PROVISIONAL REMEDY CASE DIGEST The respondent, likewise, alleged that Section 6, subsections (a) to (m) is unconstitutional
because licensed and authorized recruitment agencies are placed on equal footing with illegal
EXECUTIVE SEC V CA G.R. NO. 131719 : MAY 25, 2004
The possible unconstitutionality of a statute, on its face, does not of itself justify an injunction
against good faith attempts to enforce it, unless there is a showing of bad faith, harassment, or
any other unusual circumstance that would call for equitable relief.32 The on its face invalidation
of statutes has been described as manifestly strong medicine, to be employed sparingly and only
as a last resort, and is generally disfavoured.
Facts: The Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipino Act of 1995 RA 8042 was, thereafter, published in the April 7, 1996 issue of the Manila
Bulletin. However, even before the law took effect, the Asian Recruitment Council Philippine
Chapter, Inc. (ARCO-Phil.) filed, on July 17, 1995, a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63
of the Rules of Court with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to declare as unconstitutional
Section 2, paragraph (g), Section 6, paragraphs (a) to (j), (l) and (m), Section 7, paragraphs (a)
and (b), and Sections 9 and 10 of the law, with a plea for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the respondents therein from
enforcing the assailed provisions of the law.
Petitioner claims that great majority of the duly licensed recruitment agencies have stopped
or suspended their operations for fear of being prosecuted under the provisions of a law that are
unjust and unconstitutional.
On August 1, 1995, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order effective for a period
of only twenty (20) days therefrom. After the petitioners filed their comment on the petition, the
ARCO-Phil. filed an amended petition, the amendments consisting in the inclusion in the caption
thereof eleven (11) other corporations which it alleged were its members and which it
represented in the suit, and a plea for a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents
from enforcing Section 6 subsection (i), Section 6 subsection (k) and paragraphs 15 and 16
thereof, Section 8, Section 10, paragraphs 1 and 2, and Sections 11 and 40 of Rep. Act No.
8042.
The respondent averred that the aforequoted provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042 violate Section
1, Article III of the Constitution. 5 According to the respondent, Section 6(g) and (i)
discriminated against unskilled workers and their families and, as such, violated the equal
protection clause, as well as Article II, Section 12 6 and Article XV, Sections 1 7 and 3(3) of the
Constitution. 8 As the law encouraged the deployment of skilled Filipino workers, only overseas
skilled workers are granted rights. The respondent stressed that unskilled workers also have the
right to seek employment abroad.
According to the respondent, the right of unskilled workers to due process is violated
because they are prevented from finding employment and earning a living abroad. It cannot be
argued that skilled workers are immune from abuses by employers, while unskilled workers are
merely prone to such abuses. It was pointed out that both skilled and unskilled workers are
subjected to abuses by foreign employers. Furthermore, the prohibition of the deployment of
unskilled workers abroad would only encourage fly-by-night illegal recruiters.
According to the respondent, the grant of incentives to service contractors and manning
agencies to the exclusion of all other licensed and authorized recruiters is an invalid
classification. Licensed and authorized recruiters are thus deprived of their right to property and
due process and to the "equality of the person." It is understandable for the law to prohibit
illegal recruiters, but to discriminate against licensed and registered recruiters is
unconstitutional.
recruiters. It contended that while the Labor Code distinguished between recruiters who are
holders of licenses and non-holders thereof in the imposition of penalties, Rep. Act No. 8042
does not make any distinction. The penalties in Section 7(a) and (b) being based on an invalid
classification are, therefore, repugnant to the equal protection clause, besides being excessive;
hence, such penalties are violative of Section 19(1), Article III of the Constitution. 9 It was also
pointed out that the penalty for officers/officials/employees of recruitment agencies who are
found guilty of economic sabotage or large-scale illegal recruitment under Rep. Act No. 8042 is
life imprisonment.
The respondent also posited that Section 6(m) and paragraphs (15) and (16), Sections 8, 9
and 10, paragraph 2 of the law violate Section 22, Article III of the Constitution 10 prohibiting
ex-post facto laws and bills of attainder. This is because the provisions presume that a licensed
and registered recruitment agency is guilty of illegal recruitment involving economic sabotage,
upon a finding that it committed any of the prohibited acts under the law. Furthermore, officials,
employees and their relatives are presumed guilty of illegal recruitment involving economic
sabotage upon such finding that they committed any of the said prohibited acts.
The respondent further argued that the 90-day period in Section 10, paragraph (1) within
which a labor arbiter should decide a money claim is relatively short, and could deprive licensed
and registered recruiters of their right to due process. The period within which the summons
and the complaint would be served on foreign employees and, thereafter, the filing of the
answer to the complaint would take more than 90 days. This would thereby shift on local
licensed and authorized recruiters the burden of proving the defense of foreign employers.
The respondent asserted that the following provisions of the law are unconstitutional:
SEC. 9. Venue. A criminal action arising from illegal recruitment as defined herein shall be
filed with the Regional Trial Court of the province or city where the offense was committed or
where the offended party actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense:
Provided, That the court where the criminal action is first filed shall acquire jurisdiction to the
exclusion of other courts: Provided, however, That the aforestated provisions shall also apply to
those criminal actions that have already been filed in court at the time of the effectivity of this
Act.
In their answer to the petition, the petitioners alleged, inter alia, that (a) the respondent has
no cause of action for a declaratory relief; (b) the petition was premature as the rules
implementing Rep. Act No. 8042 not having been released as yet; (c) the assailed provisions do
not violate any provisions of the Constitution; and, (d) the law was approved by Congress in the
exercise of the police power of the State.
In opposition to the respondent's plea for injunctive relief, the petitioners averred that: As
earlier shown, the amended petition for declaratory relief is devoid of merit for failure of
petitioner to demonstrate convincingly that the assailed law is unconstitutional, apart from the
defect and impropriety of the petition.
On December 5, 1997, the appellate court came out with a four-page decision dismissing the
petition and affirming the assailed order and writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial
court. The appellate court, likewise, denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the
said decision.
Issue: The core issue in this case is whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of its
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed order and the writ of
preliminary injunction on a bond of only P50,000; and
 Whether or not the appellate court erred in affirming the trial court's order and the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by it.
Held: IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the
appellate court is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Order of the Regional Trial Court dated
August 21, 1995 in Civil Case No. Q-95-24401 and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by it
in the said case on August 24, 1995 are NULLIFIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ratio: The matter of whether to issue a writ of preliminary injunction or not is addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court. However, if the court commits grave abuse of its discretion in
issuing the said writ amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction, the same may be nullified via a
writ of certiorari and prohibition.
The possible unconstitutionality of a statute, on its face, does not of itself justify an
injunction against good faith attempts to enforce it, unless there is a showing of bad faith,
harassment, or any other unusual circumstance that would call for equitable relief. The "on its
face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be
employed "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is generally disfavored.
To be entitled to a preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of a law assailed to be
unconstitutional, the party must establish that it will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
injunctive relief and must demonstrate that it is likely to succeed on the merits, or that there are
sufficiently serious questions going to the merits and the balance of hardships tips decidedly in
its favor.
Just as the incidental "chilling effect" of such statutes does not automatically render them
unconstitutional, so the chilling effect that admittedly can result from the very existence of
certain laws on the statute books does not in itself justify prohibiting the State from carrying out
the important and necessary task of enforcing these laws against socially harmful conduct that
the State believes in good faith to be punishable under its laws and the Constitution.
One who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond
reasonable doubt (Caleon v. Agus Development Corporation, 207 SCRA 748). All reasonable
doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute (People v. Vera, 65 Phil.
56). This presumption of constitutionality is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which
enjoin upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments (Garcia
vs. Executive Secretary, 204 SCRA 516 [1991]).
SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE v MAJADUCON
G.R. No. 136760. July 29, 2003
Facts:
This case had its aegis when the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee conducted an inquiry into the
alleged mismanagement of the funds and investment of the Armed Forces Retirement and
Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS). During the public hearings by the Blue Ribbon
Committee, it appeared that the AFP-RSBS purchased a lot from Atty. Nilo J. Flaviano worth
P10,500 per square meter. However, the deed of sale filed with the Register of Deeds indicated
that the purchase price of the lot was only P3,000 per square meter. The Committee caused the
service of a subpoena to Atty. Flaviano, directing him to appear and testify before it.
Respondent refused to appear and filed a petition for prohibition and preliminary
injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order with the RTC of General
Santos City. The trial court issued a TRO directing the committee to cease and desist from
proceeding with the inquiry. The Committee filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction and failure to state a valid cause of action. The Trial Court denied the motion to
dismiss. Hence, this petition for certiorari alleging that Judge Majaducon committed grave abuse
of discretion and acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge Jose Majaducon committed grave abuse of discretion when he
dismissed the petition for prohibition and issued the writ of preliminary injunction.
Ruling:
The assailed resolution of respondent Judge Majaducon was issued without legal basis. The
principle of separation of powers essentially means that legislation belongs to Congress,
execution to the Executive, and settlement of legal controversies to the Judiciary. Each is
prevented from invading the domain of the others. When the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee served subpoena on respondent Flaviano to appear and testify before it
in connection with its investigation of the alleged misuse and mismanagement of the
AFP-RSBS funds, it did so pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation. This is clearly provided in Article 6, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution:
The Senate of the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights
of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
Hence, the RTC of General Santos City, or any court for that matter, had no authority to prohibit
the Committee from requiring respondent t appear and testify before it.
Also, the ruling in Bengzon vs. Blue Ribbon Committee cited by the respondent does not apply in
this case. The factual circumstances therein are different from those in the case at bar. In
Bengzon, no intended legislation was involved and the subject matter of the inquiry was more
within the province of the courts rather than the legislature. On the other hand, there was in
this case a clear legislative purpose, and this is to look into the reported misuse and
mismanagement of the AFP-RSBS funds, with the intention of enacting appropriate legislation to
protect the rights and interests of the officers and members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines.
Wherefore, the petition is GRANTED.
