Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-29883 November 29, 1973

ROMEO BASA, CIRILO BASA, CRISANTO BASA and PEDRO SEBASTIAN, petitioners-
appellees,
vs.
HON. JOSE GAMBOA as City Fiscal of Manila, HON. LINO R. BARBOSA as Assistant City
Fiscal of Manila, TEODOCIA REYES, represented by her mother and natural guardian,
CEFERINA ATANG, respondents-appellants.

Rafael Y. Viola for petitioners-appellees.

Almario T. Amador, Jovel P. Lizaro and Julio Contreras for respondents-appellants.

MAKALINTAL, C.J.:

The essential facts are stipulated. The charge against Romeo Basa, one of the petitioners in the
court below who are now appellees here, was abduction with rape. The specifications recite that he
and his brother Cirilo forcibly took complainant Teodocia Reyes from a place in Divisoria, Manila, to
a house in Tondo and kept her there under detention from the 26th to the 29th of November 1967,
during which period Romeo Basa repeatedly raped her; that in the night November 29 Romeo, Cirilo
and Crisanto, all surnamed Basa, took her to Gapan and thence to San Antonio, Nueva Ecija, where
she was detained inside a house up to the 1st of December and again was raped by Romeo Basa;
and that on the 1st of December she was taken back to Gapan, where she was set free.

On December 2, 1967 Teodocia Reyes, assisted by her mother, filed a complaint with the municipal
court of Gapan, with a sworn statement to support it. Romeo Basa was thereafter placed under
arrest and the municipal court started hearing the case on preliminary investigation. On December 7,
while the investigation was still pending, Teodocia Reyes sought the assistance of the METROCOM,
which thereupon lodged a complaint against the same defendants for forcible abduction with rape
and robbery with the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila.

The case in Nueva Ecija was dismissed by the municipal court of Gapan on January 11, 1968, after
it had received the evidence of the parties, on the ground that "the crime committed is and ought to
be a consented crime of abduction."

The pendency of the preliminary investigation in Gapan was brought to the attention of the
investigating Assistant Fiscal of Manila. He postponed the hearing to February 21, 1968, on which
date the METROCOM filed a written motion to dismiss, saying that the offended party could pursue
her remedy in the case she had filed in Nueva Ecija. The fiscal in-charge turned down the motion,
saying that he was hearing the case on the basis of the complaint of Teodocia Reyes, who was then
being represented by a private counsel. Thereafter the defendants themselves filed a similar motion
to dismiss, which was likewise denied by the Assistant Fiscal, as was also a subsequent
supplemental motion for the same purpose. The matter was elevated to the City Fiscal, who
sustained the action taken by his assistant.

In view of the adverse ruling of the City Fiscal the defendants filed a petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction in the Court of First Instance of Manila, which granted the writ prayed for and
enjoined the City Fiscal and his assistant from continuing with the preliminary investigation. The
case afterwards was elevated to this Court on appeal by the respondents below.

There is no dispute that the crime charged was a transitory or continuing offense, committed in
Manila and in Gapan and San Antonio, Nueva Ecija; that consequently the courts of any of the said
places could assume jurisdiction over the case; and that according to settled principle the moment
any of the said courts assumed jurisdiction such assumption was to the exclusion of all other courts.

Two circumstances, however, preclude this principle of exclusion from applying in this case. First, by
the nature of the charge the court which could have properly assumed jurisdiction to hear and decide
the case, if the corresponding information were filed there, was the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija. However, the matter was still at the stage of preliminary investigation by the municipal court of
Gapan, and preliminary investigation is merely a proceeding conducted previous to the
commencement of the criminal action and is designed for no other purpose than that of determining
whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the
accused is guilty thereof. The dismissal of the charge by the Gapan municipal court did not amount
to an acquittal. It was not final in the sense that a complaint embodying the same charge, filed for
purposes of preliminary investigation with another appropriate forum, such as the Office of the City
Fiscal of Manila, would constitute double jeopardy from which an accused person is protected by law
and by the Constitution.

The second significant feature of this case is that by virtue of the order of dismissal issued by the
Gapan municipal court, no jeopardy of conviction having yet attached, the situation was as if no
charge had been filed at all. There can be no doubt that had the complainant come to the Office of
the City Fiscal of Manila after, instead of before, the case was dismissed in Gapan, she could have
done so without the authority of the Manila City Fiscal being subject to question. It makes no
difference whatsoever that the complainant went to the said office while the investigation in Gapan
was still pending, since the said investigation ended in a dismissal.

The appellees have expressed apprehension about the possible implications of sanctioning the
procedure followed by the complainant in this case, namely, that where the offense is transitory or
continuing the offended party may file charges, simultaneously or in succession, in the courts of all
the places or provinces where such offense, or some of the essential ingredients thereof, have taken
place, even if only for preliminary investigation. To shop for a sympathetic forum in that manner is
certainly not to be countenanced, especially if it becomes evident that it is designed to oppress,
abuse or harass the defendants. In such eventuality, however, there is always the equitable remedy
of prohibition or injunction available. In the present case there is no indication of oppression, abuse
or harassment in the actuations of the complainant.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed and the writ issued by the court a quo is set
aside. No pronouncement as to costs.

Castro, Teehankee, Makasiar, Esguerra and Muoz Palma, JJ., concur.

 EN BANC

March 8, 2016

G.R. No. 221697

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,

vs.
COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 221698-700

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,

vs.
COMELEC, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS AND AMADO D.
VALDEZ Respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Before the Court are two consolidated petitions under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court with extremely urgent application for an ex parte issuance of temporary
restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary injunction assailing the following: (1)
1 December 2015 Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division; (2) 23
December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC); (3) 11 December
2015 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division; and ( 4) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-002 (DC), SPA No. 15-007 (DC) and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) for
having been issued without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.

The Facts

Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned as a newborn infant in
the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo) on 3 September 1968.
Parental care and custody over petitioner was passed on by Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano
Militar (Emiliano) and his wife. Three days after, 6 September 1968, Emiliano reported and
registered petitioner as a foundling with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo). In
her Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, the petitioner was given the name "Mary Grace
Natividad Contreras Militar." 1
When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando
Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a petition for her adoption with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan City. On 13 May 1974, the trial court granted their petition
and ordered that petitioner's name be changed from "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar" to
"Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe." Although necessary notations were made by OCR-Iloilo on
petitioner's foundling certificate reflecting the court decreed adoption,2 the petitioner's adoptive
mother discovered only sometime in the second half of 2005 that the lawyer who handled petitioner's
adoption failed to secure from the OCR-Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth indicating petitioner's
new name and the name of her adoptive parents. 3 Without delay, petitioner's mother executed an
affidavit attesting to the lawyer's omission which she submitted to the OCR-Iloilo. On 4 May 2006,
OCR-Iloilo issued a new Certificate of Live Birth in the name of Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.4

Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in 1986, petitioner registered as a voter with the local
COMELEC Office in San Juan City. On 13 December 1986, she received her COMELEC Voter's
Identification Card for Precinct No. 196 in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.5

On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine Passport No. F9272876 by the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). Subsequently, on 5 April 1993 and 19 May 1998, she renewed
her Philippine passport and respectively secured Philippine Passport Nos. L881511 and DD156616.7

Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued a degree in Development Studies at the University of the
Philippines8 but she opted to continue her studies abroad and left for the United States of America
(U.S.) in 1988. Petitioner graduated in 1991 from Boston College in Chestnuts Hill, Massachusetts
where she earned her Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Studies.9

On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares (Llamanzares), a citizen
of both the Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario de San Jose Parish in San Juan City. 10 Desirous
of being with her husband who was then based in the U.S., the couple flew back to the U.S. two
days after the wedding ceremony or on 29 July 1991. 11

While in the U.S., the petitioner gave birth to her eldest child Brian Daniel (Brian) on 16 April
1992.12 Her two daughters Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna) and Jesusa Anika (Anika) were both born in
the Philippines on 10 July 1998 and 5 June 2004, respectively. 13

On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a naturalized American citizen. 14 She obtained U.S.
Passport No. 017037793 on 19 December 2001. 15

On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came back to the Philippines together with Hanna to support her
father's candidacy for President in the May 2004 elections. It was during this time that she gave birth
to her youngest daughter Anika. She returned to the U.S. with her two daughters on 8 July 2004. 16

After a few months, specifically on 13 December 2004, petitioner rushed back to the Philippines
upon learning of her father's deteriorating medical condition. 17 Her father slipped into a coma and
eventually expired. The petitioner stayed in the country until 3 February 2005 to take care of her
father's funeral arrangements as well as to assist in the settlement of his estate.18

According to the petitioner, the untimely demise of her father was a severe blow to her entire family.
In her earnest desire to be with her grieving mother, the petitioner and her husband decided to move
and reside permanently in the Philippines sometime in the first quarter of 2005.19 The couple began
preparing for their resettlement including notification of their children's schools that they will be
transferring to Philippine schools for the next semester;20coordination with property movers for the
relocation of their household goods, furniture and cars from the U.S. to the Philippines;21 and inquiry
with Philippine authorities as to the proper procedure to be followed in bringing their pet dog into the
country.22 As early as 2004, the petitioner already quit her job in the U.S.23

Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines on 24 May 200524 and without delay, secured a Tax
Identification Number from the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Her three (3) children immediately
followed25 while her husband was forced to stay in the U.S. to complete pending projects as well as
to arrange the sale of their family home there.26

The petitioner and her children briefly stayed at her mother's place until she and her husband
purchased a condominium unit with a parking slot at One Wilson Place Condominium in San Juan
City in the second half of 2005.27 The corresponding Condominium Certificates of Title covering the
unit and parking slot were issued by the Register of Deeds of San Juan City to petitioner and her
husband on 20 February 2006.28 Meanwhile, her children of school age began attending Philippine
private schools.

On 14 February 2006, the petitioner made a quick trip to the U.S. to supervise the disposal of some
of the family's remaining household belongings.29 She travelled back to the Philippines on 11 March
2006.30

In late March 2006, petitioner's husband officially informed the U.S. Postal Service of the family's
change and abandonment of their address in the U.S.31 The family home was eventually sold on 27
April 2006.32 Petitioner's husband resigned from his job in the U.S. in April 2006, arrived in the
country on 4 May 2006 and started working for a major Philippine company in July 2006.33

In early 2006, petitioner and her husband acquired a 509-square meter lot in Corinthian Hills,
Quezon City where they built their family home34 and to this day, is where the couple and their
children have been residing.35 A Transfer Certificate of Title covering said property was issued in the
couple's name by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on 1June 2006.

On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.36 Under
the same Act, she filed with the Bureau of Immigration (BI) a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine
citizenship together with petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her three minor children on
10 July 2006.37 As can be gathered from its 18 July 2006 Order, the BI acted favorably on petitioner's
petitions and declared that she is deemed to have reacquired her Philippine citizenship while her
children are considered as citizens of the Philippines.38 Consequently, the BI issued Identification
Certificates (ICs) in petitioner's name and in the names of her three (3) children. 39

Again, petitioner registered as a voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on 31 August
2006.40 She also secured from the DFA a new Philippine Passport bearing the No. XX4731999.41 This
passport was renewed on 18 March 2014 and she was issued Philippine Passport No. EC0588861
by the DFA.42

On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed petitioner as Chairperson of the
Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB).43 Before assuming her post,
petitioner executed an "Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and
Renunciation of American Citizenship" before a notary public in Pasig City on 20 October 2010,44 in
satisfaction of the legal requisites stated in Section 5 of R.A. No. 9225.45 The following day, 21
October 2010 petitioner submitted the said affidavit to the BI46 and took her oath of office as
Chairperson of the MTRCB.47 From then on, petitioner stopped using her American passport.48
On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy in Manila an
"Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States."49 On that day, she
accomplished a sworn questionnaire before the U.S. Vice Consul wherein she stated that she had
taken her oath as MTRCB Chairperson on 21 October 2010 with the intent, among others, of
relinquishing her American citizenship.50 In the same questionnaire, the petitioner stated that she had
resided outside of the U.S., specifically in the Philippines, from 3 September 1968 to 29 July 1991
and from May 2005 to present.51

On 9 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of Nationality
of the United States" effective 21 October 2010.52

On 2 October 2012, the petitioner filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she answered "6 years and 6 months" to the question
"Period of residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013."53 Petitioner obtained the highest
number of votes and was proclaimed Senator on 16 May 2013. 54

On 19 December 2013, petitioner obtained Philippine Diplomatic Passport No. DE0004530. 55

On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016 Elections. 56 In her
COC, the petitioner declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the
Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months
counted from 24 May 2005.57 The petitioner attached to her COC an "Affidavit Affirming Renunciation
of U.S.A. Citizenship" subscribed and sworn to before a notary public in Quezon City on 14 October
2015. 58

Petitioner's filing of her COC for President in the upcoming elections triggered the filing of several
COMELEC cases against her which were the subject of these consolidated cases.

Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 221697

A day after petitioner filed her COC for President, Estrella Elamparo (Elamparo) filed a petition to
deny due course or cancel said COC which was docketed as SPA No. 15-001 (DC) and raffled to
the COMELEC Second Division.59She is convinced that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over her
petition.60 Essentially, Elamparo's contention is that petitioner committed material misrepresentation
when she stated in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and that she is a resident of
the Philippines for at least ten (10) years and eleven (11) months up to the day before the 9 May
2016 Elections.61

On the issue of citizenship, Elamparo argued that petitioner cannot be considered as a natural-born
Filipino on account of the fact that she was a foundling.62 Elamparo claimed that international law
does not confer natural-born status and Filipino citizenship on foundlings.63 Following this line of
reasoning, petitioner is not qualified to apply for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under R.A. No.
9225 for she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen to begin with.64Even assuming arguendo that
petitioner was a natural-born Filipino, she is deemed to have lost that status when she became a
naturalized American citizen.65 According to Elamparo, natural-born citizenship must be continuous
from birth.66

On the matter of petitioner's residency, Elamparo pointed out that petitioner was bound by the sworn
declaration she made in her 2012 COC for Senator wherein she indicated that she had resided in
the country for only six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as of May 2013 Elections. Elamparo likewise
insisted that assuming arguendo that petitioner is qualified to regain her natural-born status under
R.A. No. 9225, she still fell short of the ten-year residency requirement of the Constitution as her
residence could only be counted at the earliest from July 2006, when she reacquired Philippine
citizenship under the said Act. Also on the assumption that petitioner is qualified to reacquire lost
Philippine Citizenship, Elamparo is of the belief that she failed to reestablish her domicile in the
Philippines.67

Petitioner seasonably filed her Answer wherein she countered that:

(1) the COMELEC did not have jurisdiction over Elamparo's petition as it was actually a
petition for quo warranto which could only be filed if Grace Poe wins in the Presidential
elections, and that the Department of Justice (DOJ) has primary jurisdiction to revoke the
BI's July 18, 2006 Order;

(2) the petition failed to state a cause of action because it did not contain allegations which, if
hypothetically admitted, would make false the statement in her COC that she is a natural-
born Filipino citizen nor was there any allegation that there was a willful or deliberate intent to
misrepresent on her part;

(3) she did not make any material misrepresentation in the COC regarding her citizenship
and residency qualifications for:

a. the 1934 Constitutional Convention deliberations show that foundlings were

considered citizens;

b. foundlings are presumed under international law to have been born of citizens of
the place where they are found;

c. she reacquired her natural-born Philippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A.
No. 9225;

d. she executed a sworn renunciation of her American citizenship prior to the filing of
her COC for President in the May 9, 2016 Elections and that the same is in full force
and effect and has not been withdrawn or recanted;

e. the burden was on Elamparo in proving that she did not possess natural-born
status;

f. residence is a matter of evidence and that she reestablished her domicile in the
Philippines as early as May 24, 2005;

g. she could reestablish residence even before she reacquired natural-born

citizenship under R.A. No. 9225;

h. statement regarding the period of residence in her 2012 COC for Senator was an
honest mistake, not binding and should give way to evidence on her true date of
reacquisition of domicile;

i. Elamparo's petition is merely an action to usurp the sovereign right of the Filipino
people to decide a purely political question, that is, should she serve as the country's
next leader.68
After the parties submitted their respective Memoranda, the petition was deemed submitted for
resolution.

On 1 December 2015, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated a Resolution finding that
petitioner's COC, filed for the purpose of running for the President of the Republic of the Philippines
in the 9 May 2016 National and Local Elections, contained material representations which are false.
The fallo of the aforesaid Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the instant Petition to Deny Due Course
to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Certificate of Candidacy
for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections filed
by respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe Llamanzares is hereby CANCELLED.69

Motion for Reconsideration of the 1 December 2015 Resolution was filed by petitioner which the
COMELEC En Banc resolved in its 23 December 2015 Resolution by denying the same.70

Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. Nos. 221698-700

This case stemmed from three (3) separate petitions filed by Francisco S. Tatad (Tatad), Antonio P.
Contreras (Contreras) and Amado D. Valdez (Valdez) against petitioner before the COMELEC which
were consolidated and raffled to its First Division.

In his petition to disqualify petitioner under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,71 docketed
as SPA No. 15-002 (DC), Tatad alleged that petitioner lacks the requisite residency and citizenship
to qualify her for the Presidency.72

Tatad theorized that since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, persons of
unknown parentage, particularly foundlings, cannot be considered natural-born Filipino citizens since
blood relationship is determinative of natural-born status.73 Tatad invoked the rule of statutory
construction that what is not included is excluded. He averred that the fact that foundlings were not
expressly included in the categories of citizens in the 193 5 Constitution is indicative of the framers'
intent to exclude them.74 Therefore, the burden lies on petitioner to prove that she is a natural-born
citizen.75

Neither can petitioner seek refuge under international conventions or treaties to support her claim
that foundlings have a nationality.76 According to Tatad, international conventions and treaties are not
self-executory and that local legislations are necessary in order to give effect to treaty obligations
assumed by the Philippines.77 He also stressed that there is no standard state practice that
automatically confers natural-born status to foundlings.78

Similar to Elamparo's argument, Tatad claimed that petitioner cannot avail of the option to reacquire
Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 because it only applies to former natural-born citizens
and petitioner was not as she was a foundling.79

Referring to petitioner's COC for Senator, Tatad concluded that she did not comply with the ten (10)
year residency requirement.80 Tatad opined that petitioner acquired her domicile in Quezon City only
from the time she renounced her American citizenship which was sometime in 2010 or
2011.81 Additionally, Tatad questioned petitioner's lack of intention to abandon her U.S. domicile as
evinced by the fact that her husband stayed thereat and her frequent trips to the U.S.82
In support of his petition to deny due course or cancel the COC of petitioner, docketed as SPA No.
15-139 (DC), Valdez alleged that her repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 did not bestow upon her the
status of a natural-born citizen.83 He advanced the view that former natural-born citizens who are
repatriated under the said Act reacquires only their Philippine citizenship and will not revert to their
original status as natural-born citizens.84

He further argued that petitioner's own admission in her COC for Senator that she had only been a
resident of the Philippines for at least six (6) years and six (6) months prior to the 13 May 2013
Elections operates against her. Valdez rejected petitioner's claim that she could have validly
reestablished her domicile in the Philippines prior to her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In
effect, his position was that petitioner did not meet the ten (10) year residency requirement for
President.

Unlike the previous COMELEC cases filed against petitioner, Contreras' petition,85 docketed as SPA
No. 15-007 (DC), limited the attack to the residency issue. He claimed that petitioner's 2015 COC for
President should be cancelled on the ground that she did not possess the ten-year period of
residency required for said candidacy and that she made false entry in her COC when she stated
that she is a legal resident of the Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months by 9 May
2016.86 Contreras contended that the reckoning period for computing petitioner's residency in the
Philippines should be from 18 July 2006, the date when her petition to reacquire Philippine
citizenship was approved by the BI.87 He asserted that petitioner's physical presence in the country
before 18 July 2006 could not be valid evidence of reacquisition of her Philippine domicile since she
was then living here as an American citizen and as such, she was governed by the Philippine
immigration laws.88

In her defense, petitioner raised the following arguments:

First, Tatad's petition should be dismissed outright for failure to state a cause of action. His petition
did not invoke grounds proper for a disqualification case as enumerated under Sections 12 and 68 of
the Omnibus Election Code.89 Instead, Tatad completely relied on the alleged lack of residency and
natural-born status of petitioner which are not among the recognized grounds for the disqualification
of a candidate to an elective office.90

Second, the petitions filed against her are basically petitions for quo warranto as they focus on
establishing her ineligibility for the Presidency.91 A petition for quo warranto falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and not the COMELEC.92

Third, the burden to prove that she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen is on the
respondents.93 Otherwise stated, she has a presumption in her favor that she is a natural-born citizen
of this country.

Fourth, customary international law dictates that foundlings are entitled to a nationality and are
presumed to be citizens of the country where they are found.94 Consequently, the petitioner is
considered as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.95

Fifth, she claimed that as a natural-born citizen, she has every right to be repatriated under R.A. No.
9225 or the right to reacquire her natural-born status.96 Moreover, the official acts of the Philippine
Government enjoy the presumption of regularity, to wit: the issuance of the 18 July 2006 Order of the
BI declaring her as natural-born citizen, her appointment as MTRCB Chair and the issuance of the
decree of adoption of San Juan RTC.97 She believed that all these acts reinforced her position that
she is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.98
Sixth, she maintained that as early as the first quarter of 2005, she started reestablishing her
domicile of choice in the Philippines as demonstrated by her children's resettlement and schooling in
the country, purchase of a condominium unit in San Juan City and the construction of their family
home in Corinthian Hills.99

Seventh, she insisted that she could legally reestablish her domicile of choice in the Philippines even
before she renounced her American citizenship as long as the three determinants for a change of
domicile are complied with.100She reasoned out that there was no requirement that renunciation of
foreign citizenship is a prerequisite for the acquisition of a new domicile of choice.101

Eighth, she reiterated that the period appearing in the residency portion of her COC for Senator was
a mistake made in good faith.102

In a Resolution103 promulgated on 11 December 2015, the COMELEC First Division ruled that
petitioner is not a natural-born citizen, that she failed to complete the ten (10) year residency
requirement, and that she committed material misrepresentation in her COC when she declared
therein that she has been a resident of the Philippines for a period of ten (10) years and eleven (11)
months as of the day of the elections on 9 May 2016. The COMELEC First Division concluded that
she is not qualified for the elective position of President of the Republic of the Philippines. The
dispositive portion of said Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES,

to GRANT the Petitions and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD
SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES for the elective position of President of the Republic of the
Philippines in connection with the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local and National Elections.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration seeking a reversal of the COMELEC First Division's
Resolution. On 23 December 2015, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.

Alarmed by the adverse rulings of the COMELEC, petitioner instituted the present petitions
for certiorari with urgent prayer for the issuance of an ex parte temporary restraining order/status
quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. On 28 December 2015, temporary restraining
orders were issued by the Court enjoining the COMELEC and its representatives from implementing
the assailed COMELEC Resolutions until further orders from the Court. The Court also ordered the
consolidation of the two petitions filed by petitioner in its Resolution of 12 January 2016. Thereafter,
oral arguments were held in these cases.

The Court GRANTS the petition of Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares and to ANNUL and
SET ASIDE the:

1. Resolution dated 1 December 2015 rendered through its Second Division, in SPA No. 15-
001 (DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares.

2. Resolution dated 11 December 2015, rendered through its First Division, in the
consolidated cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC)
entitled Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares,
respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent.
 3. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc, upholding the 1
December 2015 Resolution of the Second Division.

4. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc, upholding the 11

December 2015 Resolution of the First Division.

The procedure and the conclusions from which the questioned Resolutions emanated are tainted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The petitioner is a QUALIFIED
CANDIDATE for President in the 9 May 2016 National Elections.

The issue before the COMELEC is whether or not the COC of petitioner should be denied due
course or cancelled "on the exclusive ground" that she made in the certificate a false material
representation. The exclusivity of the ground should hedge in the discretion of the COMELEC and
restrain it from going into the issue of the qualifications of the candidate for the position, if, as in this
case, such issue is yet undecided or undetermined by the proper authority. The COMELEC cannot
itself, in the same cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack thereof of the candidate.

We rely, first of all, on the Constitution of our Republic, particularly its provisions in Article IX, C,
Section 2:

Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.

(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and
appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by
trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by
trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving

elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.

(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections,
including determination of the number and location of polling places, appointment of
election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.

(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections.

(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions

which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program of
government; and accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on Elections. Religious
denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which seek to achieve their
goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this
Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be
refused registration.
 Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political
parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to elections constitute
interference in national affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an additional ground for
the cancellation of their registration with the Commission, in addition to other
penalties that may be prescribed by law.

(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for
inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases
of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds,
offenses, and malpractices.

(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending,

including limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to
prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and
nuisance candidacies.

(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has
deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard
of, or disobedience to its directive, order, or decision.

(9) Submit to the President and the Congress a comprehensive report on the conduct
of each election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.

Not any one of the enumerated powers approximate the exactitude of the provisions of Article VI,
Section 17 of the same basic law stating that:

The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members,
three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice,
and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as
the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

or of the last paragraph of Article VII, Section 4 which provides that:

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate
its rules for the purpose.

The tribunals which have jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of the President, the
Vice-President, Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives was made clear by the
Constitution. There is no such provision for candidates for these positions.

Can the COMELEC be such judge?

The opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on

Elections,104 which was affirmatively cited in the En Banc decision in Fermin v. COMELEC105 is our
guide. The citation in Fermin reads:
Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the ineligibility of candidates,
the COMELEC amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25 1, the
following:

Grounds for disqualification. - Any candidate who does not possess all the
qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or
who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate.

The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a
mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action which is a substantive
matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its rule-making power under Art. IX, A, 6 of the
Constitution, cannot do it. It is noteworthy that the Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even
the power to decide cases involving the right to vote, which essentially involves an inquiry
into qualifications based on age, residence and citizenship of voters. [Art. IX, C, 2(3)]

The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for
disqualification is contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but also in
their consequences are proceedings for "disqualification" different from those for a declaration of
"ineligibility." "Disqualification" proceedings, as already stated, are based on grounds specified in
12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and in 40 of the Local Government Code and are for the
purpose of barring an individual from becoming a candidate or from continuing as a candidate for
public office. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the race either from the start or
during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed
in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office and the purpose of the proceedings for
declaration of ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from office.

Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does not imply that
he is not disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate for a public office and
vice versa. We have this sort of dichotomy in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473) That an alien
has the qualifications prescribed in 2 of the Law does not imply that he does not suffer from any of
[the] disqualifications provided in 4.

Before we get derailed by the distinction as to grounds and the consequences of the respective
proceedings, the importance of the opinion is in its statement that "the lack of provision for declaring
the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule". Justice Mendoza
lectured in Romualdez-Marcos that:

Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for
determining before election the qualifications of a candidate.

First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for
determining his eligibility for the office. In contrast, whether an individual should be disqualified as a
candidate for acts constituting election offenses (e.g., vote buying, over spending, commission of
prohibited acts) is a prejudicial question which should be determined lest he wins because of the
very acts for which his disqualification is being sought. That is why it is provided that if the grounds
for disqualification are established, a candidate will not be voted for; if he has been voted for, the
votes in his favor will not be counted; and if for some reason he has been voted for and he has won,
either he will not be proclaimed or his proclamation will be set aside.

Second is the fact that the determination of a candidates' eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in this
case, his domicile, may take a long time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the term of the
office. This is amply demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No. 120265, Agapito A. Aquino v.
COMELEC) where the determination of Aquino's residence was still pending in the COMELEC even
after the elections of May 8, 1995. This is contrary to the summary character proceedings relating to
certificates of candidacy. That is why the law makes the receipt of certificates of candidacy a
ministerial duty of the COMELEC and its officers. The law is satisfied if candidates state in their
certificates of candidacy that they are eligible for the position which they seek to fill, leaving the
determination of their qualifications to be made after the election and only in the event they are
elected. Only in cases involving charges of false representations made in certificates of candidacy is
the COMELEC given jurisdiction.

Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in elections for
President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166,
15) The purpose is to preserve the prerogatives of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
and the other Tribunals as "sole judges" under the Constitution of the election,
returns and qualifications of members of Congress of the President and Vice President, as the case
may be.106

To be sure, the authoritativeness of the Romualdez pronouncements as reiterated in Fermin, led to

the amendment through COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, on 25 September 2012 of its Rule 25.
This, the 15 February1993 version of Rule 25, which states that:

Grounds for disqualification. -Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a
candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by
law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.107

was in the 2012 rendition, drastically changed to:

Grounds. - Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party, is declared by final
decision of a competent court, guilty of, or found by the Commission to be suffering from any
disqualification provided by law or the Constitution.

A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking grounds for a Petition to Deny to or Cancel a Certificate
of Candidacy or Petition to Declare a Candidate as a Nuisance Candidate, or a combination thereof,
shall be summarily dismissed.

Clearly, the amendment done in 2012 is an acceptance of the reality of absence of an authorized
proceeding for determining before election the qualifications of candidate. Such that, as presently
required, to disqualify a candidate there must be a declaration by a final judgment of a competent
court that the candidate sought to be disqualified "is guilty of or found by the Commission to be
suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the Constitution."

Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is concerned, Rule 25 and Rule 23 are flipsides of one to
the other. Both do not allow, are not authorizations, are not vestment of jurisdiction, for the
COMELEC to determine the qualification of a candidate. The facts of qualification must beforehand
be established in a prior proceeding before an authority properly vested with jurisdiction. The prior
determination of qualification may be by statute, by executive order or by a judgment of a competent
court or tribunal.

If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she is suffering from a
disqualification "provided by law or the Constitution," neither can the certificate of candidacy be
cancelled or denied due course on grounds of false representations regarding his or her
qualifications, without a prior authoritative finding that he or she is not qualified, such prior authority
being the necessary measure by which the falsity of the representation can be found. The only
exception that can be conceded are self-evident facts of unquestioned or unquestionable veracity
and judicial confessions. Such are, anyway, bases equivalent to prior decisions against which the
falsity of representation can be determined.

The need for a predicate finding or final pronouncement in a proceeding under Rule 23 that deals
with, as in this case, alleged false representations regarding the candidate's citizenship and
residence, forced the COMELEC to rule essentially that since foundlings108 are not mentioned in the
enumeration of citizens under the 1935 Constitution,109 they then cannot be citizens. As the
COMELEC stated in oral arguments, when petitioner admitted that she is a foundling, she said it all.
This borders on bigotry. Oddly, in an effort at tolerance, the COMELEC, after saying that it cannot
rule that herein petitioner possesses blood relationship with a Filipino citizen when "it is certain that
such relationship is indemonstrable," proceeded to say that "she now has the burden to present
evidence to prove her natural filiation with a Filipino parent."

The fact is that petitioner's blood relationship with a Filipino citizen is DEMONSTRABLE.

At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions regarding paternity is neither unknown nor
unaccepted in Philippine Law. The Family Code of the Philippines has a whole chapter on Paternity
and Filiation.110 That said, there is more than sufficient evider1ce that petitioner has Filipino parents
and is therefore a natural-born Filipino. Parenthetically, the burden of proof was on private
respondents to show that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen. The private respondents should have
shown that both of petitioner's parents were aliens. Her admission that she is a foundling did not shift
the burden to her because such status did not exclude the possibility that her parents were Filipinos,
especially as in this case where there is a high probability, if not certainty, that her parents are
Filipinos.

The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their identities are unknown, but
whether such parents are Filipinos. Under Section 4, Rule 128:

Sect. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters - Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to
induce belief in its existence or no-existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed,
except when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability of improbability of the fact
in issue.

The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA)111 that
from 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines was 15,986 while the total
number of Filipinos born in the country was 10,558,278. The statistical probability that any child born
in the Philippines in that decade is natural-born Filipino was 99.83%. For her part, petitioner
presented census statistics for Iloilo Province for 1960 and 1970, also from the PSA. In 1960, there
were 962,532 Filipinos and 4,734 foreigners in the province; 99.62% of the population were Filipinos.
In 1970, the figures were 1,162,669 Filipinos and 5,304 foreigners, or 99.55%. Also presented were
figures for the child producing ages (15-49). In 1960, there were 230,528 female Filipinos as against
730 female foreigners or 99.68%. In the same year, there were 210,349 Filipino males and 886 male
aliens, or 99.58%. In 1970, there were 270,299 Filipino females versus 1, 190 female aliens,
or 99.56%. That same year, there were 245,740 Filipino males as against only 1,165 male aliens
or 99.53%. COMELEC did not dispute these figures. Notably, Commissioner Arthur Lim admitted,
during the oral arguments, that at the time petitioner was found in 1968, the majority of the
population in Iloilo was Filipino.112
Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's parents are the fact that she was
abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City. She also has typical Filipino
1w phi 1

features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond shaped eyes and an oval face.

There is a disputable presumption that things have happened according to the ordinary course of
nature and the ordinary habits of life.113 All of the foregoing evidence, that a person with typical
Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic Church in a municipality where the population of the
Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than a 99% chance that a
child born in the province would be a Filipino, would indicate more than ample probability if not
statistical certainty, that petitioner's parents are Filipinos. That probability and the evidence on which
it is based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.

To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the norm. In the
words of the Solicitor General:

Second. It is contrary to common sense because foreigners do not come to the Philippines so they
can get pregnant and leave their newborn babies behind. We do not face a situation where the
probability is such that every foundling would have a 50% chance of being a Filipino and a 50%
chance of being a foreigner. We need to frame our questions properly. What are the chances that
the parents of anyone born in the Philippines would be foreigners? Almost zero. What are the
chances that the parents of anyone born in the Philippines would be Filipinos? 99.9%.

According to the Philippine Statistics Authority, from 2010 to 2014, on a yearly average, there were
1,766,046 children born in the Philippines to Filipino parents, as opposed to 1,301 children in the
Philippines of foreign parents. Thus, for that sample period, the ratio of non-Filipino children to
natural born Filipino children is 1:1357. This means that the statistical probability that any child born
in the Philippines would be a natural born Filipino is 99.93%.

From 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines is 15,986 while the total
number of Filipinos born in the Philippines is 15,558,278. For this period, the ratio of non-Filipino
children is 1:661. This means that the statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines on
that decade would be a natural born Filipino is 99.83%.

We can invite statisticians and social anthropologists to crunch the numbers for us, but I am
confident that the statistical probability that a child born in the Philippines would be a natural born
Filipino will not be affected by whether or not the parents are known. If at all, the likelihood that a
foundling would have a Filipino parent might even be higher than 99.9%. Filipinos abandon their
children out of poverty or perhaps, shame. We do not imagine foreigners abandoning their children
here in the Philippines thinking those infants would have better economic opportunities or believing
that this country is a tropical paradise suitable for raising abandoned children. I certainly doubt
whether a foreign couple has ever considered their child excess baggage that is best left behind.

To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them stateless just because there may
be a theoretical chance that one among the thousands of these foundlings might be the child of not
just one, but two, foreigners is downright discriminatory, irrational, and unjust. It just doesn't make
any sense. Given the statistical certainty - 99.9% - that any child born in the Philippines would be a
natural born citizen, a decision denying foundlings such status is effectively a denial of their
birthright. There is no reason why this Honorable Court should use an improbable hypothetical to
sacrifice the fundamental political rights of an entire class of human beings. Your Honor,
constitutional interpretation and the use of common sense are not separate disciplines.
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution's
enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude
foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to foundlings,
there is a need to examine the intent of the framers. In Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue,114 this Court held that:

The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of
constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people
adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to
ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the
people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in
ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.115

As pointed out by petitioner as well as the Solicitor General, the deliberations of the 1934
Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to be covered by the
enumeration. The following exchange is recorded:

Sr. Rafols: For an amendment. I propose that after subsection 2, the following is inserted: "The
natural children of a foreign father and a Filipino mother not recognized by the father.

xxxx

President:
[We] would like to request a clarification from the proponent of the amendment. The gentleman
refers to natural children or to any kind of illegitimate children?

Sr. Rafols:
To all kinds of illegitimate children. It also includes natural children of unknown parentage, natural or
illegitimate children of unknown parents.

Sr. Montinola:
For clarification. The gentleman said "of unknown parents." Current codes consider them Filipino,
that is, I refer to the Spanish Code wherein all children of unknown parentage born in Spanish
territory are considered Spaniards, because the presumption is that a child of unknown parentage is
the son of a Spaniard. This may be applied in the Philippines in that a child of unknown parentage
born in the Philippines is deemed to be Filipino, and there is no need ...

Sr. Rafols:
There is a need, because we are relating the conditions that are [required] to be Filipino.

Sr. Montinola:
But that is the interpretation of the law, therefore, there is no [more] need for amendment.

Sr. Rafols:
The amendment should read thus:
"Natural or illegitimate of a foreign father and a Filipino mother recognized by one, or the children of
unknown parentage."

Sr. Briones:
The amendment [should] mean children born in the Philippines of unknown parentage.
Sr. Rafols:
The son of a Filipina to a Foreigner, although this [person] does not recognize the child, is not
unknown.

President:
Does the gentleman accept the amendment or not?

Sr. Rafols:
I do not accept the amendment because the amendment would exclude the children of a Filipina
with a foreigner who does not recognize the child. Their parentage is not unknown and I think those
of overseas Filipino mother and father [whom the latter] does not recognize, should also be
considered as Filipinos.

President:
The question in order is the amendment to the amendment from the Gentleman from Cebu, Mr.
Briones.

Sr. Busion:
Mr. President, don't you think it would be better to leave this matter in the hands of the Legislature?

Sr. Roxas:
Mr. President, my humble opinion is that these cases are few and far in between, that the
constitution need [not] refer to them. By international law the principle that children or people born in
a country of unknown parents are citizens in this nation is recognized, and it is not necessary to
include a provision on the subject exhaustively.116

Though the Rafols amendment was not carried out, it was not because there was any objection to
the notion that persons of "unknown parentage" are not citizens but only because their number was
not enough to merit specific mention. Such was the account,117 cited by petitioner, of delegate and
constitution law author Jose Aruego who said:

During the debates on this provision, Delegate Rafols presented an amendment to include
as Filipino citizens the illegitimate children with a foreign father of a mother who was a citizen
of the Philippines, and also foundlings; but this amendment was defeated primarily because
the Convention believed that the cases, being too few to warrant the inclusion of a provision
in the Constitution to apply to them, should be governed by statutory legislation. Moreover, it
was believed that the rules of international law were already clear to the effect that
illegitimate children followed the citizenship of the mother, and that foundlings followed the
nationality of the place where they were found, thereby making unnecessary the inclusion in
the Constitution of the proposed amendment.

This explanation was likewise the position of the Solicitor General during the 16 February 2016 Oral
Arguments:

We all know that the Rafols proposal was rejected. But note that what was declined was the
proposal for a textual and explicit recognition of foundlings as Filipinos. And so, the way to explain
the constitutional silence is by saying that it was the view of Montinola and Roxas which prevailed
that there is no more need to expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos.

Obviously, it doesn't matter whether Montinola's or Roxas' views were legally correct. Framers of a
constitution can constitutionalize rules based on assumptions that are imperfect or even wrong. They
can even overturn existing rules. This is basic. What matters here is that Montinola and Roxas were
able to convince their colleagues in the convention that there is no more need to expressly declare
foundlings as Filipinos because they are already impliedly so recognized.

In other words, the constitutional silence is fully explained in terms of linguistic efficiency and the
avoidance of redundancy. The policy is clear: it is to recognize foundlings, as a class, as Filipinos
under Art. IV, Section 1 (3) of the 1935 Constitution. This inclusive policy is carried over into the
1973 and 1987 Constitution. It is appropriate to invoke a famous scholar as he was paraphrased by
Chief Justice Fernando: the constitution is not silently silent, it is silently vocal. 118

The Solicitor General makes the further point that the framers "worked to create a just and humane
society," that "they were reasonable patriots and that it would be unfair to impute upon them a
discriminatory intent against foundlings." He exhorts that, given the grave implications of the
argument that foundlings are not natural-born Filipinos, the Court must search the records of the
1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions "for an express intention to deny foundlings the status of
Filipinos. The burden is on those who wish to use the constitution to discriminate against foundlings
to show that the constitution really intended to take this path to the dark side and inflict this across
the board marginalization."

We find no such intent or language permitting discrimination against foundlings. On the contrary, all
three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws. All exhort the State to
render social justice. Of special consideration are several provisions in the present charter: Article II,
Section 11 which provides that the "State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees
full respect for human rights," Article XIII, Section 1 which mandates Congress to "give highest
priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human
dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities x x x" and Article XV, Section 3 which
requires the State to defend the "right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition,
and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development." Certainly, these provisions contradict an intent to discriminate
against foundlings on account of their unfortunate status.

Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not
provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in
the first place to be adopted. The most basic of such laws is Article 15 of the Civil Code which
provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights, duties, status, conditions, legal capacity of persons are
binding on citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad." Adoption deals with status, and a
Philippine adoption court will have jurisdiction only if the adoptee is a Filipino. In Ellis and Ellis v.
Republic,119 a child left by an unidentified mother was sought to be adopted by aliens. This Court
said:

In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem, which no court may entertain
unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the subject matter of the case and over the parties, but also
over the res, which is the personal status of Baby Rose as well as that of petitioners herein. Our Civil
Code (Art. 15) adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the status of a natural person is
determined by the latter's nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we have jurisdiction over the status of
Baby Rose, she being a citizen of the Philippines, but not over the status of the petitioners, who are
foreigners.120 (Underlining supplied)

Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules to Govern
the Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the
"Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995"), R.A. No. 8552, entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules and
Policies on the Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the
Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and this Court's A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC or the "Rule on Adoption," all
expressly refer to "Filipino children" and include foundlings as among Filipino children who may be
adopted.

It has been argued that the process to determine that the child is a foundling leading to the issuance
of a foundling certificate under these laws and the issuance of said certificate are acts to acquire or
perfect Philippine citizenship which make the foundling a naturalized Filipino at best. This is
erroneous. Under Article IV, Section 2 "Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship." In the first place, "having to perform an act" means that the act must be personally done
by the citizen. In this instance, the determination of foundling status is done not by the child but by
the authorities.121 Secondly, the object of the process is the determination of the whereabouts of the
parents, not the citizenship of the child. Lastly, the process is certainly not analogous to
naturalization proceedings to acquire Philippine citizenship, or the election of such citizenship by one
born of an alien father and a Filipino mother under the 1935 Constitution, which is an act to perfect it.

In this instance, such issue is moot because there is no dispute that petitioner is a foundling, as
evidenced by a Foundling Certificate issued in her favor.122 The Decree of Adoption issued on 13
May 1974, which approved petitioner's adoption by Jesusa Sonora Poe and Ronald Allan Kelley
Poe, expressly refers to Emiliano and his wife, Rosario Militar, as her "foundling parents," hence
effectively affirming petitioner's status as a foundling.123

Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an
international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or
incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a
domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation.124 On the other hand,
generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the
Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations.
Generally accepted principles of international law include international custom as evidence of a
general practice accepted as law, and general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations.125 International customary rules are accepted as binding as a result from the combination of
two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a
psychological element known as the opinionjuris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity).
Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the
existence of a rule of law requiring it.126 "General principles of law recognized by civilized nations" are
principles "established by a process of reasoning" or judicial logic, based on principles which are
"basic to legal systems generally,"127 such as "general principles of equity, i.e., the general principles
of fairness and justice," and the "general principle against discrimination" which is embodied in the
"Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
the Convention Against Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning
Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation."128 These are the same core principles
which underlie the Philippine Constitution itself, as embodied in the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Bill of Rights.129

Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been interpreted by this Court as part of the
generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the State.130 Article 15 thereof
states:

1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.

2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his
nationality.
The Philippines has also ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). Article 7 of
the UNCRC imposes the following obligations on our country:

Article 7

1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a name,
the right to acquire a nationality and as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or
her parents.

2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their national
law and their obligations under the relevant international instruments in this field, in particular where
the child would otherwise be stateless.

In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR). Article 24 thereof provide for the right of every child "to acquire a nationality:"

Article 24

1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion,
national or social origin, property or birth, the right, to such measures of protection as are required
by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and the State.

2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name.

3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.

The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to grant
nationality from birth and ensure that no child is stateless. This grant of nationality must be at the
time of birth, and it cannot be accomplished by the application of our present naturalization laws,
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and R.A. No. 9139, both of which require the applicant to
be at least eighteen (18) years old.

The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the Philippines, are generally
accepted principles of international law. The first is Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on
Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws under which a foundling is presumed
to have the "nationality of the country of birth," to wit:

Article 14

A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the country of birth. If the
child's parentage is established, its nationality shall be determined by the rules applicable in cases
where the parentage is known.

A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on the territory of the State
in which it was found. (Underlining supplied)

The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country where he is
found, contained in Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness:

Article 2
A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary,
be considered to have been born within the territory of parents possessing the nationality of that
State.

That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to the 1961 Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness does not mean that their principles are not binding. While the Philippines
is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention, it is a signatory to the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights, Article 15(1) ofwhich131effectively affirms Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention. Article 2 of
the 1961 "United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness" merely "gives effect" to
Article 15(1) of the UDHR.132 In Razon v. Tagitis, 133 this Court noted that the Philippines had not
signed or ratified the "International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance." Yet, we ruled that the proscription against enforced disappearances in the said
convention was nonetheless binding as a "generally accepted principle of international law." Razon
v. Tagitis is likewise notable for declaring the ban as a generally accepted principle of international
law although the convention had been ratified by only sixteen states and had not even come into
force and which needed the ratification of a minimum of twenty states. Additionally, as petitioner
points out, the Court was content with the practice of international and regional state organs,
regional state practice in Latin America, and State Practice in the United States.

Another case where the number of ratifying countries was not determinative is Mijares v.
Ranada, 134 where only four countries had "either ratified or acceded to"135 the 1966 "Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters" when the
case was decided in 2005. The Court also pointed out that that nine member countries of the
European Common Market had acceded to the Judgments Convention. The Court also cited U.S.
laws and jurisprudence on recognition of foreign judgments. In all, only the practices of fourteen
countries were considered and yet, there was pronouncement that recognition of foreign judgments
was widespread practice.

Our approach in Razon and Mijares effectively takes into account the fact that "generally accepted
principles of international law" are based not only on international custom, but also on "general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations," as the phrase is understood in Article 38.1
paragraph (c) of the ICJ Statute. Justice, fairness, equity and the policy against discrimination, which
are fundamental principles underlying the Bill of Rights and which are "basic to legal systems
generally,"136 support the notion that the right against enforced disappearances and the recognition of
foreign judgments, were correctly considered as "generally accepted principles of international law"
under the incorporation clause.

Petitioner's evidence137 shows that at least sixty countries in Asia, North and South America, and
Europe have passed legislation recognizing foundlings as its citizen. Forty-two (42) of those
countries follow the jus sanguinis regime. Of the sixty, only thirty-three (33) are parties to the 1961
Convention on Statelessness; twenty-six (26) are not signatories to the Convention. Also, the Chief
Justice, at the 2 February 2016 Oral Arguments pointed out that in 166 out of 189 countries
surveyed (or 87.83%), foundlings are recognized as citizens. These circumstances, including the
practice of jus sanguinis countries, show that it is a generally accepted principle of international law
to presume foundlings as having been born of nationals of the country in which the foundling is
found.

Current legislation reveals the adherence of the Philippines to this generally accepted principle of
international law. In particular, R.A. No. 8552, R.A. No. 8042 and this Court's Rules on Adoption,
expressly refer to "Filipino children." In all of them, foundlings are among the Filipino children who
could be adopted. Likewise, it has been pointed that the DFA issues passports to foundlings.
Passports are by law, issued only to citizens. This shows that even the executive department, acting
through the DFA, considers foundlings as Philippine citizens.

Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961 Convention on
Statelessness is rational and reasonable and consistent with the jus sanguinis regime in our
Constitution. The presumption of natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems from the presumption
that their parents are nationals of the Philippines. As the empirical data provided by the PSA show,
that presumption is at more than 99% and is a virtual certainty.

In sum, all of the international law conventions and instruments on the matter of nationality of
foundlings were designed to address the plight of a defenseless class which suffers from a
misfortune not of their own making. We cannot be restrictive as to their application if we are a
country which calls itself civilized and a member of the community of nations. The Solicitor General's
warning in his opening statement is relevant:

.... the total effect of those documents is to signify to this Honorable Court that those treaties and
conventions were drafted because the world community is concerned that the situation of foundlings
renders them legally invisible. It would be tragically ironic if this Honorable Court ended up using the
international instruments which seek to protect and uplift foundlings a tool to deny them political
status or to accord them second-class citizenship.138

The COMELEC also ruled139 that petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under the provisions of R.A.
No. 9225 did not result in the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship. The COMELEC reasoned that
since the applicant must perform an act, what is reacquired is not "natural-born" citizenship but only
plain "Philippine citizenship."

The COMELEC's rule arrogantly disregards consistent jurisprudence on the matter of repatriation
statutes in general and of R.A. No. 9225 in particular.

In the seminal case of Bengson Ill v. HRET, 140 repatriation was explained as follows:

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino
citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine
citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

R.A. No. 9225 is a repatriation statute and has been described as such in several cases. They
include Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC141 where we described it as an "abbreviated repatriation
process that restores one's Filipino citizenship x x x." Also included is Parreno v. Commission on
Audit,142 which cited Tabasa v. Court of Appeals,143where we said that "[t]he repatriation of the former
Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born citizenship. Parreno v. Commission on Audit144 is
categorical that "if petitioner reacquires his Filipino citizenship (under R.A. No. 9225), he will
... recover his natural-born citizenship."

The COMELEC construed the phrase "from birth" in the definition of natural citizens as implying "that
natural-born citizenship must begin at birth and remain uninterrupted and continuous from birth."
R.A. No. 9225 was obviously passed in line with Congress' sole prerogative to determine how
citizenship may be lost or reacquired. Congress saw it fit to decree that natural-born citizenship may
be reacquired even if it had been once lost. It is not for the COMELEC to disagree with the
Congress' determination.
More importantly, COMELEC's position that natural-born status must be continuous was already
rejected in Bengson III v. HRET145 where the phrase "from birth" was clarified to mean at the time of
birth: "A person who at the time of his birth, is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born
citizen thereof." Neither is "repatriation" an act to "acquire or perfect" one's citizenship. In Bengson III
v. HRET, this Court pointed out that there are only two types of citizens under the 1987 Constitution:
natural-born citizen and naturalized, and that there is no third category for repatriated citizens:

It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are
only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in
accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, ie., did not have to undergo the
process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino.
Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing
Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons,
they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their
citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As
respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to
reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the
necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives.146

The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial precedent. That is reserved to this Court. And while we
may always revisit a doctrine, a new rule reversing standing doctrine cannot be retroactively applied.
In Morales v. Court of Appeals and Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.,147 where we decreed reversed the
condonation doctrine, we cautioned that it "should be prospective in application for the reason that
judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws of the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part
of the legal system of the Philippines." This Court also said that "while the future may ultimately
uncover a doctrine's error, it should be, as a general rule, recognized as good law prior to its
abandonment. Consequently, the people's reliance thereupon should be respected."148

Lastly, it was repeatedly pointed out during the oral arguments that petitioner committed a falsehood
when she put in the spaces for "born to" in her application for repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 the
names of her adoptive parents, and this misled the BI to presume that she was a natural-born
Filipino. It has been contended that the data required were the names of her biological parents which
are precisely unknown.

This position disregards one important fact - petitioner was legally adopted. One of the effects of
adoption is "to sever all legal ties between the biological parents and the adoptee, except when the
biological parent is the spouse of the adoptee."149 Under R.A. No. 8552, petitioner was also entitled to
an amended birth certificate "attesting to the fact that the adoptee is the child of the adopter(s)" and
which certificate "shall not bear any notation that it is an amended issue."150 That law also requires
that "[a]ll records, books, and papers relating to the adoption cases in the files of the court, the
Department [of Social Welfare and Development], or any other agency or institution participating in
the adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly confidential."151 The law therefore allows petitioner to
state that her adoptive parents were her birth parents as that was what would be stated in her birth
certificate anyway. And given the policy of strict confidentiality of adoption records, petitioner was not
obligated to disclose that she was an adoptee.

Clearly, to avoid a direct ruling on the qualifications of petitioner, which it cannot make in the same
case for cancellation of COC, it resorted to opinionatedness which is, moreover, erroneous. The
whole process undertaken by COMELEC is wrapped in grave abuse of discretion.

On Residence
The tainted process was repeated in disposing of the issue of whether or not petitioner committed
false material representation when she stated in her COC that she has before and until 9 May 2016
been a resident of the Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months.

Petitioner's claim that she will have been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months on the
day before the 2016 elections, is true.

The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have ten (10) years' residence in the Philippines
before the day of the elections. Since the forthcoming elections will be held on 9 May 2016,
petitioner must have been a resident of the Philippines prior to 9 May 2016 for ten (10) years. In
answer to the requested information of "Period of Residence in the Philippines up to the day before
May 09, 2016," she put in "10 years 11 months" which according to her pleadings in these cases
corresponds to a beginning date of 25 May 2005 when she returned for good from the U.S.

When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her original domicile, which is the
Philippines. There are three requisites to acquire a new domicile: 1. Residence or bodily presence in
a new locality; 2. an intention to remain there; and 3. an intention to abandon the old domicile.152 To
successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual
change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there
must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or
at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be
voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.153

Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned their U.S.
domicile and relocated to the Philippines for good. These evidence include petitioner's former U.S.
passport showing her arrival on 24 May 2005 and her return to the Philippines every time she
travelled abroad; e-mail correspondences starting in March 2005 to September 2006 with a freight
company to arrange for the shipment of their household items weighing about 28,000 pounds to the
Philippines; e-mail with the Philippine Bureau of Animal Industry inquiring how to ship their dog to
the Philippines; school records of her children showing enrollment in Philippine schools starting June
2005 and for succeeding years; tax identification card for petitioner issued on July 2005; titles for
condominium and parking slot issued in February 2006 and their corresponding tax declarations
issued in April 2006; receipts dated 23 February 2005 from the Salvation Army in the U.S.
acknowledging donation of items from petitioner's family; March 2006 e-mail to the U.S. Postal
Service confirming request for change of address; final statement from the First American Title
Insurance Company showing sale of their U.S. home on 27 April 2006; 12 July 2011 filled-up
questionnaire submitted to the U.S. Embassy where petitioner indicated that she had been a
Philippine resident since May 2005; affidavit from Jesusa Sonora Poe (attesting to the return of
petitioner on 24 May 2005 and that she and her family stayed with affiant until the condominium was
purchased); and Affidavit from petitioner's husband (confirming that the spouses jointly decided to
relocate to the Philippines in 2005 and that he stayed behind in the U.S. only to finish some work
and to sell the family home).

The foregoing evidence were undisputed and the facts were even listed by the COMELEC,
particularly in its Resolution in the Tatad, Contreras and Valdez cases.

However, the COMELEC refused to consider that petitioner's domicile had been timely changed as
of 24 May 2005. At the oral arguments, COMELEC Commissioner Arthur Lim conceded the
presence of the first two requisites, namely, physical presence and animus manendi, but maintained
there was no animus non-revertendi.154 The COMELEC disregarded the import of all the evidence
presented by petitioner on the basis of the position that the earliest date that petitioner could have
started residence in the Philippines was in July 2006 when her application under R.A. No. 9225 was
approved by the BI. In this regard, COMELEC relied on Coquilla v. COMELEC,155 Japzon v.
COMELEC156 and Caballero v. COMELEC. 157 During the oral arguments, the private respondents
also added Reyes v. COMELEC.158 Respondents contend that these cases decree that the stay of an
alien former Filipino cannot be counted until he/she obtains a permanent resident visa or reacquires
Philippine citizenship, a visa-free entry under a balikbayan stamp being insufficient. Since petitioner
was still an American (without any resident visa) until her reacquisition of citizenship under R.A. No.
9225, her stay from 24 May 2005 to 7 July 2006 cannot be counted.

But as the petitioner pointed out, the facts in these four cases are very different from her situation.
In Coquilla v. COMELEC,159 the only evidence presented was a community tax certificate secured by
the candidate and his declaration that he would be running in the elections. Japzon v.
COMELEC160 did not involve a candidate who wanted to count residence prior to his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship. With the Court decreeing that residence is distinct from citizenship, the issue
there was whether the candidate's acts after reacquisition sufficed to establish residence.
In Caballero v. COMELEC, 161 the candidate admitted that his place of work was abroad and that he
only visited during his frequent vacations. In Reyes v. COMELEC,162 the candidate was found to be
an American citizen who had not even reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 or had
renounced her U.S. citizenship. She was disqualified on the citizenship issue. On residence, the only
proof she offered was a seven-month stint as provincial officer. The COMELEC, quoted with
approval by this Court, said that "such fact alone is not sufficient to prove her one-year residency."

It is obvious that because of the sparse evidence on residence in the four cases cited by the
respondents, the Court had no choice but to hold that residence could be counted only from
acquisition of a permanent resident visa or from reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In contrast,
the evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and taken together leads to no other conclusion that she
decided to permanently abandon her U.S. residence (selling the house, taking the children from U.S.
schools, getting quotes from the freight company, notifying the U.S. Post Office of the abandonment
of their address in the U.S., donating excess items to the Salvation Army, her husband resigning
from U.S. employment right after selling the U.S. house) and permanently relocate to the Philippines
and actually re-established her residence here on 24 May 2005 (securing T.I.N, enrolling her
children in Philippine schools, buying property here, constructing a residence here, returning to the
Philippines after all trips abroad, her husband getting employed here). Indeed, coupled with her
eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her family's actual continuous stay in the
Philippines over the years, it is clear that when petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it was for good.

In this connection, the COMELEC also took it against petitioner that she had entered the Philippines
visa-free as a balikbayan. A closer look at R.A. No. 6768 as amended, otherwise known as the "An
Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program," shows that there is no overriding intent to treat balikbayans as
temporary visitors who must leave after one year. Included in the law is a former Filipino who has
been naturalized abroad and "comes or returns to the Philippines." 163 The law institutes
a balikbayan program "providing the opportunity to avail of the necessary training to enable
the balikbayan to become economically self-reliant members of society upon their return to the
country"164in line with the government's "reintegration program."165 Obviously, balikbayans are not
ordinary transients.

Given the law's express policy to facilitate the return of a balikbayan and help him reintegrate into
society, it would be an unduly harsh conclusion to say in absolute terms that the balikbayan must
leave after one year. That visa-free period is obviously granted him to allow him to re-establish his
life and reintegrate himself into the community before he attends to the necessary formal and legal
requirements of repatriation. And that is exactly what petitioner did - she reestablished life here by
enrolling her children and buying property while awaiting the return of her husband and then
applying for repatriation shortly thereafter.
No case similar to petitioner's, where the former Filipino's evidence of change in domicile is
extensive and overwhelming, has as yet been decided by the Court. Petitioner's evidence of
residence is unprecedented. There is no judicial precedent that comes close to the facts of
residence of petitioner. There is no indication in Coquilla v. COMELEC,166 and the other cases cited
by the respondents that the Court intended to have its rulings there apply to a situation where the
facts are different. Surely, the issue of residence has been decided particularly on the facts-of-the
case basis.

To avoid the logical conclusion pointed out by the evidence of residence of petitioner, the COMELEC
ruled that petitioner's claim of residence of ten (10) years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016 in
her 2015 COC was false because she put six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as "period of residence
before May 13, 2013" in her 2012 COC for Senator. Thus, according to the COMELEC, she started
being a Philippine resident only in November 2006. In doing so, the COMELEC automatically
assumed as true the statement in the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC as false.

As explained by petitioner in her verified pleadings, she misunderstood the date required in the 2013
COC as the period of residence as of the day she submitted that COC in 2012. She said that she
reckoned residency from April-May 2006 which was the period when the U.S. house was sold and
her husband returned to the Philippines. In that regard, she was advised by her lawyers in 2015 that
residence could be counted from 25 May 2005.

Petitioner's explanation that she misunderstood the query in 2012 (period of residence before 13
May 2013) as inquiring about residence as of the time she submitted the COC, is bolstered by the
change which the COMELEC itself introduced in the 2015 COC which is now "period of residence in
the Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016." The COMELEC would not have revised the
query if it did not acknowledge that the first version was vague.

That petitioner could have reckoned residence from a date earlier than the sale of her U.S. house
and the return of her husband is plausible given the evidence that she had returned a year before.
Such evidence, to repeat, would include her passport and the school records of her children.

It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 COC as a binding and
conclusive admission against petitioner. It could be given in evidence against her, yes, but it was by
no means conclusive. There is precedent after all where a candidate's mistake as to period of
residence made in a COC was overcome by evidence. In Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC,167 the
candidate mistakenly put seven (7) months as her period of residence where the required period
was a minimum of one year. We said that "[i]t is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate
of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the
constitutions residency qualification requirement." The COMELEC ought to have looked at the
evidence presented and see if petitioner was telling the truth that she was in the Philippines from 24
May 2005. Had the COMELEC done its duty, it would have seen that the 2012 COC and the 2015
COC both correctly stated the pertinent period of residency.

The COMELEC, by its own admission, disregarded the evidence that petitioner actually and
physically returned here on 24 May 2005 not because it was false, but only because COMELEC took
the position that domicile could be established only from petitioner's repatriation under R.A. No. 9225
in July 2006. However, it does not take away the fact that in reality, petitioner had returned from the
U.S. and was here to stay permanently, on 24 May 2005. When she claimed to have been a resident
for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months, she could do so in good faith.

For another, it could not be said that petitioner was attempting to hide anything. As already stated, a
petition for quo warranto had been filed against her with the SET as early as August 2015. The event
from which the COMELEC pegged the commencement of residence, petitioner's repatriation in July
2006 under R.A. No. 9225, was an established fact to repeat, for purposes of her senatorial
candidacy.

Notably, on the statement of residence of six (6) years and six (6) months in the 2012 COC,
petitioner recounted that this was first brought up in the media on 2 June 2015 by Rep. Tobias
Tiangco of the United Nationalist Alliance. Petitioner appears to have answered the issue
immediately, also in the press. Respondents have not disputed petitioner's evidence on this point.
From that time therefore when Rep. Tiangco discussed it in the media, the stated period of
residence in the 2012 COC and the circumstances that surrounded the statement were already
matters of public record and were not hidden.

Petitioner likewise proved that the 2012 COC was also brought up in the SET petition for quo
warranto. Her Verified Answer, which was filed on 1 September 2015, admitted that she made a
mistake in the 2012 COC when she put in six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as she misunderstood
the question and could have truthfully indicated a longer period. Her answer in the SET case was a
matter of public record. Therefore, when petitioner accomplished her COC for President on 15
October 2015, she could not be said to have been attempting to hide her erroneous statement in her
2012 COC for Senator which was expressly mentioned in her Verified Answer.

The facts now, if not stretched to distortion, do not show or even hint at an intention to hide the 2012
statement and have it covered by the 2015 representation. Petitioner, moreover, has on her side this
Court's pronouncement that:

Concededly, a candidate's disqualification to run for public office does not necessarily constitute
material misrepresentation which is the sole ground for denying due course to, and for the
cancellation of, a COC. Further, as already discussed, the candidate's misrepresentation in his COC
must not only refer to a material fact (eligibility and qualifications for elective office), but should
evince a deliberate intent to mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible. It must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one's
qualifications to run for public office.168

In sum, the COMELEC, with the same posture of infallibilism, virtually ignored a good number of
evidenced dates all of which can evince animus manendi to the Philippines and animus non
revertedi to the United States of America. The veracity of the events of coming and staying home
was as much as dismissed as inconsequential, the focus having been fixed at the petitioner's "sworn
declaration in her COC for Senator" which the COMELEC said "amounts to a declaration and
therefore an admission that her residence in the Philippines only commence sometime in November
2006"; such that "based on this declaration, [petitioner] fails to meet the residency requirement for
President." This conclusion, as already shown, ignores the standing jurisprudence that it is the fact
of residence, not the statement of the person that determines residence for purposes of compliance
with the constitutional requirement of residency for election as President. It ignores the easily
researched matter that cases on questions of residency have been decided favorably for the
candidate on the basis of facts of residence far less in number, weight and substance than that
presented by petitioner.169 It ignores, above all else, what we consider as a primary reason why
petitioner cannot be bound by her declaration in her COC for Senator which declaration was not
even considered by the SET as an issue against her eligibility for Senator. When petitioner made the
declaration in her COC for Senator that she has been a resident for a period of six (6) years and six
(6) months counted up to the 13 May 2013 Elections, she naturally had as reference the residency
requirements for election as Senator which was satisfied by her declared years of residence. It was
uncontested during the oral arguments before us that at the time the declaration for Senator was
made, petitioner did not have as yet any intention to vie for the Presidency in 2016 and that the
general public was never made aware by petitioner, by word or action, that she would run for
President in 2016. Presidential candidacy has a length-of-residence different from that of a
senatorial candidacy. There are facts of residence other than that which was mentioned in the COC
for Senator. Such other facts of residence have never been proven to be false, and these, to repeat
include:

[Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 24 May 2005. (petitioner's] husband however stayed in the
USA to finish pending projects and arrange the sale of their family home.

Meanwhile [petitioner] and her children lived with her mother in San Juan City. [Petitioner] enrolled
Brian in Beacon School in Taguig City in 2005 and Hanna in Assumption College in Makati City in
2005. Anika was enrolled in Learning Connection in San Juan in 2007, when she was already old
enough to go to school.

In the second half of 2005, [petitioner] and her husband acquired Unit 7F of One Wilson Place
Condominium in San Juan. [Petitioner] and her family lived in Unit 7F until the construction of their
family home in Corinthian Hills was completed.

Sometime in the second half of 2005, [petitioner's] mother discovered that her former lawyer who
handled [petitioner's] adoption in 1974 failed to secure from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo a
new Certificate of Live Birth indicating [petitioner's] new name and stating that her parents are
"Ronald Allan K. Poe" and "Jesusa L. Sonora."

In February 2006, [petitioner] travelled briefly to the US in order to supervise the disposal of some of
the family's remaining household belongings. [Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 11 March
1a\^ /phi1

2006.

In late March 2006, [petitioner's] husband informed the United States Postal Service of the family's
abandonment of their address in the US.

The family home in the US was sole on 27 April 2006.

In April 2006, [petitioner's] husband resigned from his work in the US. He returned to the Philippines
on 4 May 2006 and began working for a Philippine company in July 2006.

In early 2006, [petitioner] and her husband acquired a vacant lot in Corinthian Hills, where they
eventually built their family home.170

In light of all these, it was arbitrary for the COMELEC to satisfy its intention to let the case fall under
the exclusive ground of false representation, to consider no other date than that mentioned by
petitioner in her COC for Senator.

All put together, in the matter of the citizenship and residence of petitioner for her candidacy as
President of the Republic, the questioned Resolutions of the COMELEC in Division and En
Banc are, one and all, deadly diseased with grave abuse of discretion from root to fruits.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions, to wit:

1. dated 1 December 2015 rendered through the COMELEC Second Division, in SPA No. 15-001
(DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares,
respondent, stating that:
[T]he Certificate of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 9, 2016
National and Local Elections filed by respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares is
hereby GRANTED.

2. dated 11 December 2015, rendered through the COMELEC First Division, in the consolidated
cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio P. Contreras,
petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-139
(DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares, respondent; stating that:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to

GRANT the petitions and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD
SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES for the elective position of President of the Republic of the
Philippines in connection with the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local and National Elections.

3. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 1 December 2015 Resolution
of the Second Division stating that:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to

DENY the Verified Motion for Reconsideration of SENATOR MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA
POE-LLAMANZARES. The Resolution dated 11 December 2015 of the Commission First Division is
AFFIRMED.

4. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 11 December 2015
Resolution of the First Division.

are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-
LLAMANZARES is DECLARED QUALIFIED to be a candidate for President in the National and
Local Elections of 9 May 2016.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

See Concurring Opinion

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

See Dissenting Opinion Please see Concurring Opinion

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice

Please see Separate Dissenting Opinion See Dissenting opinion

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice Associate Justice
 I join J. Caguioa's Opinion
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

Pls. see Dissenting Opinion

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

(I concur with the Dissenting Opinion of

See Dissenting Opinion
Justice Perlas-Bernabe)
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

See Separate Concurring Opinion See Concurring Opinion

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

See Concurring Opinion

ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Petition for Certiorari in G.R. Nos. 221698-700, pp. 15-16; COMELEC First Division
Resolution dated 11 December 2015 in SPA No. 15-002 (DC), SPA No. 15-007 (DC) and
SPA No. 15-139 (DC), p. 2.

2
Petition for Certiorari, id. at 16-17;

3
COMELEC First Division Resolution, supra note 1 at 4.

4
Petition for Certiorari, supra note 1 at 22.

5
Id. at 17; Comment (on the Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 221697) filed by respondent
COMELEC dated 11January 2016, p. 6.

6
Petition for Certiorari, id.; id. at 7.
7
Id. at 18.

8
Supra note 6.

9
Id.

10
COMELEC First Division Resolution, supra note 1 at 3.

11
Petition for Certiorari, supra note 1 at 17.

12
Id. at 18.

13
Id.

14
COMELEC First Division Resolution, supra note 10.

15
Id.

16
Supra note 1 at 17-18.

17
COMELEC First Division Resolution, supra note 10.

18
Id.

19
Id.

20
Petition for Certiorari, supra note 1 at 20.

21
Id.

22
Supra note 3.

23
Supra note 20.

24
Supra note 3.

25
Supra note 20.

26
Supra note 3.

27
Petition for Certiorari, supra note 4.

28
Id.

29
Id. at 23; COMELEC First Division Resolution, supra note 3.

30
Id.; id.

31
Id.; id.
32
Id.; id.

33
Id. at 23-24; COMELEC First Division Resolution, supra note 1 at 5.

34
Id. at 24; id.

35
Id.

36
Supra note 34.

37
Petition for Certiorari, supra note 1 at 25; COMELEC First Division Resolution, supra note
1 at 5.

38
Id. at 25-26; id.

39
Id. at 26; id.

40
Id.; id.

41
Id.; id.

42
Id. at 32; id. at 6.

43
Supra note 39.

Petition for Certiorari, supra note 1 at 26-27; COMELEC First Division Resolution, supra
44

note 1 at 5.

45
Section 5, R.A. No. 9225 states:

SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:

xx xx

3. Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior
to their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to
the country where they took that oath;

xx xx

46
Petition for Certiorari, supra note 1 at 27.

47
Id. at 29.

48
Supra note 46; supra note 1 at 6.
49
Petition for Certiorari, supra note 1 at 30; id.

50
Id.

51
Supra note 48.

52
Petition for Certiorari, supra note 1 at 31; COMELEC First Division Resolution, supra note
1 at 6.

53
Comment, supra note 5 at 9.

54
Petition for Certiorari, supra note 1 at 31.

55
Id. at 32; Comment, supra note 53 at 10.

56
Id.; COMELEC First Division Resolution, supra note 1 at 6.

57
Id.; id. at 7.

58
Id.; id.

Comment (on the Petition in G.R. No. 221697) filed by respondent Elamparo, dated
59

January 6, 2016, p. 7.

60
COMELEC Second Division Resolution dated December 1, 2015 in SPA No. 15-001 (DC),
p. 7.

61
Id. at 7-8.

62
Supra note 60.

63
Id.

64
Id. at 8.

65
Id.

66
Petition for Certiorari in GR. No. 221697, p. 7.

67
Supra note 64.

Petition for Certiorari, supra note 65 at 8; COMELEC Second Division Resolution, supra
68

note 60 at 8-11.

69
COMELEC Second Division Resolution, supra note 60 at 34.

70
Comment, supra note 59 at 10.

71
Section 1 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended, states:
 Rule 25 - Disqualification of Candidates

Section 1. Grounds. - Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a

party, is declared by final decision of a competent court, guilty of, or found by the
Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the
Constitution.

A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking grounds for a Petition to Deny to or

Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy or Petition to Declare a Candidate as a Nuisance
Candidate, or a combination thereof, shall be summarily dismissed.

72
Petition to Disqualify dated 19 October 2015 filed by Tatad in SPA No. 15-002 (DC), p. 9.

73
Id., at 9 and 14.

74
Id. at 10.

75
Id. at 12.

76
Id. at 11.

77
COMELEC First Division Resolution, supra note 1 at 8.

78
Id.

79
Petition to Disqualify, supra note 72 at 11.

80
Id. at 21.

81
Id.

82
Id.

83
Supra note I at 8.

84
Id.

85
Contreras' petition is a petition for cancellation of Grace Poe's COC under Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code which states that:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A

verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be
filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later
than fifteen days before the election.

Petition for Cancellation of Grace Poe's COC dated 17 October 2015 filed by Contreras in
86

SPA No. 15-007 (DC), pp. 2-4.

87
Id. at 3; Petition for Certiorari, supra note l at 13.

88
Id. at 3-4.

89
Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code provide:

Sec. 12. Disqualifications. -Any person who has been declared by competent
authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for
subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been
sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral
turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has
been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.

This disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed

upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had
been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of
sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.

Sec. 68. Disqualifications. - Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is

a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the
Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence,
induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b)
committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election
campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or
made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e)
violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-
paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been
elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an
immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office
under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement
provided for in the election laws.

90
COMELEC First Division Resolution, supra note 1 at 12.

91
Id. at 10.

92
Id.

93
Id. at 9.

94
Id.

95
Id.

96
Id.

97
Id.

98
Id.
99
Id.at 9-10.

100
Id.at 10.

101
Id.

102
Id.

The 11 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division was concurred in by
103

Commissioners Louie Tito F. Guia and Ma. Rowena Amelia V. Guanzon. Presiding
Commissioner Christian Robert S. Lim issued a Separate Dissenting Opinion.

104
318 Phil. 329 (1995).

105
595 Phil. 449 (2008).

106
Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, supra note 104 at 396-397.

107
Id. at 397-398; Fermin v. COMELEC, supra note 105 at 471-472.

In A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC, Resolution Approving The Proposed Rule on Adoption (Domestic
108

and Inter-Country), effective 22 August 2002, "foundling" is defined as "a deserted or

abandoned infant or child whose parents, guardian or relatives are unknown; or a child
committed to an orphanage or charitable or similar institution with unknown facts of birth and
parentage and registered in the Civil Register as a "foundling."

109
Article IV-Citizenship.

Sec. I. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution,

(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the
adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the
Philippine Islands.

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching
the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.

(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Section 2. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by

law.

Article 163 to 182, Title VI of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as The Family
110

Code of the Philippines, which took effect on 4 August 1988.

111
Statistics from the PSA or its predecessor agencies are admissible evidence. See Herrera
v. COMELEC, 376 Phil. 443 (I 999) and Bagabuyo v. COMELEC, 593 Phil. 678 (2008). In
the latter case, the Court even took judicial notice of the figures.

112
Transcipt of Stenographic Notes, 9 February 2016, p. 40.

113
Section 3 (y), Rule 131.

114
236 Phil. 307 (1987).

115
Id. at314-315.

English translation of the Spanish original presented in the petitioner's pleadings before
116

the COMELEC and this Court. The COMELEC and private respondents have not disputed
the accuracy and correctness of the translation.

117
I Jose M. Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution 209 (1949).

118
TSN, 16 February 2016, pp. 20-21.

119
117 Phil. 976 (1963).

120
Id. at 978-979.

121
See Section 5 of the RA No. 8552: "Location of Unknown Parent(s). - It shall be the duty of
the Department or the child-caring agency which has custody of the child to exert all efforts
to locate his/her unknown biological parent(s). If such efforts fail, the child shall be registered
as a foundling and subsequently be the subject of legal proceedings where he/she shall be
declared abandoned." (Underlining supplied)

122
See Exhibit "l" in SPA No. 15-001 (DC) and SPA No. 15-00 (DC).

123
See Exhibit "2" in SPA No. 15-001 (DC) and SPA No. 15-00 (DC).

Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, 621 Phil. 536, 600 (2009) citing Pharmaceutical and Health Care
124

Assoc. of the Philippines v. Duque III, 561 Phil. 386, 398 (2007).

125
Article 38.1, paragraphs (b) and (c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

126
Mijares v. Ranada, 495 Phil. 372, 395 (2005).

Pharmaceutical and Health Care Assoc. of the Philippines v. Duque III, 561 Phil. 386, 400
127

(2007).

128
International School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing, 388 Phil. 661, 672-673 (2000).

129
CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 1.

130
Rep. of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, 454 Phil. 504, 545 (2003).
131
"Everyone has the right to a nationality."

132
See Introductory Note to the United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness
issued by the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees.

133
Supra note 124.

134
Supra note 126.

135
Id. at 392; See footnote No. 55 of said case.

136
Pharmaceutical and Health Care Assoc. of the Philippines v. Duque III, supra note 127.

137
See Exhibits 38 and 39-series.

138
Opening Statement of the Solicitor General, p. 6.

First Division resolution dated 11 December 2015, upheld in toto by the COMELEC En
139

Banc.

140
409 Phil. 633, 649 (2001).

141
692 Phil. 407, 420 (2012).

142
551 Phil. 368, 381 (2007).

143
53 I Phil. 407, 417 (2006).

144
Supra note 142.

145
Supra note 140 at 646.

146
Id. at 651.

147
G.R. No. 217126-27, 10 November 2015.

148
Id.

149
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 8552, Art. VI, Sec. 33.

150
Republic Act No. 8552 (1998), Sec. 14.

151
Republic Act No. 8552 (1998), Sec. 15.

152
Fernandez v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 623 Phil. 628, 660 (2009)
citing Japzon v. COMELEC, 596 Phil. 354, 370-372 (2009) further citing Papandayan, Jr. v.
COMELEC, 430 Phil. 754, 768-770 (2002) further further citing Romualdez v. RTC,
Br. 7, Tacloban City, G.R. No. 104960, 14 September 1993, 226 SCRA408, 415.

153
Domino v. COMELEC, 369 Phil. 798, 819 (1999).
 154
TSN, 16 February 2016, p. 120.

155
434 Phil. 861 (2002).

156
596 Phil. 354 (2009).

157
G.R. No. 209835, 22 September 2015.

158
G.R. No. 207264, 25 June 2013, 699 SCRA 522.

159
Supra note 155.

160
Supra note 156.

161
Supra note 157.

162
Supra note 158.

163
Republic Act No. 6768 (1989), as amended, Sec. 2(a).

164
Republic Act No. 6768 (1989), as amended, Sec. I.

165
Republic Act No. 6768 (1989), as amended, Sec. 6.

166
Supra note 155.

167
Supra note 104 at 326. (Emphasis supplied)

168
Ugdoracion, Jr. v. COMELEC, 575 Phil. 253, 265-266 (2008).

In Mitra v. COMELEC, et al., [636 Phil. 753 (2010)], It was ruled that the residence
169

requirement can be complied with through an incremental process including acquisition of

business interest in the pertinent place and lease of feedmill building as residence.

170
COMELEC Resolution dated 11 December2015 in SPA No. 15-002 (DC), pp. 4-5.

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 207264 June 25, 2013

REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction and/or Status Quo Ante Order dated 7 June 2013 filed by petitioner Regina
Ongsiako Reyes, assailing the Resolutions dated 27 March 2013 and 14 May 2013 issued by public
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPA No. 13-053. The assailed Resolutions
ordered the cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy of petitioner for the position of
Representative of the lone district of Marinduque.

On 31 October 2012, respondent Joseph Socorro Tan, a registered voter and resident of the
Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC an Amended Petition to Deny Due
Course or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner on the ground that it contained
material misrepresentations, specifically: (1) that she is single when she is married to Congressman
Herminaldo I. Mandanas of Batangas;1 (2) that she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac, Boac, Marinduque
when she is a resident of Bauan, Batangas which is the residence of her husband, and at the same
time, when she is also a resident of 135 J.P. Rizal, Brgy. Milagrosa, Quezon City as admitted in the
Directory of Congressional Spouses of the House of Representatives;2 (3) that her date of birth is 3
July 1964 when other documents show that her birthdate is either 8 July 1959 or 3 July 1960;3 (4)
that she is not a permanent resident of another country when she is a permanent resident or an
immigrant4 of the United States of America;5and (5) that she is a Filipino citizen when she is, in fact,
an American citizen.6

In her Answer, petitioner countered that, while she is publicly known to be the wife of Congressman
Herminaldo I. Mandanas (Congressman Mandanas), there is no valid and binding marriage between
them. According to petitioner, although her marriage with Congressman Mandanas was solemnized
in a religious rite, it did not comply with certain formal requirements prescribed by the Family Code,
rendering it void ab initio.7 Consequently, petitioner argues that as she is not duty-bound to live with
Congressman Mandanas, then his residence cannot be attributed to her.8 As to her date of birth, the
Certificate of Live Birth issued by the National Statistics Office shows that it was on 3 July
1964.9 Lastly, petitioner notes that the allegation that she is a permanent resident and/or a citizen of
the United States of America is not supported by evidence.10

During the course of the proceedings, on 8 February 2013, respondent filed a "Manifestation with
Motion to Admit Newly Discovered Evidence and Amended List of Exhibits"11 consisting of, among
others: (1) a copy of an article published on the internet on 8 January 2013 entitled "Seeking and
Finding the Truth about Regina O. Reyes" with an Affidavit of Identification and Authenticity of
Document executed by its author Eliseo J. Obligacion, which provides a database record of the
Bureau of Immigration indicating that petitioner is an American citizen and a holder of a U.S.
passport; (2) a Certification of Travel Records of petitioner, issued by Simeon Sanchez, Acting Chief,
Verification and Certification Unit of the Bureau of Immigration which indicates that petitioner used a
U.S. Passport in her various travels abroad.

On 27 March 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution12 cancelling petitioners COC,
to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the
Certificate of Candidacy of respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES is hereby CANCELLED.

The COMELEC First Division found that, contrary to the declarations that she made in her COC,
petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines because of her failure to comply with the requirements of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, namely:
(1) to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; and (2) to make a personal and
sworn renunciation of her American citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an
oath. In addition, the COMELEC First Division ruled that she did not have the oneyear residency
requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.13 Thus, she is ineligible to run for
the position of Representative for the lone district of Marinduque.

Not agreeing with the Resolution of the COMELEC First Division, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration14 on 8 April 2013 claiming that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and that she has
not lost such status by simply obtaining and using an American passport. Additionally, petitioner
surmised that the COMELEC First Division relied on the fact of her marriage to an American citizen
in concluding that she is a naturalized American citizen. Petitioner averred, however, that such
marriage only resulted into dual citizenship, thus there is no need for her to fulfill the twin
requirements under R.A. No. 9225. Still, petitioner attached an Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign
Citizenship sworn to before a Notary Public on 24 September 2012. As to her alleged lack of the
one-year residency requirement prescribed by the Constitution, she averred that, as she never
became a naturalized citizen, she never lost her domicile of origin, which is Boac, Marinduque.

On 14 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc, promulgated a Resolution15 denying petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration for lack of merit.

Four days thereafter or on 18 May 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the 13 May 2013
Elections.

On 5 June 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Certificate of Finality16 declaring the 14 May 2013
Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc final and executory, considering that more than twenty-one
(21) days have elapsed from the date of promulgation with no order issued by this Court restraining
its execution.17

On same day, petitioner took her oath of office18 before Feliciano R. Belmonte Jr., Speaker of the
House of Representatives.

Petitioner has yet to assume office, the term of which officially starts at noon of 30 June 2013.

In the present Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction and/or Status Quo Ante Order, petitioner raises the following issues:19

31) Whether or not Respondent Comelec is without jurisdiction over Petitioner who is a duly
proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the position of Member of
the House of Representatives for the lone congressional district of Marinduque.

32) Whether or not Respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it took cognizance of Respondent Tans alleged "newly-
discovered evidence" without the same having been testified on and offered and admitted in
evidence which became the basis for its Resolution of the case without giving the petitioner
the opportunity to question and present controverting evidence, in violation of Petitioners
right to due process of law.

33) Whether or not Respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it declared that Petitioner is not a Filipino citizen and did
not meet the residency requirement for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives.

34) Whether or not Respondent Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when, by enforcing the provisions of
 Republic Act No. 9225, it imposed additional qualifications to the qualifications of a Member
of the House of Representatives as enumerated in Section 6 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution of the Philippines.

The petition must fail.

At the outset, it is observed that the issue of jurisdiction of respondent COMELEC vis-a-vis that of
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) appears to be a non-issue. Petitioner is taking
an inconsistent, if not confusing, stance for while she seeks remedy before this Court, she is
asserting that it is the HRET which has jurisdiction over her. Thus, she posits that the issue on her
eligibility and qualifications to be a Member of the House of Representatives is best discussed in
another tribunal of competent jurisdiction. It appears then that petitioners recourse to this Court was
made only in an attempt to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing its final and executory judgment
in SPA No. 13-053.

Nevertheless, we pay due regard to the petition, and consider each of the issues raised by
petitioner. The need to do so, and at once, was highlighted during the discussion En Banc on 25
June 2013 where and when it was emphasized that the term of office of the Members of the House
of Representatives begins on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.

According to petitioner, the COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction when she was duly
proclaimed20 because pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the HRET has the
exclusive jurisdiction to be the "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications" of the Members of the House of Representatives.

Contrary to petitioners claim, however, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction for the following reasons:

First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of petitioners qualifications, as well as
over the assailed COMELEC Resolutions, unless a petition is duly filed with said tribunal. Petitioner
has not averred that she has filed such action.

Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of the
House of Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:

Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. x x x

As held in Marcos v. COMELEC,21 the HRET does not have jurisdiction over a candidate who is not
a member of the House of Representatives, to wit:

As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunals supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the
issue of petitioners qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRETs
jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of
members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of
Representatives. Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that
the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question. (Emphasis supplied.)

The next inquiry, then, is when is a candidate considered a Member of the House of
Representatives?
In Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC,22 citing Aggabao v. COMELEC23 and Guerrero v. COMELEC,24 the
Court ruled that:

The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath,
and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own
jurisdiction begins. (Emphasis supplied.)

This pronouncement was reiterated in the case of Limkaichong v. COMELEC,25 wherein the Court,
referring to the jurisdiction of the COMELEC vis-a-vis the HRET, held that:

The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath,
and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own
jurisdiction begins. (Emphasis supplied.)

This was again affirmed in Gonzalez v. COMELEC,26 to wit:

After proclamation, taking of oath and assumption of office by Gonzalez, jurisdiction over the matter
of his qualifications, as well as questions regarding the conduct of election and contested returns
were transferred to the HRET as the constitutional body created to pass upon the same. (Emphasis
supplied.)

From the foregoing, it is then clear that to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives,
there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath,
and (3) assumption of office.

Indeed, in some cases, this Court has made the pronouncement that once a proclamation has been
made, COMELECs jurisdiction is already lost and, thus, its jurisdiction over contests relating to
elections, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins. However, it must
be noted that in these cases, the doctrinal pronouncement was made in the context of a proclaimed
candidate who had not only taken an oath of office, but who had also assumed office.

For instance, in the case of Dimaporo v. COMELEC,27 the Court upheld the jurisdiction of the HRET
against that of the COMELEC only after the candidate had been proclaimed, taken his oath of office
before the Speaker of the House, and assumed the duties of a Congressman on 26 September
2007, or after the start of his term on 30 June 2007, to wit:

On October 8, 2007, private respondent Belmonte filed his comment in which he brought to Our
attention that on September 26, 2007, even before the issuance of the status quo ante order of the
Court, he had already been proclaimed by the PBOC as the duly elected Member of the House of
Representatives of the First Congressional District of Lanao del Norte. On that very same day, he
had taken his oath before Speaker of the House Jose de Venecia, Jr. and assumed his duties
accordingly.

In light of this development, jurisdiction over this case has already been transferred to the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). (Emphasis supplied.)

Apparently, the earlier cases were decided after the questioned candidate had already assumed
office, and hence, was already considered a Member of the House of Representatives, unlike in the
present case.
Here, the petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the House of Representatives because,
primarily, she has not yet assumed office. To repeat what has earlier been said, the term of office of
a Member of the House of Representatives begins only "at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following their election."28 Thus, until such time, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction.

In her attempt to comply with the second requirement, petitioner attached a purported Oath Of Office
taken before Hon. Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 5 June 2013. However, this is not the oath of office
which confers membership to the House of Representatives.

Section 6, Rule II (Membership) of the Rules of the House of Representatives provides:

Section 6. Oath or Affirmation of Members. Members shall take their oath or affirmation either
collectively or individually before the Speaker in open session.

Consequently, before there is a valid or official taking of the oath it must be made (1) before the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, and (2) in open session. Here, although she made the
oath before Speaker Belmonte, there is no indication that it was made during plenary or in open
session and, thus, it remains unclear whether the required oath of office was indeed complied with.

More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy that before the proclamation
of petitioner on 18 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already finally disposed of the issue of
petitioners lack of Filipino citizenship and residency via its Resolution dated 14 May 2013. After 14
May 2013, there was, before the COMELEC, no longer any pending case on petitioners
qualifications to run for the position of Member of the House of Representative. We will inexcusably
disregard this fact if we accept the argument of the petitioner that the COMELEC was ousted of
jurisdiction when she was proclaimed, which was four days after the COMELEC En Banc decision.
The Board of Canvasser which proclaimed petitioner cannot by such act be allowed to render
nugatory a decision of the COMELEC En Banc which affirmed a decision of the COMELEC First
Division.

Indeed, the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC First Division which was promulgated on 27 March
2013, and the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc which was promulgated on 14 May
2013, became final and executory on 19 May 2013 based on Section 3, Rule 37 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure which provides:

Section 3. Decisions Final after five days. Decisions in pre-proclamation cases and petitions to deny
due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy, to declare nuisance candidate or to disqualify a
candidate, and to postpone or suspend elections shall become final and executory after the lapse of
five (5) days from their promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court.

To prevent the assailed Resolution dated 14 May 2013 from becoming final and executory, petitioner
should have availed herself of Section 1, Rule 3729 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or Rule
6430 of the Rules of Court by filing a petition before this Court within the 5-day period, but she failed
to do so. She would file the present last hour petition on 10 June 2013. Hence, on 5 June 2013,
respondent COMELEC rightly issued a Certificate of Finality.

As to the issue of whether petitioner failed to prove her Filipino citizenship, as well as her one-year
residency in Marinduque, suffice it to say that the COMELEC committed no grave abuse of
discretion in finding her ineligible for the position of Member of the House of Representatives.

Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it took cognizance of
"newly-discovered evidence" without the same having been testified on and offered and admitted in
evidence. She assails the admission of the blog article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay and the
photocopy of the Certification from the Bureau of Immigration. She likewise contends that there was
a violation of her right to due process of law because she was not given the opportunity to question
and present controverting evidence.

Her contentions are incorrect.

It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the technical rules of
procedure in the presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I, the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure "shall be liberally construed in order x xx to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive
determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Commission." In
view of the fact that the proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of
candidacy are summary in nature, then the "newly discovered evidence" was properly admitted by
respondent COMELEC.

Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as petitioner was given every
opportunity to argue her case before the COMELEC. From 10 October 2012 when Tans petition
was filed up to 27 March 2013 when the First Division rendered its resolution, petitioner had a period
of five (5) months to adduce evidence. Unfortunately, she did not avail herself of the opportunity
given her.

Also, in administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the party be given the
opportunity or right to be heard. As held in the case of Sahali v. COMELEC:31

The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not necessarily mean or require a
hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal
presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and predictable than oral argument,
through pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and
evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with due process in
its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a
party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration. (Emphasis supplied)

As to the ruling that petitioner is ineligible to run for office on the ground of citizenship, the
COMELEC First Division, discoursed as follows:

"x x x for respondent to reacquire her Filipino citizenship and become eligible for public office, the
law requires that she must have accomplished the following acts: (1) take the oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines before the Consul-General of the Philippine Consulate in the USA;
and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath.

In the case at bar, there is no showing that respondent complied with the aforesaid requirements.
Early on in the proceeding, respondent hammered on petitioners lack of proof regarding her
American citizenship, contending that it is petitioners burden to present a case. She, however,
specifically denied that she has become either a permanent resident or naturalized citizen of the
USA.

Due to petitioners submission of newly-discovered evidence thru a Manifestation dated February 7,

2013, however, establishing the fact that respondent is a holder of an American passport which she
continues to use until June 30, 2012, petitioner was able to substantiate his allegations. The burden
now shifts to respondent to present substantial evidence to prove otherwise. This, the respondent
utterly failed to do, leading to the conclusion inevitable that respondent falsely misrepresented in her
COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Unless and until she can establish that she had
availed of the privileges of RA 9225 by becoming a dual Filipino-American citizen, and thereafter,
made a valid sworn renunciation of her American citizenship, she remains to be an American citizen
and is, therefore, ineligible to run for and hold any elective public office in the
Philippines."32 (Emphasis supplied.)

Let us look into the events that led to this petition: In moving for the cancellation of petitioners COC,
respondent submitted records of the Bureau of Immigration showing that petitioner is a holder of a
US passport, and that her status is that of a "balikbayan." At this point, the burden of proof shifted to
petitioner, imposing upon her the duty to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and has not
lost the same, or that she has reacquired such status in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No.
9225. Aside from the bare allegation that she is a natural-born citizen, however, petitioner submitted
no proof to support such contention. Neither did she submit any proof as to the inapplicability of R.A.
No. 9225 to her.

Notably, in her Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc, petitioner admitted that
she is a holder of a US passport, but she averred that she is only a dual Filipino-American citizen,
thus the requirements of R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to her.33 Still, attached to the said motion is an
Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship dated 24 September 2012.34 Petitioner explains that
she attached said Affidavit "if only to show her desire and zeal to serve the people and to comply
with rules, even as a superfluity."35 We cannot, however, subscribe to petitioners explanation. If
petitioner executed said Affidavit "if only to comply with the rules," then it is an admission that R.A.
No. 9225 applies to her. Petitioner cannot claim that she executed it to address the observations by
the COMELEC as the assailed Resolutions were promulgated only in 2013, while the Affidavit was
executed in September 2012.

Moreover, in the present petition, petitioner added a footnote to her oath of office as Provincial
Administrator, to this effect: "This does not mean that Petitioner did not, prior to her taking her oath
of office as Provincial Administrator, take her oath of allegiance for purposes of reacquisition of
natural-born Filipino status, which she reserves to present in the proper proceeding. The reference
to the taking of oath of office is in order to make reference to what is already part of the records and
evidence in the present case and to avoid injecting into the records evidence on matters of fact that
was not previously passed upon by Respondent COMELEC."36 This statement raises a lot of
questions Did petitioner execute an oath of allegiance for re-acquisition of natural-born Filipino
status? If she did, why did she not present it at the earliest opportunity before the COMELEC? And
is this an admission that she has indeed lost her natural-born Filipino status?

To cover-up her apparent lack of an oath of allegiance as required by R.A. No. 9225, petitioner
contends that, since she took her oath of allegiance in connection with her appointment as Provincial
Administrator of Marinduque, she is deemed to have reacquired her status as a natural-born Filipino
citizen.

This contention is misplaced. For one, this issue is being presented for the first time before this
Court, as it was never raised before the COMELEC. For another, said oath of allegiance cannot be
considered compliance with Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 9225 as certain requirements have to be met as
prescribed by Memorandum Circular No. AFF-04-01, otherwise known as the Rules Governing
Philippine Citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 and Memorandum Circular No. AFF-05-002 (Revised
Rules) and Administrative Order No. 91, Series of 2004 issued by the Bureau of Immigration. Thus,
petitioners oath of office as Provincial Administrator cannot be considered as the oath of allegiance
in compliance with R.A. No. 9225.
These circumstances, taken together, show that a doubt was clearly cast on petitioners citizenship.
Petitioner, however, failed to clear such doubt.

As to the issue of residency, proceeding from the finding that petitioner has lost her natural-born
status, we quote with approval the ruling of the COMELEC First Division that petitioner cannot be
considered a resident of Marinduque:

"Thus, a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized elsewhere effectively abandons his domicile of
origin. Upon re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225, he must still show that he
chose to establish his domicile in the Philippines through positive acts, and the period of his
residency shall be counted from the time he made it his domicile of choice.

In this case, there is no showing whatsoever that petitioner had already re-acquired her Filipino
citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 so as to conclude that she has regained her domicile in the
Philippines. There being no proof that petitioner had renounced her American citizenship, it follows
that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA.

The only proof presented by petitioner to show that she has met the one-year residency requirement
of the law and never abandoned her domicile of origin in Boac, Marinduque is her claim that she
served as Provincial Administrator of the province from January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011. But such
fact alone is not sufficient to prove her one-year residency. For, petitioner has never regained her
domicile in Marinduque as she remains to be an American citizen. No amount of her stay in the said
locality can substitute the fact that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the
USA."37 (Emphasis supplied.)

All in all, considering that the petition for denial and cancellation of the COC is summary in nature,
the COMELEC is given much discretion in the evaluation and admission of evidence pursuant to its
principal objective of determining of whether or not the COC should be cancelled. We held in
Mastura v. COMELEC:38

The rule that factual findings of administrative bodies will not be disturbed by courts of justice except
when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in support of such findings should
be applied with greater force when it concerns the COMELEC, as the framers of the Constitution
intended to place the COMELEC created and explicitly made independent by the Constitution
itself on a level higher than statutory administrative organs. The COMELEC has broad powers to
ascertain the true results of the election by means available to it. For the attainment of that end, it is
not strictly bound by the rules of evidence.1w phi 1

Time and again, We emphasize that the "grave abuse of discretion" which warrants this Courts
exercise of certiorari jurisdiction has a welldefined meaning. Guidance is found in Beluso v.
Commission on Elections39 where the Court held:

x x x A petition for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and proved to
exist. "Grave abuse of discretion," under Rule 65, has a specific meaning. It is the arbitrary or
despotic exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary,
or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty
enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. For an act to be struck down as having been
done with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Here, this Court finds that petitioner failed to adequately and substantially show that grave abuse of
discretion exists.
Lastly, anent the proposition of petitioner that the act of the COMELEC in enforcing the provisions of
R.A. No. 9225, insofar as it adds to the qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives
other than those enumerated in the Constitution, is unconstitutional, We find the same meritless.

The COMELEC did not impose additional qualifications on candidates for the House of
Representatives who have acquired foreign citizenship. It merely applied the qualifications
prescribed by Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that the candidate must be a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines and must have one-year residency prior to the date of elections. Such being
the case, the COMELEC did not err when it inquired into the compliance by petitioner of Sections 3
and 5 of R.A. No. 9225 to determine if she reacquired her status as a natural-born Filipino citizen. It
simply applied the constitutional provision and nothing more.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections. The 14 May 2013 Resolution of the
COMELEC En Bane affirming the 27 March 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division is
upheld.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On official leave)

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

I joint the dissent of J. Brion No Part

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

No Part Due To Voluntary Inhibition

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
 I join the dissent of J. Brion
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Resolution were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* On official leave.

1 Rollo, p. 70.

2 Id..

3 Id. at 71.

4 Respondent relies on the following facts: (a) [petitioner] was admitted to the California State
Bar on June 12, 1995; (b) [petitioner] maintained a US address and earned her
undergraduate studies in Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.; (c) [petitioner] married
an American citizen named Saturnino S. Ador Dionisio in 1997, which marriage was
subsequently dissolved; and (4) [petitioner] acquired properties and established businesses
in the U.S.; COMELEC Resolution dated 27 March 2013. Id. at 44.

5 Id. at 71.

6 Id. at 72.

7 Id. at 84.

8
Id. at 87.

9 Id. at 93.

10 Id. at 94.

11 Id at 127-139.

12 Id. at 40-51.
13Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five
years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered
voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less
than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.

14 Id. at 140-157.

15 Id. at 52-60.

16 Id. at 163-165.

17Section 13, Rule 18 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure in relation to Par. 2, Sec. 8
of Resolution No. 9523 provides that a decision or resolution of the COMELEC En Banc in
special actions and special cases shall become final and executory five (5) days after its
promulgation unless a restraining order is issued by the Supreme Court. Sec. 3, Rule 37,
Part VII also provides that decisions in petitions to deny due course to or cancel certificates
of candidacy shall become final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days from
promulgation, unless restrained by the Supreme Court.

18 Id. at 162.

19 Id. at 9.

20 Id.

21 318 Phil. 329, 397 (1995).

22 G.R. No. 172131, 2 April 2007, 520 SCRA 166, 179.

23 G.R. No. 163756, 26 January 2005, 449 SCRA 400, 404-405.

24 391 Phil. 344, 352 (2000).

25 G.R. Nos. 179240-41, 1 April 2009, 583 SCRA 1, 33.

26 G.R. No. 192856, 8 March 2011, 644 SCRA 761, 798-799.

27 G.R. No. 179285, 11 February 2008, 544 SCRA 381, 390.

28 Section 7, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

29Section 1.Petition for Certiorari; and Time to File.Unless otherwise provided by law, or
by any specific provisions in these Rules, any decision, order or ruling of the Commission
may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty (30)
days from its promulgation.

30Section 2.Mode of review.A judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on

Elections and the Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the
Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided.
 31 G.R. No. 201796, 15 January 2013.

32 Rollo, pp. 47-48.

33 Id. at 148.

34 Id. at 154.

35 Id. at 149.

36 Id. at 26.

37 Id. at 49-50.

38 G.R. No. 124521 29 January 1998, 285 SCRA 493, 499.

39 G.R. No. 180711, 22 June 2010, 621 SCRA 450, 456.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

EN BANC

RUDOLFO I. BELUSO, G.R. No. 180711

Petitioner,
Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
- versus - BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA,* JJ.
 COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Promulgated:
and GABRIELA WOMENS
PARTY, June 22, 2010
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------------------
-x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari[1] under Rule 65 to set aside and
annul a portion of the Resolution of the COMELEC dated April 26, 2007 [2] and
November 8, 2007,[3] which declared petitioner, Rudolfo I. Beluso, perpetually
barred from serving in any capacity in any canvassing board of the COMELEC, in
relation to Election Offense Case No. 04-117 (Gabriela Womens Party vs. Atty.
Nelly Abao-Lee, et al.) for being erroneous and issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

In 2004, during the canvassing of the party list votes conducted by the
National Board of Canvassers (NBOC), GABRIELA Womens Party (GABRIELA)
discovered that the provincial certificate of canvass for
the Province of Capiz reflected only forty-three (43) votes for their party when it
actually garnered two thousand seventy-one (2,071) as shown by the Statement of
Votes.

The Chairman of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) of Capiz, Atty.

Nelly Abao-Lee, however, was quick to admit the mistake and promised to request
authority to immediately correct the erroneous entries in the certificate of canvass.
Subsequently, in Resolution No. 7158[4] dated May 19, 2004, the PBOC granted said
request. Thus, the necessary corrections were made.

Nevertheless, despite the correction, on May 21, 2004, GABRIELA filed a

Complaint against Atty. Nelly Abao-Lee, Rudolfo I. Beluso, Elnora A. Barrios,
Mary Grace Abagatnan, Sharon Barrientos, Demetrio Forel and Antonio Sobrepea
for violation of Section 27 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646, otherwise known as The
Electoral Reforms Law of 1987. On May 28, 2004, Director Alioden D. Dalaig of
the Law Department issued a Memorandum to Regional Election Director (RED)
Victor C. Gaborne directing him to conduct the preliminary investigation of the
complaint. On March 21, 2006, the said directive was issued anew to Atty. Tomas
S. Valera. The same directive was re-issued to the Acting RED, Dennis L. Agusan,
on July 22, 2006, or more than two years after. On March 30, 2006, Atty. Valera
issued summons to the respondents.

On April 21, 2006, respondents submitted their respective affidavits. In her

Affidavit,[5] Atty. Abao-Lee contended that it was only during the canvassing of the
NBOC at the Philippine International Convention Center (PICC) that she was
informed of the inaccuracies in the entries in the Certificate of Canvass of Capiz.
She claimed that the erroneous entries were made by one of the Boards support
personnel and admitted that she merely relied on the entries made by such personnel
without scrutinizing the accuracy thereof by comparing the entries in the Certificate
of Canvass with those reflected in the Statement of Votes.[6]

For their part, petitioner Beluso, the Provincial Prosecutor of Capiz and the
Vice-Chairman of the PBOC of Capiz, and Barrios, the Schools Superintendent of
Capiz and Secretary of the PBOC of Capiz, both claimed that the inaccuracies made
in the Certificate of Canvass were due to human error as admitted by Forel, one of
the tabulators of the PBOC of Capiz.

On the other hand, Abagatnan and Barrientos, both tabulators of the PBOC of
Capiz, alleged that due to voluminous work, the tabulators agreed that Forel and
Sobrepea, who were assigned to assist them, will be the ones to record the entries to
the Certificate of Canvass based on the actual votes appearing in the tally board.
Likewise, both admitted that they signed the Certificate of Canvass without further
examination and scrutiny.

For his part, Sobrepea, in his Affidavit,[7] claimed that he and Forel were
designated as assistants of the Tabulators team during the provincial canvass of the
May 10, 2004 National and Local Elections for the Province of Capiz. He and Forel
were tasked to record in the Certificate of Canvass the votes garnered by the
candidates. He narrated that he and Forel agreed to divide the workload to hasten the
recording of votes in the Certificate of Canvass. Sobrepea claimed that he recorded
the entries from the votes for president up to number 28 for Senators, while Forel
recorded the entries from number 29 for senators to number 45 of the party-list.
Thereafter, he proceeded again with the entries from number 46 for party-list
onwards. He maintained that the erroneous entries were made by Forel, as he was
the one assigned with the recording of votes for GABRIELA. Sobrepea asserted that
he signed the Statement of Votes in good faith, as he merely relied with the supposed
correctness of the entries and never intended to defraud the concerned candidates.[8]

Meanwhile, Forel, in his Affidavit,[9] corroborated the statement of Sobrepea.

He admitted that he was the one who recorded the entries from number 29 of the
senatorial candidates up to number 45 of the party-list candidates in the Certificate
of Canvass, while the rest of the entries were recorded by Sobrepea. Forel, likewise,
admitted that he made a mistake in recording the votes for GABRIELA. He admitted
that he erroneously entered the 43 votes of KALOOB to GABRIELA, instead of
2,071, which is the correct number of votes for the latter. He, however, stressed that
the errors were unintentional and not meant to defraud any party concerned.[10]

In a Resolution[11] dated April 26, 2007, the COMELEC dismissed the

Complaint for lack of probable cause to charge respondents, including petitioner
Beluso. However, it found respondents errors to be arising from sheer gross
negligence, especially on the part of the three members of the PBOC of Capiz. It,
thus, declared respondents to be perpetually barred from serving, in any capacity, in
any canvassing board of the COMELEC in any future election. The pertinent portion
of the Resolution reads:
Although the members of the PBOC are allowed to be assisted by
their support staff during the canvassing, the responsibility of preparing
the certificate of canvass falls exclusively upon the three members thereof.
According to Section 231 of the Omnibus Election Code as elaborated in
Section 24 (k) of COMELEC Resolution No. 6669, which lays down the
general instructions for canvassing in the May 10, 2004 Elections, the
Board of Canvassers shall prepare a certificate of canvass, together with
the supporting statement of votes. The substantial preparation of this
document cannot be left to a support staff by letting said staff copy the
figures from the statement of votes into the certificate of canvass without
the members of the Board personally checking for themselves the
 accuracy of the data so copied. It is in this regard that the members of
the PBOC failed in the performance of their assigned duties.

This total lack of exercise of oversight functions and supervision

by the three principal members of the PBoC over the work of their
subordinates in the canvassing body resulted into a haphazard and
mindless execution of legally sanctioned procedures. Although the
mistake was clearly not intentional the reckless negligence clearly
evident in the method of its commission the oversight committed by the
members of the board in leaving the sensitive task of accomplishing the
certificate of canvass to a mere supply officer and an eleventh hour
recruit, without double-checking the correctness of the entries made by
said supply officer, almost borders on criminal negligence.[12]

On May 11, 2007, Beluso filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration. He

argued that he is not negligent; hence, the penalty of perpetual disqualification from
serving in any canvassing board of the COMELEC was too harsh and unreasonable.

On November 8, 2007, COMELEC denied his motion for lack of merit. [13]

Thus, the instant petition for certiorari.

Petitioner advances the following arguments:

I
THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT ERRONEOUSLY FOUND PETITIONER
TO BE GROSSLY NEGLIGENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS
DUTY AS A MEMBER OF THE PROVINCIAL BOARD
OF CANVASSERS OF CAPIZ.
II

THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS COMMITTED

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT ERRONEOUSLY
RULED THAT PETITIONER HEREIN BE BARRED FROM SERVING
IN ANY CAPACITY IN ANY CANVASSING BOARD OF THIS
COMMISSION IN ANY FUTURE ELECTIONS.
 The petition lacks merit.

A special civil action for certiorari, under Rule 65, is an independent action
based on the specific grounds therein provided and will lie only if there is no appeal
or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A
petition for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and
proved to exist. "Grave abuse of discretion," under Rule 65, has a specific meaning.
It is the arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal
hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that amounts
to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in
contemplation of law. For an act to be struck down as having been done with grave
abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross.[14] Such is not
the case here.

Nothing in the records of this case supports petitioners bare assertion that the
COMELEC rendered its assailed Resolutions with grave abuse of discretion. Beluso
alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in perpetually
disqualifying him to serve in any canvassing board, yet failed to prove where the
abuse existed.

Notably, the apparent thrust of Belusos petition is the alleged error on the part
of the COMELEC in drawing its conclusions based on its findings and investigation.
Thus, in reality, what Beluso was questioning is the COMELECs appreciation of
evidence. At this point, however, it is not this Courts function to re-evaluate the
findings of fact of the COMELEC, given its limited scope of its review power, which
is properly confined only to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.

Moreover, the arguments in the petition and the issues alleged are only
possible errors of judgment, questioning the correctness of the COMELECs
rulings. Where the real issue involves the wisdom or legal soundness of the
decision not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision the same is
beyond the province of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.[15]

It is well settled that a writ of certiorari may be issued only for the correction
of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. The writ cannot be used for any other purpose, as its function is limited
to keeping the inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction.[16] The supervisory
jurisdiction of this Court to issue a certiorari writ cannot be exercised in order to
review the judgment of the lower court as to its intrinsic correctness, either upon the
law or the facts of the case.[17]

In People v. Court of Appeals,[18] the Court expounded, thus:

As observed in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,

et al. the special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The raison
detre for the rule is when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error
committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction
being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error
committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every
erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. In such a scenario, the
administration of justice would not survive. Hence, where the issue or
question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the
decision not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision the
same is beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari. x x
x [19]

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE ARTURO D. BRION

CASTRO Associate Justice
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions
in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court
 RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 142051. February 24, 2004]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE

COURT OF APPEALS (FOURTH DIVISION), CLAUDIO
FRANCISCO, JR. and RUDY PACAO, respondents.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Assailed in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the
judgment of acquittal rendered by the Court of Appeals dated December 29, 1999 in CA-
G.R. CR No. 16423, which reversed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pili,
Camarines Sur, Branch 32, convicting private respondents Claudio Francisco y Recto
and Rudy Pacao y Parone of the crimes of homicide and attempted murder, respectively.
The essential and uncontroverted factual antecedents are as follows:
Claudio Francisco, Rudy Pacao, Capt. Rodolfo Malbarosa, Pfc. Catalino Bonganay,
Sgt. Roberto Cana, Sgt. Virgilio Azucena, Sgt. Nathaniel Interino, Pat. David Valenciano,
Pat. Cesar Quiambao, Joseph Pellas, and Gabriel Alosan were charged with Murder for
the fatal shooting of one Marcial Boyet Azada in the following Information:

That on or about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon of December 2, 1989, inside the Le
Janni Restaurant, Municipality of Tigaon, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused
conniving, confederating and helping one another, moved by one common interest
and design to kill, did then and there with Pat. Pacao, using his service pistol caliber
.38 TM Squire Bingham with Serial No. 179896 issued to him by the Philippine
National Police as such member of the Police force of Tigaon and accused Claudio
Danny Francisco, Jr. likewise using a gun TM Smith and Wesson, caliber .38 revolver
with Serial No. 11327, with treachery shot one Marcial Boyet Azada y Garza while
the latter had both arms raised and his back was turned against accused Pat. Rudy
Pacao a means employed and consciously adopted by both accused to ensure the death
of said Marcial Boyet Azada without danger to their persons and thereafter with
criminal intent and design to conceal his (Pacao) criminal act did knowingly and
willfully altered, tampered and/or attempted to destroy his service pistol, while
accused Francisco did knowingly and deliberately planted the gun he used in shooting
his victim on the latters (Azada) body, all of said acts of the herein accused were done
with the sole aim and purpose to conceal and mislead the authorities as to the
authorship of the crime.

That while accused Capt. Rodolfo Malbarosa, Pfc. Catalino Bonganay, Sgt. Roberto
Cana, Sgt. Virgilio Azucena, Sgt. Nathaniel Interino, Pat. David Valenciano, Pat.
Cesar Quiambao, Joseph Pellas, and Gabriel Alosan are being impleaded in the instant
case as accessories under Art. 19 of the Revised Penal Code with grave abuse of their
authority as peace officers, with full knowledge of the criminal act of both Francisco
and Pat. Pacao, willfully, actively and knowingly cooperated, conspired and
confederated with accused Francisco and Pat. Pacao to conceal the crime and the
criminal thru the concerted efforts of all the herein accused by making it appear thru
their false narration of facts in the Tigaon Police Blotter and in their individual sworn
statement and/or narration of facts given before the agent of the National Bureau of
Investigation, all of these acts are contrary to law.

That due to the untimely death of the deceased Marcial Boyet Azada, the heirs of said
deceased suffered damages in the amount of no less than P500,000.00, Philippine
Currency, and have incurred expenses necessary and incidental to this case in the
amount of P200,000.00.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.

All the accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. On demurrer to evidence,
the trial court dismissed the case against Pfc. Bonganay, Sgt. Cana, Sgt. Azucena, Sgt.
Interino, Pat. Valenciano and Pat. Quiambao. Upon the death of Capt. Malbarosa, the
case against him was likewise dismissed. Trial on the merits ensued.
The facts as found by the trial court:

At about 5:30 oclock of the afternoon of 2 December 1989, at the Le Janni Restaurant
in the Poblacion of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, Azada was seated at the eastern end of
table 2 of the Le Janni Restaurant; to his right was Francisco, Jr.; to the right of
Francisco, Jr. was Gabriel Alosan; directly across Francisco, Jr. was seated Joseph
Pellas, who was to the left of Azada; while Francisco, Jr. and Azada were having a
discussion, Alfredo Alarcon tapped Azada to stop the discussion, but the latter told
Alarcon not to mind him, prompting Alarcon to withdraw to a seat nearby; Patrolman
Bonganay approached the group of Azada, and directing his words to Azada, asked
the latter to turn over his gun, simultaneously trying to hold the gun of Azada tucked
to his waist; Azada parried the grabbing hand of Bonganay, at first refusing to
surrender it, but Azada suddenly drew his .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver
from his waist, stood up, and placed the revolver on the table; Francisco, Jr. took the
revolver and pointed it to Azada, who raised both his arms; with both hands extended,
holding the .38 revolver, Francisco, Jr. while face to face with Azada, fired a shot,
which entered just below the left external auditory meatrus, directed backwards,
upwards and laterally, fracturing comminutedly the upper maxilla; the slug of that
first shot was recovered embedded in the sphenoid bone, right and was terribly
deformed (Exh. C-21); several more shots were fired by Francisco, Jr., but they did
not find their marks on Azada, he slowly fell backwards, grazing with his hand
Bonganay, but finally he fell back on a chair and landed on the cemented floor of the
restaurant; meanwhile, after the first shot was fired by Francisco, Jr., accused Rudy
Pacao fired three shots in the direction of Azada, one of which found its mark 23
centimeters from the left elbow, upper third arm, left directed forward, producing an
exit reentry wound just below the apex of the axilla, left, where a well-formed slug
was recovered; at the time Pacao fired his shots, he was about four meters from
Azada, and to the latters left; as Francisco continued firing after the first shot, he was
pushed by Bonganay; Francisco, Jr. then threw the .38 caliber revolver under the table
near where Azada lay sprawled on his back, with blood oozing from his mouth and
ears; Francisco, Jr. after the shooting stopped was cowering, bended with both his
hands on his head, and when confronted by Pacao, managed to utter the words, why
did it have to happen; Pacao after the shooting stopped, frisked Pellas and Francisco,
Jr. from whom no guns were found.

After Azada fell on his back, Alarcon approached him and cradled him, but he finally
left the dying Azada when he heard a voice from behind him telling him to leave
Azada alone as he was already dead, and warning Alarcon he might be involved;
Francisco, Jr. left when he was fetched by his sister, but Pacao and the policemen
remained behind, closing the restaurant, to the extent of preventing the widow of
Azada from entering it; a little while later, Capt. Malbarosa arrived; he recovered the
.38 caliber revolver and the improvised shotgun, .45 caliber type under the table near
where Azada lay.

At the time Azada was shot, he still had his .45 type shotgun tucked to his waist, and
he could have drawn it to protect himself from the gun pointed at him by Francisco,
Jr.

On December 3, 1989, Azada was autopsied at the funeral parlor by Dr. Alnor de la
Rosa, then medico-legal officer of NBI, Bicol, the result of which is Exh. C-21;
during the time Azada lay in state, the accused Francisco, Jr., Pellas and Alosan
attended the wake and the latter two even attended the funeral.
Marcial Azada is survived by his widow, Noela David vda. de Azada, and three minor
children, and by his father, Victor; his widow felt sad and suffered serious anxiety for
the future of her children, who are now deprived of support of their father; Victor
Azada felt sad and suffered a great feeling of loss at the death of his only son, and is
now without the helping hand of Marcial; he also paid for the funeral expenses for his
son, is supporting his sons family at the rate of P5,000.00 a month, and has spent for
his lawyers in the prosecution of this case to the tune of not less than P75,000.00,
exclusive of appearance fees of P1,000.00 for Atty. Rosales and Teoxon. [1]

In a decision dated February 7, 1994, the court a quo exonerated accused Pellas and
Alosan and convicted respondents Francisco Jr. and Pacao for homicide and attempted
murder, respectively, the decretal portion of which reads:[2]

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is hereby

rendered:

1. Acquitting Joseph Pellas and Gabriel Alosan; consequently, their bail bonds are
hereby cancelled; their counterclaims are dismissed;
2. Finding the accused Claudio Francisco Jr. y Recto, also known as Danilo and Danny
Francisco, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, defined and
penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentences him to suffer
imprisonment, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and crediting him with the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, ranging from Eight (8) years and One
(1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to Twelve (12) years, Ten (10) months, and
Twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with all the accessories of the
law; to indemnify the heirs of Marcial Azada the sum of Fifty thousand (P50,000.00)
Pesos, as indemnity for his death, actual damages of not less than P100,000.00,
moral damages of P100,000.00, and to pay proportionate costs;
3. Finding the accused Rudy Pacao y Parone, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Attempted Murder, defined and penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised
Penal code, in relation to Art. 6 thereof, and sentences him to suffer imprisonment,
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, ranging from Four (4) years, Two (2)
months and One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to Six (6) years, One
(1) month and Eleven days of prision mayor, as maximum, with all the accessories of
the law, and to pay proportionate costs.

The accused Claudio Francisco Jr., and Rudy Pacao, are credited in full for their
preventive detention.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the trial courts decision was reversed and respondents Francisco and
Pacao were acquitted of the crime charged.[3]
In justifying its decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the following circumstances
as indicative of the innocence of respondent Francisco, to wit: (1) the sitting position of
respondent Francisco, who was seated at the right side of Azada, made it impossible for
him to have fired the gun taking into account the points of entry of the bullets; (2) the
inability of the experts to identify the bullet and the source from which firearm it was fired,
it was unjust to conclude that the same came from the gun of the deceased which the
prosecution alleged to have been fired by respondent Francisco; (3) the paraffin test
conducted on respondent Francisco registered negative of gunpowder burns.[4]
In absolving respondent Pacao of any culpability, the Court of Appeals found that
Azada, instead of surrendering peacefully to the apprehending police officers, resisted
arrest and fired his gun towards their direction. Respondent Pacao was therefore acting
in self-defense and in fulfillment of his duty as a police officer when he returned fire at the
victim.
The prosecution, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, vehemently
challenges the acquittal in a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
arguing that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction in exonerating the private respondents notwithstanding the overwhelming
evidence of their guilt.
In support of its position, petitioner argues that the appellate courts finding that it was
impossible for Francisco Jr. to have fired the fatal shots because of his sitting position is
belied by the testimony of prosecution witness Alarcon that Azada, who was seated
obliquely to the right side of respondent, was virtually facing his alleged assailant. It also
theorizes that the negative finding of powder burns on Francisco, Jr. and the presence of
nitrates on the victim are inconclusive proof that respondent did not pull the trigger. It
surmises that the nitrates must have naturally fallen off together with Franciscos
perspiration or was deliberately cleansed by him. Petitioner also insists that the appellate
court erred in anchoring its judgment of acquittal on the inability of the ballistic experts to
identify the bullet recovered. It asserts that the appellate courts view was discredited by
the NBI agents independent finding that the bullet found was fired by Francisco Jr. using
the victims firearm. It likewise assails the appellate courts rejection of the incriminatory
testimony of prosecution witness Alarcon because of his subsequent retraction affidavits
executed on September 16, 1991 and October 28, 1991. Petitioner claims that Alarcon
retracted his accusatory statements against Francisco because he was pressured by the
latter to do so.
Two core issues must be resolved in the instant petition. First, whether or not the
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court is the proper legal
recourse for the reversal of the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals; and second,
whether or not an appeal of the judgment of acquittal by the Court of Appeals violates the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution.
The special civil action for certiorari is intended for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its
principal office is only to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or
to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.
 As observed in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al.[5] the special
civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction
and not errors of judgment. The raison detre for the rule is when a court exercises its
jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction
being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court
would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void
judgment. In such a scenario, the administration of justice would not survive. Hence,
where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the
decision not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision the same is beyond the
province of a special civil action for certiorari. The proper recourse of the aggrieved party
from a decision of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Revised Rules of Court.
While petitioner in the case at bar ostensibly alleges grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the discussions therein however ascribe to the
Court of Appeals errors of judgment, not errors of jurisdiction. Specifically, petitioner
delves on, among others, the testimonies relative to the positions of the victim vis--vis the
accused, and the opinions of the expert witnesses in respect to certain physical evidence.
Obviously, these are errors that goes deeply into the appellate courts appreciation and
assessment of the evidence proffered by the parties. These are findings that impinge on
errors of judgment and not errors of jurisdiction, correctible by a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court and not a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the said Rules. On this score alone, the dismissal of the instant petition
is called for.
In a long array of cases,[6] we dismissed similar petitions for erroneous application of
the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Specifically in the case of People v. Maquiling,[7] we
made the following observation:

It is quite obvious from the foregoing allegations that petitioner imputed grave abuse
of discretion to Respondent Court because of the latters supposed misappreciation and
wrongful assessment of factual evidence. However, as earlier stressed, the present
recourse is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. It is a fundamental aphorism in law
that a review of facts and evidence is not the province of the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari, which is extra ordinem beyond the ambit of appeal. Stated elsewise, factual
matters cannot normally be inquired into by the Supreme Court in a certiorari
proceeding. This Court cannot be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the parties
and analyze, assess and weigh them again, in order to ascertain if the trial and the
appellate courts were correct in according superior credit to this or that piece of
evidence of one party or the other. The mere fact that a court erroneously decides a
case does not necessarily deprived it of jurisdiction. Thus, assuming arguendo that a
court commits a mistake in its judgment, the error does not vitiate the decision,
considering that it has jurisdiction over the case.

Although Maquiling does not foreclose availment of the remedy of certiorari to correct
an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the lower court
blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to
dispense justice. In the words of Maquiling: if the petition, regardless of its nomenclature,
merely calls for an ordinary review of the findings of the court a quo, the constitutional
right against double jeopardy would be violated. Such recourse is tantamount to
converting the petition for certiorari into an appeal, contrary to the express injunction of
the Constitution, the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence on double jeopardy.
Likewise, in People v. Velasco,[8] it was held that Philippine jurisprudence has been
consistent in its application of the Double Jeopardy Clause such that it has viewed with
suspicion, and not without good reason, applications for the extraordinary writ questioning
decisions acquitting an accused on ground of grave abuse of discretion. It further noted
that the petition at hand which seeks to nullify the decision of respondent judge acquitting
the accused Honorato Galvez goes deeply into the trial courts appreciation and
evaluation in esse of the evidence adduced by the parties. This consequently exempts
the act from the writs limiting requirement of excess or lack of jurisdiction. As such, it
becomes an improper object of and therefore non-reviewable by certiorari. To reiterate,
errors of judgment are not to be confused with errors in the exercise of jurisdiction.
As earlier mentioned the circumstances of the case at bar call for a judicial inquiry on
the permissibility of appeal after a verdict of acquittal in view of the constitutional
guarantee against double jeopardy.
In our jurisdiction, the finality-of-acquittal doctrine as a safeguard against double
jeopardy faithfully adheres to the principle first enunciated in Kepner v. United States.[9] In
this case, verdicts of acquittal are to be regarded as absolutely final and irreviewable. The
cases of United States v. Yam Tung Way,[10] People v. Bringas,[11] Gandicela v.
Lutero,[12] People v. Cabarles,[13] People v. Bao,[14] to name a few, are illustrative cases. The
fundamental philosophy behind the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy is
to afford the defendant, who has been acquitted, final repose and safeguard him from
government oppression through the abuse of criminal processes. As succinctly observed
in Green v. United States[15] (t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least
the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and
power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an
alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing
the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty.
Noteworthy is the case of People v. Velasco[16] where the Court likewise dismissed a
similar petition not only on the ground that the acquittal of the defendant by the lower
court was not reviewable via the extraordinary writ of certiorari, but more importantly, the
grant of said petition would constitute a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Constitution. In Velasco, we clarified that in the absence of a finding of mistrial, i.e. the
criminal trial was a sham, as in Galman v. Sandiganbayan,[17] a judgment of acquittal is
final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy, whether it happens at the trial
court level or at the Court of Appeals.[18]
We are not inclined to rule differently. Respondents Francisco and Pacao, after
having been found not guilty by a court of competent jurisdiction, must be afforded rest
and tranquility from repeated attempts by the State at conviction and their anxiety finally
laid to rest. Their acquittal must therefore be accorded finality in faithful adherence to the
rule against double jeopardy.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Panganiban, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

[1]
Original Records, pp. 144-145.
[2]
Decision penned by Judge Nilo A. Malanyaon, RTC-Branch 32, Cadlan, Pili, Camarines Sur; Original
Records, p. 148.
[3]
Decision penned by Associate Justice B.A. Adefuin-De la Cruz, concurred in by Associate Justices
Fermin A. Martin, Jr. and Martin S. Villarama, Jr., Fourth Division, Court of Appeals.
[4]
Rollo, p. 40.
[5]
G.R. No. 129368, 25 August 2003.
[6]
Desamparado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 98045, 26 June 1996; Santiago Land Development
Company v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103922, 9 July 1996; Sempio v. Development Bank of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 115953, 28 October 1996; Chua v. Samaco, G.R. No. 112948, 18 April
1997; People v. Velasco, G.R. No. 127444, 13 September 2000.
[7]
G.R. No. 128986, 21 June 1999.
[8]
G.R. No. 127444, 13 September 2000, 340 SCRA 207.
[9]
195 US 100, 130.
[10]
21 Phil. 67.
[11]
70 Phil. 528 (1940).
[12]
88 Phil. 299 (1951).
[13]
102 Phil. 926 (1958).
[14]
106 Phil. 243 (1959).
[15]
355 US 184, 2 L. Ed. 199, 78 S Ct 221, 61 ALR 2d 1119.
[16]
Supra.
[17]
G.R. No. 72670, 12 September 1986, 144 SCRA 43.
[18]
See note 14, p. 238

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 129368. August 25, 2003]

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT
OF APPEALS, MAMERTA B. RODRIGUEZ, SPS. ARMANDO and
ZENAIDA STA ANA, EL OBSERVATORIO DE MANILA
INCORPORADA, SPS. WILFREDO and AURORA POSADAS,
REGINALD F. FRANCISCO, BIENVENIDO L. MACEDA, SPS.
HECTOR and MATILDE MENDOZA and EUGENIO V. ROMILLO,
respondents.

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before this Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court which seeks to annul and set aside the Decision[1] and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV Nos. 12533-35 dated November 12, 1996 and April 14, 1997,
respectively, reversing the Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 136,
in Special Proceedings Cases Nos. M-108, M-125 and M-126.

THE ANTECEDENTS

Manotoc Securities, Inc. (MSI) was a duly licensed broker and dealer in securities,
doing business and operating under the provisions of the Securities Act. The Insular Bank
of Asia and America (IBAA) and the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) are private
commercial banking corporations duly authorized to operate as trust companies.
IBAA and MSI offered and sold securities to the public. Among the purchasers were
private respondents Mamerta B. Rodriguez, the Spouses Armando and Zenaida Sta. Ana,
El Observatorio de Manila, Incorporada, Spouses Wilfredo and Aurora Posadas, Reginald
F. Francisco, Bienvenido L. Maceda, Spouses Hector and Matilde Mendoza, and Eugenio
V. Romillo.[3] As evidence of their purchases, the private respondents executed individual
investment agreements with MSI.
Under the said agreements, MSI undertook to invest funds primarily in a portfolio of
certain specified securities for fixed periods of time, and to return upon maturity the funds
of the investors and their corresponding share in the income of the same. As security for
compliance of its undertaking with private respondents, MSI, as the investment agent of
the private respondents, delivered qualified securities to the IBAA. Thus, on August 19,
1976, MSI and IBAA executed a custodianship agreement in which the latter was
constituted as custodian bank of the investment portfolio/collateral pool of securities of
the private respondents with corresponding duties and responsibilities thereunder
defined, some of which are as follows:

g) To sell out the portfolio in whole or in part upon failure by the Company to
deliver additional securities as provided for in Section 2.03 hereof, up to
an amount that would at least equal to the maximum security value of
 the Custodian Receipt outstanding and to hold such proceeds from the
sale as part of the portfolio under cash accounts until duly claimed (i) by
the Company upon presentation of additional qualified securities or
cancellation of custodian receipts or (ii) the Investor upon failure of the
Company to make such presentation, upon proper presentation of the
Investment Agreement together with the Custodian Receipt.

h) To do and perform such other acts and things as the Company may, by any
future instrument in writing delivered to the Custodian, require of the
Custodian, provided that such other acts and things are germane to the
intent and purpose of this Agreement. [4]

In case of default by the investment agent, the custodian bank as its attorney-in-fact
was authorized to sell so much of the qualified securities held in the portfolio and to apply
the proceeds thereof, thus:

Section 5.03. Sale of Securities Portfolio

The Company, by adhesion to this Agreement in the manner herein provided, shall be
deemed as having expressly in (sic) irrevocably constituted and appointed the
Custodian, as its true and lawful attorney-in-fact, with full power and authority, upon
the occurrence of an event of default, to perform the following:

a) To sell so much of the qualified securities held in the portfolio as may

be necessary to satisfy the amounts due and payable whether by
term or by declaration or otherwise such sale to be effected at
such time or times as the Trustee may determine, and any such
sale or sales may be made at a public or private sale in any
brokers board or securities exchange, or may be made over-the-
counter;

b) To collect and receive the proceeds of the sale and to issue receipts
therefor and/or execute and/or deliver such papers or documents
and perform such acts as may be necessary to transfer to the
purchaser or purchasers of the qualified securities so sold, all the
rights, title and interest on such securities.

Section 5.04. Application of Proceeds of Sale; Accounting

The proceeds from the sale of the qualified securities held in the Portfolio shall be
applied as follows:
 a) First To the payment of the costs and expenses of the sale, and the
compensation and other claims of the Custodian pursuant to
Section 3.09 hereof;

b) Second To the payment in full of the amounts then due and unpaid for
principal and income of the Investors investment upon the
maturity of the Investment Agreement;

c) Third To the placement of cash accounts as part of the portfolio so as to

maintain the aggregate maximum security value required to
cover custodian receipts outstanding pursuant to Section
2.03 and 3.01 (g) hereof;

d) Fourth Any surplus remaining shall be returned to the Company, its

successors or assigns or to whomsoever may be lawfully
entitled to receive the same.

The Custodian shall submit and render to the Company written statements and reports
of sales transactions under this Section, if any, fifteenth (15th) day of each calendar
month. [5]

MSI executed in favor of IBAA, conformably to the said custodianship agreement,

deeds of assignment, quoted in part as follows:

NOW THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises and by way
of security for the faithful compliance by the Company with the terms and conditions
of the Investment Agreement and pursuant to the Agreement, the Company hereby
transfers, assigns, sets over and delivers to the Custodian for the benefit and security
of Investors, all rights, title and interest whether legal or beneficial in and to the
securities more particularly described in the schedule attached hereto as Exhibit 1
hereof, and to such other securities as may from time to time be brought under the
operation of this assignment from time to time by way of supplementary schedules
hereto incorporated and made an integral part hereof by their terms of reference.

The Company hereby reiterates and affirms, as integral parts of this Agreement, all of
the warranties set forth in Section 4.01 of the Agreement, to which Agreement
reference is hereby made for the other terms and conditions applicable hereto. [6]

On December 12, 1979, MSI as trustor and LBP as trustee executed a contract
denominated as Substitution of Trustee with Assumption of Liabilities in which LBP
substituted and succeeded IBAA as custodian bank of the collateral pool of securities
under the custodianship agreement, and thus assumed the previous duties and
responsibilities of IBAA as custodian and safekeeper of qualified securities for the benefit
of the investors:

2. Also effective as of December 12, 1979, Land Bank has agreed to be substituted as
Custodian in place of IBAA under the aforementioned Custodianship Agreement, and
has assumed any and all liabilities of IBAA thereunder.

3. IBAA, upon the instruction of the TRUSTOR shall, under the mechanics to be
agreed upon subsequent hereto, transfer the custody and management of the collateral
pool to LAND BANK.

4. TRUSTOR undertake[s] to hold IBAA free from any and all liability which may
arise under the CUSTODIANSHIP AGREEMENT, referred to above, and agree to
defend IBAA from any and all suits which may arise by virtue thereof.

5. LAND BANK undertakes to collect all outstanding IBAA Custodian Receipts

issued pursuant to the CUSTODIANSHIP AGREEMENT mentioned above, and to
substitute its own Custodianship Receipts thereof within thirty (30) days from the
execution of this AGREEMENT.

6. LAND BANK further agrees to notify all investors of the fact of substitution of
IBAA as trustee of the collateral pool, pursuant to Section 3.05 of the
CUSTODIANSHIP AGREEMENT dated August 19, 1976.

7. The provision of Section 3.04-A of the said AGREEMENT relative to the

effectivity of removal or resignation of the trustee after the thirtieth banking day from
date of notice is hereby waived.

8. The TRUSTOR shall, upon the execution of this AGREEMENT, liquidate all its
outstanding obligations with IBAA, including but not limited to outstanding trust fees
and out of pocket expenses.

9. Upon the execution of this AGREEMENT, IBAA will render its final accounting to
the TRUSTOR. Any exception thereto must be communicated in writing to IBAA
within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, otherwise the same shall be deemed
conclusively correct. [7]

In the same month, Ricardo L. Manotoc, Jr. and Teodoro M. Kalaw filed a petition
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) docketed as SEC Case No. 1826
for the rehabilitation of MSI and the appointment of a Management Committee for the
said corporation to avoid an imminent danger of paralyzation of its business operations
brought about by serious financial problems. Teodoro M. Kalaw likewise filed a similar
petition with the SEC docketed as SEC Case No. 1835 for the rehabilitation of the Trans-
Insular Management, Inc. et al.and for the appointment of a Management Committee.
On December 20, 1979 and January 11, 1980, the SEC issued orders placing MSI
under rehabilitation and appointing a Management Committee as interim receiver of the
real and personal properties and assets of MSI, its subsidiaries and subdivisions. The
SEC issued another order on April 2, 1980 delineating the duties of the Management
Committee as interim receiver:

1. To bring and defend such action in its own name;

2. To take and keep possession of the properties in controversy;

3. To receive rents and other income;

4. To collect debts due to the corporations as receiver and all such funds,
property and estate, due to person or corporation of which it is receiver;

5. To compound for and compromise the same;

6. To make transfer;

7. To pay outstanding debts; to divide the money and other property that shall
remain among the persons legally entitled to receive the same;

8. To negotiate with any financial institution whether public or private,

domestic or foreign, for such funding and financial arrangement as may
be necessary to support the rehabilitation project and program. For this
purpose, the Committee or its duly authorized representative may sign
such documents and papers as may be necessary;

9. To make such reports to the Commission as may be decreed necessary from

time to time regarding the aforementioned projects; and generally to do
such acts respecting the property as the Commission may authorize,
including the authority to rehabilitate the said corporation, if possible.
[8]

Wilfrido B. Jacinto was appointed as Officer-In-Charge of the Committee.

On February 13, 1980, MSI wrote the LBP, advising the latter that the corporation
had been placed under rehabilitation, and that the SEC had appointed a Management
Committee to handle its affairs. MSI directed the LBP--

to suspend any movement, disposition or substitution of any and all properties you
now hold either, as collateral, security or custodian for the above-mentioned
companies as per the directive of the Securities and Exchange Commission. [9]
 On April 18, 1982, the private respondents, through counsel, wrote the LBP,
requesting the latter to return their investments with the MSI. The LBP referred the letter
of the private respondents to the Management Committee which on May 28, 1982
rejected the demands of the private respondents. On June 1, 1982, the LBP wrote the
private respondents that it could not possibly comply with their demands:

As what we have told you in our letter of May 20, 1982 we referred your demands to
the SEC-Appointed Management Committee which took over Manotoc Securities,
Inc. in view of the SEC order suspending any movement or disposition of any and all
properties of the company under our custody as per letter of Enrique J. Unson, Asst.
Vice-President of Manotoc Securities, Inc., and noted by W. B. Jacinto, Officer-In-
Charge for the SEC-Appointed Management Committee, dated February 13, 1980.

We are, therefore, attaching herewith a copy of the reply-letter from the SEC-
Appointed Management Committee dated May 28, 1982 which is self-explanatory.

Likewise, we would like to inform you that we shall be turning over all the
properties/securities lodged with us by Manotoc to the SEC-Appointed Management
Committee pursuant to the directive of the Banks top management to terminate and
close this account.[10]

On June 24, 1982, the private respondents acknowledged receipt of the June 1, 1982
Letter and informed LBP that as trustee of the investment portfolio, it held legal title over
the same. As such, the said portfolio could not be affected by any directives of the
Management Committee. The private respondents urged the LBP to--

desist from terminating and closing the account and turning over the Investment
Portfolio to the Securities and Exchange Commission as you propose to do, and we
hereby reiterate our request that you proceed to sell and dispose of the securities in
your custody for the satisfaction of the claims of our clients, without prejudice to
taking such action as you may consider necessary for securing a clarificatory order or
directive from the Securities and Exchange Commission regarding the scope and
extent of its alleged directive to you, or a reversal or nullification of said directive, as
the case may require. Needless to say, our clients shall hold you responsible for any
and all acts or omissions in breach of trust, and for any loss or damage which they or
the trust estate may suffer resulting from such acts or omissions. [11]

The LBP rejected the demands of the private respondents.

On June 29, 1982, the private respondents demanded for an accounting of their
portfolio.[12] The LBP, in a Letter dated July 20, 1982, informed the private respondents
that it could not give due course to the demands because as mere custodian of the
securities in the portfolio, it does not have legal title over the same. The demands of the
private respondents for the remittance of their investments and the earnings thereof, and
for an accounting of their portfolio was, thus, further rejected by the bank.[13]
In the meantime, the Management Committee proposed the appointment of
a permanent Receiver to perform the following:

(a) To liquidate the assets immediately for distribution to creditors and

investors without prejudice to the possibility of developing small but
viable real estate properties;

(b) To continue to pursue collection efforts and/or legal action against all
debtors;

(c) To run after the unlimited liability of the principal stockholders, Teodoro
V. Kalaw, Jr. and Ricardo L. Manotoc, Jr.;

(d) To call on the terms of the broker/dealer bond issued by FGU Insurance
Corporation;

(e) To file a case against a former company officer, Raul R. Leveriza, Jr. and
other parties involved in the fake title case; and

(f) To take proper action against the company and other parties for violations
of the Securities Act regarding the pledging of shares of stock without
the approval of the client-owners. [14]

Fearing that their investments were in serious jeopardy due to the abovementioned
developments, private respondents Mamerto B. Rodriguez and Spouses Armando and
Zenaida Sta. Ana filed a petition with the RTC of Makati under Rule 98 of the Revised
Rules of Court, seeking the removal of IBAA as trustee and the appointment of a
substitute trustee.[15] On June 30, 1983, private respondents El Observatorio de Manila,
Incorporada, Spouses Wilfredo and Aurora Posadas and Reginald Francisco [16] on the one
hand, and private respondents Bienvenido Maceda, Spouses Hector and Matilde
Mendoza and Eugenio Romillo,[17] on the other, also filed similar petitions. The respective
petitions of the private respondents were thereafter consolidated and assigned to the RTC
of Makati, Branch 136.[18]

ALLEGATIONS OF FACTS IN THE COMPLAINTS

The three petitions for the removal of IBAA as trustee of the investment portfolio
created under the custodianship agreements contained substantially similar
allegations. The private respondents alleged inter alia that MSI named and appointed
IBAA as the trustee of an investment portfolio, which was to consist initially of investment
funds solicited and obtained by MSI and IBAA from the issuance and sale to the public of
certain securities denominated as investment agreements and custodian receipts. [19] On
May 24, 1977 and October 4, 1977, MSI and IBAA amended the agreement under
instruments entitled Amendment to Custodianship Agreement. Under its provisions, the
funds of the investors in the investment pool were to be invested primarily in financing the
margin accounts of clients of MSI and other stockbrokers in the stock market, the payment
of which was to be secured only with certain specified shares of stock at 150% cover
and/or real estate properties at 200% cover, based on the latest available market
quotations on such shares and the latest independent appraisal of such real estate
properties.[20] The investment portfolio was to be held by IBAA in trust for the benefit and
protection of the investors therein, as security for the payment at maturity of the principal
and income due on their respective investments.[21]
The petitioner in Sp. Proc. Case No. M-125 alleged that on August 3, 1979, IBAA
opened Trust Account No. 576 and entered upon the discharge of its duties as trustee
when it received investment funds in the amount of P545,000 and accepted the
conveyance and delivery of 9,900,000 A shares of Basic Petroleum and Minerals, Inc.
and 5,990,000 A shares of Philippine Overseas Drilling and Development Corporation
under a deed of assignment.[22]
On August 14, 1978, LBP opened Trust Account No. 03-019 in its Makati Branch for
the petitioner in Sp. Proc. Case No. M-126. LBP entered into the discharge of its duties
as trustee upon its acceptance of the conveyance and delivery of certain securities. [23] In
Sp. Proc. Case No. M-108, the custodianship agreement was entered into on August 23,
1976, upon IBAAs initial receipt of funds in the amount of P1,074,558.66, and the receipt
of specified securities.[24]
As part of and in connection with the investments made by the private respondents
and other investors in the portfolio, and as security for the payment or return of the said
investments, IBAA as trustee issued custodian receipts to the private respondents,
certifying that it was holding in custody a portfolio of qualified securities with values
equivalent to the amounts of the investments, and acknowledged that its custodian
receipts, together with their corresponding investment agreements, constituted a lien on
the portfolio of qualified securities in its custody to the total amount of the investment
portfolio.[25]
Despite repeated demands made by the private respondents, MSI refused, failed and
neglected to pay over or return their investments as and when they matured, as follows:

a. P20,000.00 to Mamerta Rodriguez under Investment Agreement (IA) No.

4493 as of January 18, 1980;

b. P13,569.01 to the Sta. Ana spouses, under IA No. 3874 as of January 23,
1980;

c. P11,593.67 to Zenaida Sta. Ana under IA No. 4186 as of January 21, 1980;
 d. P11,241.07 to Zenaida Sta. Ana under IA No. 4265 as of December 5,
1979;

e. P13,579.29 to Zenaida Sta. Ana under IA No. 4312 as of January 21,

1980; [26]

f. P53,416.67 to Observatorio de Manila under IA No. 019 as of December 7,

1979;

g. P53,416.67 to Aurora S. Posadas under IA No. 015 as of December 4,

1979;

h. P309,133.11 to Reginald Francisco under IA No. 069 as of February 1,

1980; [27]

i. P135,005.00 to Bienvenido L. Maceda under IA No. 4231 as of December

10, 1979;

j. P120,000.00 to Matilde R. Mendoza and/or Bienvenido L. Maceda under IA

No. 4232 as of December 10, 1979; and

k. P40,895.56 to Eugenio V. Romillo under IA No. 4277 as of December 18,

1979. [28]

The private respondents further alleged that MSI failed to maintain the required
security value of the investment portfolio at a level equivalent to at least 100% of the
amount of the outstanding custodian receipts even earlier than July 30, 1979, and at no
time during the period between July 10 to December 10, 1979 did MSI deliver or assign
sufficient securities to bring the security value of the portfolio to the level of at least 100%
of the amount of the outstanding custodian receipts. Thus, the non-payment by MSI to
private respondents and other investors of their returns on the investment agreements at
maturity, and the failure of MSI to maintain the security value of the investment portfolio
as agreed upon, constituted events of default under the terms and conditions of the
custodianship agreement.[29]
The private respondents claimed that instead of being obliged to deliver additional
qualified securities to cover the recurring deficiencies in the said investment portfolio, MSI
was repeatedly allowed to effect the release or withdrawal and/or substitution of securities
which formed part of the same. IBAA likewise failed and neglected to declare the principal
and income of all investments then outstanding as due and payable, or to make any
serious and prompt demand on MSI to deliver additional securities. IBAA allowed MSI to
avail of funds pertaining to the trust, and to misappropriate and misapply the funds by
directly borrowing therefrom, and/or by extending loans to its parent and subsidiary
companies, to companies and enterprises owned and controlled by its principal officers
and directors or their families, and/or controlling stockholders, as well as to other ineligible
borrowers. IBAA furthermore allowed MSI to accept inadequate security, or to accept as
security unimproved real estate, or real estate of dubious value or with questionable title,
notwithstanding clear indications that such security was worthless, grossly inflated in
value, ineligible and not readily convertible to cash if needed to pay maturing investment
agreements.[30]
To prevent IBAA from declaring all outstanding investment agreements as
immediately due and payable, MSI wrote a letter on December 10, 1979 advising IBAA
that it was terminating the custodianship agreement effective that same date and that
LBP was assuming as the new trustee. On December 12, 1979, MSI and IBAA, together
with LBP, executed an instrument entitled Substitution of Trustee with Assumption of
Liabilities whereby IBAA ceased to act as trustee, and LBP assumed as its
substitute. Both the purported termination of the agreement and the purported substitution
of IBAA by LBP as trustee of the investment portfolio were sought to be implemented or
carried out without the knowledge and consent of the investors, without the benefit of any
accounting by IBAA, on its administration and management of the investment portfolio,
and without IBAA being discharged of its office and liability as trustee of the investment
portfolio by a court of competent jurisdiction.[31] In the interim, the SEC had appointed a
Management Committee to take custody of the properties and assets of MSI, to protect
the interest of the investors, creditors and stockholders, and to effectively carry out a
program of rehabilitation.
The private respondents prayed that after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in
their favor (a) ordering the removal of IBAA and LBP as trustee and substitute trustee of
the investment portfolio of the private respondents; (b) appointing Prudential Bank as
trustee in substitute of IBAA and LBP; (c) declaring as of no force and effect with respect
to them the Substitution of Trustee with Assumption of Liabilities executed by LBP and
MSI; and to --

1. Order IBAA and LBP to render to the court for approval a full, just and
complete accounting of their administration and management of the IP;

2. Order IBAA and LBP to restore to the Investment Portfolio whatever

losses, damages and injuries it may have suffered through their fault or
negligence or due to their failure to observe the terms and conditions of
the Custodianship Agreement and to perform the duties of trustee
thereunder;

3. Restrain and enjoin LBP from selling, disposing or encumbering any of the
securities or assets of the IP presently in its custody;

4. Order IBAA and LBP to turn over all the trust properties in their custody to
the new trustee and to execute any and all instruments necessary to
accomplish such purpose, and restrain and enjoin both of them from any
further interference in the administration and management of the trust;
 5. Order the forfeiture by the IBAA and/or LBP of any right of compensation
as trustee of the IP;

6. Order IBAA and LBP, jointly and severally, to pay petitioners damages by
way of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation in such amount as may
be considered just and reasonable;

7. Order the discharge or release of IBAA and LBP from any and all other
duties and responsibilities as trustee under the CA only upon full
restoration to the IP of all losses, damages and injuries it may have
suffered which are properly chargeable to either or both IBAA and LBP,
full payment of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation, and approval in
due course of their accounting of the administration and management of
the IP.

Both IBAA and LBP moved to dismiss/suspend the said petitions on the ground that
it was the SEC, and not the RTC, which had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
cases, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 902-A as amended by P.D. Nos. 1653 and
1799. Thus, conformably to Section 6(c) of P.D. 902-A, as amended, all claims against
the distressed corporation should be suspended upon the constitution of the Management
Committee. MSI, through its SEC-Appointed Management Committee, also filed a motion
to dismiss/suspend proceedings in SP Proc. Case No. 125 on the same ground. In behalf
of MSI, Ricardo L. Manotoc, Jr. filed a motion to intervene and a motion to suspend the
proceedings, also on the same ground. In their Reply, the private respondents averred
that IBAA and LBP were trustees of the investment portfolio, and as such, had acquired
title over the properties included in the same; hence, the distressed corporation was not
the owner of the said investment portfolio. Consequently, the SEC had no jurisdiction over
the matter.
The petitions were set for hearing, during which the petitioners therein (private
respondents herein) adduced evidence to prove their claim.

THE TRIAL COURTS RULING[32]

In an Order dated February 12, 1985, the trial court found merit in the motion to
suspend the proceedings pursuant to Section 6 of P.D. 902-A as amended. According to
the court, the allegations in the petitions indicated that although there was no prayer
specifically directed against Manotoc or MSI, the petitions were in reality claims against
the latter, or, at the very least, the disposition of the petitions would affect properties
belonging or pertaining to a corporation under management or receivership of the SEC.
In ruling for the petitioners, the trial court held that the SEC had primary jurisdiction
to the exclusion of the RTC, and that the matter of determining whether the agreement
was one of agency, bailment, or trust, should be raised in and determined first by the SEC
to the exclusion of the court. Since its jurisdiction was merely secondary, the authority of
the court was limited to reviewing the SECs final deliberations on the petitions. The
private respondents should have exhausted all remedies before the SEC. To entertain
the suit would open the gates to confusion, resulting in a duplication of proceedings
arising out of a conflict of jurisdiction, which could very well be avoided by respecting the
jurisdiction of the SEC.
The trial court resolved, thus:

1. Allowing Manotoc/MSI to intervene in all the cases;

2. Ordering the suspension and archiving of the case until after the termination
of the proceedings before the SEC in SEC Cases Nos. 1826 and 1835. [33]

The private respondents thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied on January 16, 1986. The private respondents appealed from the order to the
Court of Appeals.
The private respondents alleged on appeal that when MSI named and appointed
IBAA as trustee of the investment portfolio, it carried no other implication than that IBAA,
as trustee, became the legal owner of the funds in the investment portfolio. [34] Although
the SEC placed MSI under management and receivership, its jurisdiction extends only to
the properties and assets of MSI. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
should be applied only to those who, having gone to the SEC for relief, failed to avail of
and exhaust all possible remedies therein before seeking judicial intervention. The said
doctrine was erroneously applied by the trial court, as they were not parties to SEC Cases
Nos. 1826 and 1835.[35] While Ricardo Manotoc, Jr. may be a stockholder of MSI, he does
not have any legal interest in the trust properties involved in the proceedings; it is the
trustee who has legal ownership of the properties held in trust, subject, however, to the
equitable rights of the beneficiaries of the same.[36]
The petitioner bank, for its part, maintained that IBAA/LBP is a mere custodian of MSI
under the custodianship agreement with specific duties to perform, and as such, is only
an agent of MSI; it is not a trustee in the strict and legal sense, and does not hold any
legal title over the properties or securities.[37]
Manotoc, in behalf of MSI, contended that as one of the parties who filed the petition
for the appointment of a Management Committee and the approval of a rehabilitation
scheme for the said corporation and its affiliate companies, he has legal interests in the
matter in litigation sufficient to entitle him to intervene in the action. [38]

THE RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS[39]

The CA reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC. It held that IBAA and
LBP were trustees of the investments of the private respondents and not merely
custodians thereof; hence, IBAA and LBP had legal title over the property covered by the
said investments. The order of the lower court to archive the cases and to relinquish in
toto its jurisdiction over the actions initiated by the private respondents was
premature. The RTC should have resolved the motions on their merits and determined
whether or not the petitioner and IBAA were trustees of the investment portfolio.
The CA further explained that because of the existence of a trusteeship agreement,
under Rule 98, Sections 8 and 9 of the Rules of Court, the RTC had jurisdiction over the
petitions of the private respondents. The court a quo ought to have given due course to
the petitions as originally filed, and thereafter determine which of the reliefs sought were
available, in the light of the limitations imposed by the receivership status of the MSI and
the SECs jurisdiction over its affairs and the claims against it, instead of archiving the
petition and suspending the proceedings. Moreover, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
cannot be invoked as a pretext to bar the private respondents from seeking judicial relief
until the final resolution of SEC Cases Nos. 1826 and 1835, given the fact that the IBAA
and LBP were trustees of the portfolio of the private respondents. The CA further stated
that the RTC had jurisdiction over petitions for the removal of trustees:

MSI and its assets have been placed under a management committee assigned by the
Securities and Exchange Commission. We do not see, however, how this, of
necessity, cancels the power of the court, when it finds it meritorious and just, to order
IBAA to render an accounting to the beneficiaries. The doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, in fact, has a positive import, insofar as judicial authority is concerned. It
is this that Davis, an acknowledged American authority on administrative law,
propounds:

The purpose of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is not to divide powers between
courts and agencies, but to determine which tribunal should take initial action. An
agency which has primary jurisdiction may in effect merely lay the foundation for a
judicial determination. x x x The reason for the primary jurisdiction doctrine is not a
belief that an agencys expertise makes it superior to a court; the reason is that a court
confronted with problems within an agencys area of specialization should have the
advantage of whatever contributions the agency can make to the
solutions (Davis, Administrative Law, 381)

Seen as urged on us by Davis, some circumstances of the instant cases become

important: the investor-appellees worry that in the tangle of convoluted relations
entered into by MSI with IBAA and LBP, they have lost track of their investment and
worse still that IBAA, to their disadvantage, has not complied with the terms of the
trust. Coupled with the clear mandate of the Rules of Court to entertain petitions for
the removal of a trustee, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction cannot be invoked as a
pretext to bar the petitioners from seeking judicial relief. They have the right, at least,
to be heard by the court. It is for the lower court, after due hearing and after having
passed on the evidence, to determine which reliefs sought for are allowed and which
are not, in view of the receivership status of MSI. It cannot be right, however, for the
lower court to eschew any authority over the cases at all. [40]

The petitioner received a copy of the assailed decision of the CA on November 18,
1996 and consequently filed its motion for reconsideration on December 3, 1996. On April
18, 1997, the petitioner received a copy of the questioned resolution dated April 14, 1997,
denying its motion for reconsideration. Instead of filing a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, the petitioner filed on June 17,
1997 the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS

The petitioner avers that the CA committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that the petitioner was a trustee of the portfolio of
the private respondents and that the RTC had jurisdiction over the petitions of the latter. It
asserts that it has no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. As a mere custodian of MSI under the custodianship agreement with
specific duties to perform, it is only an agent and not a trustee in the strict legal sense,
and does not hold any legal title over the properties and securities. [41] The CA acted
despotically when it ignored the various documents showing the true relationship between
it and the private respondents.
The petitioner asserts that since it is not a trustee but a mere custodian, Section 8,
Rule 98 of the Rules of Court[42] is clearly inapplicable. Consequently, the trial court does
not have jurisdiction over the petitions filed by the private respondents for the removal of
LBP as trustee. Instead, the petitioner asserts, it is the SEC who rightly has jurisdiction
over the petitions.While cleverly denominated as petition for the removal of IBAA or LBP
as trustee, the petitions are, in reality, a mere sly scheme of private respondents to
implement the custodianship agreement between LBP and MSI through the
instrumentality of the trial court. Even assuming that the petitions are not claims or actions
against MSI, nonetheless, at the very least, their disposition would affect properties
belonging or pertaining to a corporation under management or receivership of the SEC,
and thus should accordingly be suspended, conformably to Section 6(c) of P.D. 902-A,
as amended. Since the petitions before the court a quo are in effect clearly claims/actions
against a corporation under management or receivership by the SEC which even private
respondents admit to have been placed under management/receivership due to, among
others, the alleged acts/schemes of its board of directors/officers/partners amounting to
fraud and misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the interest of the public, it then
follows that the trial court has no jurisdiction to entertain the same. Thus, only the SEC
has jurisdiction over the said cases to the exclusion of the courts. [43]
Petitioner LBP also states its willingness to perform its duties and obligations as
custodian bank under the custodianship agreement even without instigation. It, however,
averred that in deference to the SEC Order of April 2, 1980 which directed it to suspend
any movement, disposition or substitution of any and all properties held in behalf of MSI,
whether as collateral security or as custodian thereof, it is unable to do so. The petitioner
contends that it is duty-bound to comply with the order, considering that it was issued by
the SEC in the legitimate and valid exercise of its regulatory and adjudicatory powers
pursuant to P.D. 902-A. LBP reiterates that the petitions are part of a sly scheme to
implement the custodianship agreement between LBP and MSI through the
instrumentality of the trial court.[44]

PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARGUMENTS

In their Comment, the private respondents moved to dismiss the petition. According
to them, appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court was available to the petitioner and
that it was an equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient remedy in the ordinary course of
law, which consequently should have been availed of.[45] It is not enough for the petitioner
to merely allege that appeal is not a speedy or adequate remedy in the instant
case. Although the petitioner contends that it had to file the instant petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 to prevent it from further litigating the matter, it has not shown
that an ordinary appeal from the assailed decision would not have obtained the same
effect. As a matter of fact, as the private respondents assert, an appeal would have stayed
the decision by preventing it from becoming final and executory, from being entered by
the Clerk of Court of the CA in the book of entries of judgments, and from being remanded
to the lower court.
Precisely, where the remedy of appeal is available, as it was in this case, the
petitioner must interpose its appeal under Rule 45 within the reglementary period of 15
days from notice of the decision, or of the resolution denying its motion for
reconsideration. The private respondents vehemently argue that the petitioner cannot
allow the period to appeal to expire, and after having lost his right to appeal, seek to
regain it by recourse to certiorari under Rule 65.[46]
The petitioner admits in its petition that it received a copy of the questioned decision
on November 18, 1996 and filed its motion for reconsideration on December 3,
1996. Then, on April 18, 1997, it received a copy of the questioned resolution denying its
motion for reconsideration. According to the private respondents, it is clear from the
foregoing that the petitioner had 15 days from receipt of the resolution denying its motion
for reconsideration (April 18, 1997), within which to take an appeal to this Court. For
failure to do so, the decision and resolution of the CA became final and executory on May
3, 1997. It was, thus, too late for petitioner LBP to take an appeal or to file a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65.[47]
In the statement of facts and of the case in the petition for certiorari, petitioner LBP
makes reference to the following pleadings and documents:

a. Investment Agreements of private respondents with MSI (3rd paragraph, p.

2);

b. Custodianship Agreement dated August 19, 1976 (1st paragraph, p. 3);

 c. Order/s of the Securities and Exchange Commission issued in SEC Cases
No. 1826 and No. 1835 placing MSI and all its subsidiaries under
Receivership and Management Committee (1st paragraph, p. 4);

d. Petition filed on June 8, 1983 by private respondents Mamerta Rodriguez

and Spouses Armando and Zenaida Sta. Ana with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati seeking the removal of IBAA as trustee and the
appointment of a substitute trustee (2nd paragraph, p. 4);

e. Petition filed on June 30, 1983 by private respondents El Observatorio de

Manila Incorporada, Spouses Wilfredo and Aurora Posadas and
Reginald Francisco seeking the removal of IBAA (as alleged trustee) and
LBP (as alleged substitute trustee [sic]) and the appointment of a
substitute trustee (Ibid.);

f. Petition filed on June 30, 1983 by private respondents Bienvenido Maceda,

Spouses Hector and Matilde Mendoza and Eugenio Romillo (Ibid.);

g. Order/s consolidating the above petitions and their assignment to Branch

136 of the Regional Trial Court (Ibid.);

h. Motion/s filed by petitioner LBP to dismiss/suspend said petitions (Ibid.);

i. Motion for reconsideration filed by private respondents (1st paragraph, p.

5);

j. Order dated January 16, 1986 denying private respondents motion for
reconsideration (Ibid.);

k. (Notice of) Appeal filed by private respondents (2nd paragraph, p. 5);

l. Appellants Brief filed by private respondents herein with the Court of

Appeals (Ibid.);

m. Appellees Brief filed by petitioner LBP (Ibid.);

n. Custodian receipts (3rd paragraph, p. 10). [48]

According to the private respondents, most, if not all, of the foregoing pleadings and
documents are relevant and pertinent to the instant petition for certiorari, and are
absolutely necessary for a clear understanding of the facts of the case. The petitioners
failure to attach them to its petition, in violation of the requirements of Section 1, Rule 65
of the Revised Rules of Court can only be fatal to its cause, and constitutes another
ground for dismissal of the instant petition.[49]
Another argument relied upon by the private respondents is that one of the
conclusions reached by public respondent CA which is sought to be corrected by the
instant petition for certiorari is that a trust was created in each of the custodianship
agreements. This conclusion, even if erroneous, amounts to nothing more than an error
of judgment, correctible by appeal.The private respondents assert that the instant petition
for certiorari cannot correct errors of judgment, since it is confined to the correction of
errors of jurisdiction only, or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.[50]
According to the petitioner, the finding of facts made by the respondent CA as to the
transfer, assignment, set over, and delivery to IBAA and LBP of the securities in the
investment portfolios for the benefit and security of the investors should be conclusive
upon the Court, except only if shown to have been reached with abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, which petitioner has failed to do.
Even the claim of petitioner LBP that the disposition of the petitions for removal of
trustees would affect properties belonging or pertaining to a corporation (MSI) under SEC
management or receivership lacks factual basis. By virtue of the assignment of the
securities in the investment portfolios to the trustee banks, title and interest therein were
in fact vested in them, making them the legal owners of the same.
Anent the contention of LBP that it is willing to perform its duties were it not for the
directive issued by the SEC, the private respondents assert that the SEC Order dated
April 2, 1980 contains no such directive, nor is it even addressed to LBP. It is simply a
resolution placing MSI and its subsidiaries under receivership, and appointing the
Management Committee of the said entities as interim receiver of their properties. And
even if the SEC order had indeed contained an actual directive addressed to LBP to
suspend any movement, disposition or substitution of any and all properties of MSI, it
knew or ought to have known that an order so issued would be in excess of jurisdiction
and would not be binding upon it, because no court or tribunal can take property in the
possession of a stranger to the action who claims in good faith to be the owner
thereof. Furthermore, under the terms of the appointment, the Management Committee
was not given the power or authority to take over the management or control of assets or
properties not belonging to MSI. LBP, according to the private respondents, would then
be obliged, in the exercise of its duty as trustee, to defend the trust property from all
adverse claimants and to take the necessary action to nullify or set such order aside. [51]

THE DECISIVE ISSUE

The threshold issue in the case at bar is whether or not a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court is the proper recourse of the petitioner for the
reversal of the assailed decision and resolution of the CA.
The petition is dismissed.
 Section 1, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court reads:

SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting
such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or
resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and
pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the
third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.

A writ of certiorari has been called a supervisory or superintending writ. It was a

common law writ of ancient origin. Its earliest use was in the crown or criminal side of the
Court of Kings bench. Its use on the civil side later came into general use. [52] Certiorari is
a remedy narrow in scope and unflexible in character. It is not a general utility tool in the
legal workshop.[53]
The writ of certiorari issues for the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It cannot be legally used
for any other purpose. Its function is only to keep the inferior court within the bounds of
its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[54] It may issue only when the following requirements are
alleged in the petition and established: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board
or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or
officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[55] Excess of jurisdiction as
distinguished from absence of jurisdiction means that an act, though within the general
power of a tribunal, board or officer is not authorized, and invalid with respect to the
particular proceeding, because the conditions which alone authorize the exercise of the
general power in respect of it are wanting.[56] Without jurisdiction means lack or want of
legal power, right or authority to hear and determine a cause or causes, considered either
in general or with reference to a particular matter. It means lack of power to exercise
authority.[57]
The general rule is that a cert writ will not issue where the remedy of appeal is
available to the aggrieved party. The remedies of appeal in the ordinary course of law
and that of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court are mutually exclusive
and not alternative or cumulative.[58] Hence, the special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, where the latter remedy is
available. Such a remedy will not be a cure for failure to timely file a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45. Nor can it be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of
an ordinary appeal, especially if such loss or lapse was occasioned by ones own
negligence or error in the choice of remedies.[59]However, there are cases where
the cert writ may still issue even if the aggrieved party has a remedy of appeal in the
ordinary course of law. Thus, where the exigencies of the case are such that the ordinary
methods of appeal may not prove adequate either in point of promptness or completeness
so that a partial or total failure of justice may result, a cert writ may issue.[60]
In SMI Development Corporation v. Republic of the Philippines,[61] we held
that certiorari is available when the remedy of appeal is not adequate, or equally
beneficial, speedy and sufficient. The determination as to what exactly constitutes a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy rest on judicial discretion and depends on the particular
circumstances of each case.There are many authorities that subscribe to the view that it
is the inadequacy, and not the mere absence, of all other legal remedies, and the danger
of a failure of justice without it, that must usually determine the propriety of the writ.[62] An
adequate remedy is a remedy which is equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient, not
merely a remedy which at some time in the future will bring about a revival of the judgment
of the lower court complained of in the certiorari proceeding, but a remedy which would
promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of that judgment and the acts of
the inferior court, tribunal, board or officer.[63]
Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility,
and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.[64]
The special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors
of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The raison detre for the rule is when a court
exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the
jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed
by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a
void judgment. In such a scenario, the administration of justice would not
survive.[65] Hence, where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal
soundness of the decision - not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision - the
same is beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari.[66]
The proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a decision of the CA is a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. On the other hand, if
the error subject of the recourse is one of jurisdiction, or the act complained of was
perpetrated by a quasi-judicial officer or agency with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the proper remedy available to the aggrieved party is a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules. As expostulated by the Court
in Fortich v. Corona:[67]

Anent the first issue, in order to determine whether the recourse of petitioners is
proper or not, it is necessary to draw a line between an error of judgment and an error
of jurisdiction. An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the
exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal. On the
other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by
the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. This
error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. [68]

The supervisory jurisdiction of the court to issue a cert writ cannot be exercised in
order to review the judgment of the lower court as to its intrinsic correctness, either upon
the law or the facts of the case.[69]
The general rule is that questions or findings of facts in the lower court, board or
tribunal, and the probative weight and sufficiency of the evidence upon which the said
findings were based are not reviewable by certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
of Court. However, the sufficiency of the evidence may be inquired into in order to
determine whether jurisdictional facts were or were not proved or whether the lower court
had exceeded its jurisdiction. This exception arises out of the most important office and
function of the writ the keeping of the lower court and tribunal within their jurisdiction. If
the decision of the lower court as to the sufficiency of the evidence to establish
jurisdictional facts were not reviewable, certiorari would be of no avail as a remedy against
an assumption of jurisdiction. For the purpose of enabling the reviewing court to
determine whether jurisdictional facts were established, it may delve into and review the
evidence on which such facts were based.[70]

THE ERRORS ASCRIBED TO

THE COURT OF APPEALS IN
ITS DECISION ARE ERRORS
OF JUDGMENT AND NOT
OF JURISDICTION.

Inscrutably, the CA had jurisdiction over the appeals of the private respondents from
the order of the trial court. The decision of the CA was thus rendered by it in the proper
exercise of its jurisdiction. In its decision, the CA enumerated the following findings of
facts:

(a) the RTC erred in ordering the petitions archived and the proceedings in
said petitions suspended simply because of the pendency of SEC Cases
Nos. 1826 and 1835 and of the appointment of Management Committee as
interim receiver;

(b) based on the pleadings of the parties and the evidence on record, the
petitioner and the IBAA were trustees of the investment portfolios; hence,
owners and not mere agents of MSI;

(c) the investment portfolios are not assets of MSI;

 (d) the SEC had no jurisdiction over the investment portfolios held in trust by
the petitioner and IBAA;

(e) only those actions for claims against the distressed corporation are
suspended, but the petition for the dissolution of the trusteeship for IBAA
and the petitioner LBP to render an accounting of their stewardship of the
investment portfolios, and to pay damages on account of their mishandling
and/or defalcation of the same, are not suspended but may proceed until the
petitions are finally resolved;

(f) the principle of primary administrative jurisdiction does not apply in the
instant case.
[71]

These findings are mere errors of judgment and not errors of jurisdiction, correctible by a
petition for review on certiorari with this Court under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Hence, the petitioner should have filed with this Court a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 within the period therefor, and not a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules.

APPEAL UNDER RULE 45 OF

THE RULES OF COURT AS
AMENDED IS A SPEEDY AND
ADEQUATE REMEDY IN THE
ORDINARY COURSE OF LAW.

The petitioner avers that an appeal via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 would not promptly relieve it from the injurious effects of the patently erroneous
decision and resolution of the CA; the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 would
afford it a more expeditious and efficient relief. The petitioner also points out that if the
petitions of the private respondents were to be remanded to the RTC for appropriate
proceedings, the already clogged dockets of the trial court would be needlessly
exacerbated considering that it had no jurisdiction over the petitions.
We do not agree with the petitioner. A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Revised Rules of Court is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.It bears stressing that if the petitioner had filed its petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 within the period therefor, the assailed decision would have
been stayed. In such case, the petitioner could have raised issues involving questions of
law, such as whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the petitions of the private
respondents, or whether the petitions are in effect actions for claims as defined by this
Court in Finasia Investments & Finance Corp. v. Court of Appeals:[72]

The word claim is also defined as:

Right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated,
unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal,
equitable, secured, or unsecured; or right to an equitable remedy for breach of
performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right
to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured,
disputed, undisputed, secured, unsecured.

In conflicts of law, a receiver may be appointed in any state which has jurisdiction
over the defendant who owes a claim. [73]

THE DECISION OF THE

CA HAS BECOME FINAL
AND EXECUTORY.

The petitioner received a copy of the decision of the CA on November 18, 1996. It
had until December 3, 1996 within which to file its motion for reconsideration of the
decision. The petitioner did so on the said date and received on April 18, 1997 the
resolution of the CA denying its motion for reconsideration. The petitioner filed its petition
at bar only on June 17, 1997, well beyond the period therefor. Patently then, the decision
of the CA had become, in the interim, final and executory, beyond the purview of this
Court to act upon.[74]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV Nos. 12533-35 is AFFIRMED. Costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Hilarion L. Aquino, with Associate Justices Jainal D. Rasul and Hector L.
Hofilea concurring.
[2]
Penned by Judge Ricardo J. Francisco who later became an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.
[3]
CA Rollo, p. 301.
[4]
Folder of Exhibits, pp. 86-87.
[5]
Id. at 90-91.
[6]
Record on Appeal, p. 48 (Italics supplied).
[7]
Folder of Exhibits, p. 121.
[8]
Records, Sp. Proc. No. M-126, pp. 70-71 (Annex D).
[9]
Id. at 80 (Annex F-1).
[10]
Id. at 81 (Annex G).
[11]
Id. at 84 (Annex H).
[12]
Id. at 85-88 (Annex I).
[13]
Id. at 89-91 (Annex J).
[14]
Annex A.
[15]
SP Proc. Case No. M-108.
[16]
SP Proc. Case No. M-125.
[17]
SP Proc. Case No. M-126.
[18]
Records, Sp. Proc. No. M-125, p. 7.
[19]
Only in Sp. Proc. Cases Nos. M-108 and M-125. In Sp. Proc. Case No. M-126, the LBP had already
been appointed as the trustee of the investment portfolio. IBAA was not made a party to the case.
[20]
Records, Sp. Proc. Case No. M-108, p. 3.
[21]
Id. at 4.
[22]
Records, p. 4.
[23]
Records, pp. 3-4.
[24]
Id. at 4.
[25]
Id. at 5.
[26]
Id. at 6.
[27]
Records, SP Proc. Case No. M-125, pp. 5-6.
[28]
Records, SP Proc. Case No. M-126, p. 6.
[29]
Records, SP Proc. Case No. M-108, pp. 7-9.
[30]
Id. at 9-11.
[31]
Id. at 11-12.
[32]
Rollo, pp. 55-60.
[33]
Id. at 60.
[34]
CA Rollo, pp. 60-61.
[35]
Id. at 78-79.
[36]
Id. at 86.
[37]
Id. at 129.
[38]
Id. at 173.
[39]
Rollo, pp. 25-33.
[40]
Rollo, pp. 31-32 (Emphasis supplied).
[41]
Id. at 8.
[42]
Sec. 8. Removal or resignation of trustee. The proper Regional Trial Court may, upon petition of the
parties beneficially interested and after due notice to the trustee and hearing, remove a trustee if
such removal appears essential in the interests of the petitioners.
[43]
Rollo, pp. 14-16.
[44]
Id. at 17.
[45]
Id. at 74.
[46]
Id. at 122.
[47]
Id. at 75-77.
[48]
Id. at 78-79.
[49]
Id. at 79.
[50]
Id. at 80-83.
[51]
Id. at 86-89.
[52]
Conners v. City of Knoxville, 189 S.W. 870 (1916).
[53]
San Miguel Foods, Inc.Cebu BMeg Feed Plant v. Laguesma, 263 SCRA 69 (1996).
[54]
Silverio v. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 527 (1986).
[55]
Cuison v. Court of Appeals, 289 SCRA 159 (1998).
[56]
Conners v. City of Knoxville, supra.
[57]
Martin, Rules of Court of the Philippines, 2nd ed., Vol. 3, p. 152 (1969).
[58]
Sumndad v. Harrigan, G.R. No. 132358, April 12, 2002; Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage
Bank v. Court of Appeals, 334 SCRA 305 (2000); Rosete v. Court of Appeals, 331 SCRA 193
(2000); Republic v. Court of Appeals, 322 SCRA 81 (2000); Ligon v. Court of Appeals, 294 SCRA
73 (1998).
[59]
National Irrigation Administration v. Court of Appeals, 318 SCRA 255 (1999).
[60]
State v. Guinotte, 57 S.W. 281 (1900).
[61]
323 SCRA 862 (2000).
[62]
People v. State Treasurer, 24 Mich., loc.cit. 477; Inhabitants of Cushing v. Gay, 23 Me. 9;
Hopkins v. Fogler, 60 Me. 266; Spofford v. Railroad Co., 66 Med. 26; Edgar v. Greer, 14 Iowa,
loc.cit. 212, all cited in State v.Guinotte, supra.
[63]
State v. Guinotte, supra; Silvestre v. Torres and Oben, 57 Phil. 885.
[64]
De Baron v. Court of Appeals, 368 SCRA 407 (2001).
[65]
Supra.
[66]
New York Marine Managers, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 249 SCRA 416 (1995).
[67]
289 SCRA 624 (1998).
[68]
Id. at 642.
[69]
Hunt v. Norton, 5 ALR 2nd 668 (1948).
[70]
Ibid.
[71]
Rollo, pp. 24-33 (CA Decision).
[72]
237 SCRA 446 (1994).
[73]
Id. at 450, citing Blacks Law Legal Dictionary, p. 224, 5th ed.
[74]
Zacate v. Commission on Elections, 353 SCRA 441 (2001); Republic v. Court of Appeals, 322 SCRA 81
(2000); National Irrigation Commission v. Court of Appeals, supra.
FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-3535. September 26, 1907. ]

RAFAEL ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. FRANCISCO ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., Defendants-

Appellants.

W. A. Kincaid, for Appellants.

Hartigan Rohde & Gutierrez, for Appellees.

SYLLABUS

AGENCY; CONTRACT OF SALE; DEED. In an action to set aside a deed of land made by an agent in 1884,
on the ground that as to one half of the property the agent had no authority to make the sake, and as to the
other half that the sale was a fraud on the principal, it was found that in 1897 the heirs of the principal and
owners of the land made a contract with the agent by the terms of which they gave up their rights to the
land and accepted in lieu thereof the obligation of the agent to pay P2,500. Held, That in the absence of any
claim or proof that the heirs were induced to sign the contract of 1897 by fraud or deceit and of any attempt
to have such contract set aside, this action can not be maintained.

DECISION

WILLARD, J. :

The plaintiffs brought this action on the 10th day of December, 1901, asking that a deed made by the
defendant Francisco Enriquez as attorney in fact for his father, Antonio Enriquez, on the 12th day of March,
1884, conveying to Victoriano Reyes the property in question in this suit, and the deed executed by
Victoriano Reyes on the 5th of April, 1884, conveying to the defendant Carmen de la Cavada, wife of the
defendant Francisco Enriquez the same property, be declared fraudulent and void and be set aside.
Judgment was entered in the court below in favor of the plaintiff Rafael Enriquez, as administrator of the
estates of Antonio Enriquez and Ciriaca Villanueva, deceased, declaring the deeds above mentioned void and
ordering judgment against the defendant Carmen de la Cavada for the rents and profits of the said real
estate, amounting to more than 21,000 pesos. From this judgment the defendants Francisco Enriquez and
Carmen de la Cavada have appealed. A former appeal in this case is reported in 3 Philippine Reports, 746.

On the 5th day of March, 1883, Antonio Enriquez executed a general power of attorney in favor of his son,
the defendant Francisco Enriquez, by which the latter was authorized to sell and convey the property of
Antonio Enriquez. It was by virtue of that power that Francisco Enriquez, during the lifetime of his father,
executed the first of the deeds above mentioned. The property therein conveyed is described as follows:
"There tenement houses erected on land belonging to the owner thereof, made of brick and lumber and
situated on Calle Riberita, corner of Barraca, in the district of Binondo." It is now known as numbers 76 to
84, Calle Numancia. The consideration stated in the deed executed by Francisco Enriquez was 2,500 pesos.
The consideration stated in the deed executed three or four weeks later by Victoriano Reyes was the same
amount, 2,500 pesos.

A great deal of evidence was introduced in the court below relating to these two transactions, the plaintiffs
claiming that no money was paid by Reyes to Francisco Enriquez, now was any money paid by Carmen de la
Cavada to Reyes. A somewhat similar case (Naval v. Enriquez, 3 Phil. Rep., 669) was decided in favor of the
defendants. In this case, however, we do not find it necessary to resolve the question as to whether these
two transactions were bona fide or not, for we think that the parties afterwards, and in 1897, so dealt with
the property in question that the plaintiffs have now no interest therein.

The property was acquired by Antonio Enriquez in 1881, during his marriage with Ciriaca Villanueva. She
died in the lifetime of her husband, and the claim of the plaintiffs is that this property belonged to the
conjugal partnership; that upon the death of the wife the ownership of one half thereof passed immediately
to her heirs, Antonio Enriquez being thereafter the owner only of the other undivided half, and that when
after the death of Ciriaca Villanueva, Francisco Enriquez, as attorney in fact for his father, attempted to
convey all of the property to Victoriano Reyes, he, in fact, only conveyed an undivided half thereof, even on
the assumption that the sale was in good faith and for actual value received. The appellants claim that no
property can be considered as conjugal property until after the affairs of the partnership are liquidated, and
that, this liquidation not having taken place at the time of the conveyance in question, the property can not
be considered as conjugal property. We do not find it necessary to decide this question and will assume, for
the purpose of this case only, that the theory of the plaintiffs is correct and that upon the death of Ciriaca
Villanueva her heirs became the owners of an undivided half of the land in question.

The plaintiffs in this action are Rafael Enriquez, as administrator not only of the estate of his father, who
died in 1884, but also of the estate of his mother, Ciriaca Villanueva, who died in 1882, and some of the
heirs at law of both Ciriaca Villanueva and Antonio Enriquez. So far as the undivided half belonging to
Antonio Enriquez is concerned, the action is in effect one brought by the heirs of a principal against his
agent to recover property which it is claimed the agent sold in violation of the terms of his appointment, or,
in other words, property which the agent pretended to have sold but which, in fact, he never did sell.

So far as the undivided half belonging to the heirs of Ciriaca Villanueva is concerned, the action is in effect
one brought by them to set aside a conveyance of their property made by a person who pretended to have
authority to convey but who, in fact, had no such authority.

In 1897 the present plaintiffs, or the persons whom they represent, were all of full age and capable of
making contracts. It is very evident that, assuming all that is claimed by the plaintiffs, namely, that the sale
of the undivided half of the property belonging to Antonio Enriquez was fraudulent, and that the sale of the
undivided half belonging to Ciriaca Villanueva was made by a person who had no authority to make it, it is
nevertheless true that the parties interested, being, as has been before said, of full age, with capacity to
make contracts, might make a contract by virtue of which they surrendered their rights to the property in
suit; and the important question in the case is whether they did make such a contract or not.

It appears from the record that prior to 1891 the heirs had been in litigation among themselves over the
estates left by their father and mother. On the 22d of April, 1891, a document was signed by which the
heirs agreed to abandon litigation and proceed to the settlement of the estates in an amicable way. Prior to
that time Francisco Enriquez, the eldest son of Antonio Enriquez, had been, and then was, the executor of
his fathers will. The purpose of that document was to secure a liquidation of his accounts, their examination
and approval. On the 25th of August, 1896, the defendant Francisco Enriquez and the plaintiffs Rafael
Enriquez and Antonio Enriquez executed another public document in which they referred to the document of
the 22d of April, 1891. The document of 1896 stated the rules which should be followed in connection with
the examination and approval of the accounts. In pursuance of these rules, the three brothers who signed
the document met from time to time in the office or Moreno Lacalle. Minutes of these meetings were kept
and signed and some of them were offered in evidence in this case. Among these minutes so offered is that
of the meeting of the 3d day of November, 1897. The accounting and the examination was to, and did,
include not only the estate of Antonio Enriquez but also the estate of Ciriaca Villanueva, and it included not
only the accounts of Francisco Enriquez as executor of his fathers will but also his accounts as attorney in
fact of his father prior to his death. In the minute of the meeting of the 3d of November, 1897, signed by
Francisco, Rafael, and Antonio Enriquez, it is stated that the accounts are finally and definitely approved,
and in regard to the property still belonging to the two estates it is stated that "the inventory is approved in
accordance with the terms of the aforesaid draft" (proyecto de escritura).

The fifth clause of this minute is as follows:

jgc:cha nrob les.co m.ph

"Fifth. Rafael and Antonio Enriquez stated that, according to their belief, the dwelling house No. 9 Calle
David, the three tenement houses situated on Calle Barraca, all of them located in the district of Binondo,
and another house located on Calle Baluarte (or Fundacion) belonged to the estate, and in consequence of
such belief they requested that said property be included in the inventory. Francisco Enriquez replied that
the house at No. 9 Calle David was sold by his late father to his wife in consideration of the sum of 8,000
pesos, by a deed executed on March 27, 1883, attested by Miguel Torres, a notary public, a copy of which is
before the claimants. That the house on Calle Fundacion was likewise sold by his late father on a date which
is unable to state on account of the lack of necessary data; that the tenement houses on Calle Barraca (or
Riberita) were, on March 12, 1884, sold by Francisco, in his capacity of attorney in fact his father, to
Victoriano de los Reyes, for the sum of 2,500 pesos, which amount, plus 500 pesos, was sent in a draft to
his father through Manuel Enriquez. The letter of acknowledgment of the latter amounts as well as the deed
of sale are at the disposition of the parties claimant.

"In view of the above, it is agreed upon by the parties to include in the inventory neither the house No. 9
Calle David nor the tenement houses on Calle Barraca, inasmuch as the conveyance thereof was duly
explained. It is, however, agreed that the purchase price of the latter property be entered in the debit
column of the accounts of the administration, pending the presentation by Francisco of the vouchers relating
to the amount of said purchase price; and, as regards the house on Calle Fundacion, it is resolved to obtain
more data on which to act." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

The minute of this meeting was signed by Francisco, Rafael, and Antonio Enriquez. They thereby expressed
their agreement therewith. On the 20th day of November, 1897, a public document was executed in due
form before Enrique Barrera, a notary public of Manila. This document was signed by all of the present
plaintiffs, or by the persons whom they represent, either personally or by attorneys in fact, duly authorized
so to do. That document contains the following statement: jgc:chan robles. com.ph

"First. That by deed No. 537 granted in this city by the parties now appearing, Francisco, Rafael, and
Antonio Enriquez, on the 25th day of August, 1896, before the notary of the College of Manila, Jose Engracio
Monroy, which deed is hereby ratified by the said parties, each of them in their own behalf and on behalf of
the persons whom they represent (as stated at the beginning of the present document) agreed to the fact
that the estates of their deceased parents, Antonio Enriquez y Sequera and Ciriaca Villanueva, were pending
the formation of an inventory of the same, subject, in the first place, to the examination and approval of the
administrators accounts by the parties interested in the said estate, and, in the second place, to the
determination of the property belonging to said estates; and, in order to carry on both purposes and all
other requisites necessary for the division of the estates, among other particulars they agreed: (1) That the
said parties, Rafael and Antonio Enriquez, should proceed to examine the accounts of the estates
corresponding to the period from 1884 to the 30th of June, 1896, submitted by Francisco Enriquez as
executor of his father, and the account of 1883, submitted by the same person as administrator of his father
during the above year, which examination should be verified within a certain term; and, should any
objections arise, that the same should be settled in accordance with the rules laid down in the above-
mentioned deed; and (2) that the said Francisco, as executor, should submit to his brothers a statement of
the property, in order that the latter might examine it in the manner provided in the said deed.

"Second. That both agreement have been executed by the said parties, the above-mentioned accounts
having been duly examined by Rafael and Antonio Enriquez, who made some objections thereto which were
treated according to the stipulations, the same having been resolved by mutual agreement; and agreeing
likewise that the executors accounts from 1884 up to the end of June, 1896, as well as those of the
administration of the estate of the deceased Antonio Enriquez during the year of 1883, be condensed in the
following form:chan rob1e s virtual 1aw l ibra ry

ASSETS.

1. Amounts collected by Francisco Enriquez y Villanueva from

the beginning of 1883 up to June 30, 1896, as adminis-

trator of his father, Antonio Enriquez, during the first

year, and as executor of the same from 1884 up to the

said month of June $216,401.97

2. Sale price of a property consisting of three tenement houses

situated in the Riberita, Binondo, belonging to the de-

ceased Antonio Enriquez, which sale was effected on March

12, 1884, by Francisco Enriquez, as administrator of the

former 2,500.00"

This document contains also the following provision: jgc:c hanrobles. com.ph
"4. The parties interested in the estates of Antonio Enriquez y Sequera and Ciriaca Villanueva y Solis, and in
the name of all of them, the parties now appearing, with the respective representation claimed by each of
them, as stated, fully approve (errors and omissions excepted) the accounts of the administration of the
estates of the former during 1883 and those of the intestate estates of both deceased persons from 1884 up
to June 30, 1896, which service have been performed by Francisco Enriquez y Villanueva, as appears in the
said accounts as submitted and condensed in the form shown in second clause of this deed." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

There follows in the document an inventory of the real and personal property belonging to the estates to be
distributed among the heirs. The property here in question is not included therein.

These documents were before the court in the case of Enriquez v. Enriquez (5 Phil. Rep., 668). The
transaction relating to the house in Calle David was before the court in the case of Enriquez v. Enriquez 1 (5
Off. Gaz., 665), just decided.

The documents of November 3 and November 20, 1897, evidence a contract between the parties thereto. By
the terms of that contract the plaintiffs definitely gave up and surrendered all claim to the property here in
question and accepted in lieu thereof the obligation of Francisco Enriquez to pay 2,500 pesos therefor.
Francisco Enriquez, on his part by the document of the 3d of November, claimed that he had already paid
the 2,500 pesos, but agreed that if he could not produce written evidence to show such payment he would
pay it over again, and by the document of the 20th of November he definitely agreed to pay it, whether he
had paid it before or not.

It is said by the plaintiffs in one of their briefs that the settlement contained in this contract was never
carried out. So far as the approval of the accounts and the determination of the property still remaining
undistributed, there was nothing to be carried out. The contract was a final settlement of those questions.
By the terms of the document of the 20th of November it appears that there was a balance against
Francisco Enriquez, the executor, of 77,028 pesos and 63 centavos, but the document also states that this
balance was not in the possession of the executor because he had from time to time made advances to the
plaintiffs and the other heirs, and it provided that he should submit statements of such advances, which
would be examined for the purpose of determining the amount which each one of the heirs was entitled to.
This is what remained to be done under the contract, but it has nothing whatever to do with the settlement
of the question as to what property then belonged to the estate and nothing to do with the particular
property here involved. Why the amount of the balance to which each one of the persons was entitled after
deducting the advances was not determined does not appear in this case.

This contract, made between persons capable of contracting, is binding upon them as any other contract is
unless it can be set aside for fraud, misrepresentation, or other similar reason. The documents above
referred to were set out in the answer of the defendants and parts of the same were copied therein. The
plaintiffs did not, by an amended complaint or in any other way, attack the validity of the documents, nor
allege that they were not binding on them or that they were obtained by fraud or misrepresentation, nor did
they ask in any pleading to have them set aside and declared void. At the trial of the action Rafael Enriquez
and Antonio Enriquez, the persons who signed these documents for themselves and in representation of the
other plaintiffs, testified as witnesses. In their testimony the documents are not mentioned, nor was any
claim made by them therein that they were in any way deceived or defrauded in the execution thereof or
that such execution was obtained by any fraud or misrepresentation on the part of Francisco Enriquez. In
fact the documents are not in any way mentioned in their testimony. It is suggested that while the deed
from Francisco Enriquez to Victoriano Reyes was exhibited to them when the documents were signed, yet
the deed from Victoriano Reyes to the defendant Carmen de la Cavada was not so exhibited. Upon this point
these witnesses remain silent. They did not testify that at the time they signed these documents they did
not know that the property had been conveyed to Carmen de la Cavada, nor did they testify as to when they
first learned of this transaction. Rafael Enriquez said that he came here in 1896 and has remained here ever
since, and, as we judge from his testimony, his only object in coming here was to settle these matters. It is
apparent that he devoted practically his whole time from his arrival until November, 1897, in examining the
affairs relating to the estates. In his testimony he does not in any way indicate that he did not know when
he signed these documents all that he now knows.

It was alleged in the complaint that the value of this property at the time it was sold in 1884 to Victoriano
Reyes was 20,000 pesos. No evidence was offered by the plaintiffs in support of this allegation and no
evidence whatever was offered by them relating to the value at that time of the property thus conveyed. It
was, however, proven by the defendants that this same property was, on the 20th day of December, 1880,
sold at public auction to one Antonio Lorenzo Barretto for the sum of 1,367 pesos; that on the 7th day of
January, 1881, Barretto transferred to Antonio Enriquez all his interest in that purchase, and that on the
18th day of January, 1882, the then judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila conveyed the property of
Antonio Enriquez for the said sum of 1,367 pesos. Parol evidence was also offered by the defendants which
showed that at the time the property was conveyed to Victoriano Reyes in 1884 the house thereon were in a
ruinous condition and occupied by Chinese and that the entire property was worth no more than 2,500
pesos.

The contracts executed on the 3d day of November and the 20th day of November, 1897, are now binding
upon the plaintiffs. By the terms thereof they gave up and surrendered all their interest in the property here
in question, and this action, therefore, can not be maintained. The judgment of the court below is reversed,
without costs to either party in this court, and judgment is entered acquitting the defendants of the
complaint, with the costs of the first instance against the plaintiffs and in favor of the defendants Francisco
Enriquez and Carmen de la Cavada. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, and Tracey, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-1561 April 16, 1906

RAFAEL ENRIQUEZ, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
A. S. WATSON & CO., ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Gibbs and Kincaid, for appellants.

Charles C. Cohn, for appellee.

WILLARD, J.:

On the 13th day of December, 1901, the plaintiff, who was administrator of the estate of Antonio
Enriquez, brought this action against the defendants in the court of a justice of the peace of the city
of Manila for the purpose of ejecting them from the premises then occupied by the on the ground
that they were illegally occupying the same. Judgment was entered in the court of the justice of the
peace in favor of the defendants. From this judgment the plaintiff appealed to the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila.

Judgment was entered in the Court of First Instance on the 30th of April, 1903, in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendants, Watson & Co., ejecting them from the premises and ordering judgment
against them and in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of 29,200 pesos. The judgment of ejectment
was based upon the nonpayment of the rent due on November 1, 1901, under the terms of the
contract of lease by virtue of which Watson & Co. were in possession of the premises. The money
judgment was the amount of damages suffered by the plaintiff by the occupation of the premises by
the defendant after the 1st day of November, 1901. Watson & Co. moved for a new trial, which was
denied, and they have brought the case here by bill of exceptions.

On the 25th of January, 1901, Watson & Co. and Francisco Enriquez, the then executor of the estate
of Antonio Enriquez, made a contract by the terms of which the estate leased to Watson & Co. the
property in question, situated on the Escolta, in the city of Manila, for the term of twelve years, at the
monthly rent of 1,200 pesos. In the case of Rafael Enriquez vs. A. S. Watson et al.,1 just decided, it
was held by this court that lease was valid for six years. On the 1st of November, 1901, therefore the
defendants, Watson & Co., were in lawful possession of the premises by virtue thereof.

The rent for the month of November was not paid by Watson & Co. during that month. This action of
forcible entry and detainer was commenced, as has been said, on the 13th day of December, 1901.
On that day Watson & Co. deposited on court the rent for the months of November and December.

Various questions have been presented and discussed in the briefs of the respective parties, but we
find it necessary to consider only one of these. It is claimed by the appellants, Watson & Co., that
this action was prematurely commenced on the 13th day of December, because after the rent for
November became due no demand was made upon them for the payment thereof, and that thirty
day had not elapsed between any such demand that may have been made and the commencement
of this action on the 13th of December.

The first question to be determined is when the rent for November was due. Paragraph 3 of the
lease provides a follows:

The rent shall be paid monthly in advance in the first days of each month, in the following
form : Four hundred pesos in respect to the interior house to the agent of the administration
of the Obras Pias of the Sacred Mitre, under a receipt signed by him, and the remaining eight
hundred pesos to the executor-administrator of the estate who signed the present contract.

It is claimed by the appellants that the phrase "in the first days" of each month gives to the tenants
the right to pay the rent at any time during the first fifteen days of the month, and that no legal
demand can be made upon them until at least the fifteenth day. This phrase is indefinite, but for the
purpose of determining when the tenant was in default we adopt the meaning given to it by the
plaintiff in a supplementary argument presented to this court. He there says:

The month is divided into three equal parts, the names of which are, in the language of every
country in the world, the beginning, the middle, and the end, respectively.

We accordingly hold that in this contract the term "in the first days of the month" means from the first
to the tenth day, and that the tenants have all of the tenth day in which to pay the rent. No demand
was made upon the tenants for the payment of the rent on or after the 10th day of November, and
consequently they were not given thirty days within which to pay the rent after such demand, prior to
the commencement of this action. These facts bring the case within the rule laid down in Francisco
Saez Co-Tiongco vs. Co Quing Co,2 March 31, 1906, and the judgment must be reversed.

It is claimed by the appellee that no matter what the jurisdiction of the court of the justice of the
peace was, upon an appeal to the Court of First Instance the case became converted into an
ordinary action in that court, and the question as to whether the justice of the peace had or had not
jurisdiction originally, became immaterial. This question has been decided adversely to the appellee
in the case of Alfonso vs. Municipality of Placer.3

The judgment of the court below is reversed and after the expiration of twenty days let the case be
remanded to the court of its origin with instructions to enter judgment for the defendants, Watson &
Co., with costs. No costs will be allowed in this court. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.

 EN BANC

NORLAINIE MITMUG LIMBONA, G.R. No. 181097

Petitioner,
Present:
Puno, C.J.,
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Carpio,
Austria-Martinez,
- versus - Corona,
Carpio Morales,
Azcuna,
Tinga,
Chico-Nazario,
Velasco, Jr.,
Nachura,
Reyes,
Leonardo-De Castro, and
Brion, JJ.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
MALIK BOBBY T. ALINGAN, Promulgated:
Respondents.
June 25, 2008
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction seeks to reverse and nullify the September 4,
2007 Resolution[1] of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) in SPA Case No. 07-
611 disqualifying petitioner to run as mayor of the municipality of Pantar, Lanao del
Norte, as well as the January 9, 2008 Resolution [2] denying the motion for
reconsideration.

Petitioner Norlainie Mitmug Limbona (Norlainie), her husband, Mohammad G.

Limbona (Mohammad), and respondent Malik Bobby T. Alingan (Malik) were
mayoralty candidates in Pantar, Lanao del Norte during the 2007 Synchronized
National and Local Elections. Mohammad and Norlainie filed their certificates of
candidacy with Acting Election Officer, Alauya S. Tago, on January 22,
2007 and March 29, 2007, respectively; while Malik filed his certificate of
candidacy with the Office of the Election Officer on March 26, 2007.

On April 2, 2007, Malik filed a petition to disqualify Mohammad for failure to

comply with the residency requirement. The petition was docketed as SPA No. 07-
188.Subsequently, or on April 12, 2007, Malik filed another petition to disqualify
Norlainie also on the ground of lack of the one-year residency requirement. The
petition was docketed as SPA No. 07-611.[3]

On April 21, 2007, Norlainie filed an Affidavit of Withdrawal of Certificate of

Candidacy.[4] Thereafter, or on May 2, 2007, she filed before the Office of the
Provincial Election Supervisor a Motion to Dismiss[5] the petition for
disqualification in SPA No. 07-611 on the ground that the petition had become moot
in view of the withdrawal of her certificate of candidacy.

The Comelec en banc granted the withdrawal of Norlainies certificate of

candidacy in Resolution No. 7949[6] dated May 13, 2007, the dispositive portion of
which provides:

The Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to approve the

foregoing recommendations of the Law Department, as concurred in by
Commissioner Florentino A. Tuason, Jr., as follows:

1. To GIVE due course to the Affidavits of Withdrawal of Certificates of

Candidacy of the following candidates:

xxxx

Norlaine M. Limbona Mayor Pantar, Lanao del Norte

 xxxx

2. To direct the Election Officers concerned to DELETE the aforementioned

names of candidates from the Certified List of Candidates.

Let the Law Department implement this resolution with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

Meanwhile, the First Division of Comelec issued on May 24, 2007 a Resolution[7] in
SPA No. 07-188 granting the petition filed by Malik and disqualifying Mohammad
from running as municipal mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte for failing to satisfy
the one year residency requirement and for not being a registered voter of the said
place, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is

GRANTED. Respondent Mohammad Exchan G. Limbona is hereby
disqualified. Accordingly, his name is ordered deleted from the official list of
candidates for the position of mayor of the municipality of Pantar, Lanao del Norte.

SO ORDERED.
The May 24, 2007 Resolution became final and executory on June 2, 2007.[8]

Consequently, Norlainie filed a new certificate of candidacy as substitute candidate

for Mohammad which was given due course by the Comelec en banc in its
Resolution No. 8255[9] dated July 23, 2007, the dispositive portion of which states:

The Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to approve the

foregoing recommendations of the Law Department, as follows:

1. To GIVE due course to the Certificate of Candidacy and Certificate of

Nomination and Acceptance of Norlainie Lai-Exchan Mitmug
Limbona as substitute candidate for Mohammad Exchan G. Limbona for
Mayor, Pantar, Lanao del Norte; and

2. To direct the Election Officer of Pantar, Lanao del Norte to DELETE the name
of Mohammad Exchan G. Limbona from the Certified List of Candidates
for Mayor, Pantar, Lanao del Norte and to INCLUDE therein the name
of Norlainie Lai-Exchan Mitmug Limbona.

Let the Law Department implement this resolution with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.
Thus, Malik filed a second petition for disqualification against Norlainie docketed
as SPA No. 07-621.

After the elections, Norlainie emerged as the winning candidate and accordingly
took her oath and assumed office.

However, on September 4, 2007, the Second Division of Comelec in SPA No. 07-
611 disqualified Norlainie on three grounds: lack of the one-year residency
requirement; not being a registered voter of the municipality; and, nullity of her
certificate of candidacy for having been filed at a place other than the Office of the
Election Officer.

Norlainie filed an Omnibus Motion to declare the petition in SPA No. 07-611
moot and/or for reconsideration, arguing that the Comelec en banc had approved the
withdrawal of her first certificate of candidacy and had given due course to her new
certificate of candidacy as a substitute candidate for Mohammad. Malik opposed the
omnibus motion.

Meanwhile, the Second Division of Comelec in SPA No. 07-621, promulgated on

November 23, 2007 a Resolution[10] disqualifying Norlainie from running as mayor
of Pantar, Lanao del Norte. It held thus:

As regards the residency requirement, We rule for petitioner.

As borne out from the record, respondents domicile of origin was in Maguing,
Lanao del Norte, which is her place of birth. When she got married, she became a
resident of Marawi City, specifically, in Barangay Rapasun where her husband
served as Barangay Chairman until November 2006. This is her domicile by
operation of law pursuant to the Family Code as applied in the case of Larrazabal
v. Comelec (G.R. No. 100739, September 3, 1991).

What respondent now is trying to impress upon Us is that she has changed
her aforesaid domicile and resided in Pantar, Lanao del Norte. x x x

In the present case, the evidence adduced by respondent, which consists

merely of self-serving affidavits cannot persuade Us that she has abandoned her
domicile of origin or her domicile in Marawi City. It is alleged that respondent has
been staying, sleeping and doing business in her house for more than 20
 months in Lower Kalanganan and yet, there is no independent and competent
evidence that would corroborate such statement.

Further, We find no other act that would indicate respondents intention to

stay in Pantar for an indefinite period of time. The filing of her Certificate of
Candidacy in Pantar, standing alone, is not sufficient to hold that she has chosen
Pantar as her new residence. We also take notice of the fact that in SPA No. 07-
611, this Commission has even found that she is not a registered voter in the said
municipality warranting her disqualification as a candidate.[11]

On January 9, 2008, the Comelec en banc in SPA No. 07-611 denied Norlainies
motion for reconsideration.

Hence, the instant petition alleging that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in
proceeding to resolve the petition in SPA No. 07-611 despite the approval of
petitioners withdrawal of certificate of candidacy.[12]

On January 29, 2008, the Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order
effective immediately enjoining respondents from enforcing and implementing the
Comelec Resolutions disqualifying petitioner as a candidate for mayor in Pantar,
Lanao del Norte.[13]

The petition lacks merit.

The withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy does not necessarily render the

certificate void ab initio. Once filed, the permanent legal effects produced thereby
remain even if the certificate itself be subsequently withdrawn.[14] Section 73 of the
Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881, as amended) provides:

Sec. 73. Certificate of candidacy. No person shall be eligible for any

elective public office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the
period fixed herein. A person who has filed a certificate of candidacy may, prior
to the election, withdraw the same by submitting to the office concerned a
written declaration under oath. No person shall be eligible for more than one
office to be filled in the same election, and if he files his certificate of candidacy
for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for any of them. However, before
the expiration of the period for the filing of certificate of candidacy, the person who
has filed more than one certificate of candidacy may declare under oath the office
for which he desires to be eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the
other office or offices. The filing or withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy
 shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a
candidate may have incurred. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, when petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy on March 29, 2007, such act
produced legal effects, and the withdrawal of the same, despite the approval of the
Comelec, did not bar or render nugatory the legal proceedings it had set in
motion. As such, the Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it ruled
on the merits of the petition despite the withdrawal of petitioners certificate of
candidacy. The Comelec correctly held that a case only becomes moot when there
is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served
in passing upon the merits.[15] In the instant case, although petitioner withdrew her
first certificate of candidacy, the subsequent disqualification of her husband required
that she file a new certificate of candidacy as a substitute candidate. The second
filing of a certificate of candidacy thus once again put her qualifications in
issue. Hence, a ruling upon the same is necessary.

The fact that petitioners certificate of candidacy as a substitute candidate was given
due course by the Comelec did not bar the Comelec from deciding on her
qualifications to run as municipal mayor. As correctly found by the Comelec:

Said resolution (Comelec Resolution No. 8255) discloses only the

following: a) movant is given the green lights to be the substitute candidate for her
husband who was disqualified; b) her certificate of candidacy was duly
accomplished in form and substance and c) the certificate of candidacy will not
cause confusion among the voters. Clearly, no issue of disqualification was passed
upon by the Commission in the said resolution.

Movant may have been given the impression that the Commissions act of
giving due course to her substitute certificate of candidacy constitutes a
pronouncement that she is not disqualified. It must be pointed out, however, that
the bases for giving due course to a certificate of candidacy are totally different
from those for enunciating that the candidate is not disqualified. x x x[16]

Moreover, the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646) authorizes the
Commission (Comelec) to try and decide petitions for disqualifications even after
the elections,[17] thus:

SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been

declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes
 cast for him shall not be counted.If for any reason a candidate is not declared by
final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis ours)

As such, the Comelec did not err when it continued with the trial and hearing of the
petition for disqualification.
The Comelec correctly found that petitioner failed to satisfy the one-year
residency requirement. The term residence as used in the election law is synonymous
with domicile, which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention.[18] The manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is to
exclude a stranger or newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a
community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that
community.[19]

For purposes of election law, the question of residence is mainly one of

intention. There is no hard and fast rule by which to determine where a person
actually resides.[20] Three rules are, however, well established: first, that a man must
have a residence or domicile somewhere; second, that where once established it
remains until a new one is acquired; and third, a man can have but one domicile at a
time.[21]

In order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or

bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an
intention to abandon the old domicile.[22] A persons domicile once established is
considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established.[23]

To successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual

removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the
former place of residence and establishing a new one, and definite acts which
correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must basically be animus
manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the
domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence
must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must
be actual.[24]

Petitioners claim that she has been physically present and actually residing in Pantar
for almost 20 months prior to the elections,[25] is self-serving and unsubstantiated. As
correctly observed by the Comelec:
In the present case, the evidence adduced by respondent, which consists
merely of self-serving affidavits cannot persuade Us that she has abandoned her
domicile of origin or her domicile in Marawi City. It is alleged that respondent has
been staying, sleeping and doing business in her house for more than 20
months in Lower Kalanganan and yet, there is no independent and competent
evidence that would corroborate such statement.

Further, We find no other act that would indicate respondents intention to

stay in Pantar for an indefinite period of time. The filing of her Certificate of
Candidacy in Pantar, standing alone, is not sufficient to hold that she has chosen
Pantar as her new residence. We also take notice of the fact that in SPA No. 07-
611, this Commission has even found that she is not a registered voter in the said
municipality warranting her disqualification as a candidate.[26]

We note the findings of the Comelec that petitioners domicile of origin is

Maguing, Lanao del Norte,[27] which is also her place of birth; and that her domicile
by operation of law (by virtue of marriage) is Rapasun, Marawi City. The Comelec
found that Mohammad, petitioners husband, effected the change of his domicile in
favor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte only on November 11, 2006. Since it is presumed
that the husband and wife live together in one legal residence,[28] then it follows that
petitioner effected the change of her domicile also on November 11, 2006. Articles
68 and 69 of the Family Code provide:

Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.

Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of
disagreement, the court shall decide. The court may exempt one spouse from
living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid
and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not
apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family. (Emphasis
ours)
 Considering that petitioner failed to show that she maintained a separate
residence from her husband, and as there is no evidence to prove otherwise, reliance
on these provisions of the Family Code is proper and is in consonance with human
experience.[29]
Thus, for failure to comply with the residency requirement, petitioner is
disqualified to run for the office of mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte. However,
petitioners disqualification would not result in Maliks proclamation who came in
second during the special election.

The rules on succession under the Local Government Code shall apply, to wit:

SECTION 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-

Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of
the xxx mayor, the xxx vice-mayor concerned shall become the xxx mayor.

xxxx

For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective

local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify
or is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently
incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.
x x x x (Emphasis ours)

Considering the disqualification of petitioner to run as mayor of Pantar, Lanao

del Norte, the proclaimed Vice-Mayor shall then succeed as mayor.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The September 4,

2007 Resolution of the Commission on Elections in SPA Case No. 07-611
disqualifying petitioner Norlainie Mitmug Limbona from running for office of the
Mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte, and the January 9, 2008 Resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. In view of the permanent vacancy in
the Office of the Mayor, the proclaimed Vice-Mayor shall SUCCEED as
Mayor. The temporary restraining order issued on January 29, 2008 is
ordered LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.
 CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified

that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1]
Rollo, pp. 30-36; penned by Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento and concurred in by Commissioners Florentino A.
Tuason, Jr. and Nicodemo T. Ferrer.
[2]
Id. at 39-43; signed by Acting Chairman Resurreccion Z. Borra and Commissioners Florentino A. Tuason, Jr.,
Romeo A. Brawner, Rene V. Sarmiento, Nicodemo T. Ferrer, and Moslemen T. Macarambon.
[3]
Id. at 106-115.
[4]
Id. at 157.
[5]
Id. at 155-156.
[6]
Id. at 198-200.
[7]
Annex 1 of Comment. Per Commissioners Resurreccion Z. Borra and Romeo A. Brawner.
[8]
Per Order of the COMELEC En Banc dated July 19, 2007. See Annex 2 to the Comment.
[9]
Rollo, pp. 152-154.
[10]
Annex 4 of Comment.
[11]
Annex 4-D to 4-E of Comment.
[12]
Rollo, p. 5.
[13]
Id. at 211.
[14]
Monroy v. Court of Appeals, 127 Phil. 1, 6 (1967).
[15]
Enrile v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 132986, May 19, 2004, 428 SCRA 472, 477.
[16]
Rollo, p. 41.
[17]
Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 327 Phil. 521, 568 (1996).
[18]
Gallego v. Verra, 73 Phil 453, 456 (1941).
[19]
Id. at 458.
[20]
Alcantara v. Secretary of Interior, 61 Phil 459, 465 (1935).
[21]
Id.
[22]
Gallego v. Verra, supra.
[23]
Domino v. Commission on Elections, 369 Phil. 798, 819 (1999).
[24]
Id.
[25]
Rollo, p. 18.
[26]
Annex 4-E of Comment.
[27]
Should be Lanao del Sur.
[28]
Abella v. Comelec, G.R. Nos. 100710 & 100739, September 3, 1991, 201 SCRA 259, 264.
[29]
Id. at 262.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 132986. May 19, 2004]

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner, vs. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

and AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR., respondents.

DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, assailing for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion Resolution 97-22 denying petitioners Motion to Annul/Set Aside
[1]

Partial Results in Pimentels Protest and to Conduct Another Appreciation of

Ballots in the Presence of All Parties; and Resolution No. 98-02 denying his [2]

motion for reconsideration in SET Case No. 001-95, Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. vs.
Gregorio B. Honasan, et al.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
 On January 20, 1995, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, private respondent herein,
filed with the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) an election protest against
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, petitioner, and other senatorial candidates who won
in the May 1995 senatorial elections, docketed as SET Case No. 001-95.
On June 30, 1995, petitioner filed his answer with counter-protest. Issues
having been joined, the SET required the parties to submit the list of pilot
precincts numbering not more that 25% of the total precincts involved in
respondents protest.
Subsequently, the SET conducted the revision of ballots in the pilot
precincts, namely: Paoay, Ilocos Norte; Tarlac, Tarlac; Tawi-Tawi;
Maguindanao; Sulu; Bulacan; Lanao del Sur; Lanao del Norte; Pasig City; Bian,
Laguna; Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija; Pangasinan; Agusan del Sur and Agusan del
Norte. Thereafter, the SET directed the parties to submit their evidence and
memoranda.
On August 21, 1997, the SET, without resolving the election protest, held a
press conference at the Supreme Court Session Hall announcing the partial
and tentative results of the revision of ballots in the pilot precincts. A press
release entitled Partial Results in Pimentels Protest was then issued
[3]

accompanied by the tabulation of votes for the parties. In the said tabulation,
the name of petitioner dropped from number 11 to number 15. [4]

On September 24, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion to Set Aside Partial

Results in Pimentels Protest and to Conduct Another Appreciation of Ballots in
the Presence of All Parties. Petitioner alleged that the partial results were
[5]

manifestly erroneous. The SET then issued Resolution No. 97-20 requiring all
the parties to file their respective comments on petitioners motion. Only
respondent and Senator Nikki Coseteng filed their separate comments alleging,
among others, that petitioners motion is premature considering that the SET
has not yet resolved respondents election protest.
In its assailed Resolution No. 97-22, the SET admitted there was an
oversight, hence, the tally of votes for Paoay, Ilocos Norte should be
made. Consequently, the 30,000 votes deducted by the SET from those
garnered by petitioner were given back to him.
Nevertheless, the SET denied petitioners motion, holding that there is no
sufficient basis to discard its partial tabulation.

The Tribunal took pains in reviewing its records and hereby acknowledges that an
adjustment should be made in the tally of votes for the Municipality of Paoay, Ilocos
Norte. However, the Tribunal alone should not be faulted for this oversight. Although
the Regional Tally for Region I was offered in evidence by the Protestant, Protestee
Enrile, far from claming that the same reflected the accurate number of votes garnered
by the senatorial candidates, even went to the extent of objecting to its admissibility.

In the province of Ilocos Norte, the vote total of Enrile in the SOV/M of 65,343 is
listed in the PCOC at 95,343 or an increase of 30,000 votes. As unearthed, Enriles
votes had already been corrected by the COMELEC in the Regional Tally such that
the 30,000 votes deducted by the Tribunal must be, as it is hereby, given back to
him. Similarly, Mitra regains the 20,000 votes deducted from him in this province.

These corrections, notwithstanding, the Tribunal finds no sufficient basis to discard its
partial tabulation. In fact, the ranking of the parties is not at all affected by the
omission.

Finally, to grant Enriles prayer to have himself represented in the appreciation of

ballots by the Tribunal amounts to an encroachment on judicial functions. Needless to
state, appreciation of evidence is the Tribunals exclusive domain.

Petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration but was denied by the SET in
its Resolution No. 98-02.
Hence, this petition, petitioner contending that:
A.
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN RULING THAT NO
SIFFICIENT BASIS EXISTS TO ANNUL THE MANIFESTLY ERRONEOUS
TABULATION OF THE RESULTS OF REVISION AND APPRECIATION OF
BALLOTS.
B.
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED PATENT AND GROSS ERROR IN
RECTIFYING THE RESULTS OF THE PHYSICAL COUNT, AS REFELCTED IN THE
REVISION RPORTS BY USING OTHER ELECTIOB DOCUMENTS.
C.
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT
RELEASED PARTIAL AND TENTATIVE RESULTS WHICH CAUSED GRAVE
PREJUDICE TO HEREIN PETITIONER.
D.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
RULING THAT PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO BE HEARD IN THE
APPRECIATION PROCEEDINGS.

The main issue for our resolution is whether or not the SET committed grave
abuse of discretion in denying petitioners Motion To Set Aside Partial Results
in Pimentels Protest and to Conduct Another Appreciation of Ballots in the
Presence of all Parties.
Petitioner contends that the partial results released by the SET are
erroneous because they are improbable and not supported by evidence.
In their comments, both respondent and the Solicitor General maintain that
the SET did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the challenged
Resolutions. Furthermore, the Solicitor General asserts that the present petition
has become moot and academic because the tenure of the contested senatorial
position subject of respondents protest where the assailed Resolutions
originated expired on June 30, 1998.
In its assailed Resolution No. 97-22, the SET explained the process in
determining the partial results, thus:

The entire process in determining the parties votes in the pilot municipalities is
explained in the corresponding written reports thereon shortly to be completed. In the
meantime, let it be stressed that the proceedings conducted by the Tribunal with
respect to the pilot areas of Protestant Pimentel consisted of several stages or steps, to
wit:

a. Recount and revision of the ballots where the parties are represented;

b. Recount and revision of the ballots where the parties are represented;

c. Examination of the different election documents including the verification

of the accuracy of the addition of the figures appearing on Statement of
Votes by Precincts (SOV/M or SOV/C); and

d. Comparison of the figures appearing on the SOV/P, the Municipal or City

Certificate of Canvass (MCOC or CCOPC), the SOV/M or SOV/C and
the Provincial Certificate of Canvass (PCOC).

From the arguments of protestee Enrile, it is apparent that only the revision of ballots
and the SOV/P were taken into account. Worse, he speculated on the rulings made in
the appreciation of ballots.

xxx

Put differently, the number of ballots objected to against a particular party is not
necessarily the maximum number of votes that may be deducted from the said party,
in the same way as the number of ballots/votes claimed by a party is not necessarily
the maximum number of votes that may be credited to said party. As a result of the
appreciation of the contested ballots, the parties may be deducted more votes than the
number of ballots specifically objected to against them, or may be credited with
additional votes even if the parties made no claims.

Aside from the ruling on the claims and objections, the Tribunal likewise verified the
accuracy of the counting of ballots done by the revision teams. Errors in the revision
reports were rectified which also resulted in the addition to, or deduction of votes
from the parties.

Consistent with the allegation of Protestant Pimentel that Operation Dagdag-Bawas

was affected through the padding or deduction of votes in the different election
documents, the Tribunal also conducted accuracy checks on the addition of the figures
appearing on the SOV/P and the SOV/M. The verification process disclosed errors
which have resulted in the addition or deduction of votes from the parties.

To ensure that the correct figures were recorded from one election document to the
other, the Tribunal compared the figures appearing on the SOV/P vis--vis the
MCOC/CCOC; the MCOC/CCOC with the PCOC. Where the discrepancies in the
figures were noted, the corresponding adjustments were made which resulted in the
addition or deduction of votes from the parties.

Thus, while the votes of the parties in the municipal level are determined through the
counting and appreciation of the ballots, the votes of the parties on the provincial level
are also adjusted on the basis of the comparison of the different election
documents. The written report/decision on the pilot precincts, soon to be released,
contains the specifics and sets forth in detail the reason for each addition or deduction
of votes.

The above process clearly shows why the figures presented by petitioner in
his motion do not tally with the figures released by the SET.
At any rate, we agree with the Solicitor General that the petition has become
moot and academic. The tenure of the contested senatorial position subject of
this petition expired as early as June 30, 1998.
A case becomes moot and academic when there is no more actual
controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing
upon the merits. [6]

In Garcia vs. COMELEC, we held that where the issues have become
[7]

moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, thereby rendering the

resolution of the same of no practical use or value.
Likewise, in Gancho-on vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment, we ruled: [8]
It is a rule of universal application that courts of justice constituted to pass upon
substantial rights will not consider questions in which no actual interests are involved;
they decline jurisdiction of moot cases.And where the issue has become moot and
academic, there is no justiciable controversy, so that a declaration thereon would be of
no practical use or value. There is no actual substantial relief to which petitioners
would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr. C.J., and Puno, J., on official leave.
Vitug, J., acting Chief Justice, no part.
FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 108033. April 14, 1997]

TEOFISTO C. GANCHO-ON, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE

SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT AND LAKAS NG
NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA-PAFLU, respondents.

DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

On 16 January 1992 respondent Lakas ng Nagkakaisang Manggagawa-PAFLU

filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a petition for certification
election in a bid to exclusively represent the truck drivers of Eros Repair Shop.
Petitioner Teofisto C. Gancho-on, owner of the shop, moved for the dismissal of the
petition on the ground of absence of employer-employee relationship. He contended that
the members of respondent Union who would constitute the proposed bargaining unit
were not employees of his shop but of individual owners of the trucks used in the trucking
and hauling business managed by his wife, Herminia. In support thereof he presented
certificates of registration indicating the ownership of four (4) vehicles being driven by the
union members. In addition, he submitted copy of the application to operate business filed
with the Mayor's Office together with an application for renewal of the certificate of
registration which described his business as an automotive repair shop.
Respondent Union opposed the motion and asserted that while petitioner may be the
registered owner of the shop, his wife was the manager of the trucking and hauling
business under the same name and style as the shop. It offered in evidence the following
documents executed by petitioner's wife herself: (a) an affidavit dated 10 February 1992
alleging among others that she was the manager of Eros Repair Shop which was engaged
in the trucking and hauling of sugar cane and that the truck drivers were paid on
commission basis;[1] (b) a letter dated 17 February 1992 addressed to the Assistant
Regional Director of the DOLE informing the latter of the violation by one of the truck
drivers of Eros Repair Shop of a memorandum issued to all truck drivers; [2] and, (c)
another letter dated 20 February 1992 addressed to the same official seeking advice
concerning eleven (11) of her truck drivers who failed to report for work.[3]
The Med-Arbiter -Designate concluded from the evidence thus adduced that: (a) the
right to control not only the result of the drivers' work but also the means and method to
accomplish their task was being exercised by petitioner's wife; (b) except for petitioner's
business permit and accreditation no other evidence was presented to support the
allegation that Eros Repair Shop was an entity separate and distinct from the trucking
and hauling business; and, (c) most of the trucks were owned by the Gancho-on spouses.
Thus on 13 May 1992 the petition for certification election was given due course with
the following options: respondent union, or no union at all. A representative officer was
directed to call the parties to a pre-election conference to thresh out the mechanics of the
election and to conduct and supervise the same within twenty (20) days from receipt of
the order by the parties.[4]
Petitioner assailed the order for certification election before respondent Secretary
of Labor and Employment, still insisting on the absence of employer-employee
relationship.
On 31 July 1992 the appeal was denied. Respondent Secretary, ordering the pre-
election conference preparatory to the certification election be immediately
conducted,[5] declared that: (a) the affidavit of Mrs. Gancho-on in effect was an admission
that Eros Repair Shop was engaged in trucking and hauling services; (b) it was common
knowledge in the business that trucks were leased from various owners; and, (c) in the
communications sent by Mrs. Gancho-on to the DOLE, she used the business name of
Eros Repair Shop for her letterhead thus creating the impression that the Eros Repair
Shop was actually the employer. On 14 September 1992 the motion for reconsideration
was denied.[6]
Petitioner raises the same issue before us. On 11 January 1993 the certification
election nevertheless proceeded. Respondent union thereafter submitted to the Court an
original copy of the declaration of the final certification election results showing that it did
not garner a single vote because out of thirty-six (36) drivers, all of the twenty (20) who
cast their votes favored a "no union."[7]
This notwithstanding, petitioner argues that it is still necessary for the Court to resolve
the issue of employer-employee relationship not only for the guidance of the bench and
bar in general but also because the matter "hangs like the sword of Damocles over his
head."
Petitioner entirely misses the material points which have rendered the present
proceeding moot and academic. First, subject resolution of respondent Secretary as
aforestated decreed that the pre-election conference preparatory to the certification
election be immediately conducted. The certification election thereafter became a fait
accompli. Second, in a sense salutary to petitioner, the defeat suffered by respondent
Union in its bid to be certified as the sole bargaining agent of the truck drivers made
irrelevant the findings of both the Med-Arbiter-Designate and respondent Secretary that
an employer-employee relationship existed. It should be emphasized that the issue of
employer-employee relationship came into being only because petitioner denied its
existence in his motion to dismiss the petition for certification election. Since the
certification proceeding before the Med-Arbiter merely provided the mainspring of this
petition the defeat of respondent Union in the election has stripped this case of its raison
d'etre.
It is a rule of universal application, almost, that courts of justice constituted to pass
upon substantial rights will not consider questions in which no actual interests are
involved; they decline jurisdiction of moot cases.[8] And where the issue has become moot
and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, so that a declaration thereon would be
of no practical use or value. There is no actual substantial relief to which petitioners would
be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. [9]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for being moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla (Chairman), Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ., concur
Hermosisima, Jr., J., on leave.

[1]
Records, p. 29.
[2]
Id., pp. 31-32.
[3]
Id., p. 30.
[4]
Issued by Med-Arbiter-Designate Ma. Wilma M. Kalaw; Records, p. 46.
[5]
Issued by Undersecretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma; Rollo, p. 22.
[6]
Rollo, p. 16.
[7]
Id., pp. 110-112.
[8]
In the Matter of the Estate of Jose Ma. Ceballos, 12 Phil. 271 (1908).
Southeast Asia Manufacturing Corporation v. The Municipal Council of Tagbilaran, No. L-23858, 21
[9]

November 1979, 94 SCRA 341.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 121139. July 12, 1996]

ISIDRO B. GARCIA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
AUGUSTO GARCIA, respondents.

DECISION
FRANCISCO, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to nullify the Resolution of the
COMELEC en banc dated June 30, 1995[1] in SPA No. 95-034 entitled "Isidro B.
Garcia vs. Augusto M. Garcia," for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The assailed resolution reversed the previous
Resolution of the Second Division of the COMELEC promulgated on May 4,
1995,[2] wherein respondent Augusto M. Garcia was declared a nuisance candidate
resulting in the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty seat of Tagig.
During the May 8, 1995 local elections, petitioner Isidro B. Garcia and respondent
Augusto M. Garcia were both candidates for mayor in Tagig, Metro Manila. Claiming that
respondent filed his certificate of candidacy for no other legitimate purpose but to cause
confusion and disarray among the voters of Tagig considering the similarity in their
surname, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC for the declaration of respondent
as a nuisance candidate pursuant to Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.
In its Resolution dated May 4, 1995, the COMELEC (Second Division) granted the
petition and declared respondent as a nuisance candidate. The COMELEC based its
ruling on the following: 1) dubious veracity of respondent's certificate of nomination by the
PDP-LABAN; 2) failure of respondent to actively campaign; and 3) the absence of any
campaign materials.
On May 10, 1995, two days after the election, respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration[3] with the COMELEC seeking the reversal of the aforementioned
resolution. In the meanwhile, the canvassing of the election returns proceeded which
eventually resulted in the proclamation of petitioner on May 23, 1995 as the winning
candidate. However, another losing candidate, Ricardo Papa filed a petition for
annulment of the proclamation, and an election protest as well, with the COMELEC and
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, respectively, against petitioner.
On June 30, 1995, the COMELEC en banc promulgated the assailed resolution,
granting private respondent's motion for reconsideration and reversing the previous
resolution declaring him a nuisance candidate, despite admitting that the motion has been
rendered moot and academic as a result of petitioner's proclamation on May 23, 1995 as
winning candidate.
The COMELEC discarded petitioner's claim that respondent lacked the logistical
means and machinery to pursue a serious political campaign due to the absence of
propaganda materials, and ruled that such assumption has no bearing on the qualification
of respondent to seek public office.
Petitioner is now before us seeking to nullify and set aside the resolution of the
COMELEC en banc.
 It is argued that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it granted
respondent's motion for reconsideration despite having been rendered moot and
academic by the proclamation of petitioner as duly elected mayor of Tagig. Petitioner
bewails the fact that the motion was granted with the end in view of benefiting the pending
electoral protest filed by losing candidate Ricardo Papa who, according to petitioner, was
the one who instigated and conspired with respondent to run for mayor to confuse the
voters and undermine petitioner's chances of winning.
Private respondent however denies the abovementioned imputation and contends
that his only purpose in filing a motion for reconsideration from the resolution declaring
him a nuisance candidate was solely to reacquire his legal status as a legitimate and
qualified candidate for public office.
Well entrenched is the rule that where the issues have become moot and academic,
there is no justiciable controversy, thereby rendering the resolution of the same of no
practical use or value.[4]
Surprisingly, despite respondent COMELEC's admission that private respondent's
motion for reconsideration has already been rendered moot and academic due to
petitioner's proclamation as duly elected mayor of Tagig in the May 8, 1995 elections, it
nevertheless resolved to grant the motion.
Obviously, the assailed resolution would no longer be of any practical use or value to
private respondent considering that he did not even dispute the proclamation of petitioner
as the winning candidate. In fact, even private respondent's sole purpose in filing his
motion for reconsideration to regain his legal status as a legitimate and qualified
candidate for public office has been rendered inconsequential as a result of petitioner's
proclamation.
Petitioner was proclaimed mayor of Tagig as early as May 23, 1995, while the
assailed resolution was promulgated by respondent COMELEC on June 30,
1995. Undoubtedly, there was more that ample opportunity for the COMELEC to be
apprised of supervening events that rendered private respondent's motion moot and
academic, which in turn should have guided it to properly deny the motion. But having
failed to do so, respondent COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting
the motion.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The resolution of the COMELEC
dated June 30, 1995 in SPA No. 95-034 is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one entered
denying private respondent's motion for reconsideration for being moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

[1] Rollo, p. 24.

[2] Rollo, p. 32.
[3] Rollo, p. 42.
[4] Southeast Asia Manufacturing Corporation vs. Municipal Council of Tagbilaran, 94 SCRA 341 (1979);
Yorac vs. Magalona, 3 SCRA 76 (1961).

Republic of the Philippines

Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila

Eighth Congress

Republic Act No. 6768 November 3, 1989

AN ACT INSTITUTING A BALIKBAYAN PROGRAM

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled::

Section 1. Balikbayan Program. - A Balikbayan Program is hereby instituted under the

administration of the Department of Tourism to attract and encourage overseas Filipinos to come
and visit their motherland. This is in recognition of their contribution to the economy of the country
through the foreign exchange inflow that they generate.

Section 2. Definition of Terms. - For purposes of this Act:

(a) The term "balikbayan" shall mean a Filipino citizen who has been continuously out of the
Philippines for a period of at least one (1) year, a Filipino overseas worker, or a former
Filipino citizen and his family, as this term is defined hereunder, who had been naturalized in
a foreign country and comes or returns to the Philippines; and

(b) The term "family" shall mean the spouse and the children of the balikbayan who are not
balikbayan in their own right traveling with the latter to the Philippines.

Section 3. Benefits and Privileges of the Balikbayan. - The balikbayan and his family shall be
entitled to the following:

(a) Tax-free maximum purchase in the amount of One thousand United States dollars
(US$1,000.00) or its equivalent in other acceptable foreign currencies at Philippine duty-free
shops subject to the limitations contained in Section 4 hereof;

(b) The national flag air carrier shall establish a special promotional/incentive program for the
balikbayan;

(c) For foreign passport holders with the exception of restricted nationals, visa-free entry to
the Philippines for a period of one (1) year;
 (d) Travel tax exemption as provided under Presidential Decree No. 1183, Executive Order
No. 283, and other allied laws; and

(e) Especially designated reception areas at the authorized ports of entry for the expeditious
processing of documents.

The privileges granted under this Act shall be in addition to the benefits enjoyed by the balikbayan
under existing laws, rules and regulations.

SECTION 4. Limitations on Tax-Free Purchases. - The tax-free purchases privilege shall be subject
to the following limitations:

(a) Purchases shall only be made in United States dollars or other acceptable foreign
currencies;

(b) Purchases shall be made within forty-eight (48) hours from date of arrival;

(c) The privilege is nontransferable; purchases shall be made personally by the balikbayan
for himself;

(d) The privilege can be availed of by a balikbayan only once a year;

(e) Only a balikbayan of majority age under Philippine laws can enjoy the privilege: Provided,
however, That minors shall continue to be entitled to purchase privileges not exceeding Two
hundred fifty United States dollars (US$250.00); and

(f) In addition to existing limitations on the number of consumables purchased, a balikbayan

shall be entitled to buy only one (1) item of every product category of non-consumables
whose selling price exceeds Two hundred United States dollars (US$200.00).

Section 5. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - The Department of Tourism, in coordination

with other government agencies concerned, shall promulgate such rules and regulations as may be
necessary for the effective implementation of this Act.

Section 6. Semiannual Reports. - The Department of Tourism shall submit semiannual reports to
the President through the Secretary of Finance and to both Houses of Congress which reports shall
contain a statement of the quantities and the value of the goods, as classified in accordance with the
classification categories in the Tariff and Customs Code, sold by the Philippine duty-free shops.

Section 7. Penalty Clause. - Any person who shall willfully derive, obtain, receive or enjoy or cause
another to derive, obtain, receive or enjoy the benefits and privileges under this Act without being
entitled thereto shall be punished by a fine of not less than Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) but
not more than Forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) or imprisonment of not less than two (2) years or
more than four (4) years, or both at the discretion of the court. Any alien found guilty under this
section shall be summarily deported upon completion of service of sentence and be permanently
barred from reentering the country without the special permission of the President.

Section 8. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof
which are inconsistent with any provision of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 9. Biennial Review. - The Balikbayan Program, as instituted in this Act, shall be subject to
review by Congress two (2) years after the approval of this Act and every two (2) years thereafter.

Section 10. Separability Clause. - If, for any reason, any part or provision of this Act is held invalid
or unconstitutional, the same shall not affect the rest of its provisions.

Section 11. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in
the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation, whichever
comes earlier.

Approved: November 3, 1989

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 202202 March 19, 2013

SILVERIO R. TAGOLINO, Petitioner,

vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND LUCY MARIE TORRES-
GOMEZ, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the
March 22, 2012 Decision1 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) in HRET Case
No. 10-031 (QW) which declared the validity of private respondent Lucy Marie Torres-Gomezs
substitution as the Liberal Partys replacement candidate for the position of Leyte Representative
(Fourth Legislative District) in lieu of Richard Gomez.

The Facts

On November 30, 2009, Richard Gomez (Richard) filed his certificate of candidacy2 (CoC) with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), seeking congressional office as Representative for the
Fourth Legislative District of Leyte under the ticket of the Liberal Party. Subsequently, on December
6, 2009, one of the opposing candidates, Buenaventura Juntilla (Juntilla), filed a Verified
Petition,3 alleging that Richard, who was actually a resident of College Street, East Greenhills, San
Juan City, Metro Manila, misrepresented in his CoC that he resided in 910 Carlota Hills, Can-adieng,
Ormoc City. In this regard, Juntilla asserted that Richard failed to meet the one (1) year residency
requirement under Section 6, Article VI4 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) and thus
should be declared disqualified/ineligible to run for the said office. In addition, Juntilla prayed that
Richards CoC be denied due course and/or cancelled.5

On February 17, 2010, the COMELEC First Division rendered a Resolution6 granting Juntillas
petition without any qualification. The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVE, to
GRANT the Petition to Disqualify Candidate for Lack of Qualification filed by BUENAVENTURA O.
JUNTILLA against RICHARD I. GOMEZ. Accordingly, RICHARD I. GOMEZ is DISQUALIFIED as a
candidate for the Office of Congressman, Fourth District of Leyte, for lack of residency requirement.

SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, Richard moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the COMELEC En Banc
through a Resolution dated May 4, 2010.7 Thereafter, in a Manifestation of even date, Richard
accepted the said resolution with finality "in order to enable his substitute to facilitate the filing of the
necessary documents for substitution."8

On May 5, 2010, Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez (private respondent) filed her CoC9 together with a
Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance10 from the Liberal Party endorsing her as the partys
official substitute candidate vice her husband, Richard, for the same congressional post. In response
to various letter-requests submitted to the COMELECs Law Department (Law Department), the
COMELEC En Banc, in the exercise of its administrative functions, issued Resolution No. 889011 on
May 8, 2010, approving, among others, the recommendation of the said department to allow the
substitution of private respondent. The recommendation reads:

STUDY AND OBSERVATION

On the same date, this Department received an Opposition from Mr. Buenaventura O. Juntilla, thru
his counsel, opposing the candidacy of Ms. Lucy Marie Torres Gomez, as a substitute candidate for
Mr. Richard I. Gomez.

The crux of the opposition stemmed from the issue that there should be no substitution because
there is no candidate to substitute for.

It must be stressed that the resolution of the First Division, this Commission, in SPA No. 09-059
speaks for disqualification of candidate Richard I. Gomez and not of cancellation of his Certificate of
Candidacy:

Wherefore, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to

GRANT the Petition to Disqualify Candidate for Lack of Qualification filed x x x against RICHARD I.
GOMEZ. Accordingly, RICHARD I. GOMEZ is DISQUALIFIED as a candidate for the Office of
Congressman, Fourth District of Leyte, for lack of residency requirement.

The said resolution was affirmed by the Commission En Banc on May 04, 2010.

The disqualification of a candidate does not automatically cancel ones certificate of candidacy,
especially when it is nominated by a political party. In effect, the political party is still allowed to
substitute the candidate whose candidacy was declared disqualified. After all, the right to substitute
is a privilege given to a political party to exercise and not dependent totally to a candidate.

Nonetheless, in case of doubt, the same must always be resolved to the qualification of a candidate
to run in the public office.

The substitution complied with the requirements provided under Section 12 in relation to Section 13
of Comelec Resolution No. 8678 dated October 6, 2009.
 xxxx

In view of the foregoing, the Law Department RECOMMENDS the following:

xxxx

2. TO ALLOW CANDIDATE LUCY MARIE TORRES GOMEZ AS A SUBSTITUTE CANDIDATE

FOR RICHARD GOMEZ: (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

xxxx

The following day, or on May 9, 2010, Juntilla filed an Extremely Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration12 (May 9, 2010 Motion) of the above-mentioned COMELEC En Banc resolution

Pending resolution of Juntillas May 9, 2010 Motion, the national and local elections were conducted
as scheduled on May 10, 2010. During the elections, Richards, whose name remained on the
ballots, garnered 101, 250 votes while his opponents, namely, Eufrocino Codilla, Jr. and herein
petitioner Silverio Tagolino, obtained 76,549 and 493 votes, respectively.13 In view of the
aforementioned substitution, Richards votes were credited in favor of private respondent and as a
result, she was proclaimed the duly-elected Representative of the Fourth District of Leyte.

On May 11, 2010, Juntilla filed an Extremely Urgent Motion to resolve the pending May 9, 2010
Motion relative to Resolution No. 8890.14 The said motion, however, remained unacted.

On May 24, 2010, petitioner filed a Petition15 for quo warranto before the HRET in order to oust
private respondent from her congressional seat, claiming that: (1) she failed to comply with the one
(1) year residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution considering that the
transfer of her voter registration from San Rafael Bulacan16 to the Fourth District of Leyte was only
applied for on July 23, 2009; (2) she did not validly substitute Richard as his CoC was void ab initio;
and (3) private respondents CoC was void due to her non-compliance with the prescribed notarial
requirements i.e., she failed to present valid and competent proof of her identity before the notarizing
officer.17

In her Verified Answer,18 private respondent denied petitioners allegations and claimed that she
validly substituted her husband in the electoral process. She also averred that she personally known
to the notary public who notarized her CoC, one Atty. Edgardo Cordeno, and thus, she was not
required to have presented any competent proof of identity during the notarization of the said
document. Lastly, she asserted that despite her marriage to Richard and exercise of profession in
Metro Manila, she continued to maintain her residency in Ormoc City which was the place where she
was born and raised.

During the preliminary conference, and as shown in the Preliminary Conference Order dated
September 2, 2010, the parties agreed on the following issues for resolution:

1. Whether or not the instant petition for quo warranto is meritorious;

2. Whether or not the substitution of respondent is valid;
3. Whether or not a petition for quo warranto can be used as a substitute for failure to file the
necessary petition for disqualification with the COMELEC;
4. Whether or not respondents COC was duly subscribed; and
5. Whether or not respondent is ineligible for the position of Representative of the Fourth
District of Leyte for lack of residency requirement.19
 Ruling of the HRET

After due proceedings, the HRET issued the assailed March 22, 2012 Decision20 which dismissed
the quo warranto petition and declared that private respondent was a qualified candidate for the
position of Leyte Representative (Fourth Legislative District). It observed that the resolution denying
Richards candidacy i.e., the COMELEC First Divisions February 17, 2010 Resolution, spoke of
disqualification and not of CoC cancellation. Hence, it held that the substitution of private respondent
in lieu of Richard was legal and valid.21 Also, it upheld the validity of private respondents CoC due to
petitioners failure to controvert her claim that she was personally known to the notary public who
notarized her CoC.22 Finally, the HRET ruled that while it had been admitted that private respondent
resides in Colgate Street, San Juan City and lived in San Rafael, Bulacan, the fact was she
continued to retain her domicile in Ormoc City given that her absence therefrom was only temporary.

Hence, the instant petition.

Issues Before the Court

The crux of the present controversy is whatever or not the HRET gravely abused its discretion in
finding that Richard was validly substituted by private respondent as candidate for Leyte
Representative (Fourth Legislative District) in view of the formers failure to meet the one (1) year
residency requirement provided under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution.

It is petitioners submission that the HRET gravely abused its discretion when it upheld the validity of
private respondents substitution despite contrary jurisprudence holding that substitution is
impermissible where the substituted candidates CoC was denied due course to and/or cancelled, as
in the case of Richard. On the other hand, respondents maintain that Richards CoC was not denied
due course to and/or cancelled by the COMELEC as he was only "disqualified" and therefore, was
properly substituted by private respondent.

Ruling of the Court

The petition is meritorious.

A. Distinction between a petition for disqualification and a petition to deny due course to/cancel a
certificate of candidacy

The Omnibus Election Code23 (OEC) provides for certain remedies to assail a candidates bid for
public office. Among these which obtain particular significance to this case are: (1) a petition for
disqualification under Section 68; and (2) a petition to deny due course to and/or cancel a certificate
of candidacy under Section 78. The distinctions between the two are well-perceived.

Primarily, a disqualification case under Section 68 of the OEC is hinged on either: (a) a candidates
possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country;24 or (b) his or her commission of
certain acts of disqualification. Anent the latter, the prohibited acts under Section 68 refer to election
offenses under the OEC, and not to violations of other penal laws.25 In particular, these are: (1)
giving money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public
officials performing electoral functions; (2) committing acts of terrorism to enhance ones candidacy;
(3) spending in ones election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by the OEC; (4)
soliciting, receiving or making any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104 of
the OEC; and (5) violating Sections 80,26 83,27 85,28 8629 and 261, paragraphs d,30 e,31 k,32 v,33 and cc,
sub-paragraph 634 of the OEC. Accordingly, the same provision (Section 68) states that any
candidate who, in an action or protest in which he or she is a party, is declared by final decision of a
competent court guilty of, or found by the COMELEC to have committed any of the foregoing acts
shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate for public office, or disallowed from holding the
same, if he or she had already been elected.35

It must be stressed that one who is disqualified under Section 68 is still technically considered to
have been a candidate, albeit proscribed to continue as such only because of supervening
infractions which do not, however, deny his or her statutory eligibility. In other words, while the
candidates compliance with the eligibility requirements as prescribed by law, such as age,
residency, and citizenship, is not in question, he or she is, however, ordered to discontinue such
candidacy as a form of penal sanction brought by the commission of the above-mentioned election
offenses.

On the other hand, a denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC proceeding under Section
78 of the OEC36 is premised on a persons misrepresentation of any of the material qualifications
required for the elective office aspired for. It is not enough that a person lacks the relevant
qualification; he or she must have also made a false representation of the same in the CoC.37 The
nature of a Section 78 petition was discussed in the case of Fermin v. COMELEC,38 where the Court
illumined:

Let it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on
the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is
false, which may relate to the qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is
noted that the candidates states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks.
Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory
provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a
material representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to
deny due course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding
under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal
with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section
78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of
the winning candidate. (Emphasis supplied)

Corollary thereto, it must be noted that the deliberateness of the misrepresentation, much less ones
intent to defraud, is of bare significance in a Section 78 petition as it is enough that the persons
declaration of a material qualification in the CoC be false. In this relation, jurisprudence holds that an
express finding that the person committed any deliberate misrepresentation is of little consequence
in the determination of whether ones CoC should be deemed cancelled or not.39 What remains
material is that the petition essentially seeks to deny due course to and/or cancel the CoC on the
basis of ones ineligibility and that the same be granted without any qualification.40

Pertinently, while a disqualified candidate under Section 68 is still considered to have been a
candidate for all intents and purposes, on the other hand, a person whose CoC had been denied
due course to and/or cancelled under Section 78 is deemed to have not been a candidate at all. The
reason being is that a cancelled CoC is considered void ab initio and thus, cannot give rise to a valid
candidacy and necessarily, to valid votes.41 In Talaga v. COMELEC42 (Talaga), the Court ruled that:

x x x x While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a

candidate, a person who certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated
as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC.

The foregoing variance gains utmost importance to the present case considering its implications on
candidate substitution.
B. Valid CoC as a condition sine qua non for candidate substitution

Section 77 of the OEC provides that if an official candidate of a registered or accredited political
party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, a person belonging to and certified by the
same political party may file a CoC to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified.
It states that:

Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. - If after the last day
for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political
party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by,
the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died,
withdrew or was disqualified. (Emphasis supplied)

Evidently, Section 77 requires that there be an "official candidate" before candidate substitution
proceeds. Thus, whether the ground for substitution is death, withdrawal or disqualification of a
candidate, the said section unequivocally states that only an official candidate of a registered or
accredited party may be substituted.43

As defined under Section 79(a) of the OEC, the term "candidate" refers to any person aspiring for or
seeking an elective public office who has filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an
accredited political party, aggroupment, or coalition of parties. Clearly, the law requires that one
must have validly filed a CoC in order to be considered a candidate. The requirement of having a
CoC obtains even greater importance if one considers its nature. In particular, a CoC formalizes not
only a persons public declaration to run for office but evidences as well his or her statutory eligibility
to be elected for the said post. In Sinaca v. Mula,44 the Court has illumined:

A certificate of candidacy is in the nature of a formal manifestation to the whole world of the
candidates political creed or lack of political creed. It is a statement of a person seeking to run for a
public office certifying that he announces his candidacy for the office mentioned and the be is eligible
for the office, the name of the political party to which he belongs, if he belongs to any, and his post-
office address for all election purposes being as well stated. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).

In this regard, the CoC is the document which formally accords upon a person the status of a
candidate. In other words, absent a valid CoC one is not considered a candidate under legal
contemplation. As held in Talaga:45

x x x a persons declaration of his intention to run for public office and his affirmation that he
possesses the eligibility for the position he seeks to assume, followed by the timely filing of such
declaration, constitute a valid CoC that render the person making the declaration a valid or official
candidate. (Emphasis supplied)

Considering that Section 77 requires that there be a candidate in order for substitution to take place,
as well as the precept that a person without a valid CoC is not considered as a candidate at all, it
necessarily follows that if a persons CoC had been denied due course to and/or cancelled, he or
she cannot be validly substituted in the electoral process. The existence of a valid CoC is therefore a
condition sine qua non for a disqualified candidate to be validly substituted.46

C. Divergent effects of disqualification and denial of due course to and/or cancellation of CoC cases
vis--vis candidate substitution
Proceeding, from the foregoing discourse, it is evident that there lies a clear-cut distinction between
a disqualification case under Section 68 and denial of due course to and/or cancellation of COC
case under Section 78 vis--vis their respective effects on candidate substitution under Section 77. 1w phi 1

As explained in the case of Miranda v. Abaya47 (Miranda), a candidate who is disqualified under
Section 68 can be validly substituted pursuant to Section 77 because he remains a candidate until
disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been denied due course to and/or cancelled under
Section 78 cannot be substituted because he is not considered a candidate.48 Stated differently,
since there would be no candidate to speak of under a denial of due course to and/or cancellation of
a CoC case, then there would be no candidate to be substituted; the same does not obtain,
however, in a disqualification case since there remains to be a candidate to be substituted, although
his or her candidacy is discontinued.

On this note, it is equally revelatory that Section 77 expressly enumerates the instances where
substitution is permissible, that is when an official candidate of a registered or accredited political
party "dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause." Noticeably, material misrepresentation cases
are not included in the said section and therefore, cannot be a valid basis to proceed with candidate
substitution.

D. Application to the case at bar

In this case, it is undisputed that Richard was disqualified to run in the May 10, 2010 elections due to
his failure to comply with the one year residency requirement.49 The confusion, however, stemmed
from the use of the word "disqualified" in the February 17, 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC First
Division, which was adopted by the COMELEC En Banc in granting the substitution of private
respondent, and even further perpetuated by the HRET in denying the quo warranto petition. In
short, a finding that Richard was merely disqualified and not that his CoC was denied due course
to and/or cancelled would mean that he could have been validly substitute by private respondent,
thereby legitimizing her candidacy.

Yet the fact that the COMELEC First Divisions February 17, 2010 Resolution did not explicitly
decree the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of Richards CoC should not have obviated
the COMELEC En Banc from declaring the invalidity of private respondents substitution. It should be
stressed that the clear and unequivocal basis for Richards "disqualification" is his failure to comply
with the residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution which is a ground for
the denial of due course to and/or cancellation a CoC under Section 78 of the OEC,
misrepresentation contemplated under a Section 78 petition refers to statements affecting ones
qualifications for elective office such as age, residence and citizenship or non-possession of natural-
born Filipino status.51 There is therefore no legal basis to support a finding of disqualification within
the ambit of election laws. Accordingly, given Richards non-compliance with the one year residency
requirement, it cannot be mistaken that the COMELEC First Divisions unqualified grant of Juntillas
"Verified Petition to Disqualify Candidate for Lack of Qualification"52 which prayed that the
COMELEC declare Richard "DISQUALIFIED and INELIGIBLE from seeking the office of Member of
the House of Representatives" and "x x x that his Certificate of Candidacy x x x be DENIED DUE
COURSE and/or CANCELLED"53 carried with it the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of
Richards CoC pursuant to Section 78.

Case law dictates that if a petition prays for the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of CoC
and the same is granted by the COMELEC without any qualification, the cancellation of the
candidates CoC in in order. This is precisely the crux of the Miranda ruling wherein the Court, in
upholding the COMELEC En Bancs nullification of the substitution in that case, decreed that the
COMELEC Divisions unqualified grant of the petition necessarily included the denial of due course
to and/or cancellation of the candidates CoC, notwithstanding the use of the term "disqualified" in
the COMELEC Divisions resolution, as the foregoing was prayed for in the said petition:

The question to settle next is whether or not aside from Joiel "Pempe" Miranda being disqualified by
the COMELEC in its May 5, 1998 resolution, his certificate of candidacy had likewise been denied
due course and cancelled.

The Court rules that it was.

Private respondents petition in SPA No. 98-019 specifically prayed for the following:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Certificate of Candidacy filed by respondent for the
position of Mayor for the City of Snatiago be not given due course and/or cancelled.

Other reliefs just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed for.

In resolving the petition filed by private respondent specifying a very particular relief, the COMELEC
ruled favorably in the following manner:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission (FIRST DIVISION) GRANTS the Petition.
Respondent JOSE "Pempe" MIRANDA is hereby DISQUALIFIED from running for the position of
mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, in the May 11, 1998 national and local elections.

SO ORDERED.

From a plain reading of the dispositive portion of the COMELEC resolution of May 5, 1998 in SPA
No. 98-019, it is sufficiently clear that the prayer specifically and particularly sought in the petition
was GRANTED, there being no qualification on the matter whatsoever. The disqualification was
simply ruled over and above the granting of the specific prayer for denial of due course and
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy.

xxxx

There is no dispute that the complaint or petition filed by private respondent in SPA No. 98-019 is
one to deny due course and to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda. There is
likewise no question that the said petition was GRANTED without any qualification whatsoever. It is
rather clear, therefore, that whether or not the COMELEC granted any further relief in SPA No. 98-
019 by disqualifying the candidate, the fact remains that the said petition was granted and that the
certificate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda was denied due course and cancelled. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

The same rule was later discussed in the case of Talaga, viz:

3. Granting without any qualification or petition in SPA No. 09-029(DC) manifested COMELECs
intention to declare Ramon disqualified and to cancel his CoC

xxxx

In Miranda v. Abaya, the specific relief that the petition prayed for was that the CoC "be not given
due course and/or cancelled". The COMELEC categorically granted "the petition" and then
pronounced in apparent contradiction that Joel Pempe Miranda was "disqualified." The Court
held that the COMELEC, by granting the petition without any qualification, disqualified Joel Pempe
Miranda and at the same time cancelled Jose Pempe Mirandas CoC.

xxxx

The crucial point of Miranda v. Abaya was that the COMELEC actually granted the particular relief of
cancelling or denying due course to the CoC prayed for in the petition by not subjecting that relief to
any qualification. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In view of the foregoing rulings, the COMELEC En Banc direly misconstrued the COMELEC First
Divisions February 17, 2010 Resolution when it adopted the Law Departments finding that Richard
was only "disqualified" and that his CoC was not denied due course to and/or cancelled, paving the
way for the approval of private respondents substitution. It overlooked the fact that the COMELEC
First Divisions ruling encompassed the cancellation of Richards CoC and in consequence,
disallowed the substitution of private respondent. It was therefore grave and serious error on the part
of the COMELEC En Banc to have approved private respondents substitution.

Consequently, in perpetuating the COMELEC En Bancs error as above-discussed, the HRET

committed a grave abuse of discretion, warranting the grant of the instant petition.

Fundamental is the rule that grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal patently
violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.54 While it is well-recognized that the
HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House, the Court maintains jurisdiction
over it to check "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter.55 In other words, when the HRET utterly disregards
the law and settled precedents on the matter before it, it commits a grave abuse of discretion.

Records clearly show that: (1) Richard was held ineligible as a congressional candidate for the
Fourth District of Leyte due to his failure to comply with the one year residency requirement; (2)
Juntillas petition prayed for the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of his CoC; and (3) the
COMELEC First Division granted the foregoing petition without any qualification. By these
undisputed and essential facts alone, the HRET should not have adopted the COMELEC En Bancs
erroneous finding that the COMELEC First Divisions February 17, 2010 Resolution "speaks only of
"disqualification and not of cancellation of Richards CoC"36 and thereby, sanctioned the substitution
of private respondent.

Lest it be misunderstood, the HRET is not bound by previous COMELEC pronouncements relative to
the qualifications of the Members of the House. Being the sole judge57 of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of its respective members, the HRET cannot be tied down by
COMELEC resolutions, else its constitutional mandate58 be circumvented and rendered nugatory.
Instructive on this point is the Courts disquisition in Fernandez v. HRET,59 to wit:

Private respondent concludes from the above that petitioner had no legal basis to claim that the
HRET, when reference to the qualification/s of Members of the House of Representatives is
concerned, is "co-equal", to the COMELEC respecting the matter of eligibility and qualification of a
member of the House of Representatives. The truth is the other way around, because the
COMELEC is subservient to the HRET when the dispute or contest at issue refers to the eligibility
and/or qualification of a Member of the House of Representatives. A petition for quo warranto is
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET as sole judge, and cannot be considered forum
shopping even if another body may have passed upon in administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings
the issue of the Members qualification while the Member was still a candidate. There is forum-
shopping only where two cases involve the same parties and the same cause of action. The two
cases here are distinct and dissimilar in their nature and character. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Notably, the phrase "election, returns, and qualifications" should be interpreted in its totality as
referring to all matters affecting the validity of the contestees title. More particularly, the term
"qualifications" refers to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the pro-
claimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility, or the inadequacy of his certificate of
candidacy.60 As used in Section 74 of the OEC, the word "eligible" means having the right to run for
elective public office, that is, having all the qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run for the
public office.61 In this relation, private respondents own qualification to run for public office which
was inextricably linked to her husbands own qualifications due to her substitution was the proper
subject of quo warranto proceedings falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET and
independent from any previous proceedings before the COMELEC, lest the jurisdiction divide
between the two be blurred.

Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that the HRETs independence is not without limitation. As
earlier mentioned, the Court retains certiorari jurisdiction over the HRET if only to check whether or
not it has gravely abused its discretion. In this regard, the Court does not endeavor to denigrate nor
undermine the HRETs independence; rather, it merely fulfills its duty to ensure that the Constitution
and the laws are upheld through the exercise of its power of judicial review.

In fine, the Court observes that the HRET wantonly disregarded the law by deliberately adopting the
COMELEC En Bancs flawed findings regarding private respondents eligibility to run for public office
which essentially stemmed from her substitution. In this light, it cannot be gainsaid that the HRET
gravely abused its discretion.

Owing to the lack of proper substitution in its case, private respondent was therefore not a bona fide
candidate for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Leyte when she ran for office,
which means that she could not have been elected. Considering this pronouncement, there exists no
cogent reason to further dwell on the other issues respecting private respondents own qualification
to office.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the March 22, 2012 Decision rendered by the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in HRET Case No. 10-031 (QW) is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Chief Justice Associate Justice

(No part due to participation in HRET)

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
 (No part due to participation in HRET) (No part due to participation in HRET)
ARTURO D. BRION* DIOSDADO M. PERALTA*
Associate Justice Associate Justice

(No part due to participation in HRET)

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* No part.

1Rollo, pp. 48-65. Signed by Supreme Court Associate Justices Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.,
Diosdado M. Peralta, and Luas P. Bersamin, Representatives Franklin P. Bautista, Joselito
Andrew R. Mendoza; Justin Marc SB. Chipeco, Rufus B. Rodriguez (dissented), and Ma.
Theresa B. Bonoan-David (abstained).

2 Id. at 257.

3 Id. at 246-253.

4 Sec. 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a

natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five
years of age, able to read and write, and except the party-list representatives, a registered
voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less
than one year immediately preceding the day of the election. (Emphasis supplied)

5 Rollo, pp.252-253.
6Id. at 259-265. Signed by Presiding Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento, Commissioners
Armando C. Velasco and Gregorio Y. Larrazabal (no part).

7Id. at 266-277. Penned by Commissioner Elias R. Yusoph, with Commissioners Rene V.

Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Nicodemo T. Ferrer, and Armando C. Velasco, concurring,
Commissioners Jose A. R. Melo and Gregorio Y. Larrazabal, no part.

8 Id. at 278-280.

9 Id. at 297.

10 Id. at 298.

11
Id. at 132-139.

12 Id. at 311-326.

13 Id. at 98.

14 See Torres-Gomez v. Codilla, G.R. No. 195191, March 20, 2012, 668 SCRA 600.

15 Rollo, pp. 85-93.

16 Registered in Precinct No. 0004A of San Rafael, Bulacan.

17 Rollo, pp. 87-92.

18 Id. at 102-119.

19 Id. at 54-55.

20 Id. at 48-65.

21 Id. at 56.

22 Id. at 58-59.

23 BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG NO. 881, AS AMENDED.

24The exception to this is when the said status is waived. Sec. 68 of the OEC partly
provides:

Se. 68. Disqualifications. x x x x Any person who is a permanent resident of or an

immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this
Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a
foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election
laws.

25 Araneta v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 195229, October 9, 2012.

26 Refers to election campaign or political activity outside the campaign period.

27 Refers to the removal, destruction or defacement of lawful election propaganda.

28 Refers to certain forms of election propaganda.

29 Refers to violation of rules and regulations on election propaganda through mass media.

30 Refers to coercion of subordinates.

31Refers to threats, intimidation, terrorism, use of fraudulent device or other forms of

coercion.

32 Refers to unlawful electioneering.

33 Refers to the release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds.

34Refers to the solicitation of votes or undertaking any propaganda on the day of the
election.

35 See BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG NO. 881, AS AMENDED, Section 68.

36Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by
any person exclusively on the ground that any material misrepresentation contained therein
as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later
than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided, after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.

Talaga v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 196804 and 197015, October 9, 2012, citing Fermin v.
37

COMELEC, G.R. No. 179695, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 782.

38 Fermin v. COMELEC, id.

39 See Miranda v. Abaya, 370 Phil. 642.

40 Id.

41 Supra note 25, citing Bautista v. COMELEC, 359 Phil. 1, 16 (1998).

42 Supra note 37.

43 Id.

44373Phil. 896, 908, citing Ruperto G. Marting, The Revised Election Code with Annotations
41 (First Edition).

45 Supra note 37.

46 Supra notes 25 and 37.

 47 Supra note 39.

48 Id.

49 Rollo, p. 264.

50 Fermin v. COMELEC, supra note 37.

51 Gonzalez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 192856, March 8, 2011, 644 SCRA 761, 775-776.

52 Rollo, p. 246.

53 Id. at 252-253; emphasis and underscoring supplied.

54 See Fernandez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 171821, October 9, 2006, 504 SCRA 116.

55 See Bengson III v. HRET, 409 Phil. 633 (2001); citations omitted.

56 Rollo, p. 133.

57In the case of Lazatin v. HRET, 250 Phil. 390, 399-400 (1988), the Court stated that under
the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal is original and
exclusive, viz:

The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction
conferred. The exercise of power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935
Constitution has been described as "intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if
it had originally remained in the legislature." Earlier this grant of power to the
legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm as "full, clear and complete; Under
the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the
Electoral Tribunal and it remained as full, clear and complete as that previously
granted the Legislature and the Electoral Commission. The same may be said with
regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal under the 1987 Constitution.
(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

58 Art. 6, Sec. 17 of the Constitution states:

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective Members. (Emphasis supplied)

59 G.R. No. 187478, December 21, 2009, 608 SCRA 733, 747-748.

60See Liwayway Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 172131, April 2, 2007, 520 SCRA
166.

61 Supra note 25, citing the Oxford Dictionary of English (Oxford University Press 2010).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

 DISSENTING OPINION

ABAD, J.:

On November 30, 2009 Richard Gomez (Richard) filed his certificate of candidacy (CoC) for
Congressman of Leytes 4th District under the Liberal Party (LP) in the May 10, 2010 elections. He
gave his residence as 910 Carlota Hills, Barangay Can-Adieng, Ormoc City. After a week,
Buenaventura O. Juntilla, a registered voter of the district, filed a Verified Petition to Disqualify
Candidate for Lack of Qualification1 before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPA 09-059
(DC) on the ground that Richard was not an Ormoc City resident. Juntilla asked the COMELEC two
things: a) disqualify Richard and b) deny due course to or cancel his CoC for material
misrepresentation regarding his residence since he in fact resided in Greenhills, Mandaluyong City.

On February 17, 2010 the COMELEC First Division issued a resolution disqualifying Richard for
failing to present "sufficient proof that would establish his ties to Ormoc." The resolution failed,
however, to order the denial of due course or cancellation of his CoC. The dispositive portion of the
resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to

GRANT the Petition to Disqualify Candidate for Lack of Qualification filed by BUENAVENTURA O.
JUNTILLA against RICHARD I. GOMEZ. Accordingly, RICHARD I. GOMEZ is DISQUALIFIED as a
candidate for the Office of Congressman, Fourth District of Leyte, for lack of residency
requirement.2 (Emphasis supplied.)

On February 20, 2010 Richard moved for reconsideration of the above resolution Juntilla, on the
other hand, did not file a similar motion even when the COMELEC failed to grant his other prayer for
denial of due course or cancellation of Richards CoC.

On May 4, 2010 the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution3 dismissing Richards motion for
reconsideration. On the same day, Richard filed with the COMELEC a Manifestation4 informing it of
his acceptance of its decision in his case to enable a substitute to take his place. Acting on the
Manifestation, the COMELEC En Banc issued an Order on May 5 declaring its May 4 Resolution
final and executory.

On May 5, 2010 the LP Secretary-General wrote the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte,
nominating respondent Lucy Gomez as a substitute candidate for her husband, Richard. Lucy
Gomez promptly filed her CoC with COMELEC as substitute candidate. On the same date, Juntilla
filed with the COMELEC a Counter-Manifestation,5followed by a letter to the COMELEC Law
Department, opposing Lucy Gomezs substitution of her husband, claiming that the substitution was
invalid since she had no one to substitute in view of the COMELECs disqualification of Richard by
final order.

On May 8, 2010, the COMELEC En Banc issued Resolution 88906 approving and adopting, among
other things, its Law Departments study and recommendation that Lucy Gomez be allowed to
substitute for Richard, given that the 1st Divisions ruling which did not cancel Richards CoC but
merely "disqualified" him, had already become final and executory. The pertinent portion of the study
and recommendation that the En Banc adopted states:
The crux of the opposition stemmed from the issue that there should be no substitution because
there is no candidate to substitute for.

It must be stressed that the resolution of the First Division, this Commission, in SPA No. 09-059
speaks of disqualification of candidate Richard I. Gomez and not of cancellation of his Certificate of
Candidacy:

"Wherefore, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to

GRANT the Petition to Disqualify Candidate for Lack of Qualification filed against RICHARD I.
GOMEZ. Accordingly, RICHARD I. GOMEZ is DISQUALIFIED as a candidate for the Office of
Congressman, Fourth District of Leyte, for lack of residency requirement."

The said resolution was affirmed by the Commission En Banc on May 4, 2010.

xxxx

In view of the foregoing, the Law Department RECOMMENDS the following:

xxxx

2. TO ALLOW CANDIDATE LUCY MARIE TORRES GOMEZ AS A SUBSTITUTE CANDIDATE

FOR RICHARD GOMEZ; (Emphasis supplied)

On the same day the COMELEC En Banc issued its May 8, 2010 resolution allowing the
substitution, Juntilla filed an Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration7 of the same but the
motion remained unacted upon, obviously owing to the supervening May 10 elections. Juntilla never
elevated or questioned the matter before the Supreme Court.

On May 12, 2010 the Leyte Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed Lucy Gomez as
Congresswoman-elect to represent the 4th District of Leyte, having obtained 101,250 votes.
Petitioner Silvestre R. Tagolino and another candidate, Eufrocino C. Codilla, Jr., granted 493 votes
and 76,549 votes, respectively.

In due time, Tagolino brought a quo warranto action8 against Lucy Gomez with the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) pursuant to its Rule 17 which allows the filing of a
petition for quo warranto contesting the election of a member of the House of Representatives "on
the ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic." Juntilla did not join Tagolino in this action.

Tagolino alleged in his petition (1) that Lucy Gomez was not a resident of Ormoc City at least one
year immediately preceding the election; (2) that she was not a registered voter in the 4th District of
Leyte; and (3) that her CoC was void for failing to comply with the requirements of Section 2 of the
2004 Notarial Law.9 Tagolino did not raise in his petition the question of the validity of Lucy Gomezs
substitution of her husband Richard.

In her Answer,10 Lucy Gomez averred: (a) that the petition was filed beyond 10 days from
proclamation; (b) that the petition assails the validity of her CoC, which is outside the jurisdiction of
the HRET and should have been assailed before the COMELEC through a petition to deny due
course to or cancel her CoC; (c) that the COMELEC had already resolved her substitution of Richard
with finality in its Resolution 8890; (d) that she did not have to present proof of her identity when her
CoC was notarized the notary public personally knew her; and (e) she never abandoned her
domicile in Ormoc City despite her change of residence and transfer of voting registration to San
Rafael, Bulacan, arising from her marriage to Richard.

On March 22, 2010 the HRET rendered a Decision11 dismissing the quo warranto petition and
declaring Lucy Gomez a qualified candidate during the May 2010 election for the subject position,
her substitution of her disqualified husband being valid and legal. HRET ruled that Lucy Gomezs
domicile continued to be Ormoc City despite her marriage to Richard. Tagolino moved for
reconsideration but HRET denied the same on May 28, 2012, hence, this petition.

Question Presented

As the ponencia would have it, the issue boils down to the question of whether or not Lucy Gomez
validly substituted Richard whom the COMELEC declared disqualified for lack of residency.

But the above is not an accurate statement of the real issue in this case. The real issue in this case
is whether or not the HRET can review and reverse a COMELEC Decision involving a member of
the House of Representatives that had become final and executory.

Discussion

The election of Lucy Gomez as Congressman of the 4th District of Leyte was preceded by two
separate incidents before the COMELEC:

The first incident involved Ricahrd. It consists in Juntillas self-titled Verified Petition to Disqualify
Candidate for Lack of Qualification. Juntilla asked for Richards disqualification, consistent with the
substance of his petition, but added in his prayer that the candidates CoC be also cancelled or
denied due course. The COMELEC First Division granted the petition and disqualified Richard but
did not cancel or deny due course to his CoC.

The second incident involved Lucy Gomez. Juntilla opposed her substitution of Richard on the
ground that the substitution was invalid since she had no one to substitute in view of the COMELEC
First Divisions disqualified of Richard by final order. But the COMELEC En Banc denied the
opposition and allowed the substitution, given that the First Division' resolution, which merely
disqualified Richard, had already become final and executory.

The key issue in this case is actually whether or not the HRET was correct in ruling that the
COMELEC First Divisions February 17, 2010 Resolution that disqualified Richard but did not cancel
his CoC or deny it due course had already become final and executory. For, if it had indeed become
final and executory, that resolution would, as the COMELEC En Banc held in its May 8, 2010
Resolution, provide legal basis for Lucy Gomezs substitution of Richard.

It is clear from the facts that the COMELEC First Divisions February 17, 2010 Resolution, which
merely disqualified Richard but did not cancel or deny due course to his CoC, became final and
executory. That resolution may be in error, as the ponencia would have it, but it certainly became
final and executory for the following reasons:

First. Juntilla never filed a motion for reconsideration of that resolution. Consequently, he could not
help its becoming final and executory as to him.

Second. Only Richard filed a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC First Divisions February
17, 2010 Resolution, which merely disqualified him. When the COMELEC En Banc dismissed that
motion for reconsideration on May 4, 2010, Richard filed a manifestation on the same day, accepting
its validity. On May 5 the COMELEC En Banc declared its May 4, 2010 Resolution final and
executory. Consequently, what remained the last window of opportunity to review and possibly
reverse the COMELEC First Divisions February 17, 2010 Resolution closed down.

Third, Juntilla attempted to revive the issue concerning the COMELEC First Divisions February 17,
2010 Resolution when he opposed Lucy Gomezs substitution of Richard. He claimed that the First
Divisions resolution resulted in the COMELEC denying due course to Richards CoC with the effect
that, without a valid one, he could not be substituted. But Juntilla is clearly in error since the
COMELEC En Banc already declared on May 5 that the First Divisions February 17 Resolution
merely ordered Richards disqualification and such resolution had irreversibly become final and
executory.

Juntilla of course filed on May 8, 2010 a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC En Bancs
Resolution of the same date that allowed Lucy Gomezs substitution of Richard, but the motion
remained unacted upon, obviously owing to the supervising May 10, 2010 elections. At any rate,
Juntilla may be deemed to have abandoned that motion for reconsideration for he never insisted that
it be resolved. And he never raised before this Court the issue of the validity of that COMELEC En
Bancs May 8 Resolution that allowed the substitution. Unchallenged, that resolution became final
and executory as well.

The Court has of course ruled In Guerrero v. Commission on Elections12 that, since the Constitution
makes the HRET "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications" of
its members, it has the jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of substitution involving such members.
Said the Court:

Whether respondent Rodolfo Farias validly substituted Chevylle V. Farias and whether
respondent became a legitimate candidate, in our view, must likewise be addressed to the sound
judgment of the Electoral Tribunal. Only thus can we demonstrate fealty to the Constitutional
provision that the Electoral Tribunal of each House of Congress shall be the "sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective members."13 (Emphasis
supplied)

But the above ruling should be understood in the context of the facts of the Farias case. Guillermo
Ruiz, a registered voter, filed a petition with the COMELECs Second Division seeking the perpetual
disqualification of Rodolfo Farias as candidate for Congressman for the May 11, 1998 elections on
the ground that he had been campaigning for that position despite his failure to file a CoC.
Eventually, Farias filed his CoC on May 8, 1998 in substitution of Chevylle Farias who withdrew
earlier on April 3. Because of this supervening event, on May 10 the Second Division dismissed
Ruiz' petition for lack of merit.

Farias won the elections and was promptly proclaimed. On May 16, 1998, however, Ruiz filed a
motion for reconsideration of the Second Divisions May 10 Resolution, contending that Farias
could not validly substitutes for Chevylle, since the latter was not the official candidate of the Lakas
ng Makabayan Masang Pilipino but was an independent candidate. Meantime, on June 3, 1998
Farias took his oath as member of the House of Representatives.

On June 10, 1998 petitioner Arnold Guerrero, a rival candidate, filed a petition-in-interview with the
COMELEC, assailing Farias substitution of Chevylle. On January 6, 1999, the COMELEC En Banc
dismissed Ruizs motion for reconsideration and Guerreros petition-in-interview for lack of
jurisdiction since Farias had in the meantime assumed office.
Upon Guerreros petition, this Court held that while the COMELEC has the power to declare a CoC
valid or invalid, its refusal to exercise that power, following Farias proclamation and assumption of
office, simply recognized the jurisdictional boundaries between the COMELEC and the HRET. The
Court said that whether Farias validly substituted Chevylle must now be addressed to the sound
judgment of the HRET. The COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election,
returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.

Tagolino cannot invoke the Farias ruling for three reasons:

First, the Courts thesis in Farias is that the HRET can take over a pending matter before the
COMELEC since the latter may be considered ousted of its jurisdiction over the same upon the
winners assumption of office. The HRET takes over the authority to resolve such pending matter.

Here, however, the key issue of whether or not the COMELEC First Divisions February 17, 2010
Resolution, which merely disqualified Richard but did not cancel his CoC, is no longer a pending
matter. It became final and executory since, as pointed out above, Juntilla did not file a motion for its
reconsideration and the COMELEC En Banc had found it to be the case.

Second, Guerrero had the right to raise the issue of Farias disqualification before the HRET since
he intervened and joined cause with Guillermo in his action before the COMELEC. This gave
Guerrero a stake in the resolution of Guillermos motion for reconsideration after the COMELEC
declined to further act on the same.

Here, Tagolino never interviewed in Juntillas actions before the COMELEC. He stayed out of it.
Consequently, he has no right to ask the HRET to resolve Juntillas May 8, 2010 motion for
reconsideration of the COMELEC En Bancs order of the same date. The right to press for the
resolution of that May 8 motion for reconsideration belonged to Juntilla who alone filed it. But, as it
happened, he abandoned his motion when he did not come up either to the Supreme Court or to the
HRET to cause it to be resolved.

And third, Tagolino is barred from claiming that, in disqualifying Richard, the COMELECs First
Division in effect caused the cancellation of his CoC. Tagolino made a binding admission during the
Preliminary Conference before the HRET that the COMELEC did not in fact order such cancellation
of Richards CoC.14 Thus, Tagalino admitted that:

xxxx

3. By Resolution of February 17, 2010, the Comelec disqualified Richard I. Gomez as

candidate for Representative of the Fourth District of Leyte for lack of residency;

4. Gomez filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Comelec En Banc dismissed for lack
of merit by Resolution of May 4, 2010;

5. Said May 4, 2010 Resolution of the Comelec did not order the cancellation of Gomez
certificate of candidacy; (Emphasis supplied)

xxxx

Tagolinos admission in paragraph 5 abovethat the COMELEC did not order the cancellation of
Richard Gomezs certificate of candidacyis binding on him, especially since he makes no
allegation that he made such admission through palpable mistake.15
True, the parties raised before the HRET the issue of "whether the substitution of respondent is
valid." But this merely accords with Lucy Gomezs defense in her answer that the COMELEC had
already resolved her substitution of Richard with finality in its Resolution 8890. It did not mean that
the parties were submitting to the HRET for resolution the issue of the final and executory nature of
the COMELEC First Divisions resolution that enabled her to substitute for Richard.

So the Court comes to the real issue in this case: whether or not the HRET can review and reverse a
COMELEC decision, involving a member of the House of Representatives, that had already become
final and executory.

The HRET has no authority to review final and executory resolutions or decisions of the COMELEC
that it rendered pursuant to its powers under the Constitution, no matter if such resolutions or
decisions are erroneous. The parties cannot by agreement confer such authority on HRET. Neither
the HRET nor the Court can set aside the COMELECs final and executory resolutions that paved
the way for Lucy Gomez to substitute her husband.

As for Lucy Gomezs residency qualification, the evidence presented in the case amply supports
HRETs conclusion that she met such qualification.

For all of the above reasons, I vote to deny the petition.

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 246-253.

2 Id. at 259-265.

3 Id. at 266-277.

4 Id. at 278-279.

5 Id. at 281-86.

6 Id. at 303-310.

7 Id. at 311-324.

8 Id. at 85-92.

9 SEC. 2. Affirmation or Oath. The term "Affirmation" or "Oath" refers to an act in which an
individual on a single occasion:

a. appears in person before the notary public;

 b. is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; x x x

10 Rollo, pp. 23-39.

11 Annex "A," Petition, id. at 48-64.

12 39 Phil. 344 (2000).

13 Id. at 354.

14 HRET Records, Vol. I, p. 504.

15Section 4, Rule 139, Rules of Evidence. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or

written made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require
proof. The admission may be contracted only by showing that it was made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was made. (2a)

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

DISSENTING OPINION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

I vote to deny the petition of Silverio R. Tagolino on the ground that after the lapse of the
reglementary period of ten (10) days from the date of proclamation of respondent Lucy Marie Torres-
Gomez as the duly elected Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Leyte, the said
proclamation can no longer be assailed by an election protest or a petition for quo warranto.
Moreover, the substitution by said respondent of her husband Richard Gomez cannot be questioned,
there being no factual basis to assail the decision of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) not
to cancel the certificate of candidacy of respondents husband.

The Petition for Quo Warranto was filed out of time.

Respondent Gomez was proclaimed as the winning candidate for the position of Member of the
House of Representatives on May 12, 2010 whereas the Petition for Quo Warranto was filed by
petitioner Tagolino on May 24, 2010, or twelve days after the proclamation of respondent Gomez.

The pertinent provisions of the Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
provide as follows:

RULE 16. Election Protest. A verified petition contesting the election or returns of any Member of
the House of Representatives shall be filed by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of
candidacy and has been voted for the same office, within ten (10) days after the proclamation of the
winner. The party filing the protest shall be designated as the protestant while the adverse party
shall known as the protestee.
No joint election protest shall be admitted, but the Tribunal, for good and sufficient reasons, may
consolidate individual protests and hear and decide them jointly.

The protest is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read it and that the allegations therein are
true and correct of his knowledge and belief. A verification based on "information and belief," or upon
"knowledge, information and belief," is not a sufficient verification.

An unverified election protest shall not suspend the running of the reglementary period to file the
protest.

RULE 17. Quo Warranto. A verified petition for quo warranto contesting the election of a Member
of the House of Representatives on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines shall be filed by any voter within ten (10) days after the proclamation of the winner. The
party filing the petition shall be designated as the petitioner while the adverse party shall be known
as the respondent.

The rule on verification provided in Section 16 hereof shall apply to petitions for quo warranto.

As correctly asserted by respondent Gomez in her Verified Answer filed before the HRET, the
Petition for Quo Warranto should have been dismissed outright pursuant to Rule 21 of the Rules of
the HRET, quoted below:

RULE 21. Summary Dismissal of Election Contest. An election protest or petition for quo warranto
may be summarily dismissed by the Tribunal without the necessity of requiring the protestee or
respondent to answer if, inter alia: x x x

(2) The petition is filed beyond the period provided in Rules 16 and 17 of these Rules.

This Court has emphasized the importance of compliance with the HRET Rules prescribing
reglementary periods to be observed by the parties in an election contest to expedite the disposition
of election controversies so as not to frustrate the will of the electorate. In Hofer v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal,1 the Court sustained the dismissal by the HRET of the election
protest for failure to comply strictly with the period prescribed by the HRET Rules.

Similarly, Perez v. Commission on Elections2 held that remedies are unavailing once the prescriptive
period to bring the appropriate petition has set in. The pertinent ruling of the Court in Perez is quoted
as follows:

Petitioners remedies should have been (1) to reiterate her prayer in the petition for disqualification,
and move for the issuance of an order by the COMELEC suspending the proclamation of private
respondent pending the hearing of the said petition and, in the event the motion was denied before
the proclamation of private respondent, file a petition for certiorari in this Court with a prayer for a
restraining order to enjoin the proclamation of private respondent; or (2) to file a petition for quo
warranto in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal within ten (10) days after the
proclamation of private respondent as Representative-elect on May 16, 1998. Obviously, neither of
these remedies can be availed of now.3

The HRET and this Court cannot set aside at will the HRET Rules mandating the timely filing of
election contests. Otherwise, a dangerous precedent will be set that will cause uncertainty in the
application of the HRET Rules and instability in the holding of an elective post by a proclaimed
winning candidate that may aversely affect public service.
In view of the foregoing, I submit that the HRET is bereft of jurisdiction to entertain the Petition for
Quo Warranto filed by Tagolino, after the lapse of the reglementary period prescribed by its own
Rules. The proclamation of respondent Gomez has become incontrovertible or unassailable after the
expiration of ten (10) days from its date.

No factual basis to cancel the certificate of candidacy.

The lack of jurisdiction on the part of the HRET to entertain the untimely Petition for Quo Warranto
assailing the proclamation of private respondent Gomez would suffice to dismiss outright the instant
petition. Moreover, the substantive issue extensively discussed in the ponencia of the Honorable
Associate Justice Estela Perlas Bernabe, particularly as to the "divergent effects of disqualification
and denial of due course to and/or cancellation of COC (Certificate of Candidacy) cases vis--vis
candidate substitution" is inappropriate.

Firstly, the certificate of candidacy of Richard Gomez, the husband of respondent Gomez, was not
cancelled by the COMELEC.

Secondly, the decision by the COMELEC not to cancel said certificate of candidacy was proper as
the COMELEC did not reach any finding that Richard Gomez deliberately committed a
misrepresentation, which is a requisite for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy under Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code. In Mitra v. Commission on Elections,4 the Court ruled:

Section 74, in relation to Section 78, of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) governs the cancellation
of, and grant or denial of due course to, COCs. The combined application of these sections requires
that the candidates stated facts in the COC be true, under pain of the COCs denial or cancellation if
any representation of a material fact is made.

xxx

The false representation that these provisions mention must necessarily pertain to a material fact.
The critical material facts are those that refer to a candidates qualifications for elective office, such
as his or her citizenship and residence. The candidates status as a registered voter in the political
unit where he or she is a candidate similarly falls under this classification as it is a requirement that,
by law (the Local Government Code), must be reflected in the COC. The reason for this is obvious:
the candidate, if he or she wins, will work for and represent the political unit where he or she ran as a
candidate.

The false representation under Section 78 must likewise be a "deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." Given the purpose of
the requirement, it must be made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be
candidates qualifications for public office. Thus, the misrepresentation that Section78 addresses
cannot be the result of a mere innocuous mistake, and cannot exist in a situation where the intent to
deceive is patently absent, or where no deception on the electorate results. The deliberate character
of the misrepresentation necessarily follows from a consideration of the consequences of any
material falsity: a candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected, he
cannot serve; in both cases, he can be prosecuted for violation of the election laws.

Based on these standards, we find that Mitra did not commit any deliberate material
misrepresentation in his COC. The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in its appreciation of the
evidence, leading it to conclude that Mitra is not a resident of Aborlan, Palawan. The COMELEC,
too, failed to critically consider whether Mitra deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform or hide a
fact that would otherwise render him ineligible for the position of Governor of Palawan. (Emphasis
supplied and citations omitted.)

The ponencia of Justice Bernabe indulged in the legal fiction that the certificate of candidacy of
Richard Gomez was cancelled when it in fact was not. Neither can the Court now on its own decree
such cancellation in the absence of any factual basis or evidentiary support for a finding that Richard
Gomez committed a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise
render him ineligible."

Substitution was valid.

Since the COMELEC did not cancel the certificate of candidacy of Richard Gomez but only
disqualified him from running in the elections, the substitution by respondent Gomez of Richard
Gomez squarely falls within the ambit of Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), which
uses the broad language "disqualification for any cause," as follows:

Section 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. If after the last
day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited
political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and
certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who
died, withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party
concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the
preceding sections not later than mid-day of the day of the election. If the death, withdrawal or
disqualification should occur between the day before the election and mid-day of election day, said
certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a
candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the country, with
the Commission.

Petition for Quo Warranto lacked factual basis.

Regarding the issue of whether a Petition for Quo Warranto is a proper legal remedy to assail the
validity of the substitution of a candidate under Section 77 of the OEC, it suffices here to state that,
under Rule 17 of the HRET Rules, the grounds for a Petition for Quo Warranto are ineligibility to run
for a public office or disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines.

Pertinently, Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution, which provides for the qualifications of a
Member of the House of Representatives, states as follows:

Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born

citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to
read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he
shall be elected, and a resident thereat for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding
the day of the election.

The above-quoted provision refers to the personal attributes of a candidate. The ponencia did not
find any of the above qualifications absent in the case of respondent Gomez. However, the ponencia
attributed the ineligibility of respondent Gomez to its erroneous assumption that the certificate of
candidacy of Richard Gomez, whom she substituted, should have been cancelled. As explained
above, the COMELEC correctly did not so cancel said certificate, it having found no factual basis to
do so. This being the case and the fact that the Petition for Quo Warranto was filed out of time, there
is no need to dwell on the issue of whether the Petition for Quo Warranto may validly question the
validity of the substitution of a candidate and to discuss the constitutional boundaries of the
respective jurisdictions of the COMELEC and the HRET.

In view of the foregoing, I reiterate my vote to dismiss the Petition for Certiorari filed by Tagolino.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

Footnotes

1 G.R. No. 158833, May 12, 2004, 428 SCRA 383, 386-387.

2 375 Phil. 1106(1999).

3 Id. at 1116.

4 G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010, 622 SCRA 744, 768-770.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 158833 May 12, 2004

DULCE ANN K. HOFER, petitioner,

vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and BELMA C.
CABILAO, respondents.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Procedural rules in election cases are designed to achieve not only a correct but also
an expeditious determination of the popular will of the electorate.1 Unfortunately, the interpretation
of said rules by the petitioner has prolonged the termination of the instant case.

Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
assailing the Resolutions2 dated March 27, 2003 and May 8, 2003 rendered by the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal in HRET Case No. 01-006, entitled "Dulce Ann K. Hofer vs.
Belma A. Cabilao."

The antecedents of the present petition are as follows:

Dulce Ann K. Hofer, herein petitioner, and Belma A. Cabilao, herein respondent, were
congressional candidates in the lone congressional district of Zamboanga Sibugay3 during
the May 14, 2001 national and local elections. On May 18, 2001, respondent was proclaimed
 the duly elected congressional representative with a total of 55,740 votes, as against
petitioners 43,566, or a margin of 12,174 votes.

Claiming that massive vote buying, tampering of election returns and other irregularities were
committed in 671 precincts during the voting, counting of votes and canvassing of election returns,
petitioner, on May 28, 2001, filed with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) an
election protest, docketed as HRET Case No. 01-006.

After the issues were joined, the case was set for preliminary conference on September 13, 2001.

Subsequently or on July 22, 2002, the revision proceeding of contested ballots, pursuant to Section
35 of the 1998 HRET Rules, as amended, commenced with the identification by petitioner of the total
contested precincts.

On August 1, 2002, the revision of the ballots for 481 pilot contested precincts was completed. The
Report of the Canvass Board Service on the results of the revision shows a reduction of votes for
petitioner and respondent, thus:

Gain (+)
Votes before Revision Votes after Revision Claims
Loss (-)
Protestant 18,138 17,799 1,094 339 (-)

Protestee 23,793 23,492 1,425 301 (-)

During the preliminary conference, both parties, through their respective counsel, agreed on the
following dates of hearing: October 15, 16, 29, 30, November 5, 6 and 18, 2002 at 9:30 oclock in the
morning and 1:30 oclock in the afternoon. The Hearing Commissioner informed them that they could
set succeeding dates later. However, the hearings set on October 15, 16, 30 and November 5 and 6,
2002 were cancelled at the instance of petitioner. Only the hearing on October 29, 2002 took place.

On February 12, 2003, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the protest for petitioners failure to
prosecute for an unreasonable period of time.

In a Resolution dated March 27, 2003, the HRET granted the motion and dismissed petitioners
election protest, ratiocinating thus:

"We find the long delay in the prosecution of this election protest to be inexcusable. A
perusal of the records reveal that out of the seven (7) hearing dates set by protestant for the
reception of her evidence, six (6) settings were postponed through her instance. Only one
hearing on the 29th of October 2002 proceeded, in which hearing the protestant presented
documentary evidence consisting of election documents. It may be stressed that protestant,
despite the lapse of more than six (6) months, reckoned from October 15, 2002, has not yet
completed the presentation of her evidence. Having exhausted the period of twenty (20)
days and having been granted an extension of ten (10) days without presenting all her
evidence, protestant is deemed to have slept on her right. Her failure to take necessary steps
to prosecute this case justify its dismissal.

xxx
 Rule 59 of the 1998 HRET Rules lays down the period allotted to each party in the
presentation of his evidence, thus:

RULE 59. Time Limit for Presentation of Evidence. - Each party is given a period of
twenty (20) working days, preferably successive, to complete the presentation of his
evidence, including the formal offer thereof. This period shall begin to run from the
first date set for the presentation of the partys evidence, either before the Tribunal or
before a Hearing Commissioner. Once commenced, presentation of the evidence-in-
chief shall continue every working day until completed or until the period granted for
such purpose is exhausted. Upon motion based on meritorious grounds, the Tribunal
may grant a ten-day extension of the period herein fixed.

The hearing for any particular day or days may be postponed or cancelled upon the
request of the party presenting evidence, provided, however; that the delay caused
by such postponement or cancellation shall be charged to said partys period for
presenting evidence.

Simply stated, each party is given a limited period of twenty (20) days in the presentation of
his evidence, including the formal offer thereof. This requirement in the presentation of
evidence is prompted by the nature of election contest, which should be decided as soon as
practicable. The period of 20 days given to each of the parties may be extended by the
Tribunal upon meritorious grounds and on motion of the party concerned. This time limit
prescribed by the Rules in the presentation of evidence contemplates not only actual period
spent in presenting before the Tribunal, but also the period used in the taking of deposition of
the witnesses under Rule 61 of the 1998 HRET Rules."

Petitioner then filed with the HRET a motion for reconsideration but was denied in a Resolution
dated May 8, 2003.

Hence, this petition for certiorari.

Petitioner contends that the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing her protest on
mere technicalities, thus, depriving her of her right to due process.

The Solicitor General, in his comment, maintains that the HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion
in dismissing petitioners protest considering that she failed to prosecute it within the period allowed
by the rules.

Petitioner invokes our ruling in Arao vs. COMELEC4 that "the choice of the people to represent them
may not be bargained away by sheer negligence of a party, nor defeated by technical rules of
procedure." What she is saying is that the laws governing election contests, especially appreciation
of ballots and returns, must be liberally interpreted to the end that the will of the electorate in the
choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities.

We are not convinced.

The election protest filed by petitioner is a serious charge which, if true, could unseat protestee as
Representative of her district. Hence, the observance of the HRET Rules in conjunction with our own
Rules of Court, must be taken seriously.
Section 59 of the 1998 HRET Rules, quoted earlier, is explicit. Unfortunately, petitioner did not
comply with it. In fact, despite the lapse of six (6) months (starting October 15, 2002 initial date of
hearing), she failed to present her evidence. Such inaction shows her utter lack of interest to
prosecute her case.

In Baltazar vs. Commission of Elections,5 we held:

"By their very nature and given the public interest involved in the determination of the results
of an election, the controversies arising from the canvass must be resolved speedily,
otherwise the will of the electorate would be frustrated. And the delay brought about by the
tactics resorted to by petitioner is precisely the very evil sought to be prevented by election
statutes and controlling case law on the matter."

We thus find that the HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners
election protest. If at all, she has only herself to blame for her predicament.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,

Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Footnote

1 Gementiza vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 140884, March 6, 2001, 353 SCRA 724.

2 Annexes "A" and "B", Petition for Certiorari, Rollo at 35-49.

3 Former Third District of Zamboanga del Sur.

4 G.R. No. 103877, June 23, 1992, 210 SCRA 290.

5 G.R. No. 140158, January 29, 2001, 350 SCRA 518, 526-527.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 103877 June 23, 1992

BENJAMIN F. ARAO, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and WARLITO PULMONES, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:

This petition for certiorari 1 seeks to set aside, for having allegedly been issued with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of
jurisdiction, the Decision of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in EPC No. 88-1, 2 promulgated January 23, 1992, which
reconsidered the Resolution of its First Division of December 11, 1991,3 finding petitioner (protestee therein) "winner of the election protest
by a margin of 378 votes in lieu of the original lead of protestee of 417 votes over protestant at the time of the former's proclamation by the
City Board of Canvassers of Pagadian City," and declaring instead private respondent (protestant therein) duly elected mayor thereof.

Petitioner Benjamin Arao and private respondent Warlito Pulmones were candidates for the Office of City Mayor of Pagadian City on the
January 18, 1988, local elections. After canvass, petitioner was shown to have garnered 12,447 votes, while private respondent, only 12,030
votes 4 or a margin of 417 votes in favor of petitioner. Consequently, on January 21, 1988, petitioner was proclaimed City Mayor elect of
Pagadian City. 5

On January 28, 1988, private respondent filed his Protest with COMELEC 6 more particularly alleging that "while fraud and anomalies were
rampant in practically all the voting centers of Pagadian City, the violations were glaringly and notably perpetrated in the following districts
and/or precincts, to wit: (a) (I)n all the three (3) precints of Kawit District . . . (b) (I)n Tuburan District . . . particularly in Precincts 77 and 80 . .
. (c) (I)n Bonifacio District, particularly Precinct 69 . . . (d) [I)n Sta. Lucia District, particularly Precinct No. 42 . . . (e) (I)n all of the seven (7)
precincts in Sto. Nio District . . . (f) (I)n San Jose District, particularly Precinct No. 32 . . . (g) (I)n Precinct No. 33 at San Jose District . . . (h)
(I)n Precinct No. 34 of San Jose District . . . (i) (I)n all of the precincts in San Pedro District . . . (i) (I) n Precincts 19 and 22 of Gatas District . .
. (k) . . . in all the precincts in Balangasa District but more notably in Precincts 8 and 11 . . .

On February 8 1988, petitioner filed his Answer with 7 Counterprotest However, COMELEC (First Division) dismissed the courterprotest per
its Resolution of February 7, 1991, for failure to pay the required filing fee within the reglementary period. 8

On February 15, 1988, or after the 10-day period to file an election protest, private respondent filed an Amended Protest enumerating therein
thirteen (13) precincts which were not previously specified: Precincts I-A, 4, 6, 9, 17, 20, 21, 30, 31, 35, 36, 50 and 70. 9 Actually, other
precincts, i.e., Precincts 101, 110, 111, 112, 113, 121, 122, 129, 137, 143, 153 108 and 131, which were not particularly mentioned in the
Petition, were included in the Amended Protest. 10

On March 3, 1988, petitioner filed his Protestee's Comments and Observations on the Amended Protest, although received by COMELEC
only on April 4, 1988. 11

On February 7, 1991, COMELEC (First Division) issued the following Resolution:

Apparently, the Commission taking into consideration the comments and observations of protestee, was convinced that
the amended protest was not admissible as the record failed to yield any formal order admitting the amended
protest. 12

On December 11, 1991, COMELEC (First Division) issued a Resolution par. 4 of which states:

4. Protestant filed his Amended Protest on February 15, 1988, although there is nothing on record that shows the same
was duly admitted; the record shows, however, that the Protestee submitted his "Comments and Observations on the
Amended Protest" in a formal document dated March 3, 1988 and received by this Commission on April 4, 1988. 13

In holding that there was nothing on record showing that Protestant's Amended Protest was duly admitted, public respondent's First Division
apparently overlooked its Order of April 7, 1988, which reads:

For consideration is the Protestee's Comments and Observations on the Amended Protest dated March 3, 1988, filed
by Counsel for Protestee praying that the amended protest dated February 15, 1988, filed by Protestant be denied
admission. It appearing from the records of the case that Protestant's Amended Protest was filed in accordance with
Sec. 17, Rule X of COMELEC Resolution No. 1996, the Commission hereby denies the herein Protestee's Comments
and Observations on the Protestant's Amended Protest.

In the Resolution En Banc of this Court dated September 7, 1989, in G.R. No. 88036, where petitioner questioned the "transfer of the
questioned ballot boxes to Cagayan de Oro in view of the serious peace and order problem in Pagadian City, it clearly appears that the
Amended Protest was in fact admitted, thus

. . . Besides, the Order of April 7, 1988, admitting the amended protest was questioned only on May 11, 1989, when the
herein petition was filed, or way beyond the 30-day reglementary period prescribed in Article IX-A. Section 7, of the
Constitution.

On December 11, 1991, after revision of ballots and hearing, COMELEC (First Division) promulgated a Resolution the dispositive portion of
which reads:
 WHEREFORE . . . the Commission (First Division) RESOLVES, as it hereby RESOLVES, to DISMISS Election Protest
Case No. 88-1 and DECLARES protestee winner of the election protest by a margin of 378 votes in lieu of the original
lead of protestee by 417 votee over protestant at the time of the former's proclamation by the City Board of Canvassers
of Pagadian City. 14

On December 16, 1991, private respondent filed his Motion for Reconsideration. 15

Petitioner claims that on January 15, 1992, he filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration of private
respondent 16 raising the following points:

(a) examination and appreciation of ballots should have been confined to 31 protested precincts per original protest
filed January 28, 1988, considering that amended protest was decreed as "not admissible"' in the February 7, 1991,
Resolution of COMELEC (First Division);

(b) examination of ballots to determine identical handwritings should be limited to Precincts 19, 22, 8 and 11 as alleged
in the original protest;

(c) it was contrary to basic rules for COMELEC to pass upon ballots (in favor of protestee) as identical with each other
when they were not even questioned by protestant, thus depriving protestee the right to present controverting
evidence;

(d) COMELEC failed to consider its records showing that there were 139 assisted illiterate or disabled voters, hence, to
invalidate their votes is technically a disenfranchisement and a subversion of sovereign will;

(e) it is statistically improbable for a candidate to have utilized 332 groups (persons) to write 723 ballots (a ratio of 1
person for 2 ballots);

(f) mathematical computation of protestant in his motion for reconsideration is erroneous and self-serving; and,

(g) COMELEC should have credited 10 more votes for protestee as affirmed/admitted during the revision of ballots.

However, in his Comment, private respondent Pulmones denies all these averments of petitioner, and claims that they contain "baseless and
unfounded" allegations which are precisely to be rejected in this petition.

On January 23, 1992, COMELEC En Banc promulgated its Decision

thus

ACCORDINGLY, the Commission En Banc hereby renders judgment: a. GRANTING Protestant Pulmones' Motion for
Reconsideration; b. DENYING Protestee Arao's Manifestation for the dismissal of Protestants Motion for
Reconsideration; c. AFFIRMING the factual findings at the Commission (First Division) relative to the examination of
the contested ballots of both Protestant and Protestee; d. DECLARING Protestant Warlito Pulmones as the duly
elected Mayor of Pagadian City in the January 18, 1988 elections with a margin of 516 votes against Protestee
Benjamin F. Arao; and, e. ORDERING Protestee Arao to VACATE his office and surrender the same no Protestant
Pulmones once this decision becomes final and executory. 17

Meanwhile, on February 28, 1992, acting on the motion of Pulmones, respondent COMELEC granted the issuance of a writ of execution to
enforce its Decision of January 23, 1992.

On March 4, 1992, petitioner filed with Us an urgent motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order
against the February 28, 1992, Order of public respondent.

On March 5, 1992, this Court issued a temporary restraining order as prayed for by petitioner, and required private respondent to comment
thereon.

In his petition, Arao raises five issues which nevertheless may simply be reduced into whether respondent COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion or exceeded its jurisdiction: (1) when it examined and invalidated 426 ballots for petitioner in precincts not included in the original
protest but only in the amended protest filed beyond the ten-day period; (2) when it invalidated 466 ballots for petitioner as having identical
handwritings although protestant did not raise such issues, nor impugn the validity of the ballots on such ground; and, (3) when it concluded
that certain ballots were with identical handwritings, some marked and others stray, and deducting them from the total votes of petitioner
without stating the grounds therefor.

Before resolving these issues a distinction should at the outset be drawn between an original action for certiorari, as in this case brought
under Sec. 7, Art. IX-A, 1987 Constitution, and an appeal by certiorari or petition for review. In the special civil action for certiorari, the main
issue is lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction, while an appeal by certiorari or petition for review
is limited to the consideration of questions of law. Thus, in the oft-cited case of Padilla vs. COMELEC, 18 We ruled:

The principal relief sought by petitioner is predicated on the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court as provided in Section
11, Article XII-C, 1973 Constitution. It is, explained in Aratuc vs. Commission on Elections (88 SCRA 251), "not as
broad as it used to be" under the old Constitution and it "should be confined to instances of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to patent and substantial denial of due process" . . . Moreover, the legislative construction . . . of the
constitutional provision has narrowed down "the scope and extent of the inquiry the Court is supposed to undertake
to what is strictly the office of certiorari as distinguished from review." And in Lucman vs. Dimaporo . . . a case decided
under the Constitution of 1935, this Court, speaking through then Chief Justice Concepcion. ruled that "this
Court cannot . . . review rulings or findings of hot of the Commission an Elections . . . as there is "no reason to believe
that the framers of our Constitution intended to place the [said] Commission created and explicitly
made independent by the Constitution itself on a lower level" than statutory administrative organs (whose factual
findings are not disturbed by courts of justice, except when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial
evidence in support of such findings") . . . Factual matters were deemed not proper for consideration in proceedings
brought either ":as an original action for certiorari or as an appeal by certiorari . . . [for] the main issue in . . . certiorari is
one of jurisdiction lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction" while "petitions
for review on certiorari are limited to the consideration of questions of law."

The aforementioned rule was reiterated in the cases of Ticzon and Bashier . . . Indeed, as early as the year 1938,
applying Section 4, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution . . . this Court held that the Electoral Commissions "exclusive
jurisdiction" being clear from the language of the provision, "judgment rendered . . . in the exercise of such an
acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference, except . . . "upon a clear showing of
such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process of law" . . . Originally lodged
in the legislature that exclusive function of being the "sole judge" of contest "relating to the election, returns and
qualifications" of members of the legislature was transferred "in its totality" to the Electoral Commission by the 1935
Constitution. That grant of power, to use the language of the late Justice Jose P. Laurel. "was intended to be
as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature . . . These observations remain valid and
applicable to the exercise of that function, as now vested in the respondent Commission by the 1973 Constitution.

Earlier, in Sidro v. Commission on Elections, 19 it was held

. . . This Court has invariably followed the principle that in the absence of any jurisdictional infirmity or an error of law of
the utmost gravity, the conclusion reached by respondent Commission on a matter that falls within its competence is
entitled to the utmost respect. So it has been reiterated time and time again.

Although the Padilla case herein before quoted was decided under the 1973 Constitution, the doctrine therein enunciated is still applicable
under the 1987 Constitution considering that Sec. 11, Art. XII-C of the 1973 Constitution, invoked therein has been retained in the 1987
Constitution except for the limitation "as may be provided by this Constitution or by law". Consequently, unless it is shown that the
Constitution itself or any law modifies the provision that ". . . any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission 20 may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof," and none is pointed to Us, our
interpretation of the pertinent provisions adverted to in both Constitutions, as well as our adherence thereto, cannot be any less firm and
faithful.

What is certain from the above disquisition is that the extraordinary power of this Court to pass upon an order or decision of COMELEC
should be exercised restrictively, with care and caution, while giving at the highest regard and respect due a constitutional body. For, not
every abuse of discretion justifies the original action of certiorari; it must be grave. Nor any denial of due process within its ambit; it must be
patent and it must be substantial. The test therefore is whether petitioner has demonstrated convincingly that COMELEC has committed
grave abuse of discretion or exceeded its jurisdiction amounting to patent and substantial denial of due process in issuing the challenged
decision. Here, petitioner has utterly failed.

As regards the first issue of petitioner, it appears that the original Protest of private respondent Pulmones did in fact cover all the forty-five
(45) precincts the COMELEC took cognizance of in resolving EPC No. 88-1. As alleged in par. 5 of his Protest

5. That while fraud and anomalies were rampant in practically all the voting centers of Pagadian City, the violations
were glaringly and notably perpetrated in the following districts and/or precincts . . .

The prayer in the same Protest also confirms that it refers to forty-five (45) precincts as it seeks the "opening and recounting of votes cast
in all a precincts in Kawit District; Precs. 77 and 80 in Tuburan District; Precs. 77, 42, 58, 80 and 70 all of Pagadian City; Precs. 69 of
Bonifacio District; Precs. 42 and all precincts in Sta. Lucia District; all seven precincts in the District of Sto. Nio; Precs. 32, 33 and 34,
and all precincts of San Jose District; all the precincts in San Pedro District; Precs. 19 and 32 and all other precincts in the Gatas district; and
Precs. 8 and 11 and all other precincts of Balangasan District, all of Pagadian City" (emphasis supplied). Specifically, the precincts covered
are: (a) all precincts of Kawit (63, 64 and 65; (b) two in Tuburan (77 and 80); (c) one in Bonifacio (69); (d) all in Sta. Lucia (42 and 50); (e) all
in Sto. Nio (11-A, 12, 13-A, 14, 15 and 16); (f) all in San Jose (30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35 and 36); (g) all in San Pedro (52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58,
59, 60, 61 and 62); (h) all in Gatas (17, 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22); (i) all in Balangasan (1-A, 4, 6, 8, 9 and 11); and, (j) Prec. 70 (unspecified
district). The sum total of these precincts is forty-five (45), which tallies with the total number of precincts contested by protestant, now private
respondent.
It may be noted that while protestant did attempt to introduce new precincts in his Amended Protest filed on February 15, 1988, namely,
Precincts Nos. 101, 111, 112, 113, 121, 122, 129, 137, 143, 153, 108 and 131, which were not enumerated in the original Protest, these
precincts were not taken into consideration by COMELEC in deciding EPC No. 88-1. Hence, the first issue clearly appears to be based on a
wrong premise.

On the second issue, the failure or omission of protestant to raise the question of identical handwriting or of impugning the validity of the
ballots on that ground, resulting in the invalidation of 466 ballots for petitioner, does not preclude respondent COMELEC from rejecting them
on that ground.

Unlike an ordinary suit, an election protest is of utmost public concern. The rights a of the contending parties in the position aspired for most
yield to the far greater interest of the citizens in the sanctity of the electoral process. This being the case, the choice of the people to
represent them may not be bargained away by the sheer negligence of a party, nor defeated by technical rules of procedure. Thus,
COMELEC cannot just close its eyes to the illegality of the ballots brought before it, where the ground for the invalidation was omitted by the
protestant. As held in Yalung v. Atienza: 21

. . . Inasmuch as it is not necessary to specify in detail in the motion of protest in which of the ballots the frauds and
irregularities were committed, such a procedure being well-nigh impossible, and it being enough to allege in what the
fraud and irregularity consisted, and that had it not been for such anomalies. the result of the election would have been
otherwise, all of which have been alleged in the motion of protest in question, the court or the commissioners appointed
by the same may revise all the ballots, admitting the valid and legal ones and rejecting the others, with a view to
arriving at the lawfully expressed will of the electors. The institution or popular suffage is one of public interest and not
a private interest of the candidates, so that if in the revision of the ballots some illegal ballots are found which have not
been specifically impugned in the motion of protest, the court may reject them motu proprio, since it is not essential that
the contestant set forth the grounds of his contest with the same precision required of pleading in ordinary civil
cases (20 Corpus Juris, 227; emphasis supplied).

In the case of Lucero vs. De Guzman (45 Phil., 852), this court stalled the following: "The purpose of the legislature in
declaring that contests should not be conducted upon pleadings or by action was to free the courts as far as possible
from the technicalities incident to ordinary proceeding by action and to enable the courts to administer justice speedily
and without complication."

The trial court, then, did not err in taking into account in the revision of the ballots, irregularities not set forth in the
motion of protest.

With regard to the third issue, the complaint of petitioner against the alleged omission of COMELEC to state the reasons for its conclusion
that certain ballots were with Identical handwritings, some marked and others stray, does not in any magnitude diminish the straightforward
statement of the public respondent that it painstakingly examined and appreciated individually the contested ballots for both protestant and
protestee in accordance with existing norms . . . 22

Petitioner did not question this alleged irregularity by bringing the matter to the attention of COMELEC (First Division) immediately after the
promulgation of its Resolution. The Resolution containing the alleged jurisdictional defect was promulgated on December 11, 1991. However,
it was not until he filed his petition on February 17, 1992, that petitioner complained for the first time. Certainly, that Resolution having been
rendered by division of COMELEC could have been subject of a motion for reconsideration. Admittedly, petitioner did not take steps to have
the matter reconsidered by public respondent before coming to Us.

Having been declared winner in the Resolution of December 11, 1991, petitioner would not ordinarily be expected to initiate a motion for
reconsideration. Nonetheless, he could have brought up his objections in his Memorandum in opposition to the Protestant's Motion for
Reconsideration so that public respondent could have properly ruled thereon. Consequently, petitioner may be deemed to have waived his
right to question the Resolution when he failed to act accordingly despite the opportunity so to do. He should not be permitted, in other
words, to remain mute and "unaffected in the face of a perceived jurisdictional defect and. worse, profit from his quiescence, only to grumble
in the end when it turns out to be prejudicial to his interest. As it has been said, [n]either equity nor the law relieves those who seek aid in
Court merely to avoid the effects of their own negligence . . ." (Lipscomb v. Talbott, 243 Mo 1, 36 [1912]).

WHEREFORE, finding no abuse of discretion, much less grave, patent and substantial, the petition is DENIED.

The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on March 3, 1992, is hereby lifted and set aside.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr. Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., and Romero, JJ., concur.

Nocon, J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1 Filed pursuant to Sec. 7. Art. IX-A, 1987 Constitution.

2 Annex "I", Petition, Rollo, pp. 197-203.

3 Annex "F", Petition, Rollo, pp. 83-162.

4 Erroneously alleged in par. IV. 1, Petition, as "12,034".

5 Annex "F", Petition, Rollo, pp. 83-162.

6 Annex "A", Petition; Protest, par. b; Rollo, pp. 45-49.

7 Annex "B", Petition, Rollo, pp, 53-60.

8 Annex "E", Petition, Rollo, pp, 75-81.

9 Annex "C". Petition, Rollo, pp. 61-72.

10 Ibid.

11 Resolution, COMELEC (First Division), prom. December 11, 1991, p. 3.

12 Annex "E", Petition, Rollo, pp. 75.

13 Annex "F", Petition, Rollo, pp. 83-162.

14 Annex "F", Petition, Rollo, pp. 83-162.

15 Annex "G", Petition, Rollo, pp. 163-169.

16 Annex "H", Petition, Rollo pp. 170-195.

17 Annex "I", Petition. Rollo, pp. 197-203,

18 G.R. Nos. 68351-52, July 9, 1985; 137 SCRA 424.

19 G.R. No. 64033, July 25, 1983; 123 SCRA 759.

20 Art. IX, 1987 Constitution refers to Constitutional Commissions, namely, the Civil Service Commission (par. B), the
Commission on Elections (par. C) and the Commission on Audit (par. D).

21 52 Phil. 781 (1929).

22 Resolution, COMELEC (First Division), of December 11, 1991, p. 8.