Husserl Stud (2009) 25:261266

DOI 10.1007/s10743-009-9058-6

Dan Zahavi. Subjectivity and Selfhood. Cambridge/

London: The MIT Press, 2005, 265 pp., $21.00/13.95
(Paper)

Michael Shim

Published online: 26 February 2009

Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

In the last decade or so, Dan Zahavi has established himself as the most innovative
and influential philosopher working within the Husserlian tradition. One important
reason for this renown is that, unlike many other Continental philosophers, Zahavi
writes in a no-nonsense, unpretentious style, offering arguments and examples that
makes his work readily accessible even to non-specialists. Especially when it comes
to an area as difficult as Husserlian phenomenology, such clarity and accessibility
can only be attained by those who really know what they are talking about and who
have not only consumed but also thoroughly digested the objects of their intellectual
concerns. Zahavis works have always been impressive and admirable in this
respect, and Subjectivity and Selfhood is no exception.
Zahavi is not only a first-rate Husserl scholar with a remarkable command of the
vast corpus of Husserls Nachlassof which he has offered equally remarkable
original interpretationsbut also a philosopher doing Husserlian phenomenology in
concert with analytic philosophy of mind, cognitive science, psychology and social
philosophy. As his own recommendation for this kind of approach, Zahavi writes at
the start of this book:
[T]he very attempt to engage in such a dialog with analytical philosophy of
mind, developmental psychology, or psychopathology might force phenom-
enology to become more problem oriented and thereby counteract what is
currently one of its greatest weaknesses: its preoccupation with exegesis (p. 6).
And the success with which Zahavi shows how Husserlian phenomenology can
become more problem oriented in the relevant sense is what is most laudable about
Subjectivity and Selfhood. While weaving seamlessly between approaches, disci-
plines and authors from different traditions previously regarded by many as
incompatible, Zahavi identifies contemporary problems that are phenomenologically

M. Shim (&)
Department of Philosophy, California State University, Los Angeles, USA
e-mail: mshim@calstatela.edu

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relevant, explains why they are relevant, and shows how canonical phenomenological
authorsabove all Husserlcan be engaged to help address these problems.
The main thesis of Subjectivity and Selfhood is this: If we wish to understand what
it means to be a self, we will have to examine the structure of experience and self-
awareness (p. 3), and the notion of self is crucial for a proper understanding of
consciousness, and consequently it is indispensable to a variety of disciplines (p. 1).
The book itself breaks down into seven chapters, which may be summarized as
follows.
In Chapter 1, Zahavi argues that higher-order theories of consciousnessthe
view that there is no self-consciousness without a second-order consciousnesslead
to an infinite regress. The contrary view, favored by Zahavi, is what he describes as
the theory of pre-reflective self-awareness, the idea that consciousness is always
self-consciousness independent of any intervention by reflection. Zahavis signature
exegetical claim is that Husserl himself was a champion of the pre-reflective theory
of self-consciousness, and in Chapter 2 Zahavi argues that Husserl held this view as
early as the period of Logical Investigations. This exegetical claim is further
pursued in Chapter 3, where Zahavi argues that Husserls theory of inner time-
consciousness can be best understood as a further development of his pre-reflective
theory of self-consciousness. In Chapter 4 Zahavi returns to the problem of higher-
order theories of consciousness by introducing the self-alienation theory of
reflection according to which the self that does the reflecting is never identical with
the self that is reflected upon. Thus, rather than furnishing a consciousness of the
self, reflection provides instead a distortion of that self.
In my view, the most important part of the book is Chapter 5, in which Zahavi
attempts to show how one is to make sense of pre-reflective self-consciousness.
According to Zahavi, ones first-person perspective is an invariant dimension
that persists over time, which both the reflective and reflected upon consciousness
cannot help but share in common. Chapter 6 is intended to show how a theory of
intersubjectivity is possible within the phenomenological framework Zahavi estab-
lishes. Finally, in Chapter 7 Zahavi considers, then dispatches, the so-called theory-
theory of mind, which holds that in order for one to be self-aware, one must be
equipped in advance with some, even if rudimentary, theory about how minds work. The
explanation of how anyone is supposed to acquire such a theory without a pre-theoretical
possession of mind is one that, according to Zahavi, the theory-theorist cannot provide.
At the heart of Subjectivity and Selfhood is Zahavis main argument, which looks
like this:
(Z1) If one is conscious, then one is also self-conscious. Self-consciousness, in
other words, is a necessary condition of consciousness.
(Z2) Anything can count as a self if and only if it is conscious. Z2 is not a
restatement of Z1, because to be conscious is to be conscious of itself is
different than to be conscious is to be a personal self.
Therefore:
(Z3) Anything can count as a self if and only if it is self-conscious. And Z3
may be restated more precisely as: there is a personal self, some one at all, if
and only if that self is pre-reflectively self-conscious.

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Much of the rest of the book consists in providing sub-arguments for Z1 and Z2.
Chapters 1 through 4 provide the sub-arguments for Z1, which in turn ramify into
two sets of sub-arguments, both directed against higher-order or reflective theories
of self-consciousness, and both negative. The first set of sub-arguments is that
higher-order or reflective theories of self-consciousness entail an infinite regress.
The second set of sub-arguments is that higher-order or reflective theories of self-
consciousness entail self-alienation. For this reason, such theories always fail to
capture their purported quarry: i.e., some consciousness in its subjectivity. Chapter 5
presents a set of sub-arguments, this time positive, for Z2. I think this set of sub-
arguments is most central for Zahavis project, and later Ill say why. But first, let
me go through the reductio arguments in Chapters 1 through 4.
Zahavi summarizes higher-order theories of self-consciousness in the following
way:
In order to appraise this proposal let us distinguish between two uses of the
term conscious, a transitive and an intransitive use. On the one hand, we can
speak of our being conscious of something, be it x, y, or z. On the other we can
speak of our being conscious simpliciter According to higher-order theories,
what makes a mental state (intransitively) conscious is the fact that it is taken
as an object by a relevant higher-order state (p. 17)
In short, in order for an act to count as an act of consciousness at all, there must be
another act that takes it as an object; and only thanks to this latter can the first act
be said to be conscious of something. Accordingly, on the higher-order theory,
(intransitive) consciousness is a result of a reflection (or higher-order monitor-
ing) (p. 24). But such a view, according to Zahavi, entails either an infinite regress or
the explanatory vacuity of positing a non-conscious mental state (p. 25). Zahavi
dispatches the latter disjunctthat what precludes the regress is that a higher-order
state need not be consciousas follows: It is
quite unclear how a state without subjective or phenomenal qualities can be
transformed into one with such qualities, that is, into an experience with first-
personal givenness or mineness, by the mere relational addition of a meta-state
having the first order state as its intentional object (p. 25).
If one accepts this, then higher-order theories wind up in an infinite regress, which
Zahavi characterizes as follows:
If all occurrent mental states are conscious in the sense of being taken as
objects by occurrent second-order mental states, then these second-order
mental states must also be taken as objects by occurent third-order mental
states, and so forth ad infinitum (p. 2425).
Since an infinite regress yields no adequate explanation, higher-order theories must
be rejected.
Zahavis second objection to the higher-order reflection theory of self-conscious-
ness stems from Paul Natorp. It rests upon the radical difference between subject and
object (p. 73). Briefly put, if the self is essentially a subject, and no object can count
as essentially subjective, then the self cannot be any object. In reflection, however,

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one turns ones self into an object for oneself and thus fails to capture the self in its
subjectivity. Put another way, at the moment of reflection it is the second-order self
that is the real, subjective self, while the first-order self has become a mere object and
so no longer a real self. It is in this sense that Zahavi talks about the self-alienation
of the reflection theory of self-consciousness (pp. 8996).
As Zahavi points out, Natorp mounted this argument in his criticism of Husserls
phenomenologya criticism that, according to Zahavi, Heidegger simply takes
over (pp. 7685). However, as Zahavi sees it, this criticism does not get traction
against Husserl at all, since despite some appearances, Husserl was not only aware
of the self-alienating import of reflection, but endorsed the pre-reflective theory of
self-consciousness precisely as an alternative to it. As was already mentioned, the
project of Chapters 2 and 3 is to substantiate this exegetical claim.
In Chapter 2, Zahavi tries to show that, despite appearances to the contrary, even
the Husserl of Logical Investigations endorses the pre-reflective theory of self-
consciousness. As textual evidence, Zahavi offers this passage from the Second
Investigation (p. 40):
Da der zugehorige Belauf an Empfindungen oder Phantasmen erlebt und in
diesem Sinne bewut ist, besagt nicht und kann nicht besagen, da er
Gegenstand eines Bewutseins in dem Sinne eines darauf gerichteten
Wahrnehmens, Vorstellens, Urteilens ist (Hua XIX, p. 165).
One may wonder whether this passage is sufficient to establish Zahavis somewhat
revisionary thesis, but we shall leave that aside for the moment.
The exegetical work of Chapter 3 is more substantial, although the interpretation
is largely inferred from what Husserl says about inner time-consciousness rather
than what he says about self-consciousness itself. Zahavis inferential interpretation
boils down to this: inner time-consciousness simply is the pre-reflective self-
awareness of the stream of consciousness (p. 65), but his argument that this is what
Husserl himself thought is difficult to follow. Indeed, some of the passages that
Zahavi cites are far from decisive in favor of his interpretation.
As far as I can make out, Zahavi starts the argument by pointing to Husserls claim
that, in order for me to experience a temporally extended objectsuch as a melodyI
must retain the preceding note and protend the subsequent note (pp. 57, 58, 68).
Otherwise, I couldnt join the notes together to synthesize the sort of unified sound we
call experience of a melody. At this point Zahavi engages in a bit of exegetical
intervention to argue that the retention of a preceding note just is the retention of an
earlier consciousness. This consciousness of an earlier consciousness appears to be
what Zahavi wants to call self-consciousness. Thus, since retention is necessary for
the experience of a melody (or any temporally extended object), some sort of self-
consciousness is necessary for the experience of temporally extended objects. But I
can experience a melody without any additional, deliberate act of reflection.
Therefore, if I can experience any temporally extended objects, then necessarily there
must be some kind of pre-reflective self-consciousness involved.
I am not entirely sure that this is what Zahavi has in mind, since I found the
whole train of argument rather difficult to follow. But if it is, then the argument
would require some additional premise to the effect that the retention by a current

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consciousness of an earlier consciousness can count as a self-consciousness since

both tokens of consciousness share something that makes them numerically
identical. In Chapter 5 Zahavi appears to offer something like that additional
premise, which (if I have understood him rightly) would make Chapter 5 central to
the enterprise of his entire book.
Before discussing Chapter 5, let us remind ourselves why it is important for
Zahavi that Husserl should advocate some pre-reflective theory of self-conscious-
ness. The reason is that the alternative, the reflective theory of self-consciousness,
winds up in an infinite regress. In order for Zahavi to claim that the retention by a
later consciousness of an earlier consciousness can count as an instance of self-
consciousness, he must show that the two tokens of consciousness that stand in a
retentional relation have something in common, such that the retention of one
consciousness by the other can count as a retention of itself, and thus as self-
consciousness. In Chapter 5, Zahavi asserts that what these two tokens of
consciousness have in common with one another is an invariant dimension of first-
personal experiencing (p. 132). And it is this invariant dimension that allows the
retention of an earlier consciousness by a later consciousness to count as an instance
of self-consciousness. Furthermore, since Zahavi offers no other argument for his
claim that inner time-consciousness simply is pre-reflective self-awareness (p.
65), the very thesis that Husserl holds a theory of pre-reflective self-awareness turns
out to depend on the defense of Z2 in Chapter 5.
Let us look at how Zahavi himself spells out Z2: the self is closely linked to
the first-person perspective, and is, in fact, identified with the very first-personal
givenness of experiential phenomena (p. 106). The first-person perspective, we
might say, is exclusive. Put another way, access to that perspective is privileged: it
is characterized by an ineluctable mineness (pp. 124132). That is why our
experiential life is inherently individuated (p. 128).
Although I think that this is in fact Husserls view, by itself it cannot suffice to
establish the claim that inner time-consciousness simply is pre-reflective self-
awareness, which is required for Z1, and consequently for Z3, namely, that to be a
self is to be pre-reflectively self-aware. What is required is some argument for the
following additional claim:
Whereas we live through a number of different experiences, the dimension of
first-personal experiencing remains the same. In short, although the self, as an
experiential dimension, does not exist in separation from the experiences, and
is identified by the very first-personal givenness of the experiences, it may still
be described as the invariant dimension of first-personal givenness throughout
the multitude of changing experiences (p. 132).
But as far as I can make out, Zahavi does not offer a sufficient argument for the
claim that the first person perspectivedespite a number of different experi-
encesremains numerically identical over time. What Zahavi offers instead is the
view that the denial of the numerical identity of the self amounts to a denial of the
self tout court, an endorsement of the so called non-egological theory (pp. 99
103; 124128).

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But denial of the numerical identity of the self need not entail endorsement of the
non-egological theory. One can embrace the view that the self is the very
first-personal givenness of experiential phenomena (p. 106) while denying that the
first-personal givenness of experiential phenomena remains numerically identical
over time. One might argue that there is no clearly discernible difference between
the first-personal givenness of experiential phenomena and the experiential
phenomena themselves, especially since experiential phenomena qua experiences
are never anonymous. If it is thus correct to say that the self is indistinguishable
from its experiences, and if, as everyone agrees, its experiences are constantly
changing, then the self must also be constantly changing. So there is no numerically
identical self. But if there is no numerically identical self, then the claim that inner
time-consciousness simply is pre-reflective self-awareness has not been estab-
lished, since nothing guarantees that there is anything identical between the retained
consciousness and the retentive consciousness. And if Z1 is undercut in this way, Z3
does not follow either.
Whether Zahavis argument goes through or not, Subjectivity and Selfhood is a
virtuoso performance and a model of what might be described as contemporary
Husserlian phenomenology. It is not just a work of Husserl scholarship, nor a work
of contemporary phenomenology in some vaguely Husserlian vein. Instead, what is
most impressive about Zahavis accomplishment is that it achieves a balance
between addressing contemporary issues in philosophy of mind and cognitive
science from a phenomenological perspective and providing an uncompromising
defense of what he claims are core Husserlian views. That Zahavi carries out this
balancing act with such clarity and elegance, yet without sacrificing precision, is
what makes this book, like its predecessors, exemplary.

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