G.R.

No. 202692 Sydeco v. People November 12, 2014 medical certificate indicated that he has sustained physical injuries but
Edmund Sydeco y Sionzon, petitioner People of the Philippines, negative for alcohol breath.
respondent Velasco, Jr. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the presumption of
, J. regularity in the performance of duties by the police officers.

FACTS: HELD:
Swerving is not necessarily indicative of imprudent behavior let alone Going over the records, it is fairly clear that what triggered the
constitutive of reckless driving. To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act confrontational stand-off between the police team, on one hand, and
must be something more than a mere negligence in the operation of a motor Sydeco on the other, was the latters refusal to get off of the vehicle for a
vehicle, and a willful and wanton disregard of the consequences is body and vehicle search juxtaposed by his insistence on a plain view search
required. Nothing in the records indicate that the area was a no swerving only. Sydecos twin gestures cannot plausibly be considered as resisting a
or overtaking zone. lawful order. He may have sounded boorish or spoken crudely at that time,
but none of this would make him a criminal. It remains to stress that
In 2006, separate information, one for Violation of Section 56 (f) of Sydeco has not, when flagged down, committed a crime or performed an
Republic Act No. 4136 and another, for Violation of Article 151 of the overt act warranting a reasonable inference of criminal activity. He did not
Revised Penal Code were filed against petitioner Edmund Sydeco. try to avoid the road block established. He came to a full stop when so
According to the prosecution, on the night of the incident, police officers required to stop. The two key elements of resistance and serious disobedience
were manning a checkpoint when they spotted a swerving red Ford Ranger punished under Art. 151 of the RPC are: (1) That a person in authority or his agent is
pick-up driven by Sydeco. The team members flagged the vehicle down engaged in the performance of official duty or gives a lawful order to the
and asked Sydeco to alight from the vehicle so he could take a rest at the offender; and (2) That the offender resists or seriously disobeys such
police station situated nearby, before he resumes driving. Sydeco, who the person or his agent.
policemen claimed was smelling of liquor, denied being drunk and insisted
he could manage to drive. Thereafter, Sydeco was arrested and brought to In sum, the MeTC, as echoed by RTC and CA later, did not rely on the
the Ospital ng Maynila where he was examined and found to be positive of medical certificate Dr. Balucating issued on June 12, 2006 as to Sydecos
alcoholic breath per the Medical Certificate issued by that hospital. Sydeco, intoxicated state, as the former was not able to testify as to its contents,
on the other hand, averred that he, the cook and waitress in his restaurant but on the testimony of SPO4 Bodino, on the assumption that he and his
were on the way home when they were signaled to stop by police officers fellow police officers were acting in the regular performance of their
who asked him to open the vehicles door and alight for a body and vehicle duties. It cannot be emphasized enough that smelling of liquor/alcohol and
search. When Sydeco instead opened the vehicle window and insisted on a be under the influence of liquor are differing concepts. Corollarily, it is
plain view search, one of the policemen told him he was drunk, pointing to difficult to determine with legally acceptable certainty whether a person is
three empty beer bottles in the trunk of the vehicle. The officers then drunk in contemplation of Sec. 56(f) of RA 4136 penalizing the act of
pulled Sydeco out of the vehicle and brought him to the Ospital ng Maynila driving under the influence of alcohol. The legal situation has of course
where they succeeded in securing a medical certificate under the signature changed with the approval in May 2013 of the Anti-Drunk and Drugged
of one Dr. Harvey Balucating depicting Sydeco as positive of alcoholic Driving Act of 2013 (RA 10586) which also penalizes driving under the
breath, although no alcohol breath examination was conducted. Sydeco influence of alcohol (DUIA), a term defined under its Sec. 3(e) as the act of
was detained and released only in the afternoon of the following day when operating a motor vehicle while the drivers blood alcohol concentration
he was allowed to undergo actual medical examination where the resulting level has, after being subjected to a breath analyzer test reached the level
of intoxication as established jointly by the DOH, the NAPOLCOM and the
DOTC. Under Sec. 3(g) of the IRR of RA 10586, a driver of a private motor 1972). During the arraignment, Del Castillo pleaded not guilty. The RTC
vehicle with gross vehicle weight not exceeding 4,500 kilograms who has found Del Castillo guilty beyond reasonable of the charge against him in
blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.05% or higher shall be conclusive the information. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision.
proof that said driver is driving under the influence of alcohol. Viewed
from the prism of RA 10586, petitioner cannot plausibly be convicted of Del Castillo appealed his case to the CA, insisting that there was a violation
driving under the influence of alcohol for this obvious reason: he had not been tested of his constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure.
beyond reasonable doubt, let alone conclusively, for reaching during the period On the contrary, the Office of the Solicitor General argued that the
material the threshold level of intoxication set under the law for DUIA, i.e., constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure is
a BAC of 0.05% or over. Under Art. 22 of the RPC, penal laws shall be given retroactive applicable only against government authorities. Hence, assuming that the
insofar as they are favorable to the accused. Section 19 of RA 10586 expressly items seized were found in another place not designated in the search
modified Sec. 56(f) of RA4136. Verily, even by force of Art. 22 of the RPC in warrant, the same items should still be admissible as evidence because the
relation to Sec. 3(e) of RA 10586 alone, Sydeco could very well be one who discovered them was a barangay tanod who is a private
acquitted for the charge of driving under the influence of alcohol, even if
individual.
the supposed inculpatory act occurred in 2006

People vs. Mercado 2015 pala sye hehe wala pa atang digest)
ISSUE:

Del Castillo vs. People Whether or not there was a violation of Del Castillos right against
G.R. No. 185128, 30 January 2012, THIRD DIVISION (Peralta, J.) unreasonable searches and seizure


Having been established that the assistance of the barangay
HELD:
tanods was sought by the police authorities who effected the searched
warrant, the same barangay tanods therefore acted as agents of persons in Petition GRANTED.
authority.
It must be remembered that the warrant issued must particularly describe
Police Officers headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon went to the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized in order for it
serve a search warrant from the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to Petitioner to be valid. A designation or description that points out the place to be
Ruben Del Castillo in search of illegal drugs. Upon arrival, somebody searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the
shouted raid which prompted the police officers to immediately peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness.
disembark from the jeep they were riding and go directly to Del Castillos
In the present case, the search warrant specifically designates or describes
house and cordoned it off. Police men found nothing incriminating in Del
the residence of the petitioner as the place to be searched. Incidentally,
Castillos residence, but one of the barangay tanods was able to confiscate
the items were seized by a barangay tanod in a nipa hut, 20 meters away
from the hut several articles including four (4) plastic packs of
from the residence of the Del Castillo. The confiscated items, having been
methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.
found in a place other than the one described in the search warrant, can
An Information was filed before RTC against Del Castillo, charging him with be considered as fruits of an invalid warrantless search, the presentation of
violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Act of
which as an evidence is a violation of Del Castillos constitutional guaranty and any barangay member who comes to the aid of persons in authority,
against unreasonable searches and seizure. shall be deemed agents of persons in authority.

