Rizwan Jadoon EGPA 2010

AgencificationinPakistan:AComparativeStudyofRegulatoryandServiceDelivery
Agencies
AgencificationinPakistan:AComparativeStudyofRegulatory
andServiceDeliveryAgencies

PaperfortheEGPACONFERENCE,710September2010,Toulouse,France
SG6:GovernanceofPublicSectorOrganizations
AishaRizwan
Lecturer
InstituteofAdministrativeSciences
UniversityofthePunjab,Lahore,Pakistan
aisharizwan@ias.pu.edu.pk
arkhan1111@yahoo.com
MuhammadZafarIqbalJadoon
Professor
InstituteofAdministrativeSciences
UniversityofthePunjab,Lahore,Pakistan
zafar@ias.pu.edu.pk
m.z.iqbal@stir.ac.uk
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Agencification in Pakistan: A Comparative Study of Regulatory

and Service Delivery Agencies
Abstract
Like many other developing countries, agencification is not a new phenomenon in

Pakistan. However, since 1980s, not only the number of new agencies has gone up but,
the existing agencies have also been revitalized under the rubric of NPM capsulated in
World Bank/IMFs guided governance and administrative reforms. These agencies have
been created in an administrative system which has weak political institutions but well
entrenched bureaucracy with strong colonial bureaucratic traditions such as centralization
of power exercised by a class of senior bureaucrats occupying top positions in federal
ministries. Theoretically, creation of autonomous agencies led by professional managers
is an idea antithetical to colonial bureaucratic system of Pakistan. As such, NPM type
agency model will either be resisted by bureaucracy or it will be diffused in a way
maintaining the status quo. To test this proposition, an empirical research on
agencification in Pakistan is required.
This paper presents the findings of a comparative study conducted to assess the
NPMness of service delivery agencies and regulatory agencies of federal government. A
survey of 15 federal agencies, created since 1980, was conducted through semi-structured
interviews of key respondents from senior management team of each agency. Besides
answering principal question, to what extent federal agencies conform to the principles of
NPM, the study also attempts to identify the drivers of creation of these agencies and
their performance outcomes.
The principle findings of the study are: 1) all agencies have been created under
special law and as such have their independent legal status with boards/authorities as
their chief executive bodies; 2) agencies enjoy considerable operational autonomy but,
they take strategic decisions with the approval of their respective ministries; 3) there
exists no system of agency evaluation and performance contracts with chief executives;
4) agencification is part of governance reform, funded by international financial
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institutions i.e., the World Bank; 5) performance outcomes of these reformed entities
show remarkable progress in their respective functions of regulation and service delivery.
Introduction
Agencification is not a new phenomenon in the public sector. Historically, there have
been different reasons for emergence of autonomous public sector organizations in
different countries during different time periods, besides government intervention in the
market to promote social welfare. However, agencies created after 1980 under the rubric
of New Public Management meant to promote organizational efficiency. Pakistan is no
exception to this universal trend but, it embraced NPM type agencification not for the
sole purpose of promoting efficiency in the public sector. Privatization, regulation,
service delivery, and corruption also provided rationale for creation of autonomous
bodies in various policy sectors. It is, therefore, significant to raise questions in the
context of Pakistan such as:
a) What were the drivers for creation of agencies across various policy sectors?
b) To what extent agencies created particularly after 1980 conform to an ideal (in
Weberian sense) NPM agency model?
c) Which theoretical perspective can best explain peculiarities, if any, of agencies in
Pakistan?
This paper answers all of the above questions with reference to agencies created after
1980 in service delivery and regulatory sectors. It is based on a research, conducted as a
part of the requirement of MPhil at the Institute of Administrative Sciences, University of
the Punjab. Primary data was collected through semi-structured interviews of key
respondents, one from each of 15 federal agencies. Other data sources included legal
frameworks in the form of acts of parliament, ordinances issued by the President,
executive orders and various reform documents.
The paper consists of four sections. The first section delineates an ideal NPM type
agency model, drawing on edited work of Talbot and Pollitt, (2004). Structural
disaggregation, managerial autonomy, and contractualism and performance management
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are the key elements of NPM type of agency. The second section offers institutional and
policy context of Pakistan to understand initiation of agencification in the country. The
third section provides a historical account of agencies, officially called autonomous
bodies in Pakistan. Over 60 years of political and economic history of Pakistan is divided
into four periods, purely on the basis of distinct policy context, particularly regarding the
role of government vis--vis market which has led to the creation of autonomous bodies
in different historical periods. This section also addresses our first question. The fourth
section answers our first and second questions, based on the qualitative data generated
through interviews of key respondents from each agency included in the study. The
findings reported in this section cluster around four main themes: 1) drivers of creation of
agencies; 2) structural disaggregation operationally defined in terms of institutional
distance, nature of task and agency specialization; 3) managerial autonomy operationally
defined as agencys ability to make human resource and financial decisions both at
strategic and operational level; 4) contractualism, referring to performance contract
between line ministry and agency and its leadership. The fifth section attempts to provide
theoretical delineation of findings using the concept of historical institutionalism, path
dependency and sociological institutionalism. The sixth and last is the concluding section
presenting summary of findings.
Section I
NPM-Type Agency Model
Defining agency
We have used Pollit and Talbots (2004) definition and characterization of agency with
slight modification for this study. An agency is an organization that is at an arms length
from the hierarchy of the central ministry. It is involved in service provision, regulatory
function or adjudication. Employees of the agency are public servants, might not be
necessarily bureaucrats. The government finances this body legally. However, some
agencies might generate their own revenue. In either case, it is answerable to the ministry
for its financial situation. Such bodies are also legally bound to some government
legislative body (Pollitt and Talbot, 2004).
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The agency idea contains three main features, namely structural disaggregation, i.e.
creation of task-oriented organizations. It refers to autonomous agencies functioning at an
arms length from their oversight authority and having their independent legal status,
enacted on the basis of a legislature passed by the governing body. In other words, these
are specialized bodies, created by the split of the ministry into autonomous or semi-
autonomous agencies. Second prominent feature is managerial autonomy. This pattern of
managerial autonomy is assigned to the actors of these executive agencies, for them to
make decisions independently (wholly or partially) related to personnel, administrative
and financial resource allocations. Autonomy is also granted at the policy framing level.
Managerial and policy autonomy has been justified by some rational theories; namely,
property rights theory that is based on the logic of ownership. It states that managers
when made responsible and accountable for their resources and decisions pertaining to
their allocation are expected to feel obliged and prone to adopt modern based techniques
to be cost effective (Hood, 1995). They tend to act in an efficient manner. Autonomy also
promotes a professional attitude in the state agencies (B. Verscheure and D. Barbieri,
2009).
This mode of autonomy leads to a reformed control mechanism under the
directives of the new public management philosophy (Verschuere & Barbieri, 2009,
p.349). A shift from input based control, where focus is on performance, to the output
based and result oriented control formula is manifested in these autonomous agency
structures, thus rendering performance contracting as the third feature.
The process of agency formation has been justified by some theories. However, there
cannot be one best theory to explain the phenomenon (Pollitt et al., 2004). Some major
factors that determine the agency path are the institutional and cultural norms existing in
a specific jurisdiction, country or context. This has been theorized as the path-
dependency approach (Verschuere, 2006). The most notable, and particularly relevant to
our study, are the institutional theories that can explain variations or commonalities in
agencification across different jurisdictions or countries. The last section of this paper
reviews various institutional theories to explain agencification in Pakistan.
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Key characteristics of NPM type agency
Structural disaggregation.
Structural disaggregation is one of the major elements of NPM model. It refers to
autonomous agencies functioning at an arms length from their overseeing authority.
They having an independent legal status, enacted on the basis of a legislature or
ordinance. In other words, these are specialized bodies, created by the split of the
ministry into autonomous or semi-autonomous agencies. The level of structural
disaggregation in agencies studied was measured through 3 sub-dimensions:
(i) Institutional distance.

This refers to the relationship between the agency and the parent body
governing it; the legal status that exists between them and how far the agency
is from the ministry legally. What kind of powers and authority is assigned to
the agency to determine the contents of its act or statute? Whether a corporate
executive body, represented by various stakeholders exists or not. These are
indicators of distance between the ministry and the agency (Fedele et al,
2008).
It can be deduced that higher the degree of separation between the agency
and the ministry, more will be the level of autonomy in it.
(ii) Nature of task.

This refers to the nature of task assigned to the agency in terms of the functions and
the output required. Is it a single-purpose organization or multi-purpose, carrying
out wider functions? What is the domain of the agencies policy area, whether it
operates in more than one sector? All these are indicators of the task assigned to it.
Whether the agency provides a wide range of services and products or not is another
way to analyze its nature of task.
Therefore, more specific the agency task, more of structural
disaggregation, eventually more of NPM based approach implemented in it.
(iii) Agency specialization.
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This refers to the existence of policy implementation divide in the agency.

What level of distinction exists between the policy formulation role and policy
implementation. Is the autonomous body involved in either of the two or both
areas?
Thus, it can be inferred that more of agency specialization, higher will be
the degree of NPM-ness in the organization
Managerial autonomy.
It is another NPM characteristic. It refers to the extent to which the agencies granted
autonomy can take decisions independently. Decisions could be strategic or operational,
pertaining to the organizational resource (human or financial) allocation and utilization.
Giving more autonomy and responsibility to disaggregated agencies makes them perform
more efficiently. This model of agency that represents the Public Choice theory1 is
considered to be the most efficient form of organization (Christenson and Laegreid,
2006).
Contractualism or performance management.

This refers to the contractual relationship between the governing body and its agency for
performance management focusing more on results. This is one of the most important
doctrine of NPM (Hood, 1995). A performance contract between governing body and the
chief executive of agency is a practical manifestation of doctrine. It provides a ground to
have reduced input control; focus is on result oriented control through a documented
performance contract to make the agency achieve the desired outcome (Verhoest, 2005).
It requires a balance between the level of independence to be given to the agency and
extent of control by the overseeing body.
1
Atheoryinthe domain of Rational Choice Perspective
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Section II
Institutional and Policy Context
Pakistan inherited an imbalanced power structure from British India when it became an
independent state in 1947. Military and civil bureaucracy, two institutions developed by
British rulers were stronger than political institutions. The imbalance in institutional
system was further intensified in the post-independence period. Pakistan has been under
direct or indirect military rule supported by civil bureaucracy for over half of its 63 years
history as an independent nation. Military-civil bureaucratic oligarchy and nascent
democratic institutions operating in a hierarchical and pre-dominantly feudal society gave
rise to a bureaucratic-authoritarian state. Consequently, both military and even elected
governments acted in authoritarian manners contrary to democratic as well as
bureaucratic norms of behavior. The formal institutions of governance, interacting within
socio-cultural context have produced a political and administrative culture of inefficiency
and corruption, having built in preference for individuals over institutions and vested
interest over public interest. Civil society was fragmented and media remained under
state control till the last few years.
Policy context of governance and public management reform including
agencification after 1980 is the legacy of IMFs Structural Adjustment Program, initiated
during the same period which was backed by the World Bank. Liberalization,
deregulation, and privatization are the three basic principles of economic policy which
has been intact since 1980s, despite political instability and frequent changes in
government especially during and after the rule of General Zia-ul-Haque from 1977-88
till General Musharaf took over the reign of government after overthrowing an elected
government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in 1999. While the policy of liberalization,
deregulation and privatization continues to guide economic reforms of Pakistan, narrow
objective of economic growth were replaced with pro-poor economic growth as a result
of shift in policy of international financial institutions. Hence, economic growth and
poverty reduction are twin objectives of the reforms being undertaken within the same
policy framework. Attention was also shifted from pursuing a narrow objective of
reducing the size of government to strengthening the institutions of governance aiming at
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good governance which is recognized as a necessary condition of economic growth and

poverty reduction. This shift is clearly reflected in PRSPs2 since 2001, which are
prepared under the auspices of World Bank and IMF.
Historically, Pakistan has been pragmatic in terms of its policy regarding the role
of public sector vis--vis private sector except five years (1972-1977) under the
premiership of Late Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, when massive nationalization was carried out
under the so-called Islamic Socialism. After Bhutto was overthrown by Late General
Zia-ul-Haque in 1977, the process of denationalization was initiated and during his
regime Pakistan joined the IMFs Structural Adjustment Program in early 1980s. It also
became one of the major recipients of World Banks loans. The public sector reforms
process which was started in 1980s under Structural Adjustment Facility of IMF
sustained, despite political upheavals and instability in Islamabad which led to direct
military rule under Pervaiz Musharaf3, after a decade of fragile but civilian rule of
Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. Thus, liberalization, deregulation, and privatization are
policy components of public sector reform which Musharaf regime inherited from his
successors. The same policy continues under current civilian regime as a result of
elections in 2008.
Section III
Evolution of Agencies 1947-2010
Towards Strengthening Private Sector (1947-1970)
Pakistan inherited a colonial bureaucratic structure of administration after its

independence. In this initial period, bureaucracy was involved in formulation as well as
execution of policy. From 1953- till 1958, its political system was controlled by the civil
2
PovertyReductionStrategyPapers
3
ChiefofArmyStaff,in1999
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bureaucracy. Thus, the parliamentary democracy could not function in the wake of the
central executive control (Noman 1990). The first two decades are marked with military
rule.
The State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) is indeed the oldest regulatory authority,
established in 1948. Its objectives were to regulate the financial market for economic
growth, stabilize prices and to create job opportunities (M. Akhtar, 1998). Pakistan
Standards Institute (PSI) was another government body attached with the Ministry of
Industries, established in 1951, and later on assumed the status of an autonomous
statutory body in 1961. Its purpose was to ensure quality standard in industries.
During General Ayub Khans era of 1958-1971 the countrys political and
administrative system was highly unstable. Political parties were not allowed to
administer independently. Government machinery was in the hands of bureaucracy.
During late sixties, the public sector got involved in capital goods production, whereas,
private sector was encouraged to develop downstream industries. (Noman, 1990). The
Government of Pakistan intervened in the manufacturing industry. In 1958, state-run
Pakistan Industrial development Corporation (PIDC) was established, which set up
various industrial units and divested the profitable ones. (Kemal, 2002).
During this era state intervention in the market was purely on pragmatic grounds.
Public sector invested in areas where either the market/private sector failed or did not
exist; thus to maximize social and economic output. Till 1969/71, Pakistan had a free
market economy.
Towards Eliminating the Private Sector (1971-1977)

This is a highly significant era, since the 5tAdministrative Reforms of 1973 were
introduced during this period. These reforms rendered bureaucracy to play the role of
policy execution, while policy framing was in the hands of the elected representatives.
Such a policy increased the role of public sector in the economy. However due to the
biases and political patronage in official appointments the public institutions came under
scrutiny. (Noman, 1990).
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In 1970, the Securities and Exchange Authority, a semi autonomous body was
created by the government with the task of drafting upgraded rules for financial reporting
purpose (J. Ashraf & W. Ghani, 2005). The Pakistan peoples party took over the reign in
1971, after Z. A. Bhutto took oath as the Prime Minister of the country. There was a
major policy shift, under which the government decided to control the commanding
height of economy through market intervention. As a result, in early 1972, Bhutto
Government carried out a number of reforms in the industrial sector. He nationalized ten
categories of major industries.
Therefore, throughout 1970s, government invested heavily in manufacturing
industry, most of which today stand dissolved because of their inefficient and unviable
operations. Monopoly Control Authority (MCA) was established in 1971 which was
another form of an agency. It was a wing of CLA, which has been currently renamed as
Competition Commission of Pakistan (CCP). It is one of the oldest regulatory authorities.
There was proliferation of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) to keep monopoly in the
public sector, but it did not improve the economic scenario of the country. Rather such
management practices created inefficient SOEs and stringent control of the private
sector reduced private investment in the country. This led to reliance on foreign aid
(Chaudhary, 1995).
Towards Downsizing of Public Sector (1977-1990)

In mid 1977 military took over and denationalized many industries. For this purpose a
National Disinvestment Authority was established in 1988. The process of
denationalization and deregulation was initiated in 1980s, after the state realized how
inefficient the SOEs were (Akhtar, 1998). Private investors were encouraged to come
and invest in various sectors, thus curtailing the previous governments public
intervention policy. Under General Zia's reign, the economy grew steadily supporting the
private sector. During 1970s and 1980s Pakistan, due to its inadequate economic policies
and weak institutions, experienced fiscal deficit and external debts, resulting in a
declining economic growth rate. This was the period (1986), it started to receive
concessional financial assistance through IMF and World Bank induced Structural
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Adjustment Facility (SAF), which focused on liberalization and private sector

involvement (Iqbal, 1994)
Benazir Bhutto became in power in 1988. During her rule, Pakistan Peoples Party
(PPP) was inclined towards privatization. PIDC was assigned the task of reinvigorating
industrialization as well as decentralization. During late 1980s and early 1990s many
SOEs were deregulated. This policy invited private foreign investment in many
industries. However due to an unsystematic privatization policy it added to problems. But
PPP government was still able to attract foreign investors (Partnership-Pakistan, 2008).
Thus, during 1980s the process of deregulation, liberalization of markets and
institutions, and privatization of state- owned entities had begun. Economic liberalization
continued because of the donor agencies and pressure from international financial
institutions.
Nawaz Shareef took over as prime minister in 1990 and gave a boost to the
private sector. To meet economic challenges, liberalization policy was adhered to. This
was when in 1991; the government set up a Privatization Commission was created to sell
sick units in the public sector to private entrepreneurs (Akhtar, 1998).
Towards Good Governance (1990-2010)

Musharaf overthrew Nawazs government and started off with political decentralization.
It was a period of privatization, economic liberalization and re-regulatory policies. The
prime objective was to encourage foreign companies to come and invest, as well as to
attract the local players in the private sector. In the wake of massive privatization,
independent regulatory authorities were created in various sectors to protect the interests
of the citizens using the public services (Hussain, 2005). These entities were to be
manned with specialists; experts in their respective sectors. Another justification for the
regulatory concept was to separate governments roles of policy making and regulation.
During 1990s politically connected and influential industrialists defaulted on their
loans, which resulted in corporate failures, immensely. (J. Ashraf and W.I. Ghani, 2005).
Such circumstances devastated the confidence of the public both in the capital markets
and in the monitoring mechanisms of the government. This increasing pressure of
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external debts and inability of our government to pay back further increased their
financial dependence on international donor agencies (such as the Asian Development
Agencies and the International Monetary Fund). These agencies were involved in the
fiscal and monetary policy framing of the country.
In the face of the prevailing scenario, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), under
the capital market regulation reforms, formed the Securities and Exchange Commission
of Pakistan (SECP) in 1999, to monitor the activities of corporate and capital markets and
all associated players. SECP replaced the Corporate Law authority (CLA), a department
attached with the Ministry of Finance since 1981. CLA was not an autonomous body, and
was not capable to regulate the financial sector. It had a typical bureaucratic structure,
lacking in transparency and authenticity. The rapid expansion of the market during the
early 1990's further highlighted the need for the establishment of an independent
regulatory body with full operational and administrative autonomy.
Another Industry in Pakistan, where restructuring of organizations was realized
years ago is the energy sector. The government apprehended that efficiency in power
generation could be achieved through private sector involvement. As a result of the
strategic policies of the GoP, approved and supported by the donor organizations, Water
and Power Development Authoritys (WAPDA) Power Wing was unbundled into
generation, transmission and distribution companies. This task was assigned to Pakistan
Electric Power Company Private Limited (PEPCO), an autonomous management
company within WAPDA.
Oil and gas regulatory authority (OGRA) and National Electric Power Regulatory
authority (NEPRA) are two major autonomous regulatory bodies created to introduce
transparent and judicious economic regulation of the power sector and to enhance the oil
and gas sector. NEPRA was formed to improve the provision of electric power services
to the citizens. It also aimed at safeguarding the interests of the investors and operators,
as well as to create a competitive environment (www.nepra.org.pk).
Section IV
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Drivers of Creation of Agencies

Agencification process carried out particularly after 1980 lays its origin in public sector
reform carried out under the policy guidance of the World Bank. This is revealed by the
policy documents as well as from data collected through qualitative interview for the
study. However, several respondents provided rational explanation for agencification as
a reform measure to improve service delivery and regulation without getting into issue
whether such reform are endogenous or exogenous.
One of the telecom regulators responded, saying that actually whatever happens in
the country is viewed from an international perspective. Since globally a process of
deregulation came, and as a result of this trend the service delivery organizations were
taken out of the domain of the government and privatized. Within them deregulation
rather reregulation came and the number of companies was increased to improve service
delivery. It was a worldwide trend. As for Pakistan there was an international pressure,
due to which such public sector agencies were created on similar lines as the rest of the
world.
Another viewpoint from a media regulatory concern was to bring in competition
in service industry and thus to improve the quality of service delivery to the end user.
National School of Public Policy (NSPP), a prominent and elite institution functioning as
a training and research institute for the public servants, disclosed certain factors that were
considered as the prime reasons to create it as an autonomous entity. One major factor
was the realization by the government that trainings of civil servants were not up to the
mark. This was observed by Mr. Benori, whom the government hired as a consultant to
give a concept of training after research Secondly, the pattern of training was without any
discipline and there was no uniformity amongst its constituent units. It was devoid of
defined parameters, neither was there any syllabus. Evaluation system was a totally
subjective one and reports were being written sitting in offices, based on personal whims
and prejudices. Third factor was to enhance the capacity of the civil servants.
In response to why Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA) was created, the
respondent narrated reasons saying that, donor agencies brought this concept to separate
three roles performed by the government; one is policy making, the second
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implementation and third is management. These were the broader areas which primarily
the government was undertaking and acting as the main decision maker. This idea of the
donor agencies and the international trend reached Pakistan in 1990s. In the same year
these regulatory bodies came up, starting off with National Electric Power Regulatory
Authority (Nepra) and then Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA) in 2002. The
hallmark of the creation of Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (PPRA) was to
bring uniformity in procurement laws and to develop modern system of regulation in line
with international practices, as a requirement of the international donor (World Bank).
Another purpose was to encourage the private sector, which should feel free to
participate in any kind of competition, thus to strengthen them in the global market as
well.
Security Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) respondent revealed that one
of the major reasons to create an autonomous body outside the ministerial control was to
overcome issues of corruption and complaints existing in the previous set up of Corporate
Law Authority. From Pakistan Electric Power Supply (PEPCO) representatives point of
view, the purpose was to prepare the distribution companies for ultimate privatization and
to build in, best business practices. The restructuring agenda of WAPDA's Power Wing
was based on the new strategic policies of the Government of Pakistan approved and
supported by the lending institutions. The objective behind this transition was to inculcate
a corporate and industry culture by adopting good business practices, increasing
productive efficiency, including customer orientation and service culture, improving
quality of services, setting performance targets, curtailing costs, theft and wastage
(http://www.pepco.gov.pk/). Pepco was assigned the power to revamp and instill a
commercially oriented corporate culture based on efficiency, economy, responsibility and
accountability within the power distribution companies created as a result of the process
of agencification in the power sector.
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Reason for the creation of Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) was to
create an overall industry environment and to make it investor and business friendly.
National electric Power Regulatory Authority (Nepra) was created to have a non-partisan
organization, to give space to the industry, and to get rid of the bureaucratic ills4 existing
in the organization at that time. Thus, it was created to safeguard the interests of the
consumers and the industry players unanimously.
The viewpoints from different policy sectors indicate that creation of the semi
autonomous bodies revolved around two major factors:
i. International trend, which came into our country through the donor and
lending institutions.
ii. To have organizations free of bureaucratic dysfunctionalities.5 These were
taken as a major cause of inadequate and inefficient service delivery.
Thus, the primary objective of creating the autonomous bodies was to inculcate a
corporate culture of professionalism and goal-oriented approach towards management.
Thus, aiming to function in a competitive and efficiency-oriented environment; this
would unanimously serve the interests of the citizens and the service providers.
The impact of the international practices are evident in the regulatory bodies,
whereas service sector decisions appear to be tilted towards the pressure from the donor
agencies, aiming at instilling a business culture in the public sector management to
achieve a customer oriented approach.
4
Red- tapism, corruption and political patronage.
5
inefficiency,lengthyprocedures,anddelayedprocessingtime
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NPN-ness of Autonomous Bodies: Stated and Perceived

The findings of this study are interpreted on the basis of the NPM characteristics
discussed earlier in the first section.
Structural Disaggregation
Institutional distance.
As for the first sub-dimension of structural aggregation; it is evident that the institutional
distance between the selected organization and the ministry is of a considerable nature,
since all the organizations have an independent legal status, created through an ordinance
or executive order. Secondly, the degree of separation between them appears to be
generally moderate, as agencies cannot amend their act/ordinance by themselves. They
have to revert back to the parliament for its consent and approval. Hence, there role is
limited to provision of input and proposal to amend it. This is a common ritual for both
categories of agencies analyzed.
Another aspect which indicates that a distance does prevail is the existence of a
board, or authority that consists of several members, both from the public and private
sector. This feature is an indication of a fairly high degree of autonomy given to the
organizations, with regard to their disaggregated structural existence. However,
ministerial influence is evident in the decisions of the agencies, through their
representation in their apex bodies.
Nature of task.
Considering the second dimension; nature of the task being carried out by the
organizations, all the regulatory bodies are specific purpose organizations, primarily
involved in regulation, except for one, Security Exchange commission of Pakistan
(SECP).
Whereas, three service delivery agencies (33% of the service providers) namely;
NSPP, NADRA and SMEDA are multipurpose. They are involved in research and
development work as well. Furthermore, four out of nine service delivery agencies (45%)
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are providing multiple services. Thus its only to a limited extent that they can be
considered as multi functional organizations.
Besides this, since the regulatory agencies analyzed are mostly single-purpose
organizations, this indicates that agencies performing regulatory roles tend to be specific
purpose organizations. Since four service delivery organizations out of the nine that were
questioned, perform more than one function, it can be inferred that the service providers
are comparatively more into performing multiple functions than those carrying out
regulatory natured tasks.
Analyzing both the categories of selected organizations it can be inferred that
generally agencies tend to be single purpose (11 out of 15 i.e. 73%).
Agency specialization.
An aspect of agency specialization is indicated through the limited level of involvement
in policy formation at a strategic level. Almost 90% of the agencies studied, are just into
policy execution, with the exception of two service providers; SMEDA and PCB who are
involved in policy framing as well. Regulators in the higher education and the oil and gas
industry expressed their occasional input in policy decisions. This implies that a variation
does exist within agency formats, but they tend to incline towards a more specialized
role.
In a nutshell both agency forms are into policy implementation largely. This
confirms the divide between policy formulation and its implementation, which is a
feature of the new public management concept. An overview of the structural
disaggregation aspect delineated is provided in Table 1.
For all the regulatory bodies, the cabinet division is the medium or route, through
whom they interact with the federal government. However, for service providers, PCB
was one agency which very clearly denied any interference or involvement of its
ministry, mentioning that times have changed and sport is no more in the domain of the
ministry.
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Managerial Autonomy
Autonomy from the operational aspect appears to be at a very high level, especially in the
case of regulatory bodies, particularly those that are not financially dependent on the
government. This is true for both human resource, administrative and financial autonomy.
Strategic HR autonomy.
Another evident outcome is that agencies generally do not have strategic level autonomy,
since almost all of them except two, as mentioned earlier are just involved in selection of
policy tools and instruments, once strategic policies are determined by the superior
government bodies. Thus, strategic level decisions are taken at the
government/ministerial level, sometimes in their executive boards which has ministers as
members.
Operational HR autonomy.
Most of the organizations follow their in-house service rules and regulations for
operational level HR and administrative decisions to a large extent, once approved by
their chief executive body6. These agencies can determine their salary packages on the
basis of their in-house salary scales, which are not dictated to them by the government in
most of the cases. They are normally higher than the government pay package. Internal
restructuring of all the studied organizations is also an internal issue; it merely involves
the apex bodies consent.
A similarity between both the agency types is that the pay scales of most of the
organizations are normally higher than the traditional government pay package. In case of
absence of their own rules, establishment code is pursued. Thus, operational tasks are
confined at the agency level away from the overseeing body.
6
Board/authority/commission
19
Agencies
Financial autonomy.
Another finding is that, organizations supported financially by the government have low
level of financial autonomy. However, for organizations generating their own funds it
exists to a great extent, but at a differential level. Majority of the regulatory respondents
mentioned that they do set their tariffs independently looking at the market trends, but its
done by their apex body.
Whereas, for most of the service providers the ultimate decision making authority
is the Government of Pakistan. World Bank is another entity, which influences tariff
decisions, specifically in the power sector. However, some agencies do propose and
provide their recommendations. Pakistan Cricket Board is the only service provider that
reflects total autonomy in case of tariff setting. Level of expenditure is also determined
independently, specifically in case of self- funded agencies.
An overview of the level of managerial autonomy observed in various agencies
examined is presented in Table 2.
Contractualism/Performance Management
Coming down to the third dimension; in terms of control, all the agencies depicted a
similar picture which is devoid of the NPM concept of contractualism. There is no
documented, performance contract to steer the agency-ministry relationship. Just a single
respondent, belonging to PEPCO, mentioned that the government has asked them to get a
performance contract named as KPIs (key performance indicators), signed by them
(Ministry) and the distribution companies.7
7
Pakistanspowersectorconsistsof8electricitydistributioncompanies.Theseentitieswerecreatedunderthe
restructuringprogramofWapdasPowerWingin1984endorsedandsupportedbythedonorinstitutions
20
Agencies
Moreover, at a broader level, their performance is measured through two modes

of evaluation; internal and external audit. Agencies that rely on the government for funds
are required to report periodically to the government through an external audit system,
The Accountant General Pakistan Revenues (AGPR). The agency accounts are audited
by the AGPR on an annual basis. They also send reports through the cabinet to the
concerned government authority; Council of Common Interests, on an annual basis.
The second mode of performance measurement is through the agencies internal
system of checks and balances. Most of them have an in-house accounts or audit
department or committee, responsible for internal audit. However evaluations are merely
based on financial audits.
Whereas, for agencies that are not funded by the government, rather they solely
rely on their self-generated funds, the mechanism of performance evaluation is based on
both internal audit committees as well as external audit firms approved and appointed by
the federal government. Most of the regulatory bodies fall in this domain.
As evidence reveals that none of the agencies interviewed, have any performance
contract between the agency and the governing body, making the degree of
contractualism almost negligible. This is true for both categories of agencies. Reason
being, political agents dont want any sort of documented performance contract as it
would restrict them from imposing their personal interests on the autonomous bodies.
One exemplary situation is the sudden dismissal of telecom regulators chief executive,
before the completion of his tenure.
Considering managerial autonomy and the control aspect, there is homogeneity to
a large extent between organizations studied. Most of the agencies have operational
autonomy, having the discretion to take HR, financial and administrative decisions, based
on their service rules and regulations.
Finally based on the empirical evidence it can be inferred that slight variations do
exist amongst agencies, owing to the nature of their task and their organizational context.
Another interpretation of the findings is that, Pollitt et al., (2004) tripod model
which formed the basis of the dimensions investigated is not completely in line with the
agency forms analyzed. Although variations do exist along the dimensions of autonomy
21
Agencies
and structural features, but the component of contractualism; ministerial steering through
a contract does not exist. This refers to a partial implementation of NPM-type practices in
the organizations under the federal government.
Section V
Towards Theoretical Explanation of Agencification in Pakistan
Institutional theories are particularly relevant to our study. Though agencification is a
universal phenomenon, its dynamics vary from country to country due to different
institutional context. There are a variety of perspectives dealing with public institutions.
Theonig (2008) identified four principal institutional perspectives: 1) historical
institutionalism; 2) sociological institutionalism; 3) new institutionalism, and 4) local
order institutionalism. In this section, we have applied only first two institutional
perspectives to demonstrate the explanatory power of institutional theories in the study of
agencification across countries.
Historical institutionalism defines public administration as part of political life
(Thoenig, 2008). This perspective poses past as an important influence on present
policies and functioning of institution. It rests on the assumption that past shapes the
future. Therefore, political and administrative organizations are viewed as path
dependent. Their policies, rules, procedures stay in contact and continues along a
historical path. Thus, agencification, viewed through lenses of historical institutionalism,
appears to be path dependent. Therefore, any radical change in structure and processes of
public agencies in a particular institutional context may not be initiated or if it comes
through coercion may not sustain as originally intended. The process of agencification in
Pakistan, as surfaced in the study, renders support to the concept of path dependency, one
of the core concept of historical institutonalism: 1) agencies have been created with
considerable degree of institutional distance but do not enjoy strategic autonomy as
predicated by the doctrines of NPM; 2) there is a strict divide between policy and
executionagencies are strictly involved in execution but, not in policy. This
surprisingly is not the result of NPM but, is a historical continuity of divide between
Secretariat and attached departments. While the Secretariat is policy-making structure of
22
Agencies
bureaucracy comprising divisions in the federal government, the departments attached

with various divisions are exclusively involved in execution. Along the same line,
agencies were established but with great deal of operational autonomy which is not
enjoyed by the attached departments. Interestingly, autonomous bodies are still listed
under attached departments in the website of Government of Pakistan. It is evident that
policy-execution divide which is regarded as an outcome of NPM movement, is a case of
path dependency in Pakistans context but, not the result of NPM.
The sociological institutionalism defines institutions with reference to their macro

environment. It includes symbols, moral models, and cognitive schemes besides formal
rules and procedures (Thoenig, 2008). This perspective rests on the assumption that
society or culture as a whole shapes the acts and non-acts of, the structures, and the
values of the public sector (Thoening, 2008). Looking at the agencies through this
perspective, it can be inferred that agencies culture and practices are reflection of the
national culture. For example, the culture of sifarish8 (referrals) prevails in many cases
which is very much part of national cultural system of Pakistan. People feel it obligatory
to help their acquaintances. This conforms to the cultural and sociological
institutionalism perspective which states that principles of autonomy do not occur in their
true essence owed to the cultural norms and societal values that exist within the agencies
and also in the external entities overseeing them.
Further on, the survey results are explained using theoretical perspectives of
historical institutionalism, institutional isomorphism, sociological institutionalism, and
public choice theory, to comparatively assess their explanatory power.
The findings of the study indicate congruency with the historical institutional
viewpoint, which has its roots in institutional perspective. Historical traditions determine
the agency status and mode of functioning. It implies that agency structure is an outcome
8
Appointmentsonthebasisofpoliticalpatronage.
23
Agencies
of the past procedures, norms and routines. Some of the cases analyzed did reflect
traditional practices, but were far less as compared to the typical public sector
organizations. It did impact the way these autonomous bodies functioned, thus
hampering the implementation of new public management doctrines in the real spirit.
SECP is one commission that still follows orthodox measures of manual record keeping
along with the computerized data base. Such practices are followed keeping in mind the
domestic requirements of its stakeholders, the traditional norms and past procedures with
which most of them feel comfortable and are accustomed to.
The wave of creation of these autonomous bodies existing at an arms length from
their parent ministry is the breed of institutional isomorphism. Experience with one
autonomous body led to another similar setup, particularly in the case of regulatory
structures namely, PEMRA, which was created on similar pattern of PTA. Whereby,
PPRA was one that developed on similar philosophy of NEPRA and OGRA. These
organizations declared that they had framed their service rules and regulations on
principles parallel to those that had been created earlier in the time period, such as
NEPRA rules adapted by PPRA. Alongside were the international trends prevailing
across the border, especially those regions that had similar socio-demographic and
cultural characteristics. Malaysian, Indian as well as some European public sector
management trends and experiences were adopted.
National culture of typical bureaucracy also affects the level of autonomy that is
practiced and the kind of relationship that exists between the political and bureaucratic
actors within the organization, thus indirectly having an influence on the administrative
cultures of organizations. This approach can be explained by the response of the
organizations investigated, namely PEPCO, where stringent bureaucracy prevails and it is
definitely reflected through the power distance that exists between the upper and lower
level management employees.
Although, most of the respondents when questioned about how they see
organizations to have improved in this regulatory or service delivery role, expressed
positive thoughts about it. This is a clear indicator that organizations granted autonomy,
and functioning legally at a distance from the parent body render improved management
24
Agencies
practices. Hence this emerging remark justifies the aspect of public choice theory, which
presents the belief of managers performing better when given autonomy and
responsibility to manage. This rather is a manifestation of the rational choice perspective,
one of the theories that support the concept of agency formation in public sector
organizations.
Some regulatory agencies such as PEMRA, PPRA, PTA, and SECP have emerged
as an autonomous body quoting situations and decisions taken by them independently
particularly in operational matters. This implies that they have been able to rectify most
of the market failures, one highly claimed achievement by SECP, which prior to its
inception as an autonomous body was operating in the realm of constant maneuvering by
the industry. PEMRAs role of doing away with monopolistic situation is another insight
to the concept of safeguarding the interests of the citizen and market players. Similar is
the experience of PTA and some other organizations regulating the industry. Such
practical scenario parallels and reaffirms the public choice theory perspective which is
based on similar parameters of citizen rights protection and a free, fair, and competitive
market.
Conclusion
This research paper sought to assess the level or degree of NPM-like features existing in
the autonomous bodies created under the federal government after 1980. The analyses of
15 organizations in different sectors and agency forms, lead to several conclusions with
regard to the research questions. Discussions held with the key respondents; specifically,
chairmen, members, directors, or in some cases director generals, revealed various
aspects of autonomy, disaggregation and performance management prevailing in the
agencies created under the rubric of new public management. Empirical evidence
indicated that although agencies present a varied level of autonomy and structural aspect,
but in terms of the component of control both categories of agencies presented a similar
picture which is devoid of the NPM concept of contractualism; i.e. no formal documented
performance contract is formulated to steer the agency-ministry relationship.
Creation of the autonomous bodies studied, revolved around two main reasons;
one is the international trend and policies of international financial institutions. The other
25
Agencies
was to provide a professional goal-oriented environment to the agencies, thus rendering

insulated regulation and monopoly control and to enhance efficiency of the service
delivery organizations in various policy sectors.
Moreover, there exists no formal, documented system of performance evaluation

by the overseeing federal entity. The only mechanism of evaluation is the financial audit.
For those agencies that rely on the government for funds are prone to report periodically
to the government through an external audit system, The Accountant General Pakistan
Revenues (AGPR). Accounts are audited by the AGPR on an annual basis. However
both types of agencies have internal system of checks and balances.
Whereas for agencies that rely solely on their self-generated funds, their financial
audit is done by both internal audit committees as well as external audit firms approved
and appointed by the federal government. Most of the regulatory bodies fall in this
domain; initial seed money was given to them by the government or some international
donor agency through the government, to start off as an independent structure which later
on and till today made themselves self sustaining organizations. While four service
delivery organizations investigated, revealed their dependence on the government
(completely or partially) for funds with the exception of Pakistan Cricket Board (PCB).
Both regulatory and service delivery agencies enjoy considerable operational
autonomy but, they take strategic decisions with the approval of their respective
ministries. Thus, both agency types reflect partial conformity to the principles of NPM.
As for the performance outcomes and improvement that has been brought about
after being an autonomous body, most of the respondents replied in a very positive
manner, revealing what has made them say that their organization has improved the
service quality after its inception. One of the respondents views belonging to PPRA were
that corruption had definitely reduced, and procedures had become more transparent.
Another viewpoint was that they were very confident to have provided international
standards of service. PBC believed that infrastructure, grounds and academies have been
developed which are centers of excellence but more needs to be done. The Higher
Education Commission (HEC) also pointed out all the achievements they had made since
26
Agencies
inception in various academic development projects to achieve HR and educational

infrastructure quality standards in various sectors.
Real benefits of regulation can only be achieved once these autonomous bodies
are headed by professionals and experts in their sectors. Till today we do tend to find
bureaucrats sitting in their apex bodies as well as in the overseeing parliament. Most of
the members are generalists, whereas appointing specialists should be the way.
It can be inferred that the characteristics of NPM type agency model seem to
have diffused partially in our restructured agencies, striving to maintain some traditional
colonial aspects but in a disguised manner.
References
Akhtar, M. (1998). "Effects of Trade Liberalization on Agriculture in Pakistan:
Institutional and Structural Aspects." Working Papers.
Ashraf, J. and W. I. Ghani (2005). Accounting in a Country: The Case of Pakistan.
Chaudhry, M. (1995). Economic liberalization of Pakistan's economy: Trends and
repercussions. Contemporary South Asia, 4(2), 187-192.
Christensen, T. and P. Lgreid (2006). Autonomy and regulation: Coping with agencies
in the modern state, Edward Elgar Publishing.
Fedele, P., D. Galli, et al. (2008). "Disaggregation, autonomy and re-
regulation,contractualism." Public Management review 9(4): 557-558.
Hood, C. (1995). "The" new public management" in the 1980s: Variations on a theme."
Accounting Organisations and Society 20: 93-93.
Hussain, I. (2005). Economy of Pakistan: an overview.
Iqbal, Z. (1994). "Macroeconomic effects of adjustment lending in Pakistan." The
Pakistan Development Review 33(4): 1011-1031.
27
Agencies
Kemal, A.R. (2002). "Regulatory Framework in Pakistan." The Pakistan Development
Review. 41: 319-332.
Noman, O. (1990). Pakistan: a political and economic history since 1947, Kegan Paul
International.
Partnership-Pakistan, S. "Democracy and Governance in Pakistan."
Pollitt, C. and C. Talbot (2004). Unbundled government: a critical analysis of the global
trend to agencies, quangos and contractualisation, Routledge.
Pollitt C. et al. (2004). Agencies: How Government Do Things Through `Semi-
Autonomous Organizations, Palgrave macmillan, 320 p.
Talbot, C., Pollitt, C., Bathgate, K., Caulfield, J., Reilly, A., and Smullen, A. 2000, The
Idea of Agency: Researching the agencification of the (public service) world,
paper for the American Political Studies Association Conference, Washington
DC, August.
Thoenig, Jean-Claude (2008). Institutional Theories and Public Institutions: Traditions
and Appropriateness, in Peters, Guy and Peierce, Jon (ed.). The Public
Administration. Sage Publications Singapore.
Verhoest, K. (2005). "Effects of autonomy, performance contracting, and competition on
the performance of a public agency: a case study." Policy Studies Journal 33(2):
235-258.
Verschuere, B. and D. Barbieri (2009). "Investigating the 'NPM-ness' of agencies in Italy
and Fladers." Public Management review 11(3): 345-373.
28
Agencies
Verschuere, B. (2006). "Autonomy & control in arm's length public agencies: exploring
the determinants of policy autonomy." KU Leuven, Instituut voor de Overheid
373.
Internet Sources
http://www.epza.gov.pk/
http://hec.gov.pk
http://www.nadra.gov.pk/
http://www.nepra.org.pk/
http://www.nha.gov.pk
http://www.ogra.gov.pk
http://www.pakpost.gov.pk/
http://www.pasc.gov.pk/
http://www.pemra.gov.pk/
http://www.pepco.gov.pk/
http://www.ppra.org.pk/
http://www.pta.gov.pk
http://www.smeda.org/index.php
APPENDIX A
List of Federal Government Agencies Studied

These organizations are divided into two categories based on their purpose/functions they
carry out. They are either service delivery organizations or regulatory bodies.
Name of Industry/sector year of inception Function

organization /Age
Security and Exchange Finance 1997/13 Regulation
29
Agencies
Commission of Pakistan
(SECP)
Public Procurement Regulatory Industries and 2002/8 Regulation

Authority (PPRA) production
National Electric Power Power 1997/13 Regulation

Regulatory Authority (NEPRA)
Oil & Gas Regulatory Oil and gas 2002/8 Regulation

Authority (OGRA)
Pakistan Telecommunication Telecommunication 1996/14 Regulation

Authority (PTA)
Pakistan Electronic Media Communication 2002/8 Regulation

Regulatory authority (PEMRA)
Higher Education Commission Education 2005/5 Service

(HEC)
Export Processing Zone Industries and 1980/30 Service

Authority (EPZA) production
Small and Medium Enterprises Industries&production 1998/12 Service

Development authority
(SMEDA)
Pakistan Electric Power Power 1998/12 Service

Regulatory Authority (PEPCO)
National Database Regulatory Interior affairs 2000/10 Service

Authority (NADRA)
(Continued)
Year of inception
Organization Industry/sector /Age(yrs) Function
National Highway Communications 1991/19 Service

Authority (NHA)
Pakistan Postal Service(PPO) Communications/ 2002/8 Service

Postal services
30
Agencies
National School of Education 2002/8 Service

Public Policy (NSPP)
Pakistan Cricket Board (PCB) Sports 2002/8 Service
31
AgencificationinPakistan:AComparativeStudyofRegulatoryandServiceDeliveryAgencies
TABLE 1
Structural Disaggregation
regulatory body service delivery
options PTA PEMRA OGRA NEPRA PPRA SECP HEC NSPP NADRA SMEDA EPZA PEPCO PCB NHA PPS
First dimension
Institutional Distance
Chief executive body exists yes/no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes Yes
Change contents of act yes/no no no no no no no no no no no no no no no No
Second dimension
Nature of task
operate in more than one
sector yes/no no no no no yes yes no no yes yes yes no no no Yes
single purpose yes/no yes yes yes yes yes no yes no no no yes yes yes yes Yes
delivers diversified services yes/no no no no no yes yes no yes yes yes no no no yes Yes
Third dimension
Agency specialization
involved in policy
formulation y/m/s/r/n rarely no sometimes no rarely rarely sometimes no rarely yes no no yes rarely Rarely
y=yes, m=mostly, s=sometimes, r=rarely, n=no
32
TABLE 2
Managerial Autonomy
rankings PTA PEMRA OGRA NEPRA PPRA SECP HEC NSPP NADRA SMEDA EPZA PEPCO PCB NHA PPS
Operational HR autonomy
change the salary 1,2,3,4,5 * 2 5 5 5 5 5 2 4 5 5 4 1 5 3 5
promote an employee 1,2,3,4,5 * 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 4 4 5 3 5
evaluate an employee 1,2,3,4,5 * 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 4 4 5 3 5
hire an employee 1,2,3,4,5 * 4 5 5 5 5 5 3 4 5 5 4 1 5 3 5
determine size of staff 1,2,3,4,5 5 5 5 1 5 1 1 5 5 4 2 5 4 2 3
internal organizational. structure 1,2,3,4,5 5 5 4 1 5 1 1 5 5 5 2 5 4 4 5
appoint managers 1,2,3,4,5 5 5 5 1 5 1 1 5 5 5 2 2 4 3 4
employees regulated by civil service rules Y/M/S/R/N N N N N Y N N Y R R N M N M R

Strategic HR autonomy
Determine level of salary independently 1,2,3,4,5 3 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 5 4 2 5 3 1
promotion criteria 1,2,3,4,5 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 5 4 3 5 4 1
process of staff evaluation 1,2,3,4,5 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 5 4 3 5 3 4
appointment procedure 1,2,3,4,5 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 5 4 1 5 3 1
Determine BPS 1,2,3,4,5 5 5 5 5 5 5 2 5 5 5 3 2 5 1 1
33
(Continued) Managerial Autonomy

rankings PTA PEMRA OGRA NEPRA PPRA SECP HEC NSPP NADRA SMEDA EPZA PEPCO PCB NHA PPS
Financial autonomy(strategic)
acquire loans/grants without approval 1,2,3,4,5 N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A 2 N.A 5 N.A 1 N.A 2 1
acquire resources through contract without approval 1,2,3,4,5 N.A N.A N.A N.A 2 N.A N.A 2 N.A 5 4 2 4 1 1
setting tariff independently 1,2,3,4,5 5 5 2 5 5 5 4 3 3 5 1 1 5 1 3
carry out financial transactions independently 1,2,3,4,5 5 5 5 5 4 5 3 5 5 5 5 2 5 3 3
determine level of expenditure independently 1,2,3,4,5 5 5 5 5 4 5 3 5 5 5 3 2 5 3 4
Borrow for investment after approval Y/M/S/R/N N N N N N N N R N R N Y N.A Y N
set tariff after approval Y/M/S/R/N Y Y R R Y Y N.A Y R Y N N Y R S
enter partnership with pvt. legal body once
approved Y/M/S/R/N N N N N N N N N N Y Y N Y Y Y
Autonomy in policy matters
take policy decisions independently 1,2,3,4,5 2 1 2 1 2 3 1 1 1 2 1 1 5 1 2
selection of instruments totally independently 1,2,3,4,5 5 5 3 5 3 5 3 5 5 4 1 1 4 3 4

without ministries involvement
y=yes, m=mostly, s=sometimes, r=rarely, n=no

N. A. means not applicable
* 1= not independently, 2= rarely independently, 3= occasionally independently, 4= mostly independently, 5= totally independently
1= Never, 2= very rarely, 3= sometimes, 4= usually, 5= yes always
On a scale of 1-5, 1= maximum ministerial intervention, 5= least ministerial intervention
On a scale of 1-5, 1= full ministerial approval required, 5= no ministerial approval required
On a scale of 1-5, 1= no autonomy, 5= full autonomy
34

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AgencificationinPakistan:AComparativeStudyofRegulatoryandServiceDelivery

Agencification in Pakistan: A Comparative Study of Regulatory

Like many other developing countries, agencification is not a new phenomenon in

Key characteristics of NPM type agency

(i) Institutional distance.

(ii) Nature of task.

(iii) Agency specialization.

This refers to the existence of policy implementation divide in the agency.

Contractualism or performance management.

good governance which is recognized as a necessary condition of economic growth and

Towards Strengthening Private Sector (1947-1970)

Pakistan inherited a colonial bureaucratic structure of administration after its

Towards Eliminating the Private Sector (1971-1977)

Towards Downsizing of Public Sector (1977-1990)

Adjustment Facility (SAF), which focused on liberalization and private sector

Towards Good Governance (1990-2010)

Drivers of Creation of Agencies

NPN-ness of Autonomous Bodies: Stated and Perceived

Moreover, at a broader level, their performance is measured through two modes

bureaucracy comprising divisions in the federal government, the departments attached

The sociological institutionalism defines institutions with reference to their macro

was to provide a professional goal-oriented environment to the agencies, thus rendering

Moreover, there exists no formal, documented system of performance evaluation

inception in various academic development projects to achieve HR and educational

Akhtar, M. (1998). "Effects of Trade Liberalization on Agriculture in Pakistan:

Institutional and Structural Aspects." Working Papers.

Ashraf, J. and W. I. Ghani (2005). Accounting in a Country: The Case of Pakistan.

Chaudhry, M. (1995). Economic liberalization of Pakistan's economy: Trends and

repercussions. Contemporary South Asia, 4(2), 187-192.

in the modern state, Edward Elgar Publishing.

Fedele, P., D. Galli, et al. (2008). "Disaggregation, autonomy and re-

regulation,contractualism." Public Management review 9(4): 557-558.

Accounting Organisations and Society 20: 93-93.

Hussain, I. (2005). Economy of Pakistan: an overview.

Iqbal, Z. (1994). "Macroeconomic effects of adjustment lending in Pakistan." The

Pakistan Development Review 33(4): 1011-1031.

Kemal, A.R. (2002). "Regulatory Framework in Pakistan." The Pakistan Development

Review. 41: 319-332.

Partnership-Pakistan, S. "Democracy and Governance in Pakistan."

trend to agencies, quangos and contractualisation, Routledge.

Pollitt C. et al. (2004). Agencies: How Government Do Things Through `Semi-

Autonomous Organizations, Palgrave macmillan, 320 p.

Idea of Agency: Researching the agencification of the (public service) world,

paper for the American Political Studies Association Conference, Washington

Thoenig, Jean-Claude (2008). Institutional Theories and Public Institutions: Traditions

Administration. Sage Publications Singapore.

Verhoest, K. (2005). "Effects of autonomy, performance contracting, and competition on

Verschuere, B. and D. Barbieri (2009). "Investigating the 'NPM-ness' of agencies in Italy

and Fladers." Public Management review 11(3): 345-373.

the determinants of policy autonomy." KU Leuven, Instituut voor de Overheid

List of Federal Government Agencies Studied

Name of Industry/sector year of inception Function

Security and Exchange Finance 1997/13 Regulation

Public Procurement Regulatory Industries and 2002/8 Regulation

National Electric Power Power 1997/13 Regulation

Oil & Gas Regulatory Oil and gas 2002/8 Regulation

Pakistan Telecommunication Telecommunication 1996/14 Regulation

Pakistan Electronic Media Communication 2002/8 Regulation

Higher Education Commission Education 2005/5 Service

Export Processing Zone Industries and 1980/30 Service

Small and Medium Enterprises Industries&production 1998/12 Service

Pakistan Electric Power Power 1998/12 Service

National Database Regulatory Interior affairs 2000/10 Service

National Highway Communications 1991/19 Service