Property Digest 2 - Lucky 9 and friends
FELICIDAD JAVIER vs. HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO
II, Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court of First Instance of
Zambales and REINO ROSETE
Facts: In 1963, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Sales
Application for Lot No. 1641 of the Olongapo Townsite
Subdivision with the District Land Officer of Olongapo City.
Sometime in December 1970, alleging that she was forcibly
dispossessed of a portion of the land by a certain Ben Babol, she
instituted a complaint for forcible entry before the City Court of
Olongapo City. The Civil Case was dismissed on the ground
that the Bureau of Lands has considered the area in question to
be outside Lot 1641 of the plaintiff. The Court of First Instance
of Zambales and Olongapo City dismissed the appeal and
affirmed the findings and conclusions of the City Court.
Subsequently, on 17 December 1973, petitioner was granted
Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 5548 and issued Original
Certificate of Title No. P-3259 covering Lot No. 1641.
Meanwhile, Ben Babol who was the defendant in the complaint
for forcible entry had sold the property he was occupying,
including the portion of about 200 square meters in question, to
a certain Reino Rosete. Thus petitioner demanded the surrender
of the same area in dispute from Reino Rosete who repeatedly
refused to comply with the demand. About four (4) years from
the finality of the dismissal of Civil case filed by petitioner, he
instituted a complaint for quieting of title and recovery of
possession with damages against Ben Babol and Reino Rosete
before the then Court of First Instance of Zambales and
Olongapo City. Instead of filing a responsive pleading, therein
defendant Reino Rosete (private respondent herein) moved to
dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata. Defendant
Ben Babol did not file any pleading. The Court of First Instance
of Zambales sustained the argument of Rosete and granted his
motion to dismiss.
Issue: Whether or not the action for quieting title is barred
by res judicata
Held: NO. For res judicata to bar the institution of a
subsequent action the following requisites must concur: (1)
There must be a final judgment or order; (2) The court
rendering the judgment must have jurisdiction over the subject
matter; (3) The former judgment is a judgment on the merits;
and, (4) There is between the first and second actions identity of
parties, of subject matter and of causes of action. Although
there is identity in the parties as Reino Rosete is a successor in
interest of Ben Babol, there is no identity of subject matter and
cause of action as in the previous civil case, a complaint for
forcible entry was filed where what is at issue is prior
possession, regardless of who has lawful title over the disputed
property. Thus, the only issue in an action for forcible entry is
the physical or material possession of real property, that is,
possession de facto and not possession de jure. On the other
hand, the civil case recently filed by petitioner is an action for
"Quieting of Title and Recovery of Possession with Damages"
which in reality, is an action to recover a parcel of land or an
accion reivindicatoria under Art. 434. of the Civil Code. It
should be distinguished from the previously filed civil case,
which is an accion interdictal. Petitioner in the action for
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quieting title clearly sets up title to herself and prays that
respondent Rosete be ejected from the disputed land and that
she be declared the owner and given possession thereof. Thus, a
judgment in forcible entry or detainer case disposes of no other
issue than possession and declares only who has the right of
possession, but by no means constitutes a bar to an action for
determination of who has the right or title of ownership.
De Leon vs. Public Estates Authority (PEA), 626 SCRA 547,
August 3, 2010)
FACTS: On January 15, 1993, petitioner De Leon filed a
Complaint for Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) against respondent PEA,
a government-owned corporation, as well as its officers. The
suit for damages hinged on the alleged unlawful destruction of
De Leons fence and houses constructed on Lot 5155, situated
in Paranaque, which De Leon claimed has been in the
possession of his family for more than 50 years. Essentially, De
Leon prayed that one, lawful possession of the land in question
be awarded to him; two, PEA be ordered to pay damages for
demolishing the improvements constructed on Lot 5155; and,
three, an injunctive relief be issued to enjoin PEA from
committing acts which would violate his lawful and peaceful
possession of the subject premises.
The court a quo found merit in De Leons application for writ of
preliminary injunction.
