LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES v.

COMELEC

Facts:

During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities.
However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.

During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law RA 9009 amending Section 450 of the Local
Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a
city from P20 million to P100 million to restrain the mad rush of municipalities to convert into cities
solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable
of fiscal independence.

Prior to its enactment, a total of 57 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in Congress. Congress did
not act on 24 cityhood bills during the 11th Congress. During the 12th Congress, the House of
Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29. This Resolution reached the Senate. However, the
12th Congress adjourned without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29. During the 13th
Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities mentioned in the unapproved Joint Resolution No. 29 filed
between November and December of 2006, through their respective sponsors in Congress, individual
cityhood bills containing a common provision, as follows:

Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. - The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income
requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.These cityhood bills lapsed into law on various
dates from March to July 2007 after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo failed to sign them. Petitioners
filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also
lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities
in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue
set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.

Are the cityhood laws converting 16 municipalities into cities constitutional?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

November 18, 2008 Ruling

No. The SC (voting 6-5) ruled that the exemptions in the City Laws is unconstitutional because sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution
requires that such exemption must be written into the LGC and not into any other laws. The Cityhood Laws violate sec. 6, Art. X of the
Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units. The criteria, as prescribed in
sec. 450 of the LGC, must be strictly followed because such criteria prescribed by law, are material in determining the just share of local
government units (LGUs) in national taxes. (League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec GR No. 176951, November 18, 2008)

March 31, 2009 Ruling

No. The SC denied the first Motion for Reconsideration. 7-5 vote.
April 28, 2009 Ruling

No. The SC En Banc, by a split vote (6-6), denied a second motion for reconsideration.

December 21, 2009 Ruling

Yes. The SC (voting 6-4) reversed its November 18, 2008 decision and declared as constitutional the Cityhood Laws or Republic Acts
(RAs) converting 16 municipalities into cities. It said that based on Congress deliberations and clear legislative intent was that the then pending
cityhood bills would be outside the pale of the minimum income requirement of PhP100 million that Senate Bill No. 2159 proposes; and RA
9009 would not have any retroactive effect insofar as the cityhood bills are concerned. The conversion of a municipality into a city will only
affect its status as a political unit, but not its property as such, it added. The Court held that the favorable treatment accorded the sixteen
municipalities by the cityhood laws rests on substantial distinction.
The Court stressed that respondent LGUs were qualified cityhood applicants before the enactment of RA 9009. To impose on them the much
higher income requirement after what they have gone through would appear to be indeed unfair. Thus, the imperatives of fairness dictate that
they should be given a legal remedy by which they should be allowed to prove that they have all the necessary qualifications for city status using
the criteria set forth under the LGC of 1991 prior to its amendment by RA 9009. (GR No. 176951, League of Cities of the Philippines v.
COMELEC; GR No. 177499, League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC; GR No. 178056, League of Cities of the Philippines v.
COMELEC, December 21, 2009) NOTE: The November 18, 2008 ruling already became final and executory and was recorded in the SCs Book
of Entries of Judgments on May 21, 2009.)

August 24, 2010 Ruling

No. The SC (voting 7-6) granted the motions for reconsideration of the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), et al. and reinstated
its November 18, 2008 decision declaring unconstitutional the Cityhood Laws or Republic Acts (RAs) converting 16 municipalities into cities.
Undeniably, the 6-6 vote did not overrule the prior majority en banc Decision of 18 November 2008, as well as the prior majority en banc
Resolution of 31 March 2009 denying reconsideration. The tie-vote on the second motion for reconsideration is not the same as a tie-vote on the
main decision where there is no prior decision, the Court said. In the latest resolution, the Court reiterated its November 18, 2008 ruling that the
Cityhood Laws violate sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution which expressly provides that no cityshall be createdexcept in accordance with
the criteria established in the local government code. It stressed that while all the criteria for the creation of cities must be embodied exclusively
in the Local Government Code, the assailed Cityhood Laws provided an exemption from the increased income requirement for the creation of
cities under sec. 450 of the LGC. The unconstitutionality of the Cityhood Laws lies in the fact that Congress provided an exemption contrary to
the express language of the Constitution.Congress exceeded and abused its law-making power, rendering the challenged Cityhood Laws void
for being violative of the Constitution, the Court held.

The Court further held that limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the classification must
apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16
respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of
League of
the Local Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. (GR No. 176951,
Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec; GR No. 177499, League of Cities of the Philippines v.
Comelec; GR No. 178056, League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec, August 24, 2010)
February 15, 2011 Ruling

Yes, the laws are constitutional. The February 15, 2011 resolution is the fourth ruling since the High Court first resolved the Cityhood
case in 2008.