 VICENTE CHUIDIAN V. SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE REPUBLIC
G.R. NO. 1339941 | JANUARY 19, 2001 (MODES OF QUASHAL OF THE WRIT OF ATTACHMENT)
FACTS: In September 1980, Chuidian allegedly a dummy of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos, was
able to obtain, allegedly under false pretenses, a loan guarantee from Philguarantee Corp., the
BOI and the Central Bank, in favor of the Asian Reliability Co. Inc. (ARCI). ARCI, 98% of which
was allegedly owned by Chuidian, was granted a loan guarantee of US $25M for the
establishment of 5 inter-related projects in the country.
However, Chuidian used the same in investing in corporations operating in the US. ARCI then
defaulted in the payments of the loan, compelling Philguarantee to undertake payments for the
same. Philguarantee sued Chuidian before a Californian court, charging him of violating the
terms of the loan, defaulting in payments and misusing the proceeds for his personal benefit.
Chuidian claimed that he himself was a victim of the systematic plunder perpetrated by the
Marcoses.
On November 1985, Philguarantee entered into a compromise agreement with Chuidian
whereby Chuidian shall assign and surrender title to all his companies in favor of the Phil.
Govt. In return, Philguarantee shall absolve Chuidian from all civil and criminal liability
concerning the payments Philguarantee had made on Chuidians defaulted loans. It was further
stipulated that the Phil. government shall pay Chuidian the amount of US $5.3M. Chuidian
received the 1st two installments of the payment. The remaining balance of US $4.6M was to be
paid through an irrevocable Letter of Credit (L/C) from which Chuidian would draw US $100k
monthly.
With the advent of the Aquino administration, the newly-established PCGG exerted earnest
efforts to search and recover properties and assets suspected as having been illegally acquired
by the Marcoses, their relatives and cronies.Chuidian was among those whose assets were
sequestered by the PCGG. The PNB was directed to place the letters of credit under its custody,
in behalf of the PCGG.
In the meantime, Philguarantee filed a motion before the Superior Court of California, seeking to
vacate the stipulated judgment containing the settlement between Philguarantee and Chuidian
on the grounds that: (a) Philguarantee was compelled by the Marcos administration to agree to
the terms of the settlement; (b) Chuidian blackmailed Marcos into pursuing the settlement
agreement by threatening to expose the fact that the Marcoses made investments in Chuidians
American enterprises; and (c) the Aquino administration had ordered Philguarantee not to make
further payments on the L/C to Chuidian. However, the Californian court concluded that
Philguarantee was not able to sufficiently show that the settlement should be set aside. On
appeal, the CA of the State of California affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court denying
Philguarantees motion.
Chuidian filed before the California Central District Court, an action against PNB seeking to
compel the latter to pay the proceeds of the L/C. Philguarantee intervened in said action, raising
the same issues and arguments it had earlier raised in the action before the Santa Clara
Superior Court, alleging that PNB was excused from making payments on the L/C since the
settlement was void due to illegality, duress and fraud.
The Federal Court rendered judgment ruling: (1) in favor of PNB excusing the said bank from
making payment on the L/C; and (2) in Chuidians favor by denying intervenor Philguarantees
action to set aside the settlement agreement.
Meanwhile a Deed of Transfer was executed between then Sec. of Finance and then PNB
President Edgardo Espiritu, to facilitate the rehabilitation of PNB. Thus, the govt assumed all
liabilities of PNB including the L/C listed in favor of Chuidian in the amount of US $4.4M
On July 1987, the govt filed before the Sandiganbayan a civil case against the Marcos spouses,
several govt officials, and a number of individuals known to be cronies of the Marcoses,
including Chuidian, seeking the reconveyance, accounting and restitution of all forms of wealth
allegedly procured illegally by the defendants.
While the case was pending, the Republic filed a motion for issuance of a writ of
attachment over the L/C in the name of Chuidian, citing as grounds therefor the following:
(1) Chuidian embezzled or fraudulently misapplied the funds of ARCI acting in a fiduciary
capacity, justifying issuance of the writ under Section 1(b), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court;
(2) The writ is justified under Section 1(d) of the same rule as Chuidian is guilty of fraud in
contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action was brought, or that he
concealed or disposed of the property that is the subject of the action;
(3) Chuidian has removed or disposed of his property with the intent of defrauding the plaintiff
as justified under Section 1(c) of Rule 57; and
(4) Chuidian is residing out of the country or one on whom summons may be served by
publication, which justifies the writ of attachment prayed for under Section 1(e) of the same
rule.
The Republic also averred that should the action brought by Chuidian before the U.S. District
Court of California to compel payment of the L/C prosper, inspite of the sequestration of the said
L/C, Chuidian can ask the said foreign court to compel the PNB Los Angeles branch to pay the
proceeds of the L/C. Eventually, Philguarantee will be made to shoulder the expense resulting
in further damage to the government. Thus, there was an urgent need for the writ of
attachment to place the L/C under the custody of the Sandiganbayan so the same may be
preserved as security for the satisfaction of judgment in the case before said court.
Chuidian opposed the motion for issuance of the writ of attachment, contending that:
(1) The plaintiffs affidavit appended to the motion was in form and substance fatally defective;
(2) Section 1(b) of Rule 57 does not apply since there was no fiduciary relationship between the
plaintiff and Chuidian;
(3) While Chuidian does not admit fraud on his part, if ever there was breach of contract, such
fraud must be present at the time the contract is entered into;
(4) Chuidian has not removed or disposed of his property in the absence of any intent to
defraud plaintiff;
(5) Chuidians absence from the country does not necessarily make him a non-resident; and
(6) Service of summons by publication cannot be used to justify the issuance of the writ since
Chuidian had already submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court by way of a motion to lift the
freeze order filed through his counsel.
On July 1993, the Sandiganbayan ordered the issuance of a writ of attachment against the L/C
as security for the satisfaction of judgment. The Sandiganbayan ruled:
1) Although there was no separate was attached to the motion, the motion itself contained all
the requisites of an affidavit, and the verification thereof is deemed a substantial compliance of
Rule 57, Section 3.
2) Fiduciary relationship exists between Chuidian and ARCI but not with the Republic. Hence,
the Republic cannot invoke Sec. 1(b) of Rule 57.
3) There was a prima facie case of fraud committed by Chuidian, justifying the issuance of the
writ of attachment.
4) The Sandiganbayan also adopted the Republics position that since it was compelled to pay,
through Philguarantee, the bank loans taken out by Chuidian, the proceeds of which were
fraudulently diverted, it is entitled to the issuance of the writ of attachment to protect its rights
as creditor.
5) Chuidians absence from the country was considered by the Sandiganbayan to be the most
compelling ground for the issuance of the writ.
Almost four (4) years after the issuance of the order of attachment, Chuidian filed a motion to
lift the attachment based on the following grounds:
1) He had returned to the Philippines, and considering that his absence was the most compelling
ground for the issuance of the writ, the latter should be lifted.
2) There was no evidence at all of initial fraud or subsequent concealment except for the
affidavit submitted by the PCGG Chairman whose statement is hearsay since he was not a
witness to the litigated incidents, was never presented as a witness by the Republic and thus
was not subject to cross-examination.
3) He denies that he ever disposed of his assets to defraud the Republic, and there is nothing in
the records that support the Sandiganbayans erroneous conclusion on the matter.
4) He was never a defendant in any other pending criminal action.
5) He was not guilty of fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation. L/C was not a
product of fraudulent transactions but the result of court-approved settlement.
6) Should the attachment be allowed to continue, he will be deprived of his property without
due process. The L/C was payment to Chuidian in exchange for the assets he turned over to
the Republic. Said assets had already been sold by the Republic and cannot be returned to
Chuidian should the government succeed in depriving him of the proceeds of the L/C.
7) Finally, throughout the 4 years that the preliminary attachment had been in effect, the govt
had not set the case for hearing. The case itself should be dismissed for laches owing to the
Republics failure to prosecute its action for an unreasonable length of time. Accordingly, the
preliminary attachment, being only a temporary or ancillary remedy, must be lifted and the PNB
ordered to immediately pay the proceeds of the L/C to Chuidian.
The Republic opposed e motion and contended that allowing the foreign judgment as a basis for
the lifting of the attachment would essentially amount to an abdication of the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan to hear and decide the ill gotten wealth cases lodged before it in deference to
the judgment of foreign courts.
The Sandganbayan denied petitioners motion and also the latters subsequent MR.
ISSUE:
WON the writ of preliminary attachment should be lifted as a result of petitioners return to the
country and his averments that there was no fraud in incurring the obligation
HELD: No
*Preliminary attachment issued upon a ground which is at the same time the
applicants cause of action. When the preliminary attachment is issued upon a ground which
is at the same time the applicants cause of action, the defendant is not allowed to file a motion
to dissolve the attachment under Section 13 of Rule 57 by offering to show the falsity of the
factual averments in the plaintiffs application and affidavits on which the writ was based and
consequently that the writ based thereon had been improperly or irregularly issued the reason
being that the hearing on such a motion for dissolution of the writ would be tantamount to a
trial of the merits of the action. In other words, the merits of the action would be ventilated at a
mere hearing of a motion, instead of at the regular trial.
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS v CA G.R. No. 115678, G.R. No. 119723
February 23, 2001
While the Motion refers to the transaction complained of as involving trust receipts, the violation
of the terms of which is qualified by law as constituting estafa, it does not follow that a writ of
attachment can and should automatically issue. Petitioner cannot merely cite Section 1(b) and
(d), Rule 57, of the Revised Rules of Court, as mere reproduction of the rules, without more,
cannot serve as good ground for issuing a writ of attachment. An order of attachment cannot be
issued on a general averment, such as one ceremoniously quoting from a pertinent rule.
To sustain an attachment on this ground, it must be shown that the debtor in contracting the
debt or incurring the obligation intended to defraud the creditor. The fraud must relate to the
execution of the agreement and must have been the reason which induced the other party into
giving consent which he would not have otherwise given. To constitute a ground for attachment
in Section 1 (d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, fraud should be committed upon contracting the
obligation sued upon. A debt is fraudulently contracted if at the time of contracting it the debtor
has a preconceived plan or intention not to pay, as it is in this case. Fraud is a state of mind and
need not be proved by direct evidence but may be inferred from the circumstances attendant in
each case.