PEA appealed to the Supreme Court via a Petition for Certiorari
insisting that Lot 5155 was a salvage zone until it was reclaimed
through government efforts in 1982. The land was previously
under water on the coastline which reached nine to twenty
meters deep. In 1989, PEA started constructing R-1 Toll
Expressway Road for the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, which
project directly traversed Lot 5155. PEA argued that the
documentary evidence presented by De Leon to bolster his
fallacious claim of possession and ownership were procured
only in 1992, thus negating his very own allegation that he and
his predecessors-in-interest have been in occupation since time
immemorial.
The Supreme Court declared that Lot 5155 was a public land so
that De Leons occupation thereof, no matter how long ago,
could not confer ownership or possessory rights. Prescinding
therefrom, it ruled that no writ of injunction may lie to protect
De Leons nebulous right of possession.
The aforesaid Decision became final and executory as no
motion for reconsideration was filed. In due course, PEA moved
for the issuance of a writ of execution praying that De Leon and
persons claiming rights under him be ordered to vacate and
peaceably surrender possession of Lot 5155. Court a quo
granted it.
De Leon moved for reconsideration thereof and quashal of the
writ of execution. He adamantly insisted that the court a quos
Order for the issuance of the writ of execution completely
deviated from the dispositive portion of the Supreme Courts
Decision as it did not categorically direct him to surrender
possession of Lot 5155 in favor of PEA.
Property Digest 2 - Lucky 9 and friends
ISSUE: WON PEA is really entitled to possess the subject
property.
RULING: Yes. The question of ownership and rightful
possession of the subject property had already been settled and
laid to rest in PEA v. CA:
An applicant seeking to establish ownership of land must
conclusively show that he is the owner in fee simple, for the
standing presumption is that all lands belong to the public
domain of the State, unless acquired from the Government
either by purchase or by grant x x x.
In this case, the land in question is admittedly public. The
respondent Bernardo de Leon has no title thereto at all. His
claim of ownership is based on mere possession by himself
and his predecessors-in-interests, who claim to have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
land in question, under a bona fide claim of ownership for a
period of at least fifty (50) years. However, the survey plan for
the land was approved only in 1992, and respondent paid the
realty taxes thereon on October 30, 1992, shortly before the
filing of the suit below for damages with injunction. Hence,
respondent must be deemed to begin asserting his adverse claim
to Lot 5155 only in 1992. More, Lot 5155 was certified as
alienable and disposable on March 27, 1972, per certificate of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. It is
obvious that respondents possession has not ripened into
ownership.
x x x x
Consequently, respondent De Leon has no clear legal right
to the lot in question, and a writ of injunction will not lie to
protect such nebulous right of possession. x x x.
De Leon insists that what this Court did in PEA v. CA was to
simply dismiss his complaint for damages and nothing more,
and that the RTC erred and committed grave abuse of discretion
in issuing a writ of execution placing PEA in possession of the
disputed property. He insists that he can only be removed from
the disputed property through an ejectment proceeding.
The Court is not persuaded.
As a general rule, a writ of execution should conform to the
dispositive portion of the decision to be executed; an execution
is void if it is in excess of and beyond the original judgment or
award. The settled general principle is that a writ of execution
must conform strictly to every essential particular of the
judgment promulgated, and may not vary the terms of the
judgment it seeks to enforce, nor may it go beyond the terms of
the judgment sought to be executed.
However, it is equally settled that possession is an essential
attribute of ownership. Where the ownership of a parcel of land
was decreed in the judgment, the delivery of the possession of
the land should be considered included in the decision, it
appearing that the defeated partys claim to the possession
thereof is based on his claim of ownership. Furthermore,
adjudication of ownership would include the delivery of
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possession if the defeated party has not shown any right to
possess the land independently of his claim of ownership which
was rejected. This is precisely what happened in the present
case. This Court had already declared the disputed property as
owned by the State and that De Leon does not have any right to
possess the land independent of his claim of ownership.
In addition, a judgment for the delivery or restitution of
property is essentially an order to place the prevailing party in
possession of the property. If the defendant refuses to surrender
possession of the property to the prevailing party, the sheriff or
other proper officer should oust him. No express order to this
effect needs to be stated in the decision; nor is a categorical
statement needed in the decision that in such event the sheriff or
other proper officer shall have the authority to remove the
improvements on the property if the defendant fails to do so
within a reasonable period of time. The removal of the
improvements on the land under these circumstances is deemed
read into the decision, subject only to the issuance of a special
order by the court for the removal of the improvements.
Sps Bustos v. CA
Facts: Paulino Faustino died intestate on April 2, 1957. She
had four children; (1) Manuela, (2) Trinidad, (3) Beatriz, and
(4) Marcial. They executed an extra-judicial partition of the
estate of Paulino Faustino. Later on, Manuela sold her share to
Moses, husband of Beatriz, by virtue of deed of absolute sale.
The property involved in partition case were specified as Lots
280, 283, 284, 1000-A and 1000-B. The share of Manuela,
which was sold to Moses, includes Lot 284 of the Masantol
Cadastre and Lot 284 was subdivided into Lots 284-A and 284-
B.
Trinidad was in physical possession of the land. She refused to
surrender the land to her brother-in-law Moses G. Mendoza,
despite several demands.
Thereafter, Moses filed before RTC Pampanga a complaint for
partition claiming the one fourth share of Manuela which was
sold to him. During the pendency of the case, Trinidad Fajardo
died. The heirs of Trinidad executed an extra-judicial partition
of her estate. Then, Lucio Fajardo, son of Trinidad sold Lot
284-B to spouses Venancio Viray and Cecilia Nunga-Viray.
With regard to this case, RTC Pampanga ruled in favour of
Moses.
After that, Moses sold the subject land to Spouses Bustos.
However, Spouses Viray, buyers of Lucios share of property,
filed with MCTC an action for unlawful detainer against
Spouses Bustos, buyers of Moses, who were in actual
possession as lessees of the husband Trinidad of the subject
land.
The MCTC ruled in favour of Spouses Viray. Subsequently, the
trial court issued writs of execution and demolition, but were
stayed when Spouses Bustos filed with RTC Pampanga a
petition for certiorari, prohibition, and injunction. But, RTC
Pampanga dismissed the petition.
Property Digest 2 - Lucky 9 and friends
The Spouses Bustos appealed the decision of RTC to CA. Also,
Lucio Fajardo appealed.
On the consolidated petition, CA rendered decision declaring
Moses as the owner of the undivided share previously owned by
Manuela Fajardo.
Issue: WON petitioners could be ejected from what is now their
own land.
Held: No.
The issue of possession is intertwined with the issue of
ownership. In the unlawful detainer case, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court as to possession on the
ground that the decision has become final and executory. This
means that the petitioners may be evicted.
In the accion reinvindicatoria, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the ownership of petitioners over the subject land. Hence, the
court declared petitioners as the lawful owners of the land.
The Supreme Court ruled that once a decision becomes final
and executory, it is the ministerial duty of the court to order its
execution, admits of certain exceptions as in cases of special
and exceptional nature where it becomes imperative in the
higher interest of justice to direct the suspension of its
execution; whenever it is necessary to accomplish the aims of
justice; or when certain facts and circumstances transpired after
the judgment became final which could render the execution of
the judgment unjust.
In the present case, the stay of execution is warranted by the
fact that petitioners are now legal owners of the land in question
and are occupants thereof. To execute the judgment by ejecting
petitioners from the land that they owned would certainly result
in grave injustice. Besides, the issue of possession was rendered
moot when the court adjudicated ownership to the spouses
Bustos by virtue of a valid deed of sale.
Placing petitioners in possession of the land in question is the
necessary and logical consequence of the decision declaring
them as the rightful owners of the property. One of the essential
attributes of ownership is possession. It follows that as owners
of the subject property, petitioners are entitled to possession of
the same. An owner who cannot exercise the seven (7) juses or
attributes of ownership--the right to possess, to use and enjoy,
to abuse or consume, to accessories, to dispose or alienate, to
recover or vindicate and to the fruits--is a crippled owner.
Sps. Custodio et. al. v CA, Mabasa
Facts: The original plaintiff, Pacifico Mabasa, died during the
pendency of the case and was substituted by Ofelia Mabasa, his
surviving spouse.
Mabasa owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment at the
interior of P. Burgos St., Palingon, Tipas, Taguig, Metro
Manila. They acquired the said property through a contract of
sale on September 1981.
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From P. Burgos St., as the point of reference, on the left side,
the row of houses will be as follows: That of defendants
Cristino and Brigido Custodio, then that of Lito and Maria
Cristina Santos, and then of Ofelia Mabasa. On the right side is
that of defendant Rosalina Morato and then a Septic Tank. As
an access to P. Burgos St. from Mabasa's property, there are 2
passageways. The first passageway is approx 1meter wide and
is about 20m distant from Mabasa's to P. Burgos. The second
passage is about 3m width and length; it is about 26m. In
passing thru the passageway, a less than a meter wide path
through the septic tank and with 5-6 meters in length has to be
traversed.
When said property was purchased by Mabasa, there were
tenants occupying the premises and were acknowledged by
Mabasa as tenants. However, one of the tenant vacated the
apartment and when Mabasa went to see the premises, he saw
that there had been built an adobe fence in the first passageway
making it narrower in width. The fence was constructed by
Santoses along their property. Defendant Morato constructed
her adobe fence and even extended said fence in such a way that
the entire second passageway was enclosed. And it was then
that the remaining tenants of said apartment vacated the area.
Santos testified that she constructed the fence because there was
an incident when her daughter was dragged by a bicycle. She
also mentioned some other inconveniences that sometimes their
doors and windows are being banged by the drunk tenants.
Mabasa filed an easement of right of way against the
defendants.
TC: affirmed, ordered Custodios and Santoses to give Mabasa
permanent access ingress and egress, to the public street, but the
TC ordered Mabasa to pay the defendants the sum of P8,000
as indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway.
CA: affirmed but modified the damages and ordered the
Defendants to pay Mabasa the damages.
Issue: WON the act of building an adobe fence by the
defendants is unlawful and should give rise to an obligation to
pay for the damages done.
Held: No. The Court acknowledges that there was damage, but
there was no legal injury. The decision of the Trial Court was
reinstated.
The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a
valid exercise of their right as owners, hence not contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy. The law recognizes in
the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without
other limitations than those established by law. It is within the
right of petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their
property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that "(e)very
owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of
walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other means
without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon."
At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not
subject to any servitudes. There was no easement of way
existing in favor of private respondents, either by law or by
Property Digest 2 - Lucky 9 and friends
contract. The fact that private respondents had no existing right
over the said passageway is confirmed by the very decision of
the trial court granting a compulsory right of way in their favor
after payment of just compensation. It was only that decision
which gave private respondents the right to use the said
passageway after payment of the compensation and imposed a
corresponding duty on petitioners not to interfere in the exercise
of said right.
Hence, prior to said decision, petitioners had an absolute right
over their property and their act of fencing and enclosing the
same was an act which they may lawfully perform in the
employment and exercise of said right. To repeat, whatever
injury or damage may have been sustained by private
respondents by reason of the rightful use of the said land by
petitioners is damnum absque injuria.
A person has a right to the natural use and enjoyment of his own
property, according to his pleasure, for all the purposes to which
such property is usually applied. As a general rule, therefore,
there is no cause of action for acts done by one person upon his
own property in a lawful and proper manner, although such acts
incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable loss to another, as
such damage or loss is damnum absque injuria. When the
owner of property makes use thereof in the general and ordinary
manner in which the property is used, such as fencing or
enclosing the same as in this case, nobody can complain of
having been injured, because the inconvenience arising from
said use can be considered as a mere consequence of
community life.
NICOLAS LUNOD, ET. AL. vs. HIGINO MENESES
FACTS: Nicolas Lunod, Juan de la Vega, Evaristo Rodriguez,
Fernando Marcelo, Esteban Villena, Benito Litao, Ventura
Hernandez, and Casimiro Pantanilla (plaintiff, for brevity) filed
a complaint against Higino Meneses (defendant, for brevity). It
was found that Meneses, without any right or reason, converted
his land in Paraanan into a fishpond and by means of a dam and
a bamboo net, prevented the free passage of the water through
said place into the Taliptip River, that in consequence the lands
of Lunod became flooded and damaged by the stagnant waters,
there being no outlet except through the land in Paraanan. That
the construction of such fishpond was prejudicial to Lunod
since they incurred damages and losses to their rice plantations.
They therefore asked that judgment be entered against the
defendant, declaring that the said tract of land in Paraanan is
subject to a statutory easement permitting the flow of water
from the property of the plaintiffs, and that, without prejudice to
the issuing of a preliminary injunction, the defendant be ordered
to remove and destroy the obstructions that impede the passage
of the waters through Paraanan. On his defense, the defendant
alleged that no statutory easement existed nor could exist in
favor of the lands described in the complaint.
The court entered judgment declaring that the plaintiffs were
entitled to a decision in their favor, and sentenced the defendant
to remove the dam placed on the east of the Paraanan passage
on the side of the Taliptip River opposite the old dam in the
barrio of Bambang, as well as to remove and destroy the
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obstacles to the free passage of the waters through the strip of
land in Paraanan. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the land of Meneses is subject to
easement.
HELD: Yes. According to article 530 of the Civil Code, an
easement is charge imposed upon one estate for the benefit of
another estate belonging to a different owner, and the realty in
favor of which the easement is established is called the
dominant estate, and the one charged with it the servient estate.
The lands of Paraanan being the lower are subject to the
easement of receiving and giving passage to the waters
proceeding from the higher lands and the lake of Calalaran. As
stated in Article 552 of the Civil Code:
Lower estates must receive the waters which naturally
and without the intervention of man descend from the
higher estates, as well as the stone or earth which they
carry with them.
Neither may the owner of the lower estates construct
works preventing this easement, nor the one of the
higher estate works increasing the burden.
Although Article 388 (Article 430 na ngayon) of the Civil Code
authorizes every owner to enclose his estate by means of walls,
ditches fences or any other device, but his right is limited by the
easement imposed upon his estate. In the case at bar, Meneses
might have constructed the works necessary to make and
maintain a fish pond within his own land, but he was always
under the strict and necessary obligation to respect the statutory
easement of waters charged upon his property, and had no right
to close the passage and outlet of the waters flowing from the
lands of the plaintiffs and the lake of Calalaran into the Taliptip
River.
Hence, Meneses was ordered to remove and destroy the
obstacles he built so that the water will flow freely to Lunods
plantation.
ANDAMO v. IAC
FACTS: Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo
are the owners of a parcel of land adjacent to that of private
respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a
religious corporation.
Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and
contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed,
which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a
young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants,
washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners
and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed
plants and other improvements to destruction.
Petitioners initially filed a criminal complaint for destruction by
means of inundation. Petitioners filed a civil action for damages
with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
before the same court.
Property Digest 2 - Lucky 9 and friends
ISSUE WON a corporation, which has built through its agents,
waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances within its land,
thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can
be held civilly liable for damages.
HELD: YES. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that the
owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to
injure the rights of a third person. SIC UTERE TUO UT
ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners
have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must
use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe
upon the rights and interests of others. Although the Court
recognizes the right of an owner to build structures on his land,
such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all
reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining
landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of
nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining
landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification
for the injury or damage suffered.
In this case, the respondent failed to observe reasonable care in
the construction and preservation of its waterpaths and artificial
lakes which inundated the adjacent land of petitioner, caused
death and damage to properties of others. It was therefore,
injurious to third persons. Respondent shall be liable to pay for
the damages to petitioners.
REMMAN ENT. V. CA - G.R. No. 125018 April 6, 2000
FACTS: Remman Enterprises, Inc. and Crispin Lat are
adjoining landowners. The land of Lat is agricultural while
Remmans land is partly devoted to its piggery business.
Remmans land is one and a half meter higher in elevation than
that of Lat. Lat noticed that Remmans waste disposal lagoon
was already overflowing (partly because of rain) and inundating
one-fourth of his land. A year after almost one hectare or Lats
plantation was already inundated with water containing pig
manure. He filed a complaint for damages with preliminary
mandatory injunction. Remman denied the claims of Lat and
averred that measures such as construction of additional lagoons
were already adopted to contain waste water. Trial court ruled
in favor of Lat. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether or not Remman Ent. is liable for damages
HELD: YES. Petition denied.
Negligence was clearly established. Remman failed to monitor
the increases in the level of water in the lagoons before, during,
and after heavy rains; it also failed to augment the existing
lagoons prior to the incident, notwithstanding the fact that at the
time of the flooding, the piggery had grown to a capacity of
11,000 heads, and considering that it was reasonably forseeable
that the existing waste disposal facilities were no longer
adequate to accomodate the increasing volume of waste matters
in such a big farm.
Remman contend that the damages were due to a fortuitous
event. Accordingly, petitioners cannot be heard to invoke the
act of God or force majeure to escape liability for the loss or
damage sustained by private respondents since they, the
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petitioners, were guilty of negligence. This event then was not
occasioned exclusively by an act of God or force majeure; a
human factor - negligence or imprudence - had intervened. The
effect then of the force majeure in question may be deemed to
have, even if only partly, resulted from the participation of man.
Thus, the whole occurrence was thereby humanized, as it were,
and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God.
Civil Code impose natural easement on lower estates (in this
case, property of Lat).
Art. 637. Lower estates are obliged to receive the waters which
naturally and without the intervention of man descend from the
higher estates, as well as the stones or earth which they carry
with them.
The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which
will impede this easement; neither can the owner of the higher
estate make works which will increase the burden.
A similar provision is found in the Water Code of the
Philippines (P.D. No.1067), which provides:
Art. 50. Lower estates are obliged to receive the water which
naturally and without the intervention of man flow from the
higher estates, as well as the stone or earth which they carry
with them.
The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which
will impede this natural flow, unless he provides an alternative
method of drainage; neither can the owner of the higher estate
make works which will increase this natural flow.
As worded, the two (2) aforecited provisions impose a natural
easement upon the lower estate to receive the waters which
naturally and without the intervention of man descend from
higher states. However, where the waters which flow from a
higher state are those which are artificially collected in man-
made lagoons, any damage occasioned thereby entitles the
owner of the lower or servient estate to compensation.
In this case, Remman constructed man-made lagoons, where the
water flowing to Lats property comes from. Any damage
occasioned by this construction entitles Lat to damages.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS IBRAHIM
Facts: Ibrahim and his co-heirs claimed that they were owners
of several parcels of land. Sometime in 1978, NAPOCOR,
through alleged stealth and without respondents knowledge and
prior consent, took possession of the sub-terrain area of their
lands and constructed therein underground tunnels. The
existence of the tunnels was only discovered sometime in July
1992 by respondents. . The tunnels were apparently being used
by NAPOCOR in siphoning the water of Lake Lanao and in the
operation of NAPOCORs other projects. One of the
respondents requested the Marawi City Water District for a
permit to construct and/or install a motorized deep well in one
aprt of their land but his request was turned down because the
construction of the deep well would cause danger to lives and
property. Respondents demanded that NAPOCOR pay damages
Property Digest 2 - Lucky 9 and friends
and vacate the sub-terrain portion of their lands but the latter
refused to vacate much less pay damages.
