roads, which it earlier closed by means of arbitrarily putting up
steel gates without any apparent authority.[63]
Furthermore, respondents aver that the trial court and the appellate court have
ruled that only a local government unit (LGU), in this case the Barangay, can
open or close roads, whether they be public or private, in accordance with
Section 21 of the Local Government Code. Respondents contend that
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association,
Inc.,[64] wherein the Court discussed the power of LGUs to open and close
roads, is substantially in point.[65]
After the submission of the parties respective memoranda,[66] this case was
submitted for decision.
The issues before us are:
1. Whether or not petitioner has a right to the protection of the law that would
entitle it to injunctive relief against the implementation of BSV Resolution No.
98-096; and
2. Whether or not petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court of Appeals passed upon petitioners claims as to the validity of the
dismissal in this wise:
We do not agree. Although the Motion to Dismiss was filed on the same day,
but after, the Amended Petition was filed, the same cannot be considered as
directed merely against the original petition which Appellant already considers
as non-existing. The records will show that Appellants Amended Petition
contained no material amendments to the original petition. Both allege the
same factual circumstances or events that constitute the Appellants cause of
action anent the Appellees alleged violation of Appellants propriety rights
over the subdivision roads in question. Corollarily, the allegations in Appellees
Motion to Dismiss, as well as the grounds therefore predicated on lack of
cause of action and jurisdiction, could very well be considered as likewise
addressed to Appellants Amended Petition.
xxxx
It bears stressing that due process simply means giving every contending
party the opportunity to be heard and the court to consider every piece of
evidence presented in their favor (Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company
versus Benjamin Bitanga, G.R. Nos. 137934 & 137936[)]. In the instant case,
Appellant cannot be said to have been denied of due process. As borne by the
records, while Appellees Motion to Dismiss did not set the time for the hearing
of the motion, the day set therefore was the same date set for the hearing of
Appellants prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction that is,
November 20, 1998, with the precise purpose of presenting evidence in
support of the motion to dismiss on the same said scheduled hearing date and
time when Appellant and its counsel would be present. Moreover, Appellants
predication of lack of due hearing is belied by the fact that the hearing held on
November 20, 1999 took up not only the matter of whether or not to grant the
injunction, but also tackled the jurisdictional issue raised in Appellees Motion
to Dismiss, which issues were intertwined in both incidents. [67]
We see no reason to depart from these findings by the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners recourse in questioning BSV Resolution No. 98-096 should have
been with the Mayor of Paraaque City, as clearly stated in Section 32 of the
Local Government Code, which provides:
Section 32. City and Municipal Supervision over Their Respective Barangays.
- The city or municipality, through the city or municipal mayor concerned, shall
exercise general supervision over component barangays to ensure that said
barangays act within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
We do not see how petitioners act could qualify as an exception to the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies. We have emphasized the
importance of applying this doctrine in a recent case, wherein we held:
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our
judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative
agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within
the specialized areas of their respective competence. The rationale for this
doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser expenses and provides for the speedier
resolution of controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of
justice to shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress
has been completed.[68]
It is the Mayor who can best review the Sangguniang Barangays actions to
see if it acted within the scope of its prescribed powers and functions. Indeed,
this is a local problem to be resolved within the local government. Thus, the
Court of Appeals correctly found that the trial court committed no reversible
error in dismissing the case for petitioners failure to exhaust administrative
remedies, as the requirement under the Local Government Code that the
closure and opening of roads be made pursuant to an ordinance, instead of a
resolution, is not applicable in this case because the subject roads belong to
the City Government of Paraaque.
Moreover, being the party asking for injunctive relief, the burden of proof was
on petitioner to show ownership over the subject roads. This, petitioner failed
to do.
In civil cases, it is a basic rule that the party making allegations has the burden
of proving them by a preponderance of evidence. Parties must rely on the
strength of their own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defense
offered by their opponent.[69]
Petitioner dared to question the barangays ownership over the subject roads
when it should have been the one to adduce evidence to support its broad
claims of exclusivity and privacy. Petitioner did not submit an iota of proof to
support its acts of ownership, which, as pointed out by respondents, consisted
of closing the subject roads that belonged to the then Municipality of
Paraaque and were already being used by the public, limiting their use
exclusively to the subdivisions homeowners, and collecting fees from delivery
vans that would pass through the gates that they themselves had built. It is
petitioners authority to put up the road blocks in the first place that becomes
highly questionable absent any proof of ownership.
On the other hand, the local government units power to close and open roads
within its jurisdiction is clear under the Local Government Code, Section 21 of
which provides:
Section 21. Closure and Opening of Roads. (a) A local government unit may,
pursuant to an ordinance, permanently or temporarily close or open any local
road, alley, park, or square falling within its jurisdiction: Provided, however,
That in case of permanent closure, such ordinance must be approved by at
least two-thirds (2/3) of all the members of the sanggunian, and when
necessary, an adequate substitute for the public facility that is subject to
closure is provided.
We quote with approval the ruling of the Court of Appeals in this regard, as
follows:
Contrary, however, to Appellants position, the above-quoted provision, which
requires the passage of an ordinance by a local government unit to effect the
opening of a local road, can have no applicability to the instant case since the
subdivision road lots sought to be opened to decongest traffic in the area -
namely Rosemallow and Aster Streets have already been donated by the
Sun Valley Subdivision to, and the titles thereto already issued in the name of,
the City Government of Paraaque since the year 1964 (Annexes 2 to 7 of
Appellees Brief). This fact has not even been denied by the Appellant in the
proceedings below nor in the present recourse. Having been already donated
or turned over to the City Government of Paraaque, the road lots in question
have since then taken the nature of public roads which are withdrawn from the
commerce of man, and hence placed beyond the private rights or claims of
herein Appellant. Accordingly, the Appellant was not in the lawful exercise of
its predicated rights when it built obstructing structures closing the road lots in
question to vehicular traffic for the use of the general Public. Consequently,
Appellees act of passing the disputed barangay resolution, the
implementation of which is sought to be restrained by Appellant, had for its
purpose not the opening of a private road but may be considered merely as a
directive or reminder to the Appellant to cause the opening of a public road
which should rightfully be open for use to the general public.[70]

Petitioner wants this Court to recognize the rights and interests of the residents
of Sun Valley Subdivision but it miserably failed to establish the legal basis,
such as its ownership of the subject roads, which entitles petitioner to the
remedy prayed for. It even wants this Court to take judicial knowledge that
criminal activities such as robbery and kidnappings are becoming daily fares
in Philippine society.[71] This is absurd. The Rules of Court provide which
matters constitute judicial notice, to wit:

Rule 129

WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED

SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory.A court shall take judicial

notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial
extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of
nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world
and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the
official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the
Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical
divisions.(1a)

The activities claimed by petitioner to be part of judicial knowledge are not

found in the rule quoted above and do not support its petition for injunctive
relief in any way.

As petitioner has failed to establish that it has any right entitled to the
protection of the law, and it also failed to exhaust administrative remedies by
applying for injunctive relief instead of going to the Mayor as provided by the
Local Government Code, the petition must be denied.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The

Court of Appeals DECISION dated October 16, 2002 and its RESOLUTION
dated January 17, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 65559 are both AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.