88. BASILISA S. ESCONDE, petitioner, vs.HON. SAMILO N.
BARLONGAY ISSUE:
and RAMON V. DELFIN, respondents.
Facts:
RamonDelfin (private respondent) filed an application for a parcel of
land located in Valenzuela, Bulacan. It was granted and now
covered with an OCT issued by the Registry of Deeda, Bulacan.
Delfin as an applicant, filed for a petition for Writ of Possession against
spouses Francisco and BasilisaEsconde, as they have been occupying
the said land. Subsequently, on March of 1978 the opposition filed by
the petitioner was denied by Judge Bautista. Moreover, Judge
constantino, who took over the same branch presided over judge
Bautista issued an order for Writ of Possession against the spouses.
Immediately, petitioner filed a motion to quash which was denied.
Petitioner then filed complaint for conveyanceagainstDelfin which
was rebutted by the latter via motion to dismiss on the ground that (1)
the cause of action, if any, is barred by re judicata (2) the complaint
fails to state sufficient cause or causes of action for reconveyance
and (3) the plaintiff is barred by prescription or laches from filing the
case.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a rejoinder to motion to dismiss and motion
for leave of court. The sheriff then, upon the courts order, delivered
possession to Delfin however he was barred in entering the premises.
Delfin filed a motion for an Alias writ of possession which was granted.
The sheriff turned over the possession to the representative of Delfin,
however, when the latter went to the premises he was again barred
by the petitioner. Then, Delfine asked for demolition and he moved for
a second alias writ of possession which was again, granted.
Subsequently, the writ of reconveyance filed by the petitioner was
dismissed. After which motions and motions have been filed. The
second resolve the issue, a temporary restraining order directing the
sheriff and Delfin to refrain from enforcing and/or carrying out the third
alias writ of possession. Petitioner then filed motion to amend the
resolution and TRO, either nullifying third alias writ of possession served
orto issue a mandatory injunction which was denied by the said court.
Whether or not action for reconveyance is the proper remedy.
RULING:
An action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy
granted to the rightful owner of land which has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in the name of another for the purpose of
compelling the latter to transfer or reconvey the land to him. The
prevailing rule in this jurisdiction does not bar a landowner whose
property was wrongfully or erroneously registered under the Torrens
System from bringing an action, after one year from the issuance of
the decree, for the reconveyance of the property in question. Such an
action does not aim or purport to re-open the registration proceeding
and set aside the decree of registration, but only to show that the
person who secured the registration of the questioned property is not
the real owner thereof. An ordinary civil action for reconveyance does
not seek to set aside the decree but respecting the decree as
incontrovertible and no longer open to review, seeks to transfer or
reconvey the land from the registered owner to the rightful owner.
Under the circumstances in the case at bar, it is apparent that
reconveyance is not the proper remedy. There was no proof of
irregularity in the issuance of title, nor in the proceedings incident
thereto, nor was it established that fraud had indeed intervened in the
issuance of said title, and the period of one year within which intrinsic
fraud could be claimed had long expired. Under similar conditions,
the Court ruled that the land should be adjudicated to the registered
owner that: "Justice is done according to law. As a rule, equity follows
the law. There may be a moral obligation, often regarded as an
equitable consideration (meaning compassion), but if there is no
enforceable legal duty, the action must fail although the
disadvantaged party deserves commiseration or sympathy."
An action for reconveyance of real property on the ground of
fraud must be filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the
fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place from the
issuance of an original certificate of title.
89. Heirs of Labiste vs Heirs of Labiste G.R. No. 162033
Facts: Epifanio is an heir of Jose Labiste, purchased a land. Before the
execution of the deed of conveyance, Epifanio executed an affidavit
affirming that he and his uncle Tranquilino co-owned the lot because
the money came from them both. Later on it was divided and the
heirs of Tranquilino bought half interest. After the World War, the
properties were destroyed and squatters lived on the land. Petitioner
learned that an heir of the respondent filed for reconstitution.
Issue: Whether the petitioner's cause of action prescribed.