MABAYO FARMS v CA G.R. No. 140058. August 1, 2002
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to final judgment,
requiring a person to refrain from a particular act. As an ancillary or preventive remedy, a writ of
preliminary injunction may therefore be resorted to by a party to protect or preserve his rights
and for no other purpose during the pendency of the principal action. Its object is to preserve
the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard. It is not a cause of action in itself but
merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. Thus, a person who is not a party in the
main suit, like private respondent in the instant case, cannot be bound by an ancillary writ, such
as the writ of preliminary injunction issued against the defendants in Civil Case No. 6695. He
cannot be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger.

The merits of the action in which a writ of preliminary attachment has been issued are not
triable on a motion for dissolution of the attachment; otherwise an applicant for the lifting of the
writ could force a trial of the merits of the case on a mere motion.

There are only two ways of quashing a writ of attachment: (a) by filing a counterbound
immediately; or (b) by moving to quash on the ground of improper and irregular issuance.
These grounds for the dissolution of an attachment are fixed in Rule 57 of the Rules of Court
and the power of the Court to dissolve an attachment is circumscribed by the grounds specified
therein. Petitioners motion to lift attachment failed to demonstrate any infirmity or defect in the
issuance of the writ of attachment; neither did he file a counterbond.

JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS v SANDOVAL G.R. No. 135830
FACTS:
Carlos filed a Complaint in the RTC against Sandoval. He claimed that he was the sole
compulsory heir of his parents and he has survived his brother Teofilo who died intestate in
1992.
Carlos claimed that prior to their fathers death in 1963, Teofilo developed a scheme to save
the elder Carloss estate from inheritance taxes. Felix assented to the plan and Carlos entered
into certain agreements with Sandoval in connection with the subject properties. Subsequently,
Carlos discovered that Sandoval and his brother were never validly married (no marriage
license).
Carlos sought to nullify the agreements with Sandoval for want of consideration. Carlos prayed
of the RTC to declare the alleged marriage between Teofilo and Sandoval void ab initio,
provided that Teofilo died without issue, order that new titles covering the subject properties be
issued in the name of Carlos and require Sandoval to restitute Carlos in the amount of
P18,924,800.00.
Carlos likewise prayed for the issuance of the provisional relief of PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT
which the RTC granted. Carlos posted a bond for P20M issued by SIDDCOR Insurance
Corporation (SIDDCOR). Shortly thereafter, a Notice of Garnishment was served upon the PNB
over the deposit accounts maintained by respondents.
Respondents filed an URGENT MOTION TO DISCHARGE THE WRIT OF ATTACHMENT. The
RTC denied the motion. Thus, respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari.
o CA ordered the discharge and dissolution of the Writ of Attachment and Notice of
Garnishment. The CA found that there was no sufficient cause of action to warrant the
preliminary attachment. Carlos elevated the said Decision to this Court by way of Petition for
Review on Certiorari, but the Court denied Carloss Petition and thus the CA Decision ordering
the dissolution of the Writ of Attachment and Notice of Garnishment became final.
Meanwhile, the hearing on Carloss Complaint ensued before the RTC. Respondents duly filed
their Answer and thereafter filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. The RTC rendered a
summary judgment in favor of Carlos. Upon promulgation of the Summary Judgment, Carlos
moved before the RTC for execution pending appeal, which was granted upon the filing of a
bond.
Respondents
o Filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Summary Judgment Denied
o Appealed the RTC Decision to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 53229
o In CA-G.R. CV No. 53229, respondents filed a Motion for Judgment On the Attachment Bond.
They noted that the CA had already ruled that the Writ of Preliminary Attachment issued by the
RTC was improperly granted and that its Decision, as affirmed by the SC, had attained finality.
Accordingly, they were entitled to damages under Section 20, Rule 57 of the then Rules of Civil
Procedure, which governed claims for damages on account of unlawful attachment.
Resolution (3/2301998): The Court of Appeals deemed that the case may be already be
referred to the Raffle Committee for assignment to a ponente for study and report; denied
without elaboration Carlos MTD.
o Carlos filed a MR.
o Sandoval also filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, arguing that under the Revised
Internal Rules of the CA (RIRCA), the case may be re-raffled for assignment for study and report
only after there is a resolution that the case is deemed submitted for decision. They pointed out
that re-raffle could not yet be effected, as there were still pending incidents, particularly the
motions for reconsideration of Carlos and themselves, as well as the Motion for Judgment on
Attachment Bond.
CA promulgated two resolutions:
o FIRST: Denied Carloss Motion to Dismiss the Appeal and Motion for Suspension, but explained
the reasons for such denial.
o SECOND (THE assailed Resolution): CA resolved the Motion for Judgment on Attachment Bond
and ruled that it was not necessary for the determination of damages on the injunction bond to
await the decision on appeal. CA did not award moral and exemplary damages, but rendered
against the attachment bond, ordered SIDDCOR and Carlos to pay Sandoval. CA granted
respondents Motion for Immediate Execution.
G.R. No. 135830: Carlos argues that the CA could not have resolved the Motion for Judgment
on the Attachment Bond since the case had not yet been re-raffled under the two-raffle system
for study and report; that the CA erred in resolving the motion without conducting any hearing;
that the CA had no jurisdiction over the motion as the docketing fees had not yet been filed.
G.R. No. 136035: CA erred in ruling on the motion for damages without awaiting judgment in
the main case; granting that damages may be awarded, these should encompass only such
damages incurred during the pendency of the appeal; and that a hearing was necessary to
prove the claim for damages and the appellate court erred in granting the award for damages
despite lack of hearing.
G.R. No. 137743: Assails the allowance by the CA of the immediate execution of the award of
damages. SIDDCOR points out that no hearing was conducted on the Motion for Immediate
Execution despite the requirement in Section 2, Rule 39 that discretionary execution may only
issue upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing.
ISSUES: Whether or not
(1) The assailed judgment on the attachment bond could have been rendered, as it was, prior to
the adjudication of the main case;
(2) The CA properly complied with the hearing requirement under Section 20, Rule 57 prior to
its judgment on the attachment bond;
(3) The CA properly ascertained the amount of damages it awarded in the judgment on the
attachment bond.
RULING:
Scope and Import of Section 20, Rule 57 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
Section 20 allows the application to be filed at any time before the judgment becomes
executory. It should be filed in the same case that is the main action and cannot be instituted
separately. It should be filed with the court having jurisdiction over the case at the time of the
application. The remedy provided by law is exclusive and by failing to file a motion for the
determination of the damages on time and while the judgment is still under the control of the
court, the claimant loses his right to damages.
The Motion for Judgment on the Attachment Bond filed by respondents was properly filed since
it was filed with the CA during the pendency of the appeal in the main case and also as an
incident thereto. The core questions though lie in the proper interpretation of the condition
under Section 20, Rule 57 that reads: Such damages may be awarded only after proper hearing
and shall be included in the judgment on the main case. Petitioners assert that there was no
proper hearing on the application for damages and that the CA had wrongfully acted on the
application in that it resolved it prior to the rendition of the main judgment.
Such Damages May Be Awarded Only After Proper Hearing
Both Carlos and SIDDCOR were duly notified of the Motion for Judgment on the Attachment
Bond and were required to file their respective comments. Carlos and SIDDCOR filed their
respective comments in opposition to private respondents motion. All the relevant parties had
been afforded the bare right to be heard on the matter.
In this case, there were no open court hearings conducted by the CA and it is precisely this
absence that the petitioners assert as fatal. HOWEVER, there is no express requirement under
the rule that the hearing be done in open court, or that the parties be allowed to confront
adverse witnesses to the claim of damages on the bond.
The PROPER HEARING contemplated would not merely encompass the right of the parties to
submit their respective positions, but also to present evidence in support of their claims, and to
rebut the submissions and evidence of the adverse party. The necessary elements to be
established in an application for damages are essentially factual: the fact of damage or injury
and the quantifiable amount of damages sustained. HOWEVER, there is no requirement under
the rule that a full-blown hearing on the merits should be had.
It must be noted that the judicial finding on the wrongfulness of the attachment was then
already CONCLUSIVE AND BEYOND REVIEW and that the amount of actual damages sustained
was likewise indubitable as it could be found in the official case record in CA-G.R. CV No. 53229.
The only matter of controversy that could be litigable through the traditional hearing would be
the matter of moral and exemplary damages, but the CA appropriately chose not to award such
damages.
It should be noted that this case poses a situation different from what is normally contemplated
under Section 20, Rule 57wherein the very wrongfulness of the attachment remains one of the
issues in contention in the main case. In such a case, there would be a greater demand for a
more extensive hearing on the application of damages.
And Shall be Included in the Judgment on the Main Case
Section 20, Rule 57 does state that the award of damages shall be included in the judgment on
the main case, and seemingly indicates that it should not be rendered prior to the adjudication
of the main case.
However, the determination that the attachment was wrongful did not come from the trial court
or any court having jurisdiction over the main action. It was rendered by the Court of Appeals in
the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction in the original action reviewing the propriety of the
issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Attachment against the private respondents. Said ruling
attained finality when it was affirmed by this Court.
The courts are bound to respect the conclusiveness of this final judgment, deeming as it does
the allowance by the RTC of preliminary attachment as improper. This conclusion is no longer
subject to review, even by the court called upon to resolve the application for damages on the
attachment bond. The only matter left for adjudication is the proper amount of damages.
Respondents are generally correct on the point that a case can only be deemed submitted for
decision only after all pending incidents are resolved. It is clear that the award for damages
need not be resolved before the case is submitted for decision, but should instead be resolved
and included in the judgment on the main case, or the decision on the Appeal by Certiorari filed
by the respondents.
Thus, the action of the Court of Appeals in resolving the application for damages even before
the main judgment was issued does not conform to Section 20, Rule 57. However, the special
particular circumstances of this case lead us to rule that such error is not mortal to the award of
damages.
