LEOUEL SANTOS VS COURT OF APPEALS

AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS

G.R. NO. 112019

FACTS: Leouel, a member of the Army, met Julia in Iloilo City. In September 1986, they got
married. The couple latter lived with Julias parents. Julia gave birth to a son in 1987. Their
marriage, however, was marred by the frequent interference of Julias parent as averred by
Leouel. The couple also occasionally quarrels about as to, among other things, when should
they start living independently from Julias parents. In 1988, Julia went to the US to work as a
nurse despite Leouels opposition. 7 months later, she and Leouel got to talk and she promised
to return home in 1989. She never went home that year. In 1990, Leouel got the chance to be in
the US due to a military training. During his stay, he desperately tried to locate his wife but to no
avail. Leouel, in an effort to at least have his wife come home, filed to nullify their marriage due
to Julias psychological incapacity. Leouel asserted that due to Julias failure to return home or
at least communicate with him even with all his effort constitutes psychological incapacity. Julia
attacked the complaint and she said that it is Leouel who is incompetent. The prosecutor
ascertained that there is no collusion between the two. Leouels petition is however denied by
the lower and appellate court.

ISSUE: Whether or not psychological incapacity is attendant to the case at bar.

HELD: Before deciding on the case, the SC noted that the Family Code did not define the term
psychological incapacity, which is adopted from the Catholic Canon Law. But basing it on the
deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, the provision in PI, adopted with less
specificity than expected, has been designed to allow some resiliency in its application. The
FCRC did not give any examples of PI for fear that the giving of examples would limit the
applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the FCRC would
like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since
the provision was taken from Canon Law. The term psychological incapacity defies any
precise definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety. Article 36 of the
Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of but must stand in conjunction
with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. PI should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which (Art. 68),
include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render
help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of PI to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated.

The SC also notes that PI must be characterized by

(a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence, and

(c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable
of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the
party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved. In the case at bar, although Leouel stands aggrieved, his petition
must be dismissed because the alleged PI of his wife is not clearly shown by the factual settings
presented. The factual settings do not come close to to the standard required to decree a nullity
of marriage.