Republic of the Philippines on May 2, 1991 at the same casino and offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry
SUPREME COURT on commission basis. Private complainant agreed, and as a consequence, he
Baguio City
EN BANC
G.R. No. 180016 April 29, 2014
LITO CORPUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, dated November 5, 2007, of petitioner Lito Corpuz (petitioner),
seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated March 22, 2007 and
Resolution2 dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which
affirmed with modification the Decision 3 dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding the petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph
(1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code.
The antecedent facts follow.
Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the Admiral Royale
Casino in Olongapo City sometime in 1990. Private complainant was then
engaged in the business of lending money to casino players and, upon hearing
that the former had some pieces of jewelry for sale, petitioner approached him
turned over to petitioner the following items: an 18k diamond ring for men; a
woman's bracelet; one (1) men's necklace and another men's bracelet, with an
aggregate value of P98,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt of even date. They
both agreed that petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold,
to return the same items, within a period of 60 days. The period expired without
petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces of jewelry.
When private complainant was able to meet petitioner, the latter promised the
former that he will pay the value of the said items entrusted to him, but to no
avail.
Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of estafa, which
reads as follows:
That on or about the fifth (5th) day of July 1991, in the City of Olongapo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, after having received from one Danilo Tangcoy, one (1) men's
diamond ring, 18k, worth P45,000.00; one (1) three-baht men's bracelet, 22k,
worth P25,000.00; one (1) two-baht ladies' bracelet, 22k, worth P12,000.00, or
in the total amount of Ninety-Eight Thousand Pesos (P98,000.00), Philippine
currency, under expressed obligation on the part of said accused to remit the
proceeds of the sale of the said items or to return the same, if not sold, said
accused, once in possession of the said items, with intent to defraud, and with
unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, and far from complying with his
aforestated obligation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit the
aforesaid jewelries (sic) or the proceeds of the sale thereof, and despite repeated
demands, the accused failed and refused to return the said items or to remit the
amount of Ninety- Eight Thousand Pesos (P98,000.00), Philippine currency, to
the damage and prejudice of said Danilo Tangcoy in the aforementioned
amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On January 28, 1992, petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, entered a
plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution, to prove the above-stated facts, presented the lone testimony
of Danilo Tangcoy. On the other hand, the defense presented the lone testimony
of petitioner, which can be summarized, as follows:
Petitioner and private complainant were collecting agents of Antonio Balajadia,
who is engaged in the financing business of extending loans to Base employees.
For every collection made, they earn a commission. Petitioner denied having
transacted any business with private complainant.
However, he admitted obtaining a loan from Balajadia sometime in 1989 for
which he was made to sign a blank receipt. He claimed that the same receipt
was then dated May 2, 1991 and used as evidence against him for the supposed
agreement to sell the subject pieces of jewelry, which he did not even see.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged in the Information. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, finding accused LITO CORPUZ GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the felony of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph one (1),
subparagraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code;
there being no offsetting generic aggravating nor ordinary mitigating
circumstance/s to vary the penalty imposable;
accordingly, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of deprivation
of liberty consisting of an imprisonment under the Indeterminate Sentence Law
of FOUR (4) YEARS AND TWO (2) MONTHS of Prision Correccional in its
medium period AS MINIMUM, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS AND EIGHT (8)
MONTHS of Reclusion Temporal in its minimum period AS MAXIMUM; to
indemnify private complainant Danilo Tangcoy the amount of P98,000.00 as
actual damages, and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter denied the appeal of
petitioner and affirmed the decision of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Judgment dated
July 30, 2004 of the RTC of San Fernando City (P), Branch 46, is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION on the imposable prison term, such that
accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months
of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years of prision mayor, as maximum,
plus 1 year for each additional P10,000.00, or a total of 7 years. The rest of the
decision stands.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner, after the CA denied his motion for reconsideration, filed with this
Court the present petition stating the following grounds:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
CONFIRMING THE ADMISSION AND APPRECIATION BY
THE LOWER COURT OF PROSECUTION EVIDENCE,
INCLUDING ITS EXHIBITS, WHICH ARE MERE
MACHINE COPIES, AS THIS VIOLATES THE BEST
EVIDENCE RULE;
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT THE
CRIMINAL INFORMATION FOR ESTAFA WAS NOT
FATALLY DEFECTIVE ALTHOUGH THE SAME DID NOT
CHARGE THE OFFENSE UNDER ARTICLE 315 (1) (B) OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE IN THAT -
1. THE INFORMATION DID NOT FIX A PERIOD WITHIN
WHICH THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY SHOULD
BE RETURNED, IF UNSOLD, OR THE MONEY TO BE
REMITTED, IF SOLD;
2. THE DATE OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE CRIME
ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION AS OF 05 JULY 1991
WAS MATERIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE ONE
TESTIFIED TO BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WHICH
WAS 02 MAY 1991;
C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT
DEMAND TO RETURN THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF]
JEWELRY, IF UNSOLD, OR REMIT THE PROCEEDS, IF
SOLD AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE WAS PROVED;
D. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT THE
PROSECUTION'S CASE WAS PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT ALTHOUGH -
1. THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TESTIFIED ON TWO (2)
VERSIONS OF THE INCIDENT;
2. THE VERSION OF THE PETITIONER ACCUSED IS
MORE STRAIGHTFORWARD AND LOGICAL,
CONSISTENT WITH HUMAN EXPERIENCE;
3. THE EQUIPOISE RULE WAS NOT APPRECIATED IN
AND APPLIED TO THIS CASE;
4. PENAL STATUTES ARE STRICTLY CONSTRUED
AGAINST THE STATE.
In its Comment dated May 5, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
stated the following counter-arguments:
The exhibits were properly admitted inasmuch as petitioner failed to object to
their admissibility.
The information was not defective inasmuch as it sufficiently established the
designation of the offense and the acts complained of.
The prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of the crime charged.
This Court finds the present petition devoid of any merit.
The factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and carry
even more weight when said court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent
any showing that the findings are totally devoid of support in the records, or
that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of
discretion.4 Petitioner is of the opinion that the CA erred in affirming the factual
findings of the trial court. He now comes to this Court raising both procedural
and substantive issues.
According to petitioner, the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the trial court,
admitting in evidence a receipt dated May 2, 1991 marked as Exhibit "A" and
its submarkings, although the same was merely a photocopy, thus, violating the
best evidence rule. However, the records show that petitioner never objected to
the admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was identified, marked and
testified upon in court by private complainant. The CA also correctly pointed
out that petitioner also failed to raise an objection in his Comment to the
prosecution's formal offer of evidence and even admitted having signed the said
receipt. The established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely
objection to evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such objection
shall be considered as waived.5
Another procedural issue raised is, as claimed by petitioner, the formally
defective Information filed against him. He contends that the Information does
not contain the period when the pieces of jewelry were supposed to be returned
and that the date when the crime occurred was different from the one testified to
by private complainant. This argument is untenable. The CA did not err in
finding that the Information was substantially complete and in reiterating that
objections as to the matters of form and substance in the Information cannot be
made for the first time on appeal. It is true that the gravamen of the crime of
estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the
appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of
the owner6 and that the time of occurrence is not a material ingredient of the
crime, hence, the exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the occurrence
of the crime, as reflected in the Information, do not make the latter fatally
defective. The CA ruled:
x x x An information is legally viable as long as it distinctly states the statutory
designation of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. Then
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that a complaint or
information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused;
the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained
of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate
time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was
committed. In the case at bar, a reading of the subject Information shows
compliance with the foregoing rule. That the time of the commission of the
offense was stated as " on or about the fifth (5th) day of July, 1991" is not
likewise fatal to the prosecution's cause considering that Section 11 of the same
Rule requires a statement of the precise time only when the same is a material
ingredient of the offense. The gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article
315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is the appropriation or
conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the offender.
Thus, aside from the fact that the date of the commission thereof is not an
essential element of the crime herein charged, the failure of the prosecution to
specify the exact date does not render the Information ipso facto defective.
Moreover, the said date is also near the due date within which accused-
appellant should have delivered the proceeds or returned the said [pieces of
jewelry] as testified upon by Tangkoy, hence, there was sufficient compliance
with the rules. Accused-appellant, therefore, cannot now be allowed to claim
that he was not properly apprised of the charges proferred against him.7
It must be remembered that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC, which reads:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any
of the means mentioned hereinbelow.
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely: q Now, Mr. Witness, this was executed on 2 May 1991, and this transaction
could have been finished on 5 July 1991, the question is what happens (sic)
xxxx when the deadline came?

(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, a I went looking for him, sir.
goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the q For whom?
duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be
totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such a Lito Corpuz, sir.
money, goods, or other property; x x x
q Were you able to look (sic) for him?
The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that money,
goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on a I looked for him for a week, sir.
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the
duty to make delivery of, or to return the same; (b) that there be q Did you know his residence?
misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or
denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or conversion a Yes, sir.
or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) that there is a demand made by
the offended party on the offender.8 q Did you go there?

Petitioner argues that the last element, which is, that there is a demand by the a Yes, sir.
offended party on the offender, was not proved. This Court disagrees. In his
testimony, private complainant narrated how he was able to locate petitioner q Did you find him?
after almost two (2) months from the time he gave the pieces of jewelry and
asked petitioner about the same items with the latter promising to pay them. a No, sir.
Thus:
q Were you able to talk to him since 5 July 1991?
PROS. MARTINEZ
a I talked to him, sir.

q How many times?

a Two times, sir.
q What did you talk (sic) to him?
a About the items I gave to (sic) him, sir.
q Referring to Exhibit A-2?
a Yes, sir, and according to him he will take his obligation and I asked him
where the items are and he promised me that he will pay these amount, sir.
q Up to this time that you were here, were you able to collect from him partially
or full?
a No, sir.9
No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand. 10 Demand
need not even be formal; it may be verbal.11 The specific word "demand" need
not even be used to show that it has indeed been made upon the person charged,
since even a mere query as to the whereabouts of the money [in this case,
property], would be tantamount to a demand.12 As expounded in Asejo v.
People:13
With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA that demand
under this kind of estafa need not be formal or written. The appellate court
observed that the law is silent with regard to the form of demand in estafa under
Art. 315 1(b), thus:
When the law does not qualify, We should not qualify. Should a written demand
be necessary, the law would have stated so. Otherwise, the word "demand"
should be interpreted in its general meaning as to include both written and oral
demand. Thus, the failure of the prosecution to present a written demand as
evidence is not fatal.
In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the
money entrusted to the accused, we held that the query was tantamount to a
demand, thus:
x x x [T]he law does not require a demand as a condition precedent to the
existence of the crime of embezzlement. It so happens only that failure to
account, upon demand for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial
evidence of misappropriation. The same way, however, be established by other
proof, such as that introduced in the case at bar.14
In view of the foregoing and based on the records, the prosecution was able to
prove the existence of all the elements of the crime. Private complainant gave
petitioner the pieces of jewelry in trust, or on commission basis, as shown in the
receipt dated May 2, 1991 with an obligation to sell or return the same within
sixty (60) days, if unsold. There was misappropriation when petitioner failed to
remit the proceeds of those pieces of jewelry sold, or if no sale took place,
failed to return the same pieces of jewelry within or after the agreed period
despite demand from the private complainant, to the prejudice of the latter.
Anent the credibility of the prosecution's sole witness, which is questioned by
petitioner, the same is unmeritorious. Settled is the rule that in assessing the
credibility of witnesses, this Court gives great respect to the evaluation of the
trial court for it had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of
witnesses and their deportment on the witness stand, an opportunity denied the
appellate courts, which merely rely on the records of the case.15 The assessment
by the trial court is even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness
or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence, especially
when such finding is affirmed by the CA.16 Truth is established not by the
number of witnesses, but by the quality of their testimonies, for in determining
the value and credibility of evidence, the witnesses are to be weighed not
numbered.17
As regards the penalty, while this Court's Third Division was deliberating on
this case, the question of the continued validity of imposing on persons
convicted of crimes involving property came up. The legislature apparently
pegged these penalties to the value of the money and property in 1930 when it
enacted the Revised Penal Code. Since the members of the division reached no
unanimity on this question and since the issues are of first impression, they
decided to refer the case to the Court en banc for consideration and resolution.
Thus, several amici curiae were invited at the behest of the Court to give their
academic opinions on the matter. Among those that graciously complied were
Dean Jose Manuel Diokno, Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria, Professor Alfredo F.
Tadiar, the Senate President, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
The parties were later heard on oral arguments before the Court en banc, with
Atty. Mario L. Bautista appearing as counsel de oficio of the petitioner.
After a thorough consideration of the arguments presented on the matter, this
Court finds the following:
There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties
that the courts continue to impose on crimes against property committed today,
based on the amount of damage measured by the value of money eighty years
ago in 1932. However, this Court cannot modify the said range of penalties
because that would constitute judicial legislation. What the legislature's
perceived failure in amending the penalties provided for in the said crimes
cannot be remedied through this Court's decisions, as that would be encroaching
upon the power of another branch of the government. This, however, does not
render the whole situation without any remedy. It can be appropriately
presumed that the framers of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) had anticipated this
matter by including Article 5, which reads:
ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but
which are not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. -
Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to
repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision,
and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the
reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the
subject of penal legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without
suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the
provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive
penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by
the offense.18
The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states that for acts bourne out
of a case which is not punishable by law and the court finds it proper to repress,
the remedy is to render the proper decision and thereafter, report to the Chief
Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons why the same act
should be the subject of penal legislation. The premise here is that a deplorable
act is present but is not the subject of any penal legislation, thus, the court is
tasked to inform the Chief Executive of the need to make that act punishable by
law through legislation. The second paragraph is similar to the first except for
the situation wherein the act is already punishable by law but the corresponding
penalty is deemed by the court as excessive. The remedy therefore, as in the
first paragraph is not to suspend the execution of the sentence but to submit to
the Chief Executive the reasons why the court considers the said penalty to be
non-commensurate with the act committed. Again, the court is tasked to inform
the Chief Executive, this time, of the need for a legislation to provide the proper
penalty.
In his book, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 19 Guillermo B. Guevara
opined that in Article 5, the duty of the court is merely to report to the Chief
Executive, with a recommendation for an amendment or modification of the
legal provisions which it believes to be harsh. Thus:
This provision is based under the legal maxim "nullum crimen, nulla poena sige
lege," that is, that there can exist no punishable act except those previously and
specifically provided for by penal statute.
No matter how reprehensible an act is, if the law-making body does not deem it
necessary to prohibit its perpetration with penal sanction, the Court of justice
will be entirely powerless to punish such act.
Under the provisions of this article the Court cannot suspend the execution of a
sentence on the ground that the strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code
would cause excessive or harsh penalty. All that the Court could do in such
eventuality is to report the matter to the Chief Executive with a
recommendation for an amendment or modification of the legal provisions
which it believes to be harsh.20
Anent the non-suspension of the execution of the sentence, retired Chief Justice
Ramon C. Aquino and retired Associate Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino, in
their book, The Revised Penal Code,21 echoed the above-cited commentary,
thus:
The second paragraph of Art. 5 is an application of the humanitarian principle
that justice must be tempered with mercy. Generally, the courts have nothing to
do with the wisdom or justness of the penalties fixed by law. "Whether or not
the penalties prescribed by law upon conviction of violations of particular
statutes are too severe or are not severe enough, are questions as to which
commentators on the law may fairly differ; but it is the duty of the courts to
enforce the will of the legislator in all cases unless it clearly appears that a
given penalty falls within the prohibited class of excessive fines or cruel and
unusual punishment." A petition for clemency should be addressed to the Chief
Executive.22
There is an opinion that the penalties provided for in crimes against property be
based on the current inflation rate or at the ratio of P1.00 is equal to P100.00 .
However, it would be dangerous as this would result in uncertainties, as
opposed to the definite imposition of the penalties. It must be remembered that
the economy fluctuates and if the proposed imposition of the penalties in crimes
against property be adopted, the penalties will not cease to change, thus,
making the RPC, a self-amending law. Had the framers of the RPC intended
that to be so, it should have provided the same, instead, it included the earlier
cited Article 5 as a remedy. It is also improper to presume why the present
legislature has not made any moves to amend the subject penalties in order to
conform with the present times. For all we know, the legislature intends to
retain the same penalties in order to deter the further commission of those
punishable acts which have increased tremendously through the years. In fact,
in recent moves of the legislature, it is apparent that it aims to broaden the
coverage of those who violate penal laws. In the crime of Plunder, from its
original minimum amount of P100,000,000.00 plundered, the legislature
lowered it to P50,000,000.00. In the same way, the legislature lowered the
threshold amount upon which the Anti-Money Laundering Act may apply,
from P1,000,000.00 to P500,000.00.
It is also worth noting that in the crimes of Theft and Estafa, the present
penalties do not seem to be excessive compared to the proposed imposition of
their corresponding penalties. In Theft, the provisions state that:
Art. 309. Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the
value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000
pesos, but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount the penalty
shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one
year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which
may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection
with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the
other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or
reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if
the value of the thing stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed
12,000 pesos.
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if
the value of the property stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed
6,000 pesos.
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum
period, if the value of the property stolen is over 50 pesos but does not exceed
200 pesos.
5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but does not
exceed 50 pesos.
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does not
exceed 5 pesos.
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is committed
under the circumstances enumerated in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article
and the value of the thing stolen does not exceed 5 pesos. If such value exceeds
said amount, the provision of any of the five preceding subdivisions shall be
made applicable.
8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos, when
the value of the thing stolen is not over 5 pesos, and the offender shall have
acted under the impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of earning a
livelihood for the support of himself or his family.
In a case wherein the value of the thing stolen is P6,000.00, the above-provision
states that the penalty is prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). Applying the proposal, if
the value of the thing stolen is P6,000.00, the penalty is imprisonment of arresto
mayor in its medium period to prision correccional minimum period (2 months
and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months). It would seem that under the present law,
the penalty imposed is almost the same as the penalty proposed. In fact, after
the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law under the existing law, the
minimum penalty is still lowered by one degree; hence, the minimum penalty is
arresto mayor in its medium period to maximum period (2 months and 1 day to
6 months), making the offender qualified for pardon or parole after serving the
said minimum period and may even apply for probation. Moreover, under the
proposal, the minimum penalty after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law
is arresto menor in its maximum period to arresto mayor in its minimum period
(21 days to 2 months) is not too far from the minimum period under the existing
law. Thus, it would seem that the present penalty imposed under the law is not
at all excessive. The same is also true in the crime of Estafa.23
Moreover, if we apply the ratio of 1:100, as suggested to the value of the thing
stolen in the crime of Theft and the damage caused in the crime of Estafa, the
gap between the minimum and the maximum amounts, which is the basis of
determining the proper penalty to be imposed, would be too wide and the
penalty imposable would no longer be commensurate to the act committed and
the value of the thing stolen or the damage caused:
I. Article 309, or the penalties for the crime of Theft, the value would be
modified but the penalties are not changed:
1. P12,000.00 to P22,000.00 will become P1,200,000.00 to P2,200,000.00,
punished by prision mayor minimum to prision mayor medium (6 years and 1
day to 10 years).
2. P6,000.00 to P12,000.00 will become P600,000.00 to P1,200,000.00,
punished by prision correccional medium and to prision correccional maximum
(2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years).24
3. P200.00 to P6,000.00 will become P20,000.00 to P600,000.00, punishable by
prision correccional minimum to prision correccional medium (6 months and 1
day to 4 years and 2 months).
4. P50.00 to P200.00 will become P5,000.00 to P20,000.00, punishable by
arresto mayor medium to prision correccional minimum (2 months and 1 day to
2 years and 4 months).
5. P5.00 to P50.00 will become P500.00 to P5,000.00, punishable by arresto
mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6 months).
6. P5.00 will become P500.00, punishable by arresto mayor minimum to arresto
mayor medium.
x x x x.
II. Article 315, or the penalties for the crime of Estafa, the value would also be
modified but the penalties are not changed, as follows:
1st. P12,000.00 to P22,000.00, will become P1,200,000.00 to P2,200,000.00,
punishable by prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum (4
years, 2 months and 1 day to 8 years).25
2nd. P6,000.00 to P12,000.00 will become P600,000.00 to P1,200,000.00,
punishable by prision correccional minimum to prision correccional medium (6
months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).26
3rd. P200.00 to P6,000.00 will become P20,000.00 to P600,000.00, punishable
by arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional minimum (4 months and 1
day to 2 years and 4 months).
4th. P200.00 will become P20,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor maximum
(4 months and 1 day to 6 months).
An argument raised by Dean Jose Manuel I. Diokno, one of our esteemed amici
curiae, is that the incremental penalty provided under Article 315 of the RPC
violates the Equal Protection Clause.
The equal protection clause requires equality among equals, which is
determined according to a valid classification. The test developed by
jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness,27 which has four
requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and DEAN DIOKNO:

