CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASES (RULE 114- RULE 117)

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RULE 114: BAIL

1. DAVID vs. AGBAY

FACTS: In 1974, Renator David became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. He returned to the
Philippines in 2000 and bought a beach lot where he constructed a house. He later learned that
the lot was of public domain and a salvage area so he filed a Miscellaneous Lease Patent
Application in April 2007 where he indicated that he was a Filipino Citizen. In October of 2007,
he reacquired his Filipino citizenship. Agbay opposed the Lease Patent APplication of David and
filed a criminal case against him for falsification of public documents. Before he was arrested, he
filed a motion for Re-determination of Probable Cause. The MTC denied the motion on the
ground that it has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

ISSUE: Is the MTC correct in saying that it has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the accused?

DECISION: No. The law distinguishes between when a person is under the custody of the law
and when jurisdiction has been acquired over the person of the accused. While the accused has
not yet been brought to the custody of the law, the MTC is competent and with jurisdiction in the
Motion filed by the accused. The jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived
when he files any pleaading seeking an affirmative relief except when he invokes the special
jurisdiction of the court to impugn the jurisdictiom over his person. However, the MTC is correct
in dismissing the Motion, the reason being that it lacks merit.

2. LEONARDO ALMEDA vs. HON. ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ, in his capacity as presiding

judge of the Circuit Criminal Court, Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, Rizal, and HON.
GREGORIO PINEDA, City Fiscal of Pasay City
G.R. No. L-31665 August 6, 1975
FACTS: Leonardo Almeda was charged with the crime of theft of a motor vehicle together with
five others. The amount of P15,000 as bond was approved for his provision release, and with a
direction that it be posted entirely in cash.
Almeda asked Judge Villaluz of the MCTC of Pasig, Rizal to allow him to post a surety bond in
lieu of the cash bond required of him. His request was denied because based on the petitioner's
past record, the range of his career in crime weighs heavily against letting him off easily on a
middling amount of bail. The likelihood of his jumping bail or committing other harm to the
citizenry while on provisional liberty was a consideration simply cannot be ignored.
ISSUES: Whether the respondent judge has the authority to require a strictly cash bond and
disallow the petitioner's attempt to post a surety bond for his provisional liberty.
HELD: No. In this jurisdiction, the accused has a right to bail prior to conviction except when he
is charged with a capital offense and when the evidence of guilt is strong. This right is
guaranteed by the Constitution.
In order to safeguard the right of an accused to bail, the Constitution further provides that
"excessive bail shall not be required." Where conditions imposed upon a defendant seeking bail
would amount to a refusal thereof and render nugatory the constitutional right to bail, we would
not hesitate to exercise our supervisory powers to provide the required remedy.
The amount fixed for bail, while reasonable if considered in terms of surety or property bonds,
may be excessive if demanded in the form of cash. The condition that the accused may have
provisional liberty only upon his posting of a cash bond is abhorrent to the nature of bail and
transgresses our law on the matter. The sole purpose of bail is to insure the attendance of the
accused when required by the court, and there should be no suggestion of penalty on the part of
the accused nor revenue on the part of the government.
The option to deposit cash in lieu of a surety bond primarily belongs to the accused. The trial
court may not reject otherwise acceptable sureties and insist that the accused obtain his
provisional liberty only thru a cash bond.
What the court may do is to: First. it could increase the amount of the bail bond to an appropriate
level. Second, as part of the power of the court over the person of the accused and for the
purpose of discouraging likely commission of other crimes by a notorious defendant while on
provisional liberty, the latter could be required, as one of the conditions of his bail bond, to
report in person periodically to the court and make an accounting of his movements. And lastly,
the accused might be warned, though this warning is not essential to the requirements of due
process, that under the 1973 Constitution "Trial may proceed notwithstanding his absence
provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified.

3. ROBERTO ESPIRITU VS JUDGE EDUARDO JOVELLANOS

FACTS:
Roberto Espiritu filed a case for frustrated murder against Weny Dumlao in the 8th Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Alcala-Bautista, Pangasinan. Espiritu alleged that while he was with a
group, Weny Dumlao approached him and fired at him three times and as a result of which
Espiritu was wounded. After conducting a preliminary investigation, judge Jovellanos ordered
the arrest of Dumlao and fixed the amount of bail for his provisional liberty at P20,000.
However, in a subsequent order judge Jovellanos reduced the amount of the bail to P10,000,
stating that Dumlao and his father had asked for the reduction. Then judge Jovellanos dismissed
the case.
Espiritu sought a review in the DOJ but his petition was denied for having been filed late so
Espiritu filed a complaint of gross ignorance of the law against judge Jovellanos for granting bail
to Weny Dumlao despite the fact that Dumlao was not in the custody of the law.

ISSUE: Whether the judge Jovellanos erred in granting bail to Wendy Dumlao

HELD:
The Supreme Court held that Judge Jovellanos correctly granted bail to Dumlao because
although Dumlao was not in legal custody then, Dumlao subsequently submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court when on he personally asked respondent judge to admit him to bail and
reduce its amount. The Supreme Court cited the case of Paderanga vs Court of Appeals wherein
Paderanga was accused in a case for multiple murder and before the warrant of arrest could be
served on him he filed a motion for admission to bail through his counsel as he was then
confined in the hospital. In this case it was held that Paderangas was in the constructive custody
of the law when he moved for admission to bail through his lawyers (1) by filing the application
for bail with the trial court, (2) by furnishing true information of his actual whereabouts, and (3)
by unequivocably recognizing the jurisdiction of said court.
However, Jovellanos erred in fixing the amount of bail at P20,000 and reducing it to P10,000
because Under the 1981 Bail Bond the amount of bail in cases of frustrated murder is P12,500.
Also, Judge Jovellanos granted the application for bail without notice to the prosecution and the
failure to observe such requirement constitutes ignorance or incompetence which cannot be
excused by any protestation of good faith.
The Supreme court held that Judge Jovellanos is guilty of gross misconduct and imposed a fine
on him for P20,000 with a warning that repetition of similar offenses will be dealt with more
severely.

5. FRANCISCO YAP, JR vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:
For misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00,Yap was convicted of estafa by the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City and was sentenced to 4 years and 2 months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to 8 years of prision mayor as maximum.He filed a notice of appeal,
and moved to be allowed provisional liberty under the cash bond he had filed earlier in the
proceedings. The motion was denied by the trial court.

After the records of the case were transmitted to the Court of Appeals, Yap filed with the CA a
Motion to Fix Bail For the Provisional Liberty of Accused-Appellant Pending Appeal, invoking
the last paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Solicitor General: Yap may be allowed to post bail in the amount of P5,500,000.00 and be
required to secure a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is
a resident of the area and that he will remain to be so until final judgment is rendered or in case
he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the court and private complainant.

CA upheld the recommendation of the Solicitor General and in addition, that the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation (CID) shall issue a hold departure order against Yap and that Yap
surrender his passport to the Division Clerk of Court for safekeeping until the court orders its
return;

Yap contends that the Court of Appeals, by setting bail at a prohibitory amount, effectively
denied him his right to bail. He challenges the legal basis of respondent court for fixing bail at
P5,500,000.00, which is equivalent to the amount of his civil liability to Manila Mahogany
Marketing Corporation, and argues that the Rules of Court never intended for the civil liability of
the accused to be a guideline or basis for determining the amount of bail. He prays that bail be
reduced to at least P40,000.00, citing the maximum amount of bail that can be posted for the
crime of estafa under the 1996 Bail Bond Guide, or P20,000.00, equivalent to the amount of bail
he posted during the trial of the case.

The Solicitor General maintains that no grave abuse of discretion could be ascribed to the Court
of Appeals for fixing the amount of bail at P5,500,000.00 considering the severity of the penalty
imposed, the weight of the evidence against Yap and the gravity of the offense of which he was
convicted by the RTC. He asserted that the P5,500,000.00 not only corresponded to civil liability
but also to the amount of fraud imputed to Yap. The Solicitor General further pointed out the
probability of flight in case petitioner is released on bail, it having been established that Yap was
in possession of a valid passport and visa and had in fact left the country several times during the
course of the proceedings in the lower court. It was also shown that Yap used different names in
his business transactions and had several abodes in different parts of the country.

As for the conditions imposed by the bail, the Solicitor General advanced that all that the Court
of Appeals requires is notice in case of change of address; it does not in any way impair
Yaps right to change abode for as long as the court is apprised of his change of residence
during the pendency of the appeal.

Issues:
1. Whether the proposed bail of P5,500,000.00 was violative of petitioner's right against
excessive bail.

2. Whether the condition imposed by the CA violative of the liberty of abode and right to travel.

Held:

SC: The amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective denial
of Yaps right to bail.

Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1997 Rules of Court which states:

SEC. 5. Bail, when discretionary. --- Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on
application, may admit the accused to bail.

If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years, but not more than 20 years,
the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail previously granted shall be cancelled, upon a
showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar
circumstances:
(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the
crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence, or has violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, or under conditional
pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of flight if released
on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused may commit
another crime.

Court of Appeals exercised its discretion in favor of allowing bail to Yap on appeal. CA stated
that it was doing so for humanitarian reasons, and despite a perceived high risk of flight, as by
Yaps admission he went out of the country several times during the pendency of the case, for
which reason the court deemed it necessary to peg the amount of bail at P5,500,000.00.

Imposing bail in an excessive amount could render meaningless the right to bail. Section 9, Rule
114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure advises courts to consider the following factors
in the setting of the amount of bail:
(a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;
(b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;
(c) Penalty for the offense charged;
(d) Character and reputation of the accused;
(e) Age and health of the accused;
(f) Weight of the evidence against the accused;
(g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial;
(h) Forfeiture of other bail;
(i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and
(j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.

Appropriate conditions have been imposed in the bond to ensure against the risk of flight,
particularly, the combination of the hold-departure order and the requirement that Yap inform the
court of any change of residence and of his whereabouts.

The amount should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when required but no
higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. To fix bail at an amount equivalent to
the civil liability of which petitioner is charged is to permit the impression that the amount paid
as bail is an exaction of the civil liability that accused is charged of. Bail is not intended as a
punishment, nor as a satisfaction of civil liability.

Bail cannot also be set at P40,000.00 based on the 1996 Bail Bond Guide. The Courts are not
precluded from imposing in Yap case an amount higher than P40,000.00 (based on the Bail Bond
Guide) where it perceives that an appropriate increase is dictated by the circumstances.

Petitioner is seeking bail on appeal. He was in fact declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt by
the RTC, and due to the serious amount of fraud involved, sentenced to imprisonment for 20
years. Guided by the penalty imposed by the lower court and the weight of the evidence against
petitioner, P200,000.00 as bail is reasonable.

2. The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked by petitioner, are
not absolute rights. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:
The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not
be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall pthe right to travel be
 impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be
provided by law.

The condition imposed by the Court of Appeals is consistent with the nature and function of a
bail which is to ensure that petitioner will make himself available at all times whenever the Court
requires his presence. Yap is not prevented from changing abode; he is merely required to inform
the court in case he does so.

MANOLET O. LAVIDES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS; HON.

ROSALINA L. LUNA PISON, Judge Presiding over Branch 107, RTC, Quezon City; and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS:

1. Petitioner Manolet Lavides was arrested on April 3, 1997 for child abuse under R.A. No. 7610
2. His arrest was made without a warrant as a result of an entrapment conducted by the police. It
appears that on April 3, 1997, the parents of complainant Lorelie San Miguel reported to the
police that their daughter, then 16 years old, had been contacted by petitioner for an assignation
that night at petitioners room at the Metropolitan Hotel in Diliman, Quezon City. At around 8:20
in the evening of April 3, 1997, the police knocked at the door of Room 308 of the Metropolitan
Hotel where petitioner was staying. When petitioner opened the door, the police saw him with
Lorelie, who was wearing only a t-shirt and an underwear, whereupon they arrested him.
3.On April 29, 1997, nine more informations for child abuse were filed against petitioner by the
same complainant, Lorelie San Miguel, and by three other minor children, Mary Ann Tardesilla,
Jennifer Catarman, and Annalyn Talingting./
4. No bail was recommended. Nonetheless, petitioner filed separate applications for bail in the
nine cases.
5. Accordingly, petitioner was arraigned during which he pleaded not guilty to the charges
against him and then ordered him released upon posting bail bonds in the total amount of
P800,000.00, subject to the conditions in the May 16, 1997 order and the "hold-departure" order
of April 10, 1997.
ISSUE:
WON .making arraignment a prerequisite to the grant of bail to petitioner is void
HELD:
It is the condition in the May 16, 1997 order of the trial court that "approval of the bail bonds
shall be made only after arraignment," which the Court of Appeals should instead have declared
void. The condition imposed in the trial courts order of May 16, 1997 that the accused cannot
waive his appearance at the trial but that he must be present at the hearings of the case is valid
and is in accordance with Rule 114. For another condition of bail under Rule 114, 2(c) is that
"The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without justification despite due notice to him or
his bondsman shall be deemed an express waiver of his right to be present on the date specified
in the notice. In such case, trial shall proceed in absentia." Jjsc
Art. III, 14(2) of the Constitution authorizing trials in absentia allows the accused to be absent at
the trial but not at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment and plea, whether
of innocence or of guilt, (b) during trial whenever necessary for identification purposes, and
[9] [10]

(c) at the promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which case the accused may
appear by counsel or representative. At such stages of the proceedings, his presence is required
[11]
and cannot be waived. As pointed out in Borja v. Mendoza, in an opinion by Justice, later Chief
[12]

Justice, Enrique Fernando, there can be no trial in absentia unless the accused has been
arraigned.

7. OSG VS. De Castro

FACTS:
Gao Yuan is a national of the Peoples Republic of China (PROC) and holder of a special
non-immigrant visa to the Philippines and an immigrant visa to Canada. On 6 September 2005,
Gao Yuan, her husband James Mahshi, a U.S.national, and their two young children were on
their way to a vacation in Canadawhen Philippine immigration officers arrested Gao Yuan and
prevented her from boarding her flight. Gao Yuans arrest was by virtue of an order issued by
Bureau of Immigration (BI) Commissioner Alipio Fernandez, Jr., which, in turn, was a response
to a letter. dated 9 August 2004 from the Consul General of the PROC which alleged that Gao
Yuan was a fugitive from justice and charged with embezzlement by Chinese police and
requested her arrest and deportation to China. Gao Yuan was detained at the BI Detention
Center.
James Mahshi filed on 8 September 2005 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila the Petition for the writ of Habeas Corpus with Application for Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary Injunction, impleading Commissioner Fernandez as
respondent. It was alleged that Gao Yuan was illegally detained since she is not a fugitive from
justice as in fact, she was not charged with any crime at the time she left China in 2001 and [a]t
such time, no case had been filed against her, no process to compel her testimony had been
issued and no travel restrictions had been imposed on her by Chinese authorities. It was also
alleged that Gao Yuan had filed with the Department of Justice a petition for asylum as a
political refugee. James Mahshi also filed a Supplement to Application for TRO and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction praying for the amendment of the 8 September 2005 order to include
restraining Commissioner Fernandez from enforcing any order of commitment of Gao Yuan and
directing her immediate release.
On the same day, Executive Judge Eugenio, Jr. of the RTC of Manila issued a 72-hour
TRO enjoining the Commissioner from initiating any deportation proceeding and/or directing the
suspension of any such proceedings against GaoYuan. The case was then raffled to Branch 3 of
the Manila RTC presided by respondent.
Commissioner Fernandez, through the OSG, filed a Return of the Writ on 8 September
2005. The Return informed the RTC that Gao Yuans passport had been cancelled on 18
November 2004 by the PROC and her apprehension had been expressly requested by the
Embassy of the PROC. Gao Yuans summary deportation was already ordered upon prior filing
of a charge sheet for being an undocumented and undesirable alien by the BI Board of
Commissioners.

On 9 September 2005, a summary hearing on the issue of injunction was held and the
parties, upon the suggestion of respondent, agreed to the extension of the 72-hour TRO by 17
days or up to 28 September 2005. The parties were required to file their memoranda or position
papers until 19 September 2005. The Commissioner was then given until 12 September 2005 to
comment on the Supplement to Application for TRO filed by James Mahshi which prayed for the
release of Gao Yuan.
On 13 Septembter 2005, respondent promulgated an Order of Release directing Commissioner
Fernandez to immediately discharge the custody of GaoYuan, she having filed her cash bond in
the amount of P250,000.00. However, upon service of the order, the BI refused to release Gao
Yuan as there was no BI clearance. Commissioner Fernandez filed an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration of the said order on 16 September 2005.

During the hearing for clarificatory questioning on 16 September 2005, where Gao Yuan
was presented, respondent insisted on releasing Gao Yuan from custody.Through an
interlocutory order, the RTC took custody of Gao Yuan. The RTC clarified that it was only a
provisional release for the duration of the TRO or up to 28 September 2005, subject to certain
conditions: the posting of an additional cash bond of P100,000.00; (2) her movements were to be
monitored by the court; (3) the issuance of a warrant of arrest against her should she try to hide;
and (4) the signing by Gao Yuan and her husband of an undertaking that she will come to court
at any given time she is called. Respondent based the provisional release on humanitarian
reasons, considering that Gao Yuan was merely wanted as a witness in a case in the PROC and
she is a nursing mother to a 17-month old child.

Commissioner Fernandez was compelled to file a Notice of Appeal upon GaoYuans

release from the BIs custody.

On 19 September 2005, respondent issued an Order reiterating that GaoYuans release

was only temporary, thus making the Commissioners Notice of Appeal premature. The
Commissioner was then given additional time to file his memorandum.

On 23 September 2005, respondent ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest against

Gao Yuan for failing to appear before the trial court after having been directed to do so and
denied James Mahshis prayer for issuance of a writ of injunction.

Complainant OSG contends that Gao Yuans release on bail is illegal since such falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Immigration and not in the regular courts
pursuant to Section 37(e) of C.A. No.
Complainant also points out that the grant of injunction embodied in the 13 September
2005 Order was invalid for the release was only prayed for in an unverified Supplement to
Application for TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Complainant insists that the Notice of
Appeal it filed is proper since respondent already ordered the release of Gao Yuan, which was
the very action in the petition for habeas corpus, notwithstanding respondents reasoning that the
release was merely provisional or temporary.
Lastly, complainant argues that respondent is guilty of dishonesty for making it appear
that Solicitor Danilo Leyva agreed to the extension of the TRO and did not oppose the release of
Gao Yuan when the contrary is true.
Both Judge Eugenio and respondent were required to comment.
The case against Judge Eugenio, Jr. was dismissed per Resolution dated 30 August 2006,
as it was found that even though Judge Eugenio, Jr. erred in issuing the TRO, it was a mere
judgment error not meriting administrative sanction. The same resolution also resolved to re-
docket the complaint against respondent as a regular administrative matter and refer it to a Court
of Appeals Justice for investigation, report and recommendation. The case was eventually raffled
to Justice Arcangelita Romilla-Lontok.
 A summarized in the Report and Recommendation, respondent averred in his comments
that: (a) the RTC had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for habeas corpus; (b) he
acted in accordance with law in issuing the Orders dated 9, 13 and 16 September 2005; and (c)
the proper remedy of a party aggrieved by the decision of a court is to elevate the matter by
appeal or certiorari and not to file an administrative case against the judge.

Justice Romilla-Lontok agrees that the RTC, and in this particular case, Branch 3 with
respondent presiding, had clearly been vested with jurisdiction over the petition for habeas
corpus, based on the allegations in the petition that GaoYuan had been detained even without a
judicial writ or order for her commitment. She points out that the return of the writ filed by the
Commissioner of Immigration formally informed respondent about a deportation case against
Gao Yuan with the BI Board of Commissioners, supported by attachments consisting of the
Charge Sheet and Summary Deportation Order. From the time said return was filed, respondents
actions should have been governed by Section 4, Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. Pursuant thereto, the orders releasing Gao Yuan upon posting of a cash bond and
placing her under the custody of the RTC are devoid of legal basis. Justice Romilla-Lontok
concedes that respondent issued the assailed orders without any ill-will, but rather was motivated
by humanitarian considerations.Thus, she concludes that his error was not due to any conscious
and deliberate effort to commit an injustice. However, she emphasized the duty of members of
the judiciary to keep abreast of the laws, rulings and jurisprudence affecting their jurisdiction. A
judge owes it to the public and the administration of justice to know the law he is supposed to
apply to a given controversy and to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance of such laws
and procedures. Finding that respondent fell short of the conduct expected of a judge, she
recommends the imposition of a two (2)-month suspension with admonishment that similar
conduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.

ISSUE: Whether Respondent is guilty of ignorance of the law.

HELD: YES
The Court agrees with Justice Romilla-Lontoks finding that respondents conduct has proven
inadequate to satisfy the required standards, but deems it proper to increase the period of
suspension to three (3) months and one (1) day without pay.

A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by Rule
102 of the Revised Rules of Court. The objective of the writ is to determine whether the
confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be
inquired into is the legality of his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for
the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of
some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Sec. 4 of Rule 102, be no longer
illegal at the time of the filing of the application.
In the case at bar, the petition for habeas corpus was filed on 8 September 2005 and was raffled
on the same day to respondents sala. The Return of the Writ was filed on 9 September 2004,
accompanied by the Charge Sheet dated 7 September 2005 and the Summary Deportation Order
also dated 7 September 2005. When the petition was filed by James Mahshi, a charge sheet and
deportation order had already been filed against Gao Yuan. By then, the restraint of Gao Yuans
liberty was already by virtue of a lawful process. Clearly, respondents court no longer had
jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus and it was error for respondent to order Gao
Yuans release upon the filing of a cash bond and take full responsibility for the release and
custody of Gao.

The provisional or temporary release of Gao Yuan also effectively granted the petition for habeas
corpus insofar as the discharge of the detainee is concerned, since the main prayer in a petition
for habeas corpus relates to the release or discharge of the detainee. The general rule is that the
release, whether permanent or temporary, of a detained person renders the petition for habeas
corpus moot and academic. Such release must be one which is free from involuntary restraints.
Gao Yuans release, while still subject to certain conditions, did not unduly restrain her
movements or deprive her of her constitutional freedoms. The conditions were deemed necessary
by the court below to ensure her attendance in the subsequent hearings on the case. Said
conditions did not at all restrict her freedom of movement as she was able to elude the authorities
who tried to arrest her for her failure to appear before the trial court on 23 September 2005.
Respondent may also have been under the impression that the case before him was one for
extradition, particularly because Gao Yuans arrest and detention were pursuant to a request from
the PROC to hkold and deport her in connection with an embezzlement case in China. If that
were so, his acts of ordering Gao Yuans release upon the filing of a bond would have been
sanctioned by this Courts ruling in Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,
represented by the Philippine Department of Justice v. Hon. Felixberto T. Olalia and Juan
Antonio Muoz which allows the prospective extraditee to apply for bail, provided that he
presents clear and convincing evidence that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the
orders and processes of the extradition court. However, the petition filed before respondent was
one for habeas corpus which raised the simple issue of whether Gao Yuan was held under lawful
authority. The Return filed by the Commissioner sufficiently established the basis of Gao Yuans
detention, which were the Charge Sheet and Summary Deportation Order. By the time the
petition for habeas corpus was filed, there was already a legal basis to detain Gao Yuan.Her
confinement was not illegal. It was thus error for respondent to continue with the proceeding and
thereafter order her release upon posting of a cash bond.

Thus, we find respondents failure to observe the law and procedure on petitions for habeas
corpus inexcusable, albeit done in good faith for humanitarian considerations and in the honest
belief that Gao Yuans detention was in violation of due process. Accordingly, respondent is
administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law.
Ordinarily, to constitute gross ignorance of the law, the subject decision, order, or actuation of
the judge in the performance of his official duties should be contrary to existing law and
jurisprudence, and most importantly, he must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or
corruption. In the present case, there is no finding of bad faith or malice, but this does not excuse
respondent. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it,
and anything less than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. In short, when
the law is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. While
judges should not be held accountable for every erroneous judgment rendered in good faith, such
good faith is no defense where the basic issues are simple and the applicable legal principle
evident and basic as to be beyond permissible margins of error. A judge is called upon to exhibit
more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he
be conversant with basic legal principles and aware of well-settled authoritative doctrines.
Competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office. When a
judge displays an utter unfamiliarity with the law and the rules, he erodes the confidence of the
public in the courts. There will be great faith in the administration of justice only if the party
litigants believe that the occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of apparent deficiency
in their grasp of legal principle. For disregarding jurisprudential pronouncements and basic legal
principles, respondent should be held liable.

Wherefore respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and hereby suspended for 3 months
and 1 day.

8. GOVT OF HONGKONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION VS HON. OLALIA

(EXTRADITION CASE)

In this case, petitioner seeks to nullify the two Orders of the RTC, Branch 8, Manila presided by
respondent Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.
1) Order allowing Juan Antonio Muoz (private resp) to post bail; and
2) the order denying the motion to vacate the said Order(allowing resp. to post bail) filed by the
Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, represented by DOJ, petitioner.
......petition alleges that both Orders were issued by respondent judge with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is NO provision in the Constitution
granting bail to a potential extraditee.

FACTS:
Respondent Muoz was charged of 3 counts of offences of accepting an advantage as agent,
and 7 counts of conspiracy to defraud, punishable by the common law of Hongkong. The
Hongkong Department of Justice requested DOJ for the provisional arrest of respondent Muoz;
the DOJ forward the request to the NBI then to RTC. On the same day, NBI agents arrested him.

Respondent filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
application for preliminary mandatory injunction and writ of habeas corpus questioning the
validity of the order of arrest.

The CA declared the arrest void. Hence this petition by the Hongkong Department of Justice thru
DOJ.

DOJ filed a petition for certiorari in this Court and sustained the validity of the arrest.

Hongkong Administrative Region then filed in the RTC petition for extradition and arrest of
respondent. Meanwhile, respondent filed a petition for bail, which was opposed by the petitioner,
initially the RTC denied the petition holding that there is no Philippine Law granting bail in
extradition cases and that private responded is a flight risk.
Motion for reconsideration was filed by the respondent, which was granted. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not right to bail can be avail in extradition cases.

HELD:
In Purganan case, the right to bail was not included in the extradition cases, since it is available
only in criminal proceedings.

However the Supreme Court, recognised the following trends in International Law.
1. The growing importance of the individual person in publican international law who, in the
20th century attained global recognition.
2. The higher value now being given in human rights in international sphere
3. The corresponding duty of countries to observe these human rights in fulfilling their treaty
obligations
4. The of duty of this court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on
one hand, and the law on extradition on the other.

The modern trend in the public international law is the primacy placed on the sanctity of human
rights.

Enshrined the Constitution The state values the dignity of every human person and guarantees
full respect for human rights. The Philippines therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and
promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or
arrested can participate in the proceeding before the a court, to enable it to decide without delay
on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified.

Examination of this Court in the doctrines provided for in the US Vs Purganan are the following:
1. The exercise of the States police power to deprive a person of his liberty is not limited to
criminal proceedings.
2. To limit the right to bail in the criminal proceeding would be to close our eyes to
jurisprudential history. Philippines has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal
proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal
proceedings. In fact, bail has been involved in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during the
tendency of administrative proceedings, taking into cognisance the obligation of the Philippines
under international conventions to uphold human rights.

EXTRADITION, is defined as the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of
placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to
hold him in connection with criminal investigation directed against him or execution of a penalty
imposed on him under the penal and criminal law of the requesting state or government. Thus
characterized as the right of the a foreign power, created by treaty to demand the surrender of
one accused or convicted of a crimes within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative
obligation of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state.
The extradited may be subject to detention as may be necessary step in the process of extradition,
but the length of time in the detention should be reasonable.

In the case at bar, the record show that the respondent, Muoz has been detained for 2 years
without being convicted in Hongkong.

The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its
obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign
relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in
keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditees rights
to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our
Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We
should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain
standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.

In other words there should be CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.

In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not
a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether
private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to
determine whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing
evidence." If not,... should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention;
and conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.

11. People v. Cabral

People vs. Cabral
G.R. No. 131909 18 February 1999
Assailed before this Court is the August 1, 1997 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA GR. No.
42318 which affirmed the March 24, 1995 and June 14, 1996 orders of the lower court granting
[2]

accused-respondents Motion for Bail and denying petitioner Peoples Motions to Recall and
Invalidate Order of March 24, 1995 and to Recall and/or Reconsider the Order of May 5, 1995
confirming the hospitalization of accused-respondent.
Facts:
Accused-respondent Roderick Odiamar was charged with rape upon the complaint of
Cecille Buenafe. In a bid to secure temporary liberty, accused-respondent filed a motion praying
that he be released on bail which petitioner opposed by presenting real, documentary and
testimonial evidence. The lower court, however, granted the motion for bail in an order, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
The evidence not being strong at the (sic) stage of the trial, this court is constrained to grant
bail for the provisional liberty of the accused Roderick Odiamar in the amount of P30,000.00.
The people then filed a motion to recall and invalidate the order of release on bail on the ground
that the evidence of guilt against Odiamar was strong.
The lower court denied the same and granted the motion for bail despite peoples opposition and
the Court of appeal sustained the denial. Hence, the instant appeal.
Odiamar was being charged with rape qualified by the use of a deadly weapon punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death. As such, bail is discretionary and not a matter of right, depending on
whether the evidence of guilt is strong.
This means that even though there is a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, if on the
examination of the entire record, the presumption is great, that accused is guilty of a capital
offense, bail should be refused.
Here, the lower courts Order failed to include some significant factors and circumstances
which, to the mind of the Court, are strong, clear and convincing. The lower court misapplied
some doctrines, abusing its discretion and showing bias in favor of Odiamar in determining
which circumstances are to be considered in supporting its decision as to his guilt.
It must be noted that the conduct of 2 P.I,
no bail was recommended in the information. Such recommendation constitutes clear and
strong evidence of guilt of the accused. Also, the lower court did not strictly
comply with jurisprudential guidelines in the exercise of its discretion.
The court granting or denying the bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the
prosecution, which is a complete compilation of all the pieces of evidence presented during the
hearing proper. Here, the summary was incomplete; hence, the order of release on bail was void
having been issued in grave abuse of discretion.
Issue:
WON the CA acted with Grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the assailed decision and resolution despite a showing by the prosecution that there is
strong evidence proving respondents guilt for the crime charged.
Held:
The grant or denial of an application for bail is dependent on whether the evidence of guilt is
strong which the lower court should determine in a hearing called for the purpose. In this case,
accused- respondent was being charged with rape qualified by the use of deadly weapon
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. As such, bail is discretionary and not a matter of
right.
The determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong , in this regard, is a matter of
judicial discretion. While the lower court would never be deprived of its mandated prerogative to
exercise judicial discretion, this court would unhesitatingly reverse the trial courts findings if
found to be laced with grave abuse of discretion.
Wherefore petition is granted.
Duties of judge in case an application for bail is filed:
1. Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation;
2. Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution
refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of
enabling the court to exercise its discretion.
3. Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bail.
Otherwise, petition should be denied.
VITUG, J., dissenting opinion: 1. REMEDIAL LAW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE BAIL IN
AN INDICTMENT FOR A CAPITAL OFFENSE, ACCUSED NOT ENTITLED THERETO
WHEN EVIDENCE OF GUILT IS STRONG. In an indictment for a capital offense, the accused
is not entitled to bail when the evidence of guilt is strong, and it is the duty of the judge to hear
the parties and to make an intelligent assessment of the evidence presented. When the judge
views the evidence of guilt in such a capital offense not to be strong, the grant of bail becomes a
matter of sound discretion on his part.

12. Supreme Court Circular No. 39 -37 (June 19 1997)

TO: All Judges

SUBJECT: Guidelines in the Issuance of Hold-Departure Orders

In order to avoid the indiscriminate issuance of Hold-Departure Orders resulting in

inconvenience to the parties affected, the same being tantamount to an infringement on the right
and liberty of an individual to travel and to ensure that the Hold-Departure Orders which are
issued contain complete and accurate information, the following guidelines are hereby
promulgated:

1. Hold-Departure Orders shall be issued only in criminal cases within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts;

2. The Regional Trial Courts issuing the Hold-Departure Order shall furnish the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the Bureau of Immigration (BI) ofthe Department of
Justice with a copy each of the Hold-Departure Order issued within twenty-four (24) hours from
the time of issuance and through the fastest available means of transmittal;

3. The Hold-Departure Order shall contain the following information:

a. The complete name (including the middle name), the date and place of
birth and
the place of last residence of the person against whom a Hold-Departure
Order has been issued or whose departure from the country has been
enjoined
b. The complete title and the docket number of the case in which the
Hold-Departure Order was issued;
c. The specific nature of the case; and
d. The date of the Hold-Departure Order.

If available, a recent photograph of the person against whom a Hold-Departure

Order has been issued or whose departure from the country has been enjoined should also
be included.
 4. Whenever (a) the accused has been acquitted; or (b) the case has been dismissed,
the judgment of acquittal or the order of dismissal shall include therein the cancellation of the
Hold-Departure Order issued.

The courts concerned shall furnish the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Bureau of
Immigration with a copy each of the judgment of acquittal promulgated or the order of dismissal
issued within twentyfour (24) hours from the time ofpromulgation/issuance and likewise through
the fastest available means of transmittal.

All Regional Trial Courts which have furnished the Department of Foreign Affairs with
their respective lists of active Hold-Departure Orders are hereby directed to conduct an inventory
of the Hold-Departure Orders included in the said lists and inform the government agencies
concerned of the status of the Orders involved.

This Circular revokes Circular No. 38-94 dated 6 June 1994 and Circular No. 62-96 dated
9 September 1996, takes effect immediately and shall remain in force until further orders.

13. Defensor-Santiago v. Vasquez

Facts:
An information was charged against Miriam Defensor-Santiago in the Sandiganbayan for
violating Section 3(e) of RA 3019 or The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The next day,
Sandiganbayan then issued an order of arrest against Defensor, with bail for her release fixed at
P15,000.00. On the same day, Defensor filed an "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of
Cash Bail Bond for and in Behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago," stating that Defensor was
involved in a vehicular collision.
The Sandiganbayan authorized the posting of a cash bond for her provisional liberty without
need for her physical appearance. A few days later, Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez filed a
manifestation that Defensor appeared in his office in good condition. The Sandiganbayan acted
on the manifestation, and ordered a resolution setting the arraignment of Defensor, and ordered
her appearance. Defensor responded by filing a motion asking that her cash bond be cancelled
and that she be allowed provisional liberty upon a recognizance. The Sandiganbayan deferred it.
The Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order against petitioner, by reason of the
announcement she made on the media that she would be leaving for the U.S. to accept a
fellowship in Harvard. In the instant motion she submitted before the Supreme Court, she argues
that the Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the hold departure order considering that it had not acquired jurisdiction
over the person of the petitioner.

Issues: (1) Whether the Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused; and
(2) whether there was a valid posting of bail.

Held:
The Sandiganbayan did acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused because she is
deemed to have voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the said court upon the filing
of her a"Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and in behalf of Dr.
Miriam Defensor-Santiago" where she expressly sought "that she be considered as having placed
herself under the jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the required trial and other
proceedings," and categorically prayed "that the bail bond she is posting in the amount of
P15,000.00 be duly accepted" and that by said motion "she be considered as having placed
herself under the custody" of said court. Correlatively, this means that the posting of bail was
valid because through the same motion (which was granted), she asked the court to authorize her
bail without her personal appearance.

14.MARCOS VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:
The former first lady Imelda Marcos was found guilty by the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan of violating 3 of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. After conviction she
filed a "Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad" to seek diagnostic tests and treatment by
practitioners of oriental medicine in China allegedly because of "a serious and life threatening
medical condition" requiring facilities not available in the Philippines that was denied. Then she
again filed an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Permission to Travel Abroad" to undergo diagnosis
and treatment in China. This was supported by several medical reports that were prepared by her
doctor Roberto Anastacio.

Again another Motion to leave was filed by Mrs. Marcos to US and Europe for treatment of
several Heart diseases alleging that the tests were not available here.

The presiding justice, Garchitorena, contacted Dr. Gregorio B. Patacsil, Officer-in-Charge of the
Philippine Heart Center, and later wrote him a letter, asking for "expert opinion on coronary
medicine". The court still found no merit to allow the petitioners motion to leave and denied all
of the motions.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and a "Motion to Admit Clinical Summary and to
Resolve Motion for Reconsideration." Attached was a recent medical report and letters of Vice
President Joseph E. Estrada offering to be guarantor for the return of petitioner and those of
twenty four members of the House of Representatives requesting the court to allow petitioner to
travel abroad. This was also denied by the Court also stating their express disapproval of the
involvement of the VP and the Cabinet members so as to influence the resolutions, decisions or
orders or any judicial action of respondent court.

ISSUE:
W/n the Sandiganbayan erred in disallowing the Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad.

RULING:
No. The contention of the petitioner that was invalid to contact a third party asking the latter to
give an opinion on petitioner's motion and medical findings was erroneous. Respondent court
had to seek expert opinion because petitioner's motion was based on the advice of her physician.
The court could not be expected to just accept the opinion of petitioner's physician in resolving
her request for permission to travel. What would be objectionable would be if respondent court
obtained information without disclosing its source to the parties and used it in deciding a case
against them.

In disregarding the medical reports, the petitioner failed to prove the necessity for a trip abroad.
It should be emphasized that considering the fact that she is facing charges before the courts in
several cases, in two of which she was convicted although the decision is still pending
reconsideration, petitioner did not have an absolute right to leave the country and the burden was
on her to prove that because of danger to health if not to her life there was necessity to seek
medical treatment in foreign countries. The Court ordered petitioner to undergo several tests
which summarily states that the required medical treatment was available here in the Philippines
and that the expertise and facilities here were more than adequate to cater to her medical
treatment. The heart ailments of the petitioner were not as severe as that was reported by Dr.
Anastacio.

Wherefore, the petitioner is Dismissed without prejudice to the filling of another motion for
leave to travel abroad, should petitioner still desire, based on her heart condition. In such an
event the determination of her medical condition should be made by joint panel of medical
specialists recommended by both the accused and the prosecution.

16. RUIZ vs BELDIA, JR.

A.M. No. RTJ-02-1731. February 16, 2005

Facts:
Shirley Ruiz was the private complainant in a case before the Department of Justice (for
violation of the Anti-Fencing Law). One of the respondents in said case was Lourdes Estrella
Santos.

On May 24, 2000, Santos was arrested and detained in Camp Crame in Quezon City, pending the
filing of formal charges in court. Upon inquest, she executed a waiver of Article 125 of the RPC
in relation to Rule 112 of the RoC on warrantless arrests (before the filing of such complaint or
information, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation by a proper officer ...
but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 ... Notwithstanding such waiver, he
may apply for bail ... and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its
inception.)

The inquest prosecutor set the hearing for the preliminary investigation on May 31 at 2PM.
However, on May 30, Santos obtained an Order of Release, signed by Judge Rolino D. Beldia,
then assisting judge of RTC Branch 272 of Marikina City. Judge Beldia apparently granted bail
to Santos and approved the corresponding bond without serving notice to the prosecutor.

And so Ruiz filed an administrative complaint with the Office of the Court Administrator,
contending that Judge Beldia had no authority to grant bail to Santos since the Investigating
Prosecutor has yet to conclude the preliminary investigation.
The charge against Judge Beldia:
Gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of authority in connection with the grant of bail and
issuance of a release order in favor of Santos.

Ruiz's Argument:
For as long as the information has not yet been filed in court, a court has no power to grant bail
to a detained person since it has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

Judge Beldia's Answer:

In his Comment, Judge Beldia maintained that the prevailing rules then (Section 1 (c), Rule 114
of the 1985 Rules of Court) allows any person in custody, even if not formally charged in court,
to apply for bail.

OCA:
The OCA directed the Clerk of Court of Branch 272 (Atty. Elvira Badillo-Adarlo) to confirm
whether a formal petition for admission to bail was filed by Santos or her counsel and, whether
the executive judge or presiding judge of said branch were absent or unavailable on May 30
when the release order was issued.
Atty. Badillo-Adarlo informed the OCA that the records in her custody did not include the
alleged release order issued by Judge Beldia. As such, she could not tell whether a formal
petition for admission to bail was filed by Santos. She likewise confirmed that the executive and
presiding judges were present and available on May 30.
On July 31, 2002, the OCA recommended that Judge Beldia be held liable for gross ignorance of
the law and fined in the amount of P5,000.00.
It opined that although a person in custody and who is not formally charged in court could apply
for bail (pursuant to Section 17 (c), Rule 114; 1985 RoC) the grant by Judge Beldia was
nonetheless irregular, because:
1. No formal petition or application for bail was filed by Santos; and
2. Even if one was filed, the Marikina courts could not have properly taken cognizance of
the same since Santos was detained at Camp Crame in Quezon City.
3. There was also no showing that the regular judge of Branch 272, RTC-Marikina City,
was unavailable to act on the application for bail.

Issue:
Whether Judge Beldia, then designated as assisting judge of RTC in Marikina City, is guilty for
gross ignorance of the law for granting bail to Santos, then detained in Quezon City.

SC's Decision and Rationale:

Yes. The SC agreed with the OCA's recommendations. Judge Beldia was found guilty and fined
in the amount of P5,000.00. He was further warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts
shall be dealt with more severely. His grant of bail was irregular for the following reasons:

a. He had no authority. On that day, the executive and presiding judges of Branch 272 were
present to act on the bail application. Judge Bedia was merely an assisting judge (his permanent
station being in Branch 57, RTC-San Carlos City, Negros Occidental) and as such, his authority
in Branch 272 is limited; he could only act on an application for bail filed therewith in the
absence or unavailability of the regular judge.

b. The RTC of Marikina City cannot grant bail to a person detained in Quezon City. Any person
in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with any court in the province, city,
or municipality where he is held. The application for bail should have been filed before the
proper Quezon City court.

c. The procedure for the application for bail was not followed. No formal application or petition
for the grant of bail was filed. A hearing on the application for bail, which is mandatory, was not
conducted and the prosecutor was not notified of the bail application. Whether bail is a matter of
right or of discretion, reasonable notice of hearing should be given to the prosecutor because in
fixing bail, the prosecutor's recommendation must be asked so that the judge may ascertain the
applicant's character and reputation, etc. The prosecution was deprived of procedural due process
in this case, for which Judge Beldia must be held accountable.

RULE 115: RIGHTS OF ACCUSED

1.Marcos Vs Ruiz
On Aug 22 1984 the 2nd assistant City Fiscal filed two infomation for violation of BP 22 in RTC
of Bohol. On July 5, 1983 Bienvenido Marcos though he knew he has insufficient fund issued 2
checks worth 3000 pesos each in favor of Fulgencia Oculam fo pymetof the jewelries that his
wife has taken. Mr. Marcos filed bail surety to gain temporry freedom. On November 12, 1983
Mr Marcos moved to reset the hearing because his counsel withdrew. The arraignment was
moved to Nov 29 1984. On Nov 12 the accused settled his obligation in crim case no 3892. The
posecution filed for motion to dismiss but was not acted upon by the judge. Nov 29 came but the
accused and his counsel did not appear. Mrs Marcos informed the court the her husband is
indisposed. The court moved the date for trial on Feb 7 and 8. On February 7 the accused
pleaded not guilty. The court set the trial on April 8, 1985. The accused and his counsel did not
appear. Trial in absentia proceeded and the bail of accused was forfeited an an order for the
surety company was issued to produce the body of accused and explain why there should be no
order for the confisation of the surety bond. On April 9, 1985 the court recieve an urgent motion
from Mr. Marcos counsel praying for motion to reset hearing which was denied. Mr Marcos
counsel filed for motion for reconsideration but to no avail. The case was considered submitted
for decision.
Issue: whether or not the judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the following:
denying to rule on the motion to dismiss criminal case 3892
In ordering the forfeiture order of the bail surety of the accused.
In ordering that the two cases were submitted fo trial.
In denying motion for reconsideration of the counsel of the accused
The ruling of the judge is incorrect. Motion to dismiss can filed by the prosecution at anytime of
the trial. Therefore estoppel cannot set in for Motion to Dismiss the case. However since the
court failed to validly arraign the accused for Crim Case no 3892 the Supreme Court orders the
RTC to conduct trial in order to validly arraign the accused for Crim Case no. 3892.

The judge committed grave abuse of discretion when he ordered forfeiture of the surety bond.
Under rules of court the accused needs to be present in the following:
a) the arraignment pursuant to paragraph (b), Section 1, Rule 116;

(b) at the promulgation of judgment, except when conviction is for a light offense, in which case
the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative pursuant to
Section 6 of Rule 120, or unless promulgation in absentia is allowed under the third paragraph of
said section; and

(c) when the prosecution intends to present witnesses who will identify the accused.

Since the court did not require the accused to be present and the circumstances does not fall to
the rule mentioned above the absence of the accused is consider a waiver of his right to be
present in the said date of hearing.

The trial judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when he ruled that both cases were submitted for decision. There was only valid arraignment and
trial for criminal case no 3890 where the accused pleaded not guilty and waived his right to
attend the proceeding. However since there was no valid arraignment for crim case no 3892 the
court cannot validly decide on the case. Beside the waiver made by the accused is only for the
day he did not appear for trial and not for the whole trial. If this will be permitted the court will
violate the citizens constitutional right to be heard by himself and his counsel and right to present
evidence.

The court has the authority to deny the motion to reset trial for approval of such motion is left to
the wisdom of the court.

2. ALMARIO V. CA et. al., G.R. 127772

Facts: Petitioner is one of the accused for estafa thru falsification of public document, and estafa,
with respondent RCBC as the offended party in both cases.
After petitioners arraignment, the pre-trial was held, which was terminated. Thereafter, the cases
were scheduled for continuous trial in the following months the hearings were cancelled because
the Presiding Judge of the court was elevated to this Court and no trial judge was immediately
appointed thereto. During the date of the hearing, it was again postponed for lack of proof of
notice to all the accused and their counsel. The hearing was likewise cancelled and the cases
were reset for trial. On the scheduled date the private complainant failed to appear despite due
notice. Hence, Atty. Alabastro, counsel for accused Roberto Almario, moved that the case
against the latter be dismissed for failure to prosecute and considering that accused is entitled to
a speedy trial. The dismissal in the Order dated September 8, 1995, did not result in the acquittal
of the accused since the right of the accused to speedy trial has not been violated, and its
dismissal having been made upon the motion of the accused there is no double jeopardy.
Wherefore the appellate court reconsidered the trial courts order.
Aggrieved by the foregoing order, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari which the respondent appellate court denied the petition due course and dismissed it for
lack of merit.
Before us, petitioner maintains that the appellate court erred in sustaining the trial court which, in
turn, had gravely abused its discretion. Petitioner asserts that this reversal was a violation of the
doctrine of double jeopardy, as the criminal cases were initially dismissed for a violation of
petitioners constitutional right to a speedy trial.
ISSUE: Whether in petitioners cases, double jeopardy had set in so that petitioners constitutional
right against such jeopardy had been violated.
RULING:
No Clearly, jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3)
after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the defendant was
convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the accused.
In the cases at bar, the order of dismissal based on a violation of the right to speedy trial was
made upon motion by counsel for petitioner before the trial court. Generally, the dismissal of a
criminal case resulting in acquittal made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own
motion will not place the accused in double jeopardy. However, this rule admits of two
exceptions, namely: insufficiency of evidence and denial of the right to speedy trial. Double
jeopardy may attach when the proceedings have been prolonged unreasonably, in violation of the
accused right to speedy trial.
Records show that on June 21, 1995, hearing was postponed for lack of proof of notice to the
accused and their counsel. The hearing on July 17, 1995, was postponed upon motion of the
private prosecutor without objection from petitioners counsel. The hearing set on July 24, 1995
was reset, despite the presence of petitioner and his counsel, because of lack of proof of service
of notice to co-accused.
As observed by respondent appellate court, delay in the trial was due to circumstances beyond
the control of the parties and of the trial court. The first and third postponements were clearly
justified on the ground of lack of notice to accused, co-accused, and/or counsel. Another was
made without objection from petitioners counsel. However, on September 8, 1995, counsel for
petitioner moved for dismissal of this case, because of the absence of the private prosecutor due
to a severe attack of gout and arthritis, although he had sent his associate lawyer acceptable to
the court. All in all, there were only three re-setting of hearing dates. Thus, after a closer analysis
of these successive events, the trial court realized that the dates of the hearings were transferred
for valid grounds. Hence, the trial court set aside its initial order and reinstated the cases against
petitioner, which order the appellate court later sustained.
That there was no unreasonable delay of the proceedings is apparent from the chronology of the
hearings with the reasons for their postponements or transfers. Petitioner could not refute the
appellate courts findings that petitioners right to speedy trial had not been violated. As both the
trial and appellate courts have taken pains to demonstrate, there was no unreasonable, vexatious
and oppressive delay in the trial. There being no oppressive delay in the proceedings, and no
postponements unjustifiably sought, we concur with the conclusion reached by the Court of
Appeals that petitioners right to speedy trial had not been infringed. Where the right of the
accused to speedy trial had not been violated, there was no reason to support the initial order of
dismissal.
It follows that petitioner cannot invoke the constitutional right against double jeopardy when that
order was reconsidered seasonably. That being the case, despite the reconsideration of said order,
double jeopardy did not attach. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals were thus not in
error when they allowed reinstatement of the cases against petitioner.

3. PEOPLE V. NICAL, G.R. 210430, 18 February 2015

FACTS:

This is a review on the decision of the CA which affirmed the RTC of Dasmarinas Cavites
decision convicting Ronald Nical of the crime of Rape and imposing on him the penalty of
reclusion perpertua.
The accused raped the victim, AAA, on August 23, 2007. AAA was a maid of Ate Michelle who
owned two houses in Dasmarinas, Cavite. A big and a small one. The accused who stayed in the
small house, went to the big one and into the room of the victim. The victim was surprised when
the accused embraced her. The victim kicked him and tried to run, however, she hit her head on a
wall and fell unconscious. When she woke up, the accused was already on top of her and that she
felt pain as the penis of the accused was already in her vagina.

CONTENTIONS OF THE ACCUSED:

The accused stated that the victim went to his room and sat on his stomach and that they had sex
then and there. He also contended that he had an affair with the victim before the so-called rape
happened. He said that the allegations rooted on the fact that the victim was jealous of his affair
with another maid. Medical report also showed that there was no sign of laceration or any injury
on the victims genitalia. He also argued that his right to be informed was violated because the
crime alleged in the complaint was incorrect. He was charged with rape by force and
intimidation. However, he said that the victim was unconscious when the incident happened,
claiming that it should be rape based on Article 266-A(1)(b). Unconsciousness based on that
provision was an essential element of rape.

ISSUE:

Whether the right of the accused to be informed of the nature of the crime was violated.

HELD:

The Court stated that the medical diagnostic to prove whether the genitalia was injured was not
an essential element of rape as been cited in several jurisprudence. Also, The OSG pointed out
that the victim was not entirely unconscious when the rape happened. The claim of the accused
that his right to be informed was violated was not meritorious. The accuseds assertion that he
committed the second type of rape was not given weight by the court since the victims
statements were convincing. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of CA.

4. PEOPLE vs. MANANSALA, G.R. NO. 175939, April 3, 2013

FACTS:

On October 18, 1994, Olongapo PNP conducted a test-buy operation against Chad Manansala, a
suspected marijuana dealer. The next day, armed with a search warrant from RTC Branch 72, the
police conducted a search in Manansala's residence located at No. 55 Johnson Extension,
Barangay East Bajac Bajac. They recovered 750 grams of dried marijuana leaves in a wooden
box placed inside a cabinet and the amount of P655.00 that included the two marked P50.00 bills
bearing serial numbers SNKJ812018 and SNMN426747 used during the test-buy operation.

During the arraignment, Manansala pleaded to the charge of illegal sale of prohibited drugs
under Section 4 of RA No. 6425. Later on, First Asst. City Prosecutor Mario Manalansan filed a
motion for the admission of amended information to modify the offense charged from illegal sale
to illegal possession under Section 8. The RTC did not act on the motion but it convicted
Manansala for illegal possession. On appeal, the accused claims that offense of illegal possession
in violation of Section 8 as necessarily included in the offense of illegal sale of marijuana in
violation of Section 4 is a misplaced and inaccurate theory. But, the CA affirmed the decision of
RTC with modification as to the penalty of imprisonment and fine.

ISSUE:

Whether the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
Manansala was violated after conviction for violation of Section 8, which the information did not
allege, instead for violation of Section 4, which the information alleged

HELD:

No, the right of Manansala to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
was not violated simply because the information had precisely charged him with selling,
delivering, giving away, and distributing of dried marijuana leaves. The CA correctly declared
that the illegal possession of marijuana was "a crime that is necessarily included in the crime of
drug pushing or dealing, for which the accused have been charged with."

According to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Court (1985), the rule then applicable, when there is
a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information, and that proved or
established by the evidence, and the offense as charged necessarily includes the offense proved,
the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that which is charged.

5. JOVITO CANCERAN, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Facts: Canceran, together with Frederick Vequizo and Marcial Diaz, Jr., was charged with
"Frustrated Theft."

The prosecution established that Damalito Ompoc (security guard) saw Canceran approach one
of the counters in Ororama Mega Center (Ororama); that Canceran was pushing a cart which
contained two boxes of Magic Flakes for which he paid P1,423.00; that Ompoc went to the
packer and asked if the boxes had been checked; that upon inspection by Ompoc and the packer,
they found out that the contents of the two boxes were not Magic Flakes biscuits, but 14 smaller
boxes of Ponds White Beauty Cream worth P28,627.20; that Canceran hurriedly left and a chase
ensued; that upon reaching the Don Mariano gate, Canceran stumbled as he attempted to ride a
jeepney; that after being questioned, he tried to settle with the guards and even offered his
personal effects to pay for the items he tried to take; that Michael Arcenio (Customer relation
officer) refused to settle.

Canceran vehemently denied the charges against him. He claimed that he was a promo
merchandiser of La Tondena, Inc. and that he was in Ororama to buy medicine for his wife. He
was approached by someone who gave him money requesting him to pay for the 2 boxes. When
we left Ororama, he was chased by 3 persons .

RTC: Found Canceran guilty beyond reasonable doubt of consummated Theft in line with the
ruling of the Court in Valenzuela v. People that under Article 308 of the RPC, there is no crime
of "Frustrated Theft."

CA: Canceran filed an appeal raising the issue of double jeopardy for the first time.

CA held that there could be no double jeopardy because he never entered a valid plea and so the
first jeopardy never attached. The CA also debunked Canceran's contention that there was no
taking because he merely pushed the cart loaded with goods to the cashier's booth for payment
and stopped there. The unlawful taking was deemed complete from the moment the offender
gained possession of the thing, even if he had no opportunity to dispose of the same.

Issues: 1] whether Canceran should be acquitted in the crime of theft as it was not charged
in the information; 2] whether there was double jeopardy.

Canceran insists that there was already double jeopardy as the first criminal case for theft was
already dismissed and yet he was convicted in the second case. He contends that there was no
taking of the Ponds cream considering that "the information admits the act of the petitioner did
not produce the crime of theft." Thus, absent the element of taking, the felony of theft was never
proved.

Canceran averred that when the arraignment of the first case was scheduled, he was already
bonded and ready to enter a plea. It was the RTC who decided that the evidence was insufficient
or the evidence lacked the element to constitute the crime of theft. He also stressed that there was
no unlawful taking as the items were assessed and paid for.

SC: The petition is partially meritorious.

Constitutional Right of the Accused to be Informed of the Nature and Cause of Accusation
against Him.

There is no crime of Frustrated Theft. The Information can never be read to charge Canceran of
consummated Theft because the indictment itself stated that the crime was never produced.
Instead, the Information should be construed to mean that Canceran was being charged with theft
in its attempted stage only. Necessarily, Canceran may only be convicted of the lesser crime of
Attempted Theft. (xxxperforming all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of
theft as a consequence, but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of some cause
independent of accused's will x x x.)

An accused cannot be convicted of a crime, even if duly proven, unless it is alleged or

necessarily included in the information filed against him. An offense charged necessarily
includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as
alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter.

The crime of theft in its consummated stage undoubtedly includes the crime in its attempted
stage. In this case, although the evidence presented during the trial proved the crime of
consummated Theft, he could be convicted of Attempted Theft only. Regardless of the
overwhelming evidence to convict him for consummated Theft, because the Information did not
charge him with consummated Theft, the Court cannot do so as the same would violate his right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the allegations against him.

No double jeopardy when the first jeopardy never attached

Legal jeopardy did not attach. First, he never entered a valid plea. He himself admitted that he
was just about to enter a plea, but the first case was dismissed even before he was able to do so.
Second, there was no unconditional dismissal of the complaint. The case was not terminated by
reason of acquittal nor conviction but simply because he posted bail. Absent these two elements,
there can be no double jeopardy.

Jovito Canceran is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Attempted Theft.

RULE 116: ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA

1. G.R. Nos. 115236-37. January 16, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BRYAN FERDINAND DY y LA
MADRID and GIOVAN BERNARDINO y GARCIA, accused-appellants

FACTS: Accused-appellants Bryan Ferdinand Dy and Giovan Bernardino filed separate motions
for reconsideration of our Decision which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court,
finding them guilty of rape and acts of lasciviousness.
Bernardino alleges that the right to be arraigned is not among the rights that are
susceptible to waiver or estoppel, thus the lack of arraignment cannot be deemed cured by their
participation in the trial.
HELD: The allegation that there was no valid arraignment is misleading and betrays a lack of
comprehension regarding the procedural requirements of arraignment in the context of the
constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.
The right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation may not be waived.
Indeed, the defense may waive their right to enter a plea and let the court enter a plea of not
guilty in their behalf. However, it becomes altogether a different matter if the accused
themselves refuse to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them. The
defense cannot hold hostage the court by their refusal to the reading of the complaint or
information.
The records show that the proceedings were not hastily conducted. While the proceedings
might have been of short duration than usual, they were nevertheless conducted with due regard
to the right of each party to due process. The trial court should even be commended for
conducting a speedy trial, which should be the rule, rather than the exception. What is of prime
consideration is not the speed by which the trial was conducted but the manner by which the
procedural and substantial requirements were complied with.

4. Daan vs. Sandiganbayan GR Nos. 163972-77 March 28, 2008

Facts:
Joselito Raniero J. Daan and Benedicto E. Kuizon were charged for three counts of
malversation of public funds by falsifying the time book and payrolls by making it appear that
laborers worked on the construction of the new municipal hall building of Bato, Leyte. The
accused were also indicted for three counts of falsification of public document by a public officer
or employee.
In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw their plea of not guilty and
substitute the same with a plea of guilty, provided, the mitigating circumstances of confession or
plea of guilt and voluntary surrender will be appreciated in their favor. In the alternative, if the
proposal is not acceptable, said accused proposed to substitute their plea of not guilty to the
crime of falsification of public document by a public officer or employee with a plea of guilty, but
to the lesser crime of falsification of a public document by a private individual. In the
malversation cases, the accused offered to substitute their plea of not guilty to a guilty plea, but
to the lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to render accounts.
In the falsification cases, the prosecution the proposal acceptable for it will strengthen the
cases against Mayor Kuizon who appears to be the mastermind of these criminal acts. However,
the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners Motion to Plea Bargain on the main ground that no cogent
reason was presented to justify its approval..
Issue:
Whether the lesser offense of falsification of a public document by a private individual is
necessary included in the crime of falsification of public document by a public officer, hence
petitioner may plead guilty to the former
Actions of the Court:
Office of the Special Prosecutor: Granted; Sandiganbayan: Denied; SC: Granted
Court Rationale:
The lesser offenses of Falsification by Private Individuals and Failure to Render Account
by an Accountable Officer are necessarily included in the crimes of Falsification of Public
Documents and Malversation of Public Funds, respectively, with which petitioner was originally
charged.
 An offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the essential
elements or ingredients of the former as alleged in the complaint or information constitute the
latter. And vice versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in another when the
essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter
In this case, the allegations in the Informations filed against petitioner are sufficient to
hold petitioner liable for the lesser offenses. In the charge for Falsification of Public Documents,
petitioner may plead guilty to the lesser offense of Falsification by Private Individuals inasmuch
as it does not appear that petitioner took advantage of his official position in allegedly
falsifying the timebook and payroll of the Municipality of Bato, Leyte. In the same vein, he may
plead guilty for rendering account by an accountable officer instead of malversation of public
funds.
Therefore, that some of the essential elements of offenses charged in this case likewise
constitute the lesser offenses, then petitioner may plead guilty to such lesser offenses.
Moreover, petitioner is not an accountable officer in that the nature of his duty as
foreman/timekeeper does not permit or require possession or custody of local government funds,
not to mention that petitioner has already restituted the amount ofP18,860.00 involved in this
case.
SC Ruling:
The petition is GRANTED. The Sandiganbayan is hereby ORDERED to grant
petitioner's Motion to Plea Bargain. The records of the case were REMANDED to the
Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.

5. Gonzales III v. Office of the President

FACTS: Mendoza was a P/S inspector who was dismissed from service for having committed
grave misconduct. He filed motion for reconsideration however was pending for 9 months before
the office of the ombudsman. Deputy ombudsman Gonzales III without first resolving first the
motion dismissed Mendoza from service. These events prompted him to commit the hostage
taking of a bus-load of tourists in Manila.

The office of the President dismissed petitioner Emilio Gonzales III, a deputy
ombudsman for the military and other law enforcement officers (MOLEO) for Gross Neglect of
Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting a Betrayal of Public Trust for allowing Mendoza's
motion for reconsideration to languish for more than 9 months without any justification in
violation of the ombudsman prescribed rules to resolve motions within 5 days from submission.
The petitioner seeks to declare unconstitutional Section 8(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770,
otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, which gives the President the power to
dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman of the Office of the Ombudsman.

ISSUE: Primordial question in these two petitions is whether the Office of the President has
jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a
Special Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally-created Office of the Ombudsman.

HELD: The decision of the office of the President was reversed. Section 9, Article XI of the
1987 Constitution confers upon the President the power to appoint the Ombudsman and his
Deputies, viz:
Section 9. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed by the President from a list of at
least six nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council, and from a list of three nominees
for every vacancy thereafter. Such appointments shall require no confirmation. All vacancies
shall be filled within three months after they occur.While the removal of the Ombudsman
himself is also expressly provided for in the Constitution, which is by impeachment under
Section 244 of the same Article, there is, however, no constitutional provision similarly dealing
with the removal from office of a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor, for that matter.
By enacting Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply filled a gap in the law without running
afoul of any provision in the Constitution or existing statutes. That the Deputies of the
Ombudsman were intentionally excluded from the enumeration of impeachable officials.

The claim that Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 granting the President the power to remove
a Deputy Ombudsman from office totally frustrates, if not resultantly negates the independence
of the Office of the Ombudsman is tenuous. The independence which the Office of the
Ombudsman is vested with was intended to free it from political considerations in pursuing its
constitutional mandate to be a protector of the people. What the Constitution secures for the
Office of the Ombudsman is, essentially, political independence. This means nothing more than
that "the terms of office, the salary, the appointments and discipline of all persons under the
office" are "reasonably insulated from the whims of politicians.And so it was that Section 5,
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution had declared the creation of the independent Office of the
Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman and his Deputies, who are described as "protectors
of the people" and constitutionally mandated to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or
manner against public officials or employees of the Government Section 12, Article XI. Pertinent
provisions under Article XI prescribes a term of office of seven years without reappointment
Section 11, prohibits a decrease in salaries during the term of office Section 10, provides strict
qualifications for the office Section 8, grants fiscal autonomy Section 14 and ensures the exercise
of constitutional functions Section 12 and 13. The cloak of independence is meant to build up the
Office of the Ombudsman's institutional strength to effectively function as official critic,
mobilizer of government, constitutional watchdog53 and protector of the people. It certainly
cannot be made to extend to wrongdoings and permit the unbridled acts of its officials to escape
administrative discipline.

Being aware of the constitutional imperative of shielding the Office of the

Ombudsman from political influences and the discretionary acts of the executive,
Congress laid down two restrictions on the President's exercise of such power of removal
over a Deputy Ombudsman, namely: (1) that the removal of the Deputy Ombudsman
must be for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman and (2) that
there must be observance of due process. Reiterating the grounds for impeachment laid
down in Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, paragraph 1 of Section 8 of R.A.
No. 6770 states that the Deputy Ombudsman may be removed from office for the same
grounds that the Ombudsman may be removed through impeachment, namely, "culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or
betrayal of public trust." Thus, it cannot be rightly said that giving the President the
power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor for that matter, would
 diminish or compromise the constitutional independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman. It is, precisely, a measure of protection of the independence of the
Ombudsman's Deputies and Special Prosecutor in the discharge of their duties that their
removal can only be had on grounds provided by law.

6. AGUINALDO v. VENTUS

Facts: In 2003, the Assistant City Prosecutor recommended Felilibeth Aguinaldo and
Benjamin Perez were charged of Estafa. An information then charged Aguinaldo and Perez of
Estafa. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed with the OCP of Manila regarding the
preliminary investigation. Due to the pending motion, the court withdrew the information,
recalled the arrest warrant and deferred their arraignment.

In January 2004, the OCP filed a motion to set the case for trial. In February 2004, the
petitioners filed a petition for review with the DOJ. The petitioners then asked the proceedings to
be suspended further pending the DOJs decision with finality. The Court granted the motion.

In June 2004 to 2005, Levista de Castro, not a party to the case at bar, filed a motion to
reinstate the case and issue warrant of arrest. She said that the DOJ had already denied the
petition for review. While the court ruled that the motion of the DOJ was still unresolved,
nevertheless granted the petition because the Rule 116, Section 11 allows only a 60-day period of
suspension of arraignment proceedings.
Aguinaldo and Perez assail this decision, as they argue that the 60-day period is merely
directory, and may be relaxed in the interest of a speedy and orderly administration of justice.

ISSUE: Is the 60-day suspension period pending a DOJ petition for review merely
directory?

HELD: No. The aforecited provision (Rule 116, Sec. 11(c)) limits the deferment of the
arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing
office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to
arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment. . They held that the period of one
year and one month from April 16, 2004 to May 16, 2005 when the public respondent ordered
the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of petitioner Aguinaldo, was more than ample time to give
the petitioners the opportunity to obtain a resolution of their petition for review from the DOJ.
(Note: The SC decision was made in 2015, 11 years after the complaint was filed, as they
themselves have noted.)

7. Barreras-Sulit v. Office of the President

GR No. 196232
September 4, 2012

FACTS:
 In April 2005, the Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman
charged Major General Carlos F. Garcia and several others, before the Sandiganbayan, with
plunder and money laundering. An application for bail was filed but the Sandiganbayan denied
Major General Garcias petition for bail holding that strong prosecution evidence militated
against the grant of bail. On March 16, 2010, however, the government, represented by
petitioner, Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit ("Barreras-Sulit") and her prosecutorial
staff sought the Sandiganbayan's approval of a Plea Bargaining Agreement (hereinafter referred
to as "PLEBARA") entered into with the accused. On May 4, 2010, the Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution finding the change of plea warranted and the PLEBARA compliant with
jurisprudential guidelines. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice conducted
public hearings on the PLEBARA. The committee decided to adopt Committee Resolution No.
3 recommending to the President the dismissal of Barreras-Sulit from the service and the filing
of appropriate charges against her Deputies and Assistants before the appropriate government
office for having committed acts and/or omissions tantamount to culpable violations of the
Constitution and betrayal of public trust, which are violations under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act and grounds for removal from office under the Ombudsman Act.
The Office of the President initiates OP-DC-Case No. 11-B-003 against Barreras-Sulit.
Petitioner raised the defenses of prematurity and lack of jurisdiction of the OP with respect to the
administrative disciplinary proceeding against her. The OP still proceeded with the case, setting
it for preliminary investigation.

ISSUE: Whether taking and continuing to take administrative disciplinary proceeding against
petitioner be lawful and justifiable?

HELD: Yes. The taking and continuing to take the proceeding is lawful and justifiable because
the OP is vested with statutory authority to proceed administratively against petitioner to
determine the existence of any of the grounds for her removal from office under the Constitution
and the Ombudsman. Petitioneraverred that propriety of taking and continuing to take
administrative disciplinary proceeding against her must depend on the final disposition by the
Sandiganbayan of the PLEBARA, explaining that if the Sandiganbayan will hold the PLEBARA,
there would no longer be any cause of complaint against her. This argument did not hold water.
The approval or disapproval of the PLEBARA by the Sandiganbayan is of no consequence to an
administrative finding of liability against petitioner Barreras-Sulit. While the court's
determination of the propriety of a plea bargain is on the basis of the existing prosecution
evidence on record, the disciplinary authority's determination of the prosecutor's administrative
liability is based on whether the plea bargain is consistent with the conscientious consideration of
the government's best interest and the diligent and efficient performance by the prosecution of its
public duty to prosecute crimes against the State. Consequently, the disciplining authority's
finding of ineptitude, neglect or willfulness on the part of the prosecution, more particularly
petitioner Special Prosecutor Barreras-Sulit, in failing to pursue or build a strong case for the
government or, in this case, entering into an agreement which the government finds "grossly
disadvantageous," could result in administrative liability, notwithstanding court approval of the
plea bargaining agreement entered into.

16. De Villa vs. The Director, New Bilibid Prisons

FACTS: Reynaldo de Villa has been convicted of qualified rape for the rape of her niece by
affinity, Aileen Mendoza. Aileen gave birth to a baby girl which she named Leahlyn Mendoza.
Three years after promulgation of judgement, a petition was filed for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus and for a new trial. The reliefs are sought purportedly on the basis of new found
evidence, a DNA test. June de Villa, son of Reynaldo, alleges that during the trial of the case, he
was unaware that there was a scientific test that could determine once and for all if Reynaldo was
the father of the victims child, Leahlyn.
June obtained a DNA sample of Leahlyn by letting her spit on a sterile cup. The sample was sent
to the DNA Analysis Laboratory of the National Science Research Institute together with other
samples from the grandchildren of Reynaldo and Reynaldos own sample. It was found that
Reynaldo could not have sired any of the children whose samples were tested because of the
absence of the pertinent genetic markers.
ISSUE: Whether or not a the newly found evidence proving that Leahlyn is not sired by
Reynaldo is a sufficient ground for a new trial.
HELD: The DNA test in this case not a sufficient ground for the conduct of new trial. Section 2
of Rule 121 enumerates the grounds for a new trial:

SEC. 2. Grounds for a new trial. The court shall grant a new trial on any of the following
grounds:
(a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused have
been committed during the trial;
(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with
reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and
admitted would probably change the judgment.

A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if the
following requisites are met: (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that said
evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of
reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching;
and (d) that the evidence is of such weight that that, if admitted, it would probably change the
judgment.

In this instance, although the DNA evidence was undoubtedly discovered after the trial,
we nonetheless find that it does not meet the criteria for newly-discovered evidence that would
merit a new trial. Such evidence disproving paternity could have been discovered and produced
at trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence. Lack of knowledge of the existence of DNA
testing speaks of negligence, either on the part of petitioner, or on the part of petitioners
counsel.
Further, even with all of the compelling and persuasive scientific evidence presented by
petitioner and his counsel, we are not convinced that Reynaldo de Villa is entitled to outright
acquittal. Even if it is conclusively proven that Reynaldo de Villa is not the father of Leahlyn
Mendoza, his conviction could, still stand, with Aileen Mendozas testimony and positive
identification as its bases because paternity is not an element of rape

20. THE RULE ON DNA EVIDENCE.

Sec. 6. Post-conviction DNA Testing. Post-conviction DNA testing may be available, without
need of prior court order, to the prosecution or any person convicted by final and executory
judgment provided that (a) a biological sample exists, (b) such sample is relevant to the case, and
(c) the testing would probably result in the reversal or modification of the judgment of
conviction.

Sec. 7. Assessment of probative value of DNA evidence. In assessing the probative value of
the DNA evidence presented, the court shall consider the following:

The chair of custody, including how the biological samples were collected, how they were
handled, and the possibility of contamination of the samples;
The DNA testing methodology, including the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, the
advantages and disadvantages of the procedure, and compliance with the scientifically valid
standards in conducting the tests;
The forensic DNA laboratory, including accreditation by any reputable standards-setting
institution and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. If the laboratory is not
accredited, the relevant experience of the laboratory in forensic casework and credibility shall be
properly established; and
The reliability of the testing result, as hereinafter provided.
The provisions of the Rules of Court concerning the appreciation of evidence shall apply
suppletorily.

Sec. 8. Reliability of DNA Testing Methodology. In evaluating whether the DNA testing
methodology is reliable, the court shall consider the following:

The falsifiability of the principles or methods used, that is, whether the theory or technique can
be and has been tested;
The subjection to peer review and publication of the principles or methods;
The general acceptance of the principles or methods by the relevant scientific community;
The existence and maintenance of standards and controls to ensure the correctness of data
generated;
The existence of an appropriate reference population database; and
The general degree of confidence attributed to mathematical calculations used in comparing
DNA profiles and the significance and limitation of statistical calculations used in comparing
DNA profiles.
Sec. 9. of DNA Testing Results. In evaluating the results of DNA testing, the court shall
consider the following:

The evaluation of the weight of matching DNA evidence or the relevance of mismatching DNA
evidence;
The results of the DNA testing in the light of the totality of the other evidence presented in the
case; and that
DNA results that exclude the putative parent from paternity shall be conclusive proof of non-
paternity. If the value of the Probability of Paternity is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA
testing shall be considered as corroborative evidence. If the value of the Probability of Paternity
is 99.9% or higher there shall be a disputable presumption of paternity.
Sec. 10. Post-conviction DNA Testing Remedy if the Results Are Favorable to the Convict.
The convict or the prosecution may file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the court of
origin if the results of the post-conviction DNA testing are favorable to the convict. In the case
the court, after due hearing finds the petition to be meritorious, if shall reverse or modify the
judgment of conviction and order the release of the convict, unless continued detention is
justified for a lawful cause.

A similar petition may be filed either in the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, or with any
member of said courts, which may conduct a hearing thereon or remand the petition to the court
of origin and issue the appropriate orders.

RULE 117
MOTION TO QUASH

1. Los Baos v. Pedro

summary Joel Pedro was caught illegally carrying a firearm without a written permit from COMELEC
at a checkpoint at Boac, Marinduque a day before the May 14, 2001 national and local
elections (there was a gun ban). Pedro says that he has a permit from COMELEC. RTC
quashed the Info and asked the petitioners to return the items seized from Pedro. Los Baos
asked RTC to reopen the case. Pedro moved for the reconsideration of the RTCs order
primarily based on Section 8 of Rule 117, arguing that the dismissal had become permanent.
SC finds the petition meritorious and hold that the case should be remanded to the trial court
for arraignment and trial.

Facts:
May 13, 2001: Philippine National Police (PNP) caught Pedro illegally carrying his firearm at a
checkpoint at Boac, Marinduque. The Boac checkpoint team was composed of Police Senior Inspector
Victor V. Arevalo, SPO2 Marshal Olympia, SPO1 Rocky Mercene, and PO1 Raul Adlawan. The team
stopped a silver-gray Toyota Hi-Ace with plate number WHT-371 on the national highway, coming from
the Boac town proper. When Pedro (who was seated at the rear portion) opened the window, Arevalo saw
a gun carry case beside him. Pedro could not show any COMELEC authority to carry a firearm when the
checkpoint team asked for one, but he opened the case when asked to do so. The checkpoint team saw the
following when the case was opened: 1) one Revolver 357 Magnum Ruger GP100, serial number 173-
56836, loaded with six ammunitions; 2) one ammunition box containing 100 bullets; 3) two pieces speed
loader with six ammunitions each; and 4) one set ear protector. Pedro was with three other men. The
checkpoint team brought all of them to the Boac police station for investigation.
- The Boac election officer filed a criminal complaint against Pedro for violating the election gun ban,
i.e., for carrying a firearm outside of his residence or place of business without any authority from the
Comelec. After an inquest, the Marinduque provincial prosecutor filed the above Information against
Pedro with the Marinduque Regional Trial Court (RTC) for violation of the Codes Article XXII, Section
261 (q), in relation to Section 264.
- Pedro filed a Motion for Preliminary Investigation, which the RTC granted. The preliminary
investigation, however, did not materialize. Instead, Pedro filed with the RTC a Motion to Quash, arguing
that the Information "contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification
and/or that the facts charged do not constitute an offense." Pedro attached to his motion a Comelec
Certification dated September 24, 2001 that he was "exempted" from the gun ban. The provincial
prosecutor opposed the motion.
- The RTC quashed the Information and ordered the police and the prosecutors to return the seized
articles to Pedro.
- Los Baos moved to reopen the case, as Pedros Comelec Certification was a "falsification," and the
prosecution was "deprived of due process" when the judge quashed the information without a hearing.
- The RTC reopened the case for further proceedings, as Pedro did not object to Los Baos motion.
Pedro moved for the reconsideration of the RTCs order primarily based on Section 8 of Rule 117,
arguing that the dismissal had become permanent. He likewise cited the public prosecutors lack of
express approval of the motion to reopen the case.
- The public prosecutor, however, manifested his express conformity with the motion to reopen the case.
The trial court, for its part, rejected the position that Section 8, Rule 117 applies, and explained that this
provision refers to situations where both the prosecution and the accused mutually consented to the
dismissal of the case, or where the prosecution or the offended party failed to object to the dismissal of
the case, and not to a situation where the information was quashed upon motion of the accused and over
the objection of the prosecution. The RTC, thus, set Pedros arraignment date.
- Pedro filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the RTCs mandated
reopening He argued that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in ruling that the dismissal contemplated under Section 8, Rule 117.
CA: DENIED the petition for lack of merit based on:
Before the petitioner may invoke the time-bar in Section 8, he must establish the following:
1. the prosecution, with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio)
dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case;
2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;
3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally;
4. the public prosecutor is served, with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case.
- On the other hand, the petitioner was able to prove that the motion to reopen the case was filed
after the lapse of more than one year from the time the public prosecutor was served the notice of
dismissal. Therefore, the state is barred from reopening the case.
WHEREFORE, petitioner Joel Pedros motion for partial reconsideration is hereby GRANTED, and respondent
Ariel Los Banos motion for modification of judgment is, accordingly, DENIED.

Issue: - WON Section 8, Rule 117 is applicable to the case, as the CA found. If it applies, then the
CA ruling effectively lays the matter to rest. If it does not, then the revised RTC decision reopening
the case should prevail.

Held: We find the petition meritorious and hold that the case should be remanded to the trial court for
arraignment and trial.

An examination of the whole Rule tells us that a dismissal based on a motion to quash and a provisional
dismissal are far different from one another as concepts, in their features, and legal consequences. While
the provision on provisional dismissal is found within Rule 117 (entitled Motion to Quash), it does not
follow that a motion to quash results in a provisional dismissal to which Section 8, Rule 117 applies.

They are two separate concepts. In Motion to Quash, the Information itself has deficiency while in
Provisional Dismissal, the Information has no deficiencies. It does not follow that a motion to
quash results in a provisional dismissal to which Section 8, Rule 117 applies.
Motion to Quash vs. Provisional Dismissal

A provisional dismissal is, by its own terms, impermanent until the time-bar
applies, at which time it becomes a permanent dismissal.

In contrast, an information that is quashed stays quashed until revived; the

grant of a motion to quash does not per se carry any connotation of
impermanence, and becomes so only as provided by law or by the Rules. In re-
filing the case, what is important is the question of whether the action can still
be brought, i.e., whether the prescription of action or of the offense has set in.
In a provisional dismissal, there can be no re-filing after the time-bar, and
prescription is not an immediate consideration.

Thus, we conclude that Section 8, Rule 117 does not apply to the reopening of the case that the RTC
ordered and which the CA reversed; the reversal of the CAs order is legally proper.

3. LONEY, Et Al., vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:

Loney, et al were the president and board members of Marcopper Mining Corporation in
Marinduque. Informations alleging violations of the Water Code (PD 1067), the Pollution
Control Decree (PD 984), the Philippine Mining Act (RA 7942), and Reckless imprudence under
the RPC were filed with the MTC of Boac, Marinduque. They moved to quash the information
on the ground that the informations were duplicitous as the DOJ charged more than one
offense for a single act.
The MTC dismissed the motion to quash because they argue that there was no duplicity of suits.
They proceeded to their arraignment and trial, and found petitioners guilty of the offenses
charged. They raised it to the RTC Branch 94 on certiorari, but they affirmed the MTC decision.
The RTC explained that it may be possible that multiple offenses can result from a single act,
and that, because each offense is filed in a separate information from the others, there is no
duplicity or multiplicity of suits. They found petitioners guilty. So they appealed the case to the
Court of Appeals, alleging that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion. Marcopper argued
that they were correct, citing the case of People vs Relova where the Supreme Court (SC)
explained that the law was made to prevent harassment of an accused by filing multiple suits.
The appellate court affirmed the decision of the RTC stating that People vs Relova was not
applicable in the present case, and that duplicity of suits was not a ground to quash an
information.
The accused appealed the case to the Supreme Court with the same argument.

ISSUE:

Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be quashed for duplicity of
charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property should
stand, following the doctrine in People vs Relova.
HELD:

No. The Supreme Court explained that there is no duplicity or multiplicity of suits when
each allegation is filed in separate informations for each offense. While they agreed that under
Section 3 (e), Rule 117, duplicity is a ground for a motion to quash, but it is not applicable in the
case at bar. They cited Rule 110, Section 13, stating that a complaint or information must
charge but one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single
punishment for various offenses.

So the court said that where a single Information charges more than one offense, there is
duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges. But in this case, because the act violated multiple laws, the
company committed multiple offenses. But each offense were charged in a separate information
from the others, there is no such thing as duplicity or multiplicity of suits in this case.

5. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. AQUILINO ANDRADE, ROMAN LACAP,

YONG FUNG YUEN, RICKY YU, VICENTE SY, ALVIN SO, ROMUALDO MIRANDA,
SINDAO MELIBAS, SATURNINO LIWANAG, ROBERTO MEDINA AND RAMON
NAVARRO, Respondents.

It is clearly provided by the Rules of Criminal Procedure that if the motion to quash is based on an alleged
defect in the information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order the amendment to be
made.

F: A random drug test was conducted in the National Bilibid Prison (NBP) where the urine samples of 38
inmates were collected and subjected to drug testing by the Chief Medical Technologist and Assistant
Medical Technologist of the Alpha Polytechnic Laboratory. 21 urine samples tested positive. After
confirmatory tests, those 21 urine samples, which included that of the respondents', yielded positive
results confirming the result of the initial screen test. Necessarily, the 21 inmates were charged with
violation of Section 15(use of methamphetamine hydrochloride), Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.

All respondents pleaded "Not Guilty" to the crime charged during their arraignment. Thereafter, the case
was set for pre-trial and trial on August 11, 2006. The respondents filed a Consolidated Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that the facts alleged in the Information do not constitute a violation of Section 15,
RA 9165. The RTC of Muntinlupa, before the scheduled hearing date for pre-trial and trial, issued an
Order granting the'
Consolidated Motion to Dismiss.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA after its Motion for Reconsideration was denied. The
CA affirmed the trial court's Order.

People: The CA erred because respondents had lost the remedy under Section 3(a), Rule 117 of the Rules
of Court having been already arraigned before availing of the remedy.

Respondents: The CA is correct in upholding the RTC's decision dismissing the Informations filed against
them. They claim that since the ground they relied on is Section 3 (a), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court,
their motion to quash may be filed even after they have entered their plea.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in upholding the RTC's grant of respondents' motion and eventually
dismissing the case based on lack of probable cause.
SC: Yes. The petition is meritorious.

The ground relied upon by respondents in their "Motion to Dismiss," which is, that the facts alleged in the
Information do not constitute an offense, is actually one of the grounds provided under a Motion to Quash
in Section 3 (a), Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

It must be emphasized that respondents herein filed their Motion after they have been arraigned. Under
ordinary circumstances, such motion may no longer be allowed after arraignment because their failure to
raise any ground of a motion to quash before they plead is deemed a waiver of any of their objections.
However, since the ground [Sec 3(a)] asserted by respondents is one of the exceptions provided under
Rule 117, the timeliness of the filing is inconsequential.

However, the RTC judge went beyond her authority when she dismissed the cases based on lack of
probable cause and not on the ground raised by respondents.

Section 2, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure plainly states that in a motion to quash,
the court shall not consider any ground other than those stated in the motion, except lack of jurisdiction
over the offense charged. In the present case, what the respondents claim in their motion to quash is that
the facts alleged in the Informations do not constitute an offense and not lack of probable cause as ruled
by the RTC judge.

Section 4, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly states that if the ground based
upon is that "the facts charged do not constitute an offense," the prosecution shall be given by the court an
opportunity to correct the defect by amendment,

If the defect in the information is curable by amendment, the motion to quash shall be denied and the
prosecution shall be ordered to file an amended information. Generally, the fact that the allegations in the
information do not constitute an offense, or that the information does not conform substantially to the
prescribed form, are defects curable by amendment. Corollary to this rule, the court should give the
prosecution an opportunity to amend the information.28chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the present case, the RTC judge outrightly dismissed the cases without giving the prosecution an
opportunity to amend the defect in the Informations. When there is any doubt about the sufficiency of the
complaint or information, the court should direct its amendment or that a new information be filed, and
save the necessity of appealing the case on technical grounds when the complaint might easily be
amended.

Thus, the RTC and the CA, by not giving the State the opportunity to present its evidence in court or to
amend the Informations, have effectively curtailed the State's right to due process.

7. JASON IVLER y AGUILAR vs. HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO,

Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE PONCE
G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010

FACTS: Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was
charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City (MeTC), with two separate offenses:
(1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by
respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponces husband Nestor C. Ponce
and damage to the spouses Ponces vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in
both cases.
On September 7, 2004, Ivler pleaded guilty to the charge in reckless imprudence resulting in
slight physical injuries and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this
conviction, Ivler moved to quash the Information of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
and damage to property for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense
of reckless imprudence.
ISUSUE: Whether motion to quash is proper in the case.
HELD: Yes. Ivler's conviction in the first offense charged bars his prosecution in the second
offense charged. Reckless imprudence is a Single Crime, its consequences on persons and
property are material only to determine the penalty.
The two charges against the petitioner, arising from the same facts were prosecuted under the
same provision of the RPC, as amended, namely Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi
offenses. The proposition (inferred from Art 3 of the RPC) that "reckless imprudence" is not a
crime in itself but simple a way of committing it.
Prior Conviction or Acquittal of Reckless Imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same
quasi offense.
The Court thru Justice JB Reyes: Reason and precedent both coincide in that ones convicted or
acquitted to a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for
that same act. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determined the
penalty, it does not qualify the substance of an offense.
8. TEODORO C. BORLONGAN, JR., CORAZON M. BEJASA, ARTURO E. MANUEL,
JR., ERIC L. LEE, P. SIERVO H. DIZON, BENJAMIN DE LEON, DELFIN C.
GONZALEZ, JR., and BEN YU LIM, JR., versus MAGDALENO M. PEA and HON.
MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR., as Judge Designate of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Bago City
G.R. No. 143591 November 23, 2007
FACTS: Respondent Pea instituted a civil case for recovery of agents compensation and
expenses, damages and attorneys fees against Urban Bank and petitioners before the RTC of
Negros Occidental and was raffled to Branch 62. Petitioners filed a Motion to dismiss, including
several documents as evidence. Atty Pea claims that the documents were falsified. He
subsequently filed his Complaint-Affidavit with the City Prosecutor. The prosecutor found
probable cause and the Informations were filed before MTCC. Warrants of arrest were issued for
the petitioners / accused.
Petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For
Reinvestigation on the ground of non-observance of the proper procedure on preliminary
investigation prescribed in the Rules of Court and that they were not afforded the right to submit
their counter-affidavit.
Petitioners prayed that the information be quashed for lack of probable cause. The court denied
the omnibus motion on the ground that preliminary investigation was not available in the instant
case.
ISSUE: Whether there is a ground for the information to be quashed.
HELD: No. While probable cause should first be determined before an information may be filed
in court, the prosecutor is not mandated to require the respondent to submit his counter-affidavits
to oppose the complaint. In the determination of probable cause, the prosecutor may solely rely
on the complaint, affidavits and other supporting documents submitted by the complainant. If he
does not find probable cause, the prosecutor may dismiss outright the complaint or if he finds
probable cause or sufficient reason to proceed with the case, he shall issue a resolution and file
the corresponding information.
12. Ciron v Gutierrez
Facts:

Complaints for estafa were filed against the petitioner in connection with her position as the
collection officer of the University of Saint Anthony in Iriga. Ciron allegedly failed to remit
P239, 542 worth of salary deductions from employees of USANT and P2, 656, 117 worth of
tuition fees from students of the university.
She filed a motion for bill of particulars and reinvestigation. RTC ordered the amendment of the
information and due to some failure on the part of the City prosecutor, the cases against her were
dismissed without prejudice.
The prosecutor reviewed the evidence on hand pertaining to the case. Subsequently, from two
counts of estafa, this time, in a resolution, they filed 21 informations of estafa against Ciron. This
was penned by Beltran as Assistant City Prosecutor and signed by Contreras as City Prosecutor.
Aggrieved by the OCPs action, Ciron filed a complaint-affidavit against them for violation of
RA 3019 with the Ombudsman. Ciron contended that since the August 9, 2006 Order had
already attained finality, the OCP-Iriga could no longer revive nor reinstate the estafa charges
against her without Ortega, Jr. filing a new complaint before it. Thus, Ciron concludes that
Beltran and Contreras' acts of issuing the Supplemental Resolutions and filing the Informations
for estafa before the RTC were made with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross
negligence and gave unwarranted preference to Ortega, Jr., to her prejudice since she had to post
bail to secure her temporary liberty. The opposing parties, except Contreras, filed their respective
counter-affidavits denying the allegations against them.
However, Ombudsman Gutierrez said there was no probable cause to indict Beltran, Contreras
and Ortega Jr., so she dismissed the complaint. Ciron filed a motion for reconsideration which
was also denied.
Thus, she elevated the case through certiorari to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
If a case is dismissed without prejudice, is there a need for a new complaint for preliminary
investigation to be filed before the case can be revived?
Held:
As a general rule, there is no need. The Supreme Court has held that criminal cases which have
been dismissed without prejudice may be reinstated by motion before the order of dismissal
becomes final, or thereafter, by filing a new Information for the offense.

A new preliminary investigation is only required in order to accord the accused the right to
submit counter-affidavits and evidence only in the following instances:

(a) where the original witnesses of the prosecution or some of them may have recanted their
testimonies or may have died or may no longer be available and new witnesses for the State have
emerged;

(b) where aside from the original accused, other persons are charged under a new criminal
complaint for the same offense or necessarily included therein;

(c) if under a new criminal complaint, the original charge has been upgraded; or

(d) if under a new criminal complaint, the criminal liability of the accused is upgraded from
being an accessory to that of a principal.