The OSG argued that, assuming that the items seized were found in By virtue of the above provisions, the police officers, as well as the
another place not designated in the search warrant, the same items should barangay tanods were acting as agents of a person in authority during the
still be admissible as evidence because the one who discovered them was conduct of the search. Thus, the search conducted was unreasonable and
a barangay tanod who is a private individual, the constitutional guaranty the confiscated items are inadmissible in evidence.
against unreasonable searches and seizure being applicable only against
government authorities. The contention is devoid of merit. It was testified
to during trial by the police officers who effected the search warrant that Manalili vs. CA
they asked the assistance of the barangay tanods. Having been established Facts:
that the assistance of the barangay tanods was sought by the police This is a petition for certiorari seeking the reversal of CAs decision in
authorities who effected the search warrant, the same barangay tanods affirming TCs decision on convicting Manalili of
therefore acted as agents of persons in authority. Article 152 of the illegalpossession of prohibited drug violating RA 6425.Police operatives
Revised Penal Code defines persons in authority and agents of persons in Espiritu, Lumabas and driver Enriquez conducted surveillance along the
authority as any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an front of Kalookan Cemetery based on the information that drug addicts
individual or as a member of some court or governmental corporation, were roaming around in the area, saw a man who appeared to be high on
board or commission, shall be deemed a person in authority. A barangay drugs and introduced themselves as policemen. Said man avoided them
captain and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in and tried to resist, when they asked what the man was holding in his hand,
authority. A person who, by direct provision of law or by election or by the man held out his wallet and allowed Espiritu to examine it, who found
what he suspected to be crushed mj leaves. The man was brought to the
appointment by competent authority, is charged with the maintenance of
Anti-Narcotics Unit and turned out to be Manalili. The substance found on
public order and the protection and security of life and property, such as
Manalilis wallet was sent to NBI Forensic Chemistry Section and was
barrio councilman, barrio policeman and barangay leader, and any person
confirmed as mj. Manalilis version of the story was that early afternoon he
who comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be deemed an agent of was riding in a tricycle when 3 policemen stopped the tricycle and
a person in authority. informed them of the suspected possession of mj, the policemen bodily
The Local Government Code also contains a provision which describes the searched both Manalili and the driver and upon finding nothing illegal on
their persons, let the driver go but brought Manalili along to the police
function of a barangay tanod as an agent of persons in authority. Section
station. Manalili while on the way to the station saw a neighbor whom he
388 of the Local Government Code reads: For purposes of the Revised signaled to follow them and when he was again searched in the station, he
Penal Code, the punong barangay, sangguniang barangay members, and was asked to strip his pants where they found nothing illegal. Said
members of the lupong tagapamayapa in each barangay shall be deemed neighbor then asked the policemen to let Manalili go seeing as they had
as persons in authority in their jurisdictions, while other barangay officials not found anything illegal but Manalili was put on a cell who was brought
and members who may be designated by law or ordinance and charged to a fiscal later that day and was told not to say anything despite his saying
with the maintenance of public order, protection and security of life and that the policemen had not found mj on his person. Said tricycle driver and
property, or the maintenance of a desirable and balanced environment, neighbor testified on court as to how the 2 searches yielded nothing illegal
on Manalilis person.
 that Manalili has waived such right for failure to raise its violation before
Issues: the trial court, at the earliest opportunity possible. Issues not raised below
1.W/N evidence seized during a stop-and-frisk is admissible.2. cannot be pleaded for the first time on appeal.
2. W/N Manalilis actions constituted a waiver of his rights.
3.W/N the evidence is sufficient to prove Manalilis guilt. III. Manalilis contention that the charge was trumped up to extort money
and testimonies of the arresting officers were inconsistent, it held that the
Ruling: trial courts assessment of the credibility of the witnesses particularly
I. In Terry vs Ohio, a stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular when affirmed by CA is accorded great weight and respect as it had
designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, opportunity to observe their demeanor and deportment as they testified
interrogate him and pat him for weapons: W)here a police officer observes before it. The elements of illegal possession of mj are: a) the accused is in
an unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug;
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with b) such possession is not authorized by law; and c) the accused freely and
whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the consciously possessed the said drug. The substance found on Manalilis
course of investigating this behavior he identified himself as a policeman wallet was identified as mj which was prohibited and knowingly without
and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of authority. Considering that he was high and tried to avoid and resist, such
the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' behavior clearly shows that he knew he was holding mj andit was
safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to prohibited by law.
conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in
an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERTO
a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and any SALANGUIT y KO, accused-appellant
weapon seized may properly be introduced in evidence against the person
from whom they were taken. It did not, however abandon the rule that the G.R. Nos. 133254-55. April 19, 2001
police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval
Mendoza, J.
of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure, excused only by
exigent circumstances. As People vs Lacerna enumerated 5 recognized On 26 December 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant in the
exceptions to the rule against warrantless searches and seizures: 1) search Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmarias, Cavite, to search the
incidental to lawful arrest; 2) search of moving vehicles; 3) seizure in plain
residence of Robert Salanguit y Ko on Binhagan St., Novaliches, Quezon
view; 4) customs search; 5) waiver of the accused of his rights against
City. He presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified that
unreasonable searches and seizures. From Espiritus experience as a
member of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of Caloocan City as a poseur-buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from
Police, Manalilis suspicious behavior was characteristic of drug addicts Salanguit. The sale took place in Salunguit's room, and Badua saw that the
who were high. shabu was taken by Salunguit from a cabinet inside his room. The
II. SGs contention that Manalili effectively waived the inadmissibility of application was granted, and a search warrant was later issued by
the evidence illegally obtained when he failed to raise this issue or object Presiding Judge Dolores L. Espaol. At about 10:30 p.m. of said day, a
during trial. A valid waiver of right against unreasonable searches and group of about 10 policemen, along with one civilian informer, went to the
seizures require the concurrence of these requisites: 1) the right to be residence of Salunguit to serve the warrant. The police operatives knocked
waived existed; 2) the person waiving it had knowledge; and 3) he/she had on Salanguits door, but nobody opened it. They heard people inside the
actual intention to relinquish the right. In this case however, it is deemed house, apparently panicking. The police operatives then forced the door
open and entered the house. After showing the search warrant to the (1) The admissibility of the shabu allegedly recovered from his residence as
occupants of the house, Lt. Cortes and his group started searching the evidence against him on the ground that the warrant used in obtaining it
house. They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing was invalid;
a white crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a white
(2) The admissibility in evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from
crystalline substance, and two bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be
marijuana wrapped in newsprint having a total weight of approximately Salanguit to the "plain view" doctrine; and
1,255 grams. A receipt of the items seized was prepared, but Salanguit (3) The employment of unnecessary force by the police in the execution of
refused to sign it. the warrant.

