Onesima Belen v BPI and Milagros Belen De Olaguera

October 31, 1960| Reyes, J.B.L., J. | Legacies and Devises

Digester: Anna Mickaella Lingat

SUMMARY: Benigno Diaz made a codicil naming Filomena Diaz as one of the legatees. Benigno died and his will was admitted for probate
and the estate was put under the administration of BPI as trustee. When Filomena died, she left two children Milagros Belen v de Olaguera
(married with 7 legitimate children) and Onesima Belen (single). Onesima filed a petition praying that BPI be ordered to deliver to her one-
half of her share. She contends that the estate of Filomena under a codicil should only be divided between her and Milagros, to the exclusion
of the 7 children. CFI held that the children should be included. Onesima invokes Art 959 where a distribution made in general terms in
favor of the testator shall be understood as made in favor of those nearest in degree. The Court ruled that the words sus descendientes
legitimos in the codicil of Benigno Diaz refer to all living descendants and not only to descendants nearest in degree.
DOCTRINE: The word descendant must be interpreted, in the absence of other indications of contrary intent, in that the proper rule to
apply is that the testator, by designating a class or group of legatees, intended all members to succeed per capita.

FACTS:
On September 29, 1944, Benigno Diaz executed a codicil which provides that:
(Loose google translation HUHUHELP)
o 9.0 - In case of death of some or all legatees appointed(?) by me, beneficiaries or legacies in favor only legitimate descendants and
ascendants, spouses but not widowers.
o 10.0 - Ten or fifteen years after my death all my properties, movable or immovable, rights and advantageous, they can proceed with
the sale of all giving preference to the legatees and their total amount thousand pesos (P1,000) is deducted for four children of my
late brother Fabian, all expenses and reserving enough and well cover calcumada(??) to the following people who still vuiven(??) or
their legitimate descendants distribute:
Isabel M. de Santiago - (50%)
Domingo Legarda children - (30%)
Filomena Diaz - (10%)
Nestor M. Santiago - (10%)
When Diaz died, the codicil was admitted to probate. The estate was thereafter put under the administration of BPI as trustee for the
benefit of the legatees.
Ten years later, Filomena Diaz died, leaving two legitimate children, Milagros Belen de Olaguera (married with 7 legitimate children) and
Onesima Belen (single).
Onesima filed a petition in Special Proceedings contending that the estate of Filomena under the codicil should only be divided between
her and Milagros, to the exclusion of the 7 legitimate children of Milagros. Onesima, as legatee, prayed that BPI be ordered to deliver
her one-half of whatever share is due to Filomena Diaz.
The Court denied this petition and held that the share of Filomena should also be distributed among her grandchildren. Descendientes
include not only children but also grandchildren. One may be a descendant but not yet an heir and vice versa.
Onesima appealed to this Court and argued that:
o The interpretation of Clause 10 of the codicil of the will of Benigno Diaz has not been affirmed in the previous case Arguelles v Belen
de Olaguera.
o The term sus descendeintes legitimos as used in the codicil, should be interpreted to mean descendants nearest in the degree to
the original legatee Filomena. In this case, they are her two daughters (Milagros and Onesima); thereby excluding the seven
grandchildren of said legatee.

RULING: Judgment is affirmed

Whether the words sus descendientes legitimos (their legitimate descendants) refer conjointly to all living descendant (children
and grandchildren) of the legatee, as a class (or do they refer to the descendants nearest in degree)? YES, it refers to all
living descendants.
Onesima argues: the phrase should be taken to mean the relatives nearest in degree. She invokes Article 959 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines: A distribution made in general terms in favor of the testator's relatives shall be understood as made in favor of those nearest
in degree.
Art 959 is specifically limited in its application to the case where the beneficiaries are relatives of the testator, not those of the legatee.
In such an event, the law assumes that the testator intended to refer to the rules of intestacy, in order to benefit the relatives closest to
him.
Manresa: la razon y la logica ha cen fundadamente suponer que, al procurar este favorecer a sus parientes, habria de ajustarse mas a
ligadas al mismo (testador) por los vinculos de la sanger y de la familia
o Translated: by reason and logic, we can reasonably assume that, in seeking this favor their relatives, would have to conform more to
come with it (testator) by the ties of family and sanger(?)
There is no logical reason in this case to presume that the testator intended to refer to the rules of intestacy, for he precisely made a
testament and provided substitutes for each legatee; nor can it be said that his affections would prefer the nearest relatives of the
legatee to those more distant, since he envisages all of them in a group, and only as mere substitutes for a preferred beneficiary.
There are various reasons against applying Art 959 by analogy.
o Under this article, the nearest of exclude all the farther relatives and right of representation does not operate.
o The history of Art 751 (of 1889 Code) shown that the right of representation was deliberately suppressed.
The result would be that by applying to the descendants of Filorema Diaz the "nearest relatives" rule of Article 959, the inheritance
would be limited to her children, or anyone of them, excluding the grandchildren altogether. This could hardly be the intention of the
testator who, in the same clause 10 of his council (ante), speaks of "cuatro hijos de mi difunto hermano Fabian" and of "los hijos de
Domingo Legarda," as well as of "descendientes legitimos" of the other legates, to us indicating clearly that he understood well that hijos
and descendientes are not synonymous terms.
It is suggested that "descendientes legitimos" could mean the nearest descendant but with the right of representation in favor of the
more distant relatives. The testator was at liberty to provide a series of successive substitutions in the order of proximity of relationship
to the original legatee. And he, likewise, was free to ordain that the more distant descendants should enjoy the right of representation as
in intestate succession.
However, it is necessary that the testator had:
o (a) Rejected, or intended to reject, the right of accretion among co-heirs and co-legatees, as established for testamentary successions
by Articles 1016 (old Art. 982) and 1019, and intended to replace such accretion with representation;
o (b) Refused, likewise, the rule of Article 846 (reproduced from Article 765 of the Code of 1889) providing that: Heirs instituted
without designation of shares shall inherit in equal parts, which would not obtain if the right of representation were to apply;
o (c) Rejected finally the rule of Article 1022 (old Art. 986), that vacancies in the free part should be filed according to the rules of
accretion or substitution (not representation); and in default of these two, ultimately inherited by the testator's own heirs intestate.
There is no doubt that, the testator's intention being the cardinal rule of succession in the absence of compulsory (forced) heirs, he could
have rendered inoperative all the articles mentioned, if he had so desired.
But without any other supporting circumstances, the Court deemed the expression "o a sus desecendientes legitimos," the testator
Benigno Diaz did intend to circumvent all the legal provisions heretofore quoted. It was incumbent upon appellant to prove such
intention on the part of the testator; yet she has not done so.
Wyeth, et al., vs. Crane: The meaning of the word "descendants", when used in a will or deed to designate a class to take property
passing by the will or deed, has been frequently considered and decided by the Court of England and the United States.
o They established rule in England from an early date was that the word "descendants" or the word "issued" unexplained by anything in
the context of the instrument, means all persons descending lineally from another, to the remotest degree, and includes persons
descended, even though their parents are living, and that such descendants take per capita stripes.
 In the absence of other indications of contrary intent, the proper rule to apply in the instant case is that the testator, by designating a
class or group of legatees, intended all members thereof to succeed per capita, in consonance with article 846.
So that the original legacy to Filomena Diaz should be equally divided among her surviving children and grandchildren.