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Chapter 1.

Aristotle defines words as symbols of 'affections of the soul' or mental

experiences. Spoken and written symbols differ between languages, but the mental
experiences are the same for all (so that the English word 'cat' and the French word 'chat'
are different symbols, but the mental experience they stand for the concept of a cat is
the same for English speakers and French speakers). Nouns and verbs on their own do not
involve truth or falsity.
Chapter 2. A noun signifies the subject by convention, but without reference to time (i.e.
'Caesar' signifies the same now, two thousand years after his death, as it did in Roman
Chapter 3. A verb carries with it the notion of time. 'He was healthy' and 'he will be healthy'
are tenses of a verb. An untensed verb indicates the present, the tenses of a verb indicate
times outside the present.
Chapter 4. The sentence is an expression whose parts have meaning. The word 'man'
signifies something, but is not a sentence. Only when words are added to it do we have
affirmation and negation.
Chapter 5. Every simple proposition contains a verb. A simple proposition indicates a single
fact, and the conjunction of its parts gives a unity. A complex proposition is several
propositions compounded together.
Chapter 6. An affirmation is an assertion of something, a denial an assertion denying
something of something. (For example, 'a man is an animal' asserts 'animal' of 'man'. 'A
stone is not an animal' denies 'animal' of stone').
Chapter 7. Terms. Some terms are universal. A universal term is capable of being asserted of
several subjects (for example 'moon' even though the Earth has one moon, it may have
had more, and the noun 'moon' could have been said of them in exactly the same sense).
Other terms are individual. An individual or singular term ('Plato') is not predicated (in the
same) sense of more than one individual.
A universal affirmative proposition, such as, 'Every man is white' and a universal
negative proposition having the same subject and predicate, such as, 'No man is white,' are
called contrary. A universal affirmative proposition ("Every man is white") and the non-
universal denial of that proposition in a way ("Some man is not white") are
called contradictories. Of contradictories, one must be true, the other false. Contraries
cannot both be true, although they can both be false, and hence their contradictories are
both true (for example, both, 'Every man is honest,' and 'No man is honest,' are false. But
their contradictories, 'Some men are not honest,' and, 'Some men are honest,' are both true.
Chapter 8. An affirmation is single, if it expresses a single fact. For example, 'every man is
white'. However, if a word has two meanings, for example if the word 'garment' meant 'a man
and a horse', then 'garment is white' would not be a single affirmation, for it would mean 'a
man and a horse are white', which is equivalent to the two simple propositions 'a man is
white and a horse is white'.
Chapter 9. Of contradictory propositions about the past and present, one must be true, the
other false. But when the subject is individual, and the proposition is future, this is not the
case. For if so, nothing takes place by chance. For either the future proposition such as, 'A
sea battle will take place,' corresponds with future reality, or its negation does, in which case
the sea battle will take place with necessity, or not take place with necessity. But in reality,
such an event might just as easily not happen as happen; the meaning of the word 'by
chance' with regard to future events is that reality is so constituted that it may issue in either
of two opposite possibilities. This is known as the problem of future contingents.
Chapter 10. Aristotle enumerates the affirmations and denials that can be assigned when
'indefinite' terms such as 'unjust' are included. He makes a distinction that was to become
important later, between the use of the verb 'is' as a mere copula or 'third element', as in the
sentence 'a man is wise', and as a predicate signifying existence, as in 'a man is [i.e. exists]'.
Chapter 11. Some propositions appear to be simple which are really composite. A truly single
proposition the name of the subject combines to form a unity. Thus 'two-footed domesticated
animal' means the same thing as a 'man', and the three predicates combine to form a unity.
But in the term 'a white walking man' the three predicates do not combine to form a unity of
this sort.
Chapter 12. This chapter considers the mutual relation of modal propositions: affirmations
and denials which assert or deny possibility or contingency, impossibility or necessity.
Chapter 13. The relation between such propositions. Logical consequences follow from this
arrangement. For example, from the proposition 'it is possible' it follows that it is contingent,
that it is not impossible, or from the proposition 'it cannot be the case' there follows 'it is
necessarily not the case'.
Chapter 14. Is there an affirmative proposition corresponding to every denial? For example,
is the proposition 'every man is unjust' an affirmation (since it seems to affirm being unjust of
every man) or is it merely a negative (since it denies justice).