[G.R. No. 188471. April 20, 2010.
] On September 25, 1992, Francisco commenced against Cebu Country Club in the
FRANCISCO ALONSO, substituted by MERCEDES V. ALONSO,
TOMAS V. ALONSO and ASUNCION V. ALONSO, petitioners, vs.
CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC., respondent,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the OFFICE OF
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, public respondent.
By petition for review on certiorari, the petitioners appeal the order dated
December 28, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, in Cebu City, denying
the motion for issuance of writ of execution of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in
behalf of the Government, and the order dated April 24, 2009, denying their motion for
reconsideration filed against the first order.
Antecedents
The antecedent facts are those established in Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, 1 which follow.
Petitioner Francisco M. Alonso (Francisco) was the only son and sole heir of the
late spouses Tomas N. Alonso and Asuncion Medalle. Francisco died during the pendency
of this case, and was substituted by his legal heirs, namely: his surviving spouse,
Mercedes V. Alonso, his son Tomas V. Alonso (Tomas) and his daughter Asuncion V.
Alonso. 2
In 1992, Francisco discovered documents showing that his father Tomas N.
Alonso had acquired Lot No. 727 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate from the Government in
or about the year 1911; that the original vendee of Lot No. 727 had assigned his sales
certificate to Tomas N. Alonso, who had been consequently issued Patent No. 14353; and
that on March 27, 1926, the Director of Lands had executed a final deed of sale in favor of
Tomas N. Alonso, but the final deed of sale had not been registered with the Register of
Deeds because of lack of requirements, like the approval of the final deed of sale by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, as required by law. 3
Francisco subsequently found that the certificate of title covering Lot No.
727-D-2 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate had been "administratively reconstituted from
the owner's duplicate" of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-1310 in the name of
United Service Country Club, Inc., the predecessor of respondent Cebu Country Club, Inc.
(Cebu Country Club); and that upon the order of the court that had heard the petition for
reconstitution of the TCT, the name of the registered owner in TCT No. RT-1310 had been
changed to that of Cebu Country Club; and that the TCT stated that the reconstituted title
was a transfer from TCT No. 1021. 4 cSDHEC
It is relevant to mention at this point that the current TCT covering Lot 727-D-2
in the name of Cebu Country Club is TCT No. 94905, which was entered in the land records
of Cebu City on August 8, 1985. 5
With his discoveries, Francisco formally demanded upon Cebu Country Club to
restore the ownership and possession of Lot 727-D-2 to him. However, Cebu Country Club
denied Francisco's demand and claim of ownership, and refused to deliver the possession
to him. 6
RTC in Cebu City an action for the declaration of nullity and non-existence of deed/title,
the cancellation of certificates of title, and the recovery of property. On November 5,
1992, Cebu Country Club filed its answer with counterclaim. 7
On May 7, 1993, the RTC decided in favor of Cebu Country Club.
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which ultimately affirmed the
RTC on March 31, 1997. Thus, Francisco filed a motion for reconsideration, which was
denied on October 2, 1997. 8
Nothing daunted, Francisco appealed to this Court (G.R. No. 130876).
On January 31, 2002, this Court decided G.R. No. 130876, decreeing:
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review. However, we SET ASIDE
the decision of the Court of Appeals and that of the Regional Trial Court,
Cebu City, Branch 08.
IN LIEU THEREOF, we DISMISS the complaint and counterclaim of the
parties in Civil Cases No. CEB 12926 of the trial court. We declare that Lot
No. 727 D-2 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate covered by Original
Certificate of Title Nos. 251, 232, and 253 legally belongs to the
Government of the Philippines. 9
The petitioners sought a reconsideration. On December 5, 2003, however, the
Court denied their motion for reconsideration. 10 Hence, the decision in G.R. No. 130876
became final and executory.
In late 2004, the Government, through the OSG, filed in the RTC a motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution. 11 Cebu Country Club opposed the motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution in due course.
Later on, the proceedings on the OSG's motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution at the instance of Cebu Country Club in deference to the on-going hearings
being conducted by the Committee on Natural Resources of the House of Representatives
on a proposed bill to confirm the TCTs and reconstituted titles covering the Banilad Friar
Lands Estate in Cebu City. 12 The Congress ultimately enacted a law to validate the TCTs
and reconstituted titles covering the Banilad Friar Lands Estate in Cebu City. This
was Republic Act No. 9443, 13 effective on July 27, 2007. TcHCIS
Thereafter, both Cebu Country Club and the OSG brought the passage of R.A.
No. 9443 to the attention of the RTC for its consideration in resolving the OSG's motion for
the issuance of a writ of execution. 14 On December 28, 2007, therefore, the RTC denied
the OSG's motion for the issuance of a writ of execution through the first appealed
order. 15
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration dated February 1, 2008,
questioning the denial of the OSG's motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. 16
Upon being directed by the RTC to comment on the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration, the OSG manifested in writing that the Government was no longer
seeking the execution of the decision in G.R. No. 130876, subject to its reservation to
contest any other titles within the Banilad Friar Lands Estate should clear evidence show
such titles as having been obtained through fraud. 17
After the filing of the OSG's comment, the RTC issued the second appealed order,
denying the petitioners' motion for reconsideration, giving the following reasons:
 1. The party who had a direct interest in the execution of the decision and
the reconsideration of the denial of the motion for execution was
the Government, represented only by the OSG; hence, the
petitioners had no legal standing to file the motion for
reconsideration, especially that they were not authorized by the
OSG for that purpose;
2. R.A. No. 9443 "confirms and declares as valid" all "existing" TCTs and
reconstituted titles; thereby, the State in effect waived and
divested itself of whatever title or ownership over the Banilad
Friar Lands Estate in favor of the registered owners thereof,
including Lot 727 D-2; and
3. The situation of the parties had materially changed, rendering the
enforcement of the final and executory judgment unjust,
inequitable, and impossible, because Cebu Country Club was
now recognized by the State itself as the absolute owner of Lot
727 D-2. 18
Hence, the petitioners appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
Contentions of the Petitioners
The petitioners challenge the orders dated December 28, 2007 and April 29, 2009, because:
1. R.A. No. 9443 did not improve Cebu Country Club's plight, inasmuch
as R.A. No. 9443 presupposed first a sales certificate that lacked
the required signature, but Cebu Country Club did not have such
sales certificate. Moreover, the titleholders were in fact the
owners of the lands covered by their respective titles, which was
not true with Cebu Country Club due to its being already
adjudged with finality to be not the owner of Lot 727-D-2. Lastly,
Cebu Country Club's title was hopelessly defective, as found by
the Supreme Court itself; ICDcEA
2. The doctrine of law of the case barred the application of R.A. No.
9443 to Cebu Country Club;
3. The RTC's declaration that R.A. No. 9443 confirmed Cebu Country Club
as the absolute owner of Lot 727-D-2 despite the prior and final
judgment of the Supreme Court that Cebu Country Club was not
the owner was unconstitutional, because it virtually allowed the
legislative review of the Supreme Court's decision rendered
against Cebu Country Club;
4. The use of R.A. No. 9443 as a waiver on the part of the
Government vis--vis Cebu Country Club was not only
misplaced but downrightly repugnant to Act 1120, the law
governing the legal disposition and alienation of Friar Lands; and
5. The petitioners had the requisite standing to question the patent errors
of the RTC, especially in the face of the unholy conspiracy
between the OSG and Cebu Country Club, on the one hand, and,
on the other hand, the passage of R.A. No. 9443 and DENR
Memorandum No. 16, both of which in fact made their
predecessor Tomas N. Alonso's sales certificate and patent
valid. 19
Issues
The Court confronts and resolves the following issues, to wit:
1. Whether or not the petitioners were the real parties-in-interest to
question the denial by the RTC of the OSG's motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution;
2. Whether or not R.A. No. 9443 gave the petitioners a legal interest to
assail the RTC's orders; and
3. Whether or not the petitioners can appeal by petition for review
on certiorari in behalf of the OSG.
Ruling
The petition for review is denied due course.
A.
Preliminary Considerations:
Petitioners contravene the hierarchy of courts,
and the petition is fatally defective
Before delving on the stated issues, the Court notes that the petitioners are
guilty of two violations that warrant the immediate dismissal of the petition for review
on certiorari. HEIcDT
The first refers to the petitioners' breach of the hierarchy of courts by coming
directly to the Court to appeal the assailed issuances of the RTC via petition for review
on certiorari. They should not have done so, bypassing a review by the Court of Appeals
(CA), because the hierarchy of courts is essential to the efficient functioning of the courts
and to the orderly administration of justice. Their non-observance of the hierarchy of
courts has forthwith enlarged the docket of the Court by one more case, which, though it
may not seem burdensome to the layman, is one case too much to the Court, which has
to devote time and effort in poring over the papers submitted herein, only to discover in
the end that a review should have first been made by the CA. The time and effort could
have been dedicated to other cases of importance and impact on the lives and rights of
others.
The hierarchy of courts is not to be lightly regarded by litigants. The CA stands
between the RTC and the Court, and its establishment has been precisely to take over
much of the work that used to be done by the Court. Historically, the CA has been of the
greatest help to the Court in synthesizing the facts, issues, and rulings in an orderly and
intelligible manner and in identifying errors that ordinarily might escape detection. The
Court has thus been freed to better discharge its constitutional duties and perform its
most important work, which, in the words of Dean Vicente G. Sinco, 20 "is less concerned
with the decision of cases that begin and end with the transient rights and obligations of
particular individuals but is more intertwined with the direction of national policies,
momentous economic and social problems, the delimitation of governmental authority
and its impact upon fundamental rights." 21
The need to elevate the matter first to the CA is also underscored by the reality
that determining whether the petitioners were real parties in interest entitled to bring this
appeal against the denial by the RTC of the OSG's motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution was a mixed question of fact and law. As such, the CA was in the better position
to review and to determine. In that regard, the petitioners violate Section 1, Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which demands that an appeal by petition for review
on certiorari be limited to questions of law. 22
The second violation concerns the omission of a sworn certification against forum
shopping from the petition for review on certiorari. Section 4, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedurerequires that the petition for review should contain, among others, the
sworn certification on the undertakings provided in the last paragraph of Section 2, Rule
42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, viz.:
Section 2. . . .
