ASSOCIACION DE AGRICULTURES DE TALISAY-SILAY, INC., et. al. vs.

TALISAY-SILAY MILLING
CO., INC., et. al

FACTS

The claim of Associacion De Agricultures De Talisay-Silay (PLANTERS), Inc., is that under R.A. No. 809
(An Act to Regulate the Relations among persons engaged in the Sugar Industry) it is provided that:

Section 1. In the absence of written milling agreements between the majority of planters and the
millers of sugarcane in any milling district in the Philippines, the unrefined sugar produced in that
district from the mining by any sugar central of the sugar-cane of any sugar-cane planter or
plantation owner, as well as all by products and derivatives thereof, shall be divided between
them as follows:

Sixty per centum for the planter, and forty per centum for the central in any milling district the
maximum actual production of which is not more than four hundred thousand piculs: Provided,
That the provisions of this section shall not apply to sugar centrals with an actual production of
less than one hundred fifty thousand piculs.

Sixty-two and one-half per centum for the planter, and thirty-seven and one-half per centum for
the central in any milling district the maximum actual production of which exceeds four hundred
thousand piculs but does not ex six hundred thousand piculs;

Sixty-five per centum for the planter, and thirty-five per centum for the central in any milling district
the maximum actual production of which exceeds six hundred thousand piculs but does not
exceed nine hundred thousand piculs;

Sixty-seven and one-half per centum for the planter, and thirty-two and one-half per centum for
the central in any mining district the maximum actual production of which exceed nine hundred
thousand piculs but does not exceed one million two hundred thousand piculs;

Seventy per centum for the planter, and thirty per centum for the central in any milling district the
maximum actual production of which exceeds one on two hundred thousand piculs.

As second and alternative cause of action, the PLANTERS averred that the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc.
(CENTRAL) executed contracts with eight planters in which a higher percentage of partition in the sugar
and by-products and derivatives produced by the CENTRAL was given to said eight planters than those
given to the rest of the planters in the district, that is, 63% to 64%, the latter, whenever the production of
the CENTRAL should be 1,200,000 piculs or over, whereas all the others were given only 60%, and
inasmuch as under the provisions of the milling contracts between the PLANTERS and the CENTRAL
since the crop year 1920-1921.

As third cause of action, the PLANTERS alleged that notwithstanding that the applicability of R.A. No. 809
to the Talisay-Silay milling district had already been ruled upon by the Sugar Quota Administrator, the
CENTRAL still refused to abide by said ruling and to cause the release to the PLANTERS of the
corresponding amounts to which they are entitled.

CENTRAL filed its respective answers to the amended complaint and the supplements thereto. In said
answers, the CENTRAL alleged in substance the following defenses: (1) that Republic Act 809 is invalid
and unconstitutional; (2) that even if said Act were valid, it is not applicable to the Talisay-Silay milling
district because the majority of the planters had written milling contracts with the CENTRAL at the time
said Act went into effect, and that this continued during the crop years 1951-52, 1952-53, 1953-54, and all
the subsequent crop years in dispute; (3) that the planters who entered into said milling contracts did so
voluntarily and those voluntary contracts may not be altered or modified without infringing the
constitutional guarantee on freedom of contracts and the non-impairment clause of the Constitution; and
as to those planters who entered into contracts after the effective date of the law, they should be deemed
as having voluntarily waived all the rights and benefits that might accrue to them under it; (4) that the Act
does not contain any expressed or implied provision invalidating the written milling contract s entered into
between the CENTRAL and the owners of adherent plantations before its effective date; (5) that the Act
sanctions and allows the entering into milling contracts after its effective date, and as a matter of fact a
large number of the PLANTERS are also planters in the Hawaiian-Philippine milling district, adjoining the
Talisay-Silay milling district, and they had entered into milling contracts with the Hawaiian-Philippine Co.
one year and four months after the effectivity of the Act and in their milling contracts they had stipulations
regarding sharing participation without regard to the ratios fixed in the Act, and they have abided by those
mining contracts, and (6) that the arrangement, regarding the issuance of escrow quedans and the
deposit of the proceeds of the sale of the disputed increased participation of the planters was agreed to
and accepted by the CENTRAL from the Sugar Quota Administrator under duress, because said
Administrator would not allow the issuance of any warehouse receipt on the share of the mill unless the
CENTRAL agreed to the escrow quedans arrangement; (7) that neither are the PLANTERS entitled to
increased participation as claimed by them in their second and alternative cause of action because they
do not qualify as the PLANTERS contemplated in their invoked twenty second (Vigesimo Segundo)
paragraph of the original milling contract, since what are referred to in that paragraph are only the
PLANTERS "que se obliguen a molercailadulce en la fabrics para la cosecha 1920-21 "; (8) that the
provisions of Republic Act 809 relating to the increased sharing participation of the planters would affect
and alter the allocation of exportable sugar to the United States (export A sugar) among Philippine mills
and plantation owners, in violation of the Trade Relations Agreement between the Philip pines and the
United States, and this is precisely what is expected from the application of the law as provided in the
second paragraph of Section 8 of the very same Republic Act 809; and (9) that the instant case is not a
proper one for a class suit.

Issue

Whether or not Republic Act 809 is not unconstitutional for the reason that it is a social justice and police
power measure for the promotion of labor conditions in sugar plantations.

(Note: I used the phrase not unconstitutional because there is always a presumption that a law is
constitutional)

Held

Yes. Republic Act 809 is a Social Justice and Police Power Measure for the promotion of labor conditions
in sugar plantations, hence whatever rational degree of constraint it exerts on freedom of contract and
existing contractual obligations is constitutionally permissible.

Police Power

In Lutz vs. Araneta (G.R. No. L-2859, Dec. 22 1959), this Court recognized the propriety of exercising
police power when it is needed to do so in order that our sugar industry may be stabilized, and to that
end, it was held that the legislature could provide that the distribution of benefits from the proceeds of
sugar be readjusted among the components of the industry to enable it to resist the added strain of the
increase in taxes that it had to sustain then. With at least equal persuasiveness must such reasoning
obtain when the re-adjustment of the distribution of proceeds is impelled by the need to render social
justice among all the participants in the industry, specially the laborers. The amicus curiae held that there
is not enough showing of unreasonableness in the legislation in question. Quite to the contrary, all the
provisions of the impugned act to be germane to the end being pursued.

Social Justice

But it is not police power alone that sustains the validity of the statutory provision in dispute. Having in
view its primary objective to promote the interests of labor, it can never be possible that the State would
be bereft of constitutional authority to enact legislations of its kind. Here, in the Philippines, whenever any
government measure designed for the advancement of the working class is impugned on constitutional
grounds and shadows of doubt are cast over the scope of the State's prerogative in respect thereto, the
imperious mandate of the social justice Ideal consecrated in our fundamental laws, both the old and the
new asserts its majesty, upon the courts to accord utmost consideration to the spirit animating the act
assailed, not just for the sake of enforcing the explicit social justice provisions of the article on
"Declaration of Principles and State Policies", but more fundamentally, to serve the sacred cause of
human dignity, which is actually what lies at the core of those constitutional precepts as it is also the
decisive element always in the determination of any controversy between capital and labor.

Thus, Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution of 1935, under the aegis of which the law in question was
enacted, made it one of the declared principles to which the people committed themselves that "the
promotion of social justice to insure the well being and economic security of all the people should be the
concern of the State." More specifically in regard to labor, there was also Section 6 of Article XIX, to the
effect that "the State shall afford protection to labor ... and shall regulate the relation between . . . labor
and capital in industry and in agriculture. It is difficult to conceive of any legislation more aptly rooted in
the declared principle and the plain injunction of the old Constitution just quoted than the Act under
discussion which is a law to regulate the relations between the centrals and the planters with the
primordial objective of protecting and promoting the interests of labor. In regard then to the arguments of
the centrals relative to due process and the sanctity of contractual obligations as well as the freedom of
contract, We hold that more cogently than in regard to the exertion of police power as discussed above,
the criterion for determining whether or not social justice has been over-extended in any given case is
nothing more than the economic viability or feasibility of the proposed law in favor of labor, and certainly
not the existence of exceptional circumstances. In other words, as long as capital in industry or
agriculture will not be fatally prejudiced to the extent of incurring losses as a result of its enforcement, any
legislation to improve labor conditions would be valid, provided the assailed legislation is more or less
demanded as a measure to improve the situation in which the workers and laborers are actually found
And in the case at bar, there is not even a pretension that the finances of the centrals would be anywhere
in the red as a result of the enforcement of Republic Act 809.

In the light of the foregoing considerations, the court do not find the position of the CENTRAL that Section
I of Republic Act 809 interferes unconstitutionally with existing contracts and the freedom of all the parties
concerned in entering into new ones to be sufficiently persuasive.

If the court declare the Act unconstitutional upon the ground that it is unwarranted invasion of the freedom
of contract as between the millers and the planters, the deplorable condition of the laborers in the sugar
farms would remain as it was before its enactment. On the other hand, if the court sustain its validity but
at the same time apply it literally and sanction a construction thereof that would enable the centrals and
their planters to enter into agreements, under which the latter would have to be given increased
participation without any obligation to share the same with their laborers, the Court would be a party to a
conspiracy to virtually defraud labor of the benefits, the grant of which is precisely its sole redeeming
feature to save it from unconstitutionality. For it is clear for anyone to see that without the Act, under the
conditions prevailing in the industry, the planters would have no means of persuading, much less
compelling, the centrals or millers to give them any increase in their respective shares, whereas, with this
law, faced with the prospect of being forced to grant the planters their proportion of sharing prescribed by
it, if no written contracts were to be signed by them with the majority of the planters, naturally, the centrals
would readily agree to give the planters the increase they want, which could be less than that
stipulated in the Act and yet be exactly what the planters would get under it if the majority of them were
not to have written contracts with the central. In which eventuality, and should we uphold the proposed
strictly literal construction of the Act, the laborers would be left holding the proverbial empty bag. In that
way, the interests of the capitalist components of the industry, the millers and planters, would be served
by the compulsive effect of the law but labor would not be assured of receiving even the crumbs, when
the truth is that the legislation would have no reason for being as a constitutional and enforceable statute
if it did not include mandatory provisions designed to lift them from misery. The Court emphatically
refuses to have anything to do with such an unconscionable posture vis-a-vis the fate of labor, which
pose, after all We must assume could not have been in the contemplation of the legislature that precisely
inserted into it its pro-labor element in order to bring it within the ambit of the social justice and police
power protection of the fundamental law. We condemn such a view as definitely anti-social and as a gross
injustice to labor, which no respectable legislature composed of duly elected representatives of the people
may ever be deemed as capable of dirtying the sacred statute books with.

Doctrine

As long as capital in industry or agriculture will not be fatally prejudiced to the extent of incurring losses as
a result of its enforcement, any legislation to improve labor conditions would be valid, provided the
assailed legislation is more or less demanded as a measure to improve the situation in which the workers
and laborers are actually found And in the case at bar, there is not even a pretension that the finances of
the centrals would be anywhere in the red as a result of the enforcement of Republic Act 809.

PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC., vs. PHILIPPINE AIR LINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PALEA),
PHILIPPINE AIR LINES SUPERVISORS ASSOCIATION (PALSA) and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS

FACTS:
What is sought is a reversal of an order of respondent Court reinstating one Fidel Gotangco
dismissed by his employer, petitioner Philippine Air Lines, for having been found guilty of the breach of
trust and violation of the rules and regulations of the company.
 Fidel Gotangco was confiscated with a piece of lead material from his person at one of the gates
of the PAL Airfield compound and a signed statement by him, taken at an investigation, wherein he
admitted his apprehension by a company security guard with a lead material he intended to take home for
his personal use. He was held guilty of breach of trust and violation of the rules and regulations of his
employer. But respondent sees authority to dismiss him on the basis of such guilt. It is believed, however,
that in this particular case dismissal is too severe a penalty to impose on Fidel Gotangco for trying to slip
out a lead material belonging to respondent. Because (1) it is his first time to commit the charge in
question for the duration of his 17 years of service with respondent; (2) the cost of said material,
considering its size, is negligible (8" x 10" x 1/2"); (3) respondent did not lose anything after all as the lead
material was retrieved in time; (4) the ignominy and mental torture undergone by Gotangco is practically
punishment in itself; and (5) he has been under preventive suspension to date.

Petitioner was therefore ordered "to reinstate Fidel Gotangco immediately, without backwages."
But the petitioner, as indicated by his appeal, appears to be unsatisfied. It insists on dismissal.

ISSUE: W/N the State has the duty to assure workers security of tenure

RULING:
YES. The futility of this appeal becomes even more apparent considering the express provision in
the Constitution already noted, requiring the State to assure workers "security of tenure."17 It was not that
specific in the 1935 Charter. The mandate was limited to the State affording "protection to labor,
especially to working women and minors, .... "18 If by virtue of the above, it would not be legally justifiable
to reverse the order of reinstatement, it becomes even more readily apparent that such a conclusion is
even more unwarranted now. To reach it would be to show lack of fealty to a constitutional command.

National Service Corporation vs NLRC

FACTS:

Eugenia C. Credo was an employee of the National Service Corporation (NASECO), a domestic
corporation which provided security guards as well as messengerial, janitorial and other similar manpower
services to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and its agencies. She was first employed with NASECO
as a lady guard.

In 1983, she was administratively charged by the Company, stemming from her non-compliance
with a memorandum. Thus, placed her on "Forced Leave" status for 15 days. Subsequently, she filed a
complaint, with the Arbitration Branch, Manila, against the Company for placing her on forced leave,
without due process.

While she was on forced leave, the Companys Committee on Personnel Affairs deliberated and
evaluated a number of past acts of misconduct or infractions attributed to her, in consequence, the
committee recommended her termination, with forfeiture of benefits. Consequently, she filed a
supplemental complaint for illegal dismissal, alleging the absence of just or authorized cause for her
dismissal and lack of opportunity to be heard.

The labor arbiter dismissed her complaint but directed the Company to pay her separation pay
equivalent to one half month's pay for every year of service.

On appeal, NLRC directed the Company to reinstate the employee to her former position, or
substantially equivalent position, with six (6) months' back wages and without loss of seniority rights and
other privileges appertaining thereto, on the ground that: 1) the company violated the requirements
mandated by law on termination.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the employee be reinstated on the ground that the company violated the
requirements mandated by law on termination?

HELD: YES
As guidelines for employers in the exercise of their power to dismiss employees for just causes, the law
provides that:
Section 2. Notice of dismissal. Any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker shall
furnish him a written notice stating the particular acts or omission constituting the grounds
for his dismissal.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 5. Answer and Hearing. The worker may answer the allegations stated against
him in the notice of dismissal within a reasonable period from receipt of such notice. The
employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself
with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires.
Section 6. Decision to dismiss. The employer shall immediately notify a worker in
writing of a decision to dismiss him stating clearly the reasons therefor.

These guidelines mandate that the employer furnish an employee sought to be dismissed two (2)
written notices of dismissal before a termination of employment can be legally effected. These are the
notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought
and the subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him.

Likewise, a reading of the guidelines in consonance with the express provisions of law on
protection to labor (which encompasses the right to security of tenure) and the broader dictates of
procedural due process necessarily mandate that notice of the employer's decision to dismiss an
employee, with reasons therefor, can only be issued after the employer has afforded the employee
concerned ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.

In the case at bar, the Company did not comply with these guidelines in effecting the employees
dismissal. Although she was apprised and "given the chance to explain her side" of the charges filed
against her, this chance was given so perfunctorily, thus rendering illusory her right to security of tenure.
And she was not given ample opportunity to be heard and to defend herself is evident from the fact that
the compliance with the injunction to apprise her of the charges filed against her and to afford her a
chance to prepare for her defense was dispensed in only a day. This is not effective compliance with the
legal requirements aforementioned.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the challenged decision of the NLRC is AFFIRMED.

PLDT VS NLRC

Facts:
Marilyn Abucay, a traffic operator of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, was
accused by two complainants of having demanded and received from them the total amount of P3,800.00
in consideration of her promise to facilitate approval of their applications for telephone installation. She
was found guilty as charged and accordingly separated from the service. She went to the Ministry of
Labor and Employment claiming she had been illegally removed. It was dismissed but ordered to pay her
one month pay for every year of services for financial assistance. Both appealed to NLRC but it upheld
the decision. PLDT contended that the employee dismissed for a cause is not entitle to reinstatement or
backwages and is not allowed for any relief. However the NLRC claimed that she was sufficiently
punished with her dismissal. It is not a reward but merely to help her for loss based on equity and
compassion.

Issues: Whether or not the separation pay is proper on the ground that is based on social justice.
Ruling:
No. The reason is that our Constitution is replete with positive commands for the promotion of
social justice, and particularly the protection of the rights of the workers. Article XIII expressly recognizes
the vital role of labor, hand in hand with management, in the advancement of the national economy and
the welfare of the people in general. We hold that henceforth separation pay shall be allowed as a
measure of social justice only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes
other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. Where the reason for the valid
dismissal is, for example, habitual intoxication or an offense involving moral turpitude, like theft or illicit
sexual relations with a fellow worker, the employer may not be required to give the dismissed employee
separation pay, or financial assistance, or whatever other name it is called, on the ground of social justice.
The policy of social justice is not intended to countenance wrongdoing simply because it is
committed by the underprivileged. At best it may mitigate the penalty but it certainly will not condone the
offense. Compassion for the poor is an imperative of every humane society but only when the recipient is
not a rascal claiming an undeserved privilege. Social justice cannot be permitted to be refuge of
scoundrels any more than can equity be an impediment to the punishment of the guilty. Those who invoke
social justice may do so only if their hands are clean and their motives blameless and not simply because
they happen to be poor. This great policy of our Constitution is not meant for the protection of those who
have proved they are not worthy of it, like the workers who have tainted the cause of labor with the
blemishes of their own character.
The fact that she has worked with the PLDT for more than a decade, if it is to be considered at all,
should be taken against her as it reflects a regrettable lack of loyalty that she should have strengthened
instead of betraying during all of her 10 years of service with the company. If regarded as a justification for
moderating the penalty of dismissal, it will actually become a prize for disloyalty, perverting the meaning
of social justice and undermining the efforts of labor to cleanse its ranks of all undesirables.

B.F. GOODRICH PHILIPPINES, INC.,vs. B.F. GOODRICH (MARIKINA FACTORY) CONFIDENTIAL &
SALARIED EMPLOYEES UNION-NATU, B.F. GOODRICH (MAKATI OFFICE) CONFIDENTIAL &
SALARIED EMPLOYEES UNION-NATU, and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

Facts:
President of B.F. Goodrich (Makati Office) Confidential and Salaried Employees Union-NATU,
sent a letter to the petitioner, seeking recognition as the bargaining agent of such employees so
that thereafter there could be negotiations for a collective contract. On the same date, President
of B.F. Goodrich (Marikina Factory) Confidential and Salaried Employees Union-NATU and Vice-
President, NATU, sent a letter to the petitioner, of a similar tenor.

Petitioner, (The Company) countered by filing two petitions for certification election with
respondent Court of Industrial Relations. Then, two strike notices from respondents, filed with the
Bureau of Labor Relations, demanding union recognition. It was not until April 13, 1971, that
respondent Court commenced the hearings of the petitions for certification election. But, It was
then alleged that on two days in April 19 and 20, 1971, there was a strike staged by those
affiliated with private respondents, to force recognition of their unions. Subsequently, after
preliminary investigation first had, on a finding of a prima facie case of illegal strike and unfair
labor practice committed by the members of the two unions.
 The petitioner contested that if the case will prosper and the strike staged by the unions during
the pendency of the case will be declared illegal and the members cited therein found guilty of
unlabor practice and be disqualified to vote in a certification election. On the other hand, the
unions contested that the holding if the certification proceeding in abeyance until the final
judgement of the ULP case will be denial of their statutory right which is the employees being left
without collective bargaining representative.

ISSUE: Whether or not the holding of the suspension in abeyance until final judgement of the case will
cause the denial of the statutory right of the members of the union.

HELD:
Yes, The Court ruled that It is merely to stress that such a suit should not be allowed to lend itself
as a means, whether intended or not, to prevent a truly free expression of the will of the labor group as to
the organization that will represent it. It is not only the loss of time involved, in itself not likely to enhance
the prospect of respondent-unions, but also the fear engendered in the mind of an ordinary employee that
management has many weapons in its arsenal to bring the full force of its undeniable power against those
of its employees dissatisfied with things as they are. There is no valid reason then for the postponement
sought. The law clearly contemplates all the employees, not only some of them. As much as possible
then, there is to be no unwarranted reduction in the number of those taking part in a certification election,
even under the guise that in the meanwhile, which may take some time, some of those who are
employees could possibly lose such status, by virtue of a pending unfair labor practice case.

The time that might elapse is hard to predict, as the matter may eventually reach this Tribunal. In
the meanwhile, there is no opportunity for free choice on the part of the employees as to which labor
organization shall be their exclusive bargaining representative. The force of such an objection could be
blunted if after a final decision to the effect that the employees complained of were engaged in illegal
strike, they would automatically lose their jobs. Such is not the law, however. It does not necessarily
follow that whoever might have participated in a strike thus proscribed has thereby forfeited the right to
employment.
 Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors Association vs
Court of Industrial Relations, Caltex ( Philippines ) , INC., W.E. Menefee and B. F. Edwards

Facts:
The Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors Association is a labor organization of Filipino
managers supervisors in Caltex (Philippines) , Inc., respondent Company in this proceeding. The
Association sent a set of proposals to the Company wherein one of the demands was the recognition of
the Association as the duly authorized bargaining agency for managers and supervisors in the company.
To this the Company countered stating that a distinction exists between representatives of management
and individuals employed as supervisors and that is Companys belief that managerial employees are not
qualified for membership in a labor organization; hence it is digested that the Association institute a
certification proceeding so as to remove any question with regard to the position titles that should be
included in the bargaining unit. The Association felt disinclined to follow the suggestion of the company
and so on the Company initiated a certification proceeding.

On March 8, 1965 the Association filed a notice to strike giving reasons which are refusal to
bargain in good faith and to act on demands. During the hearing of the certification proceedings Judge
Tabigne cautioned the parties to maintain the status quo; he specifically advised the employees not to go
on strike, making it clear , however, that in the presence of unfair labor practices they could go on strike
even without any notice.

On the basis of the strike notice, after the efforts exerted by the Bureau of Labor Relations to
settle the differences between the parties failed. Then through the Urgent Petition , the Company filed
cases. Such urgent petition was frontally met by the Association with a motion to dismiss questioning the
jurisdiction of the industrial court. The motion to dismiss was opposed by the Company, the trial court
denied the same. Not satisfied with the order, the Association moved for its reconsideration before
respondent court en banc.

Because of the settlement between the parties of some of their disputes, the Association filed with
respondent court a manifestation ( to which was attached a copy of the return-to-work agreement signed
by the parties ), to the effect the issues had become moot and academic. Considering the interrelation of
the issues involved in the two cases and by agreement of the parties, the two cases were heard jointly.

Issue:
Whether or not the strike staged by the Association is illegal.

Held:
The court view the return-to-work agreement of May 30, 1965 as in the nature of a partial
compromise between the parties and, more important a labor; consequently in the latter aspect the same
must yield to the common good ( Art. 1700, Civil Code of the Philippines ) and in case of doubt.. shall
be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer ( Article 1702 ). The court said when
the company unqualifiedly bound itself in the return- to-work agreement that all employees will be taken
back with the same employee status prior to April 22, 1965 , the company thereby made manifest its
intention and conformity not to proceed with case no. 1484-MC relating the illegality of the strike incident.
For while it is true that there is a reservation in the return-to-work agreement as follows:

The parties agree that all court cases now pending shall continue, including CIR case no. 1484-
MC.

The court said it should be construed the same bearing in mind the conduct and intention of the
parties. The failure to mention case no. 1484-MC (1) which is the illegality of the strike while specifically
mentioning case no. 1484-MC which is incident of the certification election proceedings, the courts
opinion , bars the company from proceeding with the former especially in the light of the additional
specific stipulation that the strikers would be taken back with the same employee status prior to the strike
on April 22, 1965.
The court said that the Association resorted to means beyond the pale of the law in the
prosecution of the strike. The Association filed its notice to strike on March 8, 1965, giving reasons
therefor any one of which is valid ground for a strike. Besides, one of the important rights recognized by
the Magna Carta of Labor is the right to self-organization and the court do not hesitate to say that is the
cornerstone of the monumental piece of labor legislation.

Wherefore, respondent courts resolution en banc dated May 16, 1969, together with the decision
dated February 26, 1969, is revered.

In case no. 1484 MC (1), the court declares the strike of the Caltex Filipino Managers and
Supervisors Association as legal in all respects and consequently, the forfeit of the employee status of
J.J. Mapa and Dominador Mangalino to their former positions without loss of seniority and privileges, with
backwages from the time of dismissal on July 1, 1969.

The court finds also in case no. 4344- ULP , the company of B.F. Edwards and W. E. Menefee
guilty of unfair labor practices and they are therefore ordered to cease and desist from the same. The
company is directed to pay backwages to the striking employees from April 22, 1965 to May 30, 1965.
 FEATI UNIVERSITY vs. BAUTISTA

FACTS:
The President of the Feati University Club wrote a letter to the President of the University,
informing her of the organization of the Faculty Club into a registered labor union. The union is composed
of members of the faculty and/or instructors of the university. Another letter was sent containing 26
demands in connection with the employment of its members and requesting an answer within 10 days.
The President answered, however, requesting for an extension of 30 days to study thoroughly the
demands. The Counsel of the University wrote a letter to the President of the Faculty Club demanding
proof of its majority status and designation as a bargaining representative. The Faculty Club rejected the
request and on the same day filed a notice of strike with the Bureau of Labor, alleging that the University
refused to bargain collectively. Then, the Faculty Club declared a strike and established picket lines that
resulted to the disruption of classes. Since no satisfactory agreement was arrived at despite the efoorts of
the Department of Labor, the President of the Philippines certified the dispute to CIR, pursuant to RA No.
875.

The University, however, contended that CIR has no jurisdiction upon the ground that Republic
Act No. 875 is not applicable to the University because it is an educational institution and not an industrial
establishment and hence not an "employer" in contemplation of RA No. 875; and neither is Republic Act
No. 875 applicable to the members of the Faculty Club because the latter are independent contractors
and, therefore, not employees within the purview of the said Act.

ISSUES:
(1) WON Feati University is an employer
(2) WON the members of Faculty Club are employees

RULING:

a) YES. Under the Act. Section 2(c) of the Act, it is provided that an employer includes any person
acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not include any labor
 organization or any one acting in the capacity or agent of such labor organization. In using the
word "includes" and not "means", Congress did not intend to give a complete definition of
"employer", but rather that such definition should be complementary to what is commonly
understood as employer. Congress intended the term to be understood in a broad meaning
because (1) the statutory definition includes not only "a principal employer but also a person
acting in the interest of the employer"; and (2) the Act itself specifically enumerated those who are
not included in the term "employer namely: (a) a labor organization, (b) anyone acting in the
capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization, and (3) the Government and any political
subdivision or instrumentality. Among these statutory exemptions, educational institutions are not
included; hence, they can be included in the term "employer". However, those educational
institutions that are not operated for profit are not within the purview of Republic Act No. 875.
Since the University admits that it has declared dividends and that it is not strictly for educational
purposes, the Act is applicable.

b) YES. The principal consideration in determining whether a workman is an employee or an

independent contractor is the right to control the manner of doing the work, and it is not the actual
exercise of the right by interfering with the work, but the right to control, which constitutes the test. It is
shown that university (1) controls the work of the members of its faculty, (2) prescribes the courses or
subjects that professors teach, (3) when and where to teach, (4) their work is characterized by
regularity and continuity for a fixed duration (5) compensated for their services by wages and salaries,
rather than by profits (6) cannot substitute others to do the work without the consent of the university,
and (7) and can be laid off if their work is found not satisfactory. All these indicate that the university
has control over their work; and professors are, therefore, employees. Thus, it follows that they have
a right to unionize in accordance with the provisions of Section 3 of (Republic Act No. 875)
 Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines, et. al., vs. CIR

FACTS
A labor dispute arose between the members of ALPAP, a labor union, and PAL, the employer of
the said members, sometime in October 1970. In the membership meeting held by the union, a majority
of its members adopted a resolution amending the unions constitution and by-laws which provides that
any active member who shall be forced to retire or resign or otherwise terminated for union activities has
the option to either remain as an active member in good standing or resign in wiring his active
membership with the union. Although a no-work stoppage was issued by the CIR, a substantial majority of
the union members filed letters of retirement and resignation. Moreover, Gaston, a resigned pilot of the
employer and a member of the union, was elected as the president by those who were already resigned/
retired while Gomez was elected as the president by those who remained with their employer.

Then, a petition with the CIR was filed by Gomez praying for the certification as the sole and
exclusive bargaining representative of all pilots now under employment by PAL and are on active flight or
operational assignments. This was opposed by Gaston on the ground that a certification proceeding in
CIR is not the proper forum to determine the lawful president of a legitimate labor organization. A decision
was rendered by CIR certifying the union composed of pilots employed by PAL with Gomez as its
president as the sole and exclusive bargaining representatives since pilots belonging to Gaston group
had already resigned or retired and no longer members of the union.

ISSUE/S
W/N the membership with the union is exclusive only to the employees of a certain employer.
W/N the authorization given to Gomez to exclusively take over the office, funds, and name of the
union was is valid.

HELD
1. NO, the membership with the union is not exclusive to the employees of a certain employer.

Labor organization, as defined in Sec. 2(e) of R.A. 875 otherwise known as an Act to Promote
Industrial Peace and For Other Purposes, is any union or association of employees which exist, in whole
or in part, for the purpose of the collective bargaining or dealing with employers concerning terms and
conditions of employment. The emphasis of Industrial Peace Act is clearly on the purposes for which a
union or association of employees established rather than that membership therein should be limited only
to the employees of a particular employer. In addition, under Section 2(h) of R.A 875, a representative is
defined as a legitimate labor organization or any officer or agent of such organization, whether or not
employed by the employer or employee whom he represents.

Furthermore, nothing in the constitution and by-laws of the union which indubitably restricts
membership therein to PAL pilots alone. Although according to the union, there has never been an
instance when a non-PAL pilot became a member of ALPAP. The complete lack of any such precondition
for ALPAP membership cannot but be interpreted as an unmistakable authority for the association to
accept pilots into its fold though they may not be under PAL's employ. Hence, non-employees can
represent and be a member of a union of employees of a certain employer.

2. NO, the authorization given to Gomez is not valid. The Court held that Gomezs election cannot
be said to be valid and binding since he was elected only by 45 members as compared to Gaston who
was elected by 180 out of 270 members. However, the Gomez group cannot be said as having no right
over the office, funds, and name of the union in which they are also members.

Moreover, a segment of the union can be authorized by its duly elected officers to bargain
collectively with a certain employer on matters affecting the terms and conditions of their particular
employment. In this case, Gaston had extended recognition to Gomez to enter and conclude collective
bargaining contracts with PAL. Since Gomez was given this authority, Gaston cannot disallow the former
from the certain use of the office, funds, and name of the union which would enable Gomez to bargain
collectively with the employer. Also, in the eventuality that the pilots presently employed by PAL and who
subscribe to the leadership of Ben Hur Gomez should consider it to their better interest to have their own
separate office, name and union funds, nothing can prevent them from setting up a separate labor union.
In that eventuality, whatever vested rights, interest or participation they may have in the assets, including
cash funds, of ALPAP as a result of their membership therein should properly be liquidated in favor of
such withdrawing members of the association.
 Lopez Sugar Corp. vs Secretary of Labor

Facts:
On 7/26/1989 National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the Philippines-TUCP
(NACUSIP-TUCP) filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a petition for direct
certification or for certification election to determine the sole and exclusive collective bargaining
representative of the supervisory employees of herein petitioner, Lopez Sugar Corporation (LSC).
NACUSIP-TUCP averred that it was a legitimate national labor organization; that LSC was employing 55
supervisory employees, the majority of whom were members of the union; that no other labor
organization was claiming membership over the supervisory employees; that there was no existing
collective bargaining agreement covering said employees; and that there was no legal impediment either
to a direct certification of NACUSIP-TUCP or to the holding of a certification election. -LSC contended it.
NACUSIP-TUCP submitted Charter Certificate No. 003-89, dated 20 July 1989, of the NACUSIP-TUCP
Lopez Sugar Central Supervisory Chapter.

Issue: W/N NACUSIP-TUCP is a legitimate labor organization

Held:
No. NACUSIP-TUCP is not a legitimate labor organization. A local or chapter therefore becomes
a legitimate labor organization only upon submission of the following to the BLR: 1) A charter certificate,
within 30 days from its issuance by the labor federation or national union, and 2) The constitution and by-
laws, a statement on the set of officers, and the books of accounts all of which are certified under oath by
the secretary or treasurer, as the case may be, of such local or chapter, and attested to by its president.
Absent compliance with these mandatory requirements, the local or chapter does not become legitimate
labor organization. The only document extant on record to establish the legitimacy of the NACUSIP-
TUCP Lopez Sugar Central Supervisory Chapter is a charter certificate and nothing else.
 San Miguel Corporation Employees Union vs. Bersamira

FACTS
SMC entered into contracts for merchandising services with Lipercon and D'Rite. In said
contracts, it was expressly understood and agreed that the workers employed by the contractors were to
be paid by the latter and that none of them were to be deemed employees or agents of SMC. There was
to be no employer-employee relation between the contractors and/or its workers, on the one hand, and
SMC on the other. SMC Employees Union is the duly authorized representative of the monthly paid R&F
employees of SMC. In a letter, the Union advised SMC that some Lipercon and D'Rite workers had
signed up for union membership and sought the regularization of their employment with SMC.

ISSUE
W/N there is a labor dispute between SMC and the Union.

HELD
YES. A "labor dispute" as defined in Article 212 (1) of the Labor Code includes "any controversy
or matter concerning terms and conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons
in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or arranging the terms and conditions of employment,
regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee."

While it is SanMig's submission that no employer-employee relationship exists between itself, on

the one hand, and the contractual workers of Lipercon and D'Rite on the other, a labor dispute can
nevertheless exist "regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relationship of employer
and employee" (Article 212 [1], Labor Code, supra) provided the controversy concerns, among others, the
terms and conditions of employment or a "change" or "arrangement" thereof.

At bottom, what the Union seeks is to regularize the status of the employees. This matter
definitely dwells on the working relationship between said employees vis-a-vis SanMig. Terms, tenure and
conditions of their employment and the arrangement of those terms are thus involved bringing the matter
within the purview of a labor dispute. Further, the Union also seeks to represent those workers. SanMig
resists that Union demand on the ground that there is no employer-employee relationship between it and
those workers and because the demand violates the terms of their CBA. Obvious then is that
representation and association, for the purpose of negotiating the conditions of employment are also
involved. In fact, the injunction sought by SanMig was precisely also to prevent such representation.
Again, the matter of representation falls within the scope of a labor dispute. Neither can it be denied that
the controversy below is directly connected with the labor dispute.

As the case is indisputably linked with a labor dispute, jurisdiction belongs to the labor tribunals.
 Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc. vs NLRC

FACTS:

Petitioners employees stopped working and gathered in a mass action to express their
grievances regarding wages, thirteenth month pay and hazard pay. Said employees were all members of
the Macajalar Labor Union Federation of Free Workers (MLU-FFW) with whom petitioner had an
existing collective bargaining agreement.

The strikers filed individual notices of strike (Kaugalingon nga Declarasyon sa Pag-Welga) with
the then Ministry of Labor and Employment.

With the failure of conciliation conferences between petitioner and the strikers, INPORT filed a
complaint before the Labor Arbiter for Illegal Strike with prayer for a restraining order/preliminary
injunction.

The National Labor Relations Commission issued a temporary restraining order. Thereafter,
majority of the strikers returned to work, leaving herein private respondents who continued their protest.

For not having complied with the formal requirements in Article 264 of the Labor Code, 3 the
strike staged by petitioners workers on April 30, 1985 was found by the Labor Arbiter to be illegal. 4 The
workers who participated in the illegal strike did not, however, lose their employment, since there was no
evidence that they participated in illegal acts. After noting that petitioner accepted the other striking
employees back to work, the Labor Arbiter held that the private respondents should similarly be allowed
to return to work without having to undergo the required screening to be undertaken by their union (MLU-
FFW).

As regards the six private respondents who were union officers, the Labor Arbiter ruled that they
could not have possibly been duped or tricked into signing the strike notice for they were active
participants in the conciliation meetings and were thus fully aware of what was going on. Hence, said
union officers should be accepted back to work after seeking reconsideration from herein petitioner. 5

The NLRC affirmed with modification 8 the Arbiters decision. It held that the concerted action by
the workers was more of a protest action than a strike. Private respondents, including the six union
officers, should also be allowed to work unconditionally to avoid discrimination. However, in view of the
strained relations between the parties, separation pay was awarded in lieu of reinstatement.

The Commission ruled that since private respondents were not actually terminated from service,
there was no basis for reinstatement. However, it awarded six months salary as separation pay or
financial assistance in the nature of equitable relief. The award for backwages was also deleted for lack
of factual and legal basis. In lieu of backwages, compensation equivalent to P1,000.00 was given.

ISSUE:

W/N the employees mass action may be considered as a strike

RULING:

A strike, considered as the most effective weapon of labor, is defined as any temporary stoppage
of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. A labor dispute
includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of employment or the association or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and
conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of
employers and employees.
Private respondents and their co-workers stopped working and held the mass action on April 30,
1985 to press for their wages and other benefits. What transpired then was clearly a strike, for the
cessation of work by concerted action resulted from a labor dispute.
The Arbiter correctly ruled that the strike was illegal for failure to comply with the requirements of
Article 264 (now Article 263) paragraphs (c) and (f) of the Labor Code.
 RCPI V PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS ELECTRONICS AND ELECTRICITY WORKERS
FEDERATION

FACTS
The case is about the prayer of the respondent union, Philippine Communications, Electronics &
Electricity Workers Federation (FCWF), RCPI Employees Union for a modified judgment. The plea is for
the Supreme Court to include in the judgment the award of backwages to the employees and laborers
concerned, in addition to their immediate reinstatement. The plea is opposed by RCPI upon the ground
that the issue of payment of backwages was neither raised in nor passed upon by the Industrial Court and
is, in fact, not even touched in the previous pleadings of the parties.

ISSUE
Whether or not there is labor dispute between RCPI and FCWF.

RULING
There is no labor dispute. The Court said that they are not dealing with the backwages to be paid
to workers who are being ordered to be reinstated as a consequence of a finding by the court that their
suspension or dismissal by RCPI is illegal. What is involved is a failure to comply or a veiled defiance by
RCPI of a return-to-work order of the Industrial Court issued seven years ago. The Industrial Court had no
discretion in the matter. There was no controversial issue of fault it had to decide. It was a plain case of
exacting the most natural sanction for a defiance of its order.
 KIOK LOY, doing business under the name and style SWEDEN ICE CREAM PLANT vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC) and PAMBANSANG KILUSAN NG
PAGGAWA (KILUSAN)
FACTS:
The Pambansang Kilusang Paggawa (Union for short), a legitimate late labor federation, won and
was subsequently certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of
Sweden Ice Cream Plant (Company for short).

After several request for collective bargaining negotiations, the Union filed a "Notice of Strike",
with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) on ground of unresolved economic issues in collective
bargaining.

The NLRC held the Company guilty of unjustified refusal to bargain.

Petitioner Company now maintains that its right to procedural due process has been violated
when it was precluded from presenting further evidence in support of its stand and when its request for
further postponement was denied. Petitioner further contends that the National Labor Relations
Commission's finding of unfair labor practice for refusal to bargain is not supported by law and the
evidence considering that it was only on May 24, 1979 when the Union furnished them with a copy of the
proposed Collective Bargaining Agreement and it was only then that they came to know of the Union's
demands; and finally, that the Collective Bargaining Agreement approved and adopted by the National
Labor Relations Commission is unreasonable and lacks legal basis.

ISSUE: W/N the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion

HELD:
NO. Collective bargaining which is defined as negotiations towards a collective agreement,6 is
one of the democratic frameworks under the New Labor Code, designed to stabilize the relation between
labor and management and to create a climate of sound and stable industrial peace. It is a mutual
responsibility of the employer and the Union and is characterized as a legal obligation. So much so that
Article 249, par. (g) of the Labor Code makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse "to meet
and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with
respect to wages, hours of work, and all other terms and conditions of employment including proposals
for adjusting any grievance or question arising under such an agreement and executing a contract
incorporating such agreement, if requested by either party.

While it is a mutual obligation of the parties to bargain, the employer, however, is not under any
legal duty to initiate contract negotiation.7 The mechanics of collective bargaining is set in motion only
when the following jurisdictional preconditions are present, namely, (1) possession of the status of
majority representation of the employees' representative in accordance with any of the means of selection
or designation provided for by the Labor Code; (2) proof of majority representation; and (3) a demand to
bargain under Article 251, par. (a) of the New Labor Code . ... all of which preconditions are undisputedly
present in the instant case.

From the over-all conduct of petitioner company in relation to the task of negotiation, there can be
no doubt that the Union has a valid cause to complain against its (Company's) attitude, the totality of
which is indicative of the latter's disregard of, and failure to live up to, what is enjoined by the Labor Code
to bargain in good faith.

We are in total conformity with respondent NLRC's pronouncement that petitioner Company is
GUILTY of unfair labor practice. It has been indubitably established that (1) respondent Union was a duly
certified bargaining agent; (2) it made a definite request to bargain, accompanied with a copy of the
proposed Collective Bargaining Agreement, to the Company not only once but twice which were left
unanswered and unacted upon; and (3) the Company made no counter proposal whatsoever all of which
conclusively indicate lack of a sincere desire to negotiate.

DAVAO INTEGRATED PORT AND STEVEDORING SERVICES CORPORATION vs ALFREDO C.

OLVIDA
FACTS:
 The controversy centers on the interpretation of two provisions of the five-year Collective
Bargaining Agreement Davao Integrated Port and Stevedoring Services Corporation and Association of
Trade Unions Namely:
1. ARTICLE VIII SICK, VACATION AND EMERGENCY LEAVES.
Sec. 4 Emergency Leaves. The Company agrees to grant a maximum
or six (6) days Emergency Leave with pay per calendar year to all
regular field workers, covered by this agreement who have rendered at
least six months of service (including overtime) per calendar year, are
members of the Regular Labor Pool, upon prior approval by the
company. Said Emergency Leave is not cumulative (sic) nor
commutable." (pp. 46-47, Rollo; Emphasis supplied.)
ARTICLE XVII SPECIAL PROVISIONS.
Sec. 4 Union Education and Training Fund. The Company agrees to
contribute twelve thousand (P12,000.00) pesos per year to the Union
Education and Training Fund. (p. 48, Rollo.)
The company insisted that the above provisions are to be interpreted as:
1. Under Article VIII, Section 4 (Emergency Leave) that before the intermittent field
workers who are members of the Regular Labor Pool can avail of the six (6) days
Emergency Leave, the workers must have rendered at least six months of service per
calendar year regardless of their employment status (i.e., regular or probationary).
2. Under Article XVII, Section 4 (Union Education and Training Fund) petitioner
required that the Union should first prepare and submit a seminar program before it can
avail of the Education and Training Fund of P12,000.00 per annum.
The Arbitrator decided in favor of the Union.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the company is correct on the ground that only regular employees who have
rendered at least six months can avail the emergency leave?
2. Whether or not the company is correct in requiring the union to submit a seminar program before
it can avail the education and training fund?

HELD:
1. Yes
2. No
The provision of the CBA is clear: (1) the employee must be a member of the Regular Labor Pool;
(2) he is entitled to only six (6) days emergency leave with pay per calendar year; and (3) he must have
rendered service for at least six (6) months during the year when he took his emergency leave. The
emergency leave may be staggered or it may last for any number of days as emergencies arise but the
employee is entitled only to six (6) days of emergency leave "with pay" per year. Since the emergency
leave is allowed to enable the employee to attend to an emergency in his family or household, it may be
taken at any time during the calendar year but he must render at least six months service for that year to
be entitled to collect his wages for the six (6) days of his emergency leave. Since emergencies are
unexpected and unscheduled happenings, it would be absurd to require the employee to render six (6)
months service before being entitled to take a six-day emergency leave with pay for it would mean that no
emergency leave can be taken by an employee during the first six months of a calendar year.

With regard to the provision on Union Education and Training Fund in Section 4, Article XVII of
the CBA, the petitioner's requirement that the Union submit a seminar program for each calendar year
before it may claim the company's P12,000 yearly donation to the fund, is not warranted by the terms of
the CBA.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED however the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator is
AFFIRMED in other respects.

Victoria vs Inciong
Facts:
Victoria was employed by private respondent Far East Broadcasting Company, Incorporated as a
radio transmitter operator. He and his co-workers organized the Far East Broadcasting Company
Employees Association. After registering their association with the then Department of Labor, they
demanded recognition of said association by the company but the latter refused on the ground that being
a non-profit, non-stock, non-commercial and religious corporation, it is not covered by Industrial Peace
Act, the labor law enforced at that time. Director of Labor Relations Edmundo Cabal advised the union
members that the company could not be forced to recognize them or to bargain collectively with them
because it is a non-profit, non-commercial and religious organization. Notwithstanding such advice, the
union members led by Saturno Victoria as its president, declared a strike and picketed the company's
premises on September 6, 1972 for the purpose of seeking recognition of the labor union. This prompted
the company to file for damages and preliminary injunction. Petitioner was subsequently dismissed from
the company and he alleged that he was illegally dismissed since prior clearance is needed from the
Secretary before the dismissal of employees or cessation of business.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner was illegally dismissed since there is no prior clearance that is needed.

Ruling:
No. Technically speaking, no clearance was obtained by private respondent from the then
Secretary of Labor, the last step towards full compliance with the requirements of law on the matter of
dismissal of employees. However, the rationale behind the clearance requirement was fully met. The
Secretary of Labor was apprised of private respondent's intention to terminate the services of petitioner.
This in effect is an application for clearance to dismiss petitioner from employment. The affirmance of the
restrictive condition in the dispositive portion of the labor arbiter's decision in NLRC Case Nos. 0021 and
0285 by the Secretary of Labor and the Office of the President of the Philippines, signifies a grant of
authority to dismiss petitioner in case the strike is declared illegal by the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan. Consequently and as correctly stated by the Solicitor General, private respondent acted in good
faith when it terminated the employment of petitioner upon a declaration of illegality of the strike by the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Moreover, the then Secretary of Labor manifested his conformity to the
dismissal, not once, but twice. In this regard, the mandatory rule on clearance need not be applied.

The strike staged by the union in 1972 was a futile move. The law then enforced, Republic Act
875 specifically excluded respondent company from its coverage. Even if the parties had gone to court to
compel recognition, no positive relief could have been obtained since the same was not sanctioned by
law. Because of this, there was no necessity on the part of private respondent to show specific acts of
petitioner during the strike to justify his dismissal.

This is a matter of responsibility and of answerability. Petitioner as a union leader, must see to it
that the policies and activities of the union in the conduct of labor relations are within the precepts of law
and any deviation from the legal boundaries shall be imputable to the leader. He bears the responsibility
of guiding the union along the path of law and to cause the union to demand what is not legally
demandable, would foment anarchy which is a prelude to chaos.

Petitioner should have known and it was his duty to impart this imputed knowledge to the
members of the union that employees and laborers in non- profit organizations are not covered by the
provisions of the Industrial Peace Act and the Court of Industrial Relations [in the case at bar, the Court of
First Instance] has no jurisdiction to entertain petitions of labor unions or organizations of said non-profit
organizations for certification as the exclusive bargaining representatives of said employees and laborers.