Basic Notes on Bertrand Russells On Denoting

Denoting Phrase a phrase denoting (referring to) solely in virtue of its form (structure)
o A phrase may be denoting and yet not denote anything
o A phrase may denote one definite object
o A phrase may denote ambiguously
But we gain knowledge of a thing through acquaintance (having presentations of a
thing) and not by description (merely having denoting phrases of a thing)
o Because we do not necessarily have acquaintance with the objects denoted by
phrases as opposed to perception or thought
Thus, All thinking has to start from acquaintance (coming from thinking about things
from other peoples acquaintances)
Russells theory is as follows: he takes the notion of the variable as fundamental
o He uses C (x) to mean a proposition
The variable x is an undetermined constituent
o He considers the two notions:
C (x) is always true taken as ultimate and indefinable, and the others
are defined by means of it
C (x) is sometimes true
o The primitive denoting phrases of everything, nothing, and something are to be
interpreted as follows:
C (everything) means C (x) is always true
C (nothing) means C (x) is always false is always true
C (something) means It is false that C (x) is false is always true
o The primitive denoting phrases do not have meaning, BUT a meaning is assigned
to every proposition in which they (denoting phrases) occur
Thus, the principle of the theory of denoting:
o Denoting phrases never have any meaning in themselves, but that every
proposition in whose verbal expression they occur has a meaning.
Thus, in order for a denoting phrase to be meaningful, it must be placed
within a proposition to acquire a definite description
Denoting phrases by themselves are destitute of meaning, BUT gives a
meaning to every proposition in whose verbal expressions they occur
With phrases containing the, it involves uniqueness
o With propositions containing the, it pertains strictly to only x and nothing else
Any other variable substituted (e.g. y) is invalid
But if the other variable is identical with the original variable (y = x), then
it can be accepted
 The considerations, thus far, give a REDUCTION of all propositions in which denoting
phrases occur to forms in which no such phrases occur
o This means that the acceptable propositions are only those propositions in which
denoting phrases can occur and give meaning
The reason is against Meinong and Frege
Meinongs theory regards any grammatically correct denoting phrase as standing for an
object
o Thus, any illogical or nonexistent entity are regarded as actual objects
But precisely that they are, they infringe the law of contradiction; hence,
they do not give any meaning
Freges theory avoids Meinongs theory by providing the meaning [sense] and the
denotation [reference] of a phrase
o The difficulty in Freges theory is when a phrase may have meaning, but no
denotation
For example, when we consider non-entities, they may have meaning in
themselves, but they do not have any denotation
This leads us to say that they are nonsense
But it is not nonsense, since they are plainly false; and thus are not to be
spoken of
o Although we may advocate phrases without denotation to denote a null-class,
despite having no logical error, it is plainly artificial, and does not give an exact
analysis of the matter
 Russell provides solutions to puzzles on the (3) laws of thought
o He uses the distinction between primary occurrences and secondary occurrences
but advocates the latter
A secondary occurrence is one in which the phrase that occurs in a
proposition p is merely a constituent of the whole proposition
And the substitution for the phrase is to be effected in p, not in the whole
proposition
Law of Identity: If a is identical with b, whatever is true of the one is true of the other,
and either may be substituted for the other in any proposition without altering the truth or
falsehood of that proposition. Consider:
o George IV wished to know whether Scott was the author of Waverly
o Scott was the author of Waverly
o George IV wished to know whether Scott was Scott
Russell solves this by giving the first proposition two possibilities:
(1) One and only one man wrote Waverley, and George IV wished to
know whether Scott was that man [primary occurrence]
(2) George IV wished to know whether one and only one man wrote
Waverley and Scott was that man [secondary occurrence]
Russell advocates the latter because George IV is not concerned about
Scott, but is concerned about the author of Waverley. Scott could have
been substituted by a different name, but it just so happened that Scott
really was the author of Waverley
I.e., the phrase Scott is merely a substitutable constituent of the
proposition p, was the author of Waverley
Law of Excluded Middle: either A is B or A is not B must be true. Consider:
o (1) The present King of France is bald
o (2) The present King of France is not bald
Both pertain to a non-entity, which cannot be found in either categories of
bald or not-bald
Thus (1) is certainly false, and (2) is false if it means (2.1) There is an
entity which is now King of France and is not bald
But (2) is true if it means (2.2) It is false that there is an entity which is
now King of France and is bald because the phrase, the King of France,
here is a secondary occurrence
Both (2.1) and (2.2) refer to the category of not-bald, but (2.1) affirms the
non-entity, whereas (2.2) denies the non-entity and its baldness (hence,
placing it under not-bald)
 Law of Contradiction: what is cannot be what is not at the same time. Consider:
o If it is false that a differs from b
o Then, there is no difference between a and b
o And if the difference does not exist
o Then, how can a non-entity be the subject of a proposition?
Out of any proposition we can make a denoting phrase (which denotes an
entity if the proposition is true but does not if the proposition is false)
Thus, if non-entities are spoken of, to avoid infringing the law of
contradiction, they must be spoken of as secondary occurrences and not as
primary occurrences, in order to hold as true the proposition that denies
the supposed existence of the non-entity and regard it as a mere
constituent