The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a certification
under oath that he has not theretofore commenced any other action
involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or
different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such
other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if he
should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed
or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different
divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to
promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency thereof
within five (5) days therefrom. (n) AaSHED
Only petitioner Tomas V. Alonso has executed and signed the sworn certification
against forum shopping attached to the petition. Although neither of his co-petitioners
Mercedes V. Alonso and Asuncion V. Alonso has joined the certification, Tomas did not
present any written express authorization in his favor authorizing him to sign the
certification in their behalf. The signing of the certification by only one of the petitioners
could not be presumed to reflect the personal knowledge by his co-petitioners of the filing
or non-filing of any similar action or claim. 23Hence, the failure of Mercedes and Asuncion
to sign and execute the certification along with Tomas warranted the dismissal of their
petition. 24
B.
Petitioners are not proper parties
to appeal and assail the order of the RTC
The petitioners are relentless in insisting that their claim to Lot No. 727-D-2 of
the Banilad Friar Lands Estate should be preferred to that of Cebu Country Club, despite
the final judgment in G.R. No. 130876 being adverse to their claim. Their insistence raises
the need to resolve once and for all whether or not the petitioners retained any legal right
to assert over Lot No. 727-D-2 following the Government's manifest desistance from the
execution of the judgment in G.R. No. 130876 against Cebu Country Club.
The above-noted defects of the petition for review notwithstanding, therefore,
the Court has now to address and resolve the stated issues on the sole basis of the results
the Court earlier reached in G.R. No. 130876. In this regard, whether or not the
petitioners are the proper parties to bring this appeal is decisive.
After careful consideration, the Court finds that the cause of the petitioners
instantly fails.
In G.R. No. 130876, the Court found that the petitioners did not validly acquire
ownership of Lot No. 727-D-2, and declared that Lot No. 727 D-2 legally belonged to the
Government, thus:
The second issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the
Cebu Country Club, Inc. is owner of Lot No. 727.
Admittedly, neither petitioners nor their predecessor had any title
to the land in question. The most that petitioners could claim was that
the Director of Lands issued a sales patent in the name of Tomas N.
Alonso. The sales patent, however, and even the corresponding
deed of sale were not registered with the Register of Deeds and
no title was ever issued in the name of the latter. This is because
there were basic requirements not complied with, the most important of
which was that the deed of sale executed by the Director of Lands
was not approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. Hence, the deed of sale was void. "Approval by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce is indispensable for the validity of
the sale." Moreover, Cebu Country Club, Inc. was in possession of the land
since 1931, and had been paying the real estate taxes thereon based on
tax declarations in its name with the title number indicated thereon. Tax
receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are strong
evidence of ownership. This Court has ruled that although tax declarations
or realty tax payments are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner
for no one in his right mind will be paying taxes for a property that is not
in his actual or constructive possession. TcSCEa
Notwithstanding this fatal defect, the Court of Appeals ruled that "there
was substantial compliance with the requirement of Act No. 1120 to
validly convey title to said lot to Tomas N. Alonso."
On this point, the Court of Appeals erred.
Under Act No. 1120, which governs the administration and disposition of
friar lands, the purchase by an actual and bona fide settler or occupant of
any portion of friar land shall be "agreed upon between the purchaser and
the Director of Lands, subject to the approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources (mutatis mutandis)."
In his Memorandum filed on May 25, 2001, the Solicitor General
submitted to this Court certified copies of Sale Certificate No. 734, in favor
of Leoncio Alburo, and Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 734, in favor of
Tomas N. Alonso. Conspicuously, both instruments do not bear the
signature of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of the Interior. They
also do not bear the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources.
Only recently, in Jesus P. Liao v. Court of Appeals, the Court has ruled
categorically that approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce of the sale of friar lands is indispensable for its
validity, hence, the absence of such approval made the sale null and
void ab-initio. Necessarily, there can be no valid titles issued on the
basis of such sale or assignment. Consequently, petitioner
Francisco's father did not have any registerable title to the land in
 question. Having none, he could not transmit anything to his sole
heir, petitioner Francisco Alonso or the latter's heirs.
In a vain attempt at showing that he had succeeded to the estate of his
father, on May 4, 1991, petitioner Francisco Alonso executed an affidavit
adjudicating the entire estate to himself (Exh. "Q"), duly published in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province and city of Cebu (Exh.
"Q-1"). Such affidavit of self-adjudication is inoperative, if not void, not
only because there was nothing to adjudicate, but equally important
because petitioner Francisco did not show proof of payment of the estate
tax and submit a certificate of clearance from the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue. Obviously, petitioner Francisco has not paid the estate
taxes.
Consequently, we rule that neither Tomas N. Alonso nor his son
Francisco M. Alonso or the latter's heirs are the lawful owners of
Lot No. 727 in dispute. . . . . 25
The pronouncement in G.R. No. 130876 renders beyond dispute that the
non-execution of the judgment would not adversely affect the petitioners, who now hold
no right whatsoever in Lot No. 727-D-2. Otherwise put, they are not the proper parties to
assail the questioned orders of the RTC, because they stand to derive nothing from the
execution of the judgment against Cebu Country Club. ETCcSa
Every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest, unless otherwise authorized by law or the rules. 26 A real party in interest is one
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to
the avails of the suit. 27 "Interest" within the meaning of the rule means material
interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere
interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. The rule refers to
a real or present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy; or from a
future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest. 28 One having no right or
interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a party-plaintiff in an
action. 29
Thus, an appeal, like this one, is an action to be prosecuted by a party in interest
before a higher court. In order for the appeal to prosper, the litigant must of necessity
continue to hold areal or present substantial interest that entitles him to the avails of the
suit on appeal. If he does not, the appeal, as to him, is an exercise in futility. So it is with
the petitioners!
In contrast, the Government, being the legal owner of Lot No. 727-D-2, is the
only party adversely affected by the denial, and is the proper party entitled to assail the
denial. 30 However, its manifest desistance from the execution of the decision effectively
barred any challenge against the denial, for its non-appeal rendered the denial final and
immutable.
C.
R.A. No. 9443 gives petitioners no legal interest
to assail the denial of the motion for execution
Section 1 of R.A. No. 9443 provides:
Section 1. All existing Transfer Certificates of Title and
Reconstituted Certificates of Title duly issued by the Register of
Deeds of Cebu Province and/or Cebu City covering any portion of
the Banilad Friar Lands Estate, notwithstanding the lack of signatures
and/or approval of the then Secretary of Interior (later Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources) and/or the then Chief of the Bureau of
Public Lands (later Director of Public Lands) in the copies of the duly
executed Sale Certificates and Assignments of Sale Certificates, as the
case may be, now on file with the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO), Cebu City, are hereby declared as valid
titles and the registered owners recognized as absolute owners
thereof.
The law expressly declares as valid "(a)ll existing Transfer Certificates of Title
and Reconstituted Certificates of Title duly issued by the Register of Deeds of Cebu
Province and/or Cebu City covering any portion of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate," and
recognizes the registered owners as absolute owners. To benefit from R.A. No. 9443,
therefore, a person must hold as a condition precedent a duly issued Transfer Certificate
of Title or a Reconstituted Certificate of Title. CacTSI
Although Lot 727-D-2 was earlier declared to be owned by the Government in
G.R. No. 130876, R.A. No. 9443 later validated Cebu Country Club's registered ownership
due to its holding of TCT No. RT-1310 (T-11351) in its own name. As the OSG explained
in its manifestation in lieu of comment 31 (filed in the RTC vis--vis the
petitioners' motion for reconsideration against the RTC's denial of the OSG's motion for
issuance of a writ of execution), the enactment of R.A. No. 9443 had "mooted the final
and executory Decision of the Supreme Court in "Alonso v. Cebu Country Club,
Inc.," docketed as G.R. No. 130876, which declared the Government as the owner of Lot
727-D-2 based on the absence of signature and approval of the then Secretary of
Interior;" and that the decision in G.R. No. 130876 had "ceased to have any practical
effect" as the result of the enactment of R.A. No. 9443, and had thereby become
"academic." 32
On the other hand, the petitioners could not benefit from R.A. No. 9443 because
of their non-compliance with the express condition of holding any Transfer Certificate of
Title or Reconstituted Certificate of Title respecting Lot 727-D-2 or any portion thereof.
The appropriate recourse for the petitioners, if they persist in the belief that the
TCT of Cebu Country Club should be nullified, is to compel the OSG through the special
civil action formandamus to commence the action to annul on the ground that Cebu
Country Club had obtained its title to Lot 7217-D-2 through fraud. Yet, that recourse is no
longer availing, for the decision in G.R. No. 130876 explicitly found and declared that the
reconstituted title of Cebu Country Club had not been obtained through fraud. Said the
Court:
On the question that TCT No. RT-1310 (T-11351) bears the same number
as another title to another land, we agree with the Court of Appeals
that there is nothing fraudulent with the fact that Cebu Country
Club, Inc.'s reconstituted title bears the same number as the title
of another parcel of land. This came about because under General
Land Registration Office (GLRO) Circular No. 17, dated February 19, 1947,
and Republic Act No. 26 and Circular No. 6, RD 3, dated August 5, 1946,
which were in force at the time the title was reconstituted on July 26,
1948, the titles issued before the inauguration of the Philippine Republic
were numbered consecutively and the titles issued after the inauguration
were numbered also consecutively starting with No. 1, so that eventually,
the titles issued before the inauguration were duplicated by titles issued
after the inauguration of the Philippine Republic. . . . .
 xxx xxx xxx
Petitioners next argue that the reconstituted title of Cebu
Country Club, Inc. had no lawful source to speak of; it was
reconstituted through extrinsic and intrinsic fraud in the absence
of a deed of conveyance in its favor. In truth,
however, reconstitution was based on the owner's duplicate of the
title, hence, there was no need for the covering deed of sale or
other modes of conveyance. Cebu Country Club, Inc. was
admittedly in possession of the land since long before the Second
World War, or since 1931. In fact, the original title (TCT No.
11351) was issued to the United Service Country Club, Inc. on
November 19, 1931 as a transfer from Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 1021. More importantly, Cebu Country Club, Inc. paid the
realty taxes on the land even before the war, and tax declarations
covering the property showed the number of the TCT of the land.
Cebu Country Club, Inc. produced receipts showing real estate
tax payments since 1949. On the other hand, petitioner failed to
produce a single receipt of real estate tax payment ever made by his
father since the sales patent was issued to his father on March 24, 1926.
Worse, admittedly petitioner could not show any [T]orrens title ever
issued to Tomas N. Alonso, because, as said, the deed of sale executed on
March 27, 1926 by the Director of Lands was not approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and could not be
registered. "Under the law, it is the act of registration of the deed of
conveyance that serves as the operative act to convey the land registered
under the Torrens system. The act of registration creates constructive
notice to the whole world of the fact of such conveyance." On this
point, petitioner alleges that Cebu Country Club, Inc. obtained its
title by fraud in connivance with personnel of the Register of
Deeds in 1941 or in 1948, when the title was administratively
reconstituted. Imputations of fraud must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence. Petitioner failed to adduce evidence of
fraud. In an action for re-conveyance based on fraud, he who charges
fraud must prove such fraud in obtaining a title. "In this jurisdiction,
fraud is never presumed." The strongest suspicion cannot sway
judgment or overcome the presumption of regularity. "The sea of
suspicion has no shore, and the court that embarks upon it is without
rudder or compass." Worse, the imputation of fraud was so tardily
brought, some forty-four (44) years or sixty-one (61) years after
its supposed occurrence, that is, from the administrative reconstitution
of title on July 26, 1948, or from the issuance of the original title on
November 19, 1931, that verification is rendered extremely
difficult, if not impossible, especially due to the supervening
event of the second world war during which practically all public
records were lost or destroyed, or no longer available. 33 aEcHCD
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of
merit.
The Court declares that Cebu Country Club, Inc. is the exclusive owner of Lot No. 727-D-2 of
the Banilad Friar Lands Estate, as confirmed by Republic Act No. 9443.
Costs of suit to be paid by the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
|||
[G.R. No. 79787. June 29, 1989.]
APOLONIO EGAO AND BEATRIZ EGAO, petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (NINTH DIVISION), SEVERO
DIGNOS AND SEVERO BONTILAO, respondents.
This is a land dispute which culminated in the filing by private respondents Severo Dignos and
Severo Bontilao of a verified complaint for Quieting of Title and/or Recovery of Possession
and Ownership before the RTC of Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, * against petitioners Apolonio
and Beatriz Egao.
Private respondents' complaint alleged that they are the legitimate owners and
possessors of two (2) parcels of land situated at Lonocan, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, per
deed of absolute sale dated 21 December 1979 which, among others, recited thus: Cdpr
"WHEREAS, the above mentioned Parcels of land Lot No. 662 is covered
by Original Certificate of Title No. P-3559 Free Patent No. 298112
registered in the name of APOLONIO EGAO married to Beatriz Menosa
and Lot No. 661 is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-3558 Free
Patent No. 303249 registered in the name of RAULITA CONEJOS married
to Pedro Conejos, all transcribed in the Registration Book in the
Register of Deeds for the Province of Bukidnon;.
"WHEREAS, Lot No. 662 has been transferred in ownership from BEATRIZ
MENOSA EGAO, married to Apolonio Egao in favor of ROBERTO N.
MARFORI per Deed of Absolute Sale executed before Tommy C. Pacana,
Notary Public of Cagayan de Oro City entered in his Notarial Registry
under Doc. No. 75; Page No. 15; Book V; Series of 1965; and Lot No. 661
likewise has been transferred in ownership from RAULITA R. CONEJOS in
favor of ROBERTO N. MARFORI per Deed of Absolute Sale executed
before Tommy C. Pacana, Notary Public of Cagayan de Oro City, dated
June 3, 1965, entered in his Notarial Registry under Doc. No. 20; Page 4;
Book V; Series of 1965.
"WHEREAS, the VENDEES herein is [sic] aware of the fact that the
Certificate of Title over the above mentioned parcels of land have not yet
been transferred in favor of ROBERTO N. MARFORI except for the tax
declarations but that the VENDOR herein is in actual, physical,
continuous, uninterrupted, and adverse possession of the above
described parcels of land free from all liens and encumbrances
whatsoever;" 1
Allegedly, upon purchase of Lot No. 662 from Roberto Marfori, improvements were
introduced and taxes paid by private respondents. Sometime in June 1983, herein
petitioners allegedly occupied illegally portions of the land. 2
Petitioners' answer to the complaint asserted that Apolonio Egao is the registered
owner of the parcel of land known as Lot No. 662, Pls 854 with an area of 3,451 sq. meters
evidenced by OCT No. P-3559 issued by the Register of Deeds of Bukidnon pursuant to Free
Patent No. 298112 dated 12 August 1965; that he (Apolonio Egao) and his family have been in
actual, physical, adverse, open and continuous possession thereof even before the issuance to
him of the free patent; that the land has never been sold by reason of the prohibition against
alienation under Commonwealth ActNo. 141 (Public Land Law); and that the instant case was
the fourth in a series filed against the Egaos and is part of respondents' scheme to grab said
parcel of land from the petitioners.
Judge Felicidario M. Batoy ruled in favor of the Egaos, herein petitioners (defendants in
the court a quo), ordering respondent Severo Bontilao (plaintiff in the court a quo) to
immediately deliver to the Egaos the owner's duplicate copy of Original Certificate of Title No.
P-3559. Said trial judge held: Cdpr
"In the instant case, granting arguendo, that defendants executed the 2
documents in favor of Marfori (Exhs. A & B) after the filing of the
application for free patent but before the issuance of the latter, without
the approval of the Director of Lands, upon issuance of Free Patent No.
298112. On August 12, 1965, the said deeds of sale (Exhs. A & B) were
ipso facto cancelled or superseded by said free patent. Moreover, it
appears from the evidence that defendants never vacated or abandoned
their possession of Lot No. 662 as they have continuously lived on said lot
since 1950, a fact admitted by the plaintiffs themselves. And as long as
Original Certificate of Title No. P-3559 remains in the name of defendant
Apolonio Egao, married to Beatriz Menoza Egao, this is the ultimate and
best evidence of title granted by the government which must be honored
and respected by the courts. In a nutshell, the plaintiffs miserably failed to
present or show any title to Lot No. 662, PLS-854 which should be quieted
or freed from any cloud of doubt as prayed for in their complaint and they
further failed to show that they are entitled to the ownership and
possession to Lot No. 662, PLS-854." 3
Private respondents went to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 09539. Setting aside the RTC
decision, the appellate court ** held, in part, thus
"That the land is titled in the name of defendant Apolonio Egao is not in
question. The main point in issue is whether defendants could validly sell
the land to Marfori who in turn transferred ownership thereof to the
plaintiffs." 4
Marfori and Egao were both held by the Court of Appeals in pari delicto for violating the five
(5) year restriction under Sec. 118, Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended by Act No.
496 against encumbrance or alienation of lands acquired under a free patent or homestead;
hence, they cannot, according to the appellate court, seek affirmative relief, but respondents
on the other hand were declared innocent purchasers for value who obtained the owner's
duplicate copy of the OCT (still in the name of the Egaos) from Marfori who transferred to
them (respondents) physical possession of the property. Finally, the Court of Appeals held:
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and a new
one is rendered:
1. Declaring the plaintiffs as the absolute owners of the
land known as Lot No. 662, Pls-854 of the Land
Registry of Bukidnon;
2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Bukidnon to effect
the cancellation of Original Certificate of Title No. P-3559 in the
name of Apolonio Egao and in lieu thereof, another one be
issued in the names of plaintiffs, after payment of the proper
fees;
3. Ordering the defendants to surrender peaceful
possession of the land to plaintiffs and to desist from further
disturbing the possession over the land of plaintiffs;
4. Ordering the defendants to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED." 5
Petitioners turn to this Court for relief, assailing the appellate court for allegedly committing
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in holding that:
a. Petitioners sold Lot 662 to Roberto Marfori;
b. It was only in 1983 when Petitioners wrested possession over the land
from private Respondents;
c. Petitioners never denied the sales made in favor of Marfori, in their
answer;
d. Private Respondents are "innocent purchasers for value." 6
and/or for allegedly deciding questions of substance not in accordance with law and/or
applicable decisions of this Court.
Without giving due course to the petition, the Court required respondents to
comment. 7 After comment, the Court resolved to require petitioners to file a reply, which
they did. Respondents filed a rejoinder. Considering the allegations, issues and arguments
adduced, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition. Upon submission by the
parties of their respective memorandum, the petition was submitted for decision. 8
Validity of the Deeds of Sale executed between Marfori (as purchaser) and the petitioners (as
sellers) is the main issue to be resolved, in determining respondents' right over the disputed
land, the respondents being the transferees of Marfori. prcd
It is undisputed that Free Patent No. 298112 was issued to petitioner Apolonio Egao over Lot
No. 662 on 12 August, 1965. Sec. 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, prohibits
the alienation or encumbrance, within a period of five (5) years from the
date of issuance of the patent, of lands acquired under free patent or homestead.
Assuming, arguendo, the authenticity of the Deeds of Sale executed by the Egaos in
favor of Marfori over portions of Lot No. 662 (the land in question), dated 7 May 1964, 14
January and 6 October 1965, it clearly appears that all deeds were executed within the
prohibited period of five (5) years. As correctly found by the appellate court
"Section 124 of the Public Land Act provided [sic] that any acquisition,
conveyance, alienation, transfer or other contract made or executed in
violation of any of the provisions of Sections 118, 121, 120 122 and
123 of this Act shall be unlawful, null and void from its execution and shall
 produce the effect of annulling and cancelling the grant, title, patent or
permit originally issued, recognized or actually or prescriptively, and
cause the reversion of the property and its improvements to the state." 9
Petitioners deny the authenticity and due execution of the notarized deeds of sale in
favor of Marfori, asserting continued ownership over the land by virtue of a Torrens
Certificate of Title issued in their name. While the Court is not satisfied with respondents'
explanation of their failure to present the notaries public (who were residents of a neighboring
province) to affirm their participation in the preparation of the Deeds, the Court also finds as
insufficient the mere denials by petitioners as to due execution and authenticity of said
Deeds of Sale. A notarial document is evidence of the facts in clear unequivocal manner
therein expressed. It has in its favor the presumption of regularity. To contradict all these,
there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant. 10 The
question of authenticity being one of fact, the Court win not disturb the
conclusions of the Court of Appeals on the matter.
Original Certificate of Title No. P-3559 over the land in dispute was issued on 1 March 1966, a
few months after the execution by the Egaos of the last Deed of Sale in
favor of Marfori. 11 The OCT is registered in the name of the Egaos, herein petitioners.
A Torrens title, once registered, cannot be defeated, even by adverse open and notorious
possession. A registered title under the Torrens system cannot be defeated by prescription.
The title, once registered, is notice to the world. All persons must take notice. No one can plead
ignorance of the registration. 12
Contrary to the appellate court's conclusion, respondents are not innocent purchasers for
value. 13 An "innocent purchaser for value" is deemed, under the Torrens system, to include
an innocent lessee, mortgagee or other encumbrancer for value. 14 Where a purchaser
neglects to make the necessary inquiries and closes his eyes to facts which should put a
reasonable man on his guard as to the possibility of the existence of a defect in his vendor's
title, and relying on the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor, purchases the
property without making any further investigation, he cannot claim that he is a purchaser in
good faith for value. 15
Furthermore, a private individual may not bring an action for reversion or any action which
would have the effect of cancelling a free patent and the corresponding certificate of title
issued on the basis thereof, with the result that the land covered thereby will again form
part of the public domain, as only the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead may do
so. 16
The rule of pari delicto non oritur actio (where two persons are equally at fault neither party
may be entitled to relief under the law), admits of exceptions and does not apply to an
inexistent contract, such as, a sale void ab initio under the Public Land Act, when its
enforcement or application runs counter to the public policy of preserving the grantee's right
to the land under the homestead law. 17
Sec. 51, par. 2 of the Property Registration Decree (PD 1529), formerly Sec. 50 of the Land
Registration Act (Act No. 496) expressly provides that the registration of the Deed is the
operative act that binds or affects the land insofar as third persons are concerned. The law
requires a higher degree of prudence from one who buys from a person who is not the
registered owner, when the land object of the transaction is registered land. While one who
buys from the registered owner need not look behind the certificate of title, one who buys from
another who is not the registered owner is expected to examine not only the certificate of title
but all factual circumstances necessary for him to determine if there are any flaws in the
title of the transferor, or in his capacity to transfer the land. Failing to exercise caution of any
kind whatsoever is tantamount to bad faith. 18
Deeds of sale of patented lands, perfected within the prohibited five (5) year period are null
and void (Sec. 124, Public Land Act). No title passed from the Egaos to Marfori which could be
validly transferred to herein respondents Bontilao and Dignos. Nemo dat quod non
habet (nobody can dispose of that which does not belong to him). 19
While the government has not taken steps to assert its title, by reversion, to a homestead sold
in violation of the Public Land Act, the vendor or his heirs is better entitled to the
possession of the land, the vendee being in no better situation than any intruder. 20
Accordingly, respondents who are not innocent purchasers for value have no standing to
question petitioners' right to the land and to file an action for quieting of title. LibLex
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 09539 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Meanwhile, petitioners as registered owners are entitled to remain
in physical possession of the disputed property. Respondents are ordered to deliver the
owner's duplicate copy of the OCT (No. P-3559) to petitioners, without prejudice to an action
for reversion of the land, which may be instituted by the Solicitor General for the State.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Solicitor General.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Egao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 79787, [June 29, 1989], 256 PHIL 243-254)
[G.R. No. 107751. June 1, 1995.]
LETICIA P. LIGON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE
CELIA LIPANA-REYES, Presiding Judge, Branch 81, Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, IGLESIA NI KRISTO and the REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY, respondents.
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed
the order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 82, granting the motion of
respondent Iglesia ni Kristo to direct petitioner to surrender the owner's duplicate of the
certificates of title in her possession.
On 19 October 1990 respondent Iglesia ni Kristo (INK) filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint 1 for specific performance with damages against
the Islamic Directorate of the Philippines (IDP) docketed as Civil Case No. Q90-6937.
Respondent INK alleged in its complaint that by virtue of an Absolute Deed of Sale dated
20 April 1989 IDP sold to it two (2) parcels of land located at Tandang Sora, Barrio Culiat,
Quezon City, both of which IDP is the registered owner. The parties stipulated in the deed
of sale that the IDP, shall undertake to evict all squatters and illegal occupants in the
property within forty-five (45) days from the execution of the contract.
IDP failed to fulfill this obligation. Hence INK prayed that the trial court order IDP
to comply with its obligation of clearing the subject lots of illegal occupants and pay
damages to INK.
 IDP alleged in its answer that it was INK which violated the contract by delaying
the payment of the purchase price and prayed that the contract of sale be rescinded and
revoked.
On 15 June 1991 INK filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the ground
that there was actually no genuine issue as to any material fact.
On 12 September 1991 the trial court rendered partial judgment, and on 7
October 1991 an amended partial judgment granting the reliefs prayed for by INK except
the prayer for damages which was to be resolved later.
On 22 January 1992 INK filed a motion in the same case praying that petitioner
Leticia Ligon, who was in possession of the certificates of title over the properties as
mortgagee of IDP, be directed to surrender the certificates to the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City for the registration of the Absolute Deed of Sale in its name. INK alleged that
the document could not be registered because of the refusal and/or failure of petitioner to
deliver the certificates of title despite repeated requests.
On 31 January 1992 petitioner Ligon filed an opposition to the motion on the
ground that the IDP was not served copy of the motion, and the ownership of INK over the
property was still in issue since rescission was sought by the IDP as a counterclaim. She
prayed that the motion be denied, but should it be granted, the Register of Deeds be
directed after registration to deliver the owner's duplicate copies of the new certificates of
title to her.
On 15 February 1992 petitioner filed a Supplemental Opposition questioning the
jurisdiction of the trial court because the motion involved the registrability of the
document of sale, and she was not made a party to the main case.
On 2 March 1992 the trial court granted the motion of INK and ordered petitioner
to surrender to INK the owner's copy of RT-26521 (170567) and RT-26520 (176616) in
open court for the registration of the Absolute Deed of Sale in the latter's name and the
annotation of the mortgage executed in favor of petitioner on the new transfer certificates
of title to be issued to INK. 2
On 6 April 1992, on motion of petitioner Ligon, the trial court reconsidered its
order by directing her to deliver the certificates of title to the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City. 3
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals seeking the
annulment of the two (2) orders. However, on 28 October 1992 the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition and affirmed the orders of the trial court.
Petitioner now comes to us alleging that the trial court erred: (a) in ruling that it
had jurisdiction over petitioner; (b) in upholding the orders of the trial court even as they
violated the rule prohibiting splitting of a single cause of action and forum-shopping; (c)
in holding that INK is the owner of the property and entitled to registration of its
ownership; and, (d) in holding that INK has a superior right to the possession of the
owner's copies of the certificates of title.
Upon prior leave, the IDP intervened alleging that prior to the issuance by the
trial court of the order of 2 March 1992, its legal Board of Trustees filed a motion for
intervention informing said court that the sale of the properties was not executed by it but
was made possible by a fake Board of Trustees, hence, the sale is void. The trial court
denied the motion since jurisdiction over the incident properly belonged to the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC). Conformably therewith, IDP brought the matter before
the SEC which later declared that the sale of the of the properties was void. Thus, IDP
banks on this favorable decision in similarly seeking the nullification of the questioned
orders of the trial court.
Under our land registration law, no voluntary instrument shall be registered by
the Register of Deeds unless the owner's duplicate certificate is presented together with
such instrument, except in some cases or upon order of the court for cause shown. In case
the person in possession of the duplicate certificates refuses or fails to surrender the same
to the Register of Deeds so that a voluntary document may be registered and a new
certificate issued, Sec. 107, Chapter 10, of P.D. No. 1529 clearly states. prLL
Sec. 107. Surrender of withheld duplicate certificates. Where
it is necessary to issue a new certificate of title pursuant to any
involuntary instrument which divests the title of the registered owner
against his consent or where a voluntary instrument cannot be registered
by reason of the refusal or failure of the holder to surrender the owner's
duplicate certificate of title, the party-in-interest may file a petition in
court to compel surrender of the same to the Register of Deeds. The court,
after hearing, may order the registered owner or any person withholding
the duplicate certificate or memorandum upon such surrender. If the
person withholding the duplicate certificate is not amenable to the process
of the court, or if for any reason the outstanding owner's duplicate
certificate cannot be delivered, the court may order the annulment of the
same as well as the issuance of a new certificate of title in lieu thereof.
Such new certificate and all duplicates thereof shall contain a
memorandum of the annulment of the outstanding duplicate.
Before the enactment of P.D. No. 1529 otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree, the former law, Act No. 496 otherwise known as the Land
Registration Act, and all jurisprudence interpreting the former law had established that
summary reliefs such as an action to compel the surrender of owner's duplicate certificate
of title to the Register of Deeds could only be filed with and granted by the Regional Trial
Court sitting as a land registration court if there was unanimity among the parties or there
was no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party-in-interest, otherwise,
if the case became contentious and controversial it should be threshed out in an ordinary
action or in the case where the incident properly belonged. 4
Under Sec. 2 of P.D. No. 1529, it is now provided that "Courts of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Courts) shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for
original registration of titles to lands, including improvements and interest therein and
over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine
all questions arising upon such applications or petitions." The above provision has
eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the regional trial
court and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law when acting merely
as a cadastral court. Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits the change has simplified
registration proceedings by conferring upon the regional trial courts the authority to act
not only on applications for original registration but also over all petitions filed after
original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon
such applications or petitions. 5
The principal action filed by INK in Civil Case No. Q-90-6937 before the trial court
was for specific performance with damages based on a document of sale. Such action was
well within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.6 When IDP, the
defendant in the trial court, did not question the genuineness and validity of
said deed of sale and its obligations thereunder, the summary judgment issued
by the court granting the reliefs sought by INK was also an exercise of its
general jurisdiction.
 Hence, when INK filed a motion for the issuance of an order from the
same court to compel the holder of the duplicate certificates of title to
surrender the same to the Register of Deeds for the registration of the deed of
sale subject of the principal action, the motion was a necessary incident to the
main case. When the sale of the property was upheld by the court in its
judgment and the defendant was directed to comply with its terms and
conditions, the right of INK to have the same registered with the Register of
Deeds could not be disregarded. To assert and enjoy its right, INK should be
allowed to seek the aid of the court to direct the surrender of the certificates of
title. Since Regional Trial Courts are courts of general jurisdiction, they may
therefore take cognizance of this case pursuant to such jurisdiction. 7 Even
while Sec. 107 of P.D. 1529 speaks of a petition which can be filed by one who
wants to compel another to surrender the certificates of title to the Register of
Deeds, this does not preclude a party to a pending case to include as incident
therein the relief stated under Sec. 107, especially if the subject certificates of
title to be surrendered are intimately connected with the subject matter of the
principal action. 8 This principle is based on expediency and in accordance with
the policy against multiplicity of suits. cdll
The records of the case show that the subsisting mortgage lien of
petitioner appears in the certificates of title Nos. 26520 and 26521. Hence, the
order of the trial court directing the surrender of the certificates to the Register
of Deeds in order that the deed of sale in favor of INK can be registered, cannot
in any way prejudice her rights and interests as a mortgage of the lots. Any lien
annotated on the previous certificates of title which subsists should be
incorporated in or carried over to the new transfer certificates of title. This is
true even in the case of a real estate mortgage because pursuant to Art. 2126 of
the Civil Code it directly and immediately subjects the property upon which it is
imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation for
whose security it was constituted. It is inseparable from the property
mortgaged as it is a right in rem a lien on the property whoever its owner
may be. It subsists notwithstanding a change in ownership; in short, the
personality of the owner is disregarded. Thus, all subsequent purchasers must
respect the mortgage whether the transfer to them be with or without the
consent of the mortgagee, for such mortgage until discharged follows the
property. 9 It is clear therefore that the surrender by petitioner of the
certificates of title to the Register of Deeds as ordered by the trial court will not
create any substantial injustice to her. To grant the petition and compel INK to
file a new action in order to obtain the same reliefs it asked in the motion before
the trial court is to encourage litigations where no substantial rights are
prejudiced. This end should be avoided. Courts should not be so strict about
procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper administration of justice.
The rules are intended to insure the orderly conduct of litigations because of
the higher objective they seek, which is, to protect the parties' substantive
rights. 10
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28
October 1992 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Ligon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107751, [June 1, 1995], 314 PHIL 689-700)
[G.R. No. 127941. January 28, 1999.]
BIBLIA TOLEDO-BANAGA and JOVITA TAN, petitioners, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS and CANDELARIO DAMALERIO, respondents.
The Court of Appeals (CA), in a decision penned by then Justice Ricardo J.
Francisco, 1 categorically declared private respondent as the absolute owner of the land
subject of this case. That decision was affirmed by this Court, became final and executory and
was remanded to the lower court for execution. But the Register of Deeds frustrated private
respondent's judicially determined right as it refused to issue Certificates of Title in his name
on the ground that the matter should be referred "en consulta" to the Register of Deeds before
petitioner's title can be cancelled and a new one issued in the name of the winning party
herein private respondent. So, for the third time, this simple redemption case which
commenced in the 1980's is again before this Court.
Here is a summary of the facts, over which there is no dispute:
In an action for redemption filed by petitioner Banaga, the trial court declared that she had lost
her right to redeem her property earlier foreclosed and which was subsequently sold at public
auction to private respondent. 2 Certificates of Title covering the said property were issued to
private respondent over which petitioner Banaga annotated on March 3, 1983 a notice of lis
pendens. 3On appeal by petitioner Banaga, the CA reversed the decision of the trial court and
allowed the former to redeem the property within a certain period. 4 Private respondent's
petition to this Court was dismissed 5 and the decision became final.
On June 11, 1992, petitioner Banaga tried to redeem the property by depositing with the trial
court the amount of redemption which was financed by her co-petitioner Tan. Private
respondent opposed the redemption arguing that it was made beyond the time given to her by
the court in the earlier case. However, the lower court issued an order on August 7, 1992
upholding the redemption and ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel private respondent's
Certificates of Title and issue new titles in the name of petitioner Banaga. 6 When his motion
for reconsideration was denied by the trial court in an order dated January 4, 1993, private
respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA which was docketed as CA-G.R. No.
29869. On January 11, 1993, private respondent caused the annotation of said petition as
another notice of lis pendens on the Certificates of Title. Three days later, the CA issued a
temporary restraining order to enjoin the execution of the August 7, 1992 and January 4, 1993
orders. dctai
Meanwhile, on January 7, 1993, petitioner Banaga sold the subject property to petitioner Tan
with the deed of absolute sale mentioning private respondent's certificate of title which was
not yet cancelled. Notwithstanding the notice of lis pendens, petitioner Tan subdivided the
property in question under a subdivision plan, which she made not in her name but in the name
of private respondent. There being no preliminary injunction issued and with the expiration of
the TRO, petitioner Tan asked the Register of Deeds to issue new titles in her name. On March
24, 1993, such titles were issued in petitioner Tan's name but it still carried the annotations of
the two notices of lis pendens. Upon learning of the new title of petitioner Tan, private
respondent impleaded the former in his petition in CA-G.R. No. 29869.
On October 28, 1993, the CA set aside the August 7, 1992 and January 4, 1993 orders of the
trial court and declared private respondent absolute owner of the subject property. The CA
disposed of the petition as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the instant petition
is hereby GRANTED. The orders issued by public respondent judge dated
August 7, 1992 and January 4, 1993 are hereby ordered SET ASIDE and a
new one is hereby entered declaring petitioner as the absolute owner of
the parcels of land subject of redemption for failure of private respondent
to exercise the right of redemption within the thirty (30) day period
previously granted her by this court." 7
That decision became final and executory after petitioner Banaga's petition for review was
dismissed by this Court for lack of merit. 8 Upon motion of private respondent, the trial court
issued a writ of execution on December 27, 1994 ordering the Register of Deeds to reinstate
the Certificates of Title in the name of the movant herein private respondent. In its order
which petitioners did not contest, the court a quo said that: LexLib
"Although there is no specific pronouncement in the decision of the Court
of Appeals that reverts the titles to the land subjects of redemption to the
defendant, the fact that it declared the petitioner (Damalerio) as the
absolute owner of the lands entitles him to writ of execution issuing from
this court directing the Register of Deeds to reinstate his titles to his
name. As it is implied from the decision declaring him the absolute owner
of the lands that the titles to the land be reverted to him (See Uy v.
Capulong, 221 SCRA 87).
"Let therefore a writ of execution issue in this case to enforce the decision
of the Court of Appeals. In this connection, the Register of Deeds of the
Registry of Deeds for General Santos City is hereby ordered to reinstate
the titles of Candelario B. Damalerio Transfer Certificates of Title No.
T-19570 and T-19571, both of the Registry of Deeds from General Santos
City." 9
But the Register of Deeds refused to comply with the writ of execution alleging that the
Certificates of Title issued to petitioner Tan must first be surrendered. Accordingly, private
respondent moved to cite the Register of Deeds in contempt of court which was denied, as the
trial court ruled on January 11, 1995 that the former's remedy is by consulta to the
Commissioner of Land Registration. 10In another order (dated March 29, 1996), the trial
court likewise denied private respondent's motion for the issuance of a writ of possession
ruling that the latter's remedy is a separate action to declare petitioner Tan's Certificates of
Title void. Aggrieved, private respondent again elevated the case to the CA via a petition
for certiorari and mandamus 11 assailing the above-mentioned two orders of the court a
quo naming as respondents the trial court judge, the Register of Deeds and the petitioners. On
November 7, 1996, the CA rendered a decision granting the petition and, among others, set
aside the assailed orders of the trial court. The dispositive portion of the CA decision
reads: LLpr
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the petition is
GRANTED. Judgment is hereby rendered:
1) setting aside the orders of the respondent judge dated
January 11, 1995 and March 29, 1996;
2) declaring the title issued to Biblia Toledo-Banaga, Jovita Tan
and to those other subsequent transferee or
transferees, if any, as null and void;
3) ordering the Register of Deeds of General Santos City to issue
new certificates of title to Candelario Damalerio over
the parcels of land in question;
4) ordering the respondent court to issue writ of execution for
the enforcement of this decision and of the decision in
CA-G.R. SP No. 29868 (sic), as well as a writ of
possession for the delivery to petitioner Damalerio of
the Physical possession of the parcels of land subject
matter of this case.
"SO ORDERED." 12
Upon denial by the CA of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed the instant petition
for certiorari and mandamus. The Court, however, is puzzled why petitioners, in their petition,
would seek to set aside the two orders (January 4, 1995 and March 29, 1996) of "respondent
judge" who was not named in their petition. 13 Assuming this to be a mere lapsus since they
also confusingly refer to Banaga and Tan as "private respondent" and to Damalerio as
"petitioner", 14 the petition is still utterly without merit. It is petitioners' stand (1) that
petitioner Tan is a buyer in good faith and (2) that the remedy of private respondent to secure
the titles in his name is by consulta to the Land Registration Commissioner and not through
contempt.
The Court is not convinced of the arguments proffered by petitioners.
By arguing that petitioner Tan was a buyer in good faith, petitioners in effect raise once more
the issue of ownership of the subject property. But such issue had already been clearly and
categorically ruled upon by the CA and affirmed by this Court, wherein private respondent was
adjudged the rightful and absolute owner thereof. The decision in that case bars a further
repeated consideration of the very same issue that has already been settled with finality. To
once again re-open that issue through a different avenue would defeat the existence of our
courts as final arbiters of legal controversies. Having attained finality, the decision is beyond
review or modification even by this Court. 15 LLjur
Under the principle of res judicata, the Court and the parties, are bound by such final decision,
otherwise, there will be no end to litigation. It is to the interest of the public that there should
be an end to litigation by the parties over a subject fully and fairly adjudicated, and an
individual should not be vexed twice for the same cause. 16 All the elements of res
judicata are present in this case, which are:
(a) the former judgment must be final;
(b) the court which rendered judgment had jurisdiction over the parties
and the subject matter;
(c) it must be a judgment on the merits;
(d) and there must be between the first and second actions identity of
parties, subject matter, and cause of action. 17
The judgment in the redemption suit had long become final and executory; there is no
question that the court had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter; it involves an
adjudication on the merits of the case as the court discussed and passed upon petitioner
Banaga's right of redemption which she did not timely exercise and as a consequence, lost her
claim of ownership of the lot. Both petitioners and private respondent are parties to the earlier
cases, disputing the same parcel of land with both opposing parties claiming ownership
thereof. Certainly, res judicata had set in. Besides, once a judgment had become final and
executory, it can no longer be disturbed no matter how erroneous it may be. In any case, no
such error was attributed to in this case.
Contrary to petitioners' argument, private respondent's remedy is not a direct or independent
civil action for cancellation of petitioner Tan's titles. The facts, circumstances, evidence and
arguments invoked in this derailed final and executory decision are the very same matters that
will be established assuming such independent suit is legally warranted. It does not matter
whether the former case was a redemption suit and the new one will be for cancellation of title
because the test of identity of causes of action is not in its form but whether the same evidence
would support and establish the former and present causes of action. 18 cdasia
Petitioners other contention that the execution of the final and executory decision which is
to issue titles in the name of private respondent cannot be compelled
by mandamus because of the "formality" that the registered owner first surrenders her
duplicate Certificates of Title for cancellation per Section 80 of Presidential Decree
1529 19 cited by the Register of Deeds, 20 bears no merit. In effect, they argue that the
winning party must wait execution until the losing party has complied with the formality of
surrender of the duplicate title. Such preposterous contention borders on the absurd and has
no place in our legal system. Precisely, the Supreme Court had already affirmed the CA's
judgment that Certificates of Title be issued in private respondent's name. To file another
action just to compel the registered owner, herein petitioner Tan, to surrender her titles
constitute violation of, if not disrespect to, the orders of the highest tribunal. Otherwise, if
execution cannot be had just because the losing party will not surrender her titles, the entire
proceeding in the courts, not to say the efforts, expenses and time of the parties, would be
rendered nugatory. It is revolting to conscience to allow petitioners to further avert the
satisfaction of their obligation because of sheer literal adherence to technicality, 21 or
formality of surrender of the duplicate titles. The surrender of the duplicate is implied from the
executory decision since petitioners themselves were parties thereto. Besides, as part of the
execution process, it is a ministerial function of the Register of Deeds to comply with the
decision of the court to issue a title and register a property in the name of a certain person,
especially when the decision had attained finality, as in this case.
In addition, the enforcement of a final and executory judgment is likewise a ministerial
function of the courts 22 and does not call for the exercise of discretion. Being a ministerial
duty, a writ ofmandamus lies to compel its performance. 23 Moreover, it is axiomatic that
where a decision on the merits is rendered and the same has become final and executory, as
in this case, the action on procedural matters or issues becomes moot and academic. 24 Thus,
the so-called consulta to the Commissioner of Land Registration, which is not applicable
herein, was only a naive and belated effort resorted to by petitioners in order to delay
execution. If petitioners desire to stop the enforcement of a final and executory decision, they
should have secured the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, 25 but which they did not
avail knowing that there exists no legal or even equitable justifications to support it. cdll
At any rate, at the time petitioner Banaga sold the property to petitioner Tan, the latter was
well aware of the interest of private respondent over the lot. Petitioner Tan furnished the
amount used by petitioner Banaga for the attempted redemption. One who redeems in vain a
property of another acquires notice that there could be a controversy. It is for the same reason
that petitioner Tan was included as party to the case filed in court. Worse, at the time of the
sale, petitioner Tan was buying a property not registered in the seller's name. This clear from
the deed of absolute sale which even mentioned that the Certificates of Title is still in the name
of private respondent. It is settled that a party dealing with a registered land need not go
beyond the Certificate of Title to determine the true owner thereof so as to guard or protect her
interest. She has only to look and rely on the entries in the Certificate of Title. By looking at the
title, however, petitioner Tan cannot feigned ignorance that the property is registered in
private respondent's name and not in the name of the person selling to her. Such fact alone
should have at least prompted, if not impelled her to investigate deeper into the title of her
seller petitioner Banaga, more so when such effort would not have entailed additional
hardship, and would have been quite easy, as the titles still carried the two notices of lis
pendens.
By virtue of such notices, petitioner Tan is bound by the outcome of the litigation subject of
the lis pendens. As a transferee pendente lite, she stands exactly in the shoes of the transferor
and must respect any judgment or decree which may be rendered for or against the transferor.
Her interest is subject to the incidents or results of the pending suit, and her Certificates of
Title will, in that respect, afford her no special protection. 26
To repeat, at the time of the sale, the person from whom petitioner Tan bought the property is
neither the registered owner nor was the former authorized by the latter to sell the same. She
knew she was not dealing with the registered owner or a representative of the latter. One who
buys property with full knowledge of the flaws and defects in the title of his vendor is enough
proof of his bad faith 27 and cannot claim that he acquired title in good faith as against the
owner or of an interest therein. 28 When she nonetheless proceeded to buy the lot, petitioner
Tan gambled on the result of litigation. 29 She is bound by the outcome of her indifference
with no one to blame except herself if she looses her claim as against one who has a superior
right or interest over the property. These are the undeniable and uncontroverted facts found
by the CA, which petitioners even quote and cite in their petition. As aptly concluded by the CA
that petitioner Tan is indeed a buyer in bad faith on which the Court agrees: llcd
"Notwithstanding her constructive and actual knowledge that Damalerio
was claiming the land, that the land was in his name, and it was involved
in pending litigation, Jovita Tan bought it from Banaga on January 7,
1993. The deed of sale recites that the parcels of land sold were covered
by Transfer Certificates of Title No. ___ (formerly [T-12488] T-530) and
TCT No. ____ (formerly [T-12488] T-530), (sic) "and TCT No. ____
(formerly P-1294). (Annex "F", Petition). Apart from the fact that Banaga
was without any TCT, as abovestated, TCT No. T-12488 was petitioner's
title (Annex "C", Petition). Herein private respondent Tan was buying a
land not registered in her seller's (Banaga's) name, but in that of
petitioner Damalerio who had been claiming it as his own. She admitted
this fact when she had the land subdivided on February 2, 1993 not in her
name but in the name of Candelario Damalerio (Annex "Q", Reply).
Evidently, she was a purchaser in bad faith because she had full
knowledge of the flaws and defects of title of her seller, Banaga. . . .
"The notice of lis pendens registered on March 3, 1993 involving the land
in question and private respondent Tan's actual knowledge of the then
pending Civil Case No. 2556, where the question as to whether the
redemption of the land which she financed was raised, rendered her a
 purchaser in bad faith and made the decision therein binding upon
her." 30
Being a buyer in bad faith, petitioner Tan cannot acquire a better rights than her predecessor
in interest, 31 for she merely stepped into the shoes of the latter. Such finding of bad faith is
final and may not be re-opened for the law cannot allow the parties to trifle with the courts. 32
With respect to the issue of possession, such right is a necessary incident of
ownership. 33 The adjudication of ownership to private respondent includes the delivery of
possession since the defeated parties in this case has not shown by what right to retain
possession of the land independently of their claim of ownership which was
rejected. 34 Otherwise, it would be unjust if petitioners who has no valid right over the
property will retain the same. 35 Thus, the CA correctly disagreed with the trial court's order
denying private respondent's motion for writ of possession for the following reasons cited in its
decision: LibLex
1. The order violates the doctrine laid down in Javier vs. Court of Appeals,
224 SCRA 704, which ruled that the issuance of title in favor of a
purchaser in bad faith does not exempt the latter from complying with the
decision adverse to his predecessor in interest, nor preclude him from
being reached by writ of execution;
2. Private respondent Tan was a party respondent in CA-G.R. SP No.
29869, she having been impleaded in a supplemental petition, which this
Court gave due course and required the respondents to file their answer.
