5/9/2016 LucenaGrandCentralTerminalIncvsJACLinerInc:148339:February23,2005:J.

CarpioMorales:EnBanc:Decision

ENBANC

[G.R.No.148339.February23,2005]

LUCENAGRANDCENTRALTERMINAL,INC.,petitioner,vs.JACLINER,INC.,respondent.

DECISION
CARPIOMORALES,J.:

Respondent,JACLiner,Inc.,acommoncarrieroperatingbuseswhichplyvariousroutestoandfromLucenaCity,assailed,
[1]
viaapetitionforprohibitionandinjunction againsttheCityofLucena,itsMayor,andtheSangguniangPanlungsodofLucena
beforetheRegionalTrialCourt(RTC)ofLucenaCity,CityOrdinanceNos.1631and1778asunconstitutionalontheground
that,interalia,thesameconstitutedaninvalidexerciseofpolicepower,anunduetakingofprivateproperty,andaviolationof
theconstitutionalprohibitionagainstmonopolies.Thesalientprovisionsoftheordinancesare:
[2]
OrdinanceNo.1631

ANORDINANCEGRANTINGTHELUCENAGRANDCENTRALTERMINAL,INC.,AFRANCHISETOCONSTRUCT,FINANCE,
ESTABLISH,OPERATEANDMAINTAINACOMMONBUSJEEPNEYTERMINALFACILITYINTHECITYOFLUCENA

xxx

SECTION1.ThereisherebygrantedtotheLucenaGrandCentralTerminal,Inc.,itssuccessorsorassigns,hereinafterreferredtoasthe
grantee,afranchisetoconstruct,finance,establish,operate,andmaintainacommonbusjeepneyterminalfacilityintheCityofLucena.

SECTION2.Thisfranchiseshallcontinueforaperiodoftwentyfiveyears,countedfromtheapprovalofthisOrdinance,andrenewableat
theoptionofthegranteeforanotherperiodoftwentyfive(25)yearsuponsuchexpiration.

xxx

SECTION4.ResponsibilitiesandObligationsoftheCityGovernmentofLucena.Duringtheexistenceofthefranchise,theCity
GovernmentofLucenashallhavethefollowingresponsibilitiesandobligations:

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xxx

(c)Itshallnotgrantanythirdpartyanyprivilegeand/orconcessiontooperateabus,minibusand/orjeepneyterminal.

xxx
[3]
OrdinanceNo.1778

ANORDINANCEREGULATINGTHEENTRANCETOTHECITYOFLUCENAOFALLBUSES,MINIBUSESANDOUTOF
TOWNPASSENGERJEEPNEYSANDFORTHISPURPOSE,AMENDINGORDINACENO.1420,SERIESOF1993,AND
ORDINANCENO.1557,SERIESOF1995

xxx

SECTION1.TheentrancetotheCityofLucenaofallbuses,minibusesandoutoftownpassengerjeepneysisherebyregulatedasfollows:

(a)Allbuses,minibusesandoutoftownpassengerjeepneysshallbeprohibitedfromenteringthecityandareherebydirectedtoproceed
tothecommonterminal,forpickingupand/ordroppingoftheirpassengers.

(b)AlltemporaryterminalsintheCityofLucenaareherebydeclaredinoperablestartingfromtheeffectivityofthisordinance.

xxx

SECTION3.a)Section1ofOrdinanceNo.1557,Seriesof1995,isherebyamendedtoreadasfollows:

Buses,minibuses,andjeepneytypeminibusesfromothermunicipalitiesand/orlocalgovernmentunitsgoingtoLucenaCityaredirected
toproceedtotheCommonTerminallocatedatDiversionRoad,Brgy.IlayangDupay,tounloadandloadpassengers.

xxx

c)Section3ofOrdinanceNo.1557,Seriesof1995,isherebyamendedtoreadasfollows:

Passengerbuses,minibuses,andjeepneytypeminibusescomingfromothermunicipalitiesand/orlocalgovernmentunitsshallutilizethe
facilitiesoftheLucenaGrandCentralTerminalatDiversionRoad,Brgy.IlayangDupay,thisCity,andnootherterminalsshallbesituated
insideorwithintheCityofLucena

d)Section4ofOrdinanceNo.1557,Seriesof1995,isherebyamendedtoreadasfollows:

Passengerbuses,minibuses,andjeepneytypeminibusescomingfromothermunicipalitiesand/orlocalgovernmentunitsshallavailofthe

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facilitiesoftheLucenaGrandCentralTerminalwhichisherebydesignatedastheofficiallysanctionedcommonterminalfortheCityof
Lucena

e)Section5ofOrdinanceNo.1557,Seriesof1995,isherebyamendedtoreadasfollows:

TheLucenaGrandCentralTerminalisthepermanentcommonterminalasthisistheentitywhichwasgiventheexclusivefranchise
bytheSangguniangPanglungsodunderOrdinanceNo.1631(Emphasisandunderscoringsupplied)

Theseordinances,bygrantinganexclusivefranchisefortwentyfiveyears,renewableforanothertwentyfiveyears,toone
entityfortheconstructionandoperationofonecommonbusandjeepneyterminalfacilityinLucenaCity,tobelocatedoutside
thecityproper,wereprofessedlyaimedtowardsalleviatingthetrafficcongestionallegedtohavebeencausedbytheexistence
ofvariousbusandjeepneyterminalswithinthecity,astheExplanatoryNoteWhereasClauseadoptingOrdinanceNo.1778
states:

WHEREAS,inlinewiththeworseningtrafficconditionoftheCityofLucena,andwiththepurposeofeasingandregulatingtheflowofthe
same,itisimperativethattheBuses,MiniBusesandoutoftownjeepneysbeprohibitedfrommaintainingterminalswithintheCity,but
[4]
insteaddirectingtoproceedtotheLucenaGrandCentralTerminalforpurposesofpickingupand/ordroppingofftheirpassengers

Respondent,whohadmaintainedaterminalwithinthecity,wasoneofthoseaffectedbytheordinances.
Petitioner, Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc., claiming legal interest as the grantee of the exclusive franchise for the
[5]
operationofthecommonterminal, wasallowedtointerveneinthepetitionbeforethetrialcourt.
InthehearingconductedonNovember25,1998,allthepartiesagreedtodispensewiththepresentationofevidenceand
[6]
tosubmitthecaseforresolutionsolelyonthebasisofthepleadingsfiled.
[7]
ByOrderofMarch31,1999, Branch54oftheLucenaRTCrenderedjudgment,thedispositiveportionofwhichreads:

WHEREFORE,inviewoftheforegoingpremises,judgmentisherebyrendered,asfollows:

1.DeclaringCityOrdinanceNo.1631asvalid,havingbeenissuedintheexerciseofthepolicepoweroftheCityGovernmentofLucena
insofarasthegrantoffranchisetotheLucenaGrandCentralTerminal,Inc.,toconstruct,finance,establish,operateandmaintaincommon
busjeepneyterminalfacilityintheCityofLucena

2.Buthowever,declaringtheprovisionofSec.4(c)ofOrdinanceNo.1631totheeffectthattheCityGovernmentshallnotgrantanythird
partyanyprivilegeand/orconcessiontooperateabus,minibusand/orjeepneyterminal,asillegalandultraviresbecauseitcontravenesthe
provisionsofRepublicActNo.7160,otherwiseknownasTheLocalGovernmentCode

3.DeclaringCityOrdinanceNo.1778asnullandvoid,thesamebeingalsoanultraviresactoftheCityGovernmentofLucenaarisingfrom
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aninvalid,oppressiveandunreasonableexerciseofthepolicepower,morespecifically,declaringillegal[sections1(b),3(c)and3(e)]

4.OrderingtheissuanceofaWritofProhibitionand/orInjunctiondirectingtherespondentspublicofficials,theCityMayorandthe
SangguniangPanglungsodofLucena,toceaseanddesistfromimplementingOrdinanceNo.1778insofarassaidordinanceprohibits
orcurtailspetitionerfrommaintainingandoperatingitsownbusterminalsubjecttotheconditionsprovidedforinOrdinanceNo.
1557,Sec.3,whichauthorizestheconstructionofterminaloutsidethepoblacionofLucenaCityandlikewise,insofarassaidordinance
directsandcompelsthepetitionertousetheLucenaGrandCentralTerminalInc.,andfurthermore,insofarasitdeclaresthatno
otherterminalsshallbesituated,constructed,maintainedorestablishedinsideorwithintheCityofLucenaandfurthermore,

5.TheMotiontoDismissfiledbytheIntervenor,LucenaGrandCentralTerminalInc.,datedOctober19,1998,isherebyDENIEDforlack
ofmerit.
[8]
SOORDERED.(Emphasisandunderscoringsupplied)
[9] [10]
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the trial courts order having been denied by Order of August 6, 1999, it
[11] [12]
elevated it via petition for review under Rule 45 before this Court. This Court, by Resolution of November 24, 1999,
referredthepetitiontotheCourtofAppealswithwhichithasconcurrentjurisdiction,nospecialandimportantreasonhaving
beencitedforittotakecognizancethereofinthefirstinstance.
[13]
ByDecisionofDecember15,2000, theappellatecourtdismissedthepetitionandaffirmedthechallengedordersofthe
[14] [15]
trial court. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court by Resolution dated June 5, 2001,
[16]
petitioneronceagaincomestothisCourtviapetitionforreview, thistimeassailingtheDecisionandResolutionoftheCourt
ofAppeals.
Decisiononthepetitionhingesontwoissues,towit:(1)whetherthetrialcourthasjurisdictionoverthecase,itnothaving
furnishedtheOfficeoftheSolicitorGeneralcopyoftheordersitissuedtherein,and(2)whethertheCityofLucenaproperly
exerciseditspolicepowerwhenitenactedthesubjectordinances.
Petitioner argues that since the trial court failed to serve a copy of its assailed orders upon the Office of the Solicitor
General,itneveracquiredjurisdictionoverthecase,itcitingSection22,Rule3oftheRuleswhichprovides:

SEC.22.NoticetotheSolicitorGeneral.Inanyactioninvolvingthevalidityofanytreaty,law,ordinance,executiveorder,presidential
decree,rulesorregulations,thecourtinitsdiscretion,mayrequiretheappearanceoftheSolicitorGeneralwhomaybeheardinpersonor
throughrepresentativedulydesignatedbyhim.(Emphasisandunderscoringsupplied)

Furthermore,petitionerinvokesSections3and4ofRule63whichrespectivelyprovide:

SEC.3.NoticeonSolicitorGeneral.Inanyactionwhichinvolvesthevalidityofastatute,executiveorderorregulation,oranyother
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governmentalregulation,theSolicitorGeneralshallbenotifiedbythepartyassailingthesameandshallbeentitledtobehearduponsuch
question.

SEC.4.Localgovernmentordinances.Inanyactioninvolvingthevalidityofalocalgovernmentordinance,thecorrespondingprosecutoror
attorneyofthelocalgovernmentunitinvolvedshallbesimilarlynotifiedandentitledtobeheard.Ifsuchordinanceisallegedtobe
unconstitutional,theSolicitorGeneralshallalsobenotifiedandentitledtobeheard.(Emphasisandunderscoringsupplied)

Nowhere, however, is it stated in the abovequoted rules that failure to notify the Solicitor General about the action is a
jurisdictionaldefect.
Infact,Rule3,Section22givesthecourtsinanyactioninvolvingthevalidityofanyordinance,interalia,discretiontonotify
theSolicitorGeneral.
Section4ofRule63,whichmorespecificallydealswithcasesassailingtheconstitutionality,notjustthevalidity,ofalocal
governmentordinance,directsthattheSolicitorGeneralshallalsobenotifiedandentitledtobeheard.Whowillnotifyhim,Sec.
3ofthesameruleprovidesitisthepartywhichisassailingthelocalgovernmentsordinance.
More importantly, however, this Court finds that no procedural defect, fatal or otherwise, attended the disposition of the
case.ForrespondentactuallyservedacopyofitspetitionupontheOfficeoftheSolicitorGeneralonOctober1,1998,twodays
[17]
after it was filed. The Solicitor General has issued a Certification to that effect. There was thus compliance with above
quotedrules.
Respectingtheissueofwhetherpolicepowerwasproperlyexercisedwhenthesubjectordinanceswereenacted:Aswith
theState,thelocalgovernmentmaybeconsideredashavingproperlyexerciseditspolicepoweronlyifthefollowingrequisites
aremet:(1)theinterestsofthepublicgenerally,asdistinguishedfromthoseofaparticularclass,requiretheinterferenceofthe
State,and(2)themeansemployedarereasonablynecessaryfortheattainmentoftheobjectsoughttobeaccomplishedand
not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Otherwise stated, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful
[18]
method.
[19]
That traffic congestion is a public, not merely a private, concern, cannot be gainsaid. In Calalang v. Williams which
involvedastatuteauthorizingtheDirectorofPublicWorkstopromulgaterulesandregulationstoregulateandcontroltrafficon
nationalroads,thisCourtheld:

Inenactingsaidlaw,therefore,theNationalAssemblywaspromptedbyconsiderationsofpublicconvenienceandwelfare.Itwasinspired
byadesiretorelievecongestionoftraffic,whichis,tosaytheleast,amenacetopublicsafety.Publicwelfare,then,liesatthebottomofthe
enactmentofsaidlaw,andthestateinordertopromotethegeneralwelfaremayinterferewithpersonalliberty,withproperty,andwith
[20]
businessandoccupations. (Emphasissupplied)

ThequestionedordinanceshavingbeenenactedwiththeobjectiveofrelievingtrafficcongestionintheCityofLucena,they

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involvepublicinterestwarrantingtheinterferenceoftheState.Thefirstrequisitefortheproperexerciseofpolicepoweristhus
present.
RespondentssuggestiontohavethisCourtlookbehindtheexplicitobjectiveoftheordinanceswhich,toit,wasactuallyto
[21] [22]
benefittheprivateinterestofpetitionerbycoercingallbusoperatorstopatronizeitsterminaldoesnotlie. Limv.Pacquing
instructs:

...[T]hisCourtcannotlookintoallegationsthatPDNo.771wasenactedtobenefitaselectgroupwhichwaslatergivenauthorityto
operatethejaialaiunderPDNo.810.Theexaminationoflegislativemotivationisgenerallyprohibited.(Palmerv.Thompson,403U.S.
217,29L.Ed.2d438[1971]perBlack,J.)Thereis,inthefirstplace,absolutelackofevidencetosupportADCsallegationofimproper
motivationintheissuanceofPDNo.771.Inthesecondplace,asalreadyaverred,thisCourtcannotgobehindtheexpressedandproclaimed
[23]
purposesofPDNo.771,whicharereasonableandevenlaudable.(Underscoringsupplied)

ThisleavesfordeterminationtheissueofwhetherthemeansemployedbytheLucenaSangguniangPanlungsodtoattain
itsprofessedobjectivewerereasonablynecessaryandnotundulyoppressiveuponindividuals.
[24]
Withtheaimoflocalizingthesourceoftrafficcongestioninthecitytoasinglelocation, thesubjectordinancesprohibit
theoperationofallbusandjeepneyterminalswithinLucena,includingthosealreadyexisting,andallowtheoperationofonly
onecommonterminallocatedoutsidethecityproper,thefranchiseforwhichwasgrantedtopetitioner.Thecommoncarriers
plying routes to and from Lucena City are thus compelled to close down their existing terminals and use the facilities of
petitioner.
[25]
InDelaCruzv.Paras, thisCourtdeclaredunconstitutionalanordinancecharacterizedbyoverbreadth.Inthatcase,the
MunicipalityofBocaue,Bulacanprohibitedtheoperationofallnightclubs,cabaretsanddancehallswithinitsjurisdictionforthe
protectionofpublicmorals.HeldtheCourt:

ItcannotbesaidthatsuchasweepingexerciseofalawmakingpowerbyBocauecouldqualifyunderthetermreasonable.Theobjectiveof
fosteringpublicmorals,aworthyanddesirableendcanbeattainedbyameasurethatdoesnotencompasstoowideafield.Certainlythe
ordinanceonitsfaceischaracterizedbyoverbreadth.Thepurposesoughttobeachievedcouldhavebeenattainedbyreasonablerestrictions
ratherthanbyanabsoluteprohibition.TheadmonitioninSalaveriashouldbeheeded:TheJudiciaryshouldnotlightlysetasidelegislative
actionwhenthereisnotaclearinvasionofpersonalorpropertyrightsundertheguiseofpoliceregulation.Itisclearthatintheguiseofa
policeregulation,therewasinthisinstanceaclearinvasionofpersonalorpropertyrights,personalinthecaseofthoseindividualsdesirous
ofpatronizingthosenightclubsandpropertyintermsoftheinvestmentsmadeandsalariestobeearnedbythosethereinemployed.
[26]
(Underscoringsupplied)
[27]
In Lupangco v. Court of Appeals, this Court, in declaring unconstitutional the resolution subject thereof, advanced a
similar consideration. That case involved a resolution issued by the Professional Regulation Commission which prohibited
examinees from attending review classes and receiving handout materials, tips, and the like three days before the date of
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examination in order to preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations in accountancy. Besides being
unreasonable on its face and violative of academic freedom, the measure was found to be more sweeping than what was
necessary,viz:

Needlesstosay,theenforcementofResolutionNo.105isnotaguaranteethattheallegedleakagesinthelicensureexaminationswillbe
eradicatedoratleastminimized.Makingtheexamineessufferbydeprivingthemoflegitimatemeansofrevieworpreparationonthoselast
threepreciousdayswhentheyshouldberefreshingthemselveswithallthattheyhavelearnedinthereviewclassesandpreparingtheir
mentalandpsychologicalmakeupfortheexaminationdayitselfwouldbelikeuprootingthetreetogetridofarottenbranch.Whatis
neededtobedonebytherespondentistofindoutthesourceofsuchleakagesandstopitrightthere.Ifcorruptofficialsorpersonnel
shouldbeterminatedfromtheirloss,thensobeit.Fixersorswindlersshouldbeflushedout.Strictguidelinestobeobservedbyexaminers
shouldbesetupandifviolationsarecommitted,thenlicensesshouldbesuspendedorrevoked.xxx(Emphasisandunderscoringsupplied)
[28]

[29] [30]
AsinDelaCruz andLupangco, the ordinances assailed herein are characterized by overbreadth.They go beyond
whatisreasonablynecessarytosolvethetrafficproblem.Additionally,sincethecompulsoryuseoftheterminaloperatedby
petitionerwouldsubjecttheusersthereoftofees,rentalsandcharges,suchmeasureisundulyoppressive,ascorrectlyfound
[31]
bytheappellatecourt. Whatshouldhavebeendonewastodetermineexactlywheretheproblemliesandthentostopit
rightthere.

ThetrueroleofConstitutionalLawistoeffectanequilibriumbetweenauthorityandlibertysothatrightsareexercisedwithinthe
[32]
frameworkofthelawandthelawsareenactedwithduedeferencetorights.(Underscoringsupplied)

Aduedeferencetotherightsoftheindividualthusrequiresamorecarefulformulationofsolutionstosocietalproblems.
[33]
From the memorandum filed before this Court by petitioner, it is gathered that the Sangguniang Panlungsod had
identifiedthecauseoftrafficcongestiontobetheindiscriminateloadingandunloadingofpassengersbybusesonthestreets
ofthecityproper,hence,theconclusionthattheterminalscontributedtotheproliferationofbusesobstructingtrafficonthecity
streets.
Busterminalspersedonot,however,impedeorhelpimpedetheflowoftraffic.Howtheoutrightproscriptionagainstthe
existence of all terminals, apart from that franchised to petitioner, can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve the
trafficproblem,thisCourthasnotbeenenlightened.Ifterminalslackadequatespacesuchthatbusdriversarecompelledto
load and unload passengers on the streets instead of inside the terminals, then reasonable specifications for the size of
terminalscouldbeinstituted,withpermitstooperatethesamedeniedthosewhichareunabletomeetthespecifications.
In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the proscription against the maintenance of terminals is so broad that
evenentitieswhichmightbeabletoprovidefacilitiesbetterthanthefranchisedterminalarebarredfromoperatingatall.
Petitionerargues,however,thatothersolutionsforthetrafficproblemhavealreadybeentriedbutprovenineffective.But
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thegrantofanexclusivefranchisetopetitionerhasnotbeenshowntobetheonlysolutiontotheproblem.
[34]
WhiletheSangguniangPanlungsod,viaOrdinanceNo.1557, previouslydirectedbusownersandoperatorstoputup
their terminals outside the poblacion of Lucena City, petitioner informs that said ordinance only resulted in the relocation of
[35]
terminals to other wellpopulated barangays, thereby giving rise to traffic congestion in those areas. Assuming that
information to be true, the Sangguniang Panlungsod was not without remedy. It could have defined, among other
considerations,inamoreprecisemanner,theareaofrelocationtoavoidsuchconsequences.
As for petitioners argument that the challenged ordinances were enacted pursuant to the power of the Sangguniang
Panlungsodto[r]egulatetrafficonallstreetsandbridgesprohibitencroachmentsorobstaclesthereonand,whennecessaryin
[36]
theinterestofpublicwelfare,authorizetheremovalofencroachmentsandillegalconstructionsinpublicplaces: Absentany
showing, nay allegation, that the terminals are encroaching upon public roads, they are not obstacles. The buses which
indiscriminatelyloadandunloadpassengersonthecitystreetsare.ThepowerthenoftheSangguniangPanlungsodtoprohibit
encroachmentsandobstaclesdoesnotextendtoterminals.
Neither are terminals public nuisances as petitioner argues. For their operation is a legitimate business which, by itself,
cannotbesaidtobeinjurioustotherightsofproperty,health,orcomfortofthecommunity.
Butevenassumingthatterminalsarenuisancesduetotheirallegedindirecteffectsupontheflowoftraffic,atmosttheyare
nuisanceperaccidens,notperse.
Unlessathingisnuisanceperse,however,itmaynotbeabatedviaanordinance,withoutjudicialproceedings,aswas
doneinthecaseatbar.
[37]
InEstateofGregoriaFranciscov.CourtofAppeals, thisCourtheld:

Respondentscannotseekcoverunderthegeneralwelfareclauseauthorizingtheabatementofnuisanceswithoutjudicialproceedings.That
tenetappliestoanuisanceperse,oronewhichaffectstheimmediatesafetyofpersonsandpropertyandmaybesummarilyabatedunderthe
undefinedlawofnecessity(Monteverdev.Generoso,52Phil.123[1982]).Thestorageofcoprainthequonsetbuildingisalegitimate
business.Byitsnature,itcannotbesaidtobeinjurioustorightsofproperty,ofhealthorofcomfortofthecommunity.Ifitbeanuisance
peraccidensitmaybesoproveninahearingconductedforthatpurpose.Itisnotperseanuisancewarrantingitssummaryabatement
[38]
withoutjudicialintervention.(Underscoringsupplied)
[39]
InPampangaBusCo.,Inc.v.MunicipalityofTarlac where the appellantmunicipality similarly argued that the terminal
involvedthereinisanuisancethatmaybeabatedbytheMunicipalCouncilviaanordinance,thisCourtheld:Sufficeittosay
that in the abatement of nuisances the provisions of the Civil Code (Articles 694707) must be observed and followed. This
appellantfailedtodo.
As for petitioners claim that the challenged ordinances have actually been proven effective in easing traffic congestion:

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Whetheranordinanceiseffectiveisanissuedifferentfromwhetheritisreasonablynecessary.Itisitsreasonableness,notits
effectiveness, which bears upon its constitutionality. If the constitutionality of a law were measured by its effectiveness, then
eventyrannicallawsmaybejustifiedwhenevertheyhappentobeeffective.
TheCourtisnotunawareoftheresolutionsofvariousbarangaysinLucenaCitysupportingtheestablishmentofacommon
terminal,andsimilarexpressionsofsupportfromtheprivatesector,copiesofwhichweresubmittedtothisCourtbypetitioner.
Theweightofpopularopinion,however,mustbebalancedwiththatofanindividualsrights.

Thereisnoquestionthatnoteventhestrongestmoralconvictionorthemosturgentpublicneed,subjectonlytoafewnotableexceptions,
willexcusethebypassingofanindividual'srights.ItisnoexaggerationtosaythatapersoninvokingarightguaranteedunderArticleIIIof
[40]
theConstitutionisamajorityofoneevenasagainsttherestofthenationwhowoulddenyhimthatright.

WHEREFORE,thepetitionisherebyDENIED.
SOORDERED.
Davide,Jr.,C.J.,Puno,Panganiban,Quisumbing,YnaresSantiago,SandovalGutierrez,Carpio,AustriaMartinez,Corona,
Callejo,Sr.,Azcuna,Tinga,ChicoNazario,andGarcia,JJ.,concur.

[1]
Recordsat110.
[2]
Rolloat118120.
[3]
Id.at226229.
[4]
Id.at227.
[5]
Recordsat5559.
[6]
Id.at339.
[7]
Id.at328360.
[8]
Id.at358360.
[9]
Id.at384399.
[10]
Id.at467470.
[11]
CARolloat1859.

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[12]
Id.at327.
[13]
Id.at548557.
[14]
Id.at560572.
[15]
Id.at622623.
[16]
Rolloat9407inclusiveofAnnexesAY.
[17]
CARolloat498.
[18]
DECSv.SanDiego,180SCRA533,537(1989).
[19]
70Phil.726(1940).
[20]
Id.at733.
[21]
Rolloat539.
[22]
240SCRA649(1995).
[23]
Id.at677678.
[24]
Rolloat505.
[25]
123SCRA569(1983).
[26]
Id.at578.
[27]
160SCRA848(1988).
[28]
Id.at860.
[29]
Supra.
[30]
Supra.
[31]
Rolloat59.
[32]
CRUZ,I.,CONSTITUTIONALLAW1(1995).
[33]
Rolloat496,509510.
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[34]
Id.at109.
[35]
MemorandumofPetitioner,id.at510.
[36]
Section458(5)(vi),LOCALGOVERNMENTCODEof1991.
[37]
199SCRA595(1991).
[38]
Id.at601.
[39]
3SCRA816(1961).
[40]
AssociationofSmallLandownersinthePhilippinesv.Sec.ofAgrarianReform,175SCRA343,375376.(1989).

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