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 SEISMIC ANALYSIS

Lessons learnt from the

Wenchuan earthquake
Several dams and power plants damaged by the earthquake which occurred in Chinas
Sichuan province on 12 May 2008 were visited during a joint mission of the Chinese
Committee on Large Dams and ICOLDs Committee on Seismic Aspects of Dam Design
from 29 March-4 April 2009. Here, Martin Wieland and Chen Houqun discuss the
unique features of this earthquake and the damage caused, while addressing the question
of the earthquake being triggered by Zipingpu reservoir

I
N the afternoon of 12 May 2008 a magnitude 8 earthquake
occurred in Chinas Sichuan province with the epicentre at a dis-
tance of 17km from the Zipingpu CFRD. The earthquake rup-
tured a 240km long segment of the Longmenshan fault system
separating the Tibetan Plateau from the Chengdu Basin and is
referred to as the Wenchuan earthquake. The main seismological
features and damage to buildings and infrastructure of this earth-
quake are described by Wang et al. (2008) and others. A summary
of dams and reservoirs affected by this destructive earthquake is
given in Table 1. A more detailed description of the effects on large
dams is given by Chen (2008) and Xu (2008).
The main features of interest to dam engineers are as follows:
Local magnitude: 8
Maximum recorded peak ground acceleration: 958cm/s2 (hori-
zontal component) and 948cm/s2 (vertical component);
Duration of strong ground shaking 90 sec to 120 sec; and
Maximum fault movement at surface: 4.7m (horizontal) and 4.8m
(vertical).
The main phenomena of this earthquake relevant for dams are
as follows:
High intensity of ground shaking and long duration.
Large number of rockfalls blocking access roads to dams, causing
damage at dam sites and locations of appurtenant structures,
destroying masts of transmission lines, aqueducts, etc.
Landslide dams blocking rivers at several locations.
Overtopping of run-of-river power plants.
Failure of hydromechanical equipment (gates, penstock), etc.
It was expected from the very beginning that mass movements (rock-
falls, landslides) would be an important feature in this mountainous
terrain with steep valleys.
Sichuan is the province with the largest hydro power potential in
China with some 6678 dams and reservoirs. Some of the extraordi-
nary projects completed recently are the 240m high Ertan arch dam,
the 15m high Zipingpu CFRD, and the 132m high Shapai arch dam,
the worlds highest RCC arch dam. Several very large projects are
either under construction or under design such as the 278m high
Xiluodu arch dam (12.6GW), the 186m high Pubugou earth core
rockfill dam (3.6GW) and the 305m high Jinping 1 arch dam
(3.6GW). However, only Zipingpu and Shapai dams were located
relatively close to the ruptured fault segments and have experienced
strong ground shaking as discussed in the subsequent sections. The

Figure 1 Damage to the gate

structure on top of the intake
towers at Zipingpu dam

36 SEPTEMBER 2009 INTERNATIONAL WATER POWER & DAM CONSTRUCTION


other dams, as well as Three Gorges, were several 100km away from
the epicentre and no damage was reported at these projects.
The Wenchuan earthquake affected more dams than any other
previous earthquakes. It is also the most important seismic event to
have occurred since the creation of the International Commission
on Large Dams (ICOLD) earthquake committee some 40 years ago.
Therefore, plans for a joint mission were discussed with Chinese col-
leagues at the ICOLD Annual Meeting in Sofia, Bulgaria in early
June 2008. From presentations at the event however, it became clear
that due to the large number of rockfalls and the interruption of
roads in the worst hit area, a visit to major dams was not possible
for the foreseeable future.
Finally at the 80th Anniversary Meeting of ICOLD in Paris in
November 2008, a date could be fixed for a small joint ICOLD-
CHINCOLD mission to take place in March and April 2009,
approximately 11 months after the earthquake.
Thirteen foreign dam and earthquake experts from Austria,
Canada, Japan, Switzerland, the UK, and the US participated in this
mission, called the International Seminar on Earthquake and Dam
Safety. The local arrangements were made by Jia Jinsheng (ICOLD
President) and Chen Houqun on behalf of CHINCOLD. The pro-
gram consisted of a one day seminar in Beijing where the partici-
pants were briefed on the Wenchuan earthquake followed by a three
day visit of dam and run-of-river power plants in Sichuan, with a
final one day seminar in Chengdu where dam owners and designers
presented specific dam projects affected by the earthquake. Finally,
a discussion was held in which (i) the personal experience gained
from the mission, (ii) the lessons learnt, (iii) the topics for possible
cooperation of ICOLD with CHINCOLD, and (iv) a paper on reser-
voirs and the Wenchuan earthquake were discussed.
At the beginning, some participants may have wondered if they
could see anything at all so many months after the earthquake.
However, it became clear to everybody after the first days visit to
Zipingpu CFRD the dam which was most easily accessible that
these concerns were not justified. During the field visit, seeing the
huge number of mass movements and the serious damage to the
transportation infrastructure, it became very obvious that a visit of
the important dams and hydro power projects would not have been
possible at an earlier date. As a matter of fact, traffic conditions
along the main highway in the epicentral region were still very dif-
ficult leading to hours of waiting at some critical spots and it must
be assumed that it was not possible until recently to move heavy con-
struction equipment into some of the valleys where hydro power
projects are located.
Therefore, the damage observed in these remote sites was still
fresh, as can be seen from some of the photos.
This joint mission was a great success although only a fraction of
dams damaged by the earthquake could be visited or discussed
during the two seminars. This visit was really a unique opportunity
for all participants interested in dams and earthquake safety.
In the subsequent sections the main lessons learnt from the
Wenchuan earthquake by the authors are presented.
Table 1: Classification of damage to dams and reservoirs (Wang et al., 2008)
Province or Total number Number of damaged
municipality of reservoirs reservoirs Dangerous situations of dam-break
Sichuan 6678 1996
Chongqing 2824 352
Shaanxi 1036 126
Yunnan 5422 51
Gansu 297 81
Guizhou 2105 12
Hubei 5804 25
Hunan 11435 23
Total 35601 2666
WWW.WATERPOWERMAGAZINE.COM SEPTEMBER 2009
SEISMIC ANALYSIS
S PECIAL FEATURES OF EARTHQUAKE HAZARD IN
THE CASE OF STORAGE DAMS
The exposure of dams to strong earthquakes may be a few seconds
at most during their lifespan. Because strong earthquakes occur
very rarely, few dam engineers or dam owners have any experience
with them.
Strong earthquakes can affect a large area and many dams may
be subjected to strong ground shaking. This has been the case for
the Wenchuan earthquake. Different types of dams have been dam-
aged; therefore the lessons learnt from this earthquake will be rele-
vant for the whole dam industry.
It is well known that many existing dams were designed against
earthquakes using seismic design criteria and methods of dynamic
analysis which are considered obsolete, or even incorrect, today. This
may also be true in China and it is expected that the seismic design
criteria and methods of analysis and design will be reviewed and
modified in the near future, as this has been common practice almost
universally after a strong earthquake. In general it is easier to con-
vince a dam owner to implement modern flood design criteria for
his project, because the flood hazard is visible whereas the earth-
quake hazard is invisible.
The Wenchuan earthquake has confirmed that earthquakes are
multiple hazards, which may have the following features in the case
of storage dams:
Ground shaking causing vibrations in dams, appurtenant struc-
tures and equipment, and their foundations (Figure 1).
Fault movements in the dam foundation or discontinuities in dam
foundation near major faults which can be activated causing struc-
tural distortions.
Fault displacement in the reservoir bottom causing water waves
in the reservoir or loss of freeboard.
Mass movements (rockfalls, landslides).
Ground movements and settlements due to liquefaction, densifi-
cation of soil, causing distortions in dams.
Other effects such as water waves and reservoir oscillations are gen-
erally of lesser importance for the earthquake safety of a dam.
Usually the main hazard, which is addressed in codes and regula-
tions, is the earthquake ground shaking. It causes stresses, deforma-
tions, cracking, sliding, overturning, etc. The other hazards may not
be addressed because it is rather difficult to get any quantitative data
of these hazards. Most analysts have difficulties with such hazards.
M ASS MOVEMENTS AND LANDSLIDE DAMS
Due to steep slopes in the area, there were thousands of rockfalls and
landslides in the Longmenshan fault zone. Over 2500 people were
killed in two landslides in Wangjiayan, Beichuan county, Sichuan, each
with an estimated volume of 10Mm3 (Wang et al., 2008).
In the case of storage dams the following features are possible and
many have been observed during the Wenchuan earthquake:
Classification of damage
Highly dangerous situations Dangerous situations
69 310 1617
2 350
17 109
2 49
81
12
25
23
69 331 2266
37
 SEISMIC ANALYSIS
Left to right: Figure 2 View of a run-of-river plant with traces of mass movements in the background; Figure 3 The effect of rockfalls on the power plant at
Shapai dam; Figure 4 Equipment damaged by rocks in Shapai powerhouse
Mass movements (rockfalls with large rocks) causing damage to
spillway piers (cracks), retaining walls (overturning) (Figure 2),
powerhouses (cracking and puncturing and distortions) (Figure 3),
electro-mechanical equipment (Figure 4), hydromechanical equip-
ment such as gates (Figure 5) and surface sections of penstocks,
damaging aqueduct, overturning of masts of transmission lines
(Figure 6), etc.
Mass movements into the reservoir causing impulse waves in the
reservoir.
Mass movements blocking rivers and forming landslide lakes
whose failure may lead to overtopping of run-of-river power plants
or the inundation of powerhouses with equipment.
Mass movements blocking access roads to dam sites and appur-
tenant structures (Figure 7).
During the Wenchuan earthquake some 33 major landslide lakes
were created. Tangjiashan landslide dam with a height of 124m and
a volume of about 2Mm3, which stored 320Mm3 of water, caused
a major threat and great efforts were needed to release the water in
a controlled way without causing a secondary disaster in the down-
stream valley and the city of Meijiang. The maximum discharge was
6500m3/sec which corresponded roughly to a flood with a return
period of 200 years.
Every time a strong earthquake occurs the design guidelines have
to be reviewed as new phenomena appear, which may have previ-
ously been overlooked. For example, during the Wenchuan earth-
quake the problem of mass movements (mainly rockfalls in very
steep mountains) and landslide lakes have shown to be very impor-
tant new features of strong earthquakes. In addition, an unprece-
dented large number of dams and run-of-river power plants have
been affected by this earthquake. The Wenchuan earthquake has
confirmed and demonstrated that dams, spillways and appurtenant
structures must be able to withstand the multiple effects of strong
earthquakes.
Left to right: Figure 5 Complete failure of the radial gate in the spillway opening of a run-of-river power plant (hydraulic pistons are still there but gate was
washed away); Figure 6 Failure of the aqueduct near Shapai power plant; Figure 7 Controlled release of water from Tangjiashan landslide lake
38
S EISMIC PERFORMANCE OF LARGE DAMS SUB -
JECTED TO STRONG GROUND SHAKING
In the subsequent sections, two large dams with heights exceeding
100m which were subjected to very strong ground shaking are briefly
discussed. They are the Shapai RCC arch dam and the Zipingpu con-
crete face rockfill dam (CFRD).
As RCC and CFRD dams are very competitive dam types today,
and since none of them have been subjected to strong ground shak-
ing in the past, the lessons learnt from the behaviour of these two
dams during the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake are considered very
important for the dam community.
S HAPAI RCC ARCH DAM
During the Wenchuan earthquake, the 132m high Shapai dam,
the worlds highest RCC arch dam, was subjected to strong
ground shaking.
The dam is a three-centered arch structure with vertical upstream
face. The crest length and thickness are 250.25m and 9.5m respec-
tively. The maximum thickness at the base is 28m. The dam is locat-
ed 30km away from the epicenter and during the earthquake the
reservoir was at normal water level of 1866m. There are two verti-
cal contraction joints and two induced joints with a spacing of about
50m. The dam is founded on granite and granodiorite and was com-
pleted in 2003. The seismic design of the dam was based on a hor-
izontal peak ground acceleration of 0.138g.
During the authors visit in early April 2009 no signs of damage
could be observed, however, the reinforced concrete building on the
crest and the superstructures of the intake towers suffered some
repairable inelastic deformations. The powerhouse located several
kilometers downstream was severely damaged by high velocity rock-
falls (Figure 3) and the movement joint of the penstock failed, caus-
ing flooding of the powerhouse.
SEPTEMBER 2009 INTERNATIONAL WATER POWER & DAM CONSTRUCTION

Z IPINGPU CONCRETE FACE ROCKFILL DAM
The 156m high Zipingpu CFRD is one of the largest CFRDs in
China and one of the key projects for water supply and irrigation
for the Chengdu basin. The dam was completed in 2006 and repre-
sented the latest CFRD technology in China (Figure 8). The dam
was designed for an intensity of VIII (Chinese scale), with a design
peak ground acceleration of 0.26g. The epicentral distance of the
dam was 17km. During the earthquake the reservoir level was low
and its volume was 300Mm3. Under normal operation conditions
the reservoir volume is 1100Mm3. The crest of the dam and the con-
crete face were damaged. Of greatest interest was the damage to the
concrete face and waterproofing system which consisted of damage
of the vertical joints and the offset of the horizontal joint between
the second and third stage slab construction (Figures 9 and 10).
After the earthquake the maximum settlement at the dam crest
was 735mm and the horizontal deflection in downstream direc-
tion was 180mm. The cross-canyon deformation of both abut-
ments was 102mm. Because of the low water level in the reservoir
at the time of the earthquake, it is difficult to estimate what the
earthquake behaviour of the dam, the concrete face, and the water-
proofing system would have been if the reservoir was full.
D ISCUSSION OF THE EARTHQUAKE HAZARD
The ICOLD Committee on Seismic Aspects of Dam Design has recent-
ly revised Bulletin 62 entitled Inspection of Dams following
Earthquake. This bulletin can be used for the systematic inspection
of dams that have experienced strong ground shaking (ICOLD, 2008).
For existing and new dams it is recommended a safety plan be pre-
pared in which all hazards affecting a dam project are listed sys-
tematically and the action to be taken for each hazard is discussed.
As discussed earlier, the Wenchuan earthquake has shown the vul-
nerability of dams and especially appurtenant structures and spill-
ways to rockfall, it is therefore necessary to pay more attention to
this hazard in mountainous regions.
Among dam engineers, the concept of the maximum credible
earthquake (MCE) or the safety evaluation earthquake is well
known, however, the integral safety concept for dams, which
includes the following elements: (i) structural safety, (ii) safety mon-
itoring, (iii) operational safety and maintenance, and (iv) emergency
planning, is less known to other people involved in dam projects.
In assessing the safety of slopes little reference is made to the sta-
bility of slopes at the dam site and the reservoir under the MCE
ground motions. Usually the slope failure hazard is classified as mod-
erate, small, and very small. Such a qualitative description is inade-
quate as it is necessary to discuss the different failure scenarios under
very strong ground shaking and the consequences of such failures.
The discussion of the consequences is often omitted.
The rockfall hazard is generally underestimated. Earthquake-trig-
gered rockfalls and slides of steep slopes are usually shallow; there-
fore, protection of such slopes is technically and economically feasible.
For the seismic hazard assessment of dam sites and major infra-
Left to right: Figure 8 Zipingpu CFRD: view of downstream face with office building and powerhouse with debris from parapet wall at crest and rocks
dislocated during the earthquake; Figure 9 Damage along the vertical joints at Zipingpu; Figure 10 Repair of the dams longitudinal joint
WWW.WATERPOWERMAGAZINE.COM SEPTEMBER 2009
SEISMIC ANALYSIS
structure projects seismologists have developed sophisticated models.
At present, the emphasis is on probabilistic seismic hazard analysis.
The objective is to specify the hazard for different types of design
earthquakes. The result is basically a uniform hazard spectrum for
the acceleration at the ground/rock surface and a de-aggregation of
the hazard in terms of magnitude and epicentral distance. The engi-
neer would need the acceleration time histories of different design
earthquakes. The last step, i.e. the conversion of the uniform hazard
spectrum into different sets of acceleration time histories, is still
under development.
As discussed in the previous section the seismic hazard is not only
ground shaking. It is much more complex. Therefore, focussing on
the ground shaking may not lead to an improved earthquake safety
as other important hazards may be neglected. The situation is some-
how comparable with the development of computer programs for
the dynamic analysis of dams, which, although they were very
advanced, the elementary information on material parameters and
their strength properties was inadequate and there were, and still
are, very large uncertainties involved in estimating the safety evalu-
ation earthquake ground motion. It was realised that further
progress in the methods of dynamic analysis would not lead to an
improvement of the seismic safety of dams. Therefore, in the seis-
mic hazard assessment of dam sites, a thorough study of all hazards
is needed. Ground shaking may not necessarily be the dominant one.
The features of different types of dams to effectively resist seismic
ground motion are listed in ICOLD (2001). To observe these gen-
eral design recommendations is highly recommended as they are
often more effective than any sophisticated dynamic analyses of a
dam system where some of these guidelines have been ignored.
LARGE RESERVOIRS AND SEISMICITY IN SICHUAN
Shortly after the 12 May 2008 earthquake, reports appeared which
suggested that it was triggered by the impounding and operation of
the Zipingpu reservoir. The main arguments for this suggestion are,
firstly, the observation that large reservoirs can trigger earthquakes,
secondly, that the epicentre of the Wenchuan earthquake is located
17km from the Zipingpu dam and, thirdly, a small part of one branch
of the reservoir intersects the fault, which ruptured during the earth-
quake. However, if a tectonic fault is close to failure then it is almost
impossible to determine the exact factors triggering a major earth-
quake. This is also the case for the Wenchuan earthquake. Additional
research may shed more light into what triggered the earthquake.
The following text was prepared at the seminar in Chengdu during
the last day of the ICOLD-CHINCOLD mission.
The maximum water level of the Zipingpu reservoir (elevation
875.4m) has not exceeded the natural water level (elevation 877m)
where the Min River crosses the Beichuan-Yinxiu fault. Therefore,
the original hydrogeological conditions of the Beichuan-Yinxiu fault
have not been affected by the impounding of the Zipingpu reservoir.
In August 2004, 13 months before reservoir impounding, an earth-
quake monitoring network with seven fixed stations was set up in the
39
 SEISMIC ANALYSIS
reservoir region. In October 2006, the reservoir water level reached
elevation 875.4m, 1.6m below normal storage level. The corre-
sponding reservoir volume was 900Mm3. In July 2006 and May
2007, the water level was lowered to elevation 820m. Before the
Wenchuan earthquake (30 April 2008), the reservoir water level was
at elevation 828.95m, the corresponding reservoir volume was
300Mm3. From the statistics of the annual seismic activity of the reser-
voir obtained from the Department of Reservoir Earthquake Research
of the Sichuan Seismological Bureau, the frequency and intensity of
seismic activity after impounding of the Zipingpu reservoir was almost
unchanged before and after reservoir impounding. The recorded seis-
micity has also no relation with the reservoir water level variation.
This phenomenon is known as reservoir-triggered seismicity
(RTS). The main mechanism for RTS is the release of tectonic stress-
es due to changes in stress and strength properties in fault planes
caused by the reservoir. This requires that the fault that can produce
an earthquake is already near to failure; so that the added weight or
pore pressure build up due to reservoir impounding can trigger a
seismic event. Seismic events can also be triggered by the collapse
of underground cavities in mining areas or liquid injection.
Reservoir-triggered seismicity has been considered in the dam engi-
neering community since 1935, when the first documented case of
RTS was created at Lake Mead, the reservoir at the 220m high
Hoover arch dam in the US. Since then several strong earthquakes
in India, China, Greece and Zambia have occurred which are sus-
pected of being reservoir triggered. The maximum magnitude of an
RTS event that has been identified to date is 6.3. The exact number
of reservoir triggered cases is not known but ICOLD believes that
the number of accepted cases is today somewhere between 40 and
100. The relationship between reservoirs and seismicity continues
to be debated in the scientific community.
The increasing height of dams and size of reservoirs may con-
tribute to the possibility of earthquakes being triggered. ICOLD rec-
ommends that RTS needs to be considered for large dams over 100m
in height. ICOLD has also published a bulletin presenting the state
of knowledge on reservoirs and seismicity.
According to ICOLD recommendations, high hazard dams are
designed to safely withstand ground motions caused by the maxi-
mum credible earthquake (MCE). Therefore RTS seismicity is not a
direct safety problem for a well-designed dam as the maximum reser-
voir-triggered earthquake cannot be stronger than the MCE.
However, RTS may still be a problem for other structures, buildings
and appurtenant works because they may have a much lower earth-
quake resistance than the dam.
Adequate monitoring of RTS prior, during and after impound-
ment of a reservoir provides the most conclusive evidence as to
whether or not water impoundment causes triggered earthquakes.
To help distinguish between background seismicity and RTS, mon-
itoring should start well in advance of impounding of the reservoir.
From the observational engineering viewpoint, the RTS cases are
characterized by the following main features, which can be used as
a checklist to determine if RTS is occurring:
a) The seismic events monitored during and after impounding are
more frequent than the background seismicity before impounding.
b) With the increase and larger oscillations of storage levels, the
frequency and magnitude of RTS phenomena increases.
c) In most cases, the triggered events tend to be scaled down, after
peaking, towards ambient background activity.
d) In a number of triggered cases, the observed intensity of shak-
ing sharply decreased with distance from the epicenters, which usu-
ally cluster around the reservoir. In most cases the activity starts
soon after the beginning of impounding and grows with reservoir
levels, restarting as a rule after quick changes in reservoir levels.
e) It has been proposed to use as a diagnostic tool the relationship
between frequency and magnitude of seismic events, with more
smaller events indicating triggered seismicity, although this indi-
cator is considered controversial.
f) It is considered that more triggered events are linked to normal
and strike slip faulting than to thrust faulting.
40
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g) Relatively shallow earthquakes are the most likely outcome of
RTS. But, this statement has to be understood as a general trend,
as significant exceptions are possible, as in the case of Aswan reser-
voir, where RTS phenomena were documented at a depth of 25km.
In the case of Zipingpu, on this basis the possibility of the Wenchuan
Earthquake being RTS is very unlikely.
C ONCLUSIONS
Based on the recent observations made in China, the following con-
clusions can be drawn:
1. Following a strong earthquake, the seismic hazard at dam sites
have to be increased and the seismic design guidelines have to be
reviewed and updated.
2. In mountainous regions large rockfalls have to be expected, which
hinder access to dams after an earthquake for many weeks and
months, and rockfalls can cause substantial damage to surface
powerhouses, gates, piers, and appurtenant structures.
3. The earthquake hazard has many features which are site-specif-
ic, therefore a standard approach in which emphasis is only put
on ground shaking is problematic.
4. The concrete face of CFRD dams are vulnerable to strong ground
shaking mainly due to large in-plane forces.
5. Seismic instrumentation is still lacking in most dams, even in large
modern dams.
6. Every time a strong earthquake occurs, new features show up
which have been overlooked in the past by dam engineers.
7. Methods for the assessment of slopes in steep valleys subjected to
very strong ground shaking need further development. IWP & DC
Martin Wieland, Chairman ICOLD Committee on Seismic
Aspects of Dam Design, Poyry Energy Ltd
martin.wieland@poyry.com
Chen Houqun, Vice-Chairman, ICOLD Committee on
Seismic Aspects of Dam Design, Academician, China
Academy of Engineering, China Institute of Water
Resources and Hydropower Research, Beijing, China.
chenhq@iwhr.com
The photos showing the damage and repair works of the
concrete face of Zipingpu CFRD were obtained from Xu
Zeping of IWHR, Beijing
References
[1] Chen H. (2008), Consideration of dam safety after Wenchuan
earthquake in China, Proc. 14th World conference on Earthquake
Engineering, Special session S13 Seismic Aspects of Large Embankment
and Concrete Dams, Beijing, China
[2] ICOLD (2001), Design features of dams to effectively resist seismic
ground motion, Guidelines, Bulletin 120, Committee on Seismic Aspects of
Dam Design, International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD), Paris, France
[3] ICOLD (2008), Inspection of dams following earthquake, guidelines,
revised Bulletin 62, Committee on Seismic Aspects of Dam Design,
International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD), Paris, France
[4] ICOLD (2009), Reservoirs and seismicity: State of knowledge, Bulletin
137, Committee on Seismic Aspects of Dam Design, International
Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD), Paris, France
[5] Wang Z. et al. (2008), General introduction to engineering damage
during Wenchuan earthquake, Journal of Earthquake Engineering and
Engineering Vibration, Vol. 28 supplement compiled by China Earthquake
Administration, October
[6] Xu Z. (2008), Performance of Zipingpu CFRD during the strong
earthquake, Proc. 10th International Symposium on Landslides and
Engineered Slopes, Xian, China, June 30 to July 4
SEPTEMBER 2009 INTERNATIONAL WATER POWER & DAM CONSTRUCTION