The fact that she did not file any pleading, nor intervene therein did not
excuse her from being bound by the decision, otherwise all that a party
respondent was to fold his arm to prevent him from being bound by a
decision in a case. Her securing titles over the land during the pendency of
said case did not protect her from the effects of said decision. The validity
of title of a purchaser of registered land depends on whether he had
knowledge, actual or constructive, of defects in the title of his vendor. If
he has such knowledge, he is a purchaser in bad faith and acquires the
land subject to such defects (. . . indicates that citations of authorities
omitted). The title secured by a purchaser in bad faith is a nullity and gave
the latter no right whatsoever, as against the owner (. . .).
3. Private respondent Tan's titles and those of her predecessor, Banaga,
arose from the void orders of August 7, 1992 and January 4, 1993. Since
a void order could not give rise to valid rights, said titles were also
necessarily null and void (. . .).
4. Private respondents and respondent Judge executed the questioned
orders of August 7, 1993 and January 4, 1993, pending review of said
orders in CA-G.R. SP No. 29869. The nullification of said orders by this out
imposed upon the private respondents the obligation to return the
property to Damalerio and upon respondent Judge, upon motion for
execution, to order the cancellation of private respondent's titles and the
issuance of new titles to him.
5. This Court in its decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 29869 declared petitioner
Damalerio absolute owner of the property in question. Private
respondents were parties litigants in said case, who did not claim
possession of the land separately from their claim of ownership thereof.
Such being the case, the delivery of possession is considered included in
this Court's decision declaring Damalerio absolute owner of the property
(. . .), which can be enforced by writ of possession (. . .). In denying
petitioner's motion for writ of possession, the trial court violated said
doctrines, and
6. Lastly, the effect of respondent Judge's order of March 29, 1996 is to
re-open the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 29689 for re-litigation and
alteration in a separate action. For while this Court already declared that
Banaga's redemption of the land financed by private respondent Tan was
invalid, and as a consequence declared Damalerio absolute owner of the
property, which was binding against private respondent Tan, as she was a
respondent therein and a purchaser pendente lite and in bad faith, the
order of the respondent Court holding that another civil action be filed to
annul private respondent Tan's titles would be to re-litigate such issues
and modify or alter this Court's final decision. prcd
The respondent Court has no authority to do so." 36
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto with costs against petitioners. No further proceeding
will be entertained in this case.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Toledo-Banaga v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127941, [January 28, 1999])
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 163118. April 27, 2007.]
DORIS CHIONGBIAN-OLIVA, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CEBU
CITY, respondents.
This petition for certiorari assails (1) the Decision 1 dated August 7, 2003 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 74409, reversing the Decision 2 dated December 13, 2001 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 12 in SP. Proc. No. 10746-CEB, and (2) the
Resolution 3 dated March 17, 2004, denying the motion for reconsideration.
The following facts are undisputed.
Petitioner Doris Chiongbian-Oliva is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Talamban, Cebu
City, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 5455. 4 This title originated from
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1066 from a free patent granted on September 11, 1969
under Commonwealth Act No. 141, 5 as amended. The free patent, OCT No. 1066, and TCT
No. 5455 contained the condition that a forty-meter legal easement from the bank of any river
or stream shall be preserved as permanent timberland. 6
On October 1, 2001, petitioner filed a petition for reduction of legal easement docketed as SP.
Proc. No. 10746-CEB before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 12. Petitioner
alleged that the property is residential as shown by the tax declaration 7 and the
Certification 8 of the Office of the City Assessor. Thus, the applicable legal easement is only
three meters pursuant to Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
Administrative Order No. 99-21, 9 and not forty meters, which applies to timberlands and
forest lands. Petitioner also alleged that enforcing the forty-meter legal easement would
virtually deprive her of the use and enjoyment of the property since it consists only of 1,000
square meters.
The DENR countered that the property is inalienable. It also claimed that the applicant agreed
on the forty-meter legal easement when the free patent was applied for.
The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner. It said that there is no longer any reason for the
forty-meter legal easement because the property had been transformed into residential land
and the area where it is located has been reclassified as urban. Applying DENR A.O. No. 99-21,
the applicable legal easement is only three meters. The decision's decretal portion states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby ordered that the legal
encumbrance of forty (40) meters for river bank protection annotated on
Petitioner's Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5455 be reduced to the
applicable legal easement of three (3) meters in accordance with law.
Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Cebu City is hereby directed to
cancel the above legal encumbrance of forty (40) meters annotated on
Petitioner's Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5455 and in lieu thereof,
annotate the applicable legal encumbrance of three (3) meters for river
bank protection.
SO ORDERED. 10
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision. It upheld the DENR's claim
that the property was inalienable. Accordingly, a positive act of the government was necessary
to declassify it from forest land to alienable land. Declaration of the property as residential in
the tax declaration and reclassification of the area where it is located as urban were insufficient
bases to reclassify the property. The fallo of the appellate court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated December 13,
2001, of the Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 12, Cebu
City, in SP. PROC. NO. 10746-CEB, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 11
The appellate court later denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner now raises the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER'S LOT COVERED BY THE LEGAL
ENCUMBRANCE IS A PUBLIC LAND/LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (AND
THUS, CANNOT BE RECLASSIFIED EXCEPT BY THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT) OF THE GOVERNMENT, OR A PRIVATE LAND.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT IS CORRECT IN TAKING JUDICIAL
NOTICE OF THE FACT THAT PETITIONER'S LOT COVERED BY TCT NO.
5455 IS SITUATED IN AN URBAN AREA AND NOT IN A FOREST AREA, AND
IN THUS CONCLUDING THAT THE LEGAL EASEMENT APPLICABLE FOR
RIVER BANK PROTECTION IS THREE (3) METERS AND NOT FORTY (40)
METERS.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 90(i) OF C.A. NO. 141 WHICH PROVIDES
FOR A UNIFORM EASEMENT OF FORTY (40) METERS FROM THE BANK ON
EACH SIDE OF ANY RIVER, AND WHICH PRESERVES THE SAID 40-METER
PORTION AS PERMANENT TIMBERLAND REGARDLESS OF WHETHER IT IS
SITUATED IN A FOREST AREA OR AN URBAN AREA, IS STILL APPLICABLE
TO LOTS SITUATED IN AN URBAN AREA IN THE LIGHT OF THE
PROVISIONS OF SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATION, SPECIFICALLY SECTION 51
OF P.D. NO. 1067. 12
Simply stated, the issues are: (1) Is the property public or private land? and (2) Is the
applicable legal easement forty or three meters?
On the first issue, C.A. No. 141, as amended, provides that lands of the public domain may be
classified by the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources, into: (1) alienable or disposable; (2) timber; and (3) mineral
lands. 13 However, only alienable or disposable lands may be disposed of through any of the
forms of concession enumerated in the law. 14 A free patent is one of such
concessions 15 and once it is registered and the corresponding certificate of title issued, the
land covered by them ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private
property. 16
Verily, by the issuance of a free patent on September 11, 1969, and the subsequent issuance
of OCT No. 1066 and TCT No. 5455, the property in this case had become private land. It is
inconsistent for an alienable land of the public domain to be covered by a free patent and at the
same time retain its character as public land.
On the second issue, Section 90 (i) of C.A. No. 141 requires that a forty-meter legal easement
from the bank of any river or stream shall be preserved as permanent timberland. More
specifically, it provides:
(i) That the applicant agrees that a strip forty meters wide starting
from the bank on each side of any river or stream that may be found on
the land applied for, shall be demarcated and preserved as
permanent timberland to be planted exclusively to trees of known
economic value, and that he shall not make any clearing thereon or utilize
the same for ordinary farming purposeseven after patent shall have
been issued to him or a contract of lease shall have been executed in
his favor. (Emphasis supplied.)
To implement this, the DENR promulgated A.O. No. 99-21 which provides the guidelines in the
processing, verification, and approval of isolated and cadastral surveys. Pertinent to this case
are the following provisions:
 2.1 Original Surveys:
2.1.a Public Lands:
All alienable and disposable (A and D) lands of the
public domain shall be surveyed pursuant to Section 1
Par. (1) of R.A. 1273 [C.A. No. 141, Section 90(i)]
whereby a strip of forty (40) meters wide starting from
the banks on each side of any river or stream that may
be found on the land shall be demarcated and
preserved as permanent timberland.
Likewise, to be demarcated are public lands along the
banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas
and lakes throughout their entire length and within a
zone of three (3) meters in urban areas, twenty (20)
meters in agricultural areas and forty (40) meters in
forest area, along their margins which are subject to the
easement for public use in the interest of recreation,
navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage.
xxx xxx xxx
2.3 Survey of Titled Lands:
2.3.1 Administratively Titled Lands:
The provisions of item 2.1.a and 2.1.b shall be observed
as the above. However, when these lands are to be
subdivided, consolidated or consolidated-subdivided,
the strip of three (3) meters which falls within urban
areas shall be demarcated and marked on the plan for
easement and bank protection.
The purpose of these strips of land shall be
noted in the technical description and annotated in the
title.
xxx xxx xxx
Running in parallel vein is the Water Code of the Philippines 17 which provides:
Art. 51. The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and
lakes throughout their entire length and within a zone of three (3) meters
in urban areas, twenty (20) meters in agricultural areas and forty (40)
meters in forest areas, along their margins, are subject to the easement
of public use in the interest of recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing and
salvage. No person shall be allowed to stay in this zone longer than what
is necessary for recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or salvage or to
build structures of any kind.
Since the property in this case was originally alienable land of the public domain, the
application for free patent contained the condition that a forty-meter legal easement from the
banks on each side of any river or stream found on the land shall be demarcated and preserved
as permanent timberland. However, after the property was administratively titled, it
underwent several surveys for purposes of subdivision, consolidation, or
consolidation-subdivision as evidenced by TCT No. 5455. This title provides that it is a transfer
from TCT Nos. 3975 and 4360 18 and describes the property as Lot 2 of the
consolidation-subdivision plan Pcs-07-002121, being a portion of Lot 6 and 7
Pcs-07-000974. 19 Thus, presently only three meters is required to be demarcated and
preserved as permanent timberland.
In this case, the trial court properly took judicial notice that Talamban, Cebu City is an urban
area. Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take and act
on without proof because they already know them. 20 A municipal jurisdiction, whether
designated as chartered city or provincial capital, is considered as urban in its entirety if it has
a population density of at least 1,000 persons per square kilometer. 21 The City of Cebu was
created on October 20, 1934 under Commonwealth Act No. 58. 22 It is a highly urbanized city
classified as entirely urban. 23 Thus, all its barangays, including Talamban, are considered
urban.
Conformably with the foregoing considerations, the reduction of the legal easement of forty
meters on petitioner's property covered by TCT No. 5455 to three meters now is in order.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated August 7, 2003 and
Resolution dated March 17, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 74409 are
REVERSED, and the Decision dated December 13, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, Branch 12 in SP. Proc. No. 10746-CEB is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Chiongbian-Oliva v. Republic, G.R. No. 163118, [April 27, 2007], 550 PHIL 693-702)
[G.R. No. 215009. January 23, 2017.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CARMEN
SANTORIO GALENO, respondent.
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the Decision 2 dated June
27, 2013 and the Resolution 3 dated September 17, 2014 rendered by the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 02085, affirming the Orders dated October 13,
2006 4 and January 22, 2007 5 of the Regional Trial Court of Dumangas, Iloilo, Branch 68
(RTC), which allowed the correction of the area of Lot No. 2285 in Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 46417 from 20,948 square meters to 21,298 square meters. HTcADC
The Facts
On September 2, 2003, respondent Carmen Santorio Galeno (respondent) filed a
petition 6 for correction of the area of Lot No. 2285 covered by OCT No. 46417, Dingle
Cadastre (subject property) before the RTC. She alleged therein that she is one of the
co-owners of the subject property by virtue of a Deed of Sale 7 dated July 6, 1962. The
survey and subdivision of the subject property was duly approved by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) per its Approved Subdivision Plan of Lot No.
2285. 8
Respondent further alleged that when she and her co-owners had the subject
property resurveyed for the purpose of partition, they discovered a discrepancy in the
land area of the subject property as appearing in OCT No. 46417, 9 in that the title
reflects an area of 20,948 square meters, while the Certification 10 issued by the DENR
Office of the Regional Technical Director, Lands Management Services, shows an area
of 21,298 square meters. Hence, she sought to correct the area of the subject property in
order to avoid further confusion, and claimed to have notified the adjoining owners. 11
There being no opposition to the petition, the RTC allowed the presentation of
respondent's evidence ex parte before the Branch Clerk as well as for the satisfaction of
the jurisdictional requirements. 12
The RTC Ruling
In an Order 13 dated October 13, 2006, the RTC granted the petition upon a
finding that respondent was able to substantiate the allegations in her petition to warrant
a correction of the area of the subject property. Hence, it directed the Register of Deeds
of the Province of Iloilo to correct such area in OCT No. 46417 from 20,948 to 21,298
square meters. 14
Herein petitioner Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that the adjoining
owners had not been notified, stressing that such notice is a jurisdictional
requirement. 15 In the Order 16 dated January 22, 2007, the RTC denied the motion,
finding that a Notice of Hearing 17 was sent to the adjoining owners. As such, respondent
was able to prove compliance with the said jurisdictional requirement. 18
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. 19
The CA Ruling
In a Decision 20 dated June 27, 2013, the CA affirmed the RTC Order. It found
that respondent, by a preponderance of evidence, was able to prove, based on the records
of the proper government authority, i.e., the Office of the Technical Director, Land
Management Services of the DENR, that the true and correct area of the subject property
was 21,298 square meters as shown in the approved plan. Moreover, petitioner failed to
rebut with contrary evidence respondent's claim that she and her co-owners followed the
boundaries in the technical description of OCT No. 46417 when they caused its resurvey.
In fact, no proof had been adduced to show that the boundaries had been altered. Also,
the CA pointed out that none of the adjoining owners, who were properly notified of the
proceedings and who stand to be adversely affected by the change in the land area of the
subject property, objected to respondent's petition. 21
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration 22 was denied in a Resolution 23 dated
September 17, 2014; hence, this petition. aScITE
The Issue before the Court
The issue advanced for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in
upholding the correction of the area of the subject property in OCT No. 46417.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
A scrutiny of the evidence marked and formally offered by respondent before the
court a quo shows that the former failed to prove that there was sufficient basis to allow
the correction of the area of the subject property in OCT No. 46417 from 20,948 square
meters to 21,248 square meters.
Records reveal that respondent offered in evidence the following
documents: (a) the Certification 24 issued by a certain Althea C. Acevedo (Acevedo),
Engineer IV, Chief of the Technical Services Section of the Office of the Regional Technical
Director, Land Management Services of the DENR in Iloilo City, which states that "the true
and correct area of [L]ot 2285, Cad. 246 Dingle Cadastre is 21,928 square
meters"; (b) the technical description 25 of Lot No. 2285, a copy of which was certified by
Ameto Caballero (Caballero), Chief of the Surveys Division, while another copy was
certified correct by Acevedo; and (c) the approved subdivision plan of Lot No.
2258, 26 certified by Rogelio M. Santome (Santome), Geodetic Engineer; Alfredo
Muyarsas (Muyarsas), Chief of the Regional Surveys Division, and Edgardo R. Gerobin
(Gerobin), OIC, Regional Technical Director of the Land Management Services, DENR. On
the strength of these pieces of evidence, respondent sought a reconciliation of the area of
the subject property with the records of the DENR.
Unfortunately, the foregoing documentary evidence are not sufficient to warrant
the correction prayed for. The Court cannot accord probative weight upon them in view of
the fact that the public officers who issued the same did not testify in court to prove the
facts stated therein.
In Republic v. Medida, 27 the Court held that certifications of the Regional
Technical Director, DENR cannot be considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein, holding that:
Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence as follows:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers,
whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except
last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private
documents required by law to be entered therein.
Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents
referred to in Section 19(a), when admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy x x x.
Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
provides:
"Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence.
Documents consisting of entries in public records
made in the performance of a duty by a public officer
are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
All other public documents are evidence, even
against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to
their execution and of the date of the latter."
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR,
certifications [do] not fall within the class of public documents
contemplated in the first sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132.
The certifications do not reflect "entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer," such as entries made by the
 Civil Registrar in the books of registries, or by a ship captain in the
ship's logbook. The certifications are not the certified copies or
authenticated reproductions of original official records in the
legal custody of a government office. The certifications are not
even records of public documents. x x x 28 (Emphases supplied)
As such, sans the testimonies of Acevedo, Caballero, and the other public
officers who issued respondent's documentary evidence to confirm the veracity of its
contents, the same are bereft of probative value and cannot, by their mere issuance,
prove the facts stated therein. 29 At best, they may be considered only as prima
facie evidence of their due execution and date of issuance but do not constitute prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein. 30
In fact, the contents of the certifications are hearsay because respondent's sole
witness and attorney-in-fact, Lea Galeno Barraca, was incompetent to testify on the
veracity of their contents, 31 as she did not prepare any of the certifications nor was she
a public officer of the concerned government agencies. Notably, while it is true that the
public prosecutor who represented petitioner interposed no objection to the admission of
the foregoing evidence in the proceedings in the court below, 32 it should be borne in
mind that "hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value unless
the proponent can show that the evidence falls within the exceptions to the hearsay
evidence rule," 33 which do not, however, obtain in this case. Verily, while respondent's
documentary evidence may have been admitted due to the opposing party's lack of
objection, it does not, however, mean that they should be accorded any probative weight.
The Court has explained that: HEITAD
The general rule is that hearsay evidence is not admissible.
However, the lack of objection to hearsay testimony may result in its
being admitted as evidence. But one should not be misled into thinking
that such declarations are thereby impressed with probative value.
Admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of
evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not cannot be given
credence for it has no probative value. 34
Besides, case law states that the "absence of opposition from government
agencies is of no controlling significance because the State cannot be estopped by the
omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents. Neither is the Republic barred from
assailing the decision granting the petition for reconstitution [or correction of title, as in
this case] if, on the basis of the law and the evidence on record, such petition has no
merit." 35 Moreover, "in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must produce a
preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendant's." 36
In fine, the Court holds that respondent did not present any competent evidence
to prove that the true and correct area of the subject property is 21,298 square meters
instead of 20,948 square meters to warrant a correction thereof in OCT No. 46417.
Accordingly, respondent's petition for the correction of the said Certificate of Title must be
denied, and the present petition be granted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated June 27,
2013 and the Resolution dated September 17, 2014 rendered by the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 02085 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Carmen Santorio
Galeno's petition for correction of area of Lot No. 2285 on Original Certificate of Title No.
46417 is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.