G.R. No.

L-26940 August 21, 1982

PAULINA SANTOS, assisted by her husband FERNANDO PARREO, petitioners, vs.

GREGORIA ARANZANSO, DEMETRIA VENTURA, CONSUELO PASION, assisted by her
husband MARCOS SUGA, and PACITA PASION, assisted by her husband PABLO
MANGALONZO, and HONORABLE GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL, in his official capacity as Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Manila, respondents.

Facts:

This is a petition to restrain the trial of Civil Case No. 66515 by the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch IV. Civil Case No. 66515 was filed by the private respondents herein against
Paulina Santos, the herein petitioner, and other persons, praying that "the decree of adoption
entered on August 25, 1949, in favor of respondents Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos be
declared null and void ab initio." It is alleged in the amended petition for annulment, dated
September 16, 1966, that the adoption decreed in Civil Case No. 8332 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila is void because, among other things, the application for adoption was not
signed by both adopting parents and by the natural parents; and the judgment was procured
through and by means of fraud.

The petitioner claims that the private respondents are estopped from impugning the validity of
the adoption .

Almost from their birth, the petitioner Paulina Santos de Parreo and her late sister had been
living with the spouses Simplicio and Juliana Reyes; they had reared for and educated the
children; they were the only parents the children knew. After the adoption, the relationship
continued but in an intensified degree. The children, in gratitude to the adoption, gave their
foster parents their services, their respect, their attention and care. Suffice it to say, therefore,
that the respondents, if they have any rights at all, can have no greater rights that Doa
Juliana had. She could not and would not have questioned the adoption. What right then,
what personality now, do respondents have to what Doa Juliana could not and would not
have done. Certainly, none.

Issue: Whether or not the petition is meritorious?

Held: The quotation is at best an argumentum ad hominem; it attributes, without basis, an

attitude to someone long dead and which cannot be verified. It does not deserve consideration
.It appears that when Juliana Reyes died intestate and her estate was being settled, her
husband Simplicio asked to be appointed administrator of the estate. Gregoria Aranzanso and
Demetria Ventura who are included among the several private respondents in this case,
opposed the request. They based their opposition on the claim that the marriage of Simplicio to
Juliana was void because it was bigamous and that the adoption of Paulina and Aurora Santos
was likewise void for want of written consent of their parents.
G.R. No. L-44640 October 12, 1976

PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents

Facts: On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 Oct
1976 for the Citizens Assemblies (barangays) to resolve, among other things, the issues of
martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period
of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers.
Twenty days after, the President issued another related decree, PD No. 1031, amending the
previous PD No. 991, by declaring the provisions of PD No. 229 providing for the manner of
voting and canvass of votes in barangays applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of
Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD No. 991. On the
same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 1033, stating the questions to he submitted
to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its
whereas clauses that the peoples continued opposition to the convening of the interim
National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a
constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be
submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.

Issue: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the Constitution.

Held: Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, not the legality of a particular
act. Where the vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act,
that matter is definitely justiciable or non-political. What is in the heels of the Court is not the
wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in proposing amendments to the Constitution,
but his constitutional authority to perform such act or to assume the power of a constituent
assembly. Whether the amending process confers on the President that power to propose
amendments is therefore a downright justiciable question. Should the contrary be found, the
actuation of the President would merely be a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution provides how
it may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, can declare whether
the procedure followed or the authority assumed was valid or not.

We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in pursuing his theory of non-justiciability,
that the question of the President's authority to propose amendments and the regularity of the
procedure adopted for submission of the proposals to the people ultimately lie in the judgment
of the latter. A clear Descartes fallacy of vicious cycle. Is it not that the people themselves, by
their sovereign act, provided for the authority and procedure for the amending process when
they ratified the present Constitution in 1973? Whether, therefore, that constitutional provision
has been followed or not is indisputably a proper subject of inquiry, not by the people
themselves of course who exercise no power of judicial review, but by the Supreme Court in
whom the people themselves vested that power, a power which includes the competence to
determine whether the constitutional norms for amendments have been observed or not. And,
this inquiry must be done a priori not a posteriori, i.e., before the submission to and
ratification by the people.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. NELIA A. BARLIS

FACTS: From 1968 to 1972, petitioner MERALCO, erected four (4) power generating plants in
Sucat, Muntinlupa. To equip the power plants, various machineries and equipment were
purchased both locally and abroad. When the Real Property Tax Code took effect on June 1,
1974, MERALCO filed its tax declarations covering the Sucat power plants, including the
buildings thereon as well as the machineries and equipment. From 1975 to 1978, MERALCO
paid the real property taxes on the said properties on the basis of their assessed value as
stated in its tax declarations. On December 29, 1978, MERALCO sold all the power-generating
plants including the landsite to the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR). In 1985, the
Municipal Assessor of Muntinlupa discovered that MERALCO, for the years 1976-1978,
misdeclared and/or failed to declare for taxation purposes a number of real properties
consisting of several equipment and machineries found in the said power plants. A review of
the Deed of Sale which MERALCO executed in favor of NAPOCOR allegedly shows that the true
value of the machineries and equipment was misdeclared/undeclared.

Thereafter, the Municipal Treasurer of Muntinlupa issued three notices to MERALCO,

requesting it to pay the full amount of the claimed deficiency with a warning that its properties
could be sold at public auction unless the tax due was paid. Still, MERALCO did not pay, nor
take steps to question the tax assessed. Accordingly, the Municipal Treasurer issued, on
October 4, 1990, Warrants of Garnishment ordering the attachment of MERALCO's bank
deposits with its depository banks to the extent of its unpaid real property taxes.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the petitioner was the taxpayer for the purpose of an assessment under the
Real Property Tax Code from whom collection can be made.

2. Whether or not the RTC did commit any grave abuse of discretion when it denied the
respondent's motion to dismiss on the claim that for the petitioner's failure to appeal from the
1986 notice of assessment of the Municipal Assessor, the assessment had become final and
enforceable under Section 64 of P.D. No. 464.

Petitioner is begging the question when it asserts that it is not the taxpayer contemplated
under Sec. 64 of the RPTC. It is an accepted principle in taxation that taxes are paid by the
person obliged to declare the same for taxation purposes. Under the Real Property Tax Code,
the duty to declare the true value of real property for taxation purposes is imposed upon the
owner, or administrator, or their duly authorized representatives.16 They are thus the
taxpayers. When these persons fail or refuse to make a declaration of the true value of their
real property within the prescribed period, the provincial or city assessor shall declare then
property in the name of the defaulting owner and assess the property for taxation.17 In this
wise, the taxpayer assumes the character of a defaulting owner, or defaulting administrator, or
defaulting authorized representative, liable to pay back taxes. Respondent Municipal Treasurer
claims that petitioner MERALCO misdeclared and/or failed to declare the true value of the
Sucat power plant machineries and equipment during the taxable years 1976-1978 when it
was still the owner thereof, and that it is the deficiency in the realty tax on the real property's
reassessed value which it seeks to collect. Based on the foregoing, the notice of assessment and
collection was directed to petitioner, not because it is still the present owner of the subject real
property including the machineries and equipment thereon, but because it is the defaulting
owner thereof who has failed to make proper tax declaration and the proper tax payment
thereon. Thus, petitioner is the taxpayer contemplated under Sec. 64 of the RPTC, and
payment under protest of the tax assessed is necessary for the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction over its petition.
People v. Gacott

G.R. No. 116049 March 20, 1995

Bidin, J.

Facts:

On February 2, 1994, a complaint for violation of the Anti-Dummy Law (C.A. No. 108) was
filed by Asst. City Prosecutor Perfecto E. Pe against respondents Strom and Reyes. The accused
filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss the criminal case contending that since the power to
prosecute is vested exclusively in the Anti-Dummy Board under Republic Act No. 1130, the
City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa has no power or authority to file the same. The prosecution
filed an opposition pointing out that the Anti-Dummy Board has already been abolished by
Letter of Implementation No. 2, Series of 1972. Despite such opposition, however, respondent
judge granted the motion espousing the position that the Letter Of Implementation relied upon
by the City Fiscal is not the law contemplated in Article 7 of the New Civil Code which can
repeal another law such as R.A. 1130. Thus, respondent judge in the assailed order of March
18, 1994 held that the City Prosecutor has no power or authority to file and prosecute the case
and ordered that the case be quashed.

Issue:

whether or not respondent judge in granting the Motion to Quash gravely abused his
discretion as to warrant the issuance of a writ of certiorari

Held: Respondent judge, however, would want this Court to pass upon his other supplications,
arguments, and even his insinuations for that matter, which although born more of fecundity
in formulation and less of bases in law, we have decided to anatomize even with some expense
of prolixity.

Respondent judge prefaces his remedial approach with the assurance that "(t)he only purpose
of (h)is motion is to plead with bended knees and with all humility for the kind reconsideration"
of the decision in this case, specifically the findings that he is "grossly ignorant of the law and
as such, (he) was reprimanded and fined in the amount of P10,000.00; and that the aforesaid
decision is to be spread on (his) personal records.

He adverts to his good conduct as a person and as a judge, reiterates that the error primarily
stemmed from the shortcomings of the public prosecutor and, on a personal note, he expresses
this concern: ". . . I am again begging with humility that the spreading of the aforesaid Decision
on my personal records be reconsidered because doing so will foreclose any chance for me to
aspire for promotion in the judiciary in the future. This is very painful. I will agonize up to my
last day and my last breath in life."6

The Court assures respondent judge that it has taken all the aforesaid matters into
consideration and is not insensitive thereto, including his argumentum ad misericordium. It
feels, however, that there is more than ample substantiation for the findings of the ponente in
the main case, and compelling legal warrant for the administrative penalties imposed which are
even milder than those meted by it under similar and comparable situations.

The spreading of the decision on the personal record of a respondent is an official procedure
and requirement which, incredibly, respondent judge would want this very Court to violate and
forego, in suppression of facts which must appear in official documents. His further argument
that
The spreading of such decision on my personal records will not only open criticisms on my
private qualifications as a minister in the temple of justice but will open more comments on my
official acts, competence and credibility as a judge that might undermine the people's faith in
the judicial system in the Province of Palawan, in Puerto Princesa City and in the entire
country because it is always difficult to disassociate my private credential from that of my
public qualifications. is, to put it mildly, a mite too exaggerated and a tad too melodramatic.
The Court regrets that respondent judge appears unaware that he is actually the recipient of
uncommon sympathetic consideration in this case.

ATTY. MELVIN D.C. MANE v. JUDGE MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN

A.M. No. RTJ-08-2119, 30 June 2008

An alumnus of a particular law school has no monopoly of knowledge of the law.

Petitioner Atty. Melvin D.C. Mane filed a letter-complaint to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) charging respondent Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen of demeaning,
humilating, and berating him during a hearing of Rural Bank of Cabuyao, Inc. v. Samue
Malabanan, et al. where Mane was counsel for the plaintiff. During the proceedings, Belen
asked Mane about the latters law school. When Mane answered that he came from Manuel L.
Quezon University (MLQU), Belen told him: Then youre not from UP. Then you cannot equate
yourself to me because there is a saying and I know this, not all law students are created
equal, not all law schools are created equal, not all lawyers are created equal despite what the
Supreme Being that we all are created equal in His form and substance.Belen further
lambasted Mane and lectured him on the latters person, seemingly disregarding the case at
hand. Subsequently, the OCA, upon evaluation, found that Belens insulting remarks were
unwarranted and inexcusable and recommended a reprimand of Belen.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the statements and actions made by Judge Belen during the hearing constitute
conduct unbecoming of a judge and a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct

Held: An alumnus of a particular law school has no monopoly of knowledge of the law. By
hurdling the Bar Examinations which this Court administers, taking of the Lawyers oath, and
signing of the Roll of Attorneys, a lawyer is presumed to be competent to discharge his
functions and duties as, inter alia, an officer of the court, irrespective of where he obtained his
law degree. For a judge to determine the fitness or competence of a lawyer primarily on the
basis of his alma mater is clearly an engagement in an argumentum ad hominem.

A judge must address the merits of the case and not on the person of the counsel. If
respondent felt that his integrity and dignity were being assaulted, he acted properly when he
directed complainant to explain why he should not be cited for contempt. He went out of
bounds, however, when he, as the above-quoted portions of the transcript of stenographic
notes show, engaged on a supercilious legal and personal discourse .This Court has reminded
members of the bench that even on the face of boorish behavior from those they deal with, they
ought to conduct themselves in a manner befitting gentlemen and high officers of the
court.[Respondent having exhibited conduct unbecoming of a judge, classified as a light charge
under Section 10, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, which is penalized under Section
11(c) of the same Rule by any of the following: (1) a fine of not less than P1,000 but not
exceeding P10,000; (2) censure; (3) reprimand; and (4) admonition with warning, the Court
imposes upon him the penalty of reprimand.

CASES ON FALLACIES
 SUBMITTED BY
PAUL C. TIJAM
LEGAL TECHNIQUE