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John Buchanan1
Ned Kock2
1
Department of Management Systems, University of Waikato, Private Bag 3105, Hamilton,
New Zealand, email: jtb@waikato.ac.nz;
2
Department of Computer and Information Sciences, Temple University, 1805 N. Broad St.,
Wachman Hall (038-24), Philadelphia, PA 19122, USA, email: kock@cis.temple.edu;
1. Introduction
Much of the literature in decision making, as reflected in many textbooks, begins
with the ideal position that enough information is available for the decision to be
made and consequently focuses on the choice process. Or if there is not enough
information, it is assumed that it can be gathered. The emphasis in this literature,
then, is one of generating the necessary information (starting from the position of
a lack of information), rather than continually having to prune the information
database and/or identify mis-information (Ackoff 1967). Traditionally, uncertainty
has been conceived as the gap between the information available (for the task of
making the decision) and the information required (to make the decision), as
discussed by Allen and Griffeth (1997). Now the pendulum has swung in the
other direction. There is often far more information available than is required.
The minimalist approach is especially true in the so-called technical models
of Operations Research and Decision Making where, if anything, there is not
enough information resulting in uncertainty and probabilistic modeling.
However, the minimalist approach is opposite to some of the early work in
decision making; for example, Simon (1957) where, using a descriptive approach,
a theory of bounded rationality and satisficing for human decision making was
developed. Simons satisficing heuristic, where a decision maker stops searching
for once a satisfactory solution has been found, is one approach for dealing with
too much information and recognizes the often pragmatic constraints of time and
resources available. Further, as Miller (1956) has also noted, the satisficing
approach recognizes the cognitive limitations of human decision makers. Few
formal, prescriptive models of decision making take explicit account of cognitive
factors, although a number recognize the imprecision and fuzziness of criterion
values. A notable exception in the multiple criteria decision making literature is
the ZAPROS method of Larichev and Moshkovich (1995) which recognizes the
cognitive limitations of the human decision maker and structures the solution
process so that only modest cognitive demands are made. Even so, most of the
decision making literature presumes that less, rather than more information is
available. This, then, motivates our study of decision making in the situation
where there is information overload.
Given the growth in information technology and the Internet, it is not surprising
that information overload is increasingly addressed in the popular press (Gillespie
1997; Light 1997; Rosner 1998). The research by David Lewis, as reported by
Nellis (1997) confirms what is generally known in the wider business community;
that is, Information Fatigue Syndrome is here. Schrage (1999) considers the
impact of data mining. He suggests that data mining is more likely to provide
good questions rather than answers and concludes that, creating new information
about information guarantees a growing demand for new information. Etzioni
(1989) points out that in the past a rational decision maker was one who would
consider all information now this is simply not possible. So while there is little
doubt as to the existence of this phenomenon of information overload, our
research in this paper relates to its perceived existence and effect on decision
making, while considering both task and individual effects.
Considerable research has been undertaken regarding the effects of information
load on decision quality; both for individuals and groups, principally under
laboratory conditions. The typical approach is to consider independent variables
such as information load (quantity and type), time pressure and decision maker
experience, and examine their effect on decision quality. A distinction is often
made between the quality of information (its inherent usefulness by the decision
maker) and the quantity of information. Other issues considered in this
experimental research include problem structure (structured or unstructured
problems), the nature of the solution (selecting alternatives or actually solving a
problem) and the decision maker (group or individual).
Early work by Jacoby et al. (1974) in marketing suggested an inverted U-
shaped relationship between information load and decision quality; as information
load increases, decision quality first increases then subsequently decreases.
Malhotra (1984), and others have challenged these findings. More recently, Hahn
et al. (1992) showed that in the absence of time pressure, increasing information
load resulted in increasing decision quality. However, under conditions of time
pressure, decision quality first increased with information load and then decreased
providing additional support for the U-curve hypothesis, but only under
conditions of time pressure.
In another laboratory experiment Iselin (1989) examined unstructured decision
making. Independent variables were information diversity, decision experience
and task learning, with each categorized in two levels. The dependent variable of
decision performance was operationalized by using two variables; profit and
decision time. It was found that profit was not affected by information diversity
although, not surprisingly, decision time was. Decision experience and task
learning affected both profit and time as expected. In the light of more recent
work it is likely that profit, a key measure of decision performance, would also
have been affected if decision makers had been time constrained as the
information diversity increased. This result was noted much earlier by Wright
(1974). These findings suggest that if decision time is unlimited, then there is no
effect of information overload. Meyer et al. (1997) provide further contradictory
results with a laboratory study in a group setting where they found that
information load did affect decision quality but time pressure did not affect the
quality of decisions. In their experiments Allen and Griffeth (1997) demonstrate a
gender difference in respect of experiencing information overload.
Little research has attempted to link decision maker experience and background
to information overload. Moreover, even though early findings suggest that
information overload is likely to have an impact on worker productivity, the vast
majority of research on this topic has been with controlled laboratory experiments
where subjects were not actually dealing with real decision problems. One
exception is O'Reilly (1980), who conducted a questionnaire-based study of
information overload in the workplace. He found that subjects who report to be
underloaded perform better than those who are overloaded with information.
However, those who are (relatively) underloaded, are less satisfied.
From a multiple criteria decision making perspective, research on information
overload tends to consider information load in terms of criteria rather than
alternatives. That is, it is less about extending the choices and more focused on
extra information about those choices, such as more criteria. This is interesting
when compared with the earlier finding of Dawes and Corrigan (1974) that
decision makers only appear to need a few cues (i.e., criteria) in order to make
consistently good judgements. As findings regarding information overload became
increasingly available, some methods for dealing with it have also been proposed.
For example, Moutinho (1993) suggests that information overload can be
successfully managed by organizing complex problems into meaningful
structures; in this case, by structuring problems using the Analytic Hierarchy
Process (AHP) methodology. It is generally accepted that some formal problem
structuring does facilitate quality decision making (Henig and Buchanan 1996)
and mitigates against the use of informal decision heuristics such as satisficing.
However the issue here is more likely to be the value of problem structuring
generally, rather than any method in particular. Furthermore, most proposed
decision making methods do address individual or task effects, such as the
cognitive style of the decision maker or the specific problem context. The
tendency has been toward a one size fits all approach.
This research endeavours to contribute towards such understanding by
attempting to answer the following question: Are individual factors comparatively
more or less important than task factors in influencing perceived information
overload?
3. Results
The data analysis has been summarized into a set of descriptive statistics for each
of the construct measurement items. We first report on the extent to which our
respondents experience information overload, as shown in Table 1.
30%
25%
19.7%
20%
15%
9.9%
10%
5%
0%
Mild Moderate Intense Very intense
A number of observations can be made from the data. Data subsets will be
referred to from Table 2 using the format (row numbers, column numbers).
Firstly, (11-13,11-13) confirm the strong correlation among the different construct
measurements for information overload. Similarly, (4-7, 4-7) are all correlated
suggesting, for example, that respondents who read and write more pages are also
involved in more information interactions.
Individual factors were assessed by the constructs of knowledge base and
decision style, with only the latter having any significant correlation. Decision
style comprised two construct measures; decisional scope and decision rationality.
An analysis of (11-13, 2-3) suggests a marked difference between these two
construct measures in terms of correlation with information overload. Decisional
scope is significantly correlated with perceived overload; that is; respondents who
tend to focus more on the big picture appear more likely to perceive and
experience information overload. Or conversely, those who are more detailed are
less likely to experience overload. Perhaps more surprising is that decision
rationality is not correlated with perceived information overload. This would
suggest that neither more rational nor more intuitive people perceive or experience
information overload differently. Finally, it should be noted that decisional scope
and decision rationality have no significant correlation.
Task (or context) factors were evaluated over a number of different measures.
From Table 2, (12-13, 6-7) exhibit significant positive correlation suggesting that
the number of information interactions both giving and receiving are
important factors in respect of the information overload effect on productivity and
quality. This, however, is only a secondary effect. The data do not suggest any
direct and significant correlation between task factors and perceived information
overload.
Controlling for gender showed no evidence for any difference in perceived
information load.
4. Discussion
Recall the research question: Are individual factors comparatively more or less
important than task factors in influencing perceived information overload?
The answer to this research question appears from the data to be relatively
straightforward. Perceived information overload is correlated with both individual
and task factors. In the qualitative questions on the reasons for information load,
all but 2% of the responses could be classified as either task or individual factors.
From the quantitative analysis, the individual factor of decisional scope (focus
on details or the big picture) was significantly correlated with perceived
information overload. Respondents who tend to take a more detailed approach
appear less disposed to being overloaded. The number of information interactions
(both giving and receiving) a task factor was significantly correlated with
information overload impact on productivity and quality, but not directly with
perceived information overload.
The qualitative analysis separated the major individual factors into the two
categories of (lack of) organizing skill a skill issue, and decision or management
style a style issue. These two categories are likely to be related as, for example,
a decision maker with a holistic or intuitive style could be more disposed toward
lacking in organisation skills. Or, alternatively, it may be that big picture or
holistic people make good managers and good managers have many tasks to do
and therefore they experience information overload it is simply part of their job.
Some self selection may be occuring. In respect of task factors, two
interdependent factors of information volume and time pressure were identified.
One could expect that the combined (multiplicative) effect of these factors would
contribute significantly to perceived information overload.
What are some implications of these preliminary results for MCDM? How can
our understanding of decision making models and process contribute to lessening
the impact of information overload? One useful direction is suggested from the
study of experts (Klein 1989). Within their domain of expertise, experts do a good
job of filtering out extraneous information and focusing on critical cues. The
advocacy of Phillips (1984) for decision making as a requisite process, where one
aims for the minimum specification of a model for decision making, is no less
relevant in information overload situations. With respect to the individual factors
identified in this study, a lack of organizing skill can possibly be ameliorated with
improved problem structuring as some MCDM approaches already do.
However, more consideration of the cognitive style of a decision maker is needed
as solution methods and approaches better accommodate a decision makers
cognitive style. Task or context factors are likely to prove more problematic,
especially as technological advances continue to enable greater volumes of
information to be accessed. These are areas for further research.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the MBA students at Temple University and the
University of Waikato who participated in this study. This study was funded in
part by grants from Day & Zimmermann, Inc. and Temple University. Larry
Jenkins provided helpful comments on an earlier version.
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