The Impact of Israeli Intelligence

Collection on the United States

Samuel J. Caramela
INTL443 B002 Win 14
Professor Amanda Bowers
March 1, 2014
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Introduction

Israel and the United States intelligence services have cooperated since the start of the

cold war, post-World War II. Israels primary intelligence agencies are Mossad, AMAM, and

SHABAK, with Mossad as the primary liaison agency to the Central Intelligence Agency of the

United States. These two allied agencies have cooperated in every aspect of intelligence

collection and operations. Despite this relationship, Israel has conducted a long running

collection program against the United States, on all levels of its government, economy,

intelligence services, and military. As contrary as it may seem, the collection of intelligence

against allies is a common practice among nations and one that the United States also performs

against Israel and its other allies. Israels collection of intelligence against the United States does

not undermine their relationship, or warrant the United States take diplomatic actions against

them. Their common interests far outweigh any difficulties created by their mutual spying

against each other.

Israeli Intelligence Collection

From the beginning, cooperation between Israel and the United States intelligence

communities grew out of mutual interest in the Soviet Union and Middle East. The United States

needed intelligence about the Soviet Union, which the Israeli Mossad had access to through

Jewish immigrants coming into Israel from the Soviet Union (Kahana 2010). Israel needed

intelligence regarding their hostile neighbors in the Middle East, and support for military

operations when threatened by those same neighbors. This cooperation continued throughout the

succeeding years while Israel cemented their relationship with the United States.

From the beginning of the relationship between Israel and the United States both

countries resorted to collecting intelligence from the other when they believed the intelligence
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was incomplete. One of the first major incidents was the 1957 Israeli operation to procure

enriched uranium from the United States through an Israeli front company within the United

States. For this operation, Israel recruited Dr. Zalman Shapiro. As a noted nuclear scientist, Dr.

Shapiro was involved in the Manhattan project and had developed connections within that

community of scientists. He formed the Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation with

monies provided by Israeli Intelligence, and began producing nuclear fissile material for clients,

including the United States Military. Through this corporate setup, Dr. Shapiro was able to

funnel large amounts of enriched uranium to Israel before United States authorities caught on in

1964 (Kahana 2010).

Another major Israeli spy operation against the United States was the recruiting of the

United States citizen, Jonathan Pollard, by Israel. Pollard collected satellite imagery and passed it

to his Israeli handlers, which contained information mostly regarding Arab and Soviet states and

their military weapons capabilities (Kahana 2010). This was in response to what Israel perceived

as the United States providing inadequate satellite imagery intelligence. Israels LAKAM agency

(Bureau of Scientific Liaison), which no longer exists, was responsible for the recruiting and

handling of Pollard. Although Mossad received the information he provided, they were unaware

the information was collected covertly from the United States (Kahana 2010). According to

International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence,

following the 1954 episode in Egypt known as the Bad Business, when the
Israeli intelligence services used Egyptian Jews to sabotage British and American
sites in Egypt, Israel resolved never to activate local Jews to spy against their
government. The advantages never justified the inevitable deterioration in the
position of the Jewish community in the given state. The LAKAM, a somewhat
amateurish intelligence outlet, disregarded this decision and operated Pollard.
(Kahana 2010).
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These past incidents provide perspective in the evaluation of present intelligence attacks

by Israel, and the proper response both diplomatically and through counterintelligence

measures. The relationship between the United States and Israel is as strong today as

ever.

Today, Israels intelligence collection and covert operations continue against the United

States. According to the FBI, when it comes to industrial espionage and the collection of

economic intelligence in the United States, they rate Israel as second only to China in their

collection efforts (Ketcham 2009). Israel uses government-sponsored companies to collaborate

with United States firms in an effort to gain industrial secrets and economic information.

Israel also conducts intelligence operations designed to acquire proprietary information

from corporations within the United States and to collect massive amounts of communications

data; their primary method is through computer intrusion (Ketcham 2009). Unfortunately,

Israels techniques are far more advanced than the average hacking conducted by other countries

from outside the United States. Israel has created companies that develop high technology

devices for massive collection of communications data, including voice recordings. When United

States communications companies needed to comply with government regulations requiring the

preservation of call data, they contracted Israeli companies to provide the service (Ketcham

2009).

Israeli companies Narus and Verint now have their system fully embedded in AT&T and

Verizon networks, and provide the service that allows the National Security Agency to collect

the metadata that it receives for their communications surveillance program. The problem is that

United States counterintelligence officials have now learned that Narus and Verint are owned by

former Unit 8200 intelligence agents and are partly funded by the Israeli government (Ketchum
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2009). Unit 8200 is Israels version of the United States National Security Agency under

AMAN, the Israeli military intelligence agency. With their equipment embedded in the United

States communications network, Israeli intelligence has easy access to the same information

provided to the National Security Agency.

Since the discovery of the connection between these companies and Israeli intelligence,

the Central Intelligence Agency has attempted to monitor their access from remote locations

through their use of embedded trojans. Other countries have also come forward reporting

irregular intrusions into their networks with Verint equipment installed. These Israeli companies

have installed their equipment in many countries throughout the world.

United States Solutions

To combat Israels attempts to collect commercial intelligence from United States

companies, the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation, Counterintelligence Unit, must

develop a procedure that involves vetting foreign companies that do business or engage in joint

ventures with United States companies. If present federal laws are ineffective in combatting this

type of espionage, then the intelligence community must lobby congress to enact legislation that

will enable law enforcement to combat the theft of this proprietary information or limit foreign

government sponsored companies from engaging in business with United States companies.

Rectifying the situation created by the installation of Verint and Narus equipment into

our communications grid may be more difficult. With this equipment providing service to the

National Security Agency, it would be difficult to remove it from the network without first

developing a replacement technology. The National Security Agency could develop technology

that would block remote access by Israeli intelligence, but this would limit Verint and Narus
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from administering the network remotely. This would require continuous management of those

particular nodes by the National Security Agency.

At the diplomatic level, the United States must be careful due to the intelligence

operations they conduct against Israel. Diplomatic relations between the United States and Israel

are such that the United States could discuss the mutual cessation of each program conducted

against the other, but the United States needs Israeli cooperation as much as they need the United

States. Diplomacy rather than diplomatic actions are warranted in this situation.

Conclusion

After its creation, the State of Israel became an ally of the United States and cooperation

between their intelligence services was born. Through the years and up to today, Israel has

conducted intelligence collection against the United States when it determined it was necessary.

The United States also collected intelligence against Israel during those years and continues to

target them today. As contrary as it may seem, it is common practice among nations to collect

intelligence on their allies. These collection efforts are not perceived as hostile because the

information gathered by the collecting nation is usually acquired for their defense and not for

attack on the source nation. The majority of Israels collections against the United States are to

obtain information on their regional enemies, or to obtain technological information the United

States is unwilling to provide. None of the collection is aimed towards directly hurting United

States interests. As this type of collection is common among allied nations, and it does not

warrant diplomatic action, nor does it undermine relations between Israel and the United States.
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References

Greenwald, Glenn, Ewen MacAskill, and Laura Poitras. "NSA Shares Raw Intelligence
including Americans' Data with Israel." The Gaurdian. September 13, 2013.
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/11/nsa-americans-personal-data-israel-
documents (accessed March 01, 2014).
Kahana, Ephraim. "Mossad-CIA Cooperation." International Journal of Intelligence and
CounterIntelligence 14, no. 3 (October 2010): 409-420.
Ketcham, Christopher. "Breaking the Taboo on Israel's Spying." Alternet. March 09, 2009.
http://www.alternet.org/print/story/130891/breaking_the_taboo_on_israel%27s_spying_e
fforts_on_the_united_states (accessed March 01, 2014).
Pike, John. "Aman." Global Security.org. July 28, 2011.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/israel/aman.htm (accessed February 19, 2014).
. "Israeli Intelligence Agencies." Federation of American Scientists. June 21, 2012.
https://www.fas.org/irp/world/israel/index.html (accessed February 19, 2014).