The award of damages was made after a proper hearing had occurred wherein all the concerned
parties had been given the opportunity to present their arguments and evidence in support and
in rebuttal of the application for damages. The premature award of damages DOES NOT
NEGATE the fact that the parties were accorded due process, and indeed availed of their right to
be heard.
Even SIDDCOR acknowledges that there are recognized instances where the award of damages
or judgment on the attachment bond may not be included in the decision on the main case,
such as if the main case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and no claim for damages could
have been presented in the main case.
Scope of Damages Properly Awardable
The rule is thus well-settled that the bond issued upon an application for preliminary attachment
answers for all damages, incurred at whatever stage, which are sustained by reason of the
attachment. The award of actual damages by the Court of Appeals is thus proper in amount.
However, we disagree that the rate of legal interest be counted from the date of the unlawful
garnishment, or on 27 June 1996. Properly, interest should start to accrue only from the
moment it had been finally determined that the attachment was unlawful, since it is on that
basis that the right to damages comes to existence. In this case, legal interest commences from
the date the Court of Appeals decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 39267 became final, by reason of its
affirmation by this Court.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.
LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v CONTINENTAL WATCHMAN AGENCY
INCORPORATED G.R. No. 136114. January 22, 2004
Even assuming that the present petition is a proper remedy, still it is dismissible. Based on the
evidence presented by private respondent, the trial court found that all the requisites for the
issuance of an injunctive writ were present.13 Although petitioner presented evidence to rebut
private respondent's assertions, those will be better assessed and considered in the trial proper.
The assailed injunctive writ is not a judgment on the merits of the case, contrary to the
submission of petitioner, for a writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial
and incomplete evidence. The evidence submitted during the hearing of the incident is not
conclusive or complete for only a "sampling" is needed to give the trial court an idea of the
justification for the preliminary injunction pending the decision of the case on the merits.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v NOLASCO G.R. No. 155108. April 27, 2005
It was not proper for the RTC to cite Republic Act No. 8975 as basis for the dismissal of
Nolascos petition since the statute does not bar the institution of an action that seeks to enjoin
the implementation of a national government project, but merely the issuance of provisional
orders enjoining the same.
SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CORPORATION v PHILIPPINE CEMENT
MANUFACTURERS G.R. No. 158540. July 8, 2004
In that regard, Section 218 of the Tax Reform Act of 1997 prohibits any court from granting an
injunction to restrain the collection of any national internal revenue tax, fee or charge imposed
by the internal revenue code.
Arugay v judge lee {walay ma pull up na case}
xxxxxxxxxxx
 CITIBANK V CA 1999
FACTS:
1. In consideration for a loan with Citibank, N.A. (formerly First National City Bank), private
respondent Douglas Anama executed a promissory note to pay the plaintiff bank the sum
of P418,000.00 in sixty (60) equal successive monthly installments.
2. To secure payment of the loan, Anama also constituted a Chattel Mortgage in favor of
petitioner, on various machineries and equipment.
3. However, for failure and refusal of the private respondent to pay the monthly installments
despite repeated demands, petitioner filed a verified complaint against Anama in the Manila CFI
for the collection of his unpaid balance, for the delivery and possession of the chattels covered
preparatory to the foreclosure.
4. Anama submitted his Answer with Counterclaim, denying the material averments of the
complaint, and averring, inter alia that the remedy of replevin was improper and the writ of
seizure should be vacated.
5. The trial court, upon proof of default of the private respondent in the payment of the said
loan, issued an Order of Replevin. Despite the issuance of the said order however, actual
delivery of possession did not take place because of negotiations for an amicable settlement. A
pre-trial conference was held and the petitioner then took over private respondents business as
receiver. But when settlement failed, the lower court tried the case on the merits.
7. Petitioner presented a Motion for the Issuance of an Alias Writ of Seizure, ordering the sheriff
to seize and dispose of the properties involved.
8. Private respondent opposed the motion claiming, among others, (1) that Citibanks P400,000
replevin bond to answer for damages was grossly inadequate; (2) that he was never in default
to justify the seizure; xxx (4) that his supposed obligations with Citibank were fully secured and
his mortgaged properties are more than sufficient to secure payment thereof; xxx
9. The trial court issued an Order granting the Motion for Alias Writ of Seizure. Private
respondent moved for reconsideration of the aforesaid order but the same was denied. As a
consequence, the sheriff seized subject properties, dismantled and removed them from the
premises where they were installed, delivered them to petitioners possession and advertised
them for sale at public auction.
10. Private respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Injunction.
Finding that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolutions, the CA granted the petition, holding that the
provisions of the Rules of Court on Replevin and Receivership have not been complied with, in
that (1) there was no Affidavit of Merit accompanying the Complaint for Replevin; (2) the bond
posted by Citibank was insufficient; and (3) there was non-compliance with the requirement of a
receivers bond and oath of office. Hence the present petition for certiorari with TRO by Citibank.
ISSUE:
1. W/N CA erred in finding that the issuance of writ of replevin was improper
2. W/N CA erred in finding that the complaint did not comply with the requirements of an
affidavit of merit
3. W/N CA erred in finding that the bond posted by petitioner is insufficient
4. W/N CA erred in finding that petitioner did not comply with Section 5, Rule 59
HELD:
1. No. (See highlighted ruling.)
2. Qualified yes. While petitioner is correct insofar as it contends that substantial compliance
with the affidavit requirement may be permissible pursuant to Section 2, Rule 60 of the
ROC, petitioners complaint does notallege all the facts that should be set forth in an affidavit of
merit.
The Court held that the absence of an affidavit of merit is not fatal where the petition itself,
which is under oath, recites the following facts constitutive of the grounds for the petition: (1)
that plaintiff owns the property particularly describing the same, or that he is entitled to its
possession; (2) wrongful detention by defendant of said property; (3) that the property is not
taken by virtue of a tax assessment or fine pursuant to law or seized under execution or
attachment or, if it is so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure; and the (4) the actual value
of the property.
Although the complaint alleges that petitioner is entitled to the possession of subject properties
by virtue of the chattel mortgage executed by the private respondent, upon the latters default
on its obligation, and the defendants alleged wrongful detention of the same, the said
complaint does not state that subject properties were not taken by virtue of a tax assessment or
fine imposed pursuant to law or seized under execution or attachment or, if they were so seized,
that they are exempt from such seizure. Then too, petitioner stated the value of subject
properties at a probable value of P200,000.00, more or less.
Although respondents defense of lack of affidavit of merit is meritorious, procedurally, such
a defense is unfortunately no longer available for failure to plead the same in the Answer as
required by the omnibus motion rule.
3.Yes. ROC requires the plaintiff to give a bond, executed to the defendant in double the value
of the property as stated in the affidavit x x x . Since the valuation made by the petitioner has
been disputed by the respondent, the lower court should have determined first the actual value
of the properties. It was thus an error for the said court to approve the bond, which was based
merely on the probable value of the properties. A replevin bond is intended to answer for
damages and to indemnify the defendant against any loss that he may suffer by reason of its
being compelled to surrender the possession of the disputed property pending trial of the
action.
The remedies provided under Section 5, Rule 60, are alternative remedies. Conformably, a
defendant in a replevin suit may demand the return of possession of the property replevined by
filing a redelivery bond executed to the plaintiff in double the value of the property as stated in
the plaintiffs affidavit within the period specified in Sections 5 and 6. Alternatively, the
defendant may object to the sufficiency of the plaintiffs bond, or of the surety or sureties
thereon; but if he does so, he cannot require the return of the property by posting a counter-
bond pursuant to Sections 5 and 6. The private respondent did not opt to cause redelivery of
the properties to him by filing a counter-bond precisely because he objected to the sufficiency of
the bond posted by plaintiff. Therefore, he need not file a counter-bond or redelivery bond.
4. No. CA found that the requirements of Section 5, Rule 59 on receivership were not complied DELTAVENTURES v CABATO G.R. No. 118216. March 9, 2000
with by the petitioner, particularly the filing or posting of a bond and the taking of an
oath. However, the old Rules of Court which was in effect at the time this case was still at trial
a party, by filing its 3rd party claim with the deputy sheriff, it submitted itself to the jurisdiction
stage, a bond for the appointment of a receiver was not generally required of the applicant,
of the NLRC acting through the LA. The broad powers granted to the LA and to NLRC by Art.
except when the application was made ex parte. CA was right in finding a defect in such
217, 218 and 224 of the LC can only be interpreted as vesting in them jurisdiction over
assumption of receivership in that the requirement of taking an oath has not been complied
incidients arising from, in connection with or relating to labor disputes, as the controversy under
with.
consideration, to the exclusion of the regular courts. The RTC, being a co-equal body of the
For erroneously issuing the alias writ of seizure without inquiring into the
NLRC, has no jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or injunction to enjoin the execution of
sufficiency of the replevin bond and for allowing petitioner to assume receivership
the decision of the latter.
without the requisite oath, the Court of Appeals aptly held that the trial court acted
with grave abuse of discretion in dealing with the situation. Under the Revised Rules
of Court, the property seized under a writ of replevin is not to be delivered
immediately to the plaintiff. This is because a possessor has every right to be
respected in its possession and may not be deprived of it without due PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY v CA G.R. Nos. 115786-87. February 5, 1996
process. Petition DISMISSED.

CALUB V. CA
Replevin cannot be issued to recover a property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and
considered in the custody of the law. A replevin case against the State, without its consent,
cannot prosper.
FACTS:
Petitioner from DENR apprehended two vehicles carrying illegally sourced lumber and thereafter
confiscated them. The owners of the vehicles filed an action for replevin to recover the vehicles.
They won in the trial court on the ground that petitioner did not act in accordance with the law.
So petitioner appeals on the ground that the replevin in this case is a suit against the State and
is therefore valid.
ISSUE:
Moreover, Section 1 of P.D. No. 1818 clearly states that an injunction may not be issued to
prohibit any person or persons, entity or government official from undertaking the protected
activities enumerated therein. The prohibition, therefore, applies regardless of whether or not
the person or entity being enjoined is a public or a private person or entity, provided that the
purpose of the law to protect essential government projects in pursuit of economic development
is attained.
HB zachry v CA
For the guidance of all concerned, the Court reiterates and reaffirms the proposition that writs of
attachment may properly issue ex parte provided that the Court is satisfied that the relevant
requisites therefor have been fulfilled by the applicant, although it may, in it's discretion, require
prior hearing on the application with notice to the defendant; but that levy on property pursuant
to the writ thus issued may not be validly effected unless preceded, or contemporaneously
accompanied, by service on the defendant of summons, a copy of the complaint (and of the
appointment of guardian ad litem,if any), the application for attachment (if not incorporated in
but submitted separately from the complaint), the order of attachment, and the plaintiff's
attachment bond.

1) Whether or not a replevin may be instituted for recovery of property under custodia legis.
2) Whether or not replevin in this case is a suit against the State

RULING:

1) No! Replevin cannot be issued to recover a property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process
and considered in the custody of the law.

2) Yes! This suit is not valid because the State may not be sued without its consent or when the
public official acted in bad faith in the discharge of his duties. It has been established that the
DENR acted within its authority. Hence, its action is the action of the State.

ADLAWAN v. TORRES
G.R. No. 6595758, July 5, 1994
FACTS
Respondent Aboitiz and Company sought to collect from petitioners a sum of money for unpaid
loan amortizations, technical and managerial services rendered and unpaid installments of the
equipment provided by Aboitiz. Acting on an ex parte application for attachment, the Executive
Judge issued an order directing the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment against the
property of petitioners upon the filing by respondent Aboitiz of an attachment bond.
Petitioners, however, moved for a bill of particulars and to set aside the ex parte writ of
attachment. Finding merit on the motion, the court ordered the lifting of the writ and
consequently the discharge of the levied property.
Respondent Aboitiz filed a notice of dismissal of its complaint, which was confirmed by the
court, emphasizing that all orders of the court issued prior to the filing of the notice of dismissal
had been rendered functus oficio and all pending incidents moot and academic.
Adlawan filed a motion for implementation and enforcement of the order. However, this was
denied by the court on account of the filing by respondent Aboitiz before another court of an
action for delivery of personal property (replevin) and the filing by Adlawan before the same
court of an action for damages in connection with the seizure of his property under the writ of
attachment.
In the replevin suit, the court ordered the seizure and delivery of the property. Alleging that
while his office was in Cebu City,
Adlawan was a resident of Minglanilla and hence, Lapu Lapu City court should not entertain the
action for replevin for lack of jurisdiction. Adlawan filed an omnibus motion praying for
reconsideration and dissolution of the writ of seizure, the retrieval of his seized property and
dismissal of the complaintDENIED. MR also denied.
The 3rd Division of the SC ruled that since the attachment is an ancillary remedy, the withdrawal
of the complaint left it with no leg to stand on. Respondent Aboitiz filed MRdenied with
finality. Second MRSC ruled that the properties to be returned are only those held by Aboitiz
by virtue of writ of attachment that has been declared nonexistent.
Again, Aboitiz filed against petitioners 2 complaints for collection of sum of money with prayers
for the issuance of writs of
attachment due to money and equipment loaned by Aboitiz to petitioners. Complaint 1: Judge
Torres ordered the issuance of a writ
of attachment upon filing of P5M bond. Complaint 2: Judge Jacinto ordered issuance of writ of
attachmet upon filing of P2.5M bond. A writ was issued by sheriff for complaint 1, but not for
complaint 2.
ISSUE: Whether it was proper for the Judge to order the issuance of the writs of attachment in
the consolidated cases for collection of sums
of money NO.
RULING: The affidavit submitted by Aboitiz in support of its prayer for the writ of attachment
does NOT meet the requirements of Rule 57 of RoC regarding the allegations on impending
fraudulent removal, concealment and disposition of defendants property.
To justify a preliminary attachment, the removal or disposal must have been made with intent to
defraud defendants creditors.
Proof of fraud is mandated by paragraphs (d) and (e) of Section 1, Rule 57 on the grounds upon
which attachment may issue. Thus, the factual basis on defendants intent to defraud must be
clearly alleged in the affidavit in support of the prayer for the writ of attachment if not so
specifically alleged in the verified complaint.
It is evident from said affidavit that the prayer for attachment rests on the mortgage by
petitioners of 11 parcels of land in Cebu, which encumbrance respondent Aboitiz considered as
fraudulent concealment of property to its prejudice. We find, however, that there is no factual
allegation, which may constitute as a valid basis for the contention that the mortgage was in
fraud of respondent Aboitiz. As this Court said in JardineManila Finance, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 171 SCRA 636 (1989), "[T]he general rule is that the affidavit is the foundation of the
writ, and if none be filed or one be filed which wholly fails to set out some facts required by law
to be stated therein, there is no jurisdiction and the proceedings are null and void." Bare
allegation that an encumbrance of a property is in fraud of the creditor does not suffice. Factual
bases for such conclusion must
be clearly averred.
The execution of a mortgage in favor of another creditor is not conceived by the Rules as one of
the means of fraudulently disposing of one's property. By mortgaging a piece of property, a
debtor merely subjects it to a lien but ownership thereof is not parted with. Furthermore, the
inability to pay one's creditors is not necessarily synonymous with fraudulent intent not to honor
an obligation. Consequently, when petitioners filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order
directing the issuance of the writ of attachment, respondent Judge should have considered it as
a motion for the discharge of the attachment and should have conducted a hearing or required
submission of counteraffidavits from the petitioners, if only to gather facts in support of the
allegation of fraud (Jopillo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 167 SCRA 247 [1988]). This is what Section
13 of Rule 57 mandates.
This procedure should be followed because, as the Court has time and again said, attachment is
a harsh, extraordinary and summary remedy and the rules governing its issuance must be
construed strictly against the applicant. Verily, a writ of attachment can only be granted on
concrete and specific grounds and not on general averments quoting perfunctorily the words of
the Rules (D.P. Lub Oil Marketing Center, Inc. v. Nicolas, 191 SCRA 423 [1990]).
The judge before whom the application is made exercises full discretion in considering the
supporting evidence proffered by the
applicant. One overriding consideration is that a writ of attachment is substantially a writ of
execution except that it emanates at the
beginning, instead of at the termination of the suit
BA FINANCE CORPORATION v CA G.R. No. 102998. July 5, 1996
Replevin, broadly understood, is both a form of principal remedy and of a provisional relief. It
may refer either to the action itself, i.e., to regain the possession of personal chattels being
wrongfully detained from the plaintiff by another, or to the provisional remedy that would allow
the plaintiff to retain the thing during the pendency of the action and hold it pendente lite. The
action is primarily possessory in nature and generally determines nothing more than the right of
possession
Consequently, the person in possession of the property sought to be replevied is ordinarily the
proper and only necessary party defendant, and the plaintiff is not required to so join as
defendants other persons claiming a right on the property but not in possession thereof.
 DISTILLERIA WASHINGTON v LA TONDEA DISTILLERS, INC. G.R. No. 120961.
October 2, 1997
Since replevin as a possessory action is dependent upon ownership, it is relevant to ask: Did La
Tondea Distillers, Inc. transfer ownership of its marked bottles or containers when it sold its
products in the market? Were the marked bottles or containers part of the products sold to the
public?
In our decision sought to be reconsidered, we categorically answered the question in the
affirmative in this wise:
R.A. No. 623 does not disallow the sale or transfer of ownership of the marked bottles or
containers. In fact, the contrary is implicit in the law thus:
SEC. 5. x x x.
SEC. 6. x x x
Scarcely disputed are certain and specific industry practices in the sale of gin. The manufacturer
sells the product in marked containers, through dealers, to the public in supermarkets, grocery
shops, retail stores and other sales outlets. The buyer takes the item; he is neither required to
return the bottle nor required to make a deposit to assure its return to the seller. He could
return the bottle and get a refund. A number of bottles at times find their way to commercial
users. It cannot be gainsaid that ownership of the containers does pass on the consumer albeit
subject to the statutory limitations on the use of the registered containers and to the trademark
rights of the registrant. The statement in Section 5 of R.A. 623 to the effect that the sale of
beverage contained the said containers shall not include the sale of the containers unless
specifically so provided is not a rule of proscription. It is a rule of construction that, in keeping
with the spirit and intent of the law, establishes at best a presumption (of non-conveyance of
the container) and which by no means can be taken to be either interdictive or conclusive in
character. Upon the other hand, LTDIs sales invoice, stipulating that the sale does not include
the bottles with the blown-in marks of ownership of La Tondea Distillers, cannot affect those
who are not privies thereto.
In plain terms, therefore, La Tondea not only sold its gin products but also the marked bottles or
containers, as well. And when these products were transferred by way of sale, then ownership
over the bottles and all its attributes (jus utendi, jus abutendi, just fruendi, jus
disponendi) passed to the buyer. It necessarily follows that the transferee has the right to
possession of the bottles unless he uses them in violation of the original owners registered or
incorporeal rights.
After practically saying that La Tondea has surrendered ownership and consequently, possession
of the marked bottles or container, it is incongrous and, certainly, it does not seem fair and just
to still allow La Tondea, citing the prima facie presumption of illegal use under Sec. 3 of R.A.
623., to retain possession of the seized bottles by simply requiring payment of just
compensation to petitioner.
The pertinent provisions of R.A. 623 are as follows:
SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful for any person, without the written consent of the manufacturer,
bottler, or seller (underscoring supplied) who has successfully registered the marks of ownership
in accordance with the provisions of the next preceding section, to fill such bottles, boxes, kegs,
barrels, steel cylinders, tanks, flasks, accumulators, or other similar containers so marked or
stamped, for the purpose of sale, or to sell, dispose of, buy or traffic in, or wantonly destroy the
same, whether filled or not to use the same for drinking vessels or glasses or drain pipes,
foundation pipers, for any other purpose than that registered by the manufacturer, bottler or
seller. Any violation of this section shall be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand
pesos or imprisonment of not more than one year or both.
SEC. 3. The use by any person other than the registered manufacturer, bottler or seller, without
written permission of the latter(underscoring supplied) of any such bottle, cask, barrel, keg, box,
steel cylinders, tanks, flask, accumulators, or other similar containers, or the possession thereof
without written permission of the manufacturer, by any junk dealer or dealer in casks, barrels,
keg, boxes, steel cylinders, tanks, flask, accumulators or other similar containers, the same
being duly marked or stamped and registered as herein provided, shall give rise to a prima
facie presumption that such use or possession is unlawful.
xxx
SEC. 5. No action shall be brought under this Act (underscoring supplied) against any person to
whom the registered manufacturer, bottler or seller, has transferred by way of
sale, (underscoring supplied) any of the containers herein referred to, but the sale of the
beverage contained in the said containers shall not include the sale of the containers unless
specifically so provided.
In resolving that petitioner is the owner of the bottles, this Court applied Section 5 of R.A. 623;
and in withholding possession of the bottles from the petitioner and in concluding that use or
possession thereof without the written permission of the registered owner would
constitute prima facie presumption of illegal use, this Court invoked Sections 2 and 3 of the
same law.
A careful reading of Sections 2, 3 and 5 of R.A. 623 would lead to the conclusion that they
contemplate situations separate and distinct from each other. Section 2 prohibits any person
from using, selling or otherwise disposing of registered containers without the written consent of
the registrant. Such rights belong exclusively to the registrant.Under Section 3, mere possession
of such registered containers without the written consent of the registrant is prima
facie presumed unlawful.
It appears - and this is the critical point - that Sections 2 and 3 apply only when the filling up of
the bottle or the use of the bottle is without the written permission of the registered
manufacturer, bottler, or seller, who has registered the marks of ownership of the bottles. It is
thus implicit that Sections 2 and 3 apply only when the registered manufacturer, bottler, or
seller retain ownership of the bottles.
Upon the other hand, when the bottles have been transferred by way of sale, Section 5 applies,
thereby precluding the institution of any action under this Act, meaning to say, including any
action under Sections 2 and 3.
The general rule on ownership, therefore, must apply and petitioner be allowed to enjoy all the
rights of an owner in regard the bottles in question, to wit: the jus utendi or the right to receive
from the thing what it produces; the jus abutendi or the right to consume the thing by its use;
the jus disponendi or the power of the owner to alienate, encumber, transform and even
destroy the thing owned; and the jus vindicandi or the right to exclude from the possession of
the thing owned any other person to whom the owner has not transmitted such thing. What is
proscribed is the use of the bottles in infringement of anothers trademark or incorporeal rights.
Since the Court has found that the bottles have been transferred by way of sale then, La Tondea
has relinquished all its proprietary rights over the bottles in favor of Distilleria Washington who
has obtained them in due course. Now as owner, it can exercise all attributes of ownership over
the bottles. This is the import of the decision that La Tondea had transferred ownership over its
marked bottles or containers when it sold its gin products to the public. While others may argue
that Section 5 is applicable only to the immediate transferee of the marked bottles or container,
this matter is best discussed where the applicability of Sec. 5, R.A. 623 is squarely raised. It
must be recalled, however, that this is a case of replevin, not a violation of the "trademark
protection of the registrant" under R.A. 623 or of the Trademark Law.

SERVICEWIDE SPEACIALIST v. CA
FACTS:
1. Leticia Laus purchased on credit a Colt Galant xxx from Fortune Motors (Phils.) Corporation
and executed a promissory note for the amount of P56,028.00, inclusive of 12% annual interest,
payable within a period of 48 months. In case of default in the payment of any installment, the
total principal sum, together with the interest, shall become immediately due and payable.
2. As a security for the promissory note, a chattel mortgage was constituted over the said motor
vehicle, with a deed of assignment incorporated therein such that the credit and mortgage rights
were assigned by Fortune Motors Corp. in favor of Filinvest Credit Corporation with the consent
of the mortgagor-debtor Laus.
3. Filinvest in turn assigned the credit in favor of Servicewide Specialists, Inc.
4. Laus failed to pay the monthly installment for April 1977 and the succeeding 17 months.
Servicewide demanded payment of the entire outstanding balance with interests but Laus failed
to pay despite formal demands.
5. As a result of Laus failure to settle her obligation, or at least to surrender possession of the
motor vehicle for foreclosure, Servicewide instituted a complaint for replevin, impleading Hilda
Tee and John Dee in whose custody the vehicle was believed to be at the time of the filing of
the suit. Plaintiff alleged, among others, that it had superior lien over the mortgaged vehicle.
The court approved the replevin bond.
6. Alberto Villafranca filed a third party claim contending that he is the absolute owner of the
subject motor vehicle after purchasing it from a certain Remedios Yang free from all lien and
emcumbrances; and that on July 1984, the said automobile was taken from his residence by
Deputy Sheriff Bernardo Bernabe pursuant to the seizure order issued by the court a quo.
7. Upon motion of the plaintiff below, Villafranca was substituted as defendant and summons
was served upon him. Villafranca moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that
there is another action pending between the same parties before the Makati RTC. The court
granted the the motion but subsequently set aside the order of dismissal. For failure to file his
Answer as required by the court a quo, Villafranca was declared in default and plaintiffs
evidence was received ex parte.
8. The lower court later on dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. Its motion for
reconsideration having been denied, petitioner appealed to CA on the ground that a suit for
replevin aimed at the foreclosure of a chattel is an action quasi in rem, and does not require the
inclusion of the principal obligor in the Complaint.
9. CA affirmed the RTC decision. It also denied petitioners MR, hence, the present petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
W/N a case for replevin may be pursued against the defendant, Alberto Villafranca, without
impleading the absconding debtor-mortgagor
HELD:
No. Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of Court requires that an applicant for replevin must show that
he is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or is entitled to the
possession thereof. Where the right of the plaintiff to the possession of the specified property is
so conceded or evident, the action need only be maintained against him who so possesses the
property. In rem action est per quam rem nostram quae ab alio possidetur petimus, et semper
adversus eum est qui rem possidet.
However, in case the right of possession on the part of the plaintiff, or his authority
to claim such possession or that of his principal, is put to great doubt (a contending
party may contest the legal bases for plaintiffs cause of action or an adverse and
independent claim of ownership or right of possession may be raised by that party),
it could become essential to have other persons involved and impleaded for a
complete determination and resolution of the controversy.
In a suit for replevin, a clear right of possession must be established. The conditions essential
for foreclosure of chattel mortgage would be to show, firstly, the existence of the chattel
mortgage and, secondly, the default of the mortgagor. Since the mortgagees right of
possession is conditioned upon the actual fact of default which itself may be controverted, the
inclusion of other parties, like the debtor or the mortgagor himself, may be required in order to
allow a full and conclusive determination of the case. Laus, being an indispensable party, should
have been impleaded in the complaint for replevin and damages. An indispensable party is one
whose interest will be affected by the courts action in the litigation, and without whom no final
determination of the case can be had. Petition DENIED.
GARAYBLAS v ATIENZA G.R. No. 149493 June 22, 2006
The main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or ancillary remedy of preliminary
injunction which cannot exist except only as part or an incident of an independent action or
proceeding. As a matter of course, in an action for injunction, the auxiliary remedy of
preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, may issue. Under the law, the main
action for injunction seeks a judgment embodying a final injunction which is distinct from, and
should not be confused with, the provisional remedy of preliminary injunction, the sole object of
which is to preserve the status quo until the merits can be heard. A preliminary injunction is
granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order. It persists
until it is dissolved or until the termination of the action without the court issuing a final
injunction.
LIMITLESS POTENTIALS v CA G.R. No. 164459 April 24, 2007
A preliminary injunction should not establish new relations between the parties, but merely
maintain or re-establish the pre-existing relationship between them.
The bond insures with all practicable certainty that the defendant may sustain no ultimate loss
in the event that the injunction could finally be dissolved.[32]Consequently, the bond may
obligate the bondsmen to account to the defendant in the injunction suit for all damages, or
costs and reasonable counsel's fees, incurred or sustained by the latter in case it is determined
that the injunction was wrongfully issued.[33] Likewise, the posting of a bond in connection with
a preliminary injunction does not operate to relieve the party obtaining an injunction from any
and all responsibility for damages that the writ may thereby cause. It merely gives additional
protection to the party against whom the injunction is directed. It gives the latter a right of
recourse against either the applicant or his surety or against both.[34]
The contention of the petitioner, thus, is tenable. Attorney's fees, litigation costs, and costs of
delay can be recovered from the injunction bond as long as it can be shown that said expenses
were sustained by the party seeking recovery by reason of the writ of preliminary injunction,
which was later on determined as not to have been validly issued and that the party who
applied for the said writ was not entitled thereto. The case of Aquino v. Socorro,[35] citing the
case of Pacis v. Commission on Elections,[36]holds that the dissolution of the injunction, even if
the injunction was obtained in good faith, amounts to a determination that the injunction was
wrongfully obtained and a right of action on the injunction bond immediately accrues. It is also
erroneous for the appellate court to rule that petitioner is not entitled to claim damages from
the injunction bond simply because the preliminary injunction was directed against the MeTC
and not against the petitioner. The MeTC does not stand to suffer damages from the injunction
because it has no interest or stake in the Petition pending before it. Damage or loss is suffered
by the party whose right to pursue its case is suspended or delayed, which in this case, is the
petitioner. Upon issuance of the writ of injunction, it is the petitioner who will stand to suffer
damages for the delay in the principal case because, had it not been for the injunction, the
petitioner would not have incurred additional expenses for attending the separate hearings on
the injunction, and the RTC can already decide the main case and make a prompt determination
of the respective rights of the parties therein. Hence, even if the preliminary injunction was
directed against the MeTC and not against the petitioner, it is the latter which has the right to
recover from the injunction bond the damages which it might have suffered by reason of the
said injunction.
GARRIDO v TORTOGO G.R. No. 156358
The controlling reason for the existence of the judicial power to issue the writ of injunction is
that the court may thereby prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of
the parties before their claims can be thoroughly investigated and advisedly adjudicated.
The application for the writ rests upon an alleged existence of an emergency or of a special
reason for such an order to issue before the case can be regularly heard, and the essential
conditions for granting such temporary injunctive relief are that the complaint alleges facts that
appear to be sufficient to constitute a cause of action for injunction and that on the entire
showing from both sides, it appears, in view of all the circumstances, that the injunction is
reasonably necessary to protect the legal rights of plaintiff pending the litigation.
A writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event and is the strong arm of equity or a
transcendent remedy. It is granted only to protect actual and existing substantial rights. Without
actual and existing rights on the part of the applicant, and in the absence of facts bringing the
matter within the conditions for its issuance, the ancillary writ must be struck down for being
issued in grave abuse of discretion. Thus, injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse,
which is merely contingent, and which may never arise, or to restrain an act which does not give
rise to a cause of action.
Preysler, Jr. v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 158141, July 11, 2006
Facts:
Private respondent Far East Enterprises, Inc., owns Tali Beach Subdivision. Petitioner Fausto
Preysler, Jr. and his wife owned lots therein and also two parcels of land adjacent to the
subdivision. These two parcels were bounded on the North and West by the China Sea and on
the East and South by the subdivision. To gain access to the two parcels petitioner has to pass
through private respondents subdivision. Petitioner offered P10,000 for the easement of right of
way but private respondent refused it for being grossly inadequate. Private respondent then
barricaded the front gate of petitioners property to prevent petitioner and his family from using
the subdivision roads to access said parcels.
The petitioner filed, with the Regional Trial Court a Complaint for Right of Way with prayer for
preliminary prohibitive injunction against private respondent. After due hearing, the trial court,
in an Order dated November 5, 1996, held that barricading the property to prevent the
petitioner from entering it deprived him of his ownership rights and caused irreparable damage
and injuries.
Accordingly, the writ of preliminary injunction was issued on December 12, 1996. On July 8,
1998, petitioner used the subdivision road to transport heavy equipment and construction
materials to develop his property. Consequently, private respondent moved to dissolve the writ
claiming that the petitioner violated its right to peaceful possession and occupation of Tali Beach
Subdivision when petitioner brought in heavy equipment and construction materials. Private
respondent maintained that the damages that may be caused to it far outweigh the alleged
damages sought to be prevented by the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellate court exceeded its jurisdiction and authority in restricting or
limiting a passage over the Tali Beach Subdivision roads to ingress and egress of petitioner
and membersof the latters household in violation of the law on legal easement of right of way.
Held:
Under Article 656 of the New Civil Code, if the right of way is indispensable for the construction,
repair, improvement, alteration or beautification of a building, a temporary easement is granted
after payment of indemnity for the damage caused to the servient estate. In our view, however,
indispensable in this instance is not to be construed literally. Great inconvenience is sufficient.
In the present case, the trial court found that irrespective of which route petitioner used in
gaining access to his property, he has to pass private respondents subdivision. Thus the Court
agrees that petitioner may be granted a temporary easement. This temporary easement in the
original writ differs from the permanent easement of right of way now being tried in the main
case.
The law provides that temporary easement is allowed only after the payment of the proper
indemnity. As there are neither sufficient allegations nor established facts in the record to help
this Court determine the proper amount of indemnity, it is best to remand the case to the trial
court for such determination.
Additionally, the Court finds the installation of electric power lines a permanent easement not
covered by Article 656. Article 656 deals only with the temporary easement of passage. Neither
casn installation of electric power lines be subject to a preliminary injunction for it is not part of
the status quo. Besides, more damage would be done to both parties if the power lines
are installedonly to be removed later upon a contrary judgment of the court in the main case.
HERNANDEZ V. NAPOCOR
Injunction Against High-Voltage Lines Adjacent to Residences
Facts Sometime in 1996, Respondent National Power Corporation began the construction of 29
steel poles in connection with its 230 kilo-volt Sucat-Araneta- Balintawak Power Transmission
Project. These poles, each of which was 53.4 meters high, were to support overhead tension
cables that would pass through Dasmarias Village, Makati City, where petitioners homes were
located. Trouble ensued when petitioners discovered some scientific studies, finding that
electromagnetic fields created by high-voltage power lines could cause a range of illnesses from
cancer to leukemia. In a privileged speech, Representative Francis Joseph G. Escudero
denounced the cavalier manner in which Napocor had ignored safety and consultation
requirements. An explanation was demanded by Representative Arnulfo Fuentebella,
chairperson of the House Committee on Energy. Respondent admitted that it was still
negotiating with petitioners, and that it had come up with four options to address the problem:
transfer the line, maintain a 12-meter distance from the village, construct an underground line,
or reroute along C-5 and South Luzon Expressway. These negotiations resulted in an impasse.
On March 9, 2000, petitioners filed a Complaint for Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against Napocor. Judge
Francisco B. Ibay issued an Order temporarily restraining it from energizing and transmitting
high-voltage electric current through the project. This Order was extended from 2 days to 18
days.[1] Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for
TRO and Preliminary Injunction and sought the dismissal of the Complaint, on the ground that
the trial court had no jurisdiction.[2] It cited Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1818, which
states:
Section 1. No Court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any
restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction
in any case, dispute, or
controversy involving an infrastructure project, or a mining, fishery, forest
or other natural resource development project of the government, or any
public utility operated by the government, including among other public
utilities for transport of the goods or commodities, stevedoring and arrastre
contracts, to prohibit any person or persons, entity or government official
from proceeding with or continuing the execution or implementation of any
such project, or the operation of such public utility or pursuing any lawful
activity necessary for such execution, implementation or operation.
While the Petition was pending before the CA, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction to stop Napocor from installing high voltage cables and from energizing
and transmitting high-voltage electric current through those cables.[3]
On May 3, 2000, the CA reversed the trial courts Order on the ground that Section 1 of
Presidential Decree 1818 clearly proscribed injunctions against infrastructure projects. It further
cited Supreme Court Circulars 2-91 and 13-93 dated March 15, 1991, and March 5, 1993,
respectively.[4]
Petitioners filed the instant Petition, contending that the proscription in PD 1818 should not be
applied to cases of extreme urgency, such as when the right to health and safety was hanging
on the balance.[5]
Issue: The issue was whether the trial court may temporarily restrain or preliminarily enjoin
Napocor from constructing and operating the 29 steel poles or towers, notwithstanding
Presidential Decree 1818
Courts RulingL In a unanimous Decision penned by Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario,[6] the
Court granted the Petition. It held that the prohibition contained in Presidential Decree 1818
extended only to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders against administrative acts, in
controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases. It did not cover
controversies involving questions of law, as those involved in the instant case.
What Presidential Decree 1818 aimed to avert was the untimely frustration of government
infrastructure projects, particularly by provisional remedies. Otherwise, the greater good would
suffer from the disruption of the pursuit of essential government projects or the frustration of
the economic development effort of the nation. PD No. 1818, however, was not meant to be a
blanket prohibition that would disregard the fundamental right to the health, safety and well-
being of a community, guaranteed by the Constitution.[7]
Indeed, the prohibition was not absolute. It only prohibited the courts from issuing injunctions
against administrative acts involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases.
Outside this dimension, the Supreme Court declared that courts could not be prevented from
exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts in cases involving questions of
law.[8]
The instant controversy involved questions of law. Petitioners raised the issues of whether there
was a violation of their constitutionally protected right to health, and whether respondent had
indeed violated the Local Government Code provision[10] on prior consultation with affected
communities. These questions of law removed the case from the protective mantle of
Presidential Decree 1818.[11]
Moreover, the issuance by the trial court of a preliminary injunction found legal support in
Section 3 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court,[12] which merely required a probable violation of the
applicants rights and a tendency to render the judgment
ineffectual. In the case at bar, there was adequate evidence on record to justify the conclusion
that the Napocor project would probably imperil the health and safety of petitioners.
First, petitioners presented copies of studies linking the incidence of illnesses,
such as cancer and leukemia, to exposure to electromagnetic fields.
Second, the Napocor brochure on its Quezon power project had a provision that power lines
should be located within safe distances from residences because of the danger concomitant with
high-voltage power.
Third, documents on record showed that respondent had made representations that it was
looking into the possibility of relocating the project, and that it had even undertaken a series of
negotiations and meetings with petitioners. These documents and negotiations suggested that
their health concerns were far from imaginary. If there was indeed no cause for concern, it
would not have come up with options to address their woes. Neither would Representative
Escudero have fired away strong words of censure in his privileged speech.[13]
While it was true that the issue of whether the transmission lines were safe was essentially
evidentiary in nature and pertained to the very merits of the action below, the Court found that
the possibility of health risks from exposure to electromagnetic radiation was within the realm of
a scientific scale of probability. It held that there was sufficient basis on record engendering a
cloud of doubt over the danger posed by the project upon the lives of petitioners. Indeed,
probability was enough for injunction to issue as a provisional remedy. In contrast, injunction as
a main action was resorted to when one needed to establish absolute certainty as basis for a
final and permanent injunction. Pending the final determination of the trial court on the main
case, it was prudent to preserve the status quo.[14]
The Supreme Court held that its circulars on the observance of PD 1818 did not suggest an
unbridled prohibition on the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
orders. What these circulars prohibited was the indiscriminate issuance of court injunctions.[15]
They simply enjoined judges to observe utmost caution, prudence and judiciousness in issuing
temporary restraining orders and in granting writs of preliminary injunction, so as to avoid any
suspicion that these measures were for considerations other than the strict merits of the
case.[16] Thus, there was nothing in the circulars that would tie the hands of the courts from
issuing a writ of preliminary injunction.[17]
This Decision did not seek to undermine the purpose of the Napocor project, which was aimed
at the common good of the people. But the Court recognized, too, that the primordial concern
should be the far-reaching irreversible effects to human safety, rather than the economic
benefits presumed by respondent. Of what use would modernization be if it proved to be a
scourge to an individuals fundamental right, not just to health and safety, but to the
preservation of life itself in all of its desired quality.
 SPS. GREGORIO AND JOSEFA YU VS. NGO YET TE
G.R. No. 155868 ISSUE:
February 6, 2007 Whether the appellate court erred in refusing to award actual, moral and exemplary damages
after it was established by final judgment that the writ of attachment was procured with no true
FACTS: ground for its issuance?
Spouses Gregorio and Josefa Yu (Spouses Yu) purchased from Ngo Yet Te (Te) bars of
detergent soap worth P594,240.00, and issued to the latter three postdated checks as payment HELD:
of the purchase price. When Te presented the checks at maturity for encashment, said To merit an award of actual damages arising from a wrongful attachment, the attachment
checkswere returned dishonored and stamped ACCOUNT CLOSED. Te demanded payment defendant must prove, with the best evidence obtainable, the fact of loss or injury
fromSpouses Yu but the latter did not heed her demands. Acting through her son and attorney- suffered and the amount thereof. Such loss or injury must be of the kind which is not
infact, Charry Sy (Sy), Te filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 75, Valenzuela, Metro only capable of proof but must actually be proved with a reasonable degree of
Manila, a Complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 4061-V-93, for Collection of Sum of Money and certainty. As to its amount, the same must be measurable based on specific facts,
Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Attachment. and not on guesswork or speculation. In particular, if the claim for actual damages
covers unrealized profits, the amount of unrealized profits must be established and
In support of her prayer for preliminary attachment, Te attached to her Complaint an Affidavit supported by independent evidence of the mean income of the business undertaking
executed by Sy that Spouses Yu were guilty of fraud in entering into the purchase agreement interrupted by the illegal seizure.
for they never intended to pay the contract price, and that, based on reliable information, they
were about to move or dispose of their properties to defraud their creditors. Upon Tes posting In the case at bar, the actual damages cannot be determined. Defendant-appellant Josefa Yu
of an attachment bond, the RTC issued an Order of Attachment/Levy[ dated March 29, 1993 on testified on supposed lost profits without clear and appreciable explanation. Despite her
the basis of which Sheriff Constancio Alimurung (Sheriff Alimurung) of RTC, Branch 19, Cebu submission of the used and unused ticket stubs, there was no evidence on the daily net income,
City levied and attached Spouses Yus properties in Cebu City consisting of one parcel of land the routes plied by the bus and the average fares for each route. The submitted basis is too
(known as Lot No. 11) and four units speculative and conjectural. No reports regarding the average actual profits and other evidence
of profitability necessary to prove the amount of actual damages were presented.
of motor vehicle, specifically, a Toyota Ford Fierra, a jeep, a Canter delivery van, and a
passenger bus. On April 21, 1993, Spouses Yu filed an Answer with counterclaim for damages Besides, based on the August 29, 1994 Manifestation, it would appear that long before the
arising from the wrongful attachment of their properties, specifically, actual damages amounting passenger bus was placed under preliminary attachment in Civil Case No. 4061-V-93,the same
to P1,500.00 per day; moral damages, P1,000,000.00; and exemplary damages, P50,000.00. had been previously attached by the Sheriff of Mandaue City in connection with another case
They also sought payment of P120,000.00 as attorneys fees and P80,000.00 as litigation and that it was placed in the Cebu Bonded Warehousing Corporation, Cebu City. Thus, Spouses
expenses. On the same date, Spouses Yu filed an Urgent Motion to Dissolve Writ of Preliminary Yu cannot complain that they were unreasonably deprived of the use of the passenger bus by
Attachment. They also filed a Claim Against Surety Bond in which they demanded payment from reason of the subsequent wrongful attachment issued in Civil Case No. 4061-V-93. Nor can they
Visayan Surety and Insurance Corporation (Visayan Surety), the surety which issued the also attribute to the wrongful attachment their failure to earn income or profit from the
attachment bond, of the sum of P594,240.00, representing the damages they allegedly operation of the passenger bus. Moreover, petitioners did not present evidence as to the
sustained as a consequence of the wrongful attachment of their properties. While the RTC did damages they suffered by reason of the wrongful attachment of Lot No. 11.
not resolve the Claim Against Surety Bond, it issued an Order dated May 3, 1993, discharging
from attachment the Toyota Ford Fierra, jeep, and Canter delivery van on humanitarian
grounds, but maintaining custody of Lot No. 11 and the passenger bus. Spouses Yu filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC denied. Dissatisfied, they filed with the CA a Petition
for Certiorari, a decision was rendered lifting the RTC Order of Attachment on their remaining
properties the court stated that Insolvency is not a ground for attachment especially when
defendant has not been shown to have committed any act intended to defraud its creditors Te
filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was later on denied by the CA, he then filed with SC a
Petition for Review on Certiorari but the same were denied for having been filed late and for
failure to show that a reversible error was committed by the CA in a resolution dated June 8,
1994. Thus, the finding of the CA in its September 14, 1993 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 31230
on the wrongfulness of the attachment/levy of the properties of Spouses Yu became conclusive
and binding. However, on July 20, 1994, the RTC, apparently not informed of the SC Decision,
rendered a Decision ordering spouses YU to pay the plaintiff the sum of P549,404.00, with
interest from the date of the filing of this case and attorneys fee. On the counterclaim, the
Court declines to rule on this, considering that the question of the attachment which allegedly
gave rise to the damages incurred by the defendants is being determined by the Supreme Court.
Spouses Yu filed with the CA an appeal questioning only that portion of the July 20, 1994
Decision where the RTC declined to rule on their counterclaim for damages the CA affirmed in
toto the RTC Decision, it nonetheless made a ruling on the counterclaim of Spouses Yu by
declaring that the latter had failed to adduce sufficient evidence of their entitlement to
damages. Spouses Yu filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the CA denied the motion.

SUPERLINES TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC. v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY AND PEDRO BALUBAL 519 SCRA 432 (2007), SECOND
DIVISION
Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. (Superlines) is engaged in the business of providing
public transportation. One of its buses, while traveling north and approaching the Alabang
northbound exit lane, crashed into the radio room of respondent Philippine National Construction
Company (PNCC). PNCCs Sofronio Salvanera, and Pedro Balubal, then head of traffic control
and security department of the South Luzon tollway, investigated the incident. The bus was
turned over to the Alabang Traffic Bureau for its own investigation. Because of lack of adequate
space, traffic investigator Pat. Cesar Lopera requested that the bus be towed by the PNCC patrol
to its compound. Superlines made several requests for the release of the bus but Balubal
refused. Instead, Balubal demanded the sum of P40,000.00 or a collateral with the same value
for the reconstruction of the damaged radio room.
Superlines filed a replevin suit with damages against PNCC and Balubal before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC). The trial court dismissed the complaint and ordered Superlines to pay PNCC an
amount of P40, 320.00, representing actual damages to the radio room. The Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision and concluded that the case should have been brought
against the police authorities.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a suit for replevin is proper
HELD:
Contrary to PNCCs contention, the petition raises questions of law foremost of which is whether
the owner of a personal property may initiate an action for replevin against a depositary and
recover damages for illegal distraint. In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must
convincingly show that he is either the owner or clearly entitled to the possession of
the object sought to be recovered, and that the defendant, who is in actual or legal
possession thereof, wrongfully detains the same.
In the case at bar, Superlines ownership of the bus being admitted by PNCC, consideration of
whether PNCC has been wrongfully detaining it is in order. The bus was towed by the PNCC on
the request of Lopera in violation of constitutional right against unreasonable seizures. The
seizure and impounding of Superliness bus, on Loperas request, were unquestionably violative
of the right to be let alone by the authorities as guaranteed by the Constitution.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court (SC) finds that it cannot pass upon the same without
impleading Lopera and any other police officer responsible for ordering the seizure and distraint
of the bus. The police authorities, through Lopera, having turned over the bus to PNCC for
safekeeping, a contract of deposit was perfected between them and PNCC. Superlines or the
trial court motu proprio may implead as defendants the indispensable parties Lopera and any
other responsible police officers.
OVERSEAS WORKERS WELFARE ADMINISTRATION,represented by Administrator
Marianito D. Roque, Petitioner vs ATTY. CESAR L. CHAVEZ, etal. Respondents.
G.R. No. 169802; June 8, 2007
FACTS:
OWWA traces its beginnings to 1 May 1977, when the Welfare and Training Fund for
Overseas Workers in the DOLE was created by virtue of Letter of Instructions No. 537, with the
main objective, inter alia, of providing social and welfare services to OFW, including insurance
coverage, social work, legal and placement assistance, cultural and remittances services, and
the like. On 1 May 1980, PD 1694 was signed into law, formalizing the operations of a
comprehensive Welfare Fund (Welfund), as authorized and created under Letter of Instructions
No. 537. On 16 January 1981, PD 1809 was promulgated, amending certain provisions of PD
1694. Subsequently, EO 126 was passed renaming the Welfare Fund as the OWWA.
January 9, 2004, as there was yet no formal OWWA structure duly approved by the DBM
and CSC, the OWWA Board of Trustees passed Resolution No. 001, Series of 2004, bearing the
title Approving the Structure of the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration, and depicting
the organizational structure and staffing pattern of the OWWA.
March 24, 2004, DBM Secretary Emilia T. Boncodin approved the organizational structure and
staffing pattern of the OWWA. In her approval thereof, she stated that the total funding
requirements for the revised organizational structure shall be P107,546,379 for 400 positions.
May 31, 2004, OWWA Administrator Virgilio R. Angelo issued Advisory No. 01, advising the
officials and employees of the OWWA that the DBM had recently approved OWWAs
organizational chart, functional statements, and the staffing pattern. Advisory No. 01 also
announced that a Placement Committee will be created to evaluate and recommend placement
of all regular/permanent incumbents of OWWA in the new organizational chart and staffing
pattern.
June 3, 2004, DOLE Secretary Sto. Tomas issued Administrative Order No. 171 creating a
Placement Committee to evaluate qualifications of employees, and to recommend their
appropriate placement in the new organizