National Power Corporation vs. Philipp Brothers Oceanic, Inc.

11/6/2017 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 369
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 20, 2001 629

National Power Corporation vs. Philipp Brothers Oceanic,
Inc.
*
G.R. No. 126204. November 20, 2001.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.

PHILIPP BROTHERS OCEANIC, INC., respondent.
Remedial Law; Appeals; Findings of the Court of Appeals, by

itself, which are supported by substantial evidence, are almost
beyond the power of review by the Court.It is axiomatic that only
questions of law, not questions of fact, may be raised before this
Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and
binding on this Court and they carry even more weight when the
said court affirms the factual findings of the trial court. Stated
differently, the findings of the Court of Appeals, by itself, which
are supported by substantial evidence, are almost beyond the
power of review by this Court.
Civil Law; Obligations; Contracts; When an obligor is unable
to fulfill his obligation because of a fortuitous event or force
majeure, he cannot be held liable for damages for non
performance.The Court of Appeals is justified in sustaining the
Regional Trial Courts decision exonerating PHIBRO from any
liability for damages to NAPOCOR as it was clearly established
from the evidence, testimonial and documentary, that what
prevented PHIBRO from complying with its obligation under the
July 1987 contract was the industrial disputes which besieged
Australia during that time. Extant in our Civil Code is the rule
that no person shall be responsible for those events which could
not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable. This
means that when an obligor is unable to fulfill his obligation
because of a fortuitous event or force majeure, he cannot be held
liable for damages for nonperformance.
Same; Bids and Bidding; Where the right to reject is so
reserved, the lowest bid or any bid for that matter may be rejected
on a mere technicality.This Court has held that where the right
to reject is so reserved, the lowest bid or any bid for that matter
may be rejected on a mere technicality. And where the
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000015f8d501f3b6b4cefd1003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/35
government as advertiser, availing itself of that right, makes its

choice in rejecting any or all bids, the losing bidder has no cause
to complain nor right to dispute that choice unless an unfairness
or injustice is shown. Accordingly, a bidder has no ground of
action to compel the
______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
630
630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
National Power Corporation vs. Philipp Brothers Oceanic, Inc.
Government to award the contract in his favor, nor to compel it to

accept his bid. Even the lowest bid or any bid may be rejected.
Same; Same; The discretion given to the authorities to accept
or reject a bid is of such wide latitude that the Courts will not
interfere therewith unless it is apparent that it is used as a shield
to a fraudulent award.The discretion to accept or reject a bid
and award contracts is vested in the Government agencies
entrusted with that function. The discretion given to the
authorities on this matter is of such wide latitude that the Courts
will not interfere therewith, unless it is apparent that it is used as
a shield to a fraudulent award. (Jalandoni v. NARRA, 108 Phil.
486 [1960]). x x x. The exercise of this discretion is a policy
decision that necessitates prior inquiry, investigation,
comparison, evaluation, and deliberation. This task can best be
discharged by the Government agencies concerned, not by the
Courts. The role of the Courts is to ascertain whether a branch or
instrumentality of the Government has transgressed its
constitutional boundaries. But the Courts will not interfere with
executive or legislative discretion exercised within those
boundaries. Otherwise, it strays into the realm of policy decision
making.
Same; Damages; A person will be protected only when he acts
in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with
prudence and in good faith; but not when he acts with negligence
or abuse.Owing to the discretionary character of the right
involved in this case, the propriety of NAPOCORs act should
therefore be judged on the basis of the general principles
regulating human relations, the forefront provision of which is
Article 19 of the Civil Code which provides that every person

must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith. Accordingly, a person will be protected
only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is,
when he acts with prudence and in good faith; but not when he
acts with negligence or abuse.
Same; Same; To recover actual damages, the amount of loss
must not only be capable of proof but must actually be proven with
reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or
best evidence obtainable of the actual amount thereof.Basic is
the rule that to recover actual damages, the amount of loss must
not only be capable of proof but must actually be proven with
reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or
best evidence obtainable of the actual amount thereof. A court
cannot merely rely on speculations, conjectures, or guesswork as
to the fact and amount of damages. Thus, while indemnification
for damages shall comprehend not only the value of the loss
suffered, but also that of
631
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 20, 2001 631
the profits which the obligee failed to obtain, it is imperative that

the basis of the alleged unearned profits is not too speculative and
conjectural as to show the actual damages which may be suffered
on a future period.
Same; Same; Moral damages are not, as a general rule,
granted to a corporation.The award of moral damages is
likewise improper. To reiterate, NAPOCOR did not act in bad
faith. Moreover, moral damages are not, as a general rule,
granted to a corporation. While it is true that besmirched
reputation is included in moral damages, it cannot cause mental
anguish to a corporation, unlike in the case of a natural person,
for a corporation has no reputation in the sense that an individual
has, and besides, it is inherently impossible for a corporation to
suffer mental anguish.
Same; Attorneys Fees; In the absence of stipulation, a winning
party may be awarded attorneys fees only in case plaintiff s action
or defendants stand is so untenable as to amount to gross and
evident bad faith.This Court has laid down the rule that in the
absence of stipulation, a winning party may be awarded
attorneys fees only in case plaintiff sactionor defendants stand is
so untenable as to amount to gross and evident bad faith. This

cannot be said of the case at bar. NAPOCOR is justified in
resisting PHIBROs claim for damages. As a matter of fact, we
partially grant the prayer of NAPOCOR as we find that it did not
act in bad faith in disapproving PHIBROs prequalification to
bid.
Same; Same; Attorneys fees may not be awarded to a party
simply because the judgment is favorable to him, for it may
amount to imposing a premium on the right to redress grievances
in court.Trial courts must be reminded that attorneys fees may
not be awarded to a party simply because the judgment is
favorable to him, for it may amount to imposing a premium on the
right to redress grievances in court. We adopt the same policy
with respect to the expenses of litigation. A winning party may be
entitled to expenses of litigation only where he, by reason of
plaintiff s clearly unjustifiable claims or defendants
unreasonable refusal to his demands, was compelled to incur said
expenditures. Evidently, the facts of this case do not warrant the
granting of such litigation expenses to PHIBRO.
MELO, J., dissenting opinion:
Civil Law; Bids and Bidding; The reservation of the right to

reject any and all bids does not include the right to exclude a
prospective bidder,
632
perforce a qualified one at that.The instant case does not involve

the rejection of PHIBROs bid by NAPOCOR. The fact is that
PHIBRO was not even allowed to bid by NAPOCOR. While it may
be true that any bid may be rejected on a mere technicality if the
right to reject is reserved, there is a whale of a difference between
rejecting a bid and excluding a prospective bidder from
participating in tenders, more so in this case where the
prospective bidder has complied with all the prequalification
requirements. Indubitably, the reservation of the right to reject
any and all bids does not include the right to exclude a
prospective bidder, perforce a qualified one at that.
Same; Damages; In a number of cases, Court has sustained
the award of moral damages to a corporation despite the general
rule that moral damages cannot be awarded to an artificial person
which has no feelings, emotions or senses, and which cannot

experience physical suffering and mental anguish.The Court, in
a number of cases (i.e. Asset Privatization Trust vs. CA, 300 SCRA
579 [1998]; Maersk Tabacalera Shipping Agency [Filipina], Inc.
vs. CA, 197 SCRA 646 [1991]), has sustained the award of moral
damages to a corporation despite the general rule that moral
damages cannot be awarded to an artificial person which has no
feelings, emotions or senses, and which cannot experience
physical suffering and mental anguish (LBC Express, Inc. vs. CA,
236 SCRA 602 [1994]; see also Solid Homes, Inc. vs. CA, 275
SCRA 267 [1997]) because a corporation may have a good
reputation which, if besmirched, may also be a ground for the
award of moral damages.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Quasha, Ancheta, Pea & Nolasco for private
respondent.
SANDOVALGUTIERREZ, J.:
Where a person merely uses a right pertaining to him,

without bad faith or intent to injure, the fact that damages
1
are thereby suffered by another will not make him liable.
______________
1 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. I, 1997, p. 67.
633
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 20, 2001 633