Issue: Whether or not NAPOCOR is liable for damages to
the respondents
Held: YES. Art. 435 of the Civil Code state that the owner of a
parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of everything
under it, and he can construct thereon any works or make any
plantations and excavations which he may deem proper, without
detriment to servitudes and subject to special laws and
ordinances. Thus, the ownership of land extends to the surface
as well as to the subsoil under. The trial court found that
respondents could have dug upon their property motorized deep
wells but were prevented from doing so by the authorities
precisely because of the construction and existence of the
tunnels underneath the surface of their property. Respondents,
therefore, still had a legal interest in the sub-terrain portion
insofar as they could have excavated the same for the
construction of the deep well. The fact that they could not was
appreciated by the RTC as proof that the tunnels interfered with
respondents enjoyment of their property and deprived them of
its full use and enjoyment.
Moreover, petitioners argument that the landowners right
extends to the sub-soil insofar as necessary for their practical
interests serves only to further weaken its case. The theory
would limit the right to the sub-soil upon the economic utility
which such area offers to the surface owners. Presumably, the
landowners right extends to such height or depth where it is
possible for them to obtain some benefit or enjoyment, and it is
extinguished beyond such limit as there would be no more
interest protected by law.
Petitioner also contends that the underground tunnels in this
case constitute an easement upon the property of respondents
which does not involve any loss of title or possession.The
manner in which the easement was created by petitioner,
however, violates the due process rights of respondents as it was
without notice and indemnity to them and did not go through
proper expropriation proceedings. If the government takes
property without expropriation and devotes the property to
public use, after many years, the property owner may demand
payment of just compensation in the event restoration of
possession is neither convenient nor feasible. Respondents, as
the owners of the property thus expropriated, are entitled to a
just compensation which should be neither more nor less,
whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the money
equivalent of said property
PAZ MERCADO v. CA
FACTS: Bulaong Group, had for many years been individual
lessees of stalls in the public market of Baliuag, Bulacan. The
market was destroyed by fire. The members of the Bulaong
Group constructed new stalls therein at their expense; and they
thereafter paid rentals thereon to the Municipality of Baliuag.
The members of the group sub-leased their individual stalls to
other persons, the Mercado Group. After the Mercado Group
had been in possession of the market stalls for some months, as
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sub-lessees of the Bulaong Group, the municipal officials of
Baliuag cancelled the long standing leases of the Bulaong
Group and declared the persons comprising the Mercado Group
as the rightful lessees of the stalls in question, in substitution of
the former.
The municipal authorities justified the cancellation of the leases
of the Bulaong Group by invoking the provisions of Municipal
Ordinance No. 14 which prohibited the sub-leasing of stalls by
the lessees thereof.
The members of the Bulaong Group sued. They filed several
individual complaints with the Court of First Instance (CFI)
seeking recovery of their stalls from the Mercado Group as well
as damages. Their theory was anchored on their claimed
ownership of the stalls constructed by them at their own
expense, and their resulting right, as such owners, to sub-lease
the stalls, and necessarily, to recover them from any person
withholding possession thereof from them.
CFI Judge rendered a decision rejecting the claim of the
Municipality of Baliuag that it had automatically acquired
ownership of the new stalls constructed after the old stalls had
been razed by fire, declaring the members of the Bulaong Group
to be builders in good faith, entitled to retain possession of the
stalls respectively put up by them until and unless indemnified
for the value thereof. The decision also declared that the
Bulaong and Mercado Groups had executed the sub-letting
agreements with full awareness that they were thereby violating
Ordinance No. 14; they were thus in pari delicto, and hence had
no cause of action one against the other and no right to recover
whatever had been given or demand performance of anything
undertaken. The judgment therefore decreed the annulment of
the leases between the Municipality and the individuals
comprising the Mercado Group.
ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in ruling that members of the
Bulaong Group were builders in good faith and entitled to retain
possession of the stalls respectively put up by them.
HELD: Yes. Mercados group suggest that it was a mistake for
the Trial Court to have accorded to the individuals of the
Bulaong Group the stalls and builders in good faith in
accordance with Article 526 of the Civil Code. They are correct.
It was indeed error for the Court to have so ruled.
The members of this group were admittedly lessees of space in
the public market; they therefore could not, and in truth never
did make the claim, that they were owners of any part of the
land occupied by the market so that in respect of any new
structure put up by them thereon, they could be deemed builders
in good faith.
To be deemed a builder in good faith, it is essential that a
person assert title to the land on which he builds; i.e., that he be
a possessor in concept of owner, and that he be unaware "that
there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which
invalidates it. It is such a builder in good faith who is given the
right to retain the thing, even as against the real owner, until he
has been reimbursed in full not only for the necessary expenses
but also for useful expenses.
Property Digest 2 - Lucky 9 and friends
On the other hand, unlike the builder in good faith, a lessee who
"makes in good faith useful improvements which are suitable to
the use for which the lease is intended, without altering the form
or substance of the property leased," can only claim payment of
"one-half of the value of the improvements" or, "should the
lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, ... remove the
improvements, even though the principal thing may suffer
damage thereby."
Ignao v. IAC
Facts:
Petitioner Florencio Ignao and his uncles private respondents
Juan Ignao and Isidro Ignao were co-owners of a parcel of land
with an area of 534 square meters. Pursuant to an action for
partition filed by petitioner, the CFI Cavite rendered a decision
directed the partition of the aforesaid land, alloting 133.5 square
meters or 2/8 thereof to private respondents Juan and Isidro, and
giving the remaining portion with a total area of 266.5 square
meters to petitioner Florencio. However, no actual partition was
ever effected.
Later on, petitioner instituted a complaint for recovery of
possession of real property against private respondents Juan and
Isidro before CFI Cavite. He alleges that the area occupied by
the two (2) houses built by private respondents exceeded the
133.5 square meters previously alloted to them by the trial
court.
The lower court conducted an ocular inspection. It was found
that the houses of Juan and Isidro actually encroached upon a
portion of the land belonging to Florencio. Upon agreement of
the parties, the trial court ordered a licensed geodetic engineer
to conduct a survey to determine the exact area occupied by the
houses of private respondents. The survey subsequently
disclosed that the house of Juan occupied 42 square meters
while that of Isidro occupied 59 square meters of Florencio's
land or a total of 101 square meters.
The lower court rendered decision in favour of private
respondents stating that they are considered builders in good
faith, hence, exempt them from damages. Furthermore, the trial
court stated that pursuant to Article 448 of the Civil Code, the
owner of the land (Florencio) should have the choice to either
appropriate that part of the house standing on his land after
payment of indemnity or oblige the builders in good faith (Juan
and Isidro) to pay the price of the land. However, the trial court
observed that based on the facts of the case, it would be useless
and unsuitable for Florencio to exercise the first option since
this would render the entire houses of Juan and Isidro worthless.
Thus, the lower court ordered petitioner to sell to private
respondents those portions of his land respectively occupied by
the latter.
As a result, petitioner appealed the case before IAC. However,
IAC affirmed the decision of CFI Cavite.
Issue:
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WON the court may demand the petitioner to sell to private
respondents those portions of land occupied by the latter.
Held:
No.
The ruling of the court violates the explicit provisions of Article
448.
Article 448 provides:
Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been
built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to
appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after
payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548,
or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the
land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the
builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value
is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such
case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does
not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper
indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease
and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms
thereof.
The law is clear and unambiguous when it confers the right of
choice upon the landowner and not upon the builder and the
courts.
Thus, Petitioner Florencio Ignao is directed within thirty (30)
days from entry of judgment to exercise his option to either
appropriate as his own the portions of the houses of Juan and
Isidro Ignao occupying his land upon payment of indemnity in
accordance with Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code, or sell
to private respondents the 101 square meters occupied by them
at such price as may be agreed upon. Should the value of the
land exceed the value of the portions of the houses that private
respondents have erected thereon, private respondents may
choose not to buy the land but they must pay reasonable rent for
the use of the portion of petitioner's land as may be agreed upon
by the parties. In case of disagreement, the rate of rental and
other terms of the lease shall be determined by the trial court.
Note (CO-OWNERSHIP): All the co-owners hold the property
in common dominion but at the same time each is an owner of a
share which is abstract and undetermined until partition is
effected