Held: The court of appeals erred in applying the principle of Laches
because was is involved in this case is an express trust. The affidavit of
Epifanio is in the nature of a trust agreement. The only act that can be
construed as repudiation was when the respondent filed the petition
for reconstitution in 1993 and since petitioners files their complaint in
1995, their cause has not yet prescribed. However, to recover half of
the property covered by a private document to execute a public
deed of sale.
92. Lopez vs. CA
G.R. No. 157784. December 16, 2008
FACTS: The instant petition stemmed from an action for reconveyance
instituted by petitioner Richard B. Lopez in his capacity as trustee of
the estate of the late Juliana Lopez Manzano (Juliana) to recover
from respondents several large tracts of lands allegedly belonging to
the trust estate of Juliana.
Decedent Juliana, was married to Jose Lopez Manzano (Jose). Their
union did not bear any children. Juliana was the owner of several
properties, among them, the properties subject of this dispute. The
disputed properties totaling more than 1,500 hectares consist of six
parcels of land in Batangas, a parcel of land in Mindoro and a
fractional interest of residential land in Batangas.
On 23 March 1968, Juliana executed a notarial will, whereby she
expressed that she wished to constitute a trust fund for her
paraphernal properties, denominated as Fideicomiso de Juliana
Lopez Manzano (Fideicomiso), to be administered by her husband. If
her husband were to die or renounce the obligation, her nephew,
Enrique Lopez, was to become administrator and executor of the
Fideicomiso. Two-thirds (2/3) of the income from rentals over these
properties were to answer for the education of deserving but needy
honor students, while one-third 1/3 was to shoulder the expenses and
fees of the administrator. As to her conjugal properties, Juliana
bequeathed the portion that she could legally dispose to her
husband, and after his death, said properties were to pass to her
biznietos or great grandchildren.
Juliana initiated the probate of her will five (5) days after its execution,
but she died on 12 August 1968, before the petition for probate could
be heard. The petition was pursued instead in Special Proceedings
(S.P.) No. 706 by her husband. Thereafter, Jose then submitted an
inventory of Juliana's real properties with their appraised values, which
was approved by the probate court.
Jose then proposed a project of partition, claiming that as the only
heir of Juliana, he was entitled to of the paraphernal properties as
his legitime, while the other one-half (1/2) was to be constituted into
the Fideicomiso. He added that he and Juliana had outstanding
debts totaling P816,000.00 excluding interests, and that these debts
were secured by real estate mortgages. He noted that if these debts
were liquidated, the "residuary estate available for distribution would,
value-wise, be very small".
Probate Court thereafter issued an order approving the project of
partition.
Jose died on 22 July 1980, leaving a holographic will disposing of the
disputed properties to respondents. The will was allowed probate on
20 December 1983 in S.P. No. 2675 before the RTC of Pasay City.
Pursuant to Jose's will, the RTC ordered on 20 December 1983 the
transfer of the disputed properties to the respondents as the heirs of
Jose. Consequently, the certificates of title of the disputed properties
were cancelled and new ones issued in the names of respondents.
Petitioner's father, Enrique Lopez, also assumed the trusteeship of
Juliana's estate. On 30 August 1984, the RTC of Batangas, Branch 9
appointed petitioner as trustee of Juliana's estate in S.P. No. 706. On
11 December 1984, petitioner instituted an action for reconveyance of
parcels of land with sum of money before the RTC of Balayan,
Batangas against respondents. The complaint essentially alleged that
Jose was able to register in his name the disputed properties, which
were the paraphernal properties of Juliana, either during their
conjugal union or in the course of the performance of his duties as
executor of the testate estate of Juliana and that upon the death of
Jose, the disputed properties were included in the inventory as if they
formed part of Jose's estate when in fact Jose was holding them only
in trust for the trust estate of Juliana.
Respondents Maria Rolinda Manzano, Maria Rosario Santos, Jose
Manzano, Jr., Narciso Manzano, Maria Cristina Manzano Rubio and
Irene Monzon filed a joint answer with counterclaim for damages.
Respondents Corazon, Fernando and Roberto, all surnamed Lopez,
who were minors at that time and represented by their mother, filed a
motion to dismiss, the resolution of which was deferred until trial on the
merits. The RTC scheduled several pre-trial conferences and ordered
the parties to submit pre-trial briefs and copies of the exhibits.
On 10 September 1990, the RTC rendered a summary judgment,
dismissing the action on the ground of prescription of action. The RTC
also denied respondents' motion to set date of hearing on the
counterclaim.
Both petitioner and respondents elevated the matter to the Court of
Appeals, who rendered the assailed decision denying the appeals
filed by both petitioner and respondents. CA also denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not petitioner's action for reconveyance has
prescribed.
2. Whether or not an implied trust was constituted over the
disputed properties when Jose, the trustee, registered them in
his name.
HELD:
1. YES. The right to seek reconveyance based on an implied or
constructive trust is not absolute. It is subject to extinctive prescription.
22 An action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust
prescribes in 10 years. This period is reckoned from the date of the
issuance of the original certificate of title or transfer certificate of title.
Since such issuance operates as a constructive notice to the whole
world, the discovery of the fraud is deemed to have taken place at
that time.
In the instant case, the ten-year prescriptive period to recover the
disputed property must be counted from its registration in the name of
Jose on 15 September 1969, when petitioner was charged with
constructive notice that Jose adjudicated the disputed properties to
himself as the sole heir of Juana and not as trustee of the Fideicomiso.
2. NO. Evidently, Juliana's testamentary intent was to constitute an
express trust over her paraphernal properties which was carried out
when the Fideicomiso was established in S.P. No. 706. 5 However, the
disputed properties were expressly excluded from the Fideicomiso. The
probate court adjudicated the disputed properties to Jose as the sole
heir of Juliana. If a mistake was made in excluding the disputed
properties from the Fideicomiso and adjudicating the same to Jose as
sole heir, the mistake was not rectified as no party appeared to
oppose or appeal the exclusion of the disputed properties from the
Fideicomiso. Moreover, the exclusion of the disputed properties from
the Fideicomiso bore the approval of the probate court. The issuance
of the probate court's order adjudicating the disputed properties to
Jose as the sole heir of Juliana enjoys the presumption of regularity.
On the premise that the disputed properties were the paraphernal
properties of Juliana which should have been included in the
Fideicomiso, their registration in the name of Jose would be erroneous
and Jose's possession would be that of a trustee in an implied trust.
Implied trusts are those which, without being expressed, are deducible
from the nature of the transaction as matters of intent or which are
superinduced on the transaction by operation of law as matters of
equity, independently of the particular intention of the parties.
The provision on implied trust governing the factual milieu of this case
is provided in Article 1456 of the Civil Code, which states:
ART. 1456.If property is acquired through mistake or
fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law,
considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit
of the person from whom the property comes.
A resulting trust is presumed to have been contemplated by
the parties, the intention as to which is to be found in the
nature of their transaction but not expressed in the deed itself.
Specific examples of resulting trusts may be found in the Civil
Code, particularly Arts. 1448, 11 1449, 12 1451, 13 1452 14 and
1453. 15
A constructive trust is created, not by any word evincing a
direct intention to create a trust, but by operation of law in
order to satisfy the demands of justice and to prevent unjust
enrichment. It is raised by equity in respect of property, which
has been acquired by fraud, or where although acquired
originally without fraud, it is against equity that it should be
retained by the person holding it. 17 Constructive trusts are
illustrated in Arts. 1450, 18 1454, 19 1455 20 and 1456. 21
The disputed properties were excluded from the Fideicomiso
at the outset. Jose registered the disputed properties in his
name partly as his conjugal share and partly as his inheritance
from his wife Juliana, which is the complete reverse of the
claim of the petitioner, as the new trustee, that the properties
are intended for the beneficiaries of the Fideicomiso.
Furthermore, the exclusion of the disputed properties from the
Fideicomiso was approved by the probate court and,
subsequently, by the trial court having jurisdiction over the
Fideicomiso. The registration of the disputed properties in the
name of Jose was actually pursuant to a court order. The
apparent mistake in the adjudication of the disputed
properties to Jose created a mere implied trust of the
constructive variety in favor of the beneficiaries of the
Fideicomiso.
95. as a constructive notice to subsequent buyers, the appellate court
reversed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE: Who has the superior right to a parcel of land sold to different
buyers at different times by its former owner.
HELD: RESPONDENTS
The petition is DENIED. The Decision of the CA and the denial of the
motion for reconsideration are AFFIRMED.
a. It is not disputed that the subject land belonged to Ildefonso and
that it wasnot registered under the Torrens System when it was sold to
Gregorio in 1969 and to the petitioner in 1972. Further, the deed of sale
between Ildefonso and Gregorio was registered with the RD of
Camarines Sur pursuant to Act No. 3344.
In holding that respondents have a better right to possess the subject
land in view of the bona fide registration of the sale with the RD of
Camarines Sur by Ildefonso and Gregorio, the CA applied Article 1544
of the Civil Code.
While we agree with the appellate court that respondents have
superior right over the petitioner on the subject property, we
find Article 1544 inapplicableto the case at bar since the subject land
was unregistered at the time of the first sale. The registration
contemplated under this provision has been held to refer to
registration under the Torrens System, which considers the act of
registration as the operative act that binds the land. Thus, in Carumba
v. Court of Appeals, we held that Article 1544 of the Civil Code has no
application to land not registered under Torrens System.
The law applicable therefore is Act No. 3344, which provides for the
registration of all instruments on land neither covered by the Spanish
Mortgage Law nor the Torrens System. Under this law, registration by
the first buyer is constructive notice to the second buyer that can
defeat his right as such buyer in good faith; it binds third person who
may subsequently deal with the same property.
b. Even if petitioner argues that she purchased and registered the
subject land in good faith and without knowledge of any adverse
claim thereto, respondents still have superior right over the disputed
property. We held in Rayos v. Reyes32 that:
[T]he issue of good faith or bad faith of the buyer is relevant
only where the subject of the sale is registered land and the purchaser
is buying the same from the registered owner whose title to the land is
clean x x x in such case the purchaser who relies on the clean title of
the registered owner is protected if he is a purchaser in good faith for
value. Since the properties in question are unregistered lands,
petitioners as subsequent buyers thereof did so at their peril. Their
claim of having bought the land in good faith, i.e.,without notice that
some other person has a right to or interest in the property, would not
protect them if it turns out, as it actually did in this case, that their seller
did not own the property at the time of the sale.
c. It is an established principle that no one can give what one does
not have, nemo dat quod non habet. Accordingly, one can sell only
what one owns or is authorized to sell, and the buyer can acquire no
more than what the seller can transfer legally.In the case at bar, since
Ildefonso no longer owned the subject land at the time of the sale to
the petitioner, he had nothing to sell and the latter did not acquire
any right to it.
d. Even if we apply Article 1544, the facts would nonetheless show that
respondents and their predecessors-in-interest registered first the
source of their ownership and possession, i.e., the 1969 deed of sale,
and possessed the subject land at the earliest time. Applying the
doctrine of priority in time, priority in rights or prius tempore, potior
jure, respondents are entitled to the ownership and possession of the
subject land.
e. True, Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides that
[u]pon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of
registration and the certificate of title shall become incontrovertible.
However, it does not deprive an aggrieved party of a remedy in law.
What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not

the title or ownership which is represented by such certificate.
Ownership is different from a certificate of title. The fact that petitioner
was able to secure a title in her name did not operate to vest
ownership upon her of the subject land. Registration of a piece of land
under the Torrens System does not create or vest title, because it is not
a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an
evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described
therein. It cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner;
nor can it be used as a shield for the commission of fraud; neither does
it permit one to enrich himself at the expense of others. Its issuance in
favor of a particular person does not foreclose the possibility that the
real property may be co-owned with persons not named in the
certificate, or that it may be held in trust for another person by the
registered owner.
As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, notwithstanding the
indefeasibility of the Torrens title, the registered owner may still be
compelled to reconvey the registered property to its true owners. The
rationale for the rule is that reconveyance does not set aside or re-
subject to review the findings of fact of the Bureau of Lands. In an
action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as
incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property or
its title which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another
persons name, to its rightful or legal owner, or to the one with a better
right.
Finally, the Court of Appeals correctly held that an action for
reconveyance does not prescribe when the plaintiff is in possession of
the land to be reconveyed, as in this case. The reason for this is that
one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the
owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is
attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the
rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right
to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the
nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own
title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession.
We hold that in such a situation the right to quiet title to the property,
to seek its reconveyance and annul any certificate of title covering it,
accrued only from the time the one in possession was made aware of
a claim adverse to his own, and it is only then that the statutory period
of prescription commences to run against such possessor.
Salao vs Salao L-26699,
97.
March 16, 1976
Jul12
Facts:
The spouses Manuel Salao and Valentina Ignacio of Barrio Dampalit, Malabon,
Rizal begot four children named Patricio, Alejandra, Juan (Banli) and Ambrosia.
Manuel Salao died in 1885. His eldest son, Patricio, died in 1886 survived by his
only child. Valentin Salao.
After Valentinas death, her estate was administered by her daughter Ambrosia.
The documentary evidence proves that in 1911 or prior to the death of Valentina
Ignacio her two children, Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao, secured a Torrens
title, OCT No. 185 of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga, in their names
The property in question is the forty-seven-hectare fishpond located at Sitio
Calunuran, Lubao, Pampanga, wherein Benita Salao-Marcelo daughter of Valentin
Salao claimed 1/3 interest on the said fishpond.
The defendant Juan Y. Salao Jr. inherited from his father Juan Y. Salao, Sr. of the
fishpond and the other half from the donation of his auntie Ambrosia Salao.
It was alleged in the said case that Juan Y. Salao, Sr and Ambrosia Salao had
engaged in the fishpond business. Where they obtained the capital and that Valentin
Salao and Alejandra Salao were included in that joint venture, that the funds used
were the earnings of the properties supposedly inherited from Manuel Salao, and that
those earnings were used in the acquisition of the Calunuran fishpond. There is no
documentary evidence to support that theory.
The lawyer of Benita Salao and the Children of Victorina Salao in a letter dated
January 26, 1951 informed Juan S. Salao, Jr. that his clients had a one-third share in
the two fishponds and that when Juani took possession thereof in 1945, in which he
refused to give Benita and Victorinas children their one-third share of the net fruits
which allegedly amounted to P200,000. However, there was no mention on the deeds
as to the share of Valentin and Alejandra.
Juan S. Salao, Jr. in his answer dated February 6, 1951 categorically stated that
Valentin Salao did not have any interest in the two fishponds and that the sole
owners thereof his father Banli and his aunt Ambrosia, as shown in the Torrens titles
issued in 1911 and 1917, and that he Juani was the donee of Ambrosias one-half
share.
Benita Salao and her nephews and niece asked for the annulment of the donation to
Juan S. Salao, Jr. and for the reconveyance to them of the Calunuran fishpond as
Valentin Salaos supposed one-third share in the 145 hectares of fishpond registered
in the names of Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao.
Issue :
1. Whether or not the Calunuran fishpond was held in trust for Valentin Salao by
Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao.
2. Whether or not plaintiffs action for reconveyance had already prescribed.
Held:
1. There was no resulting trust in this case because there never was any
intention on the part of Juan Y. Salao, Sr., Ambrosia Salao and Valentin Salao
to create any trust. There was no constructive trust because the registration of
the two fishponds in the names of Juan and Ambrosia was not vitiated by fraud
or mistake. This is not a case where to satisfy the demands of justice it is
necessary to consider the Calunuran fishpond being held in trust by the heirs
of Juan Y. Salao, Sr. for the heirs of Valentin Salao.
Ratio:
A Torrens Title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land
referred to therein. (Sec. 47, Act 496). A strong presumption exists that Torrens titles
were regularly issued and that they are valid. In order to maintain an action for
reconveyance, proof as to the fiduciary relation of the parties must be clear and
convincing.
The plaintiffs utterly failed to prove by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence.
It cannot rest on vague and uncertain evidence or on loose, equivocal or indefinite
declarations.
Trust and trustee; establishment of trust by parol evidence; certainty of proof.
Where a trust is to be established by oral proof, the testimony supporting it must be
sufficiently strong to prove the right of the alleged beneficiary with as much
certainty as if a document proving the trust were shown. A trust cannot be
established, contrary to the recitals of a Torrens title, upon vague and inconclusive
proof.
Trusts; evidence needed to establish trust on parol testimony. In order to establish
a trust in real property by parol evidence, the proof should be as fully convincing as
if the act giving rise to the trust obligation were proven by an authentic document.
Such a trust cannot be established upon testimony consisting in large part of insecure
surmises based on ancient hearsay. (Syllabus, Santa Juana vs. Del Rosario 50 Phil.
110).
The foregoing rulings are good under article 1457 of the Civil Code which, as
already noted, allows an implied trust to be proven by oral evidence. Trustworthy
oral evidence is required to prove an implied trust because, oral evidence can be
easily fabricated.
On the other hand, a Torrens title is generally a conclusive of the ownership of the
land referred to therein (Sec. 47, Act 496). A strong presumption exists. that Torrens
titles were regularly issued and that they are valid. In order to maintain an action for
reconveyance, proof as to the fiduciary relation of the parties must be clear and
convincing.
The real purpose of the Torrens system is, to quiet title to land. Once a title is
registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals
of the court, or sitting in the mirador de su casa, to avoid the possibility of losing his
land.
2. Reconveyance had already prescribed. Plaintiffs action is clearly barred by
prescription or laches.
Ratio:
Under Act No. 190, whose statute of limitation would apply if there were an implied
trust in this case, the longest period of extinctive prescription was only ten year.
The Calunuran fishpond was registered in 1911. The written extrajudicial demand
for its reconveyance was made by the plaintiffs in 1951. Their action was filed in
1952 or after the lapse of more than forty years from the date of registration. The
plaintiffs and their predecessor-in-interest, Valentin Salao, slept on their rights if
they had any rights at all. Vigilanti prospiciunt jura or the law protects him who is
watchful of his rights (92 C.J.S. 1011, citing Esguerra vs. Tecson, 21 Phil. 518, 521).
Undue delay in the enforcement of a right is strongly persuasive of a lack of merit
in the claim, since it is human nature for a person to assert his rights most strongly
when they are threatened or invaded. Laches or unreasonable delay on the part of a
plaintiff in seeking to enforce a right is not only persuasive of a want of merit but
may, according to the circumstances, be destructive of the right itself.
Having reached the conclusion that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the reconveyance
of the Calunuran fishpond, it is no longer to Pass upon the validity of the donation
made by Ambrosia Salao to Juan S. Salao, Jr. of her one-half share in the two
fishponds The plaintiffs have no right and personality to assil that donation.
Even if the donation were declared void, the plaintiffs would not have any
successional rights to Ambrosias share. The sole legal heir of Ambrosia was her
nephew, Juan, Jr., her nearest relative within the third degree. Valentin Salao, if
living in 1945 when Ambrosia died, would have been also her legal heir, together
with his first cousin, Juan, Jr. (Juani). Benita Salao, the daughter of Valentin, could
not represent him in the succession to the estate of Ambrosia since in the collateral
line, representation takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters
whether they be of the full or half blood is (Art 972, Civil Code). The nephew
excludes a grandniece like Benita Salao or great-gandnephews like the plaintiffs
Alcuriza (Pavia vs. Iturralde 5 Phil. 176).