April 12, 2011Ruling

Yes! Its final. The 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional. We should not ever lose sight of the fact that the 16 cities covered by the
Cityhood Laws not only had conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, but have also complied with the requirements of the [Local
Government Code] LGC prescribed prior to its amendment by RA No. 9009. Congress undeniably gave these cities all the considerations that
justice and fair play demanded. Hence, this Court should do no less by stamping its imprimatur to the clear and unmistakable legislative intent
and by duly recognizing the certain collective wisdom of Congress, the SC said.

The Court stressed that Congress clearly intended that the local government units covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted from
the coverage of RA 9009, which imposes a higher income requirement of PhP100 million for the creation of cities.

The Court reiterated that while RA 9009 was being deliberated upon, the Congress was well aware of the pendency of conversion
bills of several municipalities, including those covered by the Cityhood Laws. It pointed out that RA 9009 took effect on June 30, 2001, when the
12th Congress was incipient. By reason of the clear legislative intent to exempt the municipalities covered by the conversion bills pending during
the 11th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 entitled Joint Resolution to Exempt Certain Municipalities
Embodied in Bills Filed in Congress before June 30, 2001 from the coverage of Republic Act No. 9009. However, the Senate failed to act on the
said Joint Resolution. Even so, the House readopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 during the 12th Congress, and forwarded
the same for approval to the Senate, which again failed to prove it. Eventually, the conversion bills of respondents were individually filed in the
Lower House and fellesters.blogspot.com were all unanimously and favorably voted upon. When forwarded to the Senate, the bills were also
unanimously approved. The acts of both Chambers of Congress show that the exemption clauses ultimately incorporated in the Cityhood Laws
are but the express articulations of the clear legislative intent to exempt the respondents, without exception, from the coverage of RA No. 9009.
Thereby, RA 9009, and, by necessity, the LCG, were amended, not by repeal but by way of the express exemptions being embodied in the
exemption clauses.(http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/news/courtnews%20flash/2011/04/04141101.php)

The Court held that the imposition of the income requirement of P100 million from local sources under RA 9009 was arbitrary.
While the Constitution mandates that the creation of local government units must comply with the criteria laid down in the LGC, it cannot be
justified to insist that the Constitution must have to yield to every amendment to the LGC despite such amendment imminently producing effects
contrary to the original thrusts of the LGC to promote autonomy, decentralization, countryside development, and the concomitant national
growth. (GR No. 176951, League of City of the Philippines v. COMELEC; GR No. 177499, League of City of the Philippines v.
COMELEC: GR No. 178056, League of City of the Philippines v. COMELEC, April 12, 2011)

197 SCRA 52 Political Law Constitutional Law Bill of Rights Equal Protection Clause

Municipal Corporation Local Autonomy Imperium in Imperio

In 1977, the Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was

created by Presidential Decree 1067-A. PD 1067-B meanwhile granted PAGCOR the power to
establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines. PAGCORs operation was a success hence in 1978, PD 1399
was passed which expanded PAGCORs power. In 1983, PAGCORs charter was updated
through PD 1869. PAGCORs charter provides that PAGCOR shall regulate and centralize all
games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. Section 1 of PD 1869
provides:

Section 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to

centralize and integrate all games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing franchises or
permitted by law.

Atty. Humberto Basco and several other lawyers assailed the validity of the law creating
PAGCOR. They claim that PD 1869 is unconstitutional because a) it violates the equal
protection clause and b) it violates the local autonomy clause of the constitution.

Basco et al argued that PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause because it legalizes
PAGCOR-conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together with
prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices.

Anent the issue of local autonomy, Basco et al contend that P.D. 1869 forced cities like Manila
to waive its right to impose taxes and legal fees as far as PAGCOR is concerned; that Section 13
par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying any tax of
any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature,
whether National or Local is violative of the local autonomy principle.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause.

2. Whether or not PD 1869 violates the local autonomy clause.

HELD:

1. No. Just how PD 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the equal
protection is not clearly explained in Bascos petition. The mere fact that some gambling
activities like cockfighting (PD 449) horse racing (RA 306 as amended by RA 983),
sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by BP 42) are legalized under certain
conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, PD. 1869 for one,
unconstitutional.

Bascos posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause equal protection of the laws.
The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different
treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary. A law does
not have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Sec 1
of the Constitution. The equal protection clause does not prohibit the Legislature from
establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate. The
Constitution does not require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law
as though they were the same.

2. No. Section 5, Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy
taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may
provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall
accrue exclusively to the local government.

A close reading of the above provision does not violate local autonomy (particularly on taxing
powers) as it was clearly stated that the taxing power of LGUs are subject to such guidelines and
limitation as Congress may provide.

Further, the City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose
taxes. The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed
that municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress which has the power to create and
abolish municipal corporations due to its general legislative powers. Congress, therefore, has
the power of control over Local governments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the
power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.

Further still, local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National
Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original
charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. Otherwise,
its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local government.

This doctrine emanates from the supremacy of the National Government over local
governments.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995

JUANITO MARIANO, JR. et al., petitioners,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.

G.R. No. 118627 March 7, 1995

JOHN R. OSMEA, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.

PUNO, J.:

At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional.
R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati." 1

G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. It was filed by petitioners Juanito
Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita
Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only
Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila.
Suing as taxpayers, they assail as unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the
following grounds:

1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial
jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local
Government Code;

2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three consecutive term"
limit for local elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI
of the Constitution.

3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:

(a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the
Charter in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a general
reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three (3) years
following the return of every census;

(b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the
bill; and
 (c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord
with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey
(1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only 450,000.

G.R. No. 118627 was filed by the petitioner John H. Osmea as senator, taxpayer, and concerned citizen.
Petitioner assails section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional on the same grounds as aforestated.

We find no merit in the petitions.

Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati, thus:

Sec. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly
urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which
shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila
Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond
by the City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the
municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the
Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila.

The foregoing provision shall be without prejudice to the resolution by the appropriate
agency or forum of existing boundary disputes or cases involving questions of territorial
jurisdiction between the City of Makati and the adjoining local government units.
(Emphasis supplied)

In G.R. No. 118577, petitioners claim that this delineation violates sections 7 and 450 of the Local
Government Code which require that the area of a local government unit should be made by metes and
bounds with technical descriptions. 2

The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of government
cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial
jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the
limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local government
units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the
people's welfare. This is the evil sought to avoided by the Local Government Code in requiring that the
land area of a local government unit must be spelled out in metes and bounds, with technical
descriptions.

Given the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot perceive how this evil can be brought about by the
description made in section 2 of R.A. No. 7854, Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of
the land area of the proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. We note that said
delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality.
Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area of Makati. In language that
cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated that, the city's land area "shall comprise the present territory of the
municipality."

The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason why the land area of the
proposed City of Makati was not defined by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. At the time of
the consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig
over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of a becoming sense of respect to co-equal department
of government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to decide. They did not want to
foreclose the dispute by making a legislative finding of fact which could decide the issue. This would have
ensued if they defined the land area of the proposed city by its exact metes and bounds, with technical
descriptions. 3 We take judicial notice of the fact that Congress has also refrained from using the metes
and bounds description of land areas of other local government units with unsettled boundary disputes. 4

We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an insurmountable difficulty
which will prevent Congress from defining with reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local
government unit. In the cases at bench, Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the proposed
City of Makati but as an act of fairness, made them subject to the ultimate resolution by the courts.
Considering these peculiar circumstances, we are not prepared to hold that section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 is
unconstitutional. We sustain the submission of the Solicitor General in this regard, viz.:

Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code, it is beyond cavil that
the requirement stated therein, viz.: "the territorial jurisdiction of newly created or
converted cities should be described by meted and bounds, with technical descriptions"
was made in order to provide a means by which the area of said cities may be
reasonably ascertained. In other words, the requirement on metes and bounds was
meant merely as tool in the establishment of local government units. It is not an end in
itself. Ergo, so long as the territorial jurisdiction of a city may be reasonably ascertained,
i.e., by referring to common boundaries with neighboring municipalities, as in this case,
then, it may be concluded that the legislative intent behind the law has been sufficiently
served.

Certainly, Congress did not intends that laws creating new cities must contain therein
detailed technical descriptions similar to those appearing in Torrens titles, as petitioners
seem to imply. To require such description in the law as a condition sine qua non for its
validity would be to defeat the very purpose which the Local Government Code to seeks
to serve. The manifest intent of the Code is to empower local government units and to
give them their rightful due. It seeks to make local governments more responsive to the
needs of their constituents while at the same time serving as a vital cog in national
development. To invalidate R.A. No. 7854 on the mere ground that no cadastral type of
description was used in the law would serve the letter but defeat the spirit of the Code. It
then becomes a case of the master serving the slave, instead of the other way around.
This could not be the intendment of the law.

Too well settled is the rule that laws must be enforced when ascertained, although it may
not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of the
statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would
otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. (Torres v.
Limjap, 56 Phil., 141; Taada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051; Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 33 SCRA
1105). Legislation is an active instrument of government, which, for purposes of
interpretation, means that laws have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so
construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes (Bocolbo v.
Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520). The same rule must indubitably apply to the case at bar.

II

Petitioners in G.R. No. 118577 also assail the constitutionality of section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854.
Section 51 states:

Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent elective officials of the
Municipality of Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati and shall
exercise their powers and functions until such time that a new election is held and the
duly elected officials shall have already qualified and assume their offices: Provided, The
new city will acquire a new corporate existence. The appointive officials and employees
 of the City shall likewise continues exercising their functions and duties and they shall be
automatically absorbed by the city government of the City of Makati.

They contend that this section collides with section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution
which provide:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall
be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three
years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of
June next following their election.

No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

Petitioners stress that under these provisions, elective local officials, including Members of the House of
Representative, have a term of three (3) years and are prohibited from serving for more than three (3)
consecutive terms. They argue that by providing that the new city shall acquire a new corporate
existence, section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 restarts the term of the present municipal elective officials of
Makati and disregards the terms previously served by them. In particular, petitioners point that section 51
favors the incumbent Makati Mayor, respondent Jejomar Binay, who has already served for two (2)
consecutive terms. They further argue that should Mayor Binay decide to run and eventually win as city
mayor in the coming elections, he can still run for the same position in 1998 and seek another three-year
consecutive term since his previous three-year consecutive term as municipal mayor would not be
counted. Thus, petitioners conclude that said section 51 has been conveniently crafted to suit the political
ambitions of respondent Mayor Binay.

We cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section 51. The requirements before a litigant
can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case
or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the
constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the
constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. 5

Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of
many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he
would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998
elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a
hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents
of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist
this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.

III

Finally, petitioners in the two (2) cases at bench assail the constitutionality of section 52, Article X of R.A.
No. 7854. Section 52 of the Charter provides:
 Sec. 52. Legislative Districts. Upon its conversion into a highly-urbanized city, Makati
shall thereafter have at least two (2) legislative districts that shall initially correspond to
the two (2) existing districts created under Section 3(a) of Republic Act. No. 7166 as
implemented by the Commission on Elections to commence at the next national elections
to be held after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays Magallanes, Dasmarias
and Forbes shall be with the first district, in lieu of Barangay Guadalupe-Viejo which shall
form part of the second district. (emphasis supplied)

They contend. that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional for: (1)
reapportionment 6 cannot made by a special law, (2) the addition of a legislative district is not expressed
in the title of the bill 7 and (3) Makati's population, as per the 1990 census, stands at only four hundred
fifty thousand (450,000).

These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos. 8 In said case, we ruled that
reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a
new city. The Constitution 9 clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than two
hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not
preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general
reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and
providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only
be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each
local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or province
created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. 10 The
intolerable situations will deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty. 11
Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not
sovereignty.

Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with
section 5(3), Article VI 12 of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of
Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). 13 Said section provides, inter alia, that a city
with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative.
Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand
(450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population
requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative. 14

Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners' contention that the creation of an additional legislative district in
Makati should have been expressly stated in the title of the bill. In the same case of Tobias v. Abalos, op
cit., we reiterated the policy of the Court favoring a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule
so as not to impede legislation. To be sure, with Constitution does not command that the title of a law
should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its details. Hence, we ruled that "it should be
sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to such
general subject."

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Municipality of Jimenez vs. Hon. Vicente
Baz, Jr.
G.R. No. 105746
December 2, 1996

Facts:

The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by E.O. 258 by then Pres. Elpidio Quirino, pursuant
to Sec. 68 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917.
By virtue of Municipal Council Resolution No. 171, Sinacaban laid claim to a portion of Barrio
Tabo-o and to Barrios Macabayao, Adorable, Sinara, Baja, and Sinara Alto, based on the
technical dedcription in E.O. No. 258. The claim was filed with the Provincial Board of Misamis
Occidental against the Municipality of Jimenez.
While conceding that the disputed area is part of Sinacaban, the Municipality of Jimenez, in its
answer, nonetheless asserted jurisdiction on the basis of an agreement it had with the
Municipality of Sinacaban. This agreement, which was approved by the Provincial Board of
Misamis Occidental in its Resolution No. 77 dated February 18, 1950, fixed the common
boundary of Sinacaban and Jimenez.
On October 11, 1989, the Provincial Board declared the disputed area to be part of Sinacaban. It
held that the previous resolution approving the agreement between the parties was void since the
Board had no power to alter the boundaries of Sinacaban as fixed in E.O. 258, that power being
vested in Congress pursuant to the Constitution and the LGC of 1983 (BP 337), Sec. 134. The
Provincial Board denied the motion of Jimenez seeking reconsideration.
On March 20, 1990, Jimenez filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in the
RTC of Oroquieta City, Branch 14 against Sinacaban, the Province of Misamis Occidental and
its Provincial Board, the Commission on Audit, the Departments of Local Government, Budget
and Management, and the Executive Secretary.

Issues:
1. Whether Sinacaban has legal personality to file a claim
2. Whether R.A. 7160, Sec. 442 (d) is valid despite not conforming to the constitutional and
statutory requirements for the holding of plebiscites in the creation of new municipalities.
3. If it has legal personality, whether it is the boundary provided for in E.O. 258 or in Resolution
No. 77 of the Provincial board of Misamis Occidental which should be used as basis for
adjudicating Sinacabans territorial claim.

Held:
1. The principal basis for the view that Sinacaban was not validly created as a municipal
corporation is the ruling in Pelaez vs. Auditor General that the creation of municipal
corporations is essentially a legislative matter and therefore the President was without power to
create by executive order the Municipality of Sinacaban. However, where a municipality
created as such by executive order is later impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded
legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned.
A municipality has been conferred the status of at least a de facto municipal corporation where
its legal existence has been recognized and acquiesced publicly and officially.

A quo warranto suit against a corporation for forfeiture of its charter must be commenced within
5 years from the act complained of was done/committed. Sinacaban has been in existence for 16
years, yet the validity of E.O. No. 258 creating it had never been questioned. Created in 1949, it
was only 40 years later that its existence was questioned and only because it had laid claim to an
area that is apparently desired for its revenue. The State and even the Municipality of Jimenez
itself has recognized Sinacabans corporate existence. Sinacaban is constituted part of a
municipal circuit for purposes of the establishment of MTCs in the country. Jimenez had earlier
recognized Sinacaban in 1950 by entering into an agreement with it regarding their common
boundary.

The Municipality of Sinacaban attained a de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance appended to
the 1987 Constitution, apportioning legislative districts throughout the country, which considered
Sinacaban part of the Second District of Misamis Occidental. Sec. 442(d) of the Local
Government Code of 1991 must be deemed to have cured any defect in the creation of
Sinacaban since it states that:

Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist
and operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential
issuances/executive orders and which have their respective set of municipal officials holding
office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be regular municipalities.

2. Sinacaban is not subject to the plebiscite requirement since it attained de facto status at the
time the 1987 Constitution took effect. The plebiscite requirement for the creation of
municipalities applies only to new municipalities created for the first time under the Constitution
it cannot be applied to municipalities created before.

3. E.O. No. 258 does not say that Sinacaban comprises only the barrios (now barangays) therein
mentioned. What it says is that Sinacaban contains those barrios. The reason for this is that the
technical description, containing the metes and bounds of a municipalitys territory, is
controlling. The trial court correctly ordered a relocation survey as the only means of
determining the boundaries of the municipality & consequently to which municipality the
barangays in question belong.

Any alteration of boundaries that is not in accordance with the law is not the carrying into effect
of the law but its amendment and a resolution of a provincial Board declaring certain barrios
part of one or another municipality that is contrary to the technical description of the territory of
the municipality is not binding. If Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board of Misamis
Occidental is contrary to the technical description of the territory of Sinacaban, it cannot be used
by Jimenez as basis for opposing Sinacabans claim.

In case no settlement of boundary disputes is made, the dispute should be elevated to the RTC of
the province (Sec. 79, LGC of 1983). Jimenez properly brought to the RTC for review the
Decision and Resolution of the Provincial Board. This was in accordance with the LGC of 1983,
the governing law when the action was brought by Jimenez in 1989. The governing law now is
Secs. 118-119, LGC of 1991 (RA 7160).

Jimenezs contention that the RTC failed to decide the case within 1 yr from the start of the
proceedings as required by Sec. 79 of the LGC of 1983 and the 90-day period provided for in
Art.VIII, Sec.15 of the Constitution does not affect the validity of the decision rendered. Failure
of a court to decide within the period prescribed by law does not divest it of its jurisdiction to
decide the case but only makes the judge thereof liable for possible administrative sanction.