Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
200334 July 30, 2014 fruiting tops,"19 and inside Dayaos yellow bag was a brick of
suspected marijuana.20
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent-Appellee,
vs. PO3 Campit prepared the suspected marijuana for laboratory
VICTOR COGAED y ROMANA, Accused-Appellant. testing.21 PSI Bayan personally delivered the suspected
marijuana to the PNP Crime Laboratory.22 Forensic Chemical
Officer Police Inspector Valeriano Panem Laya II performed
DECISION
the tests and found that the objects obtained were indeed
marijuana.23 The marijuana collected from Cogaeds blue bag
LEONEN, J.: had a total weight of 8,091.5 grams.24 The marijuana from
Cogaeds sack weighed 4,246.1 grams.25 The marijuana
The mantle of protection upon one's person and one's effects collected from Dayaos bag weighed 5,092 grams.26 A total of
through Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution is essential to 17,429.6 grams werecollected from Cogaeds and Dayaos
allow citizens to evolve their autonomy and, hence, to avail bags.27
themselves of their right to privacy. The alleged compromise
with the battle against dangerous drugs is more apparent According to Cogaeds testimony during trial, he was at
than real. Often, the compromise is there because law Balbalayan, La Union, "waiting for a jeepney to take him"28to
enforcers neglect to perform what could have been done to the Poblacion of San Gabriel so he could buy pesticide.29 He
uphold the Constitution as they pursue those who traffic this boarded a jeepney and recognized Dayao, his younger
scourge of society. brothers friend.30 Upon arrival at the Poblacion of San
Gabriel, Dayao and Cogaed alighted from the
Squarely raised in this appeal1 is the admissibility of the jeepney.31 Dayao allegedly "asked for [Cogaeds] help in
evidence seized as a result of a warrantless arrest. The police carrying his things, which included a travelling bag and a
officers identified the alleged perpetrator through facts that sack."32 Cogaed agreed because they were both going to the
were not based on their personal knowledge. The information market.33 This was when SPO1 Taracatac approached them,
as to the accuseds whereabouts was sent through a text and when SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed what was inside the
message. The accusedwho never acted suspicious was bags, Cogaed replied that he did not know.34SPO1 Taracatac
identified by a driver. The bag that allegedly contained the then talked to Dayao, however, Cogaed was not privy to their
contraband was required to be opened under intimidating conversation.35 Thereafter, SPO1 Taracatac arrested Dayao
circumstances and without the accused having been fully and Cogaed and brought them to the police station.36 These
apprised of his rights. This was not a reasonable search within facts were corroborated by an eyewitness,Teodoro Nalpu-ot,
the meaning of the Constitution. There was no reasonable who was standing across the parking lot where Cogaed was
suspicion that would allow a legitimate "stop and frisk" action. apprehended.37
The alleged waiver of rights by the accused was not done
intelligently, knowingly, and without improper pressure or At the police station, Cogaed said that "SPO1 Taracatac hit
coercion. [him] on the head."38 The bags were also opened, but Cogaed
never knew what was inside.39
The evidence, therefore, used against the accused should be
excluded consistent with Article III, Section 3 (2) of the It was only later when Cogaed learned that it was marijuana
Constitution. There being no possible admissible evidence, the when he and Dayao were charged with illegal possession of
accused should be acquitted. dangerous drugs under Republic Act No. 9165.40 The
information against them states:
I
That on or about the 25th day of November, 2005, in the
According to the prosecution, at about 6:00 a.m. of Municipality of San Gabriel, Province of La Union, and within
November 25, 2005, Police Senior Inspector Sofronio Bayan the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
(PSI Bayan) of the San Gabriel Police Station in San accused VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA and SANTIAGO DAYAO
Gabriel,La Union, "received a text message from an Y SACPA (who acted with discernment) and JOHN
unidentified civilian informer"2 that one Marvin Buya (also DOE,conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
known as Marvin Bugat) "[would]be transporting another, did then there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
marijuana"3 from Barangay LunOy, San Gabriel, La Union to knowingly, without being authorized by law, have in their
the Poblacion of San Gabriel, La Union.4 control, custody and possession dried marijuana, a dangerous
drug, with a total weight of seventeen thousand,four hundred
twenty-nine and sixtenths (17, 429.6) grams.
PSI Bayan organized checkpoints in order "to intercept the
suspect."5 PSI Bayan ordered SPO1 Jaime Taracatac, Jr.
(SPO1 Taracatac), a member of the San Gabriel Police, to set CONTRARY TO Section 11 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs),
up a checkpoint in the waiting area of passengers from San Article II, of Republic Act No. 9165 (otherwise known as the
Gabriel bound for San Fernando City.6 A passenger jeepney "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002").41
from Barangay Lun-Oy arrived at SPO1 Taracatacs
checkpoint.7 The jeepney driver disembarked and signalled to The case was raffled to Regional Trial Court, Branch 28 of San
SPO1 Taracatac indicating the two male passengers who were Fernando City, La Union.42 Cogaed and Dayao pleaded not
carrying marijuana.8 SPO1 Taracatac approached the two guilty.43 The case was dismissed against Dayao because he
male passengers who were later identified as Victor was only 14 years old at that time and was exempt from
RomanaCogaed and Santiago Sacpa Dayao.9 Cogaed was criminal liability under the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of
carrying a blue bag and a sack while Dayao was holding a 2006 or Republic Act No. 9344.44 Trial against Cogaed
yellow bag.10 ensued. In a decision45 dated May 21, 2008, the Regional
Trial Court found Cogaed guilty. The dispositive portion of the
SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao about the contents decision states:
of their bags.11 Cogaed and Dayao told SPO1 Taracatac that
they did not know since they were transporting the bags as a WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Victor Cogaed y
favor for their barriomatenamed Marvin.12 After this Romana GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of
exchange, Cogaed opened the blue bag, revealing three Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (otherwise
bricks of what looked like marijuana.13Cogaed then muttered, known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002")
"nagloko daytoy nga Marvinen, kastoymet gayam ti and sentences him to suffer life imprisonment, and to pay a
nagyanna,"which translates to "Marvin is a fool, this is what fine of one million pesos (Php 1,000,000.00).46
[is] contained in the bag."14 "SPO1 Taracatac arrested
[Cogaed] and . . . Dayao and brought them to the police
The trial court judge initiallyfound Cogaeds arrest illegal
station."15 Cogaed and Dayao "were still carrying their
considering that "Cogaed at that time was not, at the moment
respective bags"16 inside the station.17
of his arrest, committing a crime nor was shown that hewas
about to do so or that had just done so. He just alighted from
While at the police station, the Chief of Police and the passenger jeepney and there was no outward indication
Investigator PO3 Stanley Campit (PO3 Campit) requested that called for his arrest."47 Since the arrest was illegal, the
Cogaed and Dayao to empty their bags.18 Inside Cogaeds warrantless search should also be considered
sack was "four (4) rolled pieces of suspected marijuana illegal.48 However, the trial court stated that notwithstanding
the illegality of the arrest, Cogaed "waived his right to object However, there are instances when searches are reasonable
to such irregularity"49 when "he did not protest when SPO1 even when warrantless.59 In the Rules of Court,
Taracatac, after identifying himself, asked him to open his searchesincidental to lawful arrests are allowed even without
bag."50 a separate warrant.60 This court has taken into account the
"uniqueness of circumstances involved including the purpose
of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable
Cogaed appealed51 the trial courts decision.However, the
cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made,
Court of Appeals denied his appeal and affirmed the trial
the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles
courts decision.52 The Court of Appeals found that Cogaed
procured."61 The known jurisprudential instances of
waived his right against warrantless searches when "[w]ithout
reasonable warrantless searches and seizures are:
any prompting from SPO1 Taracatac, [he] voluntarily opened
his bag."53 Hence, this appeal was filed.
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. . .
;
The following errors were assigned by Cogaed in his
appellants brief:
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," . . . ;
I
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by
the government, the vehicles inherent mobility
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE
reduces expectation of privacy especially when its
SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS AS EVIDENCE AGAINST THE
transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly
ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE BEING THE RESULT OF AN
reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause
UNLAWFUL WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE.
that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
II
4. Consentedwarrantless search;
In view of the disposition of this case, we deem that a On the other hand, "stop and frisk"searches are conducted to
discussion with respect to the requirements on the chain of prevent the occurrence of a crime. For instance, the search in
custody of dangerous drugs unnecessary.55 Posadas v. Court of Appeals65 was similar "to a stop and frisk
situation whose object is either to determine the identity of a
suspicious individual or to maintain the status
We find for the accused.
quomomentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more
information."66 This court stated that the "stop and frisk"
II search should be used "[w]hen dealing with a rapidly
unfolding and potentially criminal situation in the city streets
The right to privacy is a fundamental right enshrined by where unarguably there is no time to secure . . . a search
implication in our Constitution. It has many dimensions. One warrant."67
of its dimensions is its protection through the prohibition of
unreasonable searches and seizures in Article III, Section 2 of The search involved in this case was initially a "stop and frisk"
the Constitution: search, but it did not comply with all the requirements of
reasonability required by the Constitution.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and "Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be Terrysearches68) are necessary for law enforcement. That is,
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the
issue except upon probable cause to be determinedpersonally commission of offenses. However, this should be balanced
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
The balance lies in the concept of"suspiciousness" present in
the situation where the police officer finds himself or herself
This provision requires that the court examine with care and in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience ofthe
diligence whether searches and seizures are "reasonable." As police officer. Experienced police officers have personal
a general rule, searches conducted with a warrant that meets experience dealing with criminals and criminal behavior.
all the requirements of this provision are reasonable. This Hence, they should have the ability to discern based on
warrant requires the existence of probable cause that can facts that they themselves observe whether an individual is
only be determined by a judge.56The existence of probable acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would
cause must be established by the judge after asking be that the police officer, with his or her personal knowledge,
searching questions and answers.57Probable cause at this must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit
stage can only exist if there is an offense alleged to be act.
committed. Also, the warrant frames the searches done by
the law enforcers. There must be a particular description of
In Manalili v. Court of Appeals,69 the police officers were
the place and the things to be searched.58
initially informed about a place frequented by people abusing
drugs.70 When they arrived, one of the police officers saw a
man with "reddish eyes and [who was] walking in a swaying
manner."71 The suspicion increased when the man avoided For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as "a
the police officers.72 These observations led the police officers reasonable ground of suspicionsupported by circumstances
to conclude that the man was high on drugs.73 These were sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to
sufficient facts observed by the police officers "to stop[the] believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with
petitioner [and] investigate."74 which he is charged."88
In People v. Solayao,75 police officers noticed a man who Malacat v. Court of Appeals89 clarifies the requirement further.
appeared drunk.76 This man was also "wearing a camouflage It does not have to be probable cause,but it cannot be mere
uniform or a jungle suit."77 Upon seeing the police, the man suspicion.90 It has to be a "genuine reason"91 to serve the
fled.78 His flight added to the suspicion.79After stopping him, purposes of the "stop and frisk" exception:92
the police officers found an unlicensed "homemade
firearm"80 in his possession.81 This court ruled that "[u]nder
Other notable points of Terryare that while probable cause is
the circumstances, the government agents could not possibly
not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless
have procured a search warrant first."82 This was also a valid
holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop
search.
and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police
officers experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant
In these cases, the police officers using their senses observed the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed
facts that led to the suspicion. Seeing a man with reddish about him.93 (Emphasis supplied, footnotes omitted)
eyes and walking in a swaying manner, based on their
experience, is indicative of a person who uses dangerous and
In his dissent for Esquillo v. People,94 Justice Bersamin
illicit drugs. A drunk civilian in guerrilla wear is probably
reminds us that police officers must not rely on a single
hiding something as well.
suspicious circumstance.95 There should be "presence of more
than oneseemingly innocent activity, which, taken together,
The case of Cogaed was different. He was simply a passenger warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity."96 The
carrying a bag and traveling aboarda jeepney. There was Constitution prohibits "unreasonable searches and
nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal, about riding a seizures."97 Certainly, reliance on only one suspicious
jeepney or carrying a bag. The assessment of suspicion was circumstance or none at all will not result in a reasonable
not made by the police officer but by the jeepney driver. It search.98
was the driver who signalled to the police that Cogaed was
"suspicious."
There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case,
and there was no approximation for the probable cause
This is supported by the testimony of SPO1 Taracatac himself: requirement for warrantless arrest. The person searched was
noteven the person mentioned by the informant. The
informant gave the name of Marvin Buya, and the person
COURT:
searched was Victor Cogaed. Even if it was true that Cogaed
responded by saying that he was transporting the bag to
Q So you dont know what was the content while it was still Marvin Buya, this still remained only as one circumstance.
being carried by him in the passenger jeep? This should not have been enough reason to search Cogaed
and his belongings without a valid search warrant.
WITNESS:
V
A Not yet, Your Honor.83
Police officers cannot justify unbridled searches and be
SPO1 Taracatac likewise stated: shielded by this exception, unless there is compliance with
the "genuine reason" requirement and that the search serves
the purpose of protecting the public. As stated in Malacat:
COURT:
It is the police officer who should observe facts that would The "stop and frisk" searchwas originally limited to outer
lead to a reasonable degree of suspicion of a person. The clothing and for the purpose of detecting dangerous
police officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by weapons.100 As in Manalili,101 jurisprudence also allows "stop
another person. This is necessary to justify that the person and frisk" for cases involving dangerous drugs.
suspected be stopped and reasonably searched.85 Anything
less than this would be an infringementupon ones basic right The circumstances of thiscase are analogous to People v.
to security of ones person and effects. Aruta.102 In that case, an informant told the police that a
certain "Aling Rosa" would be bringing in drugs from Baguio
IV City by bus.103 At the bus terminal, the police officers
prepared themselves.104 The informant pointed at a woman
crossing the street105 and identified her as "Aling
Normally, "stop and frisk" searches do not give the law
Rosa."106 The police apprehended "Aling Rosa," and they
enforcer an opportunity to confer with a judge to determine
alleged that she allowed them to look inside her bag.107The
probable cause. In Posadas v. Court of Appeals,86 one of the
bag contained marijuana leaves.108
earliest cases adopting the "stop and frisk" doctrine in
Philippine jurisprudence, this court approximatedthe
suspicious circumstances as probable cause: In Aruta, this court found that the search and seizure
conducted was illegal.109 There were no suspicious
circumstances that preceded Arutas arrest and the
The probable causeis that when the petitioner acted
subsequent search and seizure.110 It was only the informant
suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there
that prompted the police to apprehend her.111 The evidence
was a probable cause that he was concealing something
obtained was not admissible because of the illegal
illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police
search.112Consequently, Aruta was acquitted.113
officers to inspect the same.87 (Emphasis supplied)
Arutais almost identical to this case, except that it was the VII
jeepney driver, not the polices informant, who informed the
police that Cogaed was "suspicious."
There can be no valid waiver of Cogaeds constitutional rights
even if we assume that he did not object when the police
The facts in Arutaare also similar to the facts in People v. asked him to open his bags. As this court previously stated:
Aminnudin.114 Here, the National Bureau ofInvestigation (NBI)
acted upon a tip, naming Aminnudin as somebody possessing
Appellants silence should not be lightly taken as consent to
drugs.115 The NBI waited for the vessel to arrive and accosted
such search. The implied acquiescence to the search, if there
Aminnudin while he was disembarking from a boat.116 Like in
was any, could not have been more than mere passive
the case at bar, the NBI inspected Aminnudins bag and found
conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances
bundles of what turnedout to be marijuana leaves.117 The
and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of
court declared that the searchand seizure was
the constitutional guarantee.132(Citations omitted) Cogaeds
illegal.118 Aminnudin was acquitted.119
silence or lack of aggressive objection was a natural reaction
to a coercive environment brought about by the police
People v. Chua120 also presents almost the same officers excessive intrusion into his private space. The
circumstances. In this case, the police had been receiving prosecution and the police carry the burden of showing that
information that the accused was distributing drugs in the waiver of a constitutional right is one which is knowing,
"different karaoke bars in Angeles City."121 One night, the intelligent, and free from any coercion. In all cases, such
police received information that thisdrug dealer would be waivers are not to be presumed.
dealing drugs at the Thunder Inn Hotel so they conducted a
stakeout.122 A car "arrived and parked"123 at the hotel.124The
The coercive atmosphere created by the presence of the
informant told the police that the man parked at the hotel
police officer can be discerned again from the testimony of
was dealing drugs.125 The man alighted from his car.126 He
SPO1 Taracatac during cross-examination:
was carrying a juice box.127 The police immediately
apprehended him and discovered live ammunition and drugs
in his person and in the juice box he was holding.128 ATTY. BINWAG:
Like in Aruta, this court did not find anything unusual or Q Now, Mr. witness, you claimed that you only asked them
suspicious about Chuas situation when the police what are the contents of their bags, is it not?
apprehended him and ruled that "[t]here was no validstop-
and-frisk."129 WITNESS:
VI A Yes, maam.
None of the other exceptions to warrantless searches exist to Q And then without hesitation and voluntarily they just
allow the evidence to be admissible.The facts of this case do opened their bags, is it not?
not qualify as a search incidental to a lawful arrest.
A Yes, maam.
Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows for searches
incidental to a lawful arrest. For there to be a lawful arrest,
there should be either a warrant of arrest or a lawful Q So that there was not any order from you for them to open
warrantless arrest as enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the bags?
the Rules of Court:
A None, maam.
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace
officer or a private person may, withouta warrant, arrest a Q Now, Mr. witness when you went near them and asked
person: them what were the contents ofthe bag, you have not seen
any signs of hesitation or fright from them, is it not?
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is A It seems they were frightened, maam.
attempting to commit an offense;
Q But you actually [claimed] that there was not any hesitation
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he from them in opening the bags, is it not?
has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it; and A Yes, maam but when I went near them it seems that they
were surprised.133 (Emphasis supplied)
prosecution successfully proved that the petitioner With respect to the validity of the checkpoint, the
had no license or permit to carry the firearm CA found that not only do the police officers have
through the officer -in-charge of the firearms and in their favor the presumption that official duties
explosives office who testified that, based on his have been regularly performed, but also that the
records, the petitioner had not been issued a proximity of the day the checkpoint had been set
license, and whose testimony had not been up, to the day of the May 11, 1998 elections,
impugned by the defense; and that the testimonies specifically for the purpose of enforci ng the
of the accused and his two witnesses to the effect COMELEC gun ban, gives a strong badge of the
that while aboard their private vehicle and on their legitimacy of the checkpoint; that after a review
way to attend an election campaign meeting, they of the records, the evidence adduced by the
simply stopped and allowed a complete stranger to prosecution prevails over the self -serving and
hitch a ride who was car rying a clutch bag, left the uncorroborated claim of the petitioner that he had
same in the vehicle when he alighted, and which been framed; and, that with respect to the
later turned out to contain the subject firearm, admissibility of the firearm as evidence, the
were flimsy and unbelievable. The RTC ruled that prosecution witnesses convincingly established
the defense of alibi or denial cannot prevail over that the .45 caliber pistol, tucked into the right
the positive identification by eyewitnesses who waist of the petitioner when he alighted from the
have no improper motive to falsely testify against vehicle, was readily visible, a nd, therefore, could
the petitioner, especially where the policemen and be seized without a search warrant under the plain
the petitioner do not know each other; and, that view doctrine.
other document to justify his lawful p ossession of The petitioner is now before this Court,
I.
The petitioner appealed to the CA claiming GIVEN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, AND
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED, WAS THE
that the checkpoint was not shown to have been
CHECK-POINT VALIDLY
legally set up, and/or that the frisking of the ESTABLISHED?
The appeal is partly meritorious. The Court suspicion from the policemen nor any other
reverses the CAs finding of his conviction in circumstance showing probable cause.
After a thorough review of the records, this Court the present case, the production of the mission
is of the view that the courts a quo except for a order is not necessary in view of the fact that the
notable exception with respect to the negative checkpoint was established three days before
allegation in the Information are correct in the ir the May 11, 1998 elections; and, the
findings of fact. Indeed, the version of the circumstances under which the policemen found
defense, as found by the lower courts, is the gun warranted its seizure without a warrant .
mankind. Evidence to be believ ed must not only In People v. Escao,[16] the Court, through
proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but the ponencia of Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
saw the gun tucked into his waist. The gun was in
Thus, the Court agrees with the Solicitor
plain view and discovered inadvertently when the
General that petitioners reliance on Aniag is
petitioner alighted from the vehicle .
misplaced.
courts a quo consistently found that the police without the latter being able to present any license
team manning the checkpoint politely requested or permit to possess the same, such fact alone is
the passengers to alight from their vehicles, and not conclusive proof that he was not lawfully
the motorists who refused this request were not authorized to carry such firearm. In other words,
forced to do so. These findings of fact are fully such fact does not relieve the prosecution from its
supported by the evidence in the record. duty to establish the lack of a license or permit to
However, the Court must underscore that like a certification from the government agency
t h e p r o s e c u t i o n f a i l e d t o s a t i s f a c t o r i l y p r o v e th e concerned.[24]
petitioner possessed no license or permit to bear Thus, for failure of the prosecution to prove
It is a well-entrenched rule that in crimes or permit, the latter must be exculpated from
involving illegal posses sion of firearm, the criminal liability under P.D. No. 1866, as amended.
elements thereof, viz: the existence of the subject With respect to the charge of violating
firearm, and the fact that the accused who owned Section 261(q) of B.P. Blg. 881, as amended,
or possessed the firearm does not have the otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code,
corresponding license or permit to possess the the Court is constrained to affirm the conviction of
same. [21]
the petitioner, since the prosecution successfully
presumption of innocence that lays such burden Section 261 of B.P. Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election
upon the prosecution. The absence of such license Code), as originally worded, provides:
dated May 18, 1998, stating that the petitioner Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7166 (R.A. No.
carried no license or permit to possess the guns 7166), amending Section 261 of the Omnibus
present any form of such authority, and, therefore, Such proceeds and
instruments or tools shall be
his conviction must be affirmed. confiscated and forfeited in favor of
the Government, unless they be the
property of a third person not liable
for the offense, but those articles
Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code
which are not subject of lawful
provides: commerce shall be destroyed.
RIZALDY SANCHEZ y CAJILI, Petitioner, This certifies that on the above date at 9:25 a.m. one PO1
vs. Edgardo Nario of Imus, Mun. PS, PNP, Imus, Cavite submitted
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. to this office for laboratory examinations the following
specimen/s to wit:
DECISION
White crystalline substance contained in a small plastic
MENDOZA, J.: sachet, marked "RSC," placed in a plastic pack, marked "Mar.
19, 2003." (net wt. = 0.1017 gm)
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to
reverse and set aside the July 25, 2012 Decision1 and the Examinations conducted on the above-mentioned specimen/s
November 20, 2012 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), gave POSITIVE RESULTS for METHAMPHETAMINE
in CA-G.R. CR No. 31742 filed by petitioner Rizaldy Sanchez y HYDROCHLORIDE.
Cajili (Sanchez), affirming the April 21, 2005 Decision3 of the
Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20 (RTC), which Said specimen/s were allegedly confiscated from RIZALDY
convicted him for Violation of Section 11, Article l l of Republic SANCHEZ y CAJILI and DARWIN REYES y VILLARENTE.
Act (R.A.) No. 9165. The dispositive portion of the RTC
decision reads:
Official report follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered
convicting accused Rizaldy Sanchez y Cajili of Violation of This certification was issued uponrequest for purpose of filing
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and hereby the case.8
sentences him to suffer imprisonment from twelve (12) to
fifteen (15) years and to pay a fine of Php300,000.00. SO Version of the Defense
ORDERED.4
On April 21, 2005, the RTC rendered its decision11 finding that
Version of the Prosecution Sanchez was caught in flagrante delicto,in actual possession
of shabu. It stated that the police operatives had reasonable
The prosecutions version of the events as summarized by the ground to believe that Sanchez was in possession of the said
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)in its Comment7on the dangerous drug and such suspicion was confirmed when the
petition is as follows: match box Sanchez was carrying was found to contain shabu.
The RTC lent credence to the testimony of prosecution
witness, SPO1 Elmer Amposta (SPO1 Amposta) because there
Around 2:50 pm of March 19, 2003, acting on the information was no showing that he had been impelled by any ill motive
that Jacinta Marciano, aka "Intang," was selling drugs to to falsely testify against Sanchez. The dispositive portion of
tricycle drivers, SPO1 Elmer Amposta, together with CSU which reads:
Edmundo Hernandez, CSU Jose Tagle, Jr., and CSU Samuel
Monzon, was dispatched to Barangay Alapan 1-B, Imus,
Cavite to conduct an operation. WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered
convicting accused Rizaldy Sanchez y Cajili of Violation of
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and hereby against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes
sentences him to suffer imprisonment from twelve (12) to across an incriminating object.
fifteen (15) years and to pay a fine of Php300,000.00. SO
ORDERED.12
The Courts Ruling
The CA found no cogent reason to reverse or modify the Be that as it may, the Court, in several cases before, had
findings of facts and conclusions reached by the RTC and, treated a petition for certiorari as a petition for review under
thus, upheld the conviction of the accused for violation of Rule 45, in accordance with the liberal spirit and in the
Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. According to the CA, interest of substantial justice, particularly (1) if the petition
there was probable cause for the police officers to believe that was filed within the reglementary period for filing a petition
Sanchez was then and there committing a crime considering for review; (2) errors of judgment are averred; and (3) there
that he was seen leaving the residence of a notorious drug is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the rules.17 The
dealer where, according to a tip they received, illegal drug case at bench satisfies all the above requisites and, hence,
activities were being perpetrated. It concluded that the there is ample justification to treat this petition for certiorari
confiscation by the police operative of the subject narcotic as a petition for review. Besides, it is axiomatic that the
from Sanchez was pursuant to a valid search. The CA then nature of an action is determined by the allegations of the
went on to write that non-compliance by the police officers on complaint or petition and the character of the relief
the requirements of Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. sought.18 Here, stripped of allegations of "grave abuse of
No. 9165, particularly on the conduct of inventory and discretion," the petition actually avers errors of judgment
photograph of the seized drug, was not fatal to the rather than of jurisdiction, which are the appropriate subjects
prosecutions causesince its integrity and evidentiary value of a petition for review on certiorari.
had been duly preserved. The falloof the decision reads:
Going now into the substance of the petition, the Court finds
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch the same to be impressed with merit.
20, Imus, Cavite dated April 21, 2005 and Order dated
October 1, 2007 in Criminal Case No. 10745-03 finding
Although it is true that the trial courts evaluation of the
accused appellant Rizaldy C. Sanchez guilty beyond
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11, Article II of
great respect and not to be disturbed on appeal, this rule,
Republic Act No. 9165, is AFFIRMED.
however, is not a hard and fast one. It is a time-honored rule
that the assessment of the trial court with regard to the
SO ORDERED.13 credibility of witnesses deserves the utmost respect, if not
finality, for the reason that the trial judge has the
prerogative, denied to appellate judges, of observing the
Sanchez filed a motion for reconsideration of the July 25,
demeanor of the declarants in the course of their testimonies.
2012 Decision, but it was denied by the CA in its November
But an exception exists if there is a showing that the trial
20, 2012 Resolution.
judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance that would have
Hence, this petition. affected the case.19 After going over the records of the case
at bench, the Court finds some facts of weight and substance
Bewailing his conviction, Sanchez filed the present petition for that have been overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied
"certiorari"under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and anchored by the trial court which cast doubt on the guilt of Sanchez.
on the following
In sustaining the conviction of Sanchez, the CA ratiocinated
GROUNDS: that this was a clear case of an in flagrante delicto arrest
under paragraph (a) Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure. In this regard, the CA wrote:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH ALL
DUE RESPECT, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS In the case at Bar, the acquisition of the regulated drug by
OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT HELD THAT ACCUSED the police officers qualifies as a valid search following a lawful
WAS CAUGHT IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO, HENCE,A operation by the police officers. The law enforcers acted on
SEARCH WARRANT WAS NO LONGER NECESSARY; the directive of their superior based on an information that
AND the owner of the residence where Sanchez came from was a
notorious drug dealer. As Sanchez was seen leaving the said
residence, the law enforcers had probable cause to stop
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OFAPPEALS, WITH DUE Sanchez on the road since there was already a tip that illegal
RESPECT, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF drug-related activities were perpetrated in the place where he
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS came from and seeing a match box held on one hand, the
OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT HELD THAT NON- police officers action were justified to inspect the same. The
COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 21, PARAGRAPH 1, search therefore, is a sound basis for the lawful seizure of the
ARTICLE II OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 DOES NOT confiscated drug, arrest and conviction of Sanchez.
AUTOMATICALLY RENDER THE SEIZED ITEMS
INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.14
The case of People vs. Valdez (G.R. No. 127801, March 3,
1999) is instructive. In that case, the police officers, by virtue
Sanchez insists on his acquittal. He argues that the of an information that a person having been previously
warrantless arrest and search on him were invalid due to the described by the informant, accosted Valdez and upon
absence of probable cause on the part of the police officers to inspection of the bag he was carrying, the police officers
effect an in flagrante delicto arrest under Section 15, Rule found the information given to them to be true as it yielded
113 of the Rules of Court. He also contends that the failure of marijuana leaves hidden in the water jug and lunch box inside
the police operatives to comply with Section 21, paragraph 1, Valdezs bag. The Supreme Court in affirming the trial courts
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 renders the seized item ruling convicting Valdez declared that:
inadmissible in evidence and creates reasonable doubt on his
guilt. By way of Comment15 to the petition, the OSG prays for
the affirmance of the challenged July 25, 2012 decision of the In this case, appellant was caught in flagrante since he was
CA. The OSG submits that the warrantless search and seizure carrying marijuana at the time of his arrest.1wphi1 A crime
of the subject narcotic were justified under the plain view was actually being committed by the appellant, thus, the
doctrine where a police officer is not searching for evidence search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under
paragraph (a) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not
a warrantless search incident to lawful arrest. While it is true armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and
that SPO1 Mariano was not armed with a search warrant fatally be used against the police officer.22
when the search was conducted over the personal effects of
appellant, nevertheless, under the circumstances of the case,
In the case at bench, neither the in flagrante delictoarrest nor
there was sufficient probable cause for said police officer to
the stop- and-frisk principle was applicableto justify the
believe that appellant was then and there committing a crime.
warrantless search and seizure made by the police operatives
The cited case is akin to the circumstances in the instant
on Sanchez. An assiduous scrutiny of the factual backdrop of
appeal as in this case, Sanchez, coming from the house of the
this case shows that the search and seizure on Sanchez was
identified drug dealer, previously tipped by a concerned
unlawful. A portion of SPO1 Ampostas testimony on direct
citizen, walked to a parked tricycle and sped towards the
examination is revelatory, viz:
direction of Kawit, Cavite. The search that gave way to the
seizure of the match box containing shabu was a reasonable
course of event that led to the valid warrantless arrest since Pros. Villarin:
there was sufficient probable cause for chasing the tricycle he
was in. (Underscoring supplied) Q: On March 19, 2003 at around 2:50 p.m., can you recall
where were you?
A judicious examination of the evidence on record belies the
findings and conclusions of the RTC and the CA. A: Yes, Mam.
At the outset, it is observed that the CA confused the search Q: Where were you? A: We were in Brgy. Alapan 1-B, Imus,
incidental to a lawful arrest withthe stop-and-frisk principle, a Cavite.
wellrecognized exception to the warrant requirement. Albeit it
did not expressly state so, the CA labored under the confused
view that one and the other were indistinct and identical. That Q: What were you doing at Alapan 1-B, Imus, Cavite? A: We
confused view guided the CA to wrongly affirm the petitioner's were conducting an operation against illegal drugs.
conviction. The Court must clear this confusion and correct
the error. Q: Who were with you? A: CSU Edmundo Hernandez, CSU
Jose Tagle, Jr. and CSU Samuel
It is necessary to remind the RTC and the CA that the
Terry20 stop- and-frisk search is entirely different from and Monzon.
should not be confused with the search incidental to a lawful
arrest envisioned under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure. The distinctions have been made clear in Q: Was the operation upon the instruction of your Superior?
Malacat v. Court of Appeals21:
A: Our superior gave us the information that there were
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent tricycle drivers buying drugs from "Intang" or Jacinta
arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the Marciano.
legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these
cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext Q: What did you do after that?
for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that
there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made --
A: We waited for a tricycle who will go to the house of Jacinta
the process cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid
Marciano.
arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the
arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a
weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or Q: After that what did you do?
property found which was used in the commission of the
crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as A: A tricycle with a passenger went to the house of "Intang"
evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means and when the passenger boarded the tricycle, we chase[d]
of escaping or committing violence. them.
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of A: When we were able to catch the tricycle, the tricycle driver
a "stop-and-frisk" as a "limited protective search of outer and the passenger alighted from the tricycle.
clothing for weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus:
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he In this jurisdiction, what may be regarded as a genuine
has probable cause to believe based on personal reason or a reasonable suspicion justifying a Terry stop-and-
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person frisk search had been sufficiently illustrated in two cases. In
to be arrested has committed it; and Manalili v. Court of Appeals and People,31 a policeman
chanced upon Manalili in front of the cemetery who appeared
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who to be "high" on drugs as he was observed to have reddish
has escaped from a penal establishment or place eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. Moreover, he
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily appeared to be trying to avoid the policemen and when
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped approached and asked what he was holding in his hands, he
while being transferred from one confinement to tried to resist. When he showed his wallet, it contained
another. marijuana. The Court held that the policeman had sufficient
reason to accost Manalili to determine if he was actually
"high" on drugs due to his suspicious actuations, coupled with
xxx the fact that the area was a haven for drug addicts.
For warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 (in In People v. Solayao,32 the Court also found justifiable reason
flagrante delicto arrest) to operate, two elements must for the police to stop and frisk the accused after considering
concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt the following circumstances: the drunken actuations of the
act indicating that he has just committed, is actually accused and his companions; the fact that his companions
committing, or is attempting tocommit a crime; and (2) such fled whenthey saw the policemen; and the fact that the peace
overt act is done in the presence or withinthe view of the officers were precisely on an intelligence mission to verify
arresting officer.27 On the other hand, paragraph (b) of reports that armed persons where roaming the vicinity.
Section 5 (arrest effected in hot pursuit) requires for its Seemingly, the common thread of these examples isthe
application that at the time of the arrest, an offense has in presence of more than one seemingly innocent activity,
fact just been committed and the arresting officer has which, taken together, warranted a reasonable inference of
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be criminal activity. It was not so in the case at bench.
apprehended has committed it. These elements would be
lacking in the case at bench.
The Court does not find the totality of the circumstances
described by SPO1 Amposta as sufficient to incite a
The evidence on record reveals that no overt physical act reasonable suspicion that would justify a stop-and-frisk
could be properly attributed to Sanchez as to rouse suspicion search on Sanchez. Coming out from the house of a drug
in the minds of the police operatives that he had just pusher and boarding a tricycle, without more, were innocuous
committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime. movements, and by themselves alone could not give rise in
Sanchez was merely seen by the police operatives leaving the the mind of an experienced and prudent police officer of any
residence of a known drug peddler, and boarding a tricycle belief that hehad shabu in his possession, or that he was
that proceeded towards the direction of Kawit, Cavite. Such probably committing a crime in the presence of the officer.
acts cannot in any way be considered criminal acts. In fact, There was even no allegation that Sanchez left the house of
the drug dealer in haste or that he acted in any other placed the marking "RSC" on the seized drug; and that he
suspicious manner. There was no showing either that he tried and the three other police officers brought Sanchez and the
toevade or outmaneuver his pursuers or that he attempted to subject shabu to their station and turned them over to their
flee when the police officers approached him. Truly, his acts investigator. The prosecution evidence did not disclose where
and the surrounding circumstances could not have the marking of the confiscated shabu took place and who
engendered any reasonable suspicion on the part of the police witnessed it. The evidence does not show who was in
officers that a criminal activity had taken place or was afoot. possession of the seized shabu from the crime scene to the
police station. A reading of the Certification, dated March 20,
2003, issued by Forensic Chemist Salud Rosales shows that a
In the recent case of People v. Cogaed,33 where not a single
certain PO I Edgardo Nario submitted the specimen to the NBI
suspicious circumstance preceded the search on the accused,
for laboratory examination, but this piece of evidence does
the Court ruled that the questioned act of the police officer
not establish the identity of the police investigator to whom
did not constitute a valid stop-and-frisk operation. Cogaed
SPO 1 Amposta and his group turned over the seized shabu.
was a mere passenger carrying a blue bag and a sack and
The identities of the person who received the specimen at the
travelling aboard a jeepney. He did not exhibit any unusual or
NBI laboratory and the person who had the custody and
suspicious behavior sufficient to justify the law enforcer in
safekeeping of the seized marijuana after it was chemically
believing that he was engaged in a criminal activity. Worse,
analyzed pending its presentation in court were also not
the assessment of suspicion was made not by the police
disclosed.
officer but by the jeepney driver, who signaled to the police
officer that Cogaed was "suspicious." In view of the illegality
of the search and seizure, the 12,337.6 grams of marijuana Given the procedural lapses pointed out above, a serious
confiscated from the accused was held as inadmissible. uncertainty hangs over the identity of the seized shabu that
the prosecution introduced in evidence. The prosecution failed
to establish an unbroken chain of custody, resulting in
The OSG characterizes the seizure of the subject shabu from
rendering the seizure and confiscation of the shabu open to
Sanchez as seizure of evidence in plain view. The Court
doubt and suspicion. Hence, the incriminatory evidence
disagrees.
cannot pass judicial scrutiny. WHEREFORE, the petition is
GRANTED. The assailed July 25, 2012 Decision and the
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view November 20, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that G.R. CR No. 31742 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner
view are subject to seizure and may be presented as Rizaldy Sanchez y Cajili is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.
evidence.34 The plain view doctrine applies when the following Accordingly, the Court orders the immediate release of the
requisites concur: (1) the law enforcement officer in search of petitioner, unless the latter is being lawfully held for another
the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a cause; and to inform the Court of the date of his release, or
position from which he can view a particular area; (2) the reason for his continued confinement, within ten (10) days
discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (3) from receipt of notice.
it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he
observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or
SO ORDERED.
otherwise subject to seizure.35
A: Eduardo Radan, Ma' am. Pros. Silao: Are you fit to testify? May sakit ka ba o wala?
Witness: Wala po.
xxxx xxxx
Q: Now how far were you when you saw this incident from Q: From what portion of his body, I am referring to Alvin
these two male persons you already identified? Comerciante did you recover the plastic sachet?
A: About ten (10) meters away ma'am. A: From his hand ma'am.
Q: What were their positions in relation to you when you saw Q: Left or right hand?
them in that particular act?
Pros. Silao: You cannot recall? Hindi mo matandaan. Sabihin
A: They were quite facing me then. mo Kung Hindi mo matandaan, no problem. Kaliwa, kanan or
you cannot recall? 30
A: About thirty (30) kilometers per hour, ma'am. On the basis of such testimony, the Court finds it highly
implausible that P03 Calag, even assuming that he has
perfect vision, would be able to identify with reasonable
Q: And who was driving the motorcycle? accuracy - especially from a distance of around 10 meters,
and while aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of 30
A: Eduardo Radan, ma'am. kilometers per hour - miniscule amounts of white crystalline
substance inside two (2) very small plastic sachets held by
Comerciante. The Court also notes that no other overt act
Q: When you spotted them as if handing something to each
could be properly attributed to Comerciante as to rouse
other, what did you do?
suspicion in the mind of P03 Calag that the former had just
committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime.
A: We stopped ma'am. Verily, the acts of standing around with a companion and
handing over something to the latter cannot in any way be
considered criminal acts. In fact, even if Comerciante and his
Q: And how far were you from them when you stopped, more
companion were showing "improper and unpleasant
or less?
movements" as put by P03 Calag, the same would not have
been sufficient in order to effect a lawful warrantless arrest
A: We passed by them for a short distance before we stopped under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on
ma'am. Criminal Procedure. 31 That his reasonable suspicion bolstered
by (a) the fact that he had seen his fellow officers arrest
persons in possession of shabu; and (b) his trainings and will not result in a reasonable search. [35]] (Emphases and
seminars on illegal drugs when he was still assigned in the underscoring supplied)
province are insufficient to create a conclusion that what he
purportedly saw in Comerciante was indeed shabu. 32
In this case, the Court reiterates that Comerciante' s acts of
standing around with a companion and handing over
Neither has the prosecution established that the rigorous something to the latter do not constitute criminal
conditions set forth in Section 5 (b), Rule 113, have been acts.1wphi1 These circumstances are not enough to create a
complied with, i.e., that an offense had in fact just been reasonable inference of criminal activity which would
committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge constitute a "genuine reason" for P03 Calag to conduct a
of facts indicating that the accused had committed it. As "stop and frisk" search on the former. In this light, the "stop
already discussed, the factual backdrop of the instant case and frisk" search made on Comerciante should be deemed
failed to show that P03 Calag had personal knowledge that a unlawful.
crime had been indisputably committed by Comerciante.
Verily, it is not enough that the arresting officer had
In sum, there was neither a valid warrantless arrest nor a
reasonable ground to believe that the accused had just
valid "stop and frisk" search made on Comerciante. As such,
committed a crime; a crime must, in fact, have been
the shabu purportedly seized from him is rendered
committed first, which does not obtain in this case. 33
inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the
poisonous tree. Since the confiscated shabu is the very
In this relation, the Court finds respondent's assertion that corpus delicti of the crime charged, Comerciante must
there was a valid "stop and frisk" search made on necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from all criminal
Comerciante untenable. In People v. Cogaed, 34 the Court had liability.
an opportunity to exhaustively explain "stop and frisk"
searches:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, 'the
Decision dated October 20, 2011 and the Resolution dated
"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terry February 19, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
searches) are necessary for law enforcement.1a\^/phi1 That 32813 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly,
is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent petitioner Alvin Comerciante y Gonzales is hereby ACQUITTED
the commission of offenses. However, this should be balanced of the crime of violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act
with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance No. 9165. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is
with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. ordered to cause his immediate release, unless he is being
lawfully held for any other reason.
The balance lies in the concept of "suspiciousness" present
where the police officer finds himself or herself in. This may SO ORDERED.
be undoubtedly based on the experience of the police officer.
Experienced police officers have personal experience dealing
with criminals and criminal behavior. Hence, they should have
the ability to discern - based on facts that they themselves
observe - whether an individual is acting in a suspicious
manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would be that the police
officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must observe the [G.R. No. 113447. October 9, 1997]
facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act.
xxxx
ALAIN MANALILI y DIZON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
Normally, "stop and frisk" searches do not give the law APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
enforcer an opportunity to confer with a judge to determine PHILIPPINES, respondents.
probable cause. In Posadas v. Court of Appeals, one of the
earliest cases adopting the "stop and frisk" doctrine in
DECISION
Philippine jurisprudence, this court approximated the
suspicious circumstances as probable cause: PANGANIBAN, J.:
The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted When dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially
suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there criminal situation in the city streets where unarguably there is
was a probable cause that he was concealing something no time to secure an arrest or a search warrant, policemen
illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police should employ limited, flexible responses -- like stop-and-frisk
officers to inspect the same. -- which are graduated in relation to the amount of information
they possess, the lawmen being ever vigilant to respect and
For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as "a not to violate or to treat cavalierly the citizens constitutional
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances rights against unreasonable arrest, search and seizure.
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to
believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with
which he is charged.
The Case
Malacat v. Court of Appeals clarifies the requirement further.
It does not have to be probable cause, but it cannot be mere
suspicion. It has to be a genuine reason to serve the This rule is reiterated as we resolve this petition for review
purposes of the "stop and frisk" exception: on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the
reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 19,
1993 and its Resolution dated January 20, 1994 in CA G.R. CR
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is No. 07266, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Alain
not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless Manalili y Dizon.
holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop
and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police In an Information dated April 11, 1988,[1] Petitioner Alain
officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant Manalili y Dizon was charged by Assistant Caloocan City Fiscal
the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed E. Juan R. Bautista with violation of Section 8, Article II of
about him. Republic Act No. 6425, allegedly committed as follows:[2]
In his dissent for Esquillo v. People, Justice Bersamin reminds That on or about the 11th day of April 1988 in Caloocan City,
us that police officers must not rely on a single suspicious MM, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
circumstance. There should be "presence of more than one Court, the above-named accused without any authority of
seemingly innocent activity, which, taken together, warranted law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
a reasonable inference of criminal activity." The Constitution have in his custody, possession and control crushed
prohibits "umeasonable searches and seizures." Certainly, marijuana residue, which is a prohibited drug and knowing
reliance on only one suspicious circumstance or none at all the same to be such.
Contrary to Law. Exhibit E-3. The residue was originally wrapped in a smaller
sheet of folded paper. (Exhibit E-4).
Upon his arraignment on April 21, 1988, appellant
pleaded not guilty to the charge.[3] With the agreement of the Cpl. Tamondong next prepared a referral slip addressed to
public prosecutor, appellant was released after filing the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section requesting a chemical
a P10,000.00 bail bond.[4] After trial in due course, the analysis of the subject marijuana residue (Exhibit D). Cpl.
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 124, acting as a Tamondong thereafter prepared a Joint Affidavit of the
Special Criminal Court, rendered on May 19, 1989 a apprehending policemen (Exhibit A). Pat. Angel Lumabas
decision[5] convicting appellant of illegal possession of handcarried the referral slip (Exhibit D) to the National
marijuana residue. The dispositive portion of the decision Bureau of Investigation (NBI), including the subject
reads:[6] marijuana residue for chemical analysis. The signature of Pat.
Lumabas appears on the left bottom corner of Exhibit D.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds the
accused ALAIN MANALILI Y DIZON guilty beyond reasonable The Forensic Chemistry Section of the NBI received the
doubt of violation of Section 8, Article II, of Republic Act No. aforesaid referral slip and the subject marijuana residue at
6425, as amended (Illegal Possession of Marijuana residue), 7:40 oclock in the evening of April 11, 1988 as shown on the
and hereby snetences (sic) said accused to suffer stamped portion of Exhibit D.
imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY; and to pay
a fine of P6,000.00; and to pay the costs.
It was NBI Aida Pascual who conducted the microscopic
and chemical examinations of the specimen which she
xxx xxx xxx. identified. (Exhibit E)[13] Mrs. Pascual referred to the subject
specimen as crushed marijuana leaves in her Certification
Appellant remained on provisional liberty.[7] Atty. dated April 11, 1988 (Exhibit F).[14] These crushed marijuana
Benjamin Razon, counsel for the defense, filed a Notice of leaves gave positive results for marijuana, according to the
Appeal[8] dated May 31, 1989. On April 19, 1993, Respondent Certificate.
Court[9]promulgated its assailed Decision, denying the appeal
and affirming the trial court:[10]
Mrs. Pascual also conducted a chromatographic examination
of the specimen. In this examination, she also found that the
ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from dated May 19, crushed marijuana leaves gave positive results for
1989 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects. Costs against marijuana. She then prepared a Final Report of her
appellant. examinations (Exhibit G).
Respondent Court[11] denied reconsideration via its After conducting the examinations, Ms. Pascual placed the
assailed Resolution dated January 20, 1994, disposing: specimen in a white letter-envelope and sealed it. (Exhibit
E). She then wrote identification notes on this letter-
ACCORDINGLY, accused-appellants motion for reconsideration envelope. (Exhibit E-1).
is, as is hereby DENIED.
Pat. Lumabas carried the Certification marked as Exhibit F
from the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section to Cpl.
Tamondong. Upon receipt thereof, Cpl. Tamondong prepared
The Facts a referral slip addressed to the City Fiscal of Kalookan
Version of the Prosecution City. (Exhibit C)
The Rulings of the Trial and the Appellate Courts The petition has no merit.
Second Issue: Assessment of Evidence SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an
offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its
amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be
Petitioner also contends that the two arresting officers
that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be
testimony contained polluted, irreconcilable and unexplained
properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the
contradictions which did not support petitioners conviction.
minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next
We disagree. Time and again, this Court has ruled that lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if
the trial courts assessment of the credibility of witnesses, the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall
particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals as in this sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
case, is accorded great weight and respect, since it had the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed
opportunity to observe their demeanor and deportment as they by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the
testified before it. Unless substantial facts and circumstances minimum term prescribed by the same. (As amended by Act
have been overlooked or misappreciated by the trial court No. 4225.)
which, if considered, would materially affect the result of the
case, we will not countenance a departure from this rule.[28] SEC. 2. This Act shall not apply to persons convicted of
offenses punished with death penalty or life-imprisonment; to
We concur with Respondent Courts ruling: those convicted of treason; to those convicted of misprision of
treason, rebellion, sedition or espionage; to those convicted
(e)ven assuming as contended by appellant that there had of piracy; to those who are habitual delinquents; to those who
been some inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses shall have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence; to
testimonies, We do not find them substantial enough to those who having been granted conditional pardon by the
impair the essential veracity of their narration. In People vs. Chief Executive shall have violated the terms thereof; to
Avila, it was held that As long as the witnesses concur on the those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not
material points, slight differences in their remembrance of the exceed one year, not to those already sentenced by final
details, do not reflect on the essential veracity of their judgment at the time of approval of this Act, except as
statements. provided in Section 5 hereof. (Underscoring supplied)
However, we find that, aside from the presumption of The Dangerous Drugs Law, R.A. 6425, as amended by
regularity in the performance of duty, the bestowal of full B.P. 179, imposes the following penalty for illegal possession
credence on Pat. Espiritus testimony is justified by tangible of marijuana:
evidence on record. Despite Pat. Lumabas contradictory
testimony, that of Espiritu is supported by the Joint Sec. 8. x x x x
Affidavit[29] signed by both arresting policemen. The question
of whether the marijuana was found inside petitioners wallet or
inside a plastic bag is immaterial, considering that petitioner The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six years and one
did not deny possession of said substance. Failure to present day to twelve years and a fine ranging from six thousand to
the wallet in evidence did not negate that marijuana was found twelve thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person
in petitioners possession. This shows that such contradiction is who, unless authorized by law, shall possess or use Indian
minor, and does not destroy Espiritus credibility.[30] hemp.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: In the Joint Affidavit executed by PO3 Bueno and PO1 Padlan,
it was stated that when they frisked appellant, they discovered
For Review is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals 2 big plastic bag (sic) and 5 medium size plastic (sic) and a 9
promulgated on 31 July 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01799 mm. pistol marked Parabellum bearing serial number C-9890
entitled, People of the Philippines v. Bernardo Tuazon y with one loaded magazine with eleven ammunition.[7]
Nicolas, affirming the Decision [2]
dated 14 October 2002 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Antipolo City, Branch 71, in The white crystalline substance confiscated from
Criminal Case No. 99-16114, finding accused-appellant guilty appellant was then forwarded to the Philippine National Police
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16, Article III Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City for
of Republic Act No. 6425,[3] as amended. examination. The test conducted on the specimen turned over
to the crime laboratory yielded the following:
The Information filed against appellant alleged:
FINDINGS:
The undersigned State Prosecutor accuses
BERNARDO TUAZON y NICOLAS of the crime Qualitative examination conducted on the
of Violation of Section 16, Article III, R.A. above-stated specimen gave POSITIVE result
6425, as amended, committed as follows: to the test for Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride, a regulated drug. x x x.
That, on or about the 7th day of March, 1999,
in the City of Antipolo, Philippines and within CONCLUSION:
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, not being lawfully Specimens A-1 through A-7 contains
authorized to possess any regulated drug, Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and regulated drug. x x x.[8]
feloniously have in his possession, custody
and control seven (7) heat-sealed
transparent plastic bags each containing Expectedly, appellant presented a vastly different account of
97.92 grams, 95.46 grams, 40.47 grams,
5.36 grams, 5.41 grams, 2.95 grams and the events that led to his indictment. According to him, he used
3.17 grams for a total weight of 250.74
to work as a caretaker of Curacha, a beer house/videoke bar
grams of white crystalline substance, which
after the corresponding laboratory located along Circumferential Road, Marville II Subdivision and
examination conducted gave positive result
owned by a certain Bong Reyes. On 6 March 1999, he reported
to the test for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride also known as shabu a for work at six oclock in the evening. Later that night,
regulated drug, in violation of the above-
cited law.[4] unidentified men walked up to him. One of these men asked
him regarding the ownership of the car parked outside the
bar. He allegedly accompanied the men outside so he could
Upon arraignment, appellant, duly assisted by counsel de
confirm the identity of the owner of the car that the men were
oficio, pleaded not guilty.[5]
inquiring about. Thereupon, the men pointed to him a green
colored Isuzu Gemini car which according to him was driven by
The prosecutions version of the case relied heavily on
his employer, Reyes. After revealing this information to the
the testimony of PO3 Glenon Bueno (PO3 Bueno) who testified
unidentified men, the latter purportedly pointed guns at him
that in the morning of 7 March 1999, the Antipolo City Police
and ordered him to board an owner-type jeepney. The men
Station received through telephone, a confidential information
allegedly asked him regarding the whereabouts of Reyes and
that a Gemini car bearing plate number PFC 411[6] would
threatened to include him in whatever trouble Reyes was in. A
deliver an unspecified amount of shabu in Marville
few hours passed and he was then brought to the police
Subdivision, Antipolo City. Acting on said tip, Antipolo City
headquarters where he was asked regarding his address and
Chief of Police Major Rene Quintana dispatched a team of
the name of his employer. After two days, he was allegedly
policemen to the area to conduct a surveillance.When the team
forced to admit that he was in fact the owner of the Gemini car
arrived in Marville Subdivision, they saw the said Gemini car
as well as of the shabu and the gun recovered from said
and immediately flagged it down. The driver of the car pulled
vehicle. He learned later on that he was charged with violations
to a stop and opened a window of said vehicle giving the
of Republic Act No. 6425 for illegal possession of shabu and
policemen the opportunity to identify themselves as members
Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegal possession of
of the Antipolo City Police Station. It was then that PO1 Manuel
firearm. The latter case was eventually dismissed. At the end
Padlan (PO1 Padlan) saw a gun tucked on appellants
of his direct examination, appellant reiterated that he should
waist. PO1 Padlan inquired about the gun and appellant
not have been the one charged with illegal possession
allegedly replied it did not belong to him nor could he produce
of shabu, but Reyes who was driving the Gemini car.
Appellant is again before this Court pleading his innocence by
The trial court found the evidence presented by the prosecution making a lone assignment of error
sufficient to support a guilty verdict and imposed upon
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR
of P500,000.00.[9] VIOLATION OF SECTION 16, ARTICLE III,
REPUBLIC ACT 6425, AS AMENDED.[18]
A: At the Antipolo Police Station, sir. A: In Barangay San Roque fronting along the
highway in Antipolo City.
Q: Mr. Witness, do you know accused
Bernardo Tuazon? Q: Upon reaching that place what happened?
Q: Do you recall where were you at Q: Specifically, what did you do?
about 12:10 in the morning
of March 7, 1999? A: We flagged down the vehicle, sir.
Q: While performing your functions, do you Q: What was the reaction of the driver?
remember any unusual incident at
that time? A: When he opened the window, PO1 Padlan
saw a gun tucked on his waist.
A: One of our confidential agents gave an
information thru telephone, sir. Q: What did you do next? In your case what
did you do?
Q: About what?
A: We identified ourselves as policem[e]n.
A: About delivery of shabu of undetermined
amount in the area of Marville COURT:
Subdivision, Antipolo City, sir.
Q: Did you know what Padlan did?
Q: Do you know that person involved or who
is the person supposed to deliver an
undetermined amount of shabu? WITNESS:
A: The asset did not say who will deliver A: Yes, sir.
the shabu but he only said on the
telephone that the car is a Gemini Q: What did he do?
bearing plate number PFC 411 who
will deliver at said place. A: He questioned his gun and it turned out
that there is no pertinent document
Q: Upon receipt of said information what did for his gun.
you do next?
Q: What do you mean he was asked? Who
A: We informed our Chief of Police Major was asked?
Rene Quintana, sir.
A: The driver, Bernardo Tuazon, sir.
Q: What was the reaction of Major Quintana?
PROS. LUNA:
A: Our Chief of Police told us to do
surveillance in the area. Q: What was the reaction of Bernardo
Tuazon?
Q: What did you do next?
WITNESS:
A: We immediately recorded the dispatch
and we boarded a marked vehicle A: He said that the gun is not his.
and proceeded to the area in
Marville Subdivision, sir.
Q: Upon hearing that the gun was not owned
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
by Bernardo Tuazon what did you
do as police officer? effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. This right
A: I ordered him to get down from the car. is encapsulated in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution
which states:
COURT:
Q: After he got down from the car, what SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in
happened? their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures
WITNESS: of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or
A: I saw five (5) plastic bags on the drivers warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
seat. probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or
Q: Upon seeing that plastic bag what did you affirmation of the complainant and the
do? witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the
A: I asked him the contents of that plastic persons or things to be seized.
and he replied that it
contained shabu, sir.
Complementing this provision is the so-called exclusionary rule
Q: What did you do upon hearing the answer embodied in Section 3(2) of the same article
of the accused?
A: We immediately brought him to the (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this
headquarters together with the or the preceding section shall be inadmissible
evidence, sir. for any purpose in any proceeding.
A: It gave positive result to the tests for Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride evidence in plain view; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4)
sir.[26]
consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and
frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.[31]
appellants culpability. His testimony regarding the the occasion to elucidate on the rationale for the exemption of
circumstances that occurred in the early hours of 7 March 1999 searches of moving vehicles from the requirement of search
from the moment their office received a confidential tip from warrant, thus:
cannot be given greater evidentiary value over convincing, when it comes to moving vehicles does not give the police
straightforward and probable testimony on affirmative authorities unbridled discretion to conduct a warrantless
matters. [29]
Denial is an inherently weak defense which must search of an automobile. To do so would render the
be supported by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit aforementioned constitutional stipulations inutile and expose
We shall now resolve the issue raised by appellant consideration behind the exemption of search of moving
regarding the admissibility of the physical evidence presented vehicles does not encompass such arbitrariness on the part of
against him. No less than our Constitution recognizes the right the police authorities. In recognition of the possible abuse,
jurisprudence dictates that at all times, it is required that and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
probable cause exist in order to justify the warrantless search based. [37]
Again, we disagree.
of a vehicle.[33]
Faithful adherence to the aforementioned
In Caballes v. Court of Appeals, [34]
the term probable cause constitutional provision is a vital component of due process and
was explained to mean fair play.[38] The rule takes an even more important
significance for the losing party who is entitled to know why he
[A] reasonable ground of suspicion
lost so that he may appeal to a higher court, if permitted,
supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious should he believe that the decision needs to be reversed. A
mans belief that the person accused is guilty
of the offense with which he is charged; or decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and
the existence of such facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as
circumstances which could lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an to how it was reached and is especially prejudicial to the losing
offense has been committed and that the party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court
items, articles or objects sought in
connection with said offense or subject to for review by a higher tribunal.[39]
seizure and destruction by law is in the place
to be searched. The required probable cause
that will justify a warrantless search and In this case, we find that the assailed decision of the
seizure is not determined by a fixed formula
trial court substantially complied with the requirements of the
but is resolved according to the facts of the
case. Constitution. The decision contained a summary of the facts of
the case as presented by the prosecution and by the
When a vehicle is flagged down and subjected to an extensive defense. It likewise contained an explanation as to why it found
search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid as appellant guilty as charged. Admittedly, the decision is brief
long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or but to our mind, it sufficiently informed appellant as regards
probable cause to believe prior to the search that they would the bases for his conviction. It readily informs appellant that
find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the trial court disregarded his defense of bare denial in favor
the vehicle to be searched. [35]
of the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties
enjoyed by police officers.
In this case, we hold that the police had probable cause to
effect the warrantless search of the Gemini car driven by WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of
appellant. A confidential informer tipped them off that said car the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01799 dated 31
was going to deliver shabu at Marville Subdivision. Pursuing July 2006, finding appellant Bernardo Tuazon y Nicolas guilty
said lead, the Antipolo City police sent a team to Marville beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16, Article III
Subdivision to monitor said vehicle. The information provided of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, is AFFIRMED. No
by the informer turned out to be correct as, indeed, the Gemini costs.
car was spotted in the place where it was said to be
SO ORDERED.
bringing shabu. When they stopped the car, they saw a gun
tucked in appellants waist. Appellant did not have any
document to support his possession of said firearm which all
the more strengthened the polices suspicion. After he was told
to step out of the car, they found on the drivers seat plastic
sachets containing white powdery substance. These
circumstances, taken together, are sufficient to establish
probable cause for the warrantless search of the Gemini car
and the eventual admission into evidence of the plastic packets
against appellant.