(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.28 Absurd, it violates equal protection, Your Honor, and cruel and unusual
punishment.
According to Dean Diokno, the Incremental Penalty Rule (IPR) does not rest on
substantial distinctions asP10,000.00 may have been substantial in the past, but JUSTICE PERALTA:
it is not so today, which violates the first requisite; the IPR was devised so that
those who commit estafa involving higher amounts would receive heavier Then what will be the penalty that we are going to impose if the amount is more
penalties; however, this is no longer achieved, because a person who than Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.
steals P142,000.00 would receive the same penalty as someone who steals
hundreds of millions, which violates the second requisite; and, the IPR violates DEAN DIOKNO:
requisite no. 3, considering that the IPR is limited to existing conditions at the
time the law was promulgated, conditions that no longer exist today. Well, that would be for Congress to ... if this Court will declare the incremental
penalty rule unconstitutional, then that would ... the void should be filled by
Assuming that the Court submits to the argument of Dean Diokno and declares Congress.
the incremental penalty in Article 315 unconstitutional for violating the equal
protection clause, what then is the penalty that should be applied in case the JUSTICE PERALTA:
amount of the thing subject matter of the crime exceeds P22,000.00? It seems
that the proposition poses more questions than answers, which leads us even But in your presentation, you were fixing the amount at One Hundred Thousand
more to conclude that the appropriate remedy is to refer these matters to (P100,000.00) Pesos ...
Congress for them to exercise their inherent power to legislate laws.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Even Dean Diokno was of the opinion that if the Court declares the IPR
unconstitutional, the remedy is to go to Congress. Thus: Well, my presen ... (interrupted)

xxxx JUSTICE PERALTA:

JUSTICE PERALTA: For every One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos in excess of Twenty-
Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos you were suggesting an additional penalty
Now, your position is to declare that the incremental penalty should be struck of one (1) year, did I get you right?
down as unconstitutional because it is absurd.
DEAN DIOKNO: ... as the equivalent of one, as an incremental penalty in excess of Twenty-Two
Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.
Yes, Your Honor, that is, if the court will take the route of statutory
interpretation. DEAN DIOKNO:

JUSTICE PERALTA: No, Your Honor.

Ah ... JUSTICE PERALTA:

DEAN DIOKNO: The Court cannot do that.

If the Court will say that they can go beyond the literal wording of the law... DEAN DIOKNO:

JUSTICE PERALTA: Could not be.

But if we de ... (interrupted) JUSTICE PERALTA:

DEAN DIOKNO: The only remedy is to go to Congress...

....then.... DEAN DIOKNO:

JUSTICE PERALTA: Yes, Your Honor.

Ah, yeah. But if we declare the incremental penalty as unsconstitutional, the JUSTICE PERALTA:
court cannot fix the amount ...
... and determine the value or the amount.
DEAN DIOKNO:
DEAN DIOKNO:
No, Your Honor.
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
JUSTICE PERALTA:
That will be equivalent to the incremental penalty of one (1) year in excess of
Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
The amount in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.
Thank you, Dean.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Thank you.
x x x x29
Dean Diokno also contends that Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Citing Solem v. Helm, 30 Dean
Diokno avers that the United States Federal Supreme Court has expanded the
application of a similar Constitutional provision prohibiting cruel and unusual
punishment, to the duration of the penalty, and not just its form. The court
therein ruled that three things must be done to decide whether a sentence is
proportional to a specific crime, viz.; (1) Compare the nature and gravity of the
offense, and the harshness of the penalty; (2) Compare the sentences imposed
on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, i.e., whether more serious crimes are
subject to the same penalty or to less serious penalties; and (3) Compare the
sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.
However, the case of Solem v. Helm cannot be applied in the present case,
because in Solem what respondent therein deemed cruel was the penalty
imposed by the state court of South Dakota after it took into account the latters
recidivist statute and not the original penalty for uttering a "no account" check.
Normally, the maximum punishment for the crime would have been five years
imprisonment and a $5,000.00 fine. Nonetheless, respondent was sentenced to
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole under South Dakotas
recidivist statute because of his six prior felony convictions. Surely, the factual
antecedents of Solem are different from the present controversy.
With respect to the crime of Qualified Theft, however, it is true that the
imposable penalty for the offense is high. Nevertheless, the rationale for the
imposition of a higher penalty against a domestic servant is the fact that in the
commission of the crime, the helper will essentially gravely abuse the trust and
confidence reposed upon her by her employer. After accepting and allowing the
helper to be a member of the household, thus entrusting upon such person the
protection and safekeeping of the employers loved ones and properties, a
subsequent betrayal of that trust is so repulsive as to warrant the necessity of
imposing a higher penalty to deter the commission of such wrongful acts.
There are other crimes where the penalty of fine and/or imprisonment are
dependent on the subject matter of the crime and which, by adopting the
proposal, may create serious implications. For example, in the crime of
Malversation, the penalty imposed depends on the amount of the money
malversed by the public official, thus:
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of
malversation. Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is
accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall
take or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or negligence,
shall permit any other person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or
partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of
such funds or property, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if
the amount involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed
two hundred pesos.
2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the
amount involved is more than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six
thousand pesos.
3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in
its minimum period, if the amount involved is more than six thousand pesos but
is less than twelve thousand pesos.
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods, if
the amount involved is more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than
twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall
be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of
perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds
malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or
property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized
officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or
property to personal use.
The above-provisions contemplate a situation wherein the Government loses
money due to the unlawful acts of the offender. Thus, following the proposal, if
the amount malversed is P200.00 (under the existing law), the amount now
becomes P20,000.00 and the penalty is prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods (2 years 4 months and 1 day to 6 years). The penalty may not
be commensurate to the act of embezzlement ofP20,000.00 compared to the
acts committed by public officials punishable by a special law, i.e., Republic
Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, specifically Section
3,31 wherein the injury caused to the government is not generally defined by any
monetary amount, the penalty (6 years and 1 month to 15 years) 32under the
Anti-Graft Law will now become higher. This should not be the case, because
in the crime of malversation, the public official takes advantage of his public
position to embezzle the fund or property of the government entrusted to him.
The said inequity is also apparent in the crime of Robbery with force upon
things (inhabited or uninhabited) where the value of the thing unlawfully taken
and the act of unlawful entry are the bases of the penalty imposable, and also, in
Malicious Mischief, where the penalty of imprisonment or fine is dependent on
the cost of the damage caused.
In Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or uninhabited), if we increase the
value of the thing unlawfully taken, as proposed in the ponencia, the sole basis
of the penalty will now be the value of the thing unlawfully taken and no longer
the element of force employed in entering the premises. It may likewise cause
an inequity between the crime of Qualified Trespass to Dwelling under Article
280, and this kind of robbery because the former is punishable by prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2 years, 4 months and 1 day
to 6 years) and a fine not exceeding P1,000.00 (P100,000.00 now if the ratio is
1:100) where entrance to the premises is with violence or intimidation, which is
the main justification of the penalty. Whereas in the crime of Robbery with
force upon things, it is punished with a penalty of prision mayor (6 years and 1
day to 12 years) if the intruder is unarmed without the penalty of Fine despite
the fact that it is not merely the illegal entry that is the basis of the penalty but
likewise the unlawful taking.
Furthermore, in the crime of Other Mischiefs under Article 329, the highest
penalty that can be imposed is arresto mayor in its medium and maximum
periods (2 months and 1 day to 6 months) if the value of the damage caused
exceeds P1,000.00, but under the proposal, the value of the damage will now
become P100,000.00 (1:100), and still punishable by arresto mayor (1 month
and 1 day to 6 months). And, if the value of the damaged property does not
exceed P200.00, the penalty is arresto menor or a fine of not less than the value
of the damage caused and not more than P200.00, if the amount involved does
not exceed P200.00 or cannot be estimated. Under the proposal, P200.00 will
now become P20,000.00, which simply means that the fine of P200.00 under
the existing law will now become P20,000.00. The amount of Fine under this
situation will now become excessive and afflictive in nature despite the fact that
the offense is categorized as a light felony penalized with a light penalty under
Article 26 of the RPC.33 Unless we also amend Article 26 of the RPC, there will
be grave implications on the penalty of Fine, but changing the same through
Court decision, either expressly or impliedly, may not be legally and
constitutionally feasible.
There are other crimes against property and swindling in the RPC that may also
be affected by the proposal, such as those that impose imprisonment and/or Fine
as a penalty based on the value of the damage caused, to wit: Article 311 (Theft
of the property of the National Library and National Museum), Article 312
(Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in property), Article
313 (Altering boundaries or landmarks), Article 316 (Other forms of
swindling), Article 317 (Swindling a minor), Article 318 (Other deceits), Article
328 (Special cases of malicious mischief) and Article 331 (Destroying or
damaging statues, public monuments or paintings). Other crimes that impose
Fine as a penalty will also be affected, such as: Article 213 (Frauds against the
public treasury and similar offenses), Article 215 (Prohibited Transactions),
Article 216 (Possession of prohibited interest by a public officer), Article 218
(Failure of accountable officer to render accounts), Article 219 (Failure of a
responsible public officer to render accounts before leaving the country).
In addition, the proposal will not only affect crimes under the RPC. It will also
affect crimes which are punishable by special penal laws, such as Illegal
Logging or Violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as
amended.34 The law treats cutting, gathering, collecting and possessing timber
or other forest products without license as an offense as grave as and equivalent
to the felony of qualified theft.35 Under the law, the offender shall be punished
with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 36 of the Revised Penal
Code, which means that the penalty imposable for the offense is, again, based
on the value of the timber or forest products involved in the offense. Now, if we
accept the said proposal in the crime of Theft, will this particular crime of
Illegal Logging be amended also in so far as the penalty is concerned because
the penalty is dependent on Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC? The answer is in
the negative because the soundness of this particular law is not in question.
With the numerous crimes defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code
and Special Laws, and other related provisions of these laws affected by the
proposal, a thorough study is needed to determine its effectivity and necessity.
There may be some provisions of the law that should be amended; nevertheless,
this Court is in no position to conclude as to the intentions of the framers of the
Revised Penal Code by merely making a study of the applicability of the
penalties imposable in the present times. Such is not within the competence of
the Court but of the Legislature which is empowered to conduct public hearings
on the matter, consult legal luminaries and who, after due proceedings, can
decide whether or not to amend or to revise the questioned law or other laws, or
even create a new legislation which will adopt to the times.
Admittedly, Congress is aware that there is an urgent need to amend the
Revised Penal Code. During the oral arguments, counsel for the Senate
informed the Court that at present, fifty-six (56) bills are now pending in the
Senate seeking to amend the Revised Penal Code, 37 each one proposing much
needed change and updates to archaic laws that were promulgated decades ago
when the political, socio-economic, and cultural settings were far different from
todays conditions.
Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way
that it shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the
course of such application or construction, it should not make or supervise
legislation, or under the guise of interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort,
remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a construction which is repugnant to
its terms.38 The Court should apply the law in a manner that would give effect to
their letter and spirit, especially when the law is clear as to its intent and
purpose. Succinctly put, the Court should shy away from encroaching upon the
primary function of a co-equal branch of the Government; otherwise, this would
lead to an inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation of powers by means
of judicial legislation.
Moreover, it is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a
Fine; hence, it can be increased by the Court when appropriate. Article 2206 of
the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict
shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been
mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the
deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such
indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the
deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the
defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of
Article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance
by the law of testate or intestate succession, may demand support from the
person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five years, the exact
duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the
deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the
death of the deceased.
In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of
monetary restitution or compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction
that was done to the latter by the accused, which in a sense only covers the civil
aspect. Precisely, it is civil indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person dies, in
addition to the penalty of imprisonment imposed to the offender, the accused is
also ordered to pay the victim a sum of money as restitution. Clearly, this award
of civil indemnity due to the death of the victim could not be contemplated as
akin to the value of a thing that is unlawfully taken which is the basis in the
imposition of the proper penalty in certain crimes. Thus, the reasoning in
increasing the value of civil indemnity awarded in some offense cannot be the
same reasoning that would sustain the adoption of the suggested ratio. Also, it is
apparent from Article 2206 that the law only imposes a minimum amount for
awards of civil indemnity, which is P3,000.00. The law did not provide for a
ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount for the award cannot be changed,
increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity can be validly modified and
increased when the present circumstance warrants it. Corollarily, moral
damages under Article 222039 of the Civil Code also does not fix the amount of
damages that can be awarded. It is discretionary upon the court, depending on
the mental anguish or the suffering of the private offended party. The amount of
moral damages can, in relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so long as it does
not exceed the award of civil indemnity.
In addition, some may view the penalty provided by law for the offense
committed as tantamount to cruel punishment. However, all penalties are
generally harsh, being punitive in nature. Whether or not they are excessive or
amount to cruel punishment is a matter that should be left to lawmakers. It is
the prerogative of the courts to apply the law, especially when they are clear and
not subject to any other interpretation than that which is plainly written.
Similar to the argument of Dean Diokno, one of Justice Antonio Carpios
opinions is that the incremental penalty provision should be declared
unconstitutional and that the courts should only impose the penalty
corresponding to the amount of P22,000.00, regardless if the actual amount
involved exceeds P22,000.00. As suggested, however, from now until the law is
properly amended by Congress, all crimes of Estafa will no longer be punished
by the appropriate penalty. A conundrum in the regular course of criminal
justice would occur when every accused convicted of the crime of estafa will be
meted penalties different from the proper penalty that should be imposed. Such
drastic twist in the application of the law has no legal basis and directly runs
counter to what the law provides.
It should be noted that the death penalty was reintroduced in the dispensation of
criminal justice by the Ramos Administration by virtue of Republic Act No.
765940 in December 1993. The said law has been questioned before this Court.
There is, arguably, no punishment more cruel than that of death. Yet still, from
the time the death penalty was re-imposed until its lifting in June 2006 by
Republic Act No. 9346,41 the Court did not impede the imposition of the death
penalty on the ground that it is a "cruel punishment" within the purview of
Section 19 (1),42Article III of the Constitution. Ultimately, it was through an act
of Congress suspending the imposition of the death penalty that led to its non-
imposition and not via the intervention of the Court.
Even if the imposable penalty amounts to cruel punishment, the Court cannot
declare the provision of the law from which the proper penalty emanates
unconstitutional in the present action. Not only is it violative of due process,
considering that the State and the concerned parties were not given the
opportunity to comment on the subject matter, it is settled that the
constitutionality of a statute cannot be attacked collaterally because
constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly and not collaterally,43 more so
in the present controversy wherein the issues never touched upon the
constitutionality of any of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
Besides, it has long been held that the prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishments is generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment
rather than its severity in respect of duration or amount, and applies to
punishments which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete, for
instance, those inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the
stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like. Fine and
imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition.44
It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe
for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. The fact that the punishment
authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual.
Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come under the ban, the
punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly oppressive," "wholly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the
community."45
Cruel as it may be, as discussed above, it is for the Congress to amend the law PROFESSOR TADIAR:
and adapt it to our modern time.
Per capita income.
The solution to the present controversy could not be solved by merely adjusting
the questioned monetary values to the present value of money based only on the JUSTICE PERALTA:
current inflation rate. There are other factors and variables that need to be taken
into consideration, researched, and deliberated upon before the said values Consumer price index.
could be accurately and properly adjusted. The effects on the society, the
injured party, the accused, its socio-economic impact, and the likes must be PROFESSOR TADIAR:
painstakingly evaluated and weighed upon in order to arrive at a wholistic
change that all of us believe should be made to our existing law. Dejectedly, the Yeah.
Court is ill-equipped, has no resources, and lacks sufficient personnel to
conduct public hearings and sponsor studies and surveys to validly effect these JUSTICE PERALTA:
changes in our Revised Penal Code. This function clearly and appropriately
belongs to Congress. Even Professor Tadiar concedes to this conclusion, to wit: Inflation ...

xxxx PROFESSOR TADIAR:

JUSTICE PERALTA: Yes.

Yeah, Just one question. You are suggesting that in order to determine the value JUSTICE PERALTA:
of Peso you have to take into consideration several factors.
... and so on. Is the Supreme Court equipped to determine those factors?
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Yes.
There are many ways by which the value of the Philippine Peso can be
JUSTICE PERALTA: determined utilizing all of those economic terms.

Per capita income. JUSTICE PERALTA:

Yeah, but ... JUSTICE PERALTA:

PROFESSOR TADIAR: Thank you, Professor.

And I dont think it is within the power of the Supreme Court to pass upon and PROFESSOR TADIAR:
peg the value to One Hundred (P100.00) Pesos to ...
Thank you.46
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Finally, the opinion advanced by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno
Yeah. echoes the view that the role of the Court is not merely to dispense justice, but
also the active duty to prevent injustice. Thus, in order to prevent injustice in
PROFESSOR TADIAR: the present controversy, the Court should not impose an obsolete penalty
pegged eighty three years ago, but consider the proposed ratio of 1:100 as
... One (P1.00.00) Peso in 1930. simply compensating for inflation. Furthermore, the Court has in the past taken
into consideration "changed conditions" or "significant changes in
JUSTICE PERALTA: circumstances" in its decisions.

That is legislative in nature. Similarly, the Chief Justice is of the view that the Court is not delving into the
validity of the substance of a statute. The issue is no different from the Courts
PROFESSOR TADIAR: adjustment of indemnity in crimes against persons, which the Court had
previously adjusted in light of current times, like in the case of People v.
That is my position that the Supreme Court ... Pantoja.47 Besides, Article 10 of the Civil Code mandates a presumption that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
With due respect to the opinions and proposals advanced by the Chief Justice
Yeah, okay. and my Colleagues, all the proposals ultimately lead to prohibited judicial
legislation. Short of being repetitious and as extensively discussed above, it is
PROFESSOR TADIAR: truly beyond the powers of the Court to legislate laws, such immense power
belongs to Congress and the Court should refrain from crossing this clear-cut
... has no power to utilize the power of judicial review to in order to adjust, to divide. With regard to civil indemnity, as elucidated before, this refers to civil
make the adjustment that is a power that belongs to the legislature. liability which is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary
restitution. It is truly based on the value of money. The same cannot be said on
penalties because, as earlier stated, penalties are not only based on the value of
money, but on several other factors. Further, since the law is silent as to the
maximum amount that can be awarded and only pegged the minimum sum,
increasing the amount granted as civil indemnity is not proscribed. Thus, it can
be adjusted in light of current conditions.
Now, with regard to the penalty imposed in the present case, the CA modified
the ruling of the RTC. The RTC imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional in its medium period, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal in
its minimum period, as maximum. However, the CA imposed the indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus one (1) year
for each additionalP10,000.00, or a total of seven (7) years.
In computing the penalty for this type of estafa, this Court's ruling in Cosme, Jr.
v. People48 is highly instructive, thus:
With respect to the imposable penalty, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
provides:
ART. 315 Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of
the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor
in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not
exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty
provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one
year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be
imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such case, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other
provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be.
The penalty prescribed by Article 315 is composed of only two, not three,
periods, in which case, Article 65 of the same Code requires the division of the
time included in the penalty into three equal portions of time included in the
penalty prescribed, forming one period of each of the three portions. Applying
the latter provisions, the maximum, medium and minimum periods of the
penalty prescribed are:
Maximum - 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years
Medium - 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, 20 days
Minimum - 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, 10 days49
To compute the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prisin correccional
maximum to prisin mayor minimum should be divided into three equal
portions of time each of which portion shall be deemed to form one period in
accordance with Article 6550 of the RPC.51 In the present case, the amount
involved is P98,000.00, which exceeds P22,000.00, thus, the maximum penalty
imposable should be within the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21
days to 8 years of prision mayor. Article 315 also states that a period of one
year shall be added to the penalty for every additional P10,000.00 defrauded in
excess of P22,000.00, but in no case shall the total penalty which may be
imposed exceed 20 years.
Considering that the amount of P98,000.00 is P76,000.00 more than
the P22,000.00 ceiling set by law, then, adding one year for each
additional P10,000.00, the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to
8 years of prision mayor minimum would be increased by 7 years. Taking the
maximum of the prescribed penalty, which is 8 years, plus an additional 7 years,
the maximum of the indeterminate penalty is 15 years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, since the penalty prescribed by law
for the estafa charge against petitioner is prision correccional maximum to
prision mayor minimum, the penalty next lower would then be prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere
from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months.
One final note, the Court should give Congress a chance to perform its
primordial duty of lawmaking. The Court should not pre-empt Congress and
usurp its inherent powers of making and enacting laws. While it may be the
most expeditious approach, a short cut by judicial fiat is a dangerous
proposition, lest the Court dare trespass on prohibited judicial legislation.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 5, 2007
of petitioner Lito Corpuz is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated
March 22, 2007 and Resolution dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed with modification the Decision dated July 30, 2004 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code, are hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed is the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from THREE (3) YEARS,
TWO (2) MONTHS and ELEVEN DAYS of prision correccional, as minimum,
to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a Copy of this Decision be
furnished the President of the Republic of the Philippines, through the
Department of Justice.
Also, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 208719, June 09, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROGER RINGOR
UMAWID, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellant Roger Ringor
Umawid (Umawid) is the Decision2 dated February 28, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05332 which affirmed the Joint
Decision3 dated November 8, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas,
Isabela, Branch 23 (RTC) in Criminal Case Nos. 23-04714 and 23-0543,
finding Umawid guilty of the crimes of Murder and Frustrated Murder, defined
and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended (RPC).
The Informations5 therefor read as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Criminal Case No. Br. 23-0471
 That on or about the 26th day of November, 2002, in the municipality of San
Manuel, province of Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to kill and with evident
premeditation and treachery, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, assault, attack and hack with a long bolo (panabas) one Maureen
Joy Ringor, a two year old baby girl, inflicting upon her body mortal wounds,
which directly and instantaneously caused her death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Roxas, Isabela, November 27, 2002.6
Criminal Case No. 23-0543
That on or about the 26th day of November, 2002, in the municipality of San
Manuel, province of Isabela, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to kill and with evident
premeditation and treachery, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, assault, attack and hack for several times with a long bolo
(Panabas) one, Jeffrey R. Mercado, inflicting upon him, incised wounds on the
(R) and (L), hand and on the parietal area, which injuries would ordinarily
cause the death of the said Jeffrey R. Mercado, thus, performing all the acts of
execution which should have produced the crime of Murder, as a consequence,
but nevertheless, did not produce it, by reason of causes independent of his will,
that is, by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to the said Jeffrey R.
Mercado, which prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Ilagan for Roxas, Isabela, April 3, 2003.7
The Facts
The prosecution presents the following version of the
facts:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
At around 4 oclock in the afternoon of November 26, 2002, Vicente Ringor
(Vicente) was staying with his two (2)-year old granddaughter, Maureen Joy
Ringor (Maureen), at the terrace of their house located at Villanueva, San
Manuel, Isabela. Suddenly, Umawid appeared and started attacking Vicente
with a panabas with neither reason nor provocation. While Vicente was able to
evade Umawids blows, the latter nevertheless hit Maureen on her abdomen and
back, causing her instantaneous death. Upon seeing Maureen bloodied, Umawid
walked away.8
Thereafter, Umawid went to a nearby house which was only five (5) meters
away from Vicentes house9 where his nephew, Jeffrey R. Mercado (Jeffrey),
was sleeping. Awakened by the commotion, Jeffrey went outside only to see his
uncle charging at him with his panabas. Instinctively, Jeffrey, along with his
sister and cousin, rushed inside the house to seek for safety. However, Umawid
was able to prevent Jeffrey from closing the door of the house, and, as such, the
former was able to barge into the said house. Cornered and nowhere else to go,
Jeffrey crouched and covered his head with his arms to shield him from
Umawids impending attacks. Eventually, Umawid delivered fatal hacking
blows to Jeffrey, causing the mutilation of the latters fingers. Umawid only
stopped his barrage upon seeing Jeffrey, who was then pretending to be dead,
leaning on the wall and blood-stained.10
For his part, Umawid set up the defense of insanity, but did not, however, take
the witness stand to attest to the same. Instead, he presented the testimonies of
 Dr. Arthur M. Quincina (Dr. Quincina) and Dr. Leonor Andres Juliana (Dr.
Juliana) to bolster his claim. Dr. Quincina testified that he evaluated Umawids Aggrieved, Umawid appealed to the CA.cra1awredjgc
psychiatric condition in May 2002, February 2003, and on March 24, 2003 and
The CA Ruling
found that the latter was manifesting psychotic symptoms. However, he could
not tell with certainty whether Umawid was psychotic at the time of the
commission of the crimes. On the other hand, Dr. Juliana failed to testify on In a Decision15 dated February 28, 2013, the CA affirmed Umawids
Umawids mental state since she merely referred the latter to another doctor for conviction. It held that by invoking the defense of insanity, Umawid had, in
further evaluation.11 effect, admitted the commission of the crimes but nevertheless pleaded to be
exonerated from criminal liability. However, he failed to prove by clear and
The RTC Ruling
positive evidence that he was actually insane immediately preceding the time of
the commission of the crimes or during their execution.
In a Joint Decision12 dated November 8, 2011, the RTC found Umawid guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder in Criminal Case No. 23-0471, Dissatisfied with the CAs ruling, Umawid filed the instant appeal.cra1awredjgc
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered him
The Issue Before the Court
to pay the heirs of Maureen the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P50,000.00 as moral damages. Umawid was also found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder in Criminal Case No. 23- The issue for the Courts resolution is whether or not Umawids conviction for
0543, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate the crimes of Murder and Frustrated Murder should be upheld.cra1awredjgc
period of six (6) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
The Courts Ruling
minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day ofreclusion
temporal, as maximum, and ordered to pay Jeffrey the sum of P10,000.00 as
moral damages.13 Umawids appeal is bereft of merit.

The RTC found that Umawid committed the acts complained of in the
informations and that they were done in a treacherous manner, considering that
Maureen was only two (2) years old at the time of the attack and thus, cannot be
expected to put up a defense, and that Jeffrey was never given an opportunity to
defend himself. Further, it did not lend credence to Umawidsalleged insanity as
the defense failed to show that he was indeed of unsound mind at the time of
the commission of the crimes.14
A. The Defense of Insanity
Umawids plea of insanity as an exempting circumstance to exonerate himself
from criminal liability rests on Article 12 of the RPC which
provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. The following
are exempt from criminal liability:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid
interval.
Where the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law
defines as a felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the
hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be
permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court.
xxxx
As case law instructs, the defense of insanity is in the nature of confession and
avoidance because an accused invoking the same admits to have committed the
crime but claims that he or she is not guilty because of such insanity. As there is
a presumption in favor of sanity,anyone who pleads the said defense bears the
burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, the
evidence on this matter must relate to the time immediately preceding or
simultaneous with the commission of the offense/s with which he is charged.16
Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence while
committing the act, i.e., when the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without
the least discernment because there is a complete absence of power to discern,
or there is total deprivation of freedom of the will. Mere abnormality of the
mental faculties is not enough, especially if the offender has not lost
consciousness of his acts. Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted
condition of the mental faculties and is manifested in language and conduct.
Thus, in order to lend credence to adefense of insanity, it must be shown that
theaccused had no full and clear understanding of the nature and consequences
of his or her acts.17
In this case, Umawid solely relied on the testimonies of Dr. Quincina and Dr.
Juliana to substantiate his plea of insanity. Records, however, reveal that Dr.
Quincinas testimony only showed that he evaluated Umawids mental
condition in May 2002, February 2003, and March 2003.18 In other words, he
only examined Umawid six (6) months before the latter committed the crimes
and three (3) months and four (4) months thereafter. Notably, he admitted that
his findings did not include Umawids mental disposition immediately before or
at the very moment when he committed such crimes.19As such, Dr. Quincinas
testimony cannot prove Umawids insanity. Neither would Dr. Julianas
testimony shore up Umawids cause as the former failed to attest to the latters
mental condition and even referred him to another doctor for further evaluation.
Given these circumstances, Umawids defense of insanity remained
unsubstantiated and, hence, he was properly adjudged by the RTC and the CA
as criminally liable.
With Umawids criminal liability having been established, the Court now
proceeds to examine whether or not treachery was correctly appreciated as a
qualifying circumstance for the crimes charged.
B. The Qualifying Circumstance of Treachery
Under Article 248 of the RPC, treachery qualifies the killing of a person to the
crime of Murder:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Art. 248. Murder. Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article
246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed
men, or employing means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to
 insure or afford impunity; (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
xxxx
The concept of treachery in criminal law is well-established there is treachery
when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make.20 Based on the foregoing, it
may then be deduced that two (2) conditions must concur for treachery to be
appreciated: first, the employment of means of execution that gives the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and,second, the means
of execution was deliberate or consciously adopted.21
In this relation, jurisprudence states that an unexpected and sudden attack which
renders the victim unable and unprepared to put up a defense is the essence of
treachery.22 Likewise, it has been held that the killing of a child is
characterized by treachery even if the manner of the assault is not shown
because the weakness of the victim due to her tender age results in the absence
of any danger to the accused.23
With these principles in mind, the Court agrees with the findings of the RTC
and the CA that treachery was attendant in the killing of Maureen. The facts of
this case show that Umawid suddenly appeared at the terrace of Vicentes house
and started attacking Vicente with panabas. However, the latter was able to
evade Umawids attacks, resulting in Maureen being inadvertently hit and killed
in the process. While it was not shown that Umawid consciously employed
treachery so as to insure the death of Maureen, who was then just two (2) years
old at the time, it is well to reiterate that the killing by an adult of a minor child
is treacherous,24 and thus, qualifies Maureens killing to Murder.
In the same manner, treachery exists in Umawids attack on Jeffrey, albeit the
Court disagrees with the RTC and the CAs finding that Umawid employed
means, methods, and forms that rendered Jeffrey incapable of raising a credible
defense.25 While it is true that treachery may also be appreciated even when
the victim was warned of the danger to his person and what is decisive is that
the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself
or to retaliate,26 a review of the factual circumstances herein would reveal that
it was not impossible for Jeffrey to put up a defense against Umawids attacks.
In fact, Jeffrey was sufficiently informed of Umawids impending assault upon
him as he saw the latter charging at him. Jeffrey even attempted to prevent
Umawid from entering the house, albeit he was unsuccessful in doing so.
Despite this, Jeffrey was still capable of mounting a defense against Umawids
attacks but it was simply unfortunate that he chose not to do so when he
crouched and covered his head with his arms. Nevertheless, treachery may still
be appreciated on account of Jeffreys minority, considering that he was just 15
years of age when Umawid attacked him. Instructive on this point is the case
of People v. Guzman,27 where it was held that treachery attended the killing of
a 17-year old victim due to his minority, viz:28
As viewed from the foregoing, the suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack
of appellant and his two companions rendered Michael defenseless, vulnerable
and without means of escape. It appears that Michael was unarmed and alone
at the time of the attack. Further, he was merely seventeen years of age then.
In such a helpless situation, it was absolutely impossible for Michael to escape
or to defend himself against the assault of appellant and his two companions.
Being young and weak, Michael is certainly no match against adult persons like
appellant and his two companions. Michael was also outnumbered since he had
three assailants, and, was unarmed when he was stabbed to death. Appellant
and his two companions took advantage of their size, number, and weapon in
killing Michael. They also deliberately adopted means and methods in exacting
the cruel death of Michael by first surrounding him, then grabbing his shoulders
and overpowering him. Afterwards, each of them repeatedly stabbed Michael
with a knife at the stomach until the latter fell lifeless to the ground. The stab
wounds sustained by Michael proved to be fatal as they severely damaged the
latters large intestine.
The fact that the place where the incident occurred was lighted and many
people were walking then in different directions does not negate treachery. It
should be made clear that the essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected
attack on an unsuspecting victim without the slightest provocation on his
part. This is even more true if the assailant is an adult and the victim is a minor.
Minor children, who by reason of their tender years, cannot be expected to put
up a defense. Thus, when an adult person illegally attacks a minor, treachery
exists. As we earlier found, Michael was peacefully walking and not provoking
anyone to a fight when he was stabbed to death by appellant and his two
companions. Further, Michael was a minor at the time of his death while
appellant and his two companions were adult persons. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In this light, there is no reason not to appreciate the qualifying circumstance of
treachery in an attack against a minor, as in this case.
C. Aberratio Ictus; Due Process Considerations
As a final point, the Court observes that Maureens death is a case of aberratio
ictus, given that the fatal blow therefor was only delivered by mistake as it was
actually Vicente who was Umawids intended target. In this regard, Umawids
single deed actually resulted in the: (a) Attempted Murder of Vicente; and (b)
Consummated Murder of Maureen. This may be classified as species of
complex crime defined under Article 4829 of the RPC, particularly, a delito
compuesto, or a compound crime where a single act produces two (2) or more
grave or less grave felonies.30Based on the foregoing, Umawid should have
been punished for committing the complex crime of Murder and Attempted
Murder, pursuant to Article 48 in relation to Article 4(1)31 of the RPC.
However, considering that the information in Criminal Case No. 23-0471 only
charged him with the Murder of Maureen, Umawid cannot be convicted of a
complex crime because to do so would be violative of his right to due
process.32As held in the case of Burgos v. Sandiganbayan:33
In criminal cases, where the life and liberty of the accused is at stake, due
process requires that the accused be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. An accused cannot be convicted of an offense unless it
is clearly charged in the complaint or information. To convict him of an offense
other than that charged in the complaint or information would be a violation of
this constitutional right.34 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
All told, the Court hereby finds Umawid guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of Murder in Criminal Case No. 23-0471 and Frustrated Murder in
Criminal Case No. 23-0543, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the
RPC.
In addition, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed
on all damages awarded from the date of finality of judgement until fully paid,
pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.35
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated February 28, 2013
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05332is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all damages awarded from the
date of finality of judgment, until fully paid.
 goods. Unfortunately, this is no longer unusual or shocking nowadays, as it
SO ORDERED. seems that life has become cheap. And thats precisely what is so painfully
tragic for all of us.
Together with Antonio Pareja and one John Doe, herein accused-appellant
Jose Toledo was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City,
Branch 8, with the crime of attempted robbery with homicide in an
information[1] which reads as follows:

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 88043. December 9, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO
PAREJA, JOSE TOLEDO and JOHN DOE, accuseds,
JOSE TOLEDO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Senseless killing takes on an almost blas signification in the instant case,
where the accused tried but failed to asport a TV set and betamax machine, and
instead ended up killing a defenseless person. Attempted robbery with
homicide, committed in the name of a few mundane material
That on or about the 22nd day of November, 1986, in the City of Legazpi,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with intent
of gain, being then armed with a knife and by means of violence and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the
house of HENEROSO (should be Generoso) JACOB, by forcibly detaching the
bamboo wall of the kitchen and once inside, threatened the occupants thereof
and demanded for the video machine trade mark betacord, however Sabina
Jacob grabbed the cloth covering the face of accused Antonio Pareja which
caused the latter to scamper away together with the two other accused and on
the occasion of said attempted robbery the accused Antonio Pareja, with intent
to kill, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab (sic) said HENEROSO
JACOB several times consequently inflicting injuries which directly caused his
death; thus said accused commencing the commission of the crime of Robbery
directly by overt acts and was (sic) not able to perform all the acts of execution
which would have produced the felony by reason of some cause or accident
other than their own spontaneous desistance. That there is present in the
commission of the offense the aggravating circumstances of night time.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
 At his arraignment on June 23, 1987, appellant Toledo pleaded not guilty to
the charge.[2] His two co-accused have remained at large.
The Facts
According to the Prosecution
The family of 54-year-old Generoso Jacob[3]resided in a one-bedroom
house in Pawa, Legazpi City. At around 2:00 oclock in the morning
of November 22, 1986, Generoso was asleep on a folding bed in the kitchen,
three steps below the living room where his wife Amada, and their children
Shirley, Alberto, Marlene and Sabina were sleeping.
A six-and-a-half feet high partition separated the living room from the 2 x 3
meters bedroom which was lighted by a 50-watt bulb. Asleep in the bedroom.
About four meters away from the kitchen, were Generosos daughter Emelita,
her husband Romeo Ramirez, and their baby Marlon.
Kept in the said bedroom was a 14 Sanyo color TV which had been
brought from Saudi Arabia by Generosos son, Rafael. In the living room was a
betamax with three components.
The family was roused from sleep by shouts of Gising kayo, huwag
sumigaw! three masked intruders had gained entry into the house. Amada saw
one of them asking Sabina for the betamax. The same fellow tried to lift and
carry off the machine but it proved to be too heavy for him. Almost without
thought, Sabina snatched off his mask and recognized him to be Antonio Pareja,
who used to frequent their house and take lunch at Emelitas store, as he was
even one of Emelitas gangmates.[4] The latter tried to stab Sabina but she evaded
the thrust and swiftly jumped out the window.[5]
Emelita was awakened by her fathers cries of tabangi ako nindo (please
help me). Instinctively, Emelita also screamed for help from their neighbors, but
one of the robbers poked a white-and-gold colored gun at her sentido (temple),
and neither she nor her husband could lift a finger. The gunwielders face was
covered by a t-shirt, except for his nose. Incidentally, Emelita recognized the T-
shirt to be hers, which she had left hanging on the clothesline outside the
house. The man uttered. Huwag kayong sisigaw kung ayaw ninyong mamatay,
nasaan yung TV? When she answered, diyan, the man tried to lift the television
set. Failing to do so, he called out, Ger, tulungan mo ako. But no one responded
to his call. While he was thus distracted, Emelita grabbed at the T-shirt and un-
masked him, thus recognizing him to be herein appellant Toledo. She thus
confirmed her earlier suspicion about his identity based on his body build and
voice.[6] As the neighbors were starting to respond to her cries for help, the trio
fled empty-handed.
Hearing her husbands moans, Amada went to the kitchen, where she saw
Generoso lying in a pool of blood on the cemented floor. She embraced him but
he merely looked at her, tried to open his mouth and expired. [7] He had bled
profusely from the wound on his chest.
Generoso was autopsied at the Funeraria Oro by Dr. Cesar Chua of the
Albay Provincial Hospital, who found that the victim sustained a 2-cm.
penetrating stab wound at the level of the nipple, left parasternal line; a 2-cm.
incised wound at the pulmonary arterial trunk; another 1 cm. incised wound at
the outlet of the right ventricle, and hemoperitoneum. [8] Dr. Chua opined that
Generosos wounds could have been caused by only one sharp pointed and long
instrument.[9]
A police photographer took pictures of the damaged bamboo portion of the
kitchen used for drying dishes,[10] which the robbers detached in order to gain
entry into the house.
 The Defenses Version appellant should like-wise be held equally liable for the death. If thus disposed
of the case as follows:
In his own defense, appellant interposed alibi. He swore that in the evening
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proved the guilt of accused beyond
of November 22, 1986, he attended the wake of Nerry Armario in
reasonable doubt Jose Toledo is hereby convicted of the offense charged, and is
Bogtong, Legazpi City, and he stayed there until past 3:00 oclock early morning
sentenced to reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties provided by
of the following day.[11] Santos Armario testified that his wife Nerry died
law and to pay the costs. Accused Jose Toledo is moreover ordered to
on November 22, 1986 and that at around 9:00 oclock that evening, appellant
indemnify the heirs of the late Heneroso Jacob in the amount of P30,000.00.
arrived at his house where he stayed until early morning of November 23, 1986.
[12]
Armando Armario and Eduardo Armario both testified that appellant arrived
Accused Jose Toledo, who has been under detention since April 29, 1987, is
for the wake more or less nine in the evening of the same day.[13]
given full credit for his preventive imprisonment.
The defense also presented the victims daughter Sabina as their
witness. She swore that of the three robbers, she was able to recognize only SO ORDERED.
Antonio Pareja. She failed to see the other two culprits because one was in the
bedroom and the other was in the kitchen while she was in the sala because held
at knifepoint by Antonio Pareja. She afirmed that pareja indeed had two Errors Assigned
companions during that incident.
In this appeal, appellant assigned the following errors:
The Trial Courts Ruling
The trial court erred in holding that there was a clear and positive
identification of Jose Toledo by the prosecution witnesses as one of the
On March 6, 1989, the trial court[14] rendered its Decision[15] holding that authors of the crime.
appellants denial and alibi could not prevail over the positive identification by
Emelita of appellant himself and Antonio Pareja as the malefactors, adding that The lower court erred in not acquitting the accused-appellant Jose Toledo
there was no reason at all for Emelita to unjustly and falsely finger appellant as on reasonable doubt.
one of the culprits. The court a quo opined that, although it may have been true
that appellant did attend the wake in Bogtong, it was however not impossible Appellant contends that prosecution witness Amada Jacob failed to place
for him to have left the wake with two companions to commit the crime in him at the scene of the crime on account of her admission to the police that she
nearby Pawa.While pointing out that it was Antonio Pareja who was responsible could not identify the two companions of Antonio Pareja. Neither could she
for inflicting the fatal injuries upon the victim, the trial court ruled that have seen appellant inside the bedroom where he was supposed to have
threatened Emelita, because of the partition between the bedroom and the living
room. Moreover, appellant highlights that variance in the testimonies of Emelita
and her mother regarding the weapon used by appellant in threatening the
former, with Emelita swearing that it was a knife and Amada affirming that it
was a gun. Appellant also claims that it was highly unlikely that Emelita would
have the courage to suddenly remove the mask from his face, on account of the
gun pointed at her head, and considering that her husband could not even do
anything under the circumstances. Lastly, appellant emphasizes the fact that
Sabina, one of the victims daughters, failed to identify the other assailants apart
from Antonio Pareja.
The Courts Ruling
Positive identification
Very telling is the fact that appellant does not even discuss Emelitas
testimony establishing his presence at the crime scene, notwithstanding that it
was Emelita whom he confronted and threatened and who pulled off his mask
inside the well-lighted bedroom. Appellant was no stranger to the Jacob family;
in fact, they were familiar with his build and his voice, since he frequented their
home when peddling fruit juices and homemade chocolates in Pawa.
[16]
Considering these circumstances, in the absence of proof that she had any
bias or ill-motive against appellant, Emelitas sole identification of appellant as
one of the three intruders in the Jacob residence stands completely
unscathed. Consequently, such identification suffices to obtain conviction even
in the absence of corroboration.[17] Besides, it would be unnatural for the
relatives of the victim who seek justice to commit an injustice by imputing the
crime to innocent persons and not those who were actually responsible therefor.
[18]
As regards the variance in the testimonies of Emelita and her mother
Amada concerning the type of weapon used by appellant in threatening the
former, such alleged inconsistency is insignificant as it refers only to a minor
detail. Rather than eroding the credibility of their testimonies, such difference in
fact constitutes a sign of veracity.[19] It is a well-recognized fact that witnesses
testifying about the same nerve-wracking event can hardly be expected to be
correct in every detail nor consistent with other witnesses in every aspect,
considering the inevitability of differences in their perception, recollection,
viewpoint or impressions, as well as in their physical, mental, emotional and
psychological states at the time of reception and recall of such
impressions. After all, to begin with, no to individuals are alike in term of
powers of observation and of recall. Total recall or perfect symmetry is not
required as long as witnesses concur on material points.[20]
We are also unpersuaded by appellants contention that it would have been
well nigh impossible for Emelita to have the courage to snatch the mask off his
face when she was being held at gunpoint, and considering that her husband did
not even dare lift a finger. While it is true that people faced with danger usually
become passive and submissive, it is equally true that there are some people
who are emboldened in sudden or impulsive reaction to a frightening
experience. Different persons have different reactions to similar
situations. Mans behavior and reactions can never be stereotyped.[21] In the same
vein, it is not improbable or unusual for victims of or witnesses to crimes or
startling events to strive to recognize the culprits and observe the manner of
commission of the crime.[22]
Appellant also relies on the testimony of Sabina Jacob that she could not
identify the two associates of Antonio Pareja. This contention cannot be taken
seriously. A careful reading of Sabinas testimony shows why she was able to
identify only Antonio Pareja -- she focused her full attention on him as he was
the one with her in the living room. [23] Moreover, her statement that she was not
able to identify the other two intruders -- one of whom was in the bedroom and
the other in the kitchen -- in no way implied that he (Jose Toledo) was not
among the three malefactors.
Alibi
As regards appellants alibi, the Court has time and again ruled that alibi is
the weakest of defenses because it is easy to fabricate but difficult to prove. It
cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by witnesses. For
the defense to prosper, the requirements of time and place (or distance) must be
strictly met: It is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else
when the crime was committed; he must also demonstrate by clear convincing
evidence that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of
the crime during its commission.[24]
In the case before us, such physical impossibility had not been proven, and
in fact, quite the opposite was shown. According to Fiscal Fidel Sarmiento, the
distance between Pawa and Bogtong, which are adjacent barangays, could be
negotiated in ten to twenty minutes by crossing the river; and appellant
admitted that in travelling between Bogtong and Pawa to peddle his wares, he
would usually cross the river instead of passing through San Joaquin. [25] Even
the corroborative testimonies of appellants drinking partners at the wake[26] are
rendered valueless on account of the case of going back and forth between the
two barangays, as well as in light of appellants positive identification by
prosecution witnesses as one of the interlopers in the Jacob abode.
Non-Flight?
Moreover, the mere fact that, according to his companions at the wake,
appellant did not flee the crime scene, may not be deemed as indicative of his
innocence.[27] There is no law ordictum holding that non-flight of an accused is
conclusive proof of innocence.[28]
Credibility of Witnesses
On the whole therefore, appellants guilt hinges on the issue of
credibility. This Court has repeatedly said that the task of assigning values to
declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently performed by
the trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrate, can weigh such testimonies in
light of the declarants demeanor, conduct and attitude at the trial and is thereby
placed in a more competent position to discriminate between the true and the
false. The rule holds firmly especially where, as in this case, the appellant failed
to show any fact of substance which the trial court might have overlooked that,
when considered, may affect the result of the case. [29] No such fact obtains in
this case.
It is beyond dispute that the trial court correctly found appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted robbery with homicide as
defined in Art. 297 of the Revised Penal Code. Robbery was the intended
purpose of the intruders trespass into the residence of the Jacobs. Generoso
Jacobs killing was on the occasion of a robbery which, however, was not
consummated.
The failure to cart away the goods due to their weight (something the
culprits had not taken into account) may not be considered as voluntary
desistance from the commission of the crime so as to remove the element of
asportation from the complex crime charged. Such failure to consummate the
robbery was not caused solely by their own volition and inabilities. It was
likewise brought about by factors such as their unmasking and the arrival of prevailing jurisprudential law,[35] indemnity for the death of Generoso Jacob
neighbors who respondent to Emelitas shouts for help. These circumstances shall be increased to P50,000.00.
forced them to flee, leaving behind the objects.
WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision finding appellant Jose Toledo
Appellant is liable for attempted robbery with homicide even if he was not guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted robbery with
himself the author of the killing of Generoso Jacob, for lack of evidence homicide is hereby AFFIRMED, subject to the modification that he shall
showing that he endeavored to prevent such slaying. Thus, the general rule indemnify the heirs of Generoso Jacob in the sum of fifty thousand pesos
applies that whenever homicide is committed on the occasion or as a (P50,000.00).
consequence of robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Philippine National police and
shall be held guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide
the National Bureau of Investigation which are herewith instructed to effect
although they did not actually take part in the homicide. [30] The same principle
with dispatch the arrest of Antonio Pareja in order that he too may stand trial for
applies even if the crime committed is attempted robbery with homicide.
[31] the crime charged and duly proven here.
Pursuant to Art. 297 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime charged and
proven in this case carries the penalty of reclusion perpetua in its maximum SO OREDERED.
period to reclusion perpetua unless the homicide committed shall deserve a
Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
higher penalty. Said penalty is imposable in this case, there being no ground to
apply the exception mentioned in the article.
The aggravating circumstance of nighttime alleged in the Information was
not conclusively proven. For nocturnity to be considered as such circumstance,
it must have been particularly sought by the accuse or taken advantage of by
him to facilitate the commission of the crime or to ensure his immunity from
capture,[32] or otherwise to facilitate his getaway.
Nonetheless, we find that the aggravating circumstance of dwelling had
been duly proven. Although dwelling (morada) is considered as inherent in
crimes which can only be committed in the abode of the victim, such as trespass
to dwelling and robbery in an inhabited house, it has been held as aggravating
in robbery with homicide because the author thereof could have accomplished
the heinous deed of snuffing out the victims life without having to violate his
domicile.[33] Hence, in view of this aggravating circumstance, the penalty
imposable upon appellant shall be reclusion perpetua.[34] In conformity with

DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 141724-27. November 12, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ARNULFO ORANDE y
CHAVEZ, appellant.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 18, in Criminal Case Nos. 97-159184, 97-159185, 97-159186 and 97-
159187, convicting appellant for two counts of simple rape, one count of
statutory rape and one count of frustrated rape, and sentencing him to suffer
three counts of reclusion perpetua for the simple and statutory rapes, and an
indeterminate penalty of 8 years to 14 years and 8 months of imprisonment for
the frustrated rape.
Complainant Jessica Castro charged appellant with raping her four times
between January 1994 and November 1996. The informations filed against
appellant by the City Prosecutor read:
In Criminal Case No. 97-159184 -
That on or about January 14, 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of
force and intimidation, that is, by threatening to kill said Jessica Castro, had
carnal knowledge of the latter against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
In Criminal Case No. 97-159185-
That on or about April 15, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of
force and intimidation, that is, by threatening JESSICA CASTRO Y DE LA
CRUZ of death should she resist or report the matter to anybody, had carnal
knowledge of said Jessica C. Castro, a minor, under 12 years of age, against her
will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
In Criminal Case No. 97-159186 -
That on or about March 12, 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of
force and intimidation, that is, by threatening Jessica Castro y de la Cruz of
death should she resist or report the matter to anybody, had carnal knowledge of
said Jessica C. Castro, a minor, under 12 years of age, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
In Criminal Case No. 97-159187-
That on or about November 17, 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means
of force and intimidation, that is, by threatening to kill said Jessica Castro, had
carnal knowledge of the latter against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Arraigned on September 5, 1997, appellant pleaded not guilty.[3] Thereafter,
trial on the merits ensued. However, the trial was subsequently postponed for
eight months as Jessica was suffering from psychological and emotional trauma
from her horrifying ordeal.[4] The lower court ordered the suspension of the trial
to enable her to undergo psychological therapy at the Child Protection Unit of
the Philippine General Hospital. Trial resumed in November 1998 with the
prosecution presenting Jessica as its first witness.
Incidentally, prior to the filing of the aforementioned cases, Jessica also
filed a criminal case against her mother, Girlie de la Cruz Castro, and the
appellant for child abuse.
The evidence of the prosecution showed that appellant was the common
law husband of Jessicas mother Girlie. Appellant, a pedicab driver, started
living with Girlie and her three children sometime in 1993 in a two-storey
house in Paco, Manila owned by Girlies mother. They occupied a room on the
ground floor which served as their bedroom, kitchen and living room. The
adjacent room was occupied by Girlies brother and his family while the room
on the second floor was occupied by Girlies sister and her family.
Girlie gave birth to two more children by appellant. To earn a living, Girlie
sold fish at the Paco Market, buying her stock from the Navotas fish market late
at night and sometimes in the early hours of the morning.
The first incident of rape, subject of Criminal Case No. 97-159185,
happened sometime in April 1994 when Girlie was at the fish market. Appellant
was left in the house with Jessica, her siblings and appellants two children with
Girlie. Jessica was then watching television while her brothers and sisters were
sleeping beside her. Appellant grabbed Jessicas right hand and lasciviously
jabbed her palm with his finger. He ordered her to undress which she obeyed
out of fear as appellant was armed with a knife. Appellant then removed his
pants, placed himself on top of complainant and succeeded in partially
penetrating her. Jessica felt pain in her vagina and saw it smeared with blood
and semen. She tried to leave the room but appellant locked the door and
threatened to kill her if she told her mother what happened. Jessica was then
only nine years and four months old, having been born on December 19, 1983.
[5]
The second rape, subject of Criminal Case No. 97-159186, occurred
on March 14, 1995 at around 11:00 a.m. when Jessica was 11 years and 3
months old. Girlie was in the market while Jessica and her siblings were left in
the house watching television. Soon after, appellant arrived and sent the
children, except Jessica, to play outside. Left alone with Jessica, appellant
removed his clothes, pulled out a balisong and ordered Jessica to undress. He
then held her by the shoulder and made her lie down. Then he mounted her.
Appellant reached his orgasm shortly after penetrating her slightly. He stood up
with semen still dripping from his penis. Apparently still not satisfied, he knelt
down, kissed and fingered Jessicas vagina, then mashed her breasts. He only
stopped what he was doing when someone knocked at the door. Appellant and
Jessica hurriedly put on their clothes and, as appellant opened the door, Jessica
went to the bathroom to wash herself.
 The third rape, subject of Criminal Case No. 97-159184, occurred the police station to file a complaint and to the Philippine General Hospital
on January 14, 1996, when Jessica was 12 years and 6 months old. She arrived (PGH), Child Protection Unit, to be examined. Dr. Bernadette J. Madrid,
from school at around 11:00 a.m.While she was changing her clothes, appellant Director of the Child Protection Unit, examined Jessica and the findings
ordered Jessicas brother and sister to visit their mother at the Paco Market and revealed the following:
sent his children to play outside the house. When appellant and Jessica were
Genital Examination:
alone, he removed his pants, got his knife and ordered her to undress. Since she
Hymen: Estrogenized,
was afraid, Jessica was forced to remove her clothes. Appellant then told her
Attenuated from 1 oclock position to 4 o clock position
they would do what they did before, pulled her towards him and made her lie
and from 6 o clock to 12 o clock position
down on the floor. While holding the knife, he kissed and fingered her vagina,
Notch at 5 oclock
then mashed her breasts. Thereafter, he placed himself on top of her, partially
Healed hymenal tear at the 6 o clock position
penetrated her until he ejaculated. When Jessicas brother and sister arrived,
Anus: Normal rectal tone, no pigmentation, no scars, normal rugae[6]
appellant hurriedly put on his clothes. Jessica did the same. She then went to the
bathroom to wash herself and change her bloodstained underwear. For his defense, appellant advanced denial and alibi. He denied ever raping
Jessica and testified that, during the alleged second rape incident, he was
The last rape, subject of Criminal Case No. 97-159187, occurred sometime
driving his pedicab. His live-in partner Girlie testified that, during the purported
in November 1996, at around 11:00 p.m. Girlie was again in the public market
first and second incidents of rape, appellant was with her to buy fish
while Jessica was at home with her siblings who were all asleep. Appellant told
in Navotas and sell them in Paco market. Appellant argued that since Jessica
Jessica that they would again do what they did before but she refused, saying
disapproved of his relationship with her mother, she had the motive to falsely
that she might get pregnant. Appellant brandished hisbalisong and threatened to
accuse him of raping her. Further, he pointed out the improbability of the
kill her. He then covered himself and Jessica with a blanket, removed his pants
alleged first and fourth incidents of rape inasmuch as the make-up of the room
and her shorts, and placed himself on top of her. His penis slightly penetrated
made it impossible for Jessicas siblings not to wake up during the commission
her vagina. He mashed her breasts, inserted his finger into her vagina and
of the crime. Appellant further contended that Jessicas failure to cry out for
kissed it. Jessica pushed him away and told him she wanted to sleep. Then she
help, knowing that her mothers relatives were in the same house, made her
put on her shorts. Appellant also put on his pants and told Jessica not to tell her
story of rape unbelievable.
mother what he did to her. He assured her that she would not get pregnant
because she was not yet menstruating. The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Jessica and convicted the
appellant:
Sometime in March 1997, a teacher of Jessica, Mrs. Adoracion Mojica,
noticed the unusual treatment of Jessica by appellant. When confronted by
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 97-159184, Accused Arnulfo Orande y
Mrs. Mojica, Jessica admitted that appellant had raped her several times.
Chavez is convicted of simple rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Mrs. Mojica called up Jessicas aunt, Mrs. Antonina de la Cruz, and narrated to
her what Jessica had confessed. Mrs. De la Cruz then accompanied Jessica to
Code and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusionperpetua with all the
accessory penalties provided by law.
In Criminal Case No. 97-159185, the accused is also convicted of simple rape
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties provided by law.
In Criminal Case No. 97-159186, the accused is likewise convicted of statutory
rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties provided by law.
In Criminal Case No. 97-159187, the accused is convicted of frustrated rape
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of 8 years of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years and 8
months of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay the costs.
On the civil liability of the accused in the four cases, he is ordered to pay the
victim, Jessica Castro, moral, nominal and exemplary damages in the respective
sums of P400,000.00, P200,000.00 and P100,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[7]
In this appeal, appellant assigns the following errors:
I. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF ONE COUNT OF STATUTORY RAPE, ONE
COUNT OF FRUSTRATED RAPE AND TWO COUNTS OF
SIMPLE RAPE.
II. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF FRUSTRATED RAPE DESPITE
THE FACT THAT UNDER PREVAILING JURISPRUDENCE
THERE IS NO SUCH CRIME.[8]
The Office of the Solicitor General argues that appellants convictions
should be upheld as the prosecution was able to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
The appeal is partly meritorious. This Court finds that the prosecution was
able to prove beyond reasonable doubt appellants guilt for two counts of
statutory rape and two counts of simple rape, there being no such crime as
frustrated rape in this jurisdiction.
After a thorough review of the records, we find no reason to deviate from
the well-established rule that the credibility of witnesses is a matter best
assessed by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe them
firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude. [9] In the present case,
the trial court found Jessicas testimony convincing, logical and credible.
Moreover, the court a quo:
xxx discerned from her demeanor the intense mental torture, embarrassment,
emotional pain and bitterness she suffered whenever she was asked to recall and
narrate the humiliating sexual ordeals she had gone through, and her ... desire
for justice and the punishment of her defiler. She was continually in tears while
testifying and the proceeding was interrupted several times to calm her down.[10]
No young woman would allow an examination of her private part and
subject herself to the humiliation and rigor of a public trial if the accusations
were not true, or if her motive were other than a fervent desire to seek justice.[11]
We do not subscribe to appellants theory that the filing of the rape charges
was motivated by Jessicas dislike for him. To charge appellant with rape for the
sole purpose of exacting revenge, as appellant implies in his brief, takes a
certain kind of psychiatric depravity which this Court does not see in Jessica.
The fact that Jessica had to undergo psychological treatment [12] after her first
testimony in February 1998 belies appellants defense. The need for such
counseling came about after the defilement she suffered in the hands of
appellant. In fact, it was the incidents of rape that caused her psychological and
emotional imbalance which required therapy at the Child Protection Unit of the
Philippine General Hospital.
The alleged inconsistencies and improbabilities in Jessicas testimony did
not discredit her nor reveal any fabrication. Inconsistencies regarding minor
details were attributable to the fact that she was recalling details of incidents
that happened three years before, not to mention the fact that these details
pertained to something she had very little knowledge of, being then only nine
years and three months old when the first rape was committed. We have
consistently ruled that errorless recollection of a harrowing experience cannot
be expected of a witness (a very young one at that) specially when she is
recounting details of an occurrence so humiliating, so painful and, in this case,
so alien as rape.[13]
Appellant makes much of the fact that two incidents of rape happened
inside the room where the other children were sleeping. This Court has
repeatedly held that rape can be committed in the same room where other
members of the family are also sleeping, in a house where there are other
occupants or even in places which to many might appear unlikely and high-risk
venues for its commission.[14]
Also, the failure of Jessica to cry out for help during the incidents in
question, inspite of the physical proximity of her relatives, or to report to them
what happened, did not at all make her testimony improbable inasmuch as it is
not uncommon for a young girl of tender age to be easily intimidated into
silence and conceal for sometime the violation of her honor, even by the mildest
threat to her life.[15] Besides, Girlie, Jessicas mother, had a rift with her siblings
who lived in the same house and forbade Jessica to socialize with them. It was
likewise highly probable that the strained relations between Jessicas mother,
uncle and aunt prevented Jessica from confiding in them.
In a number of cases, this Court has likewise ruled that delay, even of three
years, in reporting the crime does not necessarily detract from the witness
credibility as long as it is satisfactorily explained.[16] Jessica was threatened by
appellant that he would kill her mother and relatives if she reported the rape. A
young girl like Jessica can easily be mesmerized by fear of bodily harm and,
unlike a mature woman, cannot be expected to have the courage or confidence
to immediately report a sexual assault on her, specially when a death threat
hangs over her head.[17]
In view of the credible testimony of Jessica, appellants defenses of denial
and alibi deserve no consideration. These weak defenses cannot stand against
the positive identification and categorical testimony of a rape victim.[18]
The court a quo convicted appellant of one count of frustrated rape in
Criminal Case No. 97-151987, the dispositive portion of which read:
xxx xxx xxx.
In Criminal Case No. 97-159187, the accused is convicted of frustrated rape
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of 8 years of prision mayor as minimum, and to pay the
costs.
xxx xxx xxx.
SO ORDERED.[19]
However, we agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the
court a quo was referring to Criminal Case No. 97-159185, and not Criminal
Case No. 97-159187, in convicting appellant of frustrated rape:
The trial court convicted appellant of simple rape in Criminal Case No. 97-
159185. However, the factual basis thereof in the body of the decision reads:
With regard to Criminal Case No. 97-159185, the Court has gathered that
sometime in April, 1994, at around 11:00 p.m., Jessica and her two siblings
together with the accused were in their house, while their mother,
Girlie, was in Navotas buying fish. Jessica was watching TV in a lying position
beside her two sleeping siblings, when the accused held Jessicas right hand and
jabbed her palm with his finger. Then he told her to remove her short pants,
panty and T-shirt, after which the accused removed his pants and with
a balisong in his hand, he began kissing the sensitive parts of her body. Then he
placed himself on top of her and tried to have sexual intercourse with her. He
succeeded in nudging her sex organ with the tip of his penis, but was unable to
accomplish penetration, due to the resistance offered by her by struggling and
kicking him. Nonetheless, the accused had orgasm and Jessicas sex organ was
smeared with his semen. (emphasis supplied, p. 2, Decision)
Such was the only rape incident where the trial court concluded there was no
penetration.
On the other hand, the factual basis for the conviction in Criminal Case No. 97-
159187 in the body of the trial courts decision reads:
Anent Criminal Case No. 97-159187, the records further show that in
November, 1996, at around 11:00 p.m., Jessica was watching TV while the
other siblings were asleep and her mother was away, when accused again made
sexual advances to her. She resisted and told accused she might become
pregnant, but the accused persisted and threatened to kill her at that very
moment if she would not submit to his lust. As in the previous occasions, he
again succeeded in having carnal knowledge of the helpless and scared victim.
After her defilement, the victim continually cried and the accused tried to calm
her down by assuring her that she would not be impregnated, because she has
not yet began to have menstruation (p. 3, Decision)
Consequently the conviction for frustrated rape should pertain to the incident in
April 1994 described in Criminal Case No. 97-159185 and not Criminal Case
No. 97-159187 since this case refers to the November 1996 rape incident where
the findings of the trial court was that there was carnal knowledge.[20]
Moreover, the oversight of the court a quo in interchanging Criminal Case Nos.
97-159185 and 97-159187 is further evidenced by the following paragraph
found in page four of the trial court decision:
In Criminal Case 97-159185 and 97-159184, the acts of the accused in having
carnal knowledge of the victim by intimidation on two separate occasions in
[the] early or middle part [of] 1996, and in November of the same year,
constitute two separate crimes of qualified rape under R.A. 7659 and the
penalty prescribed therefore is death by lethal injection.[21] (Emphasis Ours)
The rape incidents which occurred in 1996 were designated as Criminal
Case Nos. 97-159184 and 97-159187, as borne out by the informations filed by
the City Prosecutor.[22] Thus, the conviction for frustrated rape should pertain to
Criminal Case No. 97-159185 and not Criminal Case No. 97-159187.
Regarding Criminal Case No. 97-159185 (the April 1994 rape incident),
the Court sustains appellants contention that there is no such crime as frustrated
rape, as we have ruled in a long line of cases. [23] Recently, in People vs.
Quinanola,[24] we again reiterated the rule:
Let it be said once again that, as the Revised Penal Code presently so stands,
there is no such crime as frustrated rape. In People vs. Orita, the Court has
explicitly pronounced:
Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal
knowledge of his victim, he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment
also all the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished. Nothing
more is left to be done by the offender, because he has performed the last act
necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the felony is consummated. In a long line
of cases (People vs. Oscar, 48 Phil. 527; People vs. Hernandez, 49 Phil. 980;
People vs. Royeras, G.R. No. L-31886, April 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 666; People
vs. Amores, G.R. No. L-32996, August 21, 1974, 58 SCRA 505), Wehave set
the uniform rule that for the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not
essential. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient.
Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or
laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is
attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ (People vs. Tayaba, 62
Phil. 559; People vs. Rabadan, et al., 53 Phil. 694; United States vs. Garcia, 9
Phil. 434) because not all acts of execution was performed. The offender merely
commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt acts. Taking into
account the nature, elements and manner of execution of the crime of rape and
jurisprudence on the matter, it is hardly conceivable how the frustrated stage in
rape can ever be committed.
Of course, We are aware of our earlier pronouncement in the case of People
vs. Eriia, 50 Phil. 998 [1927] where We found the offender guilty of frustrated
rape there being no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of
the offended party. However, it appears that this is a stray decision inasmuch as
it has not been reiterated in Our subsequent decisions. Likewise, We are aware
of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
2632 (dated September 12, 1960) and Republic Act No. 4111 (dated March 29,
1965) which provides, in its penultimate paragraph, for the penalty of death
when the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason
or on the occasion thereof. We are of the opinion that this particular provision
on frustrated rape is a dead provision. The Eriia case, supra, might have
prompted the law-making body to include the crime of frustrated rape in the
amendments introduced by said laws.
The Court is not unaware that Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code, has retained the provision penalizing with
reclusion perpetua to death an accused who commits homicide by reason or on
the occasion of an attempted or frustrated rape. Until Congress sees it fit to
define the term frustrated rape and thereby penalize it, the Court will see its
continued usage in the statute book as being merely a persistent lapse in
language. (emphasis ours)
Thus, it was error for the trial court to convict appellant of frustrated rape.
Besides, after a careful review of the records, we find that the rape was in fact
consummated. Jessica initially testified that, although appellant did not succeed
in inserting his penis in her vagina, she felt his sex organ touch hers and she
saw and felt semen come out of his penis and smear her vagina. [25] In response
to the clarificatory questions asked by the prosecutor, Jessica testified that the
appellant was able to slightly penetrate her because she felt pain and her vagina
bled.[26] It has been held that, to be convicted of rape, there must be convincing
and sufficient proof that the penis indeed touched the labia or slid into the
female organ, and not merely stroked the external surface thereof.
[27]
Nevertheless, we have also ruled in cases where penetration is not
established that the rape is deemed consummated if the victim felt pain, or the
medico-legal examination finds discoloration in the inner lips of the vagina, or
the labia minora is already gaping with redness, or the hymenal tags are no
longer visible.[28] In the present case, the victim testified that she felt pain and
her vagina bled, indisputable indications of slight penetration or, at the very
least, that the penis indeed touched the labia and not merely stroked the external
surface thereof. Thus, the appellant should be found guilty of (consummated)
rape and not merely frustrated or attempted rape.
 Pursuant to Section 11 of RA 7659 or the Heinous Crimes Law, the penalty 3. In Criminal Case No. 97-159186, appellant is convicted of statutory
of death is imposed if rape is committed when the victim is under 18 years of rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced to
age and the offender is the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
However, the trial court was correct in not imposing the death penalty in
4. In Criminal Case No. 97-159187, appellant is convicted of simple
Criminal Case Nos. 97-159184 and 97-159187 because the qualifying
rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced to
circumstances of age and relationship of the victim to the appellant were not
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
alleged in the information.[29] Thus, appellant can only be convicted of simple
rape punishable byreclusion perpetua under Article 335 of the Revised Penal For each count of rape, appellant is ordered to pay complainant Jessica
Code. However, in Criminal Case Nos. 97-159185 and 97-159186, the Castro P50,000 as moral damages, P50,000 as civil indemnity and P25,000 as
appellant can be convicted of statutory rape also punishable exemplary damages, or a total of P500,000. Costs against appellant.
by reclusion perpetua under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code inasmuch as
SO ORDERED.
the age of Jessica was alleged in the information [30] and duly proven during the
trial by the presentation of her birth certificate.[31] Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio-
Morales, JJ., concur.
We award moral damages of P50,000 for each count of rape as moral
damages are automatically awarded to rape victims without need of pleading or
proof.[32] We also award civil indemnity ex delicto of P50,000 for each count of
rape in the light of the ruling that civil indemnity, which is distinct from moral
damages, is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape. [33]We likewise
award exemplary damages of P25,000 for each count of rape consistent with the
prevailing jurisprudence on the matter.[34] HIRD DIVISION
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 18, in Criminal Case Nos. 97-159 184 to 87 is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS: [G.R. No. 126148. May 5, 1999]
1. In Criminal Case No. 97-159 184, appellant is convicted of simple
rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AGAPITO
QUIANOLA y ESCUADRO and EDUARDO ESCUADRO y
2. In Criminal Case No. 97-159 185, appellant is convicted of statutory
FLORO, accused-appellants.
rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
 DECISION Already in force and effect at the time of the averred commission of the
crime are the provisions of Republic Act No. 7659, amending the Revised Penal
VITUG, J.:
Code, which define and penalize rape, as follows:
In People vs. Orita,[1] this Court has declared that the crime of frustrated
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having
rape is non-existent. The pronouncement, notwithstanding, on 01 March 1996,
carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
more than six years after the promulgation of the decision in Orita, the
Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Cebu City, Branch 14, has convicted accused
"1. By using force or intimidation;
Agapito Quianola y Escuadro and Eduardo Escuadro y Floro, herein appellants,
of the crime of frustrated rape, principally on the strength of People vs.
"2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
Eriia[2] which this Court, in the Orita decision, has considered to be a stray
decision. The 1st March 1996 decision of the RTC of Cebu City imposing upon
"3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
each of the accused the penalty of reclusion perpetua of Forty (40) Years, has
been brought up by them to this Court. The appeal opens up the whole case for
"The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
review.
The information, dated 06 April 1994, charging the two accused with the "Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or
crime of rape reads: by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