After the search, the police operatives took Salanguit with them to Station Issues:
10, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City, along with the items they had seized.
PO3 Duazo requested a laboratory examination of the confiscated Whether or not the warrant was invalid for failure of providing evidence to
evidence. The white crystalline substance with a total weight of 2.77 grams support the seizure of drug paraphernalia.
and those contained in a small box with a total weight of 8.37 grams were
Whether or not the marijuana may be included as evidence in light of the
found to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. On the other
plain view doctrine.
hand, the two bricks of dried leaves, one weighing 425 grams and the
other 850 grams, were found to be marijuana.

Held:

Charges against Roberto Salanguit y Ko for violations of Republic Act (RA) Yes. The warrant authorized the seizure of undetermined quantity of
6425, i.e. for possession of shabu and marijuana, (Criminal Cases Q-95- shabu and drug paraphernalia. Evidence was presented showing probable
64357 and Q- 95-64358, respectively) were filed on 28 December 1995. cause of the existence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The
After hearing, the trial court rendered its decision, convicting Salanguit in fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for the
Criminal Cases Q-95-64357 and Q-95-64358 for violation of Section 16 and seizure of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the
8, respectively, RA 6425, and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate search warrant is void. This fact would be material only if drug
sentence with a minimum of 6 months of arresto mayor and a maximum of paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. The fact is that none was
4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, and reclusion perpetua and taken by virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search
to pay a fine of P700,000.00, respectively. warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug
paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine

hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented showing probable
Salanguit appealed; contesting his conviction on the grounds of: cause as to its existence.

In sum, with respect to the seizure of shabu from Salanguits residence,
Search Warrant 160 was properly issued, such warrant being founded on

probable cause personally determined by the judge under oath or
affirmation of the deposing witness and particularly describing the place to People Vs. Musa
be searched and the things to be seized. With respect to, and in light of the 217 SCRA 597
plain view doctrine, the police failed to allege the time when the January 27, 1993
marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior to, or contemporaneous with, the
shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was recovered on Salanguits Facts: A civilian informer gave the information that Mari Musa was
person or in an area within his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore, engaged in selling marijuana in Suterville, Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani was
presumably during the search conducted after the shabu had been ordered by NARCOM leader T/Sgt. Belarga, to conduct a surveillance and
recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua in his test buy on Musa. The civilian informer guided Ani to Musas house and
deposition, was invalid. Thus, the Court affirmed the decision as to gave the description of Musa. Ani was able to buy one newspaper-
Criminal Case Q-95-64357 only. wrapped dried marijuana for P10.00.

The next day, a buy-bust was planned. Ani was to raise his right hand if he
successfully buys marijuana from Musa. As Ani proceeded to the house,
Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, finding accused-appellant Roberto
the NARCOM team positioned themselves about 90 to 100 meters away.
Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of illegal drugs under 16 of R.A. No.
From his position, Belarga could see what was going on. Musa came out of
6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, and sentencing him to
the house and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted more
suffer a prison term ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
marijuana and gave Musa the P20.00 marked money. Musa went into the
minimum, and four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
house and came back, giving Ani two newspaper wrappers containing
maximum, and ordering the confiscation of 11.14 grams of
dried marijuana. Ani opened and inspected it. He raised his right hand as a
methamphetamine hydrochloride is AFFIRMED.
signal to the other NARCOM agents, and the latter moved in and arrested
Musa inside the house. Belarga frisked Musa in the living room but did not
find the marked money (gave it to his wife who slipped away). T/Sgt.
Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, finding accused-appellant Roberto Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to the kitchen and found a cellophane colored
Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of prohibited drugs under 8 of R.A. No. white and stripe hanging at the corner of the kitchen. They asked Musa
6425, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to about its contents but failed to get a response. So they opened it and
pay a fine of P700,000.00 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused- found dried marijuana leaves inside. Musa was then placed under arrest.
appellant is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
Issue: Whether the seizure of the plastic bag and the marijuana inside it is
unreasonable, hence, inadmissible as evidence.
Confiscation of the 1,254 grams of marijuana, as well as the 11.14 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, and its disposition as ordered by the trial Held: Yes. It constituted unreasonable search and seizure thus it may not
court is AFFIRMED be admitted as evidence. The warrantless search and seizure, as an
incident to a suspects lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the finished with their search Go arrived and immediately together with the
one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate two witnesses was made to sign the inventory reciept.
control. Objects in the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in
the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented Based on the evidence taken from the search Go was charged for violation
as evidence. The plain view doctrine is usually applied where a police of R.A. 6425. Upon hearing, testimonies as well as evidences were
officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless presented by the prosecution against Go. However, the two witnesses
questioned the validity of some of the evidence presented such as the
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. It will not justify the
inventory receipt as well as the illegal drugs said to have been seized from
seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not
the search.
apparent from the plain view of the object.
The Regional Trial Court of Manila convicted Go for violation of the offense
In the case at bar, the plastic bag was not in the plain view of the police. cahrged. On appeal, Go assails the decision of the RTC as well the validity
They arrested the accused in the living room and moved into the kitchen in of the search performed by the raiding team and the admissibility of the
search for other evidences where they found the plastic bag. Furthermore, evidence taken therefrom. Go also asks for the return of the properties
the marijuana inside the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from seized that were not included in the search warrant.
the plain view of said object.
ISSUE: Whether or not the properties not included in the search warrant
Therefore, the plain view does not apply. The plastic bag was seized may be returned to Go

illegally and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to Article III Section
HELD: It bears reiterating that the purpose of the constitutional
3 (2) of the Constitution.
requirement that the articles to be seized be particularly described in the
warrant is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those,
particularly described in the search warrant - to leave the officers of the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILLIPINES v. BENNY GO law with no discretion regarding what articles they should seize. At the
411 SCRA 81 (2003), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.) same time, the raiding team characterized the seizure of the assorted
documents, passports, bankbooks, checks, check writer, typewriter, dry
The search and seizure of articles must be limited to those which are seals and stamp pads as seizure of evidence in plain view. Under the
particularly described in the search warrant. plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer who
has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure
FACTS: A raiding team armed with a warrant entered the home of appelant and may be presented as evidence.
Benny Go in search of evidence for the violation of Republic Act 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act), otherwise know as the To be sure, the policemen also filed a complaint against Go for alleged
possession of instruments or implements intended for the commission of
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 . Upon their entry, they met falsification under paragraph 2 of Article 176 of the Revised Penal Code on
Jack Go, son of the Go and restrained him. As the former was the only one the basis of dry seals and rubber stamps also found in appellants
present at the time they then called on two baranggay kagawads to act as residence.
witnesses on the said search. They then siezed properties and objects even
those which were not included in the warrant. When they were almost
The counterfeit nature of the seals and stamps was in fact not established Whether or not the following provisions are valid and constitutional.
until after they had been turned over to the Chinese embassy and Bureau
of Immigration and Deportation for verification. It is, therefore, incredible a. Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access;
that SPO1 Fernandez could make such determination from a plain view
of the items from his vantage point in the sala. b. Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference;

In sum, the circumstances attendant to the case at bar do not warrant the c. Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting;
application of the plain view doctrine to justify the seizure and
retention of the questioned seized items. The things belonging to appellant d. Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft;
not specifically mentioned in the warrants, like those not particularly
described, must thus be ordered returned to him. e. Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex;

Be that as it may, considering that the two (2) dry seals and eight (8) of the f. Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography;
rubber stamps have been certified to be counterfeit by the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation, they may not be returned and are hereby g.Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications;
declared confiscated in favor of the State to be disposed of according to
law. h. Section 4(c)(4) on Libel;

Moreover, the various bankbooks and passports not belonging to appellant i. Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt in the Commission of
may not be ordered returned in the instant proceedings. The legality of a Cybercrimes;
seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been
impaired thereby, and the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is j. Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree Higher;
purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.
k. Section 7 on the Prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
DISINI VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE and R.A. 10175;
FACTS:
l. Section 8 on Penalties;
Petitioners assail the validity of several provision of the Republic Act (R.A.)
10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012. m. Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data;

Petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for n. Section 13 on Preservation of Computer Data;
regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their
constitutional rights. The government of course asserts that the law merely o. Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer Data;
seeks to reasonably put order into cyberspace activities, punish
wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the system. p. Section 15 on Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data;

ISSUES: q. Section 17 on Destruction of Computer Data;

r. Section 19 on Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data; between them as to the extent of the search, the methods to be used, and
the systems to be tested. Since the ethical hacker does his job with prior
s. Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice; permission from the client, such permission would insulate him from the
coverage of Section 4(a)(1).
t. Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC);
and Hence, valid and constitutional.

u. Section 26(a) on CICCs Powers and Functions. b. Section 4(a)(3) of the Cybercrime Law

Some petitioners also raise the constitutionality of related Articles 353, Section 4(a)(3) provides:
354, 361, and 362 of the RPC on the crime of libel.
(3) Data Interference. The intentional or reckless alteration, damaging,
HELD: deletion or deterioration of computer data, electronic document, or
electronic data message, without right, including the introduction or
a. Section 4(a)(1) of the Cybercrime Law transmission of viruses.

Section 4(a)(1) provides: Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers from overbreadth in that,
while it seeks to discourage data interference, it intrudes into the area of
Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute the offense protected speech and expression, creating a chilling and deterrent effect
of cybercrime punishable under this Act: on these guaranteed freedoms.

(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose,
computer data and systems: constitutionally subject to state regulation, may not be achieved by means
that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of
(1) Illegal Access. The access to the whole or any part of a computer protected freedoms.But Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on these
system without right. freedoms at all. It simply punishes what essentially is a form of
vandalism,the act of willfully destroying without right the things that
Petitioners contend that Section 4(a)(1) fails to meet the strict scrutiny belong to others, in this case their computer data, electronic document, or
standard required of laws that interfere with the fundamental rights of the electronic data message. Such act has no connection to guaranteed
people and should thus be struck down. freedoms. There is no freedom to destroy other peoples computer systems
and private documents.
The Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the application of
the strict scrutiny standard since no fundamental freedom, like speech, is Besides, the overbreadth challenge places on petitioners the heavy burden
involved in punishing what is essentially a condemnable act accessing the of proving that under no set of circumstances will Section 4(a)(3) be
computer system of another without right. It is a universally condemned valid.Petitioner has failed to discharge this burden.
conduct.
Hence, valid and constitutional.
Besides, a clients engagement of an ethical hacker requires an agreement
Section 4(a)(6) of the Cybercrime Law misuse, transfer, possession, alteration, or deletion of identifying
information belonging to another, whether natural or juridical, without
Section 4(a)(6) provides: right: Provided: that if no damage has yet been caused, the penalty
imposable shall be one (1) degree lower.
(6) Cyber-squatting. The acquisition of domain name over the internet in
bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy the reputation, and deprive others Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates the constitutional rights to
from registering the same, if such a domain name is: due process and to privacy and correspondence, and transgresses the
freedom of the press.
(i) Similar, identical, or confusingly similar to an existing trademark
registered with the appropriate government agency at the time of the In Morfe v. Mutuc,it ruled that the right to privacy exists independently of
domain name registration; its identification with liberty; it is in itself fully deserving of constitutional
protection.
(ii) Identical or in any way similar with the name of a person other than the
registrant, in case of a personal name; and Relevant to any discussion of the right to privacy is the concept known as
the "Zones of Privacy."
(iii) Acquired without right or with intellectual property interests in it.
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these
Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or cyber-squatting violates the equal zones, any form of intrusion is impermissible unless excused by law and in
protection clausein that, not being narrowly tailored, it will cause a user accordance with customary legal process. The meticulous regard we
using his real name to suffer the same fate as those who use aliases or take accord to these zones arises not only from our conviction that the right to
the name of another in satire, parody, or any other literary device. privacy is a "constitutional right" and "the right most valued by civilized
men," but also from our adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human
The law is reasonable in penalizing the offender for acquiring the domain Rights which mandates that, "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary
name in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive others interference with his privacy" and "everyone has the right to the
who are not ill-motivated of the rightful opportunity of registering the protection of the law against such interference or attacks." In the Matter
same. of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of Sabio v. Senator
Gordon, 535 Phil. 687, 714-715 (2006).
Hence, valid and constitutional.
Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of privacy: (a) the right
Section 4(b)(3) of the Cybercrime Law against unreasonable searchesand seizures, which is the basis of the right
to be let alone, and (b) the right to privacy of communication and
Section 4(b)(3) provides: correspondence.In assessing the challenge that the State has
impermissibly intruded into these zones of privacy, a court must determine
b) Computer-related Offenses: whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if
so, whether that expectation has been violated by unreasonable
x x x x government intrusion.

