Intestate Estate of Petra V. Rosales.

Irenea C. Rosales v. Fortunato Rosales, et. al.

G.R. No. L-40789, February 27, 1987

FACTS:

On February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra Rosales died intestate. She was survived by her
husband Fortunato Rosales and their two children Magna Rosales Acebes
and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosario, predeceased her, leaving behind
a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein
petitioner. Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased. The trial court ordered that Fortunato, Magna, Macikequerox
and Antonio be entitled each to share in the estate of decedent. Irenea, on the other
hand, insisted in getting a share of the estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of
the late Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of
her mother-in-law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Irenea is entitled to inherit from her mother-in-law.

RULING:

No. Under the law, intestate or legal heirs are classified into two groups, namely, those
who inherit by their own right, and those who inherit by the right of
representation. There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow
(surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The law has already
meticulously enumerated the intestate heirs of a decedent. The Court held that Irenea
misinterpreted the provision of Article 887 because the provision refers to the estate of
the deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir. It does not
apply to the estate of a parent-in-law. Therefore, the surviving spouse is considered a
third person as regards the estate of the parent-in-law.

Teotico vs. Del Val

G.R. No. L-18753, March 26, 1965 Anna

Facts:
Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died on July 14, 1955 in the City of Manila
with no ascendants or descendants. She left properties worth P600,000.00 and a will
written in Spanish which she executed at her residence at No. 2 Legarda St., Quiapo,
Manila. She affixed her signature at the bottom of the will and on the left margin of
each and every page thereof in the presence of three witnesses who in turn affixed
their signatures below the attestation clause and on the left margin of each and every
page of the will in the presence of the testatrix and of each other. Said will was
acknowledged before a Notary Public by the testatrix and her witnesses.
In said will Maria stated among others that she was possessed of the full use of her
mental faculties; that she was free from illegal pressure or influence of any kind from
the beneficiaries of the will and from any influence of fear or threat and that she freely
and spontaneously executed said will.
 She left P20,000.00 to Rene A. Teotico, married to her niece named Josefina Mortera;
and the usufruct of her interest in the Calvo building to the said spouses. However, the
naked ownership of the building was left in equal parts to the legitimate children of said
spouses. She also instituted Josefina Mortera as her sole and universal heir to all the
remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed of in the will.
Thereafter, Vicente B. Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will before the
Court of First Instance of Manila. However, Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted
child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged
natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the same testatrix.

Issues:
(1) Has oppositor Ana del Val Chan the right to intervene in this proceeding?;
(2) Has the will in question been duly admitted to probate?;
(3) Did the probate court commit an error in passing on the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will and in determining who should inherit the portion to be vacated by
the nullification of the legacy made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico?

Held:
1. Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene
because she has no interest in the estate either as heir, executor, or
administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property affected by the
will, because nowhere in the will was any provision designating her as heir,
legatee or devisee of any portion of the estate. She has also no interest in
the will either as administratrix or executrix. Neither has she any claim
against any portion of the estate because she is not a co-owner thereof.
Additionally, if the will is denied probate, she would not acquire any interest in any
portion of the estate left by the testatrix. She would acquire such right only if she were
a legal heir of the deceased, but she is not under our Civil Code. It is true that she
claims to be an acknowledged natural child of Jose and also an adopted daughter of
Francisca. But the law does not give her any right to succeed to the estate of Maria
because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from succeeding to the
legitimate relatives of her natural father. Thus, Article 992 of our Civil Code provides:
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother; .
It thus appears that the oppositor has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as
legal heir in this probate proceeding contrary to the ruling of the court a quo.

2. On the secon issue, the claim that the will was not properly attested to
is contradicted by the evidence of record. The will was duly executed because
it was signed by the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses and the notary
public in the manner provided for by law.
The claim that the will was procured by improper pressure and influence is also belied
by the evidence.
Moreover, the mere claim that Josefina and her husband Rene had the opportunity to
exert pressure on the testatrix simply because she lived in their house several years
prior to the execution of the will and that she was old and suffering from hypertension
in that she was virtually isolated from her friends for several years prior to her death is
insufficient to disprove what the instrumental witnesses had testified in court. The
exercise of improper pressure and undue influence must be supported by substantial
evidence and must be of a kind that would overpower and subjugate the mind of the
testatrix as to destroy her free agency and make her express the will of another rather
than her own

3. On the third issue, the question of whether the probate court could
determine the intrinsic validity of the provisions of a will has been decided by
this Court in a long line of decisions. In Castaeda v. Alemany, the Court had
stated, thus:
To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a will was
executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator was in a condition to
make a will, is the only purpose of the proceedings under the new code for the probate
of a will. The judgment in such proceedings determines and can determine nothing
more. In them the court has no power to pass upon the validity of any provisions made
in the will. It can not decide, for example, that a certain legacy is void and another one
is valid.

Pursuant to the foregoing precedents the pronouncement made by the court a quo
declaring invalid the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico in the will Exhibit A must be set
aside as having been made in excess of its jurisdiction. Another reason why said
pronouncement should be set aside is that the legatee was not given an opportunity to
defend the validity of the legacy for he was not allowed to intervene in this proceeding.
As a corollary, the other pronouncements touching on the disposition of the estate in
favor of some relatives of the deceased should also be set aside for the same reason.

De los Santos v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. L-29192, 22 February 1971

02OCT
[VILLAMOR, J.]
FACTS
The parties admit that the owner of the estate, subject matter of the extrajudicial partition
agreement, was Pelagia de la Cruz, who died intestate; that defendant-appellant (De la
Cruz)is a nephew of the said decedent; that plaintiff-appellee (De los Santos) is a
grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz, her mother, Marciana de la Cruz, being a niece who
predeceased said Pelagia de la Cruz; and that the purpose of the extrajudicial partition
agreement was to divide and distribute the estate among the heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz.
ISSUE
What is the effect of an extra-judicial partition which included a person who is not an heir
of the deceased?
RULING
The extrajudicial partition agreement is void with respect to plaintiff-appellee.
Article 1105 of the Civil Code provides: A partition which includes a person believed to
be a heir, but who is not, shall be void only with respect to such person. Partition of
property affected between a person entitled to inherit from the deceased owner thereof
and another person who thought he was an heir, when he was not really and lawfully
such, to the prejudice of the rights of the true heir designated by law to succeed the
deceased, is null and void. A fortiori, plaintiff-appellee could hardly derive from the
agreement the right to have its terms enforced.

Gertrudes De Los SANTOS, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

Maximo De La CRUZ, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-29192, February 22, 1971
FACTS:

Pelagia de la Cruz died intestate and without issue. She had a niece named
Marciana who is the mother of herein defendant, Maximo. Gertrudes, who is Pelagias
grandniece, and several co-heirs including Maximo, entered into an Extrajudicial
Partition Agreement purposely for the distribution of Pelagias estate. They agreed to
adjudicate three (3) lots to Maximo, in addition to his share, on condition that the latter
would undertake the development and subdivision of the estate which was the subject
matter of the agreement. Due to Maximos failure to comply with his obligation,
Gertrudes filed a complaint for specific performance. In Maximos answer, he stated that
Gertrudes had no cause of action against him because the said agreement was void
with respect to her, for the reason that she was not an heir of Pelagia and was included
in the agreement by mistake. The lower court held that Maximo, being a party to the
extrajudicial partition agreement, was estopped from raising in issue the right of the
plaintiff to inherit from Pelagia, hence, he must abide by the terms of the agreement.
Maximo filed a Motion for New Trial but was denied. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, Gertrudes de los Santos, a grandniece of the decedent, is an heir of

the latter.

RULING:

Plaintiff-appellee being a mere grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz, could not inherit

from the latter by right of representation.

Article 972. The right of representation takes place in the

direct descending line, but never in the ascending.

In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the

children of brothers or sisters, whether they be of the full or
half blood.

Much less could plaintiff-appelle inherit in her own right.

Article 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in

degree excludes the more distant ones, saving the right of
representation when it properly takes place.

In the present case, the relatives nearest in degree to Pelagia de la Cruz are her
nephews and nieces, one of whom is defendant-appellant. Necessarily, plaintiff-appellee,
a grandniece is excluded by law from the inheritance.
Case Digest: Diaz vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
Case Digest: Diaz vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 66574, February
21, 1990

Doctrine: Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda (what is generally spoken

shall be
generally understood)

Facts:
It is undisputed:
1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who
together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate child of the
spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion;
2) that Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the
mother of Pablo Santero;
3) that Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents;
4) that Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona
Santero in 1976;
5) that Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother
Simona Santero and his six minor natural children to wit: four minor children with
Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.

Issue:
Who are the legal heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero her niece Felisa
Pamuti-Jardin or her grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo Santero)?

Held:

Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent
Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti Jardin to
be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero.

The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not defined by it. In
accordance therefore with the canons of statutory interpretation, it should be
understood to have a general and inclusive scope, inasmuch as the term is a
general one. Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda. That the law does not
make a distinction prevents us from making one: Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos
distinguera debemus.
The term relatives in Article 992 of New Civil Code in more restrictive sense
than it is used and intended; is not warranted by any rule of interpretation.
Besides, when the law intends to use the term in a more restrictive sense, it
qualifies the term with the word collateral, as in Articles 1003 and 1009 of the
New Civil Code.
Anselma Diaz v. IAC and Felisa Pamuti Jardin

GR No. L-66574 (150 SCRA 645) June 17, 1987

Paras, J.

Nature: Petition for Review

Doctrine: Right of Representation is admitted only within the legitimate family

Facts:

Felisa is a niece of Simona who together with Felisas mother Juliana were the only
legitimate children of spouses Felipe and Petronilla;
Juliana married Simon and out of their union were born Felisa and another child who
died during infancy;
Simona is the widow of Pascual and mother of Pablo;
Pablo was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual and Simona;
Pascual died in 1970; Pablo in 1973 and Simona in 1976;
Pablo at the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona and six minor natural
children: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta.
1976 Judge Jose Raval declared Felisa as the sole legitimate heir of Simona
Petitioners Anselma and Felixberta as guardians of their minor children file for
opposition and motion to exclude Felisa from further taking part or intervening in the
settlement of the intestate estate of Simona
1980 Judge Bleza issued an order excluding Felisa from further taking part or
intervening and declared her to be not an heir of Simona
Felisas motion for recon was denied, and she filed her appeal to the Intermediate
Appellate Court declaring her as the sole heir of Simona

Issue: Who are the legal heirs of Simona, her niece Felisa or her grandchildren (the natural
children of Pablo)? Felisa

Ruling:
 The 6 minor children cannot represent their father Pablo in the succession of the latter
to the intestate estate of his legitimate mother Simona because of the barrier provided
for under Art. 992 of the Civil Code
o Art 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children
or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.
Pablo is a legitimate child. However, his 6 minor children are illegitimate.
Art 992 provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab
intestate between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the
father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is
not recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992.
JBL Reyes reflections on this which also finds full support from other civilists:
o In the Spanish Civil Code of 1989, the right of representation was admitted only
within the legitimate family.
o An illegitimate child cannot inherit ab intestate from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father and mother.
o The Civil Code of the Philippines adhered to this principle since it reproduced Art
943 in its own Art 992, but with fine inconsistency in subsequent articles (990,
995, 998) which allows the hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass to
his own descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate.
Diaz vs IAC (1990)

Facts:

Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who together
with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses
Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion; that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out
of their union were born Felisa Pamuti and another child who died during infancy;
that Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the
mother of Pablo Santero; that Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his
parents Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero; that Pascual Santero
died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976; that Pablo
Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and
his six minor natural children to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and
two minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.

Issue: who are the legal heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero her niece
Felisa Pamuti-Jardin or her grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo Santero)?

Ruling:

Petitioners claim that the amendment of Articles 941 and 943 of the old Civil
Code (Civil Code of Spain) by Articles 990 and 992 of the new Civil Code (Civil
Code of the Philippines) constitute a substantial and not merely a formal change,
which grants illegitimate children certain successional rights. A careful evaluation
of the New Civil Code provisions, especially Articles 902, 982, 989, and 990,
 claimed by petitioners to have conferred illegitimate children the right to
represent their parents in the inheritance of their legitimate grandparents, would in
point of fact reveal that such right to this time does not exist.

Article 982 is inapplicable to instant case because Article 992 prohibits absolutely
a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children
and relatives of the father or mother. It may not be amiss to state that Article 982
is the general rule and Article 992 the exception. Articles 902, 989, and 990
clearly speak of successional rights of illegitimate children, which rights are
transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these
illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may
be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact
that the persons to be represented are themselves illegitimate.

Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it
prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and
the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said illegitimate
child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for
the purpose of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate
family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility.
The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family;
and the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the
privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby
deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product
of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than
recognize this truth, by avoiding further ground of resentment.

It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase
"legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" is broad enough to comprehend all the
kindred of the person spoken of. (Comment, p. 139 Rollo citing p. 2862 Bouvier's
Law Dictionary vol. 11, Third Revision, Eight Edition) The record reveals that
from the commencement of this case the only parties who claimed to be the
legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti
Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since
petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent
Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti
Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

The word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it embraces not
only collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the person spoken of, unless the
context indicates that it was used in a more restrictive or limited sense which
as already discussed earlier, is not so in the case at bar.

In the light of the foregoing, We conclude that until Article 992 is suppressed or at
least amended to clarify the term "relatives" there is no other alternative but to
apply the law literally. Thus, We hereby reiterate the decision of June 17, 1987
 and declare Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole heir to the intestate estate of
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, to the exclusion of petitioners.

Abellana de Bacayo v. Ferraris de Borromeo

G.R. No. L-19382 August 31, 1965
FACTS:
Melodia Ferraris was declared presumptively dead for purposes of opening
her succession and distributing her estate among her heirs. She left
properties in Cebu City, consisting of one-third share in the estate of her
aunt, Rosa Ferraris, valued at P6,000.00, more or less. The deceased
Melodia Ferraris left no surviving direct descendant, ascendant, or spouse,
but was survived only by collateralrelatives, namely, Filomena Abellana de
Bacayo, an aunt and half-sister of decedents father, Anacleto Ferraris; and
by Gaudencia, Catalina, Conchita, and Juanito, all surnamed Ferraris, her
nieces and nephew, who were the children of Melodias only brother of
full blood, Arturo Ferraris, who pre-deceased her. These two classes
of heirs claim to be the nearest intestate heirs and seek to participate in
the estate of said Melodia Ferraris.
ISSUE:
WON a decedents uncles and aunts may succeed ab intestato while
nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified
to succeed.
RULING:
No. in case of intestacy, nephews and nieces of the de cujus exclude all
other collaterals from the succession. This is readily apparent from articles
1001, 1004, 1005, and 1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Under Art.
1009, the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the decedent
is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called
to the succession. The last of the relatives of the decedent to succeed in
intestate succession are the collaterals other than brothers or sisters or
children of brothers or sisters. They are, however, limited to relatives
within the fifth degree. Beyond this, we can safely say there is hardly any
affection to merit the succession of collaterals. Under the law, therefore,
relatives beyond the fifth degree are no longer considered as relatives, for
successional purposes. Article 1009 does not state any order of preference.
However, this article should be understood in connection with the general
rule that the nearest relatives exclude the farther. Collaterals of the same
degree inherit in equal parts, there being no right of representation. They
succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them on account
of the whole blood relationship.
Bacayo v. Borromeo
G.R. No. L-19382 | August 31, 1965 | J. JBL Reyes

Petitioner: Filomena Abellana De Bacayo

Respondents: Gaudencia Ferraris De Borromeo, Catalina Feraris De Villegas, Juanito Ferraris & Conchita
Ferraris

Summary:
Melodia Ferraris left properties in Cebu City consisting of 1/3 share in the estate of her aunt Rosa Ferraris.
Ten years have elapsed since the last time she was known to be alive, she was declared presumptively
dead for purposes of opening her succession and distribute her estate among heirs. Hence, a petition for the
summary settlement of her estate was filed. Melodia left no surviving descendant, ascendant or spouse, but
was survived only by collateral relatives: 1) Filomena, an aunt and half-sister of her father; and 2) her nieces
and nephews who were children of her only brother of full blood who predeceased her. In the settlement
proceeding, Filomena was excluded as an heir pursuant to a resolution issued by the CFI of Cebu. MR was
also denied hence this action.

The SC held that the trial court was correct in ruling that under articles 1001, 1004, 1005, and 1009 of the
Civil Code, in case of intestacy, nephews and nieces exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first
cousins, etc.) from the succession. Thus, it is the nieces and nephews of Melodia, not Filomena, who should
inherit the intestate estate of Melodia.

FACTS:
Refer to the family tree:

Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937 when she transferred to Intramuros, Manila.
She was known to have resided there continuously until 1944. Up to the filing on December 22, 1960 of
the petition for the summary settlement of her estate, she has not been heard of and her whereabouts
are still unknown. More than ten (10) years having elapsed since the last time she was known to be
alive, she was declared presumptively dead for purposes of opening her succession and distributing her
estate among her heirs.
Melodia left properties in Cebu City, consisting of 1/3 share in the estate of her aunt, Rosa, valued at
P6,000.
Melodia left no surviving direct descendant, ascendant, or spouse, but was survived only by collateral
relatives, Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, an aunt and half-sister of her father, Anacleto Ferraris; and by
Gaudencia, Catalina, Conchita, and Juanito, all surnamed Ferraris, her nieces and nephew, who were
the children of Melodia's only brother of full blood, Arturo, who pre-deceased her. These two classes of
heirs claim to be the nearest intestate heirs and seek to participate in her estate.
CFI Cebu: in favor of the nieces and nephew. They are nearer in degree (two degrees) than Filomena
since nieces and nephews succeed by right of representation, while Filomena is three degrees distant
from Melodia, and that other collateral relatives are excluded by brothers or sisters or children of
brothers or sisters of the decedent in accordance with Art. 1009 of the NCC.
Melodias contention: Under Art. 9751 of the NCC, no right of representation could take place when
the nieces and nephew of the decedent do not concur with an uncle or aunt, but rather the former
succeed in their own right.

ISSUE: WON the aunt concur with the children of the decedent's brother in the inheritance. NO. The aunt
will be excluded.

RATIO
Filomena is correct in her contention that nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of
representation (i.e., per stripes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased, as provided
expressly by Article 975. Nevertheless, in case of intestacy, nephews and nieces of the de cujus

1
ART. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by
representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions.
 exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession. This is readily
apparent from articles 1001, 1004, 1005, and 1009 of the Civil Code.
o ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the
latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to
the other half.
o ART. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in
equal shares.
o ART. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews and nieces, who are the
children of the decedent's brothers and sisters of the full blood, the former shall inherit per capita,
and the latter per stripes.
o ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sister nor children of brothers or sisters, the other
collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate. The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines
or preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood.
Note that under Art. 1009, the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the decedent is a
precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the succession.
Moreover, Tolentino's commentaries to Article 1009 expressly states that:
o The last of the relatives of the decedent to succeed in intestate succession are the collaterals other
than brothers or sisters or children of brothers or sisters. They are, however, limited to relatives
within the fifth degree Article 1009 does not state any order of preference. However, this article
should be understood in connection with the general rule that the nearest relatives exclude the
farther. Collaterals of the same degree inherit in equal parts, there being no right of representation.
They succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them on account of the whole blood
relationship.
Abellana de Bacayo v. Ferraris de Borromeo (Aug. 31, 1965)

Jose Benedicto Luna Reyes, J.:

Mateo C. Bacalso and C. Kintanar for petitioner-appellant.

Gaudioso Sosmea and C. Tomakin for oppositors-appellees.

CAPTION/PROBLEM: Melodia Ferraris was declared presumptively dead after not being seen for 10 years.
Her closest surviving relatives were an aunt (half-sister of Melodias father), 3 nieces, and a nephew (all
children of Melodias only brother). Who are the intestate heirs of Melodia? Do the nieces and nephew
(niblings) exclude the aunt (or vice versa)?

HELD: The nieces and nephew are the intestate heirs. The aunt is excluded. Under NCC 1009, the absence
of siblings or nieces and nephews is a precondition to the other collateral relatives being called to the
succession. If such condition is satisfied, the collateral relatives then inherit in equal parts, subject to the
general rule that nearer relatives exclude farther relatives.

FACTS
Dec. 22, 1960 Filomena ABELLANA de Bacayo filed a petition for the summary settlement of the
estate of MELODIA Ferraris before the Cebu CFI.
o Melodia was last seen in Intramuros, Manila (where she was a resident since 1937). The
estate proceedings were had since Melodia was presumptively dead (she was last seen in
1944).
o She left 6,000 pesos worth of properties located in Cebu City.
o She left no direct descendants, her only surviving relatives being;
Abellana (Melodias aunt; half-sister of her father)
Gaudencia, Catalina, Conchita, and Juanito, all surnamed Ferraris (FERRARIS
SIBLINGS, children of Melodias only brother Arturo, who died in 1947
[predeceased Melodia]). They opposed the estate proceedings.
Sep 20, 1961 - CFI RULING: In favor of the Ferraris siblings.
o The Ferraris siblings, as children of Melodias only predeceased brother, exclude Abellana
because the former are nearer in degree (two degrees) than the latter since nieces and
nephews succeed by right of representation, while Abellana is three degrees distant from
Melodia, and because other collateral relatives are excluded by brothers or sisters or
children of brothers or sisters of the decedent in accordance with NCC 1009.
o Abellana filed a paupers appeal before the SC.
ISSUE (HELD): Who should inherit the intestate estate of a deceased person when he or she is survived
only by collateral relatives, to wit an aunt and the children of a brother who predeceased him or her?
Otherwise, will the aunt concur with the children of the decedent's brother in the inheritance or will the
former be excluded by the latter? (The nieces and nephews will inherit; and they will exclude the aunt.)

RATIO
Abellana: She is in the same degree of relationship to Melodia as the Ferraris siblings (3 degrees).
Also, under NCC 975, nephews and nieces do not have the right of representation when they
concur with uncles or aunts; hence they succeed in their own right.
SC: Agrees with both of Abellanas contentions, nevertheless CFI decision is correct and must be
upheld insofar as it conforms to the rules about to be set forth.
o Abellana is correct in claiming that under NCC 975, nieces/nephews do not inherit by right
of representation unless they concur with brothers/sisters of the decedent. If only
nieces/nephews are left, they shall inherit in equal portions.
o BUT in case of intestacy, nephews/nieces of the decedent exclude all other collateral
relatives from the succession. BASES: NCC 1001, 1004, 1005, and 1009.
NCC 1009: Should there be neither brothers nor sisters nor children of
brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by
reason of relationship by the whole blood.
o Under NCC 1009, the absence of siblings and niblings of the decedent is a precondition
to the succeeding by the other collateral relatives (aunts, uncles, cousins, etc.)
o The old Civil Code was clearer on the matter:
ART. 952. In the absence of brother, or sisters and of nephews or nieces,
children of the former, whether of the whole blood or not, the surviving spouse, if
not separated by a final decree of divorce, shall succeed to the entire estate of
the deceased.
ART. 954. Should there be neither brothers or sisters, nor children of brothers or
sisters, nor a surviving spouse, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the
estate of deceased.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by
reason of the whole blood.
o Under Arts. 952 and 954 of the old Code, siblings and niblings of the decedent inherited
ahead of the surviving spouse, while the other collateral relatives inherited only after
the surviving spouse. The New Civil Code simply placed the spouse on par with the
siblings and niblings of the deceased, without altering the preferred position of
the latter vis--vis the other collateral relatives.
o The reliance on Tolentinos commentaries to NCC 1009 is misplaced. Indeed there is no
order of preference under NCC 1009, but this is true with respect to Other collaterals
because their order of preference is already provided for in NCC 9621, which embodied
the general principle that relatives nearer in degree exclude the farther ones.
o Tolentino does not say that nephews and nieces concur with other collaterals of equal
degree. In fact he is of the opposing view (and counsel for Abellana unethically failed to
quote the whole portion of Tolentinos comments which shows this):
Other collaterals. The last of the relatives of the decedent to succeed in
intestate succession are the collaterals other than brothers or sisters or
children of brothers or sisters. They are, however, limited to relatives within
the fifth degree. Beyond this, we can safely say there is hardly any affection to
merit the succession of collaterals. Under the law, therefore, relatives beyond the
fifth degree are no longer considered as relatives, for successional purposes.
Article 1009 does not state any order of preference. However, this article should
be understood in connection with the general rule that the nearest relatives
exclude the farther. Collaterals of the same degree inherit in equal parts, there
being no right of representation. They succeed without distinction of lines or
preference among them on account of the whole blood relationship.

DISPOSITION: Decision affirmed.