That on or about the 5th day of March, 1994, at about 11:30 oclock in the
evening, more or less, at Barangay Tangil, Municipality of Dumanjug, Province
of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, with lewd design and by means of force and intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and succeed in having carnal
knowledge of the offended party Catalina Carciller, fifteen (15) years of age,
against her will and consent.
"CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane,
the penalty shall be death.
"When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by
reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to
death.
"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the
penalty shall be death.
"The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with
any of the following attendant circumstances:
"1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common-law-spouse of the parent of the
victim.
"2. when the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.
"3. when the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the
children or other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity.
"4. when the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.
"5. when the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease.
"6. when committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or
the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency.
"7. when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered
permanent physical mutilation.
Duly assisted by counsel, the two accused pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. During the trial that ensued, the prosecution and the defense presented
their respective versions of the case.
The story of prosecution was the first to be told.
Catalina Carciller, her cousin 15-year-old Rufo Ginto and another male
companion named Richard Diaz, went to attend a dance at around ten oclock in
the evening of 05 March 1994 in Sitio Bangag, Tangil, Dumanjug,
Cebu. Catalina, born on 09 November 1978,[4] was just then fifteen (15) years
and four (4) months old. She was a student at the Bito-on National Vocational
School at Dumanjug, Cebu.About an hour later, they left the party and were
soon on their way home. The three unsuspecting youngsters stopped
momentarily to rest at a waiting shed beside the Tangil Elementary
School. Accused Agapito Quianola, a.k.a. Petoy, and accused Eduardo
Escuadro, a.k.a. Botiquil, who were both armed with guns, suddenly turned
up. Quianola, beaming his flashlight at the trio while Escuadro stood by,
focused his attention on Catalina. Quianola announced that he and Escuadro
were members of the New Peoples Army ("NPA"). Quianola instructed
Escuadro to take care of the male companions of Catalina while he (Quianola)
held the latter at gunpoint.
Escuadro brought Diaz and Ginto outside the waiting shed area. He ordered
the duo to lie face down on the ground and then urinated at them. While
Escuadro was fixing the zipper of his pants, Diaz and Ginto were able to escape
and ran away. Meanwhile, Quianola, with his gun pointed at Catalina, forcibly
brought her towards the nearby school. Catalina heard a gunfire but Quianola
assured her that it was only an exploding firecracker. When Escuadro again
showed up, Catalina asked about her two friends. Quianola replied that he had
ordered them to go home. Catalina begged that she herself be allowed to
leave. Pretending to agree, they walked the path towards the road behind the
school. Then, unsuspectingly, Quianola forced Catalina to sit on the
ground. She resisted but Quianola, pointing his gun at her, warned her that if
she would not accede to what he wanted, he would kill her. Catalina started to
cry. Quianola told Escuadro to remove her denim pants. Catalina struggled to
free herself from Escuadro's hold but to no avail. Escuadro ultimately
succeeded in undressing her. Quianola unzipped his pants and laid on top of her
while Escuadro held her legs. Quianola started to pump, to push and pull [5] even
as Catalina still tried desperately to free herself from him. She felt his organ "on
the lips of (her) genitalia.[6] When Quianola had satisfied his lust, Escuadro took
his turn by placing himself on top of Catalina.Catalina could feel the sex organ
of Escuadro on the lips of (her) vulva[7] while he made a push and pull
movement. Quianola, who stood by, kept on smoking a cigarette.
Escuadro and Quianola scampered immediately after Catalina's
ordeal. Failing to find her pair of pants and panty, Catalina was left wearing
only her T-shirt and brassieres. Catalina just then sat down, not knowing what
to do, until she finally started to run home fearing that she might be
followed. Upon reaching home, Catalina went upstairs and, afraid that the
culprits would still come after her, hid herself behind the door. Baffled by
Catalina's strange behavior, her mother and her elder sister took turns in
interrogating her. Catalina finally said that she was raped but she would not
reveal the names of the persons who had committed the dastardly act because of
their threat.
Guillermo Zozobrado learned from his wife, Catalinas sister, that Catalina
had been raped. He promptly repaired to the municipal hall of Dumanjug to
report the crime. Policemen were immediately dispatched to the Carcillers
residence. Still in a state of shock, Catalina initially kept mum about it; later,
when the police officers returned at daytime, she was able to respond to
questions and to disclose that Petoy, referring to Agapito Quianola, and
Botiquil, the other accused Eduardo Escuadro, were the persons who ravished
her. The officers later invited her to the police station to identify a suspect
whom she positively identified to be Botiquil or Eduardo Escuadro.
Living Case Report No. 94-MI-7,[8] prepared by Dr. Tomas P. Refe,
medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI") of Region
7, Central Visayas, who conducted the physical examination of Catalina on 07
March 1994, showed that there was no evidence of extragenital physical injury
noted on the body of the Subject. [9] The genital examination yielded the
following findings on the victim:
Pubic hairs, fully grown, moderately dense. Labiae mejora and minora, both
coaptated. Fourchette, tense. Vestibular mucosa, pinkish. Hymen, moderately
thick, wide, intact. Hymenal orifice, annular, admits a tube 1.8 cms. in diameter
with moderate resistance. Vaginal walls, tight and rogusities, prominent.
[10]
(Italics supplied.)
The report concluded that the hymenal orifice, about 1.8 cms. in diameter,
was so small as to preclude complete penetration of an average-size adult penis
in erection without producing laceration.[11]
Against the evidence submitted by the prosecution, the accused, in their
defense, interposed alibi, ill motive on the part of an "uncle" of the
complainant, and insufficient identification.
Accused Agapito Quianola, a member of the Philippine National Police
stationed at Naga, Cebu, testified that it was his day-off on 05 March 1994. At
about 8:30 a.m., he and his wife, Leticia, who had just arrived in Naga from
Cebu City, proceeded to the house of his parents in Panla-an, Dumanjug, to
attend to the construction of their unfinished house. Quianola helped Vidal
Laojan and Nicasio Arnaiz in cementing the kitchen floor of their house. The
work was finished at around 11:00 oclock in the evening. After Vidal and
Nicasio had gone home, Quianola went to bed with his wife around midnight
until the following morning of 06 March 1994. He denied having been in the
company of his co-accused, Escuadro a.k.a. Botiquil, at any time during the
whole day and night of 05 March 1994. According to him, Guillermo
Zozobrado, Catalinas brother-in-law, concocted the rape charge to get even with
him because of an incident in August 1993 at a fiesta dance in upper Tangil,
Panla-an, when George Camaso, the husband of his sister Jinga, got into trouble
with Samuel Escuadro.
Quianola tried to pacify George Camaso who was then drunk but Camaso
suddenly hit him. He parried the blow and slapped Camaso on the
face. Zozobrado joined the fray and tried to hit Quianola but because
Zozobrado was drunk, he stumbled when Quianola had pushed him. [12] He
admitted that he had no misunderstanding of any kind with the complainant and
her parents themselves.
Leticia Quianola, the wife of accused Agapito Quianola, testified to attest
to her husband's good moral character and to corroborate his testimony. Leticia
said that after the workers had left their house at around midnight, she and
appellant talked for a while and then made love. Vidal Laojan, the carpenter,
was presented to state that Quianola was at home helping the carpenters until
past 11:00 oclock on the night of the incident. Nicasio Arnaiz, a farmer and
stone cutter, added that work in the Quianola house had started late in the
morning of 05 March 1994 since they still waited for Quianola and his wife
Pritsy to arrive. Work in the house, he said, had stopped at about past 11:00
oclock that night.
Accused Eduardo Escuadro, a.k.a. Botiquil, declared that at about seven
oclock in the evening of 05 March 1994, he and Pablito Cuizon, Jr., went
fishing in Tangil, Dumanjug, Cebu, until about ten oclock that evening. After
partaking of supper at around 11:30 p.m., they had a drinking spree and went to
bed at 12:00 midnight, waking up at 6:30 a.m. the following day. He denied
having been in the company of Quianola and insisted that the rape charge had
been the result of a mere mistaken identity. Pablito Cuizon, Jr., corroborated
Escuadros story about their being together up until they parted company after a
drinking spree.
The defense also presented the two police officers, PO2 William Beltran
and SPO2 Liberato Mascarinas, Jr., who took part in the investigation of the
crime, and Margarito Villaluna, a suspect at the early stages of the police
investigation who was in the frequent company of the accused. According to
PO2 Beltran, barangay tanods Gilly and George Zozobrado reported the rape
incident to him at midnight of 05 March 1994. He entered the report in the
temporary blotter because the suspect was unknown then. [13] Accompanied by
the two tanods, he went to the residence of the victim and when he asked
Catalina if she was able to recognize the malefactors, she kept silent and
continued crying. SPO2 Liberato Mascarinas, Jr., asserted that, in the early
morning of 06 March 1994, Gilly and George Zozobrado went to the police
station and named Pitoy Quianola, Margarito Villaluna and Batiquil or
Escuadro as being the suspects in the rape incident. While on their way to the
latter's respective residences, the team met Catalina Carciller and party who
were themselves about to repair to the police headquarters. Mascarinas asked
Catalina about the identities of the rapists. She named "Pitoy Quianola but said
she did not know the names of the other persons although she could recognize
them by face. Botiquil was later brought to the police station. Pitoy Quianola by
that time had already gone to Naga. Margarito Villaluna declared that he had
been in Panla-an, Negros Oriental, from 05 March 1994 until 09 March 1994,
harvesting corn. His sister, Mercy Villaluna, testified that, in the morning of 06
March 1994, policemen in the company of barangay tanods, including Gilly
Zozobrado and his son Marcelo, came to their house looking for her brother
Margarito. Shortly after the group had left, another policeman, in the company
of one Erwin Quirante also came looking for her brother. The arrival of the
policemen prompted her to verify from the Coast Guard whether her brother
had indeed left for Negros Oriental. She was told that her brother was in the
boat that departed for Negros in early dawn of 02 March 1994. Still unsatisfied
with the result of her queries, Mercy went to Guinholngan where she met
Margarito.
Following the trial and submission of the case for decision, the court a quo,
[14]
on 01 March 1996, found the two accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of "frustrated rape" and sentenced them accordingly; thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby finds guilty beyond
reasonable doubt the two accused Agapito `Petoy Quianola and Eduardo
Escuadro, alias `Batiquil, as principals by direct participation and indispensable
cooperation of the frustrated rape of the complaining witness Catalina 'Cathy'
Carciller, and considering the attendance in the commission of the crime of the
six (6) aggravating circumstances aforementioned, not offset by any mitigating
circumstance, hereby sentences these two accused individually to Reclusion
Perpetua of Forty (40) Years, plus all the accessory penalties prescribed by law,
and to pay the offended party civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 each.
"The Court also hereby recommends that under no circumstance should the two
accused be granted parole or conditional or absolute pardon, in view of the
extreme moral turpitude and perversity which they exhibited in the commission
of the crime not until they shall have served at least thirty (30) years of the full
range of forty (40) years of reclusion perpetua meted out against them in this
case. They should be interdicted for that length of time from the usual and
normal liasons (sic) and dealings with their fellowmen and their community so
as to protect the latter from their pernicious and insidious examples. This is the
most generous and charitable recommendation that the Court can make for
these two malefactors, short of imposing upon them the supreme penalty of
death, which the Court in other times and conditions might have been
compelled, as a matter of inexorable duty, to mete out against them, in
obedience to the implacable and peremptory demands and dictates of retributive
justice.
"Costs shall also be taxed against the two accused.
"SO ORDERED.[15]
The trial court ruled that the accused were liable for the crime of frustrated
rape with an eye to extending to the two accused the benefit of the principle that
in case of doubt criminal justice naturally leans in favor of the milder form of
penalty[16] but that, because of the existence of at least six (6) aggravating
circumstances,[17] not offset by any mitigating circumstance, [18] the accused
should each be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua. It explained:
Now, the crime of rape had it been consummated and had it been committed
with the attendance of the above-mentioned aggravating circumstances, with
absolutely no offsetting mitigating circumstances, ought to be punished with the
mandatory penalty of death under the pertinent provisions of Section 11 and 23
of Republic Act No. 7659, which amended Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, and further amplified the aggravating circumstances enumerated in
Article 14 of the same code. But because the crime committed here is 'merely'
frustrated rape for the reasons heretofore discussed, attended by the
aforementioned six aggravating circumstances, not offset by even one
mitigating circumstance, the proper penalty to be imposed upon the two
principals, the two accused herein, both co-conspirators, by direct participation
and indispensable cooperation, of the frustrated rape, should be one degree
lower than the indivisible afflictive penalty of death, which is also the
indivisible afflictive penalty of reclusion perpetua which, under Section 21 of
the amendatory statute, shall range from twenty years and one day to forty
years.[19]
In their appeal to this court, the two convicted accused interposed the
following assignment of errors:
"I. THE COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE INCONSISTENCIES OF
THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES WHICH IF THOROUGHLY
CONSIDERED COULD HAVE ALTERED THE DECISION IN FAVOR OF
THE ACCUSED.
"II. THE COURT ERRED IN BELIEVING THE TESTIMONY OF
COMPLAINING WITNESS CARCILLER EVEN IF THE SAME WERE
CLOUDED WITH GRAVE INCONSISTENCIES.
"III. THE COURT ERRED BY DISREGARDING THE TESTIMONIES OF
ACCUSED AND BY DISMISSING IT AS WEAK ALIBIS.
"IV. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO CONSIDER THE REBUTTAL
EVIDENCE OF DEFENSE WITNESSES EVEN IF THE SAME WERE NOT
CONTROVERTED.
"V. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE WEIGHT TO THE
TESTIMONIES OF THE POLICEMEN WHICH WERE
UNCONTROVERTED AND WITH PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN
THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES.
"VI. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF
FRUSTRATED RAPE AND OF SENTENCING THEM TO 40 YEARS OF
RECLUSION PERPETUA."[20]
In reviewing rape cases, this Court must again say that it has been
continually guided by the principles (a) that an accusation of rape can be made
with facility; it is difficult to prove, but more difficult for the person accused,
though innocent, to disprove; (b) that in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime
which usually involves only two persons, the testimony of the complainant
must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) that the evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense.[21] Expectedly, courts
would scrupulously examine the testimony of the complainant with the thought
always in mind that the conviction of the accused would have to depend heavily
on the credibility of the offended woman. It is not much different in this
instance for, at bottom, appellants assail the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses, particularly that of the complainant, in seeking a reversal of the
judgment of conviction.
The doctrine, then again, is that the findings of the trial court on credibility
are entitled to highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence
of any clear showing that the trial court has overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied facts or circumstances of weight and substance that could have
consequential effects. The stringency with which appellate tribunals have
observed this rule is predicated on the undisputed vantage of the trial court in
the evaluation and appreciation of testimonial evidence.[22]
In assailing Catalinas credibility, as against the assessment made by the
trial court which has described the victim's testimony to be impressed with
candor, spontaneity and naturalness, appellants theorize that the sexual
intercourse, if indeed true, could have only been committed against Catalina in
a sitting position, contrary to her declaration of having been made to lie on the
ground, because her T-shirt, marked Exhibit E, is not tainted with mud at all
especially the back if she were made to lie down.[23] The Court finds this so-
called incongruity committed by the complainant to be a feeble attempt to
discredit her testimony. The Court is convinced of the sexual assault made
against her. Here follows the testimony of Catalina on this score.
Q You said that you were forced by Agapito Quianola to sit down, where
were you forced to sit down, in what particular place or area?
"A Just behind the back of the school.
"Q You were forced to sit down on the ground?
"A Yes.
"Q In effect did you sit down as ordered by him?
"A I resisted.
"COURT:
"Q How did you resist?
"A I said I will not sit down. "COURT:
"TRIAL PROS. NAZARENO: "Q How about you, what what (sic) were you doing at that time?
"Q What did Agapito Quianola do, if any, when you resisted? "A I cried and tried to free myself.
"A He pointed his gun to me. "TRIAL PROS. NAZARENO:
"Q When he pointed a gun at you, referring to Agapito Quianola, what did he "Q Now, when Eduardo Escuadro removed your pants and panty where was
say? Agapito Quianola and what did Agapito Quianola do?
"A He said that if I will not accede to what he wanted me to do and if I will "A He unzipped his pants.
shout, he will kill me.
"Q After that what happened?
"Q What did you do when you heard those words coming from Agapito
In effect, were your pants and panty removed by Eduardo Escuadro?
Quianola?
"A Yes.
"A I cried.
"Q Now, you said Agapito Quianola opened his fly or unzipped his pants,
"Q When you cried what did Agapito Quianola do, if any?
when Agapito Quianola already unzipped his pants, what did he do?
"A He ordered Eduardo Escuadro to remove my pants and panty.
"A He approached me and lay on top of me.
"COURT:
"Q When Agapito Quianola approached you and laid on top of you, what did
"Q Why what were you wearing at that time? Eduardo Escuadro do?
"A Pants. "A He was holding on to my legs.
"Q What kind of pants? "Q Then what happened after that?
"A Denim. "A Agapito Quianola started to pump, to push and pull.
"TRIAL PROS. NAZARENO: "Q What did you do when Agapito Quianola was already on top of you and
made a push and pull on you?
"Q Now, after Agapito Quianola ordered Eduardo Escuadro to remove your
pants and panty what did Eduardo Escuadro do, if any? "A I struggled to free myself.
"A He did what Agapito Quianola commanded him.
"Q After that what happened when Agapito Quianola was already on top of
you and kept on making a push and pull?
"A Eduardo Escuadro took his turn.
"Q What do you mean by took his turn, please specify what did Escuadro
do? He did what Agapito had just done to you?
"COURT:
"Q What did Agapito Quianola do to you actually?
"A He lay on top of me and did a push and pull movement.
"TRIAL PROS. NAZARENO:
"Q When Agapito Quianola lay on top of you and made a push and pull
movement, do you mean to say that he inserted his penis into your
vagina?
"A I felt something hard on the lips of my genitals.
"Q What is this something hard that you felt that touched the lips of your
vagina or vulva?
"A His organ or penis.
"Q When Agapito Quianola unzipped his pants, did you see his penis?
"A Yes.
"Q You also said that Eduardo Escuadro took his turn and laid on top of you
and made a push and pull on you, specifically what did Eduardo
Escuadro do?
"A The same as Agapito did, he was doing the push and pull movement.
"Q What did you feel when Eduardo Escuadro was already on top of you and
made a push and pull on you?
"A I held my breath.
"Q Did you see the penis of Eduardo Escuadro?
"A No.
"Q Now, did you feel that the penis of Escuadro was inserted into your
vagina?
"A I felt it on the lips of my vulva.[24]
The fact that she must have been lying down when violated has even more been
made clear by the defense on cross-examination. Thus:
Q Did you say any testimony in the direct that you were made to lie on the
ground at the time when you were raped by these two accused?
"A They pointed a gun at me and ordered me to lie down.
"Q Lie on the ground?
"A Yes.[25]
And on why her T-shirt was no longer soiled with mud when presented in
court, Catalina creditably explained that when it was offered in evidence, she
had already dusted and rid it of grass particles. At all events, whether appellants
spent their lust on Catalina in a sitting position or lying down would not be of
any real moment for what remained clear, established rather convincingly by
the prosecution, was that appellants had forced carnal knowledge of the victim.
The reliance being made by appellants on the affidavit of Catalina in order
to discredit her is likewise futile. The Court has consistently ruled that
discrepancies between the statement of an affiant in an affidavit and those made
on the witness stand do not necessarily downgrade testimonial evidence. Ex
parte affidavits are usually incomplete and frequently prepared by an
administering officer and cast in the latters language and understanding of what
the affiant has said. Quite frequently, the affiant would simply sign the affidavit
after it has been read to him or to her.[26]
Not much differently could be said of Catalinas identification of appellants
as being her ravishers. On the witness stand, Catalina explained that while she
gave appellant Escuadros nickname Botiquil to the investigating police officer,
the latter did not mention that name in the affidavit because, according to the
officer, the affidavit was merely a shortcut.[27] In her testimony, she was
categorical that she had known appellants even before the rape incident. She
knew that appellant Quianola was a policeman and a "popular maldito (nasty)
in the locality.[28] Catalina knew that appellant Escuadro, a resident of Punla-an
not far from her own abode, was commonly known as Batiquil (Botiquil). She
could not have been mistaken in the identification of the culprits since
appellants themselves held a flashlight which they used that added to the
illumination shed by a fluorescent lamp and two bulbs on the side of a house
only some meters away.
As regards the allegation of appellants that the testimony of Catalina
contradicted in certain respects that of prosecution witness Rufo Ginto, suffice
it to say that the testimony of Rufo Ginto (who was noted by the trial court not
to be an intelligent witness[29]) was merely corroborative in nature and neither
dealt with the actual commission of the crime nor delved on material points.
Catalinas candid and straightforward narration of the two sexual assaults
perpetrated on her on the night of the incident unmistakably deserves
credence. It is unbelievable that a young barrio lass would concoct a tale of
defloration, publicly admit having been ravished and her honor tainted, allow
the examination of her private parts, and undergo all the trouble and
inconvenience, not to mention the trauma and scandal of a public trial, had she
not in fact been raped and truly moved to protect and preserve her honor, as
well as to obtain justice, for the wicked acts committed against her. [30] There is
no plausible reason why Catalina should testify against appellants, imputing
upon them so grave a crime as rape if it did not happen. This Court has
consistently held that where there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or
improper motive why a prosecution witness should testify falsely against the
accused or implicate him in a serious offense, the testimony deserves faith and
credit.[31] So, also, the Court has repeatedly said that the lone testimony of the
victim in a rape case, if credible, is enough to sustain a conviction.[32]
The positive identification of appellants as being the perpetrators of the
crime effectively effaces their alibi.[33] The rule is that affirmative testimony is
far weightier than a mere denial, especially when it comes from the mouth of a
credible witness.[34] Moreover, alibi might be aptly considered only when an
accused has been shown to be in some other place at the crucial time and that it
would have been physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis or its
immediate vicinity at the time of the commission of the crime.[35]
In the context it is used in the Revised Penal Code, carnal knowledge,
unlike its ordinary connotation of sexual intercourse, does not necessarily
require that the vagina be penetrated or that the hymen be ruptured. [36] The
crime of rape is deemed consummated even when the mans penis merely enters
the labia or lips of the female organ [37] or, as once so said in a case, by the mere
touching of the external genitalia by a penis capable of consummating the
sexual act.[38] In People vs. Escober,[39] in convicting a father of having raped
twice his 11-year-old daughter, the Court has said:
While the evidence may not show full penetration on both occasions of rape,
the slightest penetration is enough to consummate the offense. In fact, there was
vulva penetration in both cases. The fact that the hymen was intact upon
examination does not belie rape for a broken hymen is not an essential element
of rape; nor does the fact that the victim has remained a virgin negate the
crime. What is fundamental is that the entrance, or at least the introduction, of
the male organ into the labia of the pudendum is proved. As in the case at bar, it
can be said that there was penetration, although incomplete, and it was
sufficient to prove carnal knowledge of a child under twelve years of age. A
medical examination is not an indispensable element in a prosecution for
rape. The accused may be convicted on the sole basis of complainants
testimony, if credible, and the findings of the medico-legal officer do not
disprove the commission of rape.
"There are no half measures or even quarter measures nor is their gravity
graduated by the inches of entry. Partial penile penetration is as serious as full
penetration. The rape is deemed consummated in either case. In a manner of
speaking, bombardment of the drawbridge is invasion enough even if the troops
do not succeed in entering the castle.[40] (Italics supplied.)
In another case, People vs. Gabayron,[41] where the accused has been found
guilty of raping his daughter, then less than twelve years old, the Court has
observed:
Accused-appellant draws attention to the fact that based on the medico-legal
findings, there is no showing that his daughters hymen was penetrated, nor was
there any evidence of injuries inflicted. However, jurisprudence is well-settled
to the effect that for rape to be consummated, rupture of the hymen is not
necessary, nor is it necessary that the vagina sustained a laceration especially if
the complainant is a young girl. The medical examination merely stated that the
smallness of the vaginal orifice only precludes COMPLETE penetration. This
does not mean that rape has not been committed. The fact that there was no
deep penetration of the victims vagina and that her hymen was intact does not
negate rape, since this crime is committed even with the slightest penetration of
a womans sex organ. Presence of a laceration in the vagina is not an essential
prerequisite to prove that a victim has been raped. Research in medicine even
points out that negative findings are of no significance, since the hymen may
not be torn despite repeated coitus. In fact, many cases of pregnancy have been
reported in women with unruptured hymen. Entry of the labia or lips of the
female organ merely, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina,
is sufficient to warrant conviction. What must be proven in the crime of rape is
merely the introduction of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum and
not the full penetration of the complainants private part. As we held in Baculi:
'there could still be a finding of rape even if despite the repeated intercourse
over a period of four years the complainant still retained an intact hymen
without signs of injury.' In the case at bench, Summers testimony has
established without a doubt that accused-appellants organ managed to come
into contact with her vagina, enough to cause her pain.[42](Italics supplied.)
In its recent holding in People vs. Echegaray,[43] the Court has declared that a
mere knocking at the doors of the pudenda, so to speak, by the accused's penis
suffices to constitute the crime of rape as full entry into the victims vagina is
not required to sustain a conviction.
The trial court, in convicting appellants only of frustrated rape, ruled that
there was no "conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the
offended party,[44] in that: (a) Catalina had admitted that she did not spread her
legs and (b) the medico-legal officers findings showed she did not sustain any
extragenital injuries and her hymenal orifice was so small that an erect average-
size penis would not have completely penetrated it without causing
laceration. It would seem that the trial court failed to consider Catalinas
testimony in its entirety; she testified:
Q And when he mounted on top of you Escuadro was holding on to your two
feet and all the time that he (Quianola) was making a push and pull on
you, Escuadro was holding on to your two feet?
"A. Yes.
"COURT:
 "Q Your two feet?
"A Yes.
"ATTY. CREER:
"Q Now, in other words, since your two feet were held and Eduardo
Escuadro was waving (sic [moving]) slightly to your left, as you
demonstrated, your two feet became closer to each other, it could not be
spread?
"A I was still struggling at that time to free myself and I do not know
whether my legs were spread out or not.
"Q Did you spread your legs?
"A No.
"Q Since you did not spread your legs and Quianola was on top of you, did
you not bother to pull your legs, kick the one holding it and pushed
Quianola or do any harm to him?
"A No, because I was already frightened considering that there were two of
them and they were armed.[45]
This testimony would indicate that Catalina, considering her struggle to free
herself, understandably failed to notice whether her legs were spread apart or
close together during her ordeal. What she did distinctly recall, however, was
that Escuadro had kept holding both her legs when Quianola took her. Thus -
Q At that time when he unzipped and your hands were free, did you not
attempt to hold his penis forcibly so that he will refrain from raping
you?
"A I was not able to think of that because of my fear, and besides that
Eduardo Escuadro was holding on to both my legs.
"Q Now, if Eduardo Escuadro was holding on both your two legs how was
Quianola able to place himself on top of you?
"A It was because Eduardo Escuadro had already released my hands and
Quianola was the one holding on to it already, afterwards Eduardo
Escuadro transferred to hold both my legs.[46]
Let it be said once again that, as the Revised Penal Code presently so
stands, there is no such crime as frustrated rape. In People vs. Orita,[47] the
Court has explicitly pronounced:
Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal
knowledge of his victim, he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment
also all the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished. Nothing
more is left to be done by the offender, because he has performed the last act
necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the felony is consummated. In a long line
of cases (People vs. Oscar, 48 Phil. 527; People vs. Hernandez, 49 Phil. 980;
People vs. Royeras, G.R. No. L-31886, April 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 666; People
vs. Amores, G.R. No. L-32996, August 21, 1974, 58 SCRA 505), We have set
the uniform rule that for the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not
essential. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is
sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, without rupture of the
hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant
conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the
female organ (People vs. Tayaba, 62 Phil. 559; People vs. Rabadan, et al., 53
Phil. 694; United States vs. Garcia, 9 Phil. 434) because not all acts of
execution was performed. The offender merely commenced the commission of
a felony directly by overt acts. Taking into account the nature, elements and
manner of execution of the crime of rape and jurisprudence on the matter, it is
hardly conceivable how the frustrated stage in rape can ever be committed.
"Of course, We are aware of our earlier pronouncement in the case of People vs.
Eriia, 50 Phil. 998 [1927] where We found the offender guilty of frustrated rape
there being no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the
offended party. However, it appears that this is a 'stray' decision inasmuch as it
has not been reiterated in Our subsequent decisions. Likewise, We are aware of
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 2632
(dated September 12, 1960) and Republic Act No. 4111 (dated March 29, 1965)
which provides, in its penultimate paragraph, for the penalty of death when the
rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the
occasion thereof. We are of the opinion that this particular provision on
frustrated rape is a dead provision. The Eriia case, supra, might have prompted
the law-making body to include the crime of frustrated rape in the amendments
introduced by said laws.[48]
The Court is not unaware that Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code, has retained the provision penalizing
with reclusion perpetua to death an accused who commits homicide by reason
or on the occasion of an attempted or frustrated rape. Until Congress sees it fit
to define the term frustrated rape and thereby penalize it, the Court will see its
continued usage in the statute book as being merely a persistent lapse in
language.
Each appellant is liable for two counts of consummated rape on account of
a clear conspiracy between them shown by their obvious concerted efforts to
perpetrate, one after the other, the crime. Each of them, therefore, is responsible
not only for the rape committed personally by him but also for the rape
committed by the other as well.[49]
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659, when rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two
persons, the crime is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Even while the
information has failed to allege the use of a deadly weapon in the commission
of the rape, appellants can, nonetheless, be held accountable under that
provision since the information has likewise averred that the above-named
accused, referring to the two appellants, have conspiratorially committed the
crime.
Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code,[50] includes among its enumeration of
generic aggravating circumstances the fact that the crime is committed with the
aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity. The fact alone,
then, that a malefactor has sported a firearm does not, by itself, militate to
aggravate the crime. As regards appellant Quianola, the aggravating
circumstance of his being a member of the Philippine National Police would
have exposed him to the penalty of death [51] under the amendatory provisions of
Article 335 by Republic Act No. 7659, had this circumstance been properly
alleged in the information. The description by the trial court of appellants as
being powerfully, built, brawny and mean-looking as against the short, slender,
easily cowed 15-year-old victim would not here warrant a finding that abuse of
superior strength has aggravated the commission of the crime. The law should
be deemed to have already considered this circumstance in qualifying the crime
to its "heinous" character, rendering, in that context, abuse of superior strength
as an inherent element thereof. Neither may nighttime be considered an
aggravating circumstance in the absence of proof of its having been deliberately
sought out by appellants to facilitate the commission of the offense.[52] Craft,
fraud or disguise[53] is a species of aggravating circumstance that denotes
intellectual trickery or cunning resorted to by an accused to aid in the execution
of his criminal design or to lure the victim into a trap and to conceal the identity
of the accused. The fact that one of the appellants has pretended to be a member
of the New Peoples Army does not necessarily imply the use of craft, fraud or
disguise, in the commission of the crime. Finally, the Court does not subscribe
to the view of the trial court that accused-appellants have employed means
which added ignominy to the natural effects of the crime, particularly in
stripp(ing) the victim of her denim pants and panties and then sending her home
in this humiliating and distressing condition.[54] There is nothing on record that
even remotely suggests that accused-appellants so deliberately sought to leave
Catalina with bottoms bare that she might be left alone in shame with only her
T-shirt and brassieres on.
The absence of any aggravating circumstance in the commission of a crime
punishable by two (2) indivisible penalties, such as reclusion perpetua to death,
would justify, even without any mitigating circumstance, the imposition of the
lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The trial court has ordered appellants to each pay the offended party civil
indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00. Prevailing jurisprudence[55] likewise
allows the victim to have an award of moral damages for having evidently
undergone "mental, physical and psychological sufferings. The civil liability of
appellants, being predicated on delict, is solidary.[56]
WHEREFORE, appellants Agapito Quianola y Escuadro and Eduardo
Escuadro y Floro are each found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2)
counts of consummated rape and, accordingly, sentenced to the penalty
of reclusion perpetua in each case. Said appellants are ordered to pay, jointly
and severally, Catalina Carciller the sum of P100,000.00 by way of
indemnity ex delictu for the two counts of consummated rape
plus P60,000.00 moral damages. Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Romero (Chairman), Panganiban, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes,
JJ., concur.