Asian Perspective 36 (2012), 331351

The Korea-US Alliance as a

Source of Creeping Tension:
A Korean Perspective

Hyon Joo Yoo

South Koreas alliance strategies for the past several years have
demonstrated that Seoul has a strong desire to maintain the US
South Korean alliance and to accommodate the US requests to
transform the alliance. The Korean government accepted the flex-
ible use of US forces in Korea and increased cooperation with the
United States in developing antimissile shields. South Koreas strate-
gic choices have derived from the precarious situation on the Ko-
rean peninsula and the North Korean threat. Although the
convergence of security interests between China and South Korea
works against the transformation of the US alliance, North Koreas
provocations stimulate South Koreas desire to maintain the al-
liance and limit the ability of South Korea to refuse the US requests.
Keywords: US-ROK alliance, ROKNorth Korea relations, Chinas in-
terests in Korea.

FOR THE PAST TWO DECADES, THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK) AND THE
Peoples Republic of China (PRC) have made a drastic improvement
in bilateral relations (Lee 1996; Kim 2002). China has become the
dominant source of economic growth for South Korea, and its de-
pendence on Chinas economy is increasingly greater than its de-
pendence on the US economy (Ross 2006). In light of this, many
scholars and pundits cautiously predict that China will soon replace
the United States as a strategic ally with South Korea (Manning 1997;
Kang 2003; Cha 2004; Sutter 2005; Chung 2006; Ross 2006). For in-
stance, David Kang notes, If forced to choose between the United
States and China, it is unclear which state South Korea would sup-
port (Kang 2003, 79). Victor Cha states that over the next several
years, the United States might have to prepare for a scenario in which
South Korea seeks a continental accommodation with China and
pushes the United States off the peninsula (Cha 2004, 111). Robert

331
332 The Korea-US Alliance as a Source of Creeping Tension

Manning also expects that creation of a security and political collab-

oration between these two Asian continental powers may occur in the
foreseeable future (Manning 1997).
These assertions reflect the changing balance of power in East
Asia. The implications for South Korea are significant. On the one
hand, China has become the ROKs largest trade and investment part-
ner and exerts increasing political clout on the Korean peninsula. On
the other hand, the United States has remained a significant alliance
partner for South Korea; together they have preserved peace and pros-
perity on the Korean peninsula over the past sixty years. After the Ko-
rean War armistice in 1953 the US-ROK alliance provided robust
defense for South Korea and successfully deterred the Democratic
Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) from invading south of the
thirty-eighth parallel. Facing Washington and Beijing, Seoul deals
with a strategic dilemma in which its cooperation with one is likely
to antagonize the other. Ratcheting up bilateral relations with China
will gradually alienate South Korea from the United States and per-
haps ultimately undermine the US-ROK alliance. However, the
ROKs strengthening of its commitment to the United States is likely
to entail confrontation with China if the Beijing government sees such
a move as containment.
Hence, South Korea should avoid premature choices and keep
strategic ambiguity in order to maintain the security alliance with the
United States while expanding bilateral ties with China (Chung 2001).
However, South Koreas actions for the past several years have
demonstrated that the ROK seems unlikely to depart from the US
South Korean alliance anytime soon or strengthen bilateral relations
with China at the expense of the alliance with the United States (Sny-
der 2009). South Korea has chosen to coordinate its defense planning
with the changes in US strategies, even though such coordination may
create problems with China.
This article does not discount the dramatic development of bilat-
eral intercourse between China and South Korea. Nor does it argue
that South Korea undervalues partnership with China. Despite Chinas
growing economic and political weight on the Korean peninsula,
Seoul has increasingly accommodated US requests and strengthened
alliance commitments. South Koreas strategic choice in favor of the
alliance derives from the precarious situation on the peninsula. The
 Hyon Joo Yoo 333

uncertainty of North Koreas intentions has been a destabilizing force

in regional security, and Pyongyangs brazen behavior, including bal-
listic missile and nuclear-weapon tests, has increased tensions be-
tween the two Koreas. The security challenge of North Korea limits
the ability of South Korea to refuse the US requests and stimulates
South Koreas desire to maintain the alliance with the United States.
I begin by exploring the change in South Koreas perception of
China after the Cold War era. Then I show how and why such a
change runs contrary to the US-ROK alliance. This section also dis-
cusses why North Koreas conventional weapons and nuclear capa-
bility play a significant role in the alliance. The next section examines
how South Koreas concerns about the North Korean threat promote
alliance cooperation between Seoul and Washington, focusing on
three major issuesthe strategic flexibility of US forces in Korea,
the missile defense program, and military exercises. This section also
discusses how South Koreas accommodation with the United States
generates creeping tension between Seoul and Beijing.

China, North Korea, and the US-ROK Alliance

Since the end of the Cold War, South Koreas view of China has
changed dramatically. China, once called a hostile country, is no
longer deemed an antagonist or a monolithic threat aligned with North
Korea. The friendly overtures of the Chinese government reinforced
Seouls positive perception of China. The first important change of
perspective by South Korea appeared when it acknowledged the Chi-
nese role in discouraging North Korea from taking provocative ac-
tions in the late 1980s (ROK Ministry of National Defense 1990).
China stopped selling weapons to North Korea and no longer offered
unconditional support for its communist partner. China also pledged
to place the focus of its foreign policy on maintaining a peaceful at-
mosphere on the Korean peninsula. All in all, Beijing has emerged as
a significant partner for Seoul in promoting the peace and prosperity
of East Asia and preserving stability on the peninsula.
South Korea shares a common strategic interest with China. Both
countries are interested in securing the status quothe absence of
major warand preventing Pyongyangs hostile activities without
334 The Korea-US Alliance as a Source of Creeping Tension

causing the regimes sudden collapse. As a significant economic part-

ner for North Korea, China has continued financial exchanges with
North Korea because not doing so might lead to unpleasant conse-
quences. In other words, Pyongyang would initiate even more reck-
less actions or the regime would fall apart abruptly without
continuous Chinese economic assistance. In light of this, the Chinese
government has been supportive of South Koreas effort to improve
economic relations with North Korea, particularly the Sunshine pol-
icy developed by former president Kim Dae-jung. Moreover, South
Korea and China are both concerned about North Koreas nuclear pro-
grams and have supported the notion of a nuclear-free peninsula. The
two countries also find common ground for cooperation as both worry
about North Koreas ballistic missile capability (Han 2000).
The convergence of China-ROK security interests is not neces-
sarily compatible with the US strategy in East Asia. The United States
has been using its alliance partners to preserve its leadership in the re-
gion and hedge against an emerging power that would challenge US
supremacy. More specifically, South Korea has been asked to comply
with the increasing role of US forces in Korea and to participate in the
US missile defense program that protects not only South Korea but
also Japan and Taiwan. As South Korea discovers more reasons for
cooperating with China, keeping the US-ROK alliance can create
problems for Seoul. If the United States uses the US-ROK alliance
against the ascendance of Chinas economic and military capability,
South Korea will find it difficult to maintain an amicable relationship
with China. Such a scenario will not be beneficial for Seoul; hence it
will try to avoid being entrapped into potential conflicts between the
United States and China.
However, it has been extremely difficult for South Korea to refuse
to accommodate US military strategies. As South Korean leaders have
acknowledged, the alliance with the United States is still critical given
the challenges and threats that North Korea poses. As long as South
Korea perceives North Korea as a threat, maintaining the alliance with
the United States will be critical even if it means that South Korea
might face an unwanted confrontation with regional powers. How-
ever, identifying Pyongyang as a serious threat has at least two prob-
lems. The first has to do with an increasing economic gap between
North Korea and South Korea. North Korea has suffered from finan-
 Hyon Joo Yoo 335

cial hardships and chronic famine while the ROK has become the thir-
teenth-largest economy in the world based on gross domestic product
(GDP) (Suh 2007). Second, South Korea has come to realize that
North Korea would make an important partner as economic interac-
tions have grown over the past ten years. South Korean businesspeo-
ple moved their companies to the Kaesong industrial complex to
enjoy cheap North Korean labor, and a number of South Koreans vis-
ited the Mount Kumgang tourist site in North Korea. In particular, the
younger generation that does not have vivid memories of the Korean
War increasingly accepts North Korea as a political and economic
partner and questions the necessity of the US alliance.
Nevertheless, as South Koreas Defense Ministry has acknowl-
edged, North Koreas military capability constitutes a grave security
threat (ROK Ministry of National Defense 2006; 2008). Pyongyangs
conventional weapons, reinforced by the official military-first strat-
egy, now create an asymmetric threat to Seoul. North Koreas hit-and-
run style of attack can make it difficult for the ROK government to
predict North Koreas actions and to defend military assets and civil-
ians in South Korea. The incident in the West Sea in March 2010
showed this: a simple torpedo allegedly manufactured by North Korea
destroyed a South Korean corvette that was armed with state-of-the-
art technologies. Importantly, Pyongyang has not decreased the scale
and frequency of provocations. North Koreas sudden attack on Yeon-
pyeong Island in November 2010 killed several servicemen and civil-
ians. This tragic incident reminded the South Korean people of the
fact that they were dealing with a North Korea that might have still be-
lieved that the use of force was helpful in turning the political situa-
tion in its favor.
Furthermore, North Korea admitted to the development of clan-
destine uranium-enrichment programs in October 2002 when US as-
sistant secretary of state James Kelly visited Pyongyang. After the
Six Party Talks were initiated to discuss the Norths nuclear weapons,
Pyongyang undermined the talks by conducting a nuclear-weapon test
and a series of ballistic missile tests. Although some tests were not
successful, they suggested that North Korea could make some reck-
less choices with biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Most
South Koreans regarded these tests as threats. Several public surveys
demonstrated that the majority of the population believed that the sit-
336 The Korea-US Alliance as a Source of Creeping Tension

uation on the Korean peninsula had become unstable owing to North

Koreas nuclear weapons (Hankuk Ilbo 2006a; East Asia Institute
2009; Moonhwa Ilbo 2009).
A survey in 2011 revealed that a majority of respondents in South
Korea want nuclear bombs if North Korea does not denuclearize. In
the same survey, 91 percent of respondents said the alliance with the
United States remains crucial to South Korea (Kim and Friedhoff
2011). Importantly, a majority of the South Korean public thinks that
the United States is the best foreign-policy partner for the ROK and
that the alliance with the United States is beneficial for South Koreas
national security (Bouton et al. 2004; Hankuk Ilbo 2006a; East Asia
Institute 2009).
At the elite level, liberals and conservatives alike consider North
Korea a security threat.1 Even President Roh Moo-hyun said that
North Koreas nuclear program threatened the South, and he ac-
knowledged the importance of the US alliance. After the first nuclear
test by North Korea in October 2006, the Roh-led ROK government
announced that it would not accept Pyongyangs possession of nu-
clear weapons. He vowed to react sternly to the nuclear test (Hankuk
Ilbo 2006b). During his meeting with Japanese prime minister Abe
Shinzo on the day of North Koreas nuclear test, Roh also stated that
the nuclear test risked destabilizing Northeast Asia (Jeong 2006).
Two days later, Roh criticized North Korea by noting that its ratio-
nale for having nuclear weapons was, in fact, groundless. Although
Pyongyang claimed that it needed nuclear weapons to defend itself
from security threats, Roh stated that such threats were either exag-
gerated by the North Korean regime or simply did not exist (Jo
2006). In the same announcement he demanded that North Korea en-
gage in peaceful actions and emphasized that the alliance with the
United States was one of the pillars of the ROKs defense against
the North (Lee 2006).2
The conservative leader and Rohs successor, Lee Myung-bak,
shared this view. Right after the second nuclear test by North Korea
in May 2009, the Lee administration issued a warning against North
Korea. President Lee stated that he would not tolerate North Koreas
brazen behavior, which threatened the security and stability of South
Korea. Although he opened a door for dialogue with Pyongyang,
Lees position was basically unyielding and tough. In response to Py-
 Hyon Joo Yoo 337

ongyangs provocations, the Lee administration discussed whether an

adversary should be reinstated in the defense white paper to iden-
tify North Korea. The South Korean government also proactively
sought to raise international awareness of North Koreas offensive ac-
tions and nuclear-weapons program at various regional and interna-
tional meetings. Thus, although liberal and conservative leaders had
different approaches toward North Koreaessentially, unconditional
as opposed to conditional engagementthey shared deep concerns
about the Norths nuclear weapons and firmly opposed Pyongyangs
provocations (Suh 2009).3

South Koreas Accommodation with the United States

Strategic Flexibility

South Korea has a strong desire to have the US forces stay in Korea
to offer protection against North Koreas weapons of mass destruction
(WMD). The ROK lacks the capability for nuclear deterrence, and
North Koreas conventional forces and thousands of artillery pieces
deployed near the demilitarized zone (DMZ) are alarming despite the
fact that Seouls military spending is approximately three times that
of Pyongyang (Yonhap 2011). Seoul therefore believes that the focus
of the alliance should be placed on preserving stability on the Korean
peninsula; its concern is how to use the US Forces in Korea (USFK)
effectively for defense and deterrence against North Korea (Choi
2006). Standing against this view, however, is the US desire to trans-
form the alliance into one that goes beyond the Korean peninsula and
deals with regional conflicts. Washingtons main interest is how ef-
fectively and flexibly the USFK can operate in regional and interna-
tional contingencies when necessary.
The transformation of the US Forces in Korea is in line with
changes in the US militarys global posture. The US troops have been
restructured to become agile and readily deployable in the face of con-
stantly changing regional and global security environments (Rumsfeld
2004). The focus of this change has been on advancing capabilities
relying on a smaller number of forces and precision weapons, and re-
locating troops to critical places that allow quick, flexible responses to
338 The Korea-US Alliance as a Source of Creeping Tension

new threats and global emergencies. The USFK has been downsizing
and promoting mobility while maintaining a capacity to deter nuclear
threats from North Korea (US Department of Defense 2010a).
South Korea has raised two fundamental concerns regarding this
transformation. The first is that a decreasing number of US forces in
Korea will have a negative influence on deterrence of the North, es-
pecially if these forces are deployed outside the peninsula. The sec-
ond concern is that Seoul might be dragged into regional conflicts
involving US forces. South Korea cannot preclude the possibility that
the United States might request its involvement, such as by providing
logistical support. From South Koreas perspective, the most prob-
lematic regional contingency in East Asia would be a conflict between
the United States and China over Taiwan. China has been suspicious
about the USFKs transformation because it believes that US strate-
gic flexibility is an extension of its unspoken policy to contain China
(Choi 2006).
Nevertheless, South Korea agreed with the United States on the
strategic flexibility of the USFK. Seoul understood that it was im-
possible to block the transformation; even if it tried, its rejection of
this change would be tantamount to termination of the alliance. From
the US perspective, the reorganization of the USFK was a litmus test
of South Koreas intent. Seouls acceptance of the change would mean
that South Korea would keep the alliance intact while its intransi-
gence would represent that the government would let the alliance go.
As a former South Korean foreign minister indicated, if South Korea
had refused to comply with the transformation of the US alliance
strategy, it might have killed the alliance (Park 2011). Obviously,
South Korea under the liberal leader Roh Moo-hyun, who once ad-
vocated Korean self-defense, had a strong desire to preserve the US-
ROK alliance. In addition to accepting the flexible use of the USFK,
President Roh dispatched 3,600 troops to assist US military opera-
tions in Iraq in response to a US request, making the ROK the third-
largest provider of troops after the United States and Britain. The
dispatch of South Korean forces was designed to restore the alliance
with the United States and in fact dispel Washingtons suspicion about
the Roh administrations willingness to cooperate with US policy
goals (Yoon 2003).
The motivation behind Seouls choice with respect to strategic
 Hyon Joo Yoo 339

flexibility resided in deterrence and defense against North Korea.

South Korean military leaders believed that the decrease of US troops
that would accompany strategic flexibility would make the South vul-
nerable since it would remove the tripwire that would come into ef-
fect if North Korea invaded (Marquand 2003). US senator John Kerry
agreed, stating that the unilateral US decision to decrease the size of
its forces would send a wrong signal to North Korea and undermine
South Koreas defense (Korea Herald 2004). If the reduction of the
USFK is a fait accompli, a major issue for South Korea will be how
to delay it while maintaining its deterrence and defense capability.
Ironically, South Korea decided to accept strategic flexibility
mainly because it feared the withdrawal of US troops. During the
working-level policy consultation meetings in August 2004, South
Korean defense officials became alarmed when their US counterparts
talked about withdrawing one-third of the 37,000 US forces over a
year and a half. The ROK immediately announced that it was not op-
posed to the USFKs greater role in the region in order to slow down
the withdrawal of the US forces. In the bilateral Security Consultative
Meeting of October 2004, Washington changed its plan after negoti-
ating with Seoul and decided to pull out forces gradually over four
years. However, South Korea was still not ready to give full consent.
President Roh and his advisers raised a question as to whether South
Korea could avoid being entrapped into regional conflicts outside the
Korean peninsula were US forces to get involved. A high-ranking US
official reportedly threatened to withdraw forces if South Korea
would not accept the US request, although Seoul denied that such an
incident had occurred. Eventually, Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice and Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon issued a joint statement in
January 2006 indicating that South Korea approved the flexible use
of the USFK.
The agreement contains one important condition: South Korea
will not get involved in any regional conflicts against the will of the
Korean people. However, the flexibility allows the US forces to enter
regional contingencies more easily than before. Moreover, if the US
forces in Korea ever get involved in regional conflicts, they will need
to use South Korea as a strategic base and even have to ask South
Korean forces to conduct joint operations under the US command
(Choi 2006). If South Korea is unwilling to participate in these com-
340 The Korea-US Alliance as a Source of Creeping Tension

bined forces and refuses the US request, it will face a critical problem
that might even lead to the collapse of the alliance.
The strategic flexibility of the USFK is a potential source of ten-
sion between Seoul and Beijing. A classified document disclosed by
a South Korean lawmaker revealed that the government in Seoul un-
derstood that a changed role for the USFK raised the prospect of in-
volvement in disputes between China and other regional powers and
military intervention in the China-Taiwan conflict (Korea Times
2004). Strategic flexibility also required the relocation of US bases in
Korea. South Korea agreed with the United States on moving US
combat forces to Pyongtaek and Osan, south of Seoul, giving them
greater mobility. Critics argue that these new military bases will func-
tion as key US operational bases in East Asia because of their prox-
imity to major cities in China, including Beijing and Shanghai. In the
worst case, the ROK would provide US forces with missile sites
aimed at China. Chinese experts warn that in such a scenario, South
Korean cities would become the target of Chinese missiles (Jeong
2005). The United States may also utilize a military base on Jeju Is-
land, just off the southern tip of South Korea. This island offers strate-
gic access for US operations in the South China Sea, the East China
Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the Yellow Seaall areas where US and
Chinese interests may collide (Jeong 2011).

Missile Defense

South Koreas missile defense strategy has been driven by North

Koreas short-range ballistic missiles, such as the KN-02 and Scud.
KN-02 missiles, which are a Russian SS-21 variant and have a range
of 160 kilometers, can target military installations near the DMZ and
military bases in South Korea. On the other hand, the Scud, with a
range from 300 to 500 kilometers, can destroy major cities in South
Korea, as well as Jeju Island. A series of missile tests by North Korea
in the past few years showed that the accuracy and speed of these
missiles have been greatly enhanced. The ROK Defense Develop-
ment Agency, a government-funded research and development center
for weapons and defense technology, has revealed that North Korea
is working on a project to decrease the weight of nuclear warheads
from 40 kilograms to as low as 4 kilograms (Yonhap 2010). If the
 Hyon Joo Yoo 341

project is completed in a year or two, Pyongyang will be able to make

lighter nuclear warheads for short-range ballistic missiles.
In contrast to Japans decision to participate in the US ballistic
missile defense (BMD) systems, South Korea refused to join. It chose
to develop its own missile defense system, the Korean Air and Mis-
sile Defense (KAMD). Some defense experts argue that Seoul made
that decision because the US systems are designed to ward off long-
range ballistic missiles and would not work effectively on the Korean
peninsula (Shin 1994). The North Korean threat is based on thousands
of artillery and short-range missiles deployed near the thirty-eighth
parallel. The ROK government reasoned that given the geographic
proximity between North Korea and South Korea, the US-led missile
defense systems would not improve South Koreas defense against
unexpected air and land strikes from North Korea, not to mention bal-
listic missiles whose flying time is less than ten minutes from the
South. The cost of the US BMD was also a consideration. The US
system would require South Korea to build upper-tier systems, in-
cluding the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), which
would cost more than $15 billiontoo much of a financial burden on
the ROK government, which has already allocated about $2 billion for
the Korean missile defense system.
However, some experts claim that Seoul has rejected the US re-
quest because the regional missile defense system is designed to de-
fend against Chinas missiles and perhaps potential attacks from
China on Taiwan (Jeon 2000; Kim 2004). Although the US govern-
ment notes that China is not likely to attack US territory and thus is
not the focus of the US antimissile shield, promissile defense con-
servatives still stress potential conflicts with China and express con-
cerns about the proliferation of Chinese ballistic missiles (US
Department of Defense 2010a; Bennett 2000). Accordingly, some
South Korean officials during the Kim and Roh administrations were
not eager to accept the US missile defense system because it would
provoke China as well as North Korea (Lee 2001). The conservative
Lee administration agreed with them and noted that the ROK would
not join the regional missile defense system for similar reasons (Jung
2009; Lee 2010).
Does this mean South Korea has sided with China at the expense
of the alliance with the United States? No. In fact, Koreas indige-
342 The Korea-US Alliance as a Source of Creeping Tension

nous missile defense program requires Seoul to seek US cooperation,

since the KAMD is based mostly on US technologies (Jeon 2000;
Park 2008). The Korean government has purchased the US Patriot
Advanced Capability (PAC) missile interceptors to complete its land-
based low-tier systems. For sea-based missile defense, Seoul has been
developing Aegis destroyers and Spy-One radars in association with
US defense industries. South Korea also needs help from the USFKs
missile defense systems, including X-band radars, to get precise in-
formation about the speed of ballistic missiles. The PAC batteries, de-
ployed at US bases in South Korea, are more effective interceptors
than South Korean forces have, and they can offer protection for
major cities in South Korea. Indeed, geography places the ROK well
within the regional missile defense shields operated by the United
States and Japan.
There is evidence that the South Korean government has been ac-
commodating to the US missile defense strategy in East Asia. While re-
fusing to participate in the regional programs, neither liberal nor
conservative leaders in Korea have opposed the USFKs deployment
of missile defense systems in Korea. Furthermore, when South Korea
tried to replace a forty-year-old Nike Hercules with new surface-to-air
missiles under the KAMD project, it chose the Patriot over two other
alternatives, including the Russian S-300 and the French Eurosam
Land. Although the Kim Dae-jung government was interested in Rus-
sian missiles because of their speed, capability, and most importantly
cost, the ROK did not choose the Russian missiles because they were
not compatible with the USFKs command-and-control systems. South
Korean officials in the Roh administration talked about the possibility
of coordinating with the United States in order to deal with short- and
long-term missile threats from North Korea (Yoo 2003).
Critics claim that the procurement of weapons for the KAMD
will eventually lead the ROK to tap into the US missile defense shield
because the technologies of the two systems are interoperable. Al-
though the Chinese government might contest this move if it means
focusing on low-tier systems, Beijings response might be limited to
criticism instead of mobilization against South Korea (Sutter 1999).
However, China might express strong opposition and take some re-
taliatory actions if South Korea decides to cooperate with the United
States and move toward upper-tier systems that can target longer-
 Hyon Joo Yoo 343

range ballistic missiles. The PRC might also develop its own missile
defense system and perhaps aim it at the Korean peninsula. South
Koreas cooperation with the United States with respect to missile de-
fense has become evident these days. The government in Seoul agreed
with the United States to conduct joint research on missile defense
technologies in April 2011. The two governments discussed broad-
ening the scope of KAMD systems to cover the peninsula and other
regions, such as Okinawa and Guam, which will require upper-tier
systems that South Korea has avoided building for many years (Shin-
donga 2011).

Military Exercises

South Koreas military exercises with the United States display the
strong cooperation between the two countries. One of the major an-
nual exercises is Key Resolve (previously called RSOI, or Recep-
tion, Staging, Onward Movement, Integration), which takes place
during February and March every year. It focuses on the defense of
South Korea against contingencies such as a North Korean invasion.
Another major exercise is Ulchi Freedom Guardian (formerly known
as Ulchi Focus Lens), which is a combined military exercise be-
tween the South Korean Ulchi and the US Focus drills. This one
takes place in August. The South Korean government led by liberal
leaders Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun did not discontinue these
annual military exercises even when they were planning to visit
North Korea for summit meetings. Progressive South Korean people
criticized Kim and Roh for their hypocrisy in seeking to improve bi-
lateral relations with North Korea while conducting military exer-
cises with the United States that identified the North as the main
target. For instance, the Roh government introduced Nighthawk
stealth aircraft and the nuclear-powered USS Carl Vinson into the
exercises for the first time in several years. Critics in South Korea
criticized the government for making a move that was sure to offend
North Korea.
South Korea and the United States used military exercises to
demonstrate the alliances resolve against North Korea after two
tragic incidents occurred in 2010. The first was on March 26, 2010,
when the South Korean 1,200-ton patrol ship Cheonan sank near the
344 The Korea-US Alliance as a Source of Creeping Tension

maritime border between North Korea and South Korea in the Yel-
low (or West) Sea, leaving forty-six South Korean sailors dead. Sev-
eral weeks later, an international inspection team comprising
civilians and military personnel from South Korea, the United States,
Britain, Australia, and Sweden released a finding that a North Ko-
rean torpedo had caused the underwater explosion of the South Ko-
rean corvette. The ROK immediately condemned North Korea for
the sinking of the Cheonan and demanded a sincere apology,
whereas North Korea argued that it had nothing to do with the inci-
dent. The United States immediately pledged its firm support of
South Korea. A few months later, in July 2010, Washington and
Seoul announced that they had decided to hold large-scale military
exercises, named Invincible Spirit, that would augment the annual
military exercises by adding new naval and air components in both
the Sea of Japan (East Sea) and the Yellow Sea. After the first se-
quence of Invincible Spirit, the two countries conducted their an-
nual Ulchi Freedom Guardian exercises in August. But this time the
US-led Combined Forces Command took back control of exercises
that South Korea had led since 2006. The US side noted that these
exercises would send a clear message of deterrence to North Korea
and demonstrate its unwavering commitment to defend South Korea
(US Department of Defense 2010b).
After North Koreas bombardments killed two marines and two
civilians in Yeonpyeong in November 2012, tensions increased even
further on the peninsula. According to a EAI/Hankuk Research pub-
lic survey, 81 percent of respondents in South Korea were concerned
about insecurity (Lee and Jeong 2010). This number was even higher
than previous surveys conducted after North Koreas first and second
nuclear tests, where 63 percent and 59 percent of respondents, re-
spectively, felt insecure. Four days after the shelling, the United States
and South Korea began joint military exercises that had been planned
beforehand in the Yellow Sea. This time the aircraft carrier USS
George Washington, four other US Navy vessels, South Korean Aegis
destroyers, patrol vessels, frigates, and support ships participated. In
January 2011 the South Korean government announced that it would
double the number of joint antisubmarine drills with the United States
to guard against North Korean submarine infiltrations. These exer-
cises will carry out offensive and defensive maneuvers, underwater
 Hyon Joo Yoo 345

searches, and firing exercises to prepare for surprise attacks by North

Koreas patrol killers and motorized torpedo boats.
China has severely criticized recent joint military exercises by
South Korea and the United States. In July 2010 when the United
States announced scheduled military exercises in the Yellow Sea,
China criticized the United States for including the George Washing-
ton, whose presence there for exercises had not previously created a
problem for China. According to the Global Times, an official PRC
publication, the USS George Washingtons participation generated
alarm and antipathy among the Chinese people and represented a
provocative action against China (Global Times 2010). The true in-
tention of South Koreas overreaction was to increase tension in the
region, the article said. Moreover, several Chinese officials including
Qin Gang, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson, publicly opposed
the US-ROK military drills. It was reported that Ma Xiaotian, deputy
chief of staff of the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army, opposed the
exercise in the Yellow Sea because of the proximity to Chinas terri-
torial waters (Long 2010). The United States carried out the exercises
in the Yellow Sea as scheduled but sent the George Washington to the
Sea of Japan, thus seeming to give China a diplomatic victory (Pe-
drozo 2010).
South Koreas military exercises with the United States agitated
the Chinese government. After the US-ROK exercises following the
Yeonpyeong incident, Chinese military officials reportedly said that
they offended North Korea and created excessive pressure on the
North Korean regime (Jo 2010). A Chinese foreign ministry official,
Cui Tiankai, warned South Korea that disputes between North Korea
and South Korea should be handled through dialogue and negotia-
tions instead of military confrontation (BBC 2010). Moreover, the
PRC government responded with its own military exercises, dubbed
Vanguard 2010, in Henan and Shandong provinces close to the Yel-
low Sea. It also went through military drills that included the air force
and navy the very next day after the USSouth Korean exercises in
November 2010. The Chinese military exercises were low-key, but
the government sent a clear message that China had the military
means, like the United States, to deal with those who might threaten
the nations interests (Peoples Daily 2010).
Whether China will continue to criticize the annual US exercises
346 The Korea-US Alliance as a Source of Creeping Tension

in the Yellow Sea is not clear. However, China clearly warned the
United States and South Korea that their exercises damage relations
with China. Luo Yuan, a Chinese military official, said,

China, although it currently has no aircraft carriers, will certainly

have them one day. . . . The US aircraft carrier entering the Yellow
Sea will only reveal its technologies and tactics and create a good
opportunity for China to research aircraft carriers at close hand. . . .
Imagine how the US would feel if China operated military exer-
cises with the US neighbors or competitors in its neighboring or
sensitive regions. Do not do to others what you would not have
them do to you. (Luo 2010)

Conclusion

This article has demonstrated that South Koreas attempt to strengthen

the alliance with the United States has been driven mostly by per-
ceived threats from North Koreas military forces despite the con-
vergence of security interests between China and South Korea that
works against the transformation of the US alliance. The North Ko-
rean threat is certainly not the only element that drives South Koreas
alliance policy options. For instance, South Koreas economic and
military growth allows it to take more responsibility in alliance tasks.
If Seoul had not been confident of its deterrence and defense capa-
bility, it would not have accepted the USFKs flexibility. This is be-
cause strategic flexibility creates a situation in which South Korea
alone has to carry out defense and deterrence vis--vis the North if US
forces are ever dispatched to other regions.
South Koreas increased material capability can also explain why
South Korea has sought an independent missile defense system. It
was a natural step for economically powerful Korea to develop in-
digenous antimissile programs and more expensive military tech-
nologies. However, this assertion does not offer an explanation as to
why South Korea has a strong desire to maintain the alliance. In other
words, as Seoul grew more powerful, it should have gradually de-
tached itself from the alliance with Washington.
The South Korean government has chosen to accept the flexible
 Hyon Joo Yoo 347

use of US forces. Had it not complied with that change, Seoul might
have lost its ally. Moreover, cooperation between Seoul and Wash-
ington over missile defense is gradually increasing. From the be-
ginning South Korea has relied on US technologies to develop its
indigenous missile defense systems. The nation is now seeking co-
operation with the United States to conduct joint research on de-
veloping antimissile technologies. Although South Korea has not
yet announced that it would join the US regional BMD, South
Koreas KAMD weapons can be interoperable with US missile de-
fense programs.
South Koreas cooperation with the United States is sometimes a
potential source of tension between South Korea and China. A posi-
tive scenario for South Korea would be to avoid involvement in re-
gional conflicts, particularly if they occur between the United States
and China. However, it is not clear if the ROK can get completely off
the hook should the United States call upon it in an actual conflict. Be-
cause the nature of the US-ROK alliance reflects an asymmetric
power structure, South Koreas capability to restrain the United States
is very limited. In other words, even if South Korea refuses to ap-
prove the deployment of the USFK to contingencies in the Taiwan
Strait, it may not be able to prevent attacks against China that would
bring on an unwanted war.

Notes

Hyon Joo Yoo is assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at

Trinity University, San Antonio, Texas. Her research interests include Chinas
relations with North Korea and South Korea, the US alliance in Asia, Chinese
foreign policy, and international relations theory. She was a Korea Foundation
fellow and a visiting fellow at the East West Center, Washington, D.C. Her
publications have appeared in the Asia Pacific Bulletin and in Pacific Affairs.
She can be reached at hyoo@trinity.edu.
1. Liberal and conservative elites perceive threats from North Korea but
differ in their policy preferences regarding those threats. Although both groups
believe that economic engagement is feasible, liberal elites argue that
cooperation should not be abandoned even after North Koreas provocations.
Conservative elites state that reciprocity is required for cooperation and that
economic assistance should be conditional on North Koreas behavior.
2. Nevertheless, some conservatives in South Korea reprimanded Roh for
348 The Korea-US Alliance as a Source of Creeping Tension

supposedly making proNorth Korea comments. For instance, Roh noted that
the North Korean threat should not be overstated and that Pyongyangs
development of nuclear weapons was understandable. However, a close
examination reveals that Roh made such statements not because he was
insensitive to the threat of North Korea but because he tried to avoid provoking
an obstinate North Korea.
3. During the liberal era of the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun
governments, South Koreas military budget increased from 9.9 million won in
1998 to 28.6 million won in 2008. The rationale of this increase rested mostly
on the North Korean threat.

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