(3) Computer-related Identity Theft. The intentional acquisition, use, Petitioners simply fail to show how government effort to curb computer-
related identity theft violates the right to privacy and correspondence as
well as the right to due process of law. The Act actually seeks to punish cyber prostitution, white slave trade, and
pornography for favor and consideration. This includes interactive
Clearly, what this section regulates are specific actions: the acquisition, prostitution and pornography, i.e., by webcam.
use, misuse or deletion of personal identifying data of another. There is no
fundamental right to acquire anothers personal data. Likewise, engaging in sexual acts privately through internet connection,
perceived by some as a right, has to be balanced with the mandate of the
Further, petitioners fear that Section 4(b)(3) violates the freedom of the State to eradicate white slavery and the exploitation of women.
press in that journalists would be hindered from accessing the unrestricted
user account of a person in the news to secure information about him that Hence, valid and constitutional.
could be published.
Section 4(c)(2) of the Cybercrime Law
The Court held, the press, whether in quest of news reporting or social
investigation, has nothing to fear since a special circumstance is present to Section 4(c)(2) provides:
negate intent to gain which is required by this Section.
(2) Child Pornography. The unlawful or prohibited acts defined and
Hence, valid and constitutional. punishable by Republic Act No. 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of
2009, committed through a computer system: Provided, That the penalty
Section 4(c)(1) of the Cybercrime Law to be imposed shall be (1) one degree higher than that provided for in
Republic Act No. 9775.
Section 4(c)(1) provides:
The above merely expands the scope of the Anti-Child Pornography Act of
(c) Content-related Offenses: 2009(ACPA) to cover identical activities in cyberspace. In theory, nothing
prevents the government from invoking the ACPA when prosecuting
(1) Cybersex. The willful engagement, maintenance, control, or operation, persons who commit child pornography using a computer system. Actually,
directly or indirectly, of any lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual ACPAs definition of child pornography already embraces the use of
activity, with the aid of a computer system, for favor or consideration. "electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means."

Petitioners claim that the above violates the freedom of expression Of course, the law makes the penalty higher by one degree when the crime
clause.They express fear that private communications of sexual character is committed in cyberspace. But no one can complain since the intensity or
between husband and wife or consenting adults, which are not regarded duration of penalty is a legislative prerogative and there is rational basis
as crimes under the penal code, would now be regarded as crimes when for such higher penalty.The potential for uncontrolled proliferation of a
done "for favor" in cyberspace. In common usage, the term "favor" particular piece of child pornography when uploaded in the cyberspace is
includes "gracious kindness," "a special privilege or right granted or incalculable.
conceded," or "a token of love (as a ribbon) usually worn
conspicuously."This meaning given to the term "favor" embraces socially Hence, valid and constitutional.
tolerated trysts. The law as written would invite law enforcement agencies
into the bedrooms of married couples or consenting individuals. Section 4(c)(3) of the Cybercrime Law
 enters the recipients domain without prior permission. The OSG contends
Section 4(c)(3) provides: that commercial speech enjoys less protection in law.

(3) Unsolicited Commercial Communications. The transmission of These have never been outlawed as nuisance since people might have
commercial electronic communication with the use of computer system interest in such ads. What matters is that the recipient has the option of
which seeks to advertise, sell, or offer for sale products and services are not opening or reading these mail ads. That is true with spams. Their
prohibited unless: recipients always have the option to delete or not to read them.

(i) There is prior affirmative consent from the recipient; or To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the
right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him.
(ii) The primary intent of the communication is for service and/or Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of expression.
administrative announcements from the sender to its existing users,
subscribers or customers; or Hence, void for being unconstitutional.

(iii) The following conditions are present: Articles 353, 354, and 355 of the Penal Code

(aa) The commercial electronic communication contains a simple, valid, Section 4(c)(4) of the Cyber Crime Law
and reliable way for the recipient to reject receipt of further commercial
electronic messages (opt-out) from the same source; Petitioners dispute the constitutionality of both the penal code provisions
on libel as well as Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act on
(bb) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely cyberlibel.
disguise the source of the electronic message; and
The RPC provisions on libel read:
(cc) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely include
misleading information in any part of the message in order to induce the Art. 353. Definition of libel. A libel is public and malicious imputation of a
recipients to read the message. crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission,
condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit,
The above penalizes the transmission of unsolicited commercial or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of
communications, also known as "spam." The term "spam" surfaced in early one who is dead.
internet chat rooms and interactive fantasy games. One who repeats the
same sentence or comment was said to be making a "spam." Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. Every defamatory imputation is
presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and
The Government, represented by the Solicitor General, points out that justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:
unsolicited commercial communications or spams are a nuisance that
wastes the storage and network capacities of internet service providers, 1. A private communication made by any person to another in the
reduces the efficiency of commerce and technology, and interferes with performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and
the owners peaceful enjoyment of his property. Transmitting spams
amounts to trespass to ones privacy since the person sending out spams 2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or
remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are has an obligation to protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed,
not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to Article
in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the 355 of the penal code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above
exercise of their functions. merely affirms that online defamation constitutes "similar means" for
committing libel.
Art. 355. Libel means by writings or similar means. A libel committed by
means of writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, But the Courts acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime law
painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar penalizes the author of the libelous statement or article. Cyberlibel brings
means, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and with it certain intricacies, unheard of when the penal code provisions on
medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in libel were enacted. The culture associated with internet media is distinct
addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended party. from that of print.

The libel provision of the cybercrime law, on the other hand, merely The internet is characterized as encouraging a freewheeling, anything-goes
incorporates to form part of it the provisions of the RPC on libel. Thus writing style. In a sense, they are a world apart in terms of quickness of the
Section 4(c)(4) reads: readers reaction to defamatory statements posted in cyberspace,
facilitated by one-click reply options offered by the networking site as well
Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute the offense of as by the speed with which such reactions are disseminated down the line
cybercrime punishable under this Act: to other internet users.

x x x x Hence, Section 4(c)(4) penalizing online libel is valid and constitutional with
respect to the original author of the post; but void and unconstitutional
(c) Content-related Offenses: with respect to others who simply receive the post and react to it; and

x x x x Section 5 of the Cybercrime Law

(4) Libel. The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in Article 355 of Section 5 provides:
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed through a computer
system or any other similar means which may be devised in the future. Sec. 5. Other Offenses. The following acts shall also constitute an offense:

Petitioners lament that libel provisions of the penal codeand, in effect, the (a) Aiding or Abetting in the Commission of Cybercrime. Any person who
libel provisions of the cybercrime law carry with them the requirement of willfully abets or aids in the commission of any of the offenses enumerated
"presumed malice" even when the latest jurisprudence already replaces it in this Act shall be held liable.
with the higher standard of "actual malice" as a basis for
conviction.Petitioners argue that inferring "presumed malice" from the (b) Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrime. Any person who willfully
accuseds defamatory statement by virtue of Article 354 of the penal code attempts to commit any of the offenses enumerated in this Act shall be
infringes on his constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. held liable.

Libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the government Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 5 that renders criminally
liable any person who willfully abets or aids in the commission or attempts communication. It is inevitable that any government threat of punishment
to commit any of the offenses enumerated as cybercrimes. It suffers from regarding certain uses of the medium creates a chilling effect on the
overbreadth, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on protected constitutionally-protected freedom of expression of the great masses that
expression. use it. In this case, the particularly complex web of interaction on social
media websites would give law enforcers such latitude that they could
The Solicitor General contends, however, that the current body of arbitrarily or selectively enforce the law.
jurisprudence and laws on aiding and abetting sufficiently protects the
freedom of expression of "netizens," the multitude that avail themselves of Section 5 with respect to Section 4(c)(4) is unconstitutional. Its vagueness
the services of the internet. He points out that existing laws and raises apprehension on the part of internet users because of its obvious
jurisprudence sufficiently delineate the meaning of "aiding or abetting" a chilling effect on the freedom of expression, especially since the crime of
crime as to protect the innocent. The Solicitor General argues that plain, aiding or abetting ensnares all the actors in the cyberspace front in a fuzzy
ordinary, and common usage is at times sufficient to guide law way.In the absence of legislation tracing the interaction of netizens and
enforcement agencies in enforcing the law. their level of responsibility such as in other countries, Section 5, in relation
to Section 4(c)(4) on Libel, Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial
Libel in the cyberspace can of course stain a persons image with just one Communications, and Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, cannot stand
click of the mouse. Scurrilous statements can spread and travel fast across scrutiny.
the globe like bad news. Moreover, cyberlibel often goes hand in hand
with cyberbullying that oppresses the victim, his relatives, and friends, But the crime of aiding or abetting the commission of cybercrimes under
evoking from mild to disastrous reactions. Still, a governmental purpose, Section 5 should be permitted to apply to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access,
which seeks to regulate the use of this cyberspace communication Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference,
technology to protect a persons reputation and peace of mind, cannot Section 4(a)(4) on System Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of
adopt means that will unnecessarily and broadly sweep, invading the area Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-
of protected freedoms. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). related Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3)
on Computer-related Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex. None
If such means are adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of what sinister of these offenses borders on the exercise of the freedom of expression.
predicaments await internet users will suppress otherwise robust
discussion of public issues. Democracy will be threatened and with it, all Section 6 of the Cybercrime Law
liberties. Penal laws should provide reasonably clear guidelines for law
enforcement officials and triers of facts to prevent arbitrary and Section 6 provides:
discriminatory enforcement. (Adonis) G.R. No. 203378The terms "aiding or
abetting" constitute broad sweep that generates chilling effect on those Sec. 6. All crimes defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code, as
who express themselves through cyberspace posts, comments, and other amended, and special laws, if committed by, through and with the use of
messages. information and communications technologies shall be covered by the
relevant provisions of this Act: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed
Hence, Section 5 of the cybercrime law that punishes "aiding or abetting" shall be one (1) degree higher than that provided for by the Revised Penal
libel on the cyberspace is a nullity. Code, as amended, and special laws, as the case may be.

As already stated, the cyberspace is an incomparable, pervasive medium of Section 6 merely makes commission of existing crimes through the internet
a qualifying circumstance. As the Solicitor General points out, there exists a as
substantial distinction between crimes committed through the use of
information and communications technology and similar crimes committed 2. Child pornography committed online as to which, charging the offender
using other means. In using the technology in question, the offender often under both Section 4(c)(2) of Republic Act 10175 and Republic Act 9775 or
evades identification and is able to reach far more victims or cause greater the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 also constitutes a violation of the
harm. The distinction, therefore, creates a basis for higher penalties for same proscription, and, in respect to these, is void and unconstitutional.
cybercrimes.
Section 8 of the Cybercrime Law
Hence, valid and constitutional.
Section 8 provides:
Section 7 of the Cybercrime Law
Sec. 8. Penalties. Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts
Section 7 provides: enumerated in Sections 4(a) and 4(b) of this Act shall be punished with
imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of at least Two hundred thousand
Sec. 7. Liability under Other Laws. A prosecution under this Act shall be pesos (PhP200,000.00) up to a maximum amount commensurate to the
without prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision of the damage incurred or both.
Revised Penal Code, as amended, or special laws.
Any person found guilty of the punishable act under Section 4(a)(5) shall
Online libel is different. There should be no question that if the published be punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of not more
material on print, said to be libelous, is again posted online or vice versa, than Five hundred thousand pesos (PhP500,000.00) or both.
that identical material cannot be the subject of two separate libels. The
two offenses, one a violation of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code and If punishable acts in Section 4(a) are committed against critical
the other a violation of Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175 involve essentially the infrastructure, the penalty of reclusion temporal or a fine of at least Five
same elements and are in fact one and the same offense. Indeed, the OSG hundred thousand pesos (PhP500,000.00) up to maximum amount
itself claims that online libel under Section 4(c)(4) is not a new crime but is commensurate to the damage incurred or both, shall be imposed.
one already punished under Article 353. Section 4(c)(4) merely establishes
the computer system as another means of publication. Charging the Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in
offender under both laws would be a blatant violation of the proscription Section 4(c)(1) of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment of prision
against double jeopardy. mayor or a fine of at least Two hundred thousand pesos (PhP200,000.00)
but not exceeding One million pesos (PhP1,000,000.00) or both.
The Court RESOLVES to LEAVE THE DETERMINATION of the correct
application of Section 7 that authorizes prosecution of the offender under Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in
both the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act 10175 to actual cases, WITH Section 4(c)(2) of this Act shall be punished with the penalties as
THE EXCEPTION of the crimes of: enumerated in Republic Act No. 9775 or the "Anti-Child Pornography Act
of 2009:" Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree
1. Online libel as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(4) higher than that provided for in Republic Act No. 9775, if committed
of Republic Act 10175 and Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code through a computer system.
constitutes a violation of the proscription against double jeopardy; as well
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in authorities in the collection or recording of the above-stated information.
Section 4(c)(3) shall be punished with imprisonment of arresto mayor or a
fine of at least Fifty thousand pesos (PhP50,000.00) but not exceeding Two The court warrant required under this section shall only be issued or
hundred fifty thousand pesos (PhP250,000.00) or both. granted upon written application and the examination under oath or
affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce and the
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in showing: (1) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the
Section 5 shall be punished with imprisonment one (1) degree lower than crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed, or is being
that of the prescribed penalty for the offense or a fine of at least One committed, or is about to be committed; (2) that there are reasonable
hundred thousand pesos (PhP100,000.00) but not exceeding Five hundred grounds to believe that evidence that will be obtained is essential to the
thousand pesos (PhP500,000.00) or both. conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the prevention of,
any such crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily available for
The matter of fixing penalties for the commission of crimes is as a rule a obtaining such evidence.
legislative prerogative. Here the legislature prescribed a measure of severe
penalties for what it regards as deleterious cybercrimes. Judges and Petitioners assail the grant to law enforcement agencies of the power to
magistrates can only interpret and apply them and have no authority to collect or record traffic data in real time as tending to curtail civil liberties
modify or revise their range as determined by the legislative department. or provide opportunities for official abuse. They claim that data showing
where digital messages come from, what kind they are, and where they
The courts should not encroach on this prerogative of the lawmaking body. are destined need not be incriminating to their senders or recipients
before they are to be protected. Petitioners invoke the right of every
Hence, valid and constitutional. individual to privacy and to be protected from government snooping into
the messages or information that they send to one another.
Section 12 of the Cybercrime Law
Undoubtedly, the State has a compelling interest in enacting the
Section 12 provides: cybercrime law for there is a need to put order to the tremendous
activities in cyberspace for public good. To do this, it is within the realm of
Sec. 12. Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data. Law enforcement authorities, reason that the government should be able to monitor traffic data to
with due cause, shall be authorized to collect or record by technical or enhance its ability to combat all sorts of cybercrimes.
electronic means traffic data in real-time associated with specified
communications transmitted by means of a computer system. Informational privacy has two aspects: the right not to have private
information disclosed, and the right to live freely without surveillance and
Traffic data refer only to the communications origin, destination, route, intrusion.In determining whether or not a matter is entitled to the right to
time, date, size, duration, or type of underlying service, but not content, privacy, this Court has laid down a two-fold test. The first is a subjective
nor identities. test, where one claiming the right must have an actual or legitimate
expectation of privacy over a certain matter. The second is an objective
All other data to be collected or seized or disclosed will require a court test, where his or her expectation of privacy must be one society is
warrant. prepared to accept as objectively reasonable. 429 U.S. 589 (1977)

Service providers are required to cooperate and assist law enforcement Since the validity of the cybercrime law is being challenged, not in relation
to its application to a particular person or group, petitioners challenge to Sec. 13. Preservation of Computer Data. The integrity of traffic data and
Section 12 applies to all information and communications technology (ICT) subscriber information relating to communication services provided by a
users, meaning the large segment of the population who use all sorts of service provider shall be preserved for a minimum period of six (6) months
electronic devices to communicate with one another. Consequently, the from the date of the transaction. Content data shall be similarly preserved
expectation of privacy is to be measured from the general publics point of for six (6) months from the date of receipt of the order from law
view. Without reasonable expectation of privacy, the right to it would have enforcement authorities requiring its preservation.
no basis in fact.
Law enforcement authorities may order a one-time extension for another
In Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977)the United States Supreme Court six (6) months: Provided, That once computer data preserved, transmitted
classified privacy into two categories: decisional privacy and informational or stored by a service provider is used as evidence in a case, the mere
privacy. Decisional privacy involves the right to independence in making furnishing to such service provider of the transmittal document to the
certain important decisions, while informational privacy refers to the Office of the Prosecutor shall be deemed a notification to preserve the
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters. It is the latter rightthe computer data until the termination of the case.
right to informational privacythat those who oppose government
collection or recording of traffic data in real-time seek to protect. The service provider ordered to preserve computer data shall keep
confidential the order and its compliance.
Section 12 does not permit law enforcement authorities to look into the
contents of the messages and uncover the identities of the sender and the Petitioners in G.R. No. 203391 (Palatino v. Ochoa)claim that Section 13
recipient. constitutes an undue deprivation of the right to property. They liken the
data preservation order that law enforcement authorities are to issue as a
Section 12, of course, limits the collection of traffic data to those form of garnishment of personal property in civil forfeiture proceedings.
"associated with specified communications." But this supposed limitation Such order prevents internet users from accessing and disposing of traffic
is no limitation at all since, evidently, it is the law enforcement agencies data that essentially belong to them.
that would specify the target communications. The power is virtually
limitless, enabling law enforcement authorities to engage in "fishing No doubt, the contents of materials sent or received through the internet
expedition," choosing whatever specified communication they want. This belong to their authors or recipients and are to be considered private
evidently threatens the right of individuals to privacy. communications. But it is not clear that a service provider has an obligation
to indefinitely keep a copy of the same as they pass its system for the
The Court must ensure that laws seeking to take advantage of these benefit of users. By virtue of Section 13, however, the law now requires
technologies be written with specificity and definiteness as to ensure service providers to keep traffic data and subscriber information relating to
respect for the rights that the Constitution guarantees. communication services for at least six months from the date of the
transaction and those relating to content data for at least six months from
Hence, void for being unconstitutional receipt of the order for their preservation.

Section 13 of the Cybercrime Law At any rate, as the Solicitor General correctly points out, the data that
service providers preserve on orders of law enforcement authorities are
Section 13 provides: not made inaccessible to users by reason of the issuance of such orders.
The process of preserving data will not unduly hamper the normal
transmission or use of the same.
(a) To secure a computer system or a computer data storage medium;
Hence, valid and constitutional
(b) To make and retain a copy of those computer data secured;
Section 14 of the Cybercrime Law
(c) To maintain the integrity of the relevant stored computer data;
Section 14 provides:
(d) To conduct forensic analysis or examination of the computer data
Sec. 14. Disclosure of Computer Data. Law enforcement authorities, upon storage medium; and
securing a court warrant, shall issue an order requiring any person or
service provider to disclose or submit subscribers information, traffic data (e) To render inaccessible or remove those computer data in the accessed
or relevant data in his/its possession or control within seventy-two (72) computer or computer and communications network.
hours from receipt of the order in relation to a valid complaint officially
docketed and assigned for investigation and the disclosure is necessary Pursuant thereof, the law enforcement authorities may order any person
and relevant for the purpose of investigation. who has knowledge about the functioning of the computer system and the
measures to protect and preserve the computer data therein to provide, as
The process envisioned in Section 14 is being likened to the issuance of a is reasonable, the necessary information, to enable the undertaking of the
subpoena. search, seizure and examination.

Besides, what Section 14 envisions is merely the enforcement of a duly Law enforcement authorities may request for an extension of time to
issued court warrant, a function usually lodged in the hands of law complete the examination of the computer data storage medium and to
enforcers to enable them to carry out their executive functions. The make a return thereon but in no case for a period longer than thirty (30)
prescribed procedure for disclosure would not constitute an unlawful days from date of approval by the court.
search or seizure nor would it violate the privacy of communications and
correspondence. Disclosure can be made only after judicial intervention. Petitioners challenge Section 15 on the assumption that it will supplant
established search and seizure procedures.
Hence, valid and constitutional.
The exercise of these duties do not pose any threat on the rights of the
Section 15 of the Cybercrime Law person from whom they were taken. Section 15 does not appear to
supersede existing search and seizure rules but merely supplements them.
Section 15 provides:
Hence, valid and constitutional.
Sec. 15. Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data. Where a
search and seizure warrant is properly issued, the law enforcement Section 17 of the Cybercrime Law
authorities shall likewise have the following powers and duties.
Section 17 provides:
Within the time period specified in the warrant, to conduct interception, as
defined in this Act, and: Sec. 17. Destruction of Computer Data. Upon expiration of the periods as
provided in Sections 13 and 15, service providers and law enforcement Taking Section 6 into consideration, this can actually be made to apply in
authorities, as the case may be, shall immediately and completely destroy relation to any penal provision. It does not take into consideration any of
the computer data subject of a preservation and examination. the three tests mentioned above.

Petitioners claim that such destruction of computer data subject of The Court is therefore compelled to strike down Section 19 for being
previous preservation or examination violates the users right against violative of the constitutional guarantees to freedom of expression and
deprivation of property without due process of law. But, as already stated, against unreasonable searches and seizures.
it is unclear that the user has a demandable right to require the service
provider to have that copy of the data saved indefinitely for him in its Section 20 of the Cybercrime Law
storage system. If he wanted them preserved, he should have saved them
in his computer when he generated the data or received it. He could also Section 20 provides:
request the service provider for a copy before it is deleted.
Sec. 20. Noncompliance. Failure to comply with the provisions of Chapter
Hence, valid and constitutional. IV hereof specifically the orders from law enforcement authorities shall be
punished as a violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 with imprisonment
Section 19 of the Cybercrime Law of prision correctional in its maximum period or a fine of One hundred
thousand pesos (Php100,000.00) or both, for each and every
Section 19 empowers the Department of Justice to restrict or block access noncompliance with an order issued by law enforcement authorities.
to computer data:
Petitioners challenge Section 20, alleging that it is a bill of attainder. The
Sec. 19. Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data. When a argument is that the mere failure to comply constitutes a legislative finding
computer data is prima facie found to be in violation of the provisions of of guilt, without regard to situations where non-compliance would be
this Act, the DOJ shall issue an order to restrict or block access to such reasonable or valid.
computer data.
But since the non-compliance would be punished as a violation of
Petitioners contest Section 19 in that it stifles freedom of expression and Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1829,PENALIZING OBSTRUCTION OF
violates the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Solicitor APPREHENSION AND PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS. Section 20
General concedes that this provision may be unconstitutional. But since necessarily incorporates elements of the offense which are defined
laws enjoy a presumption of constitutionality, the Court must satisfy itself therein.
that Section 19 indeed violates the freedom and right mentioned.
Thus, the act of non-compliance, for it to be punishable, must still be done
Not only does Section 19 preclude any judicial intervention, but it also "knowingly or willfully." There must still be a judicial determination of
disregards jurisprudential guidelines established to determine the validity guilt, during which, as the Solicitor General assumes, defense and
of restrictions on speech. Restraints on free speech are generally evaluated justifications for non-compliance may be raised. Thus, Section 20 is valid
on one of or a combination of three tests: the dangerous tendency insofar as it applies to the provisions of Chapter IV which are not struck
doctrine, the balancing of interest test, and the clear and present danger down by the Court.
rule. Section 19, however, merely requires that the data to be blocked be
found prima facie in violation of any provision of the cybercrime law. Hence, valid and constitutional.
 CICC to follow when it provided a definition of cybersecurity.
Sections 24 and 26(a) of the Cybercrime Law
Cybersecurity refers to the collection of tools, policies, risk management
Sections 24 and 26(a) provide: approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and technologies
that can be used to protect cyber environment and organization and users
Sec. 24. Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center. There is hereby assets.This definition serves as the parameters within which CICC should
created, within thirty (30) days from the effectivity of this Act, an inter- work in formulating the cybersecurity plan.
agency body to be known as the Cybercrime Investigation and
Coordinating Center (CICC), under the administrative supervision of the Further, the formulation of the cybersecurity plan is consistent with the
Office of the President, for policy coordination among concerned agencies policy of the law to "prevent and combat such [cyber] offenses by
and for the formulation and enforcement of the national cybersecurity facilitating their detection, investigation, and prosecution at both the
plan. domestic and international levels, and by providing arrangements for fast
and reliable international cooperation." This policy is clearly adopted in the
Sec. 26. Powers and Functions. The CICC shall have the following powers interest of law and order, which has been considered as sufficient
and functions: standard.

(a) To formulate a national cybersecurity plan and extend immediate Hence, Sections 24 and 26(a) are likewise valid and constitutional.
assistance of real time commission of cybercrime offenses through a
computer emergency response team (CERT); x x x. Pestilos v Generoso G.R. No. 182601 | SCRA | November 10, 2014 | Brion,
J. Petition: Petition for Review on Certiorari Petitioners: Joey M. Pestilos,
Petitioners mainly contend that Congress invalidly delegated its power Dwight Macapanas, Miguel Gaces, Jerry Fernandez and Ronald Muoz
when it gave the Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC) Respondents: Moreno Generoso and People of the Philippines
the power to formulate a national cybersecurity plan without any sufficient
standards or parameters for it to follow. FACTS:
The petitioners were indicted for attempted murder. Petitioners filed an
In order to determine whether there is undue delegation of legislative Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation on the ground that
power, the Court has adopted two tests: the completeness test and the there no valid warrantless took place. The RTC denied the motion and the
sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in CA affirmed the denial.
all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it
reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce Records show that an altercation ensued between the petitioners and
it.1avvphi1The second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in Atty. Moreno Generoso. The latter called the Central Police District to
the law to determine the boundaries of the delegates authority and report the incident and acting on this report, SPO1 Monsalve dispatched
prevent the delegation from running riot. Gerochi v. Department of SPO2 Javier to go to the scene of the crime and render assistance. SPO2,
Energy, 554 Phil. 563 (2007). together with augmentation personnel arrived at the scene of the crime
less than one hour after the alleged altercation and saw Atty. Generoso
Here, the cybercrime law is complete in itself when it directed the CICC to badly beaten.
formulate and implement a national cybersecurity plan. Also, contrary to
the position of the petitioners, the law gave sufficient standards for the Atty. Generoso then pointed the petitioners as those who mauled him
which prompted the police officers to invite the petitioners to go to the committed the crime.
police station for investigation. At the inquest proceeding, the City
Prosecutor found that the petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a However, the determination of probable cause and the gathering of facts
bladed weapon who fortunately survived the attack. or circumstances should be made immediately after the commission of the
crime in order to comply with the element of immediacy. In other words,
Petitioners aver that they were not validly arrested without a warrant. the clincher in the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances" is the required element of immediacy within which these
ISSUE: facts or circumstances should be gathered.
Are the petitioners validly arrested without warrant when the police
officers did not witness the crime and arrived only less than an hour after With the facts and circumstances of the case at bar that the police officers
the alleged altercation? gathered and which they have personally observed less than one hour
from the time that they have arrived at the scene of the crime, it is
HELD: reasonable to conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of
YES, the petitioners were validly arrested without warrant. Section 5(b), the facts and circumstances justifying the petitioners warrantless arrests.
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that:
Hence, the petitioners were validly arrested and the subsequent inquest
When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to proceeding was likewise appropriate.
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it.

The elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure are: first, an offense has just been committed; and second, the
arresting officer has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it.

The Court's appreciation of the elements that "the offense has just been
committed" and ''personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the
person to be arrested committed it" depended on the particular
circumstances of the case. The element of ''personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances", however, under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure requires clarification. Circumstances may
pertain to events or actions within the actual perception, personal
evaluation or observation of the police officer at the scene of the crime.
Thus, even though the police officer has not seen someone actually fleeing,
he could still make a warrantless arrest if, based on his personal evaluation
of the circumstances at the scene of the crime, he could determine the
existence of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested has