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Measuring Muslim Integration in Europe
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Measuring Muslim Integration in Europe

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DOI: 10.1080/17419160903212570
Measuring Muslim Integration

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Measuring
P. Irving Jackson
Muslim Integration in Europe
Pamela Irving Jackson

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Justice Studies Program, Department of Sociology, Rhode Island College, Providence, RI

The European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (established by the Council
of Europe in 1997) has warned that anti-terrorism security measures risk disrupting
the task of integrating Muslim communities in EU member states.1 Without reliable
statistics, the effects of these measures are difficult to assess. Fears of Muslim radical-
ization and cultural conflict can then be exploited to justify just such measures.
Despite these acknowledged concerns research on the situation of Muslims in western
democracies relies on mostly proxy data, referring to nationality and ethnicity.2 The
European Commission has initiated an effort toward the systematic production of
harmonized Community statistics, with a long-term view to improving knowledge of
the socioeconomic integration of immigrants and there are moves towards an EU-wide
benchmarking system.3 An examination of data on the situation of Muslims in the
Netherlands, Germany, France, and Britain provided in this paper finds that these
data are neither comparable between nations, nor sufficient to benchmarking Muslim
integration according to criteria being drawn up at the national and European levels.
The data neglect important questions relating to the place of Muslims in European
societies, including incendiary problems, such as the tension between Muslim youth
and the police, and overlapping inequalities that lead to violent crime. Reference to
entrenched national norms surrounding the role of the state in society provides a ratio-
nale for those opposed to change to undermine the effectiveness of the EUs Commu-
nity Statistics initiative in tracking and improving the integration of Muslim minority
groups.
Keywords: Anti-Terrorism Security Measures, Islamophobia, Muslim Integration,
Muslim Radicalization, Religion and Citizenship, Victimization, Xenophobia
The concern that anti-terrorism measures risk disrupting the integration of

Muslim communities was raised in the 2006 report, Muslims in the European
Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia, prepared by the European Monitor-
ing Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC).4 Without reliable statistics
the effects of these measures cannot be determined, fears of Muslim radical-
ization can be exploited, and tools to improve the socioeconomic situation of
Muslims will be ineffective. According to the Open Society Institute,5
Address correspondence to Pamela Irving Jackson, Justice Studies Program, Department

of Sociology, Rhode Island College, Providence, RI 02908. E-mail: PJackson@Ric.edu
224 P. Irving Jackson
unfounded assumptions about Muslims in European states slant scholarship.

The influence of such bias in Germany is described in the report, Muslims in
the EU: Cities Report, prepared by the Institutes EU Monitoring and Advo-
cacy Program:
Religious attitudes and extremist behavior are not only linked in the public
opinion in Germany, but also in some scientific literature . . . for certain authors,
questions of Muslims individual identity are always linked to these issues.
One example is the survey of Wilhelm Heitmeyer et al. published in 1998,
Verlockender Fundamentalismus (Seductive Fundamentalism). Heitmeyer and
others questioned 1,221 Muslims (aged between 1521 years old) about their atti-
tudes in relation to religion, nationalism, and extremism. Even though the

research shows that the majority of religious Muslim young people are far from
the politicalfundamentalist sphere, the survey still concentrates on this minor-
ity, and views religious attitude as the first step toward taking on fundamental-
ist ideas and being politically exploited.6
European agencies have mounted significant data gathering efforts to

counteract the bias that fuels hostility and conflict. The European Monitoring
Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) was itself established in 1997,
during the European Year Against Racism. EUMC was designated as an
independent body of the European Union by Council Regulation (EC) No 1035/97
of 2 June 1997. . . .7 The EUMC established the European Information
Network on Racism and Xenophobia (RAXEN) to stimulate the collection of
data and information at the national level through National Focal Points.8
In 2007 EUMC and its subsidiaries were subsumed into the European Union
Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) a body of the European Union . . .
established through Council Regulation (EC) No 168/2007) . . . based
in Vienna.9
In their encouragement of the development of data necessary to assess
progress in reducing racism and xenophobia and assuring fundamental rights,
the data gathering agencies reporting to FRA face an uphill battle in some
states because of the dominance of entrenched national norms supporting
secularity. But common apologias for the patchy collection of data at the
national level, namely that an extension and harmonization of data collection
would require a change of established national norms and perhaps even
infringe libertarian principles, may simply reflect resistance to change in the
very structures that serve to segment Muslims from the mainstream.
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and Council (On the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data or
the Free Movement of Such Data), for example, permits the use of data on
ethnicity and religion where the subject is not identifiable.10 In light of this
directive and despite the legislative and constitutional barriers cited by
national policy-makers as preventing data collection on ethnicity and religion,
Measuring Muslim Integration in Europe 225
EUMC concludes that there is scope for anonymous data collection for statis-
tical purposes in member states that could provide a wealth of information,
which does not identify the individual and is collected under strict codes of
conduct, about the social situation of Muslim communities with respect to, for
example, employment, housing, and education.11 Currently research on the
situation of Muslims in western democracies relies on mostly proxy data,
referring to nationality and ethnicity.12
The practice of avoiding data collection relating to religious orientation
because of privacy concerns contradicts developments in other policy areas.
Immigration and security policymaking in the EU member states has been
criticized for breaking with entrenched national norms as well as for the
diminishing respect shown for the civil liberties and human rights of immi-
grants and citizens alike.13 Some authors argue that it is the responsibility of
the European Union to provide guidance on data matters in areas necessary
to further initiatives undertaken by European institutions. These include
preventing and combating racism and xenophobia, a sphere in which article
29 of the Treaty establishing the European Community gives police and judi-
cial authorities heightened powers to cooperate. . . .14 Other supra-European
agencies have similarly been criticized for their lack of data collection initia-
tives necessary to accomplish community specified goals. Milcher and Ivanov
for example, argue that the United Nations Development Program Vulnera-
bility Project has not sufficiently led in stimulating the collection of data on
Roma and other ethnic groups.15
Lack of data on Muslim integration may be a greater problem in European
states that provide a social welfare cushion for their residents than in the
US, where the state plays little role in the social integration of its residents.16
But continuing voter support for political parties with an anti-foreigner
stance and persistent questions about the legitimacy of Islam in the European
religious landscape17 make elected officials in European states wary of initia-
tives to measure and track Muslim integration. Abuse of personal data by the
fascist regimes of World War II provides a historical context for these con-
cerns.18 While unofficial studies by private researchers, non-profit organiza-
tions, and thinktanks are increasingly undertaken (for example by the Pew
Global Attitudes Initiative, and the Eurobarometer),19 their results may be
ignored (as the Open Society Institutes analysis suggests) or dismissed as inac-
curate by those who do not support the goals of the organization and do not
want to devote resources to Muslim integration. Unofficial studies also fail to
provide the detailed, focused comparative European data sought by the Euro-
pean Parliaments benchmarking effort.20
The policy areas of immigration, immigrant integration, and internal
security are notoriously difficult to manage through state intervention as well
as being highly politicized. For governments, a broadening of data collection
may well be useful to improve the quality of policy; however, it would be
accompanied by an unwelcome increase in accountability resulting from a

diffusion of data in the public domain. The drawbacks for governments are
compounded by the prospect of closer European cooperation in data gathering.
The looming possibility of harmonized European data collection forms raises
the prospect of international accountability, with the actions of governments
being more closely scrutinized by their counterparts in other member states.
The efforts of governments to export their specific national paradigms of
Muslim integration to the EU-level may also be undermined by the easy avail-
ability of data suggesting that these paradigms are failing. Once collected,
information on Muslim integration would be hard for policymakers to ignore.
Despite the difficult political terrain in this area of data collection, the
European Commission has nevertheless initiated an effort toward the
systematic production of harmonized Community statistics on international
immigration and protection, admittedly confined for now to data proxy to the
question of Muslim integration, but with an apparent strategic view to
improving knowledge of the socioeconomic integration of immigrants in the
long term.21 Moves are also afoot towards a possible EU-wide benchmarking
effort on immigrant integration.22
In light of the growing pressure for a change in the way that data are
drawn and used as well as the broader political context in which national
governments operate, this paper examines data available on the situation of
Muslims in the Netherlands, Germany, France, Britain, and, as a non-EU
point of comparison, the United States. The four European states considered
merit particular attention for several reasons. First, they display an instruc-
tive range of alternative relationships between religion and the state as well
as strategies for coordinating the ethnic and state identities.23 Secondly, they
are likely to continue to dominate the EU-level debate on such issues, thus
leaving a particular mark on any Europe-wide standards. With their organi-
zation of the Groningen (2004) and Potsdam (2007) ministerial meetings, the
Netherlands and Germany have so far been the only member states to really
exploit official EU channels to advance the debate most closely related to that
concerning Muslimsthe integration of immigrants. France and the UK,
meanwhile, have been particularly active at raising questions of Muslim
integration within the framework of the G6 meetings as part of an effort to
influence the EU agenda.24
The involvement of these states in European discussion of Muslim
integration is also, no doubt, a result of the size of their Muslim populations.
Of the 25 EU states examined in 2006 by the European Monitoring Center on
Racism and Xenophobia in Muslims in the European Union, the six states
estimated to have the numerically largest Muslim population are (in
descending order)France, Germany, the UK, Spain, the Netherlands, and
Italy.25 As a percentage of the total population, Muslims in both Spain and
Italy are estimated to be only 12%; while Muslims in France are estimated
as 78% of the population, those in Germany as 34%, the Netherlands 56%,

and the UK 34%.26
This paper considers the adequacy of the current statistical practices of
these states in terms of their suitability for meeting the goals of Muslim inte-
gration which they have set themselves. The analysis does not critically dis-
sect these goals, but acknowledges that such goals are deeply suspect from an
academic perspective.27 Political debate has tended to reify integration and
Muslims, presenting them as clearly identifiable and existent entities to be
shaped and melded by policy. In reality, official efforts to examine Muslims
may not so much measure an existent entity as define and create one. The
term integration is even more problematicreferring uncritically to social

integration may give rise to the notion, politically convenient but practically
false, that an integrated society already exists for others to be integrated into
and that this is in some way threatened by Muslim outsiders.28
The use of the terms integration and Muslim in this paper rests on the
recognition that there is a growing political consensus about what integration
programs entail as well as about those who are supposed to come within their
ambit. The question examined here is whether the current statistical practice
of states is conducive to the realization of their own policy goals, not whether
the assumptions underpinning these goals are flawed.
The recent report commissioned by the European Parliaments Committee
on Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs on immigrant integration provides
a benchmark definition of integration as a societys ability to integrate all its
members into new arrangements of active citizenship that ensure the long-
term well-being of all in a diverse society.29 The report bases this definition
on the increasing commonalities identified in previously disparate national
approaches towards immigrant integration, in turn defining eight key aspects
of integrationemployment, housing, health care, nutrition, education, infor-
mation, culture, and finally integration of basic public functions (which
include equality, anti-discrimination, and self-organization).
As for the definition of Muslims on which the paper is based, some
European states are officially religion blind towards their own citizens
and can only officially target integration measures at minority groups
defined by proxy characteristics like nationality or socioeconomic position.
This does not mean that they desist from tailoring integration measures to
religious minorities in practice, and although policies are said to apply to
national groupings, it is in fact individuals displaying certain religio-
cultural behavior who are targeted.30 For this reason though, the definition
of Muslims used in this paper cannot be reflexive to an explicit consensus
among the four governments as to the individuals they are targeting, nor
can the paper take its cue from an identification of those individuals who
effectively fall within the ambit of Muslim integration policies; some non-
Muslims who display the racial or cultural traits of Muslims might be
subject to Islamophobic discrimination in the absence of Muslim integration

measures. Although these individuals benefit from integration policy, they
cannot be considered Muslim.
The recent report by EUMC provides guidance to states in developing the
definitional distinctions concerning Muslims necessary to measure their
integration through national policies.31 While current measurement strategies32
assume that selected ethnic proxy groups are Muslim, the multifaceted nature
of Muslims in Europe suggests that only self-identification of religious orien-
tation can capture this aspect of identity accurately. As EUMC recognizes,
European Muslims are a highly diverse mix of ethnicities, religious affilia-
tion, philosophical beliefs, political persuasion, secular tendencies, languages,

and cultural traditions, constituting the second largest religious group of
Europes multi-faith society. . . .33 Like other religious groups (such as Catholics
or Protestants choosing to pay the church tax (Kirchensteuer) in Germany)34
Muslims might self-identify if they had reason to believe it would result in pol-
icy gains (for example, social or educational services to their faith community)
or political clout.35
Taking account of the European Parliaments Benchmarking Report36 and
the related official EU and national documents that preceded it, this paper
thus assumes the integration of Muslims to refer to moves towards a state
in which individuals self-identifying as Muslims are not prevented from fully
accessing social, economic, and even political structures due to their religious
and cultural practices, even while these individuals are seen as actively
adhering to the codes of behavior laid down by the state.
THE PERCEIVED NEED FOR DATA COLLECTION ON MUSLIM

MINORITIES
The Limited Extent of Data Collection on Muslims

Among western European nations, only the UKs census gathers statisti-
cal data on populations categorized by religious orientation. Members of
largely Muslim ethnic groups in other western European states are not auto-
matically considered to be part of a minority, nor can their progress toward
benchmarks of socio-economic equality be tracked.
Until the new German citizenship law came into effect in 2001, easing the
citizenship process for those who were not of German origin, it was relatively
easy to discern the population characteristics of these ethnic groups since
many were categorized as foreign nationals even if they were born in Germany.
Exploiting these limited clues, studies of Muslim integration in Germany
often made assumptions about religious affiliation on the basis of data on
Turkish nationals living in Germany. More often than not, though, the specific
question of Muslim integration has been neglected. An OECD study on The
Labour Market Integration of Immigrants in Germany does not mention the

problem of Muslim integration, though it does focus a great deal of attention
on the poor labor market performance of Turks.37 In France, similarly,
North Africans (Maghrebians) are considered to be largely Muslim in religious
orientation, and foreign nationals from this region living in France are evalu-
ated to determine the population characteristics of Muslims. In the Nether-
lands, those of migrant descent (allochtonen, 18.4% of the Dutch population)
are sometimes the basis of summary statistics about Muslims.38 This practice
is unnecessarily inaccurate, because national statistics in the Netherlands
separate out from the allochtonen those of non-Western background (who are
9.4% of the Dutch population, and are of Turkish, African, South American, or
Asianbut not Indonesian or Japanesebackground), under the designation
ethnic minorities.39 Of the allochtonen, it is the ethnic minorities who are most
likely to be Muslim; the use of these individuals (rather than the broader cate-
gory of allochtonen) as the basis of proxy statistics on Muslims would promise
greater accuracy.
In the UK, the 2001 Census for the first time asked a voluntary question
on religious orientation, complementing the data it gathers on ethnicity,
including racial distinctions within ethnic groups. Researchers have, however,
approached the UK data on religion carefully, primarily because questions
posed on religious background differed across the UK, but also because of
problems with the data collection and its lack of comparability with questions
from the previous census rounds.40 Despite these initial problems, the ques-
tions on religion initiated a national effort to understand and track the social,
economic, and educational progress of Muslims in general, separately from
their membership in racial and ethnic groups likely to be Muslim. This
suggests official recognition of both the importance of Muslim identity as an
aspect of minority status and the need for new data permitting the differenti-
ation of ethnicity from religious orientation in the examination of inequality.
Inconsistency of data collection on religion within and among the four
states hampers efforts to compare the situation of their Muslim popula-
tions. In their preparation of reports on the Benchmarking effort and on
Muslims in the European Union, investigators examined data gathered
(respectively) by the National Action Plans (NAPs) in their delineation of
target groups for Social Protection and Social Inclusion (SPSI), and by the
National Focal Points (NFPs) in their regular reports (RAXEN) on individ-
ual states.41 The 2006 NAPs defined the following arrangements of target
groups for SPSI efforts: ethnic minorities in the UK; immigrants in
France and Germany; and ethnic minorities and immigrants in the Neth-
erlands.42 While the RAXEN reports prepared by NFPs make reference to
problems of religious violence, Islamophobia, and anti-Semitism, their data
on these topics is based on criminal justice sources and NGOs without
specific measurement of the religious orientation of victims or offenders.
Discussion of group membership in NFP reports refers to national back-

ground and assumed religious affiliation.43
The Pressure for Statistics on Muslim Integration

The academic response to integration as a political goal has typically
been skeptical, and has focused on critically deconstructing the assumptions
underpinning it. However, those scholars who acknowledge integration as a
political goal, without necessarily being in accord with all its premises, have
often noted that changes in the drawing and use of statistical data are neces-
sary if governments are to realize this aim. They have also pointed out the
link between statistical representations of a groups size and the groups

access to power.
Among scholars, various country-specialists have been critical of specific
arrangements in our four case-study states. Azouz Begag comments, [t]he idea
of drawing statistical distinctions on the basis of origins always makes people
feel ill at ease in France. . . . Yet the fact remains that, if we are serious about
equal opportunities . . . we need the right kind of toolbox. When the elevator of
social mobility has broken down, we need, not a lucky charm, or a republican
incantation, but tools that will get it working again.44 In a section titled
Islam Outweighs Citizenship, Begag discusses the importance of [q]uantita-
tive demographic arguments . . . [as] strategies for occupying public space.45
Such strategies are open to abuse in the absence of proper statistical evidence.
While the political slogan Five or six million Muslims in France count!. . . .
misleadingly amalgamates numerous individuals under the label Muslim
when there are, in reality, many differences among them, Begag notes that
such slogans are crucial in attracting the attention of political parties.46
Turning attention to Germany, meanwhile, Thomas Liebig laments that
[w]hereas the traditional immigration countries (Australia, Canada, New
Zealand, and the United States) talk about the foreign-born populationi.e.
people who actually migratedwhen referring to migrants, Germany and most
European countries are implicitly referring to the foreign nationals when speak-
ing about migrants and their labor market performance.47 Liebig notes:
[. . .] until the late 1980s, there was a large overlap between the foreign-born
and the population with a foreign nationality . . . most offspring of immigrants did
not have German citizenship . . . citizenship take-up of foreign nationals was very
low. Annual naturalizations of Turkish nationals, for example, surpassed the
figure of 2000 for the first time only in 1990, despite a stock of almost 2 million
Turks, many of whom had been in the country for more than twenty years. [. . .]
since the reforms of the citizenship law in 1991 and 2000, a significant number of
the non-nationals who were foreign-born have obtained German nationality . . .
naturalization appears to be selective: individuals who acquire German nationality
tend to be higher educated, to speak better German and to earn more . . . 48
As a result, he concludes foreigner integration statistics in Germany may

appear to worsen even in the face of improved integration circumstances for
the migrant population overall. The situation of those of migrant descent in
France is similarly hard to gauge through examination of the characteristics
of foreigners, as most children of immigrants born in France of migrant
descent take French citizenship. The proxy basis, foreigners, may not provide
for accurate operationalization of indicators of their situation.49
Scholars working in specific thematic areas have also highlighted the prob-
lems arising from a lack of data and information. Criminal justice researchers,
for example, have responded to questions related to the marginality of Muslims
in European societies. Beckford, Joly, and Khosrokhavar argue that:
in view of the continuing growth of the population of Muslims resident in

Western Europe and the Nordic countries . . . public officials, politicians and
religious leaders need to address a range of new issues . . . concern[ing] the
responsiveness of prison regulations, regimes and staff to the challenges that the
increasing number of Muslim inmates presents to them. Attitudes and practices
that are rooted in an era when very few inmates came from religious back-
grounds other than Christian are now under pressure to adapt to changed
circumstances.50
Beckford, Joly, and Khosrokhavar compare the situation in the UK, where
the National Census and the Prison Service of England and Wales gather sta-
tistics on ethnicity and religion, to that in France, where such official categoriza-
tion is prohibited.51 Unofficial identity attribution occurs in France, nonetheless,
largely by prison officers, many of whom have little understanding of Islam
and associate it with the young men from the Banlieues.52 The team of
researchers led by Beckford found that in French prisons, the lack of institu-
tional structures means that Islam does not constitute a standardized frame
of reference.53 As a result, rather than following a set of institutionally
prescribed rituals and rules, inmates who wish to identify with Islam create
an individualized, secular version that permits a radical ideological
identification with the poor and the oppressed elsewhere.54
As for political protagonists, it is EU-level actors that have arguably been
most active in their calls for statistical change. The European Parliament, like
the European Commission, has, however, focused its calls for changes to the
way that statistics are collected and used, not on Muslims, but on the related
questions of immigration and immigrant integration. The European Parlia-
ment Benchmarking effort focuses on legally resident third-country nation-
als (i.e., migrants who are not citizens of one of the member states), or
migrants as defined by the UN and EU.55 Muslim cultural identity is
excluded from the list of minority cultural identities to be protected.
Other EU bodies have nevertheless turned their attention specifically to
the question of data on Muslims. The 2009 Annual Work Program of the
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA)56 specifies as its aim
the collection and dissemination of objective and comparable data: Reporting
on the situation concerning racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, Islamophobia,
and related intolerance is cited as a project toward that end.57 In this
endeavor, the FRA is, to some extent, responding to problems cited in research
by national study groups. The National Focal Point (NFP) reports (RAXEN)
produced under the aegis of the FRA have also served as a mouthpiece for
various national bodies to highlight what they view as the deleterious lacunae
in data. Beginning with the view that racial violence is embedded in social
processes of social exclusion the Commission for Racial Equality in Britain
highlights the importance of the racialization of immigrants and asylum-seekers,

fears of . . . economic competition and cultural pollution58 and the role of
right-wing parties (such as the British National Party) in fanning the racist
flames. The Racial Commission clarifies its estimation of gaps in the data
as follows:
Classification of victims and analysis of the problem is too closely tied to the
color line while the issues of asylum seeking, anti-Semitism, Islamophobia
render the problem more complex than this. There is still no official recording of
Islamophobic or anti-Semitic incidents as such.59
Overall, the National Analytical Study on Racist Violence and Crime in

the UK was clear in its 2005 assessment that the data collection methods
available in the UK were not sufficient to the task of assessing the extent to
which religion is a factor in targeting victims of racist violence and crime.
Since a groups victimization is one indicator of its lack of integration in the
society, efforts to develop reliable indicators of integration should take this
problem into account.
The Security Dimension of Muslim Social Membership

The question of the social membership of Muslims has been conflated with
a whole range of politically sensitive questionsmost obviously, the question
of internal security. This includes issues of home-grown and transnational
terrorism.60 Although wary that statistical evidence is not necessarily the
antidote to muddled political argument, many scholars and political actors
have redoubled their calls for an expansion and clarification of Muslim statis-
tics in the face of this politicization of the issue of Muslim integration.
In political debate, the notion of what constitutes internal security has
gradually been expanded to include a whole range of loosely connected
phenomena such as immigration and asylum.61 The security threat posed by
Muslims has been stretched accordingly. Virginie Guiraudon explains that
electoral debates and policy discourses call into question the legitimacy of the
presence of immigrants on French soil: immigration is linked to crime and
insecurity and, in the case of North Africans, their loyalty to France is ques-
tioned because of their adherence to Islam.62 Olivier Roy laments that the
constant association of Islam and immigration in the mind[s] of the public
and of politicians . . . continues to have a negative effect . . .63 Fact-finding
agencies concur: [. . .] a large numberpossibly the majorityof asylum
seekers are Islamic, so the issues of Islamophobia and the panic over asylum
overlap with one another.64
The existential security threat posed by Muslims to European societies
even stretches to include the survival of the nation-states very values and
cultural essence. Werner Schiffauer asserts that the . . . sense of moral panic
[that] underlies the current debate about Islam in Germany . . . apparent in

discussions concerning citizenship, religious minority rights and access to
public funds . . . [in part] . . . reflects the change in Turkish migrants civic
status as they naturalize.65 Tariq Modood argues, It is most regrettable that
the emergence of Muslim political agency has thrown British multicultural-
ism into theoretical and practical disarray. It has led to policy reversals in the
Netherlands and elsewhere, and across Europe has strengthened intolerant,
exclusive nationalism and secularism. . . .66 Jocelyne Cesari explains that in
Europe, in particular, the term secularization has an ideological function and
manifests itself as an element of European identity in a variety of political and
cultural narratives. . . . Consequently the establishment of Islam is perceived
as a potential threat to this cultural norm. Most of the justifications offered in
support of this fear invoke . . . the idea that for Islam, there is no separation
between politics and religion.67 Cesari also discusses the complexity of the
separation of Church and State in the social systems of Europe in contrast to
the United States, where religious pluralism . . . is one of the basic elements
of the national ethos.68
The Resistance to Expanded Data Collection and Sharing

The EUs governments thus face a double pressure to alter their data
collection practices and even to expand the extent of their data collection. The
first comes from scholars, concerned particularly about the quality of national
policy; the second emanates from EU Institutions and bodies, which point to
the fact that EU cooperation in economic and immigration policies has created
a need for data comparable between member states.69
Yet, the governments have apparently proved reluctant to cede to this
kind of pressure, and the existing gentlemans agreements regulating the
exchange of migration data have proved unequal to the task of ensuring the
Union the necessary information.70 If it is anything to go by, in its proposals
on the sharing of migration statistics the European Commission tiptoed
around the member states, stressing the principle of subsidiarity in order to
accommodate member state sensibilities.71 For their part, member state
governments have tended to stress the immutability of entrenched national

arrangements of state-society and state-church relations as an obstacle to
data collation and exchange.
Indeed, Koenig notes that it is one of the many ironies of Europeanisation
that . . . distinctive patterns of church/state relations . . . [have gained] legiti-
macy as symbols of national heritage . . . in the transnational identity
discourses spurred by European integration.72 This has occurred despite the
claims-making abetted by human rights agreements73 and the transnational-
ism resulting from global economic integration.74
The situation is a curious one. National governments have more usually
sought to use European cooperation as a means to expand the data that they
hold on individuals 75 and particularly on non-nationals.76 Moreover, the EUs
framework of Justice and Home Affairs cooperation has most often served as a
means for national governments to overhaul the kinds of national rules and
norms that are apparently such an obstacle in this case.77 And, indeed, it has
typically been just the kind of loose coalition of European institutions and
scholars which is today calling for an expansion of statistics that has previ-
ously sought to prevent this kind of data collection and other apparently
illiberal policies.78
This is no doubt a caricature of a highly nuanced reality, but the situation
is nevertheless odd.79 To the frustration of many scholars, standards of data
collection are not simply molded as an objective response to policy problems. If
information is power, national governments have greater incentive to expand
data collection if it will equate to an expansion of their clout and discretion, in
addition to enabling them to clarify policy problems or promote solutions.
The capacity of non-totalitarian states to influence human movement and
behavior is very limited. Some degree of policy failure in immigration control
or social integration is a given. This is a political reality of which governments
are aware, but which they choose not to communicate to publics in order to
safeguard their political survival in areas of high sovereignty.80 An absence of
relevant data facilitates this.
In short, although the expanded collection of data might well bring an
improvement in policy-making, any resulting political gains falling to national
governments would be more than wiped out by the growing public awareness
of remaining policy failures. The previous efforts to expand data collection
that national governments have appeared keenest on have frequently
concerned data not generally released into the public domain.81 By contrast,
the kinds of data involved in efforts to improve Muslim integration programs
are generally supposed to be available to publics and civil society.
If expanded data collection at the national level would bring with it an
increase in domestic accountability for governments, EU cooperation bears
the unwelcome prospect of increased international accountability. European
integration, and the resulting interdependence of national economies and
societies, has created new responsibilities for national governments, namely

to their European partners. Failure to integrate immigrants or Muslims in
one member state can have a negative effect for all member states. Perhaps
counterintuitively, some member states have actually been at pains to stress
the responsibility to their EU-partners that they bear as regards immigrants
and asylum-seekers;82 the perception of a high burden can be translated into
political influence at the European level. Indeed, with a premium increasingly
set on burden-sharing between the EU member states,83 those states that
succeed in claiming a particularly large onus may even be compensated with
material reward.84
Within this context, European cooperation places ambiguous pressures on

the readiness of national governments to expand and harmonize data collec-
tion. An increase in data availability on an EU-wide scale would certainly be
welcomed by some governments since it would help them to identify the true
burden borne by their partners; yet, these advantages are overshadowed
by the fact that it would increase the power of scrutiny of their counterparts
over them.
Against this background, it is hardly surprising that some national
governments have stressed entrenched national norms pertaining to state-
society relations as blocks to the alteration of data rules.
THE COMPARABILITY AND AVAILABILITY OF DATA

It is clear, then, that new and entrenched norms on state-society relations are
by no means the immutable obstacles to data collation that some governments
would have them to be. Nor do governments necessarily cite them because
they are committed to the values of privacy and personal liberty that such
norms typically protect. Instead, these norms are ripe to be exploited for polit-
ical purposes by governments reluctant to render themselves more account-
able in this sensitive area. If these norms are indeed malleable or actually
permit the kinds of data collection called for by scholars, it appears more
sensible to turn to the more tangible practical issues of their availability and
comparability in order to ascertain what need and scope there is for change.
Areas of Interest
Efforts to understand the characteristics and integration problems of
Muslims in European states are hampered by a lack of information specific to
their circumstances. The use of proxy groups in assessing the integration of
Muslims blends several sets of acculturation and discrimination problems and
avoids examination of significant acknowledged concerns of integration that
are unique to Muslims, separately from their national heritage. These include
both macro- and micro-level institutional accommodations to Islam.
On the micro-level are the problems of personal manifestation of religious

affiliation in ideologically secular societies, and the educational and workplace
concessions necessary to accommodate the expression of religious traditions of
individuals in public and private institutional settings. On the macro-level,
there is the question of the place of mosques in the existing system of church/
state relationships. As the Economist noted in its update on the French
banlieues where rioting occurred in the fall of 2005, the role of the mosque
and the political representation of Islam are still unclear in France; this,
despite the recent creation of the French Council of Muslims.85
Sandwiched in between these neglected micro- and macro-level problems
of Muslim integration are incendiary questions, such as the relationship

between Muslim youth and the police86 that require systemic (macro-level)
changes for their clarification and improvement.87 The overlap of income and
racial/ethnic inequality in socio-political systems ideologically based on equality
has been found to produce the most destructive alienation and anger.88
Research linking these overlapping types of inequality to violent crime89
suggests that we should not be surprised when major terrorist incidents are
planned by those who identify with the Muslim cause or political Islam
despite the fact that they have lived for a long time (possibly their entire lives)
in western, democratic non-Muslim societies.
The following passages examine some of the data that exist on key micro-
and macro-level issues. In this effort, we turn to the EUMC for clues. Data
used by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Intolerance in its
recent report, Muslims in the European Union,90 can be seen as having been
officially determined to be the best currently available on Muslim integra-
tion in EU states. The subtitle of the EUMC report, Discrimination and
Islamophobia, describes the overall focus of the research. The situation of
Muslims in employment, education, and housing is examined in the fourteen
EU member states where data were available, complemented by a qualitative
study into Perceptions of discrimination and Islamophobia, based on in-depth
interviews with members of Muslim Communities in ten Member States.91
Research for the report was developed by EUMC staff and National Focal
Points.92 (As noted above, in February, 2007, the European Agency for Funda-
mental Rights assumed EUMCs data collection tasks. EUMC reports are now
available on the FRA website established in February, 2009.)93
In addition to its choice of a proxy for the Muslim population in those
states without data on members of specific religious groups, the report is
relevant to our discussion of how to measure Muslim integration in three ways.
First, the report examines specific areas of integration (employment, education,
and housing). Secondly, it examines specific topics indicating problems of inte-
gration (marginalization and alienation of Muslims; the headscarf issue,
forced marriages, violence against women, and diminution of the legal status
of married women; and the cartoon controversy.) Thirdly, the report provides
information on Islamophobia, offering data on racist violence and crime

targeting Muslims in specific EU member states.
EUMC Proxy Choice

National Focal Points forming the Racism and Xenophobia European
Network (RAXEN, initiated in 1998, with a competitively chosen center in
each EU member state)94 provided statistical information to EUMC. But
EUMC cautions that while:
Nationality and/or ethnicity are usually the closest proxy categories avail-
able in the absence of specific data collection on religious groups . . . [q]ualitative

research . . . shows clearly that religion and ethnicity are often inextricably
connected, making it impossible to distinguish between them clearly as grounds
for discrimination. There is, nevertheless, some evidence that certain aspects of
discrimination could be directly related to religious affiliation and practices, such
as the refusal to accommodate Muslim holidays or Muslim prayers and the
banning of the headscarf in the workplace, when similar accommodation is
provided to other religious groups.95
In its report on Muslim integration in individual member states, EUMC uses

foreigners as the proxy for Muslims in Germany; people of foreign origin as
the proxy in France; and allochtonen (those with migrant descent) as the proxy
for the Netherlands.96 In the UK, where detailed information is available . . .
according to ethnicity and religion, results are usually reported for those who
self-identify as Muslims.97 Sometimes proxy ethnic groups, such as Bang-
ladeshis and Pakistanis, are the basis for statistics (possibly because the neces-
sary data for self-identified Muslims had not yet been gathered or analyzed).
While proxy (or, in the case of the UK, actual) data on Muslims are based
on the groups indicated above, EUMC discusses the problems of Muslims as
those of Turks in Germany; North Africans and young people of Maghrebian
origin in France; and Bangladeshis and Pakistanis in the UK and of ethnic
minorities (groups such as Surinamese, Moroccans, Turks and Antilleans, or
Arubans) . . . in the Netherlands.98 Neither the data, nor discussions of them
are precise in terms of the reference points. To the extent that host-country
language-acquisition problems, ethnically traditional norms, or segregation
impede integration separately from religious affiliation, generalizations made
about the proxy groups are likely to be inaccurate, providing a weak basis for
pro-integration policy development.
Specific Areas of Integration: Employment, Education,

and Housing
Comparisons made, on the one hand, between Muslim proxy groups
based on nationality and, on the other, the general population (Germany), or
people born in the country (France) or the total labour force (Netherlands)
paint a picture of reduced life chances for Muslims. EUMC for example,
describes the 2004 unemployment rate of twenty percent for foreigners as
almost twice the general average in Germany.99 In France, 2005 research
is reported to indicate a foreigner unemployment rate far higher than that
for people born in France, and the situation for young people of Maghrebian
origin is described as notably worse. The 16% unemployment rate of the
Netherlands allochtonen (those of migrant descent) in 2005 is cited in con-
trast to 6.5 percent of the total labor force.100 It was, however, noted above
that statistics that can only capture the situation of foreigners may ignore the
improved life chances of those Muslims of immigrant origin who naturalize.

Similar problems pertain to efforts to identify the reasons for any reduced
life chances, since data on discrimination in the workplace fails to capture the
complex interplay of national, ethnic, racial, and religious expression. In the
absence of truly comparable official data on Muslim integration in employ-
ment, EUMC examined the results of unofficial research, including surveys.101
A 2004 survey of 1,000 Turkish people in Germany found that over half had
been treated in a discriminatory manner at their work place, and just under
half indicated that they had faced discrimination while they were looking for
a job.102 The 2004 University of Paris French Monitoring Center on Discrimi-
nations study, which sent out different standard curricula vitae in response
to 258 job advertisements for a sales person. . . found that a person from the
Maghreb had five times less chance of getting a positive reply.103 A job appli-
cation exercise in the UK also reported discrimination, with Muslims the
worst off.104
In assessing education as an area of Muslim integration meanwhile,
EUMC relies on three (Program for International Student Assessment
PISArelated) studies by OECD105 all of which compare non-native born
pupils to native pupils, and all of which indicate significant lack of educa-
tional achievement on the part of migrant origin students in contrast to
native students in France, Germany, and the Netherlands (as well as in
Austria, Belgium, and Denmark).106 EUMC prefaces its discussion on the lack
of integration of Muslim pupils into EU member state educational systems
with the following disclaimer about the quality of their data:
Due to the lack of educational statistics based on religion or ethnicity an
assessment of the educational situation of Muslim pupils can be inferred mainly
indirectly by looking at data referring to nationality or country of origin. These
do not reveal the effects of a complex array of other factors contributing to school
performance and educational attainment.107
As for issues of housing, EUMC cites an earlier study devoted exclusively

to the issue, and notes again that official and research based data at the
national level on housing do not specifically target Muslims, but, nonetheless,
common themes do emerge from reviewing the existing national evidence

related to country of origin. . . .108 EUMC offers the appropriate caution that
as in the previous sections . . . it is not always possible to distinguish between
Islamophobia and xenophobia or racism as causes of discrimination, and goes
on to discuss the difficult housing circumstances of [m]igrantsamong them
many Muslims. . . .109 Finance and tax policy-related structural barriers to
suitable housing are discussed, as are the poor fit between the stock of social
housing and the needs of larger minority families, and residential segrega-
tion resulting from either discrimination or self-segregation.110
The discussion of Muslim integration in employment, education, and
housing is consistently hampered by lack of official data on religious identity.

To a great extent, the situation of Muslim groups in western European
nations is generalized, without documentation of the multi-faceted nature of
the Muslim population and its specific problems in Member states. While
Britain now has the capacity to develop the data analyses necessary to differ-
entiate among Muslim ethnic group members in assessing their progress
toward benchmarks of successful integration, the other European nations in
our group do not (and EUMC uses information about Bangladeshis and
Pakistanis when discussing Britain, rather than specific information on the
situation of Muslims within these groups).
Attitudinal Research Regarding Muslims

Data from a range of public opinion polls111 are discussed in EUMC as
provid[ing] some [unscientific] insight as to [opinion] trends regarding Islam
and Muslims . . . [and] show[ing] a rather negative picture of public opinion
towards Muslims and Islam in Member States.112 The difficulty of comparing
and synthesizing such sources is indicated by the fact the 2005 Pew Global
Attitudes Survey can be seen as offering somewhat less pessimistic results. It
indicates that majorities in Great Britain, France . . . [and] the U.S. . . . say
they have a somewhat or very favorable view of Muslims. In the West, only
among the Dutch and Germans does a majority or plurality hold unfavorable
views of Muslims (51% and 47% respectively).113
As for the specific issue of Islamophobia, for each of the European nations
in our investigation EUMC reviews the official (criminal justice) data and
non-official data (e.g. from surveys, NGO reports, research, and media
reports) relevant to examination of the victimization of Muslims.114 The gen-
eral inadequacy of available data for both this report and a previous related
EUMC report (Racist Violence in 15 EU Member States)115 has been recog-
nized by EUMC.116
It is not only the attitudes of host societies that are of relevance to
integration efforts; the attitudes of Muslims too are salient. Some surveys
have been taken and the results suggest that Muslims are more willing to
integrate than members of their host nations recognize. For example, the Pew
poll of Muslims in Great Britain, France, and Germany (the Netherlands was
not included in the study) found that Muslims . . . are generally positive
about conditions in their host nation . . . more positive than the general [pub-
lic]. . . . However, many Muslims, especially in Britain, worry about the future
of Muslims in their country.117 Muslims in France, Great Britain, and
Germany were more likely than the general pool of respondents in their host
nations to agree that Muslims want to adopt the customs and way of life of
the country into which they immigrate.118 Thirty percent of German Muslims
agreed with this statement (in contrast to 17% of the general public), 41% of
British Muslims agreed (vs. 22% of the British general public), and 78% of
French Muslims agreed (contrasting 46% of the general public in France).119
The primary issues among European Muslims are, in many ways, similar
to those of non-Muslims. The study indicated, for example, that unemploy-
ment was the greatest concern among Muslims in the European nations
examined. But, as the results above suggest, the poll also underscored the
diversity of the experiences of Muslims in Europe and of their opinions.120
US Point of Comparison
The US Census does not collect data on religious affiliation. Public Law
94-521, passed in 1976, introduced the mid-decade census of population
(beginning in 1985), removed the possibility of imprisonment for willful fail-
ure to answer census questions, and made it illegal to require individuals to
disclose their religious beliefs, church, or other religious group membership.
The US Census directs those interested in questions related to religious
membership in the United States to the American Religious Identification Sur-
vey (ARIS),121 the Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA) and other non-
official sources. In terms of official data availability, then, the situation of
Muslims in the United States is much like that of Muslims in western European
societies. But the much more limited role of the state in integration processes in
the United States122 may reduce the consequences of this lack of official data.
Nor is there the same pressure for state intervention on these matters in
the US as there is in the four European case-studies. The failure of Muslims
(who constitute 1% or less of the US population) to integrate has not been
problematized in the same way that it has in many western European
nations. This may be, to some extent, because Muslims are more affluent, edu-
cated, and politically active in the US than in Europe; but it may also be a
result of the general sense of individualism, the belief that state policy is lim-
ited to the removal of barriers to full participation.123 For example, a plan to
map Muslim Angelenos in order to prevent radicalization . . . angered civil
rights groups, which say it is no better than racial profiling.124
The US state plays little role in religious education or support for religious
organizations, offers little in the way of employment and income support, and
assists in housing support only in cases of extreme financial exigency. The

state also imposes relatively few requirements regarding the individuals
manifestation of religious orientation in public.125 It may be, then, that since
the state has not taken on many tasks toward the integration of specific reli-
gious groups it can get along better without data about them.
This is not to say that the issue has no political importance in the US;
merely that it is handled in a different manner than in our four case-studies.
The salience of prospective Muslim terrorism is, for example, demonstrated
by the fact that the Amici Curiae126 (Friends of the Court) brief submitted to
the Supreme Court by religious organizations and affiliated individuals in
support of the Seattle, Washington and Lexington, Kentucky school districts

voluntary school desegregation plans, sought to convince the court of the
importance of desegregation efforts by citing the relative lack of Muslim segre-
gation in the United States (demonstrated by Logan and Deane, using US cen-
sus data on individuals from largely Muslim nations, proxy data) in contrast
to European states.127 The brief argued that the lower degree of segregation
was important in explaining US Muslims comparative lack of radicalization
and involvement in terrorist incidents on behalf of the Muslim cause or
political Islam. The organizations submitting the brief hoped to support the
salience of their position through reference to the possible consequences of
school segregation on Muslims. The court found fault with the school desegre-
gation plans. But these examplesof securitization provoked mapping of
Muslims and highlighting of the relative residential and educational integra-
tion of Muslims in the USprovide evidence of the political importance of the
question of Muslim integration in the United States. The fact that the American
Civil Liberties Union, Muslim Advocates (a national association of Muslim
lawyers), and the Islamic Shura Council of Southern California (an umbrella
organization for mosques)128 coordinated in public efforts against the plan to
map the location of Muslims in Los Angeles demonstrates the ability of
Muslims to project a political voice within the system when they feel that
their interests are being trampled.
CONCLUSIONS
The EUs efforts to foster inclusion and protection of minority heritage are
being undermined as member nations seek to protect the national identity
image from extension.129 National historical conceptualizations of secularity
have been frozen in time, despite the fact that they conflict with the economic
and social goals of EU membership. The utilization of talent throughout the
workforceso key to the EUs intervention in the economic sphereis blocked
by rules that require a kind of linear assimilation that seeks to force a change
in personal habits on the part of many who are trying to forge a blended
religio/ethnic identity.
In a European environment with an increasingly specified minority

protection regime, states have been able to opt out of some norms of minority
heritage expression by asserting a historical institutionalist130 legitimacy for
pre-existing patterns of church/state relations, and by refusing to recognize as
minorities deserving of special protections either the descendents of guestwork-
ers or religious groups (other than Jews). This policy stance means that the prob-
lems of cultural disidentificationthe absence of identificationfaced by
Muslims cannot be systematically addressed. Indeed, such an approach fosters
the conclusion that Muslim groups are outside of the cultural mainstream due to
their own failure to integrate.131 The system is not expected to change to
accommodate them; rather, they must be moved toward accommodation with the
system in ways that make it difficult for them to take the best of both worlds,
and that reduce the possibilities for gradual integration on their part.132
By relying upon the conflation of Muslim with foreigner in statistics,
state support of ideological secularism can serve to reify the public image of
Muslims as outsiders, the source of public problems and threatening to the
system. And conversely, rendering Muslim minorities statistically invisible
when they take on citizenship, can reduce the practical salience of religious
issues in the true outsider status in these individuals. A glance at the U.S. as
a point of comparison suggests that it is another historically entrenched norm
of state-society relations that makes the problem of disidentification so press-
ingnamely, the expectation and acceptance of the large role played by
European states in social integration.
Future research extending the European Parliaments Benchmarking
effort,133 utilizing its definition of the eight key facets of integration to exam-
ine self-identified Muslims, would yield information valuable to the benchmark-
ing initiative and supportive of the integration goals of the European Council.
The Benchmarking Report underscores the Council of Europes core definition
of well-being as central to the integration effort and focused on the reduction
of disparities and polarizations.134 Movement toward this aim with regard
to those who think of themselves as both Muslim and European would
mitigate the sources of conflict and violence outlined in reports by European
fact-finding agencies like the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and
Xenophobia (2006), non-governmental organizations such as the Open Society
Institute, and research organizations, including the Migration Policy Institute
and the Bertelsmann Stiftung.135
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The author would like to thank the Fulbright Program, the Rhode Island College
Faculty Research and Development Funds, the German Institute for International and
Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin, and the former Centre for Research on European
Integration (ZEI) in Bonn for their support of research leading to this project. The
paper reflects the authors views, not necessarily those of these institutions.
NOTES
1. European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC), Muslims in the
European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia (Wien, Austria: Fundamental
Rights Agency of the European Union, 2006), 3.
2. Ibid, 8; Thomas Liebig, Labour Market Integration of Immigrants in Germany (Paris:
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2007).
3. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of
the Council on Community Statistics on Migration and International Protection
(Brussels: Author, 2005). http://eur.lex.europa/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
CELEX:52005PC0375:EN:NOT
4. EUMC, Muslims in the European Union.
5. Open Society Institute, Muslims in the EU: Cities Report, Germany (New York:
Soros Foundation Network, 2007). http://www.eumap.org/topics/minority/reports/
eumuslims/background_reports/download/germany/germany.pdf (accessed October 12, 2009)
6. Ibid.,19.
7. European Agency for Fundamental Rights, Combating Ethnic and Racial Discrimi-
nation and Promoting Equality in the European Union, (Vienna: Author, 2007). http://
fra.europa.eu/fra/material/pub/trends/trends-en.pdf (accessed October 12, 2009)
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and Council, European Parliament
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs; J. Niessen and T. Huddleston,
Setting Up a System of Benchmarking to Measure the Success of Integration Policies in
Europe (Brussels: European Parliament, 2007).
11. EUMC, Muslims in the European Union, 25; See also Niessen and Huddleston,
Setting Up a System, 197, on the problems of data comparability and specificity.
12. EUMC, Muslims in the European Union, 8; OECD, Liebig, Labour Market Integra-
tion of Immigrants in Germany. See also: Haut Conseil a lIntegration, LIslam en
France et en Allemagne (Paris: La Documentation Francaise, 2001).
13. V. Guiraudon, European Integration and Migration Policy, Journal of Common
Market Studies, 38, 2 (2000): 251271.
14. C. Cahn, Void at the Centre, Roma Rights Quarterly, 6 (2004): 3037. http://
www.ceol.com (accessed October 12, 2009)
15. S. Milcher and A. Ivanov, The United Nations Development Programmes
Vulnerability Projects, Roma and Ethnic Data, Roma Rights Quarterly, 2 (2004):
713.
16. For variations in state intervention in immigrant integration, see G. Haller, Die
Grenzen der Solidaritt. Europa und die USA im Umgang mit Staat, Nation und
Religion [The Boundaries of Solidarity in Europe and the USA: State, Nation and Reli-
gion] (Berlin: Aufbau, 2002); P. I. Jackson, P. Zervakis, and R. Parkes, A Contextual
Analysis of the Integration of Muslims, Discourse of Sociological Practice, 7 (2005):
205216; P.I. Jackson and R. Parkes, Parallel Societies, Cultural Tolerance and
Securitization, Journal of Social and Ecological Boundaries, (2007): 742.
17. EUMC, Racist Violence in 15 EU Member States (2005) http://www.fra.europa.eu/
fraWebsite/attachments/CS-RV-main.pdf (accessed October 12, 2009); EUMC,
Muslims in the Europen Union.
18. K. Negrin, Collecting Ethnic Data: An Old Dilemma, the New Challenges,
EUMAP: EU Monitoring and Advocacy Program Online Journal (April 2003). http://
www.eumap.org/journal/features/2003/april/oldilemma/ (accessed October 12, 2009)
19. Pew Attitudes Survey, The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each
Other (2005) http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=253 (accessed October
12, 2009); Open Society Institute, Muslims in the EU.
20. Niessen and Huddleston, Setting Up a System of Benchmarking.
21. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and
of the Council on Community Statistics on Migration and International Protection
(Brussels: Author, 2005). http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
CELEX:52005PC0375:EN:NOT (accessed October 12, 2009)
22. Niessen and Huddleston, Setting Up a System of Benchmarking.

23. See, for example, J.S. Fetzer and J. C. Soper, Muslims and the State (Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005); R. Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in
France and Germany (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); E. Bleich,
Race Politics in Britain and France (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
2003); M. Feldblum, Reconstructing Citizenship (New York: SUNY, 1999); F. Buijs,
Muslims in NL (Amsterdam: Institute Migration, Ethnical Studies, University of
Amsterdam, 2006); Haller, Die Grenzen der Solidaritt.
24. Conclusions of the Meeting of the Interior Minister of France, Germany, Italy,
Poland, Spain, and UK, G6 Conference, October 2526, 2006, Stratford-upon-Avon, UK.
25. EUMC, Muslims in the European Union, 2729.
26. J. Laurence and J. Vaisse, Integrating Islam (Washington, DC: Brookings Institu-
tion, 2006), 2425.
27. A. Favell, Integration Nations, Comparative Social Research, vol. 22 (2003): 1342.
28. For specific examples of anti-Muslim and anti-foreigner hostility in European
states, see: European Commission on Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) Reports on
France (1998, 2000, 2005) http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/Country-by-country/
France/France_CBC_en.asp (accessed October 12, 2009); ECRI Reports on Germany
(1998, 2000, 2004, 2009) http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/Country-by-country/
Germany/Germany_CBC_en.asp (accessed October 12, 2009); ECRI Reports on
Netherlands (1998, 2001, 2008) http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/Country-by-
country/Netherlands/Netherlands_CBC_en.asp (accessed October 12, 2009); ECRI
Reports on UK (1999, 2001, 2005) http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/Country-
by-country/United_Kingdom/UnitedKingdom_CBC_en.asp (accessed October 12, 2009);
EUMC Migrants, Minorities and Housing, 2008, http://www.libertysecurity.org/
auteur655.html (accessed October 12, 2009); EUMC Racist Violence in 15 EU Member
States http://www.fra.europa.eu/fra Website/attachments/CS-RV-main.pdf (accessed
October 12, 2009); EUMC, Muslims in the European Union, http://www.fra.europa.eu/
fraWebsite/attachments/Manifestations_EN.pdf (accessed October 12, 2009).
29. Niessen and Huddleston, Setting Up a System, 71.
30. Ibid., 101.
32. Racism and Xenophobia Network (RAXEN) reports are available through the following
link sponsored by the Fundamental Rights Agency: http://www.fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/
research/raxen/country_reports/country_reports_en.htm (accessed October 12, 2009).
34. C. R. Barker, Church and State, The International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law,
3 (2000): 115. http://www.icnl.org/KNOWLEDGE/ijnl/vol3iss2/art_1.htm (accessed
October 12, 2009).
35. A. Begag, Ethnicity and Equality (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 2007), 8586.
36. Niessen and Huddleston, Setting Up a System.
37. Liebig, Labour Market Integration of Immigrants in Germany.
38. See, for example, EUMC, Muslims in the European Union, 45.
39. FRA, RAXEN Focal Point for the Netherlands (Vienna: Author, 2005). http://
www.fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/attachments/CS-RV-NR-NL.pdf (accessed October 12,
2009).
40. National Statistics, Focus on Ethnicity and Religion (New York: Palgrave,
2006).
41. Niessen and Huddleston, Setting Up a System; EUMC, Muslims in the European
Union.
43. RAXEN France 2005: 3, 27, 35; RAXEN Germany 2005: 5, 35; RAXEN Netherlands
2005:34, 35; RAXEN UK 2005:2224, 31. Racism and Xenophobia Network (RAXEN)
reports are available through the following link sponsored by the Fundamental Rights
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44. Begag, Ethnicity and Equality, 120.
45. Ibid., 8586.
46. Ibid., 86.
47. Liebig, Labour Market Integration of Immigrants in Germany, 11.
48. Ibid.
49. Haut Conseil a lIntegration, La Connaissance de lImmigration et de lIntegration
[Understanding Immigration and Integration] (Paris: La Documentation Francais,
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50. J. A. Beckford, D. Joly, and F. Khosrokhavar, Muslims in Prison (New York:
Palgrave, 2005), 2.
51. Ibid., 204.
52. Ibid., 207.
53. Ibid., 219.
54. Ibid, 229.
56. 2009 Annual Work Programme, 7. http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/news&events/
news& events_en.htm (accessed October 12, 2009).
57. Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), 11. The 2009 Work Program of the
Fundamental Rights Agency is available here: http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/
attachments/wp09_en.pdf (accessed October 12, 2009).
58. RAXEN, UK (Vienna: Author, 2005), 1011. http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/
attachments/CS-RV-NR-UK.pdf (accessed October 12, 2009).
59. Ibid., 31.
60. See, for example, EU Proposes Monitoring Radical Mosques, Washington Post
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61. D. Bigo, The European Internal Security Field in M. Anderson and M. den Boer,
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63. O. Roy, Forward, in Laurence and Vaisse, eds., Integrating Islam (Washington, DC:
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64. RAXEN UK, 24.
65. W. Schiffauer, Enemies within the Gates, in T. Modood, A. Triandafyllidou, and
R. Zapata-Barrero, Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship (New York: Routledge,
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66. T. Modood, British Muslims and the Politics of Multiculturalism, in T. Modood, A.
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67. J. Cesari, When Islam and Democracy Meet (New York: Palgrave, 2004), 44.
68. Ibid., 43.
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70. European Commission, Action Plan for the Collection and Analysis of Community
Statistics in the Field of Migration (Brussels: Author, 2003), 2; European Commission,
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Commu-
nity Statistics on Migration and International Protection, (Brussels: Author, 2005), 3.
71. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament, 35.
72. M. Koenig, Europeanising the Governance of Religious Diversity, Journal of
Ethnic and Migration Studies, 33(6) (2007): 928.
73. D. Jacobson, Rights Across Borders (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1996).
74. S. Sassen, Guests and Aliens (New Press, 1999).
75. Statewatch, Online Observatory on the Surveillance of Telecommunications in the
EU, 2008. http://www.statewatch.org/eu-data-retention.htm
76. J. Aus, Eurodac, European Integration Online Papers, July, 2006.
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(2007): 173205.
78. M. McGinley and R. Parkes, Rights vs. Effectiveness? European Security, 16
(2007): 245266.
79. C. Cahn, Void at the Centre, 30.
80. D. Bigo, Immigration and Security, Alternatives, 27 (2002): 6392.
81. McGinley and Parkes, Rights vs. Effectiveness?
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83. European Commission, Green Paper on the Future Common European Asylum
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84. E. Thielemann, Symbolic Politics or Effective Burden-Sharing? Journal of

Common Market Studies, 43(4) (2005): 807824.
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87. R. Zauberman and R. Levy, Police, Minorities, and the French Republican Ideal,
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(1993): 182202; R.J. Sampson and J.L. Lauritsen, Racial and Ethnic Disparities in
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91. Ibid., 3.
92. Ibid., 4.
93. European Agency for Fundamental Rights, Combating Ethnic and Racial Discrimi-
nation and Promoting Equality in the European Union, 2007. http://fra.europa.eu/fra/
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94. http://www.fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/home/home_en.htm (accessed October 11, 2009).
96. Ibid., 45.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid., 58.
99. Ibid., 45.
100. Ibid.
101. Ibid., 4450.
102. EUMC, Muslims in the European Union, 46, citing the results of A. Goldberg and
M. Saver, ZFT Multi-Topic Survey (Duisburg-Essen, Germany: Stiftungzft, 2004).
103. Ibid., 45.
104. BBCs Radio Five Live, cf. EUMC, Muslims in the European Union, 44.
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107. Ibid., 12.
108. Ibid., 54; EUMC, Migrants, Minorities and Housing (Wien, Austria: Fundamental
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109. EUMC, Muslims in the EU, 54.

110. Ibid., 55.
111. For example, the 2004 GFK Custom Research Survey on behalf of The Wall Street
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117. Pew Attitudes Survey, Muslims in Europe, 2.

118. Ibid., 8.
119. Ibid.
120. Pew Attitudes Survey, Muslims in Europe, 1.
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(ARIS) (New York: The Graduate Center of the City University of New York, 2001).
122. Haller, Die Grenzen der Solidaritt.
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(New York: Simpson, Thatcher & Bartlett LLP, 2006).
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Lewis Mumford Center, SUNY, 2003).
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133. Niessen and Huddleston, Setting Up a System.
134. Ibid., 71.
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EU; J. Laurence, Integrating Islam: A New Chapter in Church-State Relations,
Transatlantic Task Force Paper; Migration Policy Institute. http://www.migration
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Measuring Muslim Integration in Europe

Article in Democracy and Security September 2009

Pamela Irving Jackson

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Measuring Muslim Integration in Europe

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Measuring Muslim Integration

Pamela Irving Jackson

Justice Studies Program, Department of Sociology, Rhode Island College, Providence, RI

The concern that anti-terrorism measures risk disrupting the integration of

Address correspondence to Pamela Irving Jackson, Justice Studies Program, Department

unfounded assumptions about Muslims in European states slant scholarship.

tudes in relation to religion, nationalism, and extremism. Even though the

European agencies have mounted significant data gathering efforts to

accompanied by an unwelcome increase in accountability resulting from a

as 78% of the population, those in Germany as 34%, the Netherlands 56%,

term integration is even more problematicreferring uncritically to social

subject to Islamophobic discrimination in the absence of Muslim integration

tion, philosophical beliefs, political persuasion, secular tendencies, languages,

THE PERCEIVED NEED FOR DATA COLLECTION ON MUSLIM

The Limited Extent of Data Collection on Muslims

Labour Market Integration of Immigrants in Germany does not mention the

Discussion of group membership in NFP reports refers to national back-

The Pressure for Statistics on Muslim Integration

link between statistical representations of a groups size and the groups

As a result, he concludes foreigner integration statistics in Germany may

in European societies. Beckford, Joly, and Khosrokhavar argue that:

in view of the continuing growth of the population of Muslims resident in

highlights the importance of the racialization of immigrants and asylum-seekers,

Overall, the National Analytical Study on Racist Violence and Crime in

The Security Dimension of Muslim Social Membership

[that] underlies the current debate about Islam in Germany . . . apparent in

The Resistance to Expanded Data Collection and Sharing

governments have tended to stress the immutability of entrenched national

societies, has created new responsibilities for national governments, namely

Within this context, European cooperation places ambiguous pressures on

THE COMPARABILITY AND AVAILABILITY OF DATA

On the micro-level are the problems of personal manifestation of religious

of Muslim integration are incendiary questions, such as the relationship

information on Islamophobia, offering data on racist violence and crime

EUMC Proxy Choice

able in the absence of specific data collection on religious groups . . . [q]ualitative

In its report on Muslim integration in individual member states, EUMC uses

Specific Areas of Integration: Employment, Education,

improved life chances of those Muslims of immigrant origin who naturalize.

As for issues of housing, EUMC cites an earlier study devoted exclusively

common themes do emerge from reviewing the existing national evidence

housing is consistently hampered by lack of official data on religious identity.

Attitudinal Research Regarding Muslims

assists in housing support only in cases of extreme financial exigency. The

support of the Seattle, Washington and Lexington, Kentucky school districts

In a European environment with an increasingly specified minority

22. Niessen and Huddleston, Setting Up a System of Benchmarking.

2006), 94116, 94.

84. E. Thielemann, Symbolic Politics or Effective Burden-Sharing? Journal of

109. EUMC, Muslims in the EU, 54.

117. Pew Attitudes Survey, Muslims in Europe, 2.

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