Inc.
This principle finds useful application to the present

2
case.
Before us is a petition for review of the Decision dated
August 27, 1996
3
of the Court of Appeals affirming in toto
the Decision dated January 16, 1992 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 57, Makati City.
The facts are:
On May 14, 1987, the National Power Corporation
(NAPOCOR) issued invitations to bid for the supply and
delivery of 120,000 metric tons of imported coal for its
Batangas CoalFired Thermal Power Plant in Calaca,
Batangas. The Philipp Brothers Oceanic, Inc. (PHIBRO)
prequalified and was allowed to participate as one of the

bidders. After the public bidding was conducted, PHIBROs
bid was accepted. NAPOCORs acceptance was conveyed in
a letter dated July 8, 1987, which was received by PHIBRO
on July 15, 1987. 4
The Bidding Terms and Specifications provide for the
manner of shipment of coals, thus:
SECTION V
SHIPMENT
The winning TENDERER who then becomes the SELLER shall

arrange and provide gearless bulk carrier for the shipment of coal
to arrive at discharging port on or before thirty (30) calendar days
after receipt of the Letter of Credit by the SELLER or its nominee
as per Section XIV hereof to meet the vessel arrival schedules at
Calaca, Batangas, Philippines as follows:
60,000 +/ 10% July 20, 1987
5
60,000 +/ 10% September 4, 1987
On July 10, 1987, PHIBRO sent word to NAPOCOR that

industrial disputes might soon plague Australia, the
shipments point of
______________
2 Rollo, pp. 5369.

3 Rollo, pp. 7080.
4 Records, pp. 86110.
5 Records, p. 90.
634

Inc.
origin, which could seriously

6
hamper PHIBROs ability to
supply the needed coal. From July 23 to July 31, 1987,
PHIBRO again apprised NAPOCOR of the situation in
Australia, particularly informing the latter that the ship
owners therein are not willing to load cargo unless a
strikefree clause is incorporated
7
in the charter party or
the contract of carriage. In order to hasten the transfer of
coal, PHIBRO proposed to NAPOCOR that they equally
share the burden of a strikefree clause. NAPOCOR
refused.
On August 6, 1987, PHIBRO received from NAPOCOR a

confirmed and workable letter of credit. Instead of
delivering the coal on or before the thirtieth day after
receipt of the Letter of Credit, as agreed upon by the
parties in the July contract, PHIBRO effected its first
shipment only on November 17, 1987.
Consequently, in October 1987, NAPOCOR once more
advertised for the delivery of coal to its Calaca thermal
plant. PHIBRO participated anew in this subsequent
bidding. On November 24, 1987, NAPOCOR disapproved
PHIBROs application for prequalification8
to bid for not
meeting the minimum requirements. Upon further
inquiry, PHIBRO found that the real reason for the
disapproval was its purported failure to satisfy
NAPOCORsdemand for damages due to the delay in the
delivery of the first coal shipment.
This prompted PHIBRO to file an action for damages
with application for injunction against NAPOCOR with
9
the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 57, Makati City. In its
complaint, PHIBRO alleged that NAPOCORs act of
disqualifying it in the October 1987 bidding and in all
subsequent biddings was tainted with malice and bad faith.
PHIBRO prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages
and attorneys fees.
In its answer, NAPOCOR averred that the strikes in
Australia could not be invoked as reason for the delay in
the delivery of coal because PHIBRO itself admitted that as
of July 28, 1987 those strikes had already ceased. And,
even assuming that the strikes
______________
6 Plaintiffs Exhibits, Part I, Exhibit C, p. 66.

7 Ibid., Exhibits D, E, F, G, H, I, pp. 6773.
8 Records, p. 180.
9 Records, pp. 623.
635
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 20, 2001 635

Inc.
were still ongoing, PHIBRO should have shouldered the

burden of a strikefree clause because their contract was
C and F Calaca, Batangas, Philippines, meaning, the cost
and freight from the point of origin until the point of
destination would be for the account of PHIBRO.
Furthermore, NAPOCOR claimed that due to PHIBROs

failure to deliver the coal on time, it was compelled to
purchase coal from ASEA at a higher price. NAPOCOR
claimed for actual damages in the amount of
P12,436,185.73, representing the increase in the price 10
of
coal, and a claim of P500,000.00 as litigation expenses.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
On January 16, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision
in favor of PHIBRO, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff

Philipp Brothers Oceanic, Inc. (PHIBRO) and against the
defendant National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) ordering the
said defendant NAPOCOR:
1. To reinstate Philipp Brothers Oceanic, Inc. (PHIBRO) in

the defendant National Power Corporations list of
accredited bidders and allow PHIBRO to participate in
any and all future tenders of National Power Corporation
for the supply and delivery of imported steam coal;
2. To pay Philipp Brothers Oceanic, Inc. (PHIBRO);
a. The peso equivalent at the time of payment of $864,000 as

actual damages;
b. The peso equivalent at the time of payment of $100,000 as
moral damages;
c. The peso equivalent at the time of payment of $50,000 as
exemplary damages;
d. The peso equivalent at the time of payment of $73,231.91
as reimbursement for expenses, cost of litigation and
attorneysfees;
3. To pay the costs of suit;

4. The counterclaims of defendant NAPOCOR are dismissed
for lack of merit.
______________
10 Records, pp. 187197.
636

11
SO ORDERED.
Unsatisfied, NAPOCOR, through the Solicitor General,

elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. On August 27,
1996, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming in
toto the Decision of the Regional Trial Court. It
ratiocinated that:
There is ample evidence to show that although PHIBROs

delivery of the shipment of coal was delayed, the delay was in fact
caused by a) Napocors own delay in opening a workable letter of
credit; and b) the strikes which plagued the Australian coal
industry from the first week of July to the third week of
September 1987. Strikes are included in the definition of force
majeure in Section XVII of the Bidding Terms and Specifications,
(supra), so Phibro is not liable for any delay caused thereby.
Phibro was informed of the acceptance of its bid on July 8,
1987. Delivery of coal was to be effected thirty (30) days from
Napocors opening of a confirmed and workable letter of credit.
Napocor was only able to do so on August 6, 1987.
By that time, Australias coal industry was in the middle of a
seething controversy and unrest, occasioned by strikes, overtime
bans, mine stoppages. The origin, the scope and the effects of this
industrial unrest are lucidly described in the uncontroverted
testimony of James Archibald, an employee of Phibro and member
of the Export Committee of the Australian Coal Association
during the time these events transpired.
xxx xxx
The records also attest that Phibro periodically informed
Napocor of these developments as early as July 1, 1987, even
before the bid was approved. Yet, Napocor did not forthwith open
the letter of credit in order to avoid delay which might be caused
by the strikes and their aftereffects.
Strikes are undoubtedly included in the force majeure clause
of the Bidding Terms and Specifications (supra). The renowned
civilist, Prof. Arturo Tolentino, defines force majeure as an event
which takes place by accident and could not have been foreseen.
(Civil Code of the Philippines, Volume IV, Obligations and
Contracts, 126, [1991]) He further states:
Fortuitous events may be produced by two general causes: (1) by Nature,

such as earthquakes, storms, floods, epidemics, fires, etc., and (2) by the
act of man, such as an armed invasion, attack by bandits, governmental
prohibitions, robbery, etc.
______________
11 Rollo, p. 80.
637
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 20, 2001 637

Inc.
Tolentino adds that the term generally applies, broadly speaking,

to natural accidents. In order that acts of man such as a strike,
may constitute fortuitous event, it is necessary that they have the
force of an imposition which the debtor could not have resisted.
He cites a parallel example in the case of Philippine National
Bank v. Court of Appeals, 94 SCRA 357 (1979), wherein the
Supreme Court said that the outbreak of war which prevents
performance exempts a party from liability.
Hence, by law and by stipulation of the parties, the strikes
which took place in Australia from the first week of July to the
third week of September, 1987, exempted Phibro from the effects
12
of delay of the delivery of the shipment of coal.
Twice thwarted, NAPOCOR comes to us via a petition for

review ascribing to the Court of Appeals the following
errors:
Respondent Court of Appeals gravely and seriously erred in

concluding and so holding that PHIBROs delay in the delivery of
imported coal was due to NAPOCORs alleged delay in opening a
letter of credit and to force majeure, and not to PHIBROs own
13
deliberate acts and faults.
II

concluding and so holding that NAPOCOR acted maliciously and
unjustifiably in disqualifying PHIBRO from participating in the
December 8, 1987 and future biddings for the supply of imported
coal despite the existence of valid grounds therefor such as
14
serious impairment of its track record.
III

concluding and so holding that PHIBRO was entitled to injunctive
relief, to actual or compensatory, moral and exemplary damages,
attorneys fees and litigation expenses despite the clear absence of
15
legal and factual bases for such award.
______________
12 Rollo, pp. 5963.

13 Rollo, p. 27.
14 Rollo, pp. 3738.
15 Rollo, p. 42.
638

Inc.
IV

absolving PHIBRO from any liability for damages to NAPOCOR
for its unjustified and deliberate refusal and/or failure to deliver
16
the contracted imported coal within the stipulated period.

dismissing NAPOCORs counterclaims for damages and litigation
17
expenses.
It is axiomatic that only questions of law, not questions of

fact, may be raised before this Court in 18a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The findings
of facts of the19Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding
on this Court and they carry even more weight when the 20
said court affirms the factual findings of the trial court.
Stated differently, the findings of the Court of Appeals, by
itself, which are supported by substantial evidence,
21
are
almost beyond the power of review by this Court.
With the foregoing settled jurisprudence, we find it
pointless to delve lengthily on the factual issues raised by
petitioner. The existence of strikes in Australia having
been duly established in the lower courts, we are left only
with the burden of determining whether or not NAPOCOR
acted wrongfully or with bad faith in disqualifying
PHIBRO from participating in the subsequent public
bidding.
Let us consider the case in its proper perspective.
______________
16 Rollo, p. 45.
17 Rollo, p. 47.
18 Tinio v. Manzano, 307 SCRA 460 (1999); Siguan v. Lim, 318 SCRA
725 (1999); and National Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA
45 (1997).
19 Security Bank and Trust Company v. Triumph Lumber and
Construction Corporation, 301 SCRA 537 (1999); American Express
International, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 308 SCRA 65 (1999).
20 Borromeo v. Sun, 317 SCRA 176 (1999); Boneng v. People,304 SCRA
252 (1999).
21 Pimentel v. Court of Appeals, 307 SCRA 38 (1999).
639
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 20, 2001 639

Inc.
The Court of Appeals is justified in sustaining the Regional

Trial Courts decision exonerating PHIBRO from any
liability for damages to NAPOCOR as it was clearly
established from the evidence, testimonial and
documentary, that what prevented PHIBRO from
complying with its obligation under the July 1987 contract
was the industrial disputes which besieged Australia
during that time. Extant in our Civil Code is the rule that
no person shall be responsible for those events which could
not be foreseen,
22
or which, though foreseen, were
inevitable. This means that when an obligor is unable to
fulfill his obligation because of a fortuitous event or force
majeure, he 23cannot be held liable for damages for non
performance.
In addition to the above legal precept, it is worthy to
note that PHIBRO and NAPOCOR explicitly agreed in 24
Section XVII of the Bidding Terms and Specifications
that neither seller (PHIBRO) nor buyer (NAPOCOR) shall
be liable for any delay in or failure of the performance of its
obligations, other than the payment of money due, if any
such delay or failure is due to Force Majeure. Specifically,
they defined force majeure as any disabling cause beyond
the control of and without fault or negligence of the party,
which causes may include but are not restricted to Acts of
God or of the public enemy; acts of the Government in
either its sovereign or contractual capacity; governmental
restrictions; strikes, fires, floods, wars, typhoons, storms,
epidemics and quarantine restrictions.
The law is clear and so is the contract between
NAPOCOR and PHIBRO. Therefore, we have no reason to
rule otherwise.
However, proceeding from the premise that PHIBRO
was prevented by force majeure from complying with its
obligation, does it necessarily follow that NAPOCOR acted
unjustly, capriciously, and unfairly in disapproving

PHIBROs application for prequalification to bid?
______________
22 Article1174oftheCivilCode.
23 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Volume IV, 1997 Ed., p. 128.
24 Records, p. 24.
640

Inc.
First, it must be stressed that NAPOCOR was not bound

under any contract to approve PHIBROs prequalification
requirements. In fact, NAPOCOR had expressly reserved
its right to reject bids. The Instruction to Bidders found in
the PostQualification Documents/Specifications for the
Supply and Delivery of Coal for the Batangas CoalFired 25
Thermal Power Plant I at Calaca, Batangas Philippines,
is explicit, thus:
IB17 RESERVATION OF NAPOCOR TO REJECT BIDS
NAPOCOR reserves the right to reject any or all bids, to waive

any minor informality in the bids received. The right is also
reserved to reject the bids of any bidder who has previously failed
to properly perform or complete on time any and all contracts for
26
delivery of coal or any supply undertaken by a bidder.
(Emphasis supplied)
This Court has held that where the right to reject is so

reserved, the lowest bid or any bid for27 that matter may be
rejected on a mere technicality. And where the
government as advertiser, availing itself of that right,
makes its choice in rejecting any or all bids, the losing
bidder has no cause to complain nor right to dispute that
choice unless an unfairness or injustice is shown.
Accordingly, a bidder has no ground of action to compel the
Government to award the contract in his favor, nor to
compel it to accept
28
his bid. Even the lowest bid or
29
any bid
may be rejected. In Celeste v. Court of Appeals, we had
the occasion to rule:
Moreover, paragraph 15 of the Instructions to Bidders states that

the Government hereby reserves the right to reject any or all bids
submitted. In the case of A.C. Esguerra and Sons v. Aytona, 4

SCRA 1245, 1249 (1962), we held:
x x x. [I]n the invitation to bid, there is a condition imposed upon the

bidders to the effect that the bidders shall be subject to the
______________
25 Records, pp. 234, 279.

26 Records, p. 250.
27 A Treatise on Government Contracts Under Philippine Law, Fernandez, Jr.,
1996 Ed. p. 28.
28 A.C. Esguerra & Sons v. Aytona, 4 SCRA 1245 (1962).
29 209 SCRA 79 (1992).
641
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 20, 2001 641

right of the government to reject any and all bids subject to its discretion.
Here the government has made its choice, and unless an unfairness or
injustice is shown, the losing bidders have no cause to complain, nor right
to dispute that choice.
Since there is no evidence to prove bad faith and arbitrariness

on the part of the petitioners in evaluating the bids, we rule that
the private respondents are not entitled to damages representing
lost profits. (Emphasis supplied)
Verily, a reservation of the government of its right to reject

any bid, generally vests in the authorities a wide discretion
as to who is the best and most advantageous bidder. The
exercise of such discretion involves inquiry, investigation,
comparison, deliberation and decision, which are quasi
judicial functions, and when
30
honestly exercised, may not be
reviewed by31
the court. In Bureau Veritas v. Office of the
President, we decreed:
The discretion to accept or reject a bid and award contracts is

vested in the Government agencies entrusted with that function.
The discretion given to the authorities on this matter is of such
wide latitude that the Courts will not interfere therewith, unless it
is apparent that it is used as a shield to a fraudulent award.
(Jalandoni v. NARRA, 108 Phil. 486 [1960]). x x x. The exercise of
this discretion is a policy decision that necessitates prior inquiry,
investigation, comparison, evaluation, and deliberation. This task
can best be discharged by the Government agencies concerned,
not by the Courts. The role of the Courts is to ascertain whether a
branch or instrumentality of the Government has transgresses its
constitutional boundaries. But the Courts will not interfere with

executive or legislative discretion exercised within those
boundaries. Otherwise, it strays into the realm of policy decision
making. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Owing to the discretionary character of the right involved

in this case, the propriety of NAPOCORs act should
therefore be judged on the basis of the general principles
regulating human relations, the forefront provision of
which is Article 19 of the Civil Code which provides that
every person must, in the exercise of his
______________
30 Virata v. Bocar, 50 SCRA 468 (1973); Jalandoni v. NARRA,108 Phil.

486 (1960).
31 205 SCRA 705 (1992).
642

Inc.
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with

justice, give32 everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith. Accordingly, a person will be protected only
when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is,
when he acts with prudence and in 33good faith; but not
when he acts with negligence or abuse.
Did NAPOCOR abuse its right or act unjustly in
disqualifying PHIBRO from the public bidding?
We rule in the negative.
In practice, courts, in the sound exercise of their
discretion, will have to determine under all the facts and
circumstances when the exercise of a34 right is unjust, or
when there has been an abuse of right.
We went over the record of the case with painstaking
solicitude and we are convinced that NAPOCORs act of
disapproving PHIBROs application for prequalification to
bid was without any intent to injure or a purposive motive
to perpetrate damage. Apparently, NAPOCOR acted on the
strong conviction that PHIBRO had a seriouslyimpaired
track record. NAPOCOR cannot be faulted from believing
so. At this juncture, it is worth mentioning that at the time
NAPOCOR issued its subsequent Invitation to Bid, i.e.,
October 1987, PHIBRO had not yet delivered the first
shipment of coal under the July 1987 contract, which was
due on or before September 5, 1987. Naturally, NAPOCOR

is justified in
______________
32 The classical theory is that he who uses a right injures no one.

Traditionally, therefore, it has been a settled doctrine that no person can
be held liable for damages occasioned to another by the exercise of a right.
The modern tendency, therefore, is to depart from the classical and
traditional theory, and to grant indemnity for damages in cases where
there is an abuse of right, even when the act is not illicit. Law cannot be
given an antisocial effect. If mere fault or negligence in ones act can
make him liable for damages for injury caused thereby, with more reason
should abuse or bad faith make him liable.
33 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. I, 1997, pp. 6162. There
is an abuse of right when it is exercised only for the purpose of prejudicing
or injuring another. When the objective of the actor is illegitimate, the
illicit act cannot be concealed under the guise of exercising a right.
34 Ibid., p. 62.
643
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 20, 2001 643

Inc.
entertaining doubts on PHIBROs qualification or

capability to assume an obligation under a new contract.
Moreover, PHIBROs actuation in 1987 raised doubts as
to the real situation of the coal industry in Australia. It
appears from the records that when NAPOCOR was
constrained to consider an offer from another coal supplier
(ASEA) at a price of US$33.44 per metric ton, PHIBRO
unexpectedly offered the immediate delivery of 60,000
metric tons of Ulan steam coal at US$31.00 per metric ton
for arrival
35
at Calaca, Batangas on September 2021,
1987. Of course, NAPOCOR had reason to ponderhow
come PHIBRO could assure the immediate delivery of
60,000 metric tons of coal from the same source to arrive at
Calaca not later than September 20/21, 1987 but it could
not deliver the coal it had undertaken under its contract?
Significantly, one characteristic of a fortuitous event, in
a legal sense, and consequently in relation to contracts, is
that the concurrence must be such as to render it
impossible 36
for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal
manner. Faced with the above circumstance, NAPOCOR
is justified in assuming that, may be, there was really no
fortuitous event or force majeure which could render it
impossible for PHIBRO to effect the delivery of coal.

Correspondingly, it is also justified in treating PHIBROs
failure, to deliver a serious impairment of its track record.
That the trial court, thereafter, found PHIBROs
unexpected offer actually a result of its desire to minimize
losses on the part of NAPOCOR is inconsequential. In
determining the existence of good faith, the yardstick is the
frame of mind of the actor at the time he committed the
act, disregarding actualities or facts outside his knowledge.
We cannot fault NAPOCOR if it mistook PHIBROs
unexpected offer a mere attempt on the
lattersparttoundercutASEAoran indication of PHIBROs
inconsistency. The circumstances warrant such
contemplation.
______________
35 Plaintiffs Exhibit, Part I, p. 120.

36 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. IV, 1997, p. 128.
644

Inc.
That NAPOCOR believed all along that

PHIBROsfailuretodeliver37 on time was unfounded is
manifest from its letters reminding PHIBRO that it was
bound to deliver the coal within 30 days from its
(PHIBROs) receipt of the Letter of Credit, otherwise it
would be constrained to take legal action. The same honest
belief can be deduced from NAPOCORs Board Resolution,
thus:
On the legal aspect, Management stressed that failure of PBO to

deliver under the contract makes them liable for damages,
considering that the reasons invoked were not valid. The measure
of the damages will be limited to actual and compensatory
damages. However, it was reported that Philipp Brothers advised
they would like to have continuous business relation with NPC so
they are willing to sit down or even proposed that the case be
submitted to the Department of Justice as to avoid a court action
or arbitration.
xxx xxx
On the technicaleconomic aspect, Management claims that if
PBO delivers in November 1987 and January 1988, there are
some advantages. If PBO reacts to any legal action and fails to
deliver, the options are: one, to use 100% Semirara and second, to
go into urgent coal order. The first option will result in a 75 MW
derating and oil will be needed as supplement. We will stand to
lose around P30 M. On the other hand, if NPC goes into an urgent
coal order, there will be an additional expense of $786,000 or
P16.11 M, considering the price of the latest purchase with ASEA.
38
On both points, reliability is decreased.
The very purpose of requiring a bidder to furnish the

awarding authority its prequalification documents is to
ensure that only those responsible and qualified bidders
could bid and be awarded with government contracts. It
bears stressing that the award of a contract is measured
not solely by the smallest amount of bid for its
performance, but also by the responsibility of the bidder.
Consequently, the integrity, honesty, and trustworthiness
of the bidder is to be considered. An awarding official is
justified in considering a bidder not qualified or not
responsible if he has previously defrauded the public in
such contracts or if, on the evidence
______________
37 Dated August 11, 1987, August 27, 1987, September 8, 1987 and
September 14, 1987, Defendants Exhibits, p. 27.
38 Part I, Plaintiff s Exhibit, pp. 178179.
645
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 20, 2001 645

Inc.
before him, the official bonafide believes the bidder has

committed such fraud, despite the fact39
that there is yet no
judicial determination to that effect. Otherwise stated, if
the awarding body bonafide believes that a bidder has
seriously impaired its track record because of a particular
conduct, it is justified in disqualifying the bidder. This
policy is necessary to protect the interest of the awarding
body against irresponsible bidders.
Thus, one who acted pursuant to the sincere belief that
another willfully committed an act prejudicial to the
interest of the government cannot be considered to have
acted in bad faith. Bad faith has always been a question of
intention. It is that corrupt motive that operates in the
mind. As understood in law, it contemplates a state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some
40
40
motive of selfinterest or illwill or for ulterior purpose.
While confined in the realm of thought, its presence may be
ascertained through the 41
partys actuation or through
circumstantial evidence. The circumstances under which
NAPOCOR disapproved PHIBROs prequalification to bid
do not show an intention to cause damage to the latter. The
measure it adopted was one of selfprotection.
Consequently, we cannot penalize NAPOCOR for the
course of action it took. NAPOCOR cannot be made liable
for actual, moral and exemplary damages.
Corollarily, in awarding to PHIBRO actual damages in
the amount of $864,000, the Regional Trial Court computed
what could have been the profits of PHIBRO had
NAPOCOR allowed it to participate in the subsequent
public bidding. It ruled that PHIBRO would have won the
tenders for the supply of about 960,000 metric tons out of
at least 1,200,000 metric tons from the public bidding of
December 1987 to 1990. We quote the trial courtsruling,
thus:
______________
39 Cobach, Lucenario, Law on Public Bidding and Government

Contracts, pp. 9293. Citing 28 Corn. L.Q. 44; Douglas v. Commonwealth,
108 Pa. 559 (1885); Jacobson v. Board of Education, 64 A. 609 (N.J. 1906).
40 Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155 (1966).
41 Vda. de Laig v. Court of Appeals, 82 SCRA 294 (1978).
646

Inc.
x x x. PHIBRO was unjustly excluded from participating in at

least five (5) tenders beginning December 1987 to 1990, for the
supply and delivery of imported coal with a total volume of about
1,200,000 metric tons valued at no less than US$32 Million.
(Exhs. AA,AA1, to AA2). The price of imported coal for
delivery in 1988 was quoted in June 1988 by bidders at US$41.35
to US$43.95 per metric ton (Exh. JJ); in September 1988 at
US$41.50 to US$49.50 per metric ton (Exh. J1); in November
1988 at US$39.00 to US$48.50 per metric ton (Exh. J2) and for
the 1989 deliveries, at US$44.35 to US$47.35 per metric ton (Exh.
J3)and US$38.00 to US$48.25 per metric ton in September
1990 (Exh. JJ6 and JJ7). PHIBRO would have won the
tenders for the supply and delivery of about 960,000 metric tons of
coal out of at least 1,200,000 metric tons awarded during said
period based on its proven track record of 80%. The Court,

therefore finds that as a result of its disqualification, PHIBRO
suffered damages equivalent to its standard 3% margin in 960,000
metric tons of coal at the most conservative price of US$30.000 per
metric ton, or the total of US$864,000 which PHIBRO would have
earned had it been allowed to participate in biddings in which it
was disqualified and in subsequent tenders for supply and
delivery of imported coal.
We find this to be erroneous.

Basic is the rule that to recover actual damages, the
amount of loss must not only be capable of proof but must
actually be proven with reasonable degree of certainty,
premised upon competent proof 42
or best evidence obtainable
of the actual amount thereof. A court cannot merely rely
on speculations, conjectures, or guesswork as to the fact
and amount of damages. Thus, while indemnification for
damages shall comprehend not only the value of the loss
suffered, but
43
also that of the profits which the obligee failed
to obtain, it is imperative that the basis of the alleged
unearned profits is not too speculative and conjectural as to
show the actual damages which may be suffered on a
future period. 44
In Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
this Court denied the plaintiff s claim for actual damages
which was premised on a contract he was about to
negotiate on the ground
______________
42 PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 297

SCRA 402 (1998).
43 Article 2200 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
44 224 SCRA 477 (1993).
647
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 20, 2001 647

Inc.
that there was still the requisite public bidding to be

complied with, thus:
As to the alleged contract he was about to negotiate with

Minister Hipolito, there is no showing that the same has been
awarded to him. If Tandoc was about to negotiate a contract with
Minister Hipolito, there was no assurance that the former would
get it or that the latter would award the contract to him since
there was the requisite public bidding. The claimed loss of profit
arising out of that alleged contract which was still to be negotiated
is a mere expectancy. Tandocs claim that he could have earned P2
million in profits is highly speculative and no concrete evidence
was presented to prove the same. The only unearned income to
which Tandoc is entitled to from the evidence presented is that for
the onemonth period, during which his business was interrupted,
which is P6,125.00, considering that his annual net income was
P73,500.00.
45
In Lufthansa German Airlines v. Court of Appeals, this
Court likewise disallowed the trial courts award of actual
damages for unrealized profits in the amount of
US$75,000.00 for being highly speculative. It was held that
the realization of profits by respondent x x x was not a
certainty, but depended on a number of factors, foremost of
which was his ability to invite investors and to win the
bid. This Court went further saying that actual or
compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be
duly proved, and proved with reasonable degree of
certainty.
And 46in National Power Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, the Court, in denying the bidders claim for
unrealized commissions, ruled that even if NAPOCOR does
not deny its (bidders) claims for unrealized commissions,
and that these claims have been transmuted into judicial
admissions, these admissions cannot prevail over the rules
and regulations governing the bidding for NAPOCOR
contracts, which necessarily and inherently include the
reservation by the NAPOCOR of its right to reject any or
all bids.
The award of moral damages is likewise improper. To
reiterate, NAPOCOR did not act in bad faith. Moreover,
moral damages are
______________
45 243 SCRA 600 (1995).

46 273 SCRA 420 (1997).
648

Inc.
47
not, as a general rule, granted to a corporation. While it is
true that besmirched reputation is included in moral
damages, it cannot cause mental anguish to a corporation,

unlike in the case of a natural person, for a corporation has
no reputation in the sense that an individual has, and
besides, it is inherently
48
impossible for a corporation to
suffer mental
49
anguish. In LBC Express, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, we ruled:
Moral damages are granted in recompense for physical suffering,

mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
injury. A corporation, being an artificial person and having
existence only in legal contemplation, has no feelings, no
emotions, no senses; therefore, it cannot experience physical
suffering and mental anguish. Mental suffering can be
experienced only by one having a nervous system and it flows
from real ills, sorrows, and griefs of lifeall of which cannot be
suffered by respondent bank as an artificial person.
Neither can we award exemplary damages under Article

2234 of the Civil Code. Before the court may consider the
question of whether or not exemplary damages should be
awarded, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to
moral, temperate, or compensatory damages.
NAPOCOR, in this petition, likewise contests the
judgment of the lower courts awarding PHIBRO the
amount of $73,231.91 as reimbursement for expenses, cost
of litigation and attorneys fees.
We agree with NAPOCOR.
This Court has laid down the rule that in the absence of
stipulation, a winning party may be awarded attorneys
fees only in case
______________
47 Sea Commercial Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, (G.R. No.

122823, November 25, 1999, 319 SCRA 210).
48 Agbayani, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Commercial
Laws of the Philippines, 1996 Edition, Vol. 3, p. 17; Tamayo v. University
of Negros Occidental, 58 OG No. 37, p. 6023, September 10, 1962, citing
Memphis Telephone Co. v. Cumberland Telephone and Telegraph Co., 145
Fed. 906 and other cases cited in 52 ALR 11923 and 90 ALR 11801.
49 236 SCRA 602 (1994); See also Acme Shoe, Rubber & Plastic Corp. v.
Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 714 (1996).
649
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 20, 2001 649

Inc.
plaintiffs action or defendants stand is so50

untenable as to
amount to gross and evident bad faith. This cannot be
said of the case at bar. NAPOCOR is justified in resisting
PHIBROs claim for damages. As a matter of fact, we
partially grant the prayer of NAPOCOR as we find that it
did not act in bad faith in disapproving PHIBROs pre
qualification to bid.
Trial courts must be reminded that attorneys fees may
not be awarded to a party simply because the judgment is
favorable to him, for it may amount to imposing a premium
on the right to redress grievances in court. We adopt the
same policy with respect to the expenses of litigation. A
winning party may be entitled to expenses of litigation only
where he, by reason of plaintiff s clearly unjustifiable
claims or defendants unreasonable refusal to his demands,
was compelled to incur said expenditures. Evidently, the
facts of this case do not warrant the granting of such
litigation expenses to PHIBRO.
At this point, we believe that, in the interest of fairness,
NAPOCOR should give PHIBRO another opportunity to
participate in future public bidding. As earlier mentioned,
the delay on its part was due to a fortuitous event.
But before we dispose of this case, we take this occasion
to remind PHIBRO of the indispensability of coal to a coal
fired thermal plant. With households and businesses being
entirely dependent on the electricity supplied by
NAPOCOR, the delivery of coal cannot be venturesome.
Indeed, public interest demands that one who offers to
deliver coal at an appointed time must give a reasonable
assurance that it can carry through. With the deleterious
possible consequences that may result from failure to
deliver the needed coal, we believe there is greater strain of
commitment in this kind of obligation.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CAG.R. CV No. 126204 dated August 27, 1996 is hereby
MODIFIED. The award, in favor of PHIBRO, of actual,
moral and exemplary dam
______________
50 Jimenez v. Bucoy, 103 Phil. 40 (1958); Castillo v. Samonte, 106 Phil.

1023 (1960).
650

Inc.
ages, reimbursement for expenses, cost of litigation and

attorneys fees,andcostsofsuit,isDELETED.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Panganiban and Carpio, JJ., concur.

Melo (Chairman), J., Please see dissenting opinion.
DISSENTING OPINION
MELO, J.:
While I agree with the majority opinion insofar as it finds

that the delay in delivery of coal by respondent Philipp
Brothers Oceanic, Inc. (hereafter PHIBRO) to petitioner
National Power Corporation (hereafter NAPOCOR) was not
due to the formersfault,I have to dissent from the majority
insofar as it denies the award of actual, moral, and
exemplary damages to PHIBRO for the latters act of
excluding PHIBRO from participating in biddings
conducted by NAPOCOR.
The facts are undisputed.
On July 8, 1987, private respondent PHIBRO, one of the
largest trading firms in energy worldwide, was awarded by
NAPOCOR the contract to supply 120,000 MT of steam coal
for the Batangas Coal Fired Thermal Power Plant, the
same to be delivered in two (2) equal shipments on July 20
and September 14, 1987.
However, while the contract provided for the arrival
schedule of the two coal shipments, it also provided that
PHIBRO had to effect delivery not later than 30 days from
receipt of the letter of credit to be opened by NAPOCOR.
Petitioner NAPOCOR was able to open its letter of credit
only on August 6, 1987. Moreover, the contract had a
clause which excused any delay occasioned by force
majeure. This clause included strikes as one of the events
to be considered as constituting force majeure.
From July to September 1987, a series of strikes in the
collieries in New South Wales (NSW), Australia, and the
coal loading facility at Newcastle Port took place, which
adversely affected PHIBROs ability to deliver the first
shipment on time.
651
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 20, 2001 651


Inc.
Pursuant to the contract, PHIBRO notified NAPOCOR of

these force majeure conditions and that as a result of the
strikes, vessels were not readily available and shipowners
were unwilling to load cargo unless a strikefree risk was
incorporated in the charter party.
PHIBRO proposed an equal sharing in the strike free
risk, but NAPOCOR refused. Instead, it demanded delivery
of the first shipment not later than 30 days from the
opening of its letter of credit.
In the meantime, NAPOCOR negotiated to buy from a
company called ASEA 60,000MT imported steam coal at
US$33.00/MT. This higher priced coal was purchased by
NAPOCOR despite PHIBROs offer for the same tonnage
and delivery date at only US$31.00/MT, a price differential
of US$2.00/MT. The PHIBRO offer was with the
understanding that the existing 120,000MT contract would
be delivered in accordance with a shipping schedule to be
mutually agreed between PHIBRO and NAPOCOR, taking
into account the strikes and NAPOCORs needs.
NAPOCOR ignored the offer and bought the higher priced
material from ASEA.
In October 1987, NAPOCOR conducted a tender for the
supply of 180,000 MT imported coal. PHIBRO, as in prior
tenders, complied with all prequalification requirements of
the tender. However, NAPOCOR disqualified PHIBRO
allegedly for not meeting the minimum prequalification
requirements. PHIBRO was also refused the tender
documents. In addition, NAPOCOR, in total disregard of
the force majeure clause incorporated in the July 8, 1987
contract, demanded that unless its claims for damages due
to the delayed delivery of the coal in said contract were
first settled, PHIBRO would not be allowed to participate
in any and all subsequent tenders to be conducted by
NAPOCOR for the supply of imported coal. On November
25, 1987, PHIBRO protested the wrongful and unjust
action taken by NAPOCOR inasmuch as PHIBRO had all
the qualifications and none of the disqualifications.
PHIBRO demanded that it be provided with tender and
post qualification documents but NAPOCOR withheld the
release of tender documents to PHIBRO. After inquiry,
PHIBRO was told that the real reason for the
disqualification was not its failure to meet the minimum
prequalification requirements, but was principally the
652

Inc.
claim of NAPOCOR for alleged damages due to the delayed

delivery of the first shipment of the July 8, 1987 contract.
PHIBRO, on the other hand, maintained that its delayed
deliveries were due to force majeure and NAPOCORs
delayed opening of its letter of credit. Despite this,
however, NAPOCOR continued to bar PHIBRO from
participating in tenders.
Consequently, PHIBRO initiated suit before the Makati
Regional Trial Court on December 4, 1987 against
NAPOCOR, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 18473,
complaining against the latters alleged capricious,
malevolent, iniquitous, discriminatory, oppressive and
unjustified disqualification of PHIBRO, and asking for
damages and that NAPOCOR be enjoined from blacklisting
PHIBRO in the subsequent NAPOCOR tenders.
After trial on the merits, the Makati Regional Trial
Court, Branch 57, rendered its Decision on January 16,
1992 in favor of PHIBRO and against NAPOCOR, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the

plaintiff Philipp Brothers Oceanic, Inc. (PHIBRO) and against the
defendant National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) ordering the
said defendant NAPOCOR:
1. To reinstate Philipp Brothers Oceanic, Inc. (PHIBRO) in

the defendant National Power Corporations list of
accredited bidders and allow PHIBRO to participate in
any and all future tenders of National Power Corporation
for the supply and delivery of imported steam coal;
2. To pay Philipp Brothers Oceanic, Inc. (PHIBRO):
a) The peso equivalent at the time of payment of $864,000

actual damages;
b) The peso equivalent at the time of payment of $100,000 as
moral damages;
c) The peso equivalent at the time of payment of $50,000 as
exemplary damages;
d) The peso equivalent at the time of payment of $73,231.91
as reimbursement for expenses, cost of litigation and
attorneys fees;
3. To pay the costs of suit;
4. The counterclaim of defendant NAPOCOR are dismissed

for lack of merit.
653
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 20, 2001 653

Inc.
On January 27, 1992, the Office of the Solicitor General

appealed the lower courts decision to the Court of Appeals.
The appeal, docketed therein as CAG.R. CV No. 37906,
was decided on August 27, 1996 with the appellate court
handing down an affirmance of the decision.
Petitioner NAPOCOR now comes to this Court by way of
a petition for review by certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking to review, reverse, and set aside the
aforementioned decision.
Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals committed
serious errors of law, overlooked certain substantial facts
which if properly considered would affect the results of the
case, drew incorrect conclusions from facts established by
evidence or based on misapprehension of facts, its factual
findings being incomplete and do not reflect the actual
events that transpired and the important points were left
out and decided the case in a way not in accord with law or
the applicable decisions of this Court, which collectively
amount to grave abuse of discretion, to the damage and
prejudice of petitioners right to due process. Specifically,
petitioner maintains that the Court of Appeals gravely and
seriously erred:
(1) in concluding and so holding that PHIBROs delay

in the delivery of imported coal was due to
NAPOCORs alleged delay in opening letter of
credit to force majeure, and not to PHIBROs own
deliberate acts and faults;
(2) in concluding and so holding that NAPOCOR acted
maliciously and unjustifiably in disqualifying
PHIBRO from participating in the December 8,
1987 and future biddings for the supply of imported
coal despite the existence of valid grounds therefore
such as serious impairment of its track record;
(3) in concluding and so holding that PHIBRO was
entitled to injunctive relief, to actual or
compensatory, moral and exemplary damages,
attorneys fees and litigation expenses despite the
clear absence of legal and factual bases for such

award;
(4) in absolving PHIBRO from any liability for
damages to NAPOCOR for its unjustified and
deliberate refusal and/or failure to deliver the
contracted imported coal within the stipulated
period; and
654

Inc.
(5) in dismissing NAPOCORs counterclaims for

damages and litigation expenses.
As correctly pointed out in the majority opinion, the rules

are explicit that a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court can raise only questions of law (Section 1, Rule 45,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). PHIBROs delay in the
delivery of imported coal was found by both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals to have been due to the industrial
unrest, occasioned by strikes and work stoppages, that
occurred in Australia from the first week of July to the
third week of September, 1987. As aptly observed by the
Court of Appeals:
There is ample evidence to show that although PHIBROs delivery

of the shipment of coal was delayed, the delay was in fact caused
by a) NAPOCORs own delay in opening a workable letter of
credit; and b) the strikes which plagued the Australian coal
industry from the first week of July to the third week of
September, 1987. Strikes are included in the definition of force
majeure in Section XVII of the Bidding Terms and Specifications,
(supra), so PHIBRO is not liable for any delay caused thereby.
PHIBRO was informed of the acceptance of its bid on July 8,
1987. Delivery of coal was to be effected thirty (30) days from
NAPOCORs opening of a confirmed and workable letter of credit.
NAPOCOR was only able to do so on August 6, 1987.
By that time, Australias coal industry was in the middle of

a seething controversy and unrest, occasioned by strikes,
overtime bans, and mine stoppages.
The general rule is that findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are binding and conclusive upon this Court (DBP
vs. CA, 302 SCRA 362 [1999]). These factual findings carry
even more weight when said court affirms the factual
findings of the trial court (Lagrosa vs. CA, 312 SCRA 298
[1999]). Thus, it is beyond question that PHIBROs delay in
the delivery of coal is not attributable to its fault or
negligence, these being the factual findings of both the trial
court and the appellate court.
However, despite this finding, the majority would find
NAPOCOR free from liability to PHIBRO for its act of
excluding the PHIBRO from NAPOCORs subsequent
biddings on the ground that the exclusion is merely the
legitimate exercise of a right
655
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 20, 2001 655

Inc.
vested in NAPOCOR. In fine, the majority opinion would

characterize PHIBRO s exclusion as damnum absque
injura. I beg to disagree.
The majority opinion anchors its thesis on the
Instruction to Bidders found in the PostQualification
Documents/Specifications for the Supply and Delivery of
Coal for the Batangas CoalFired Thermal Power Plant I at
Calaca, Batangas, Philippines providing that:
NAPOCOR reserves the right to reject any and all bids, to waive
any minor informality in the bids received. The right is also
reserved to reject the bids of any bidder who has previously failed
to properly perform or complete on time any and all contracts for
delivery of coal or any supply undertaken by a bidder.
(Original Records, p. 250.)
My esteemed colleagues declare that since NAPOCOR has

reserved the right to reject the bid of any bidder, the
exclusion of PHIBRO was, in effect, only the use by
NAPOCOR of a right pertaining to it, without bad faith or
intent to injure and that the fact that PHIBRO may have
suffered injuries thereby would not make NAPOCOR
liable. The majority opinion goes on to state that where the
government rejects any or all bids, the losing bidder has no
cause to complain and that accordingly, a bidder has no
ground of action to compel the Government to award the
contract in his favor, nor to compel it to accept his bid.
I would wish to point out the following circumstances
which I believe were ignored by the majority.
Firstly, the instant case does not involve the rejection of
PHIBROs bid by NAPOCOR. The fact is that PHIBRO was
not even allowed to bid by NAPOCOR. While it may be true

that any bid may be rejected on a mere technicality if the
right to reject is reserved, there is a whale of a difference
between rejecting a bid and excluding a prospective bidder
from participating in tenders, more so in this case where
the prospective bidder has complied with all the
prequalification requirements. Indubitably, the reservation
of the right to reject any and all bids does not include the
right to exclude a prospective bidder, perforce a qualified
one at that.
656

Inc.
Secondly, the reservation of the right to reject bids

contained in the Instruction to Bidders is of doubtful
applicability in this case since PHIBRO was not even
allowed to submit a bid by NAPOCOR. The right to reject a
bid implies that there was a bid submitted. In this case,
PHIBRO was barred from submitting bids for subsequent
tenders of NAPOCOR.
Thirdly, this is not a simple case of rejecting a bid but
one of barring participation in any and all subsequent bids
for the supply of coal. This barring of PHIBRO caused the
latter to incur damages, all because of what both the trial
court and the Court of Appeals viewed to be an unfounded
imputation of delay to PHIBRO in the July 8, 1987 contract
for delivery of coal.
As adverted to earlier, this delay was covered by the
force majeure clause of the contract which validly excused
the noncompliance with the specified delivery date. The
situation was further exacerbated to private respondents
disadvantage when NAPOCOR, instead of accepting
PHIBROs offer to shoulder half the burden of a strike free
clause, used the nondelivery on time of the coal as an
excuse to exclude private respondent from future bidding
processes at NAPOCOR. Thus, the Court of Appeals
correctly found that:
Under the factual milieu, the court aquocorrectly made an award

of damages to PHIBRO for Napocors malicious and unjustified
act of disqualifying it from any and all subsequent bids for the
supply of coal. It was sufficiently established that Phibro was
entitled to an amount of US$864,000.00 representing unrealized
profits or lucro cessante. Article 2200 of the Civil Code provides:
Article 2200. Indemnification for damages shall comprehend not only

the value for the loss suffered, but also that of the profits when the
obligee failed to obtain.
Undoubtedly, PHIBRO could have earned the questioned

amount if NAPOCOR did not unjustly discriminate against it
during the October, 1987 bidding and all other bidding
subsequent thereto. x x x x x x x x x.
Moreover, private respondents business reputation and

credibility in the market greatly suffered because of this
malicious act ofpetitioner. As attested to by Vicente del
Castillo:
657
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 20, 2001 657

Inc.
Q. In addition to loss of earnings and opportunity loss

which you quantified earlier to be in the range of
770,000.00, what other damage, if any, did Philip
Brothers incur?
A Well, when we were blacklisted by the National Power
Corporation, it became known to the international
market, and with such an unfair reputation, we had
difficulty in obtaining business, new clients since our
old clients know what kind of company we are and they
continued to do business with us, and our business with
Ulan Coal Mines for market other than the Philippines
became difficult and we could no longer do business
that we used to before this problem came about.
(TSN, January 31, 1989, pp. 5051.)
Furthermore, James Archibald, an employee of PHIBRO

and a member of the Export Committee of the Australia
Coal Association, stated in his deposition, thus:
NBP Can you please state what affect the banning of NPC
of PHIBRO tendering a supply of coal has had on
PHIBRO?
JMA Well, it ended the special relationship between
Phibro and Ulan for a start out now I am in the cost
trading business and I can tell you that when you
loss a significant portion of your throughout like that
the industry is extremely incestuous and everybody
known very quickly that you have not been so
successful as your past years which makes it that
11/6/2017 y
SUPREME y REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 369
COURT
much more difficult to gain support from supplier in

bidding for other spot contracts.
NBP Can you explain what you mean by incestuous?
JMA It is a very tight industry. Most people have worked
in it in a number of companies such as myself, with
deals with some markets such as Japan, we have
actually joint negotiations and we actually go in to
customers, on a collective needs. It is inevitable that
we get to know each other very well. Also at the port
of Newcastle, ten per cent of the coal shipped is
actually traded amongst the various shippers
because often one shipper maybe short say ten
thousand tonnes for a particular cargo and they
would buy in or swap coal with other shippers. A
very common port practice. So you know everybody
quite well. And also I am a representative of the Coal
Association so I may have had a lot more exposure to
the people in the industry.
658

Inc.
(Exh. CC30, 3031.)
Despite the favorable findings of the lower court and the

Court of Appeals attributing no fault to PHIBRO, the harm
done to PHIBROs good standing in the market by the
blacklisting of NAPOCOR, at least as far as Philippine
setting is concerned, has already been done. Thus, I believe
that the court aquo,as sustained by the Court of Appeals,
correctly made the following findings:
PHIBRO is therefore entitled to damages for the discriminatory,

oppressive and unjustified disqualification imposed upon it by
NAPOCOR. PHIBRO was unjustly excluded from participating in
at least five (5) tenders beginning December 1987 to 1990, for the
supply and delivery of imported coal with a total volume of about
1,200,00 metric tons valued at no less than US$32 Million (Exhs.
AA, AA1,toAA2). The price of imported coal for delivery in
1988 was quoted in June 1988 by bidders at US$41.35 to
US$43.95 per metric ton (Exh. JJ); in September 1988 at
US$41.50 to US$49.50 per metric ton (Exh. J1); in November
1988 at US$39.00 to US$48.50 per metric ton (Exh. J2); and for
the 1989 deliveries, at US$44.35 to US$47.35 per metric ton (Exh.
J3) and US$38.00 to US$48.25 per metric ton in September
1990 (Exhs. JJ6 and JJ7). PHIBRO would have won the
tenders for the supply and delivery of about 960,000 metric tons of
coal out of at least 1,200,000 metric tons awarded during said
period based on its proven track record of 80%. The Court,
therefore, finds that as a result of its disqualification, PHIBRO
suffered damages equivalent to its standard 3% margin in
960,000 metric tons of coal at the most conservative price of
US$30.00 per metric ton, or the total of US$864,000 which
PHIBRO would have earned had it been allowed to participate in
biddings in which it was disqualified and in subsequent tenders
for supply and delivery of imported coal.
There is likewise uncontested or unrefuted evidence that as a
result of PHIBROs disqualification by NAPOCOR, PHIBRO
suffered damages in its international reputation and lost
credibility in Government and business circle, and hence an
award is authorized by Art. 2205 of our Civil Code.
For the damage done to the business reputation of

PHIBRO, I respectfully submit that the Court of Appeals
was likewise correct in sustaining the award of
US$100,000.00 as moral damages to private respondenta
corporate bodyunder Article 2217 of the Civil Code.
659
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 20, 2001 659

Inc.
The Court, in a number of cases (i.e. Asset Privatization

Trust vs. CA, 300 SCRA 579 [1998]; Maersk Tabacalera
Shipping Agency [Filipina], Inc. vs. CA, 197 SCRA 646
[1991]), has sustained the award of moral damages to a
corporation despite the general rule that moral damages
cannot be awarded to an artificial person which has no
feelings, emotions or senses, and which cannot experience
physical suffering and mental anguish (LBC Express, Inc.
vs. CA, 236 SCRA 602 [1994]; see also Solid Homes, Inc. vs.
CA, 275 SCRA 267 [1997]) because a corporation may have
a good reputation which, if besmirched, may also be a
ground for the award of moral damages (Mambulao
Lumber Co. vs. PNB, 22 SCRA 359 [1968]). Thus, in the
case of Simex International (Manila), Inc. vs. CA (183
SCRA 360 [1990]), the Court held:
From every viewpoint except that of the petitioners, its claim of

moral damages in the amount of Php 1,000,000.00 is nothing
short of preposterous. Its business certainly is not that big, or its
name that prestigious, to sustain such an extravagant pretense.

Moreover, a corporation is not as a rule entitled to moral damages
because, not being a natural person, it cannot experience physical
suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety,
mental anguish and moral shock. The only exception to this rule
is where the corporation has a good reputation that is debased,
resulting in its social humiliation.
We shall recognize that the petitioner did suffer injury because
of the private respondents negligence that caused the dishonor of
the checks issued by it. The immediate consequence was that its
prestige was impaired because of the bouncing checks and
confidence in it as a reliable debtor was diminished. The private
respondent makes much of the one instance when the petitioner
was sued in a collection case, but that did not prove that it did not
have a good reputation that could not be marred, more so since
that case was ultimately settled. It does not appear that, as the
private respondent would portray it, the petitioner is an unsavory
and disreputable entity that has no good name to protect.
Considering all this, we feel that the award of nominal
damages in the sum of Php20,000.00 was not the proper relief to
which the petitioner was entitled. Under Article 2221 of the Civil
Code, nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of
the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant,
may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. As we
have found that the petitioner has indeed incurred loss through
the fault of the private respondent, the proper remedy is the
award to it of
660

moral damages, which we impose, in our discretion, in the same

amount of Php20,000.00.
It must be noted that trial courts are generally given

discretion to determine the amount of moral damages, the
same being incapable of pecuniary estimation. The Court of
Appeals can only modify or change the amount awarded
when they are palpably or scandalously excessive so as to
indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice or
corruption on the part of the trial court. In the case at bar,
the conclusive finding of the Court of Appeals of petitioners
malice and bad faith justify the award of both moral and
exemplary damages. As held in De Guzman vs. NLRC, (211
SCRA 723 [1992]):
When moral damages are awarded, exemplary damages may also

be decreed. Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example
or correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages. According to the Code
Commission, exemplary damages are required by public policy,
for wanton acts must be suppressed. They are an antidote so that
the poison of wickedness may not run through the body politic.
These damages are legally assessible against him.
In addition, NAPOCORs baseless and unwarranted

discrimination against PHIBRO constrained the latter to
seek the aid of the courts in order to obtain redress. This
calls for an award of attorneys fees, which the lower court
correctly made.
Consequently, I vote to dismiss the petition and to
affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Judgment modified, award of damages deleted.
Note.The effect of an unqualified acceptance of the

offer or proposal of the bidder is to perfect a contract upon
notice of the award to the bidder. (City of Cebu vs. Heirs of
Candido Rubi, 306 SCRA 408 [1999])
o0o
661
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11/6/2017 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 369

VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 20, 2001 629

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.

Remedial Law; Appeals; Findings of the Court of Appeals, by

government as advertiser, availing itself of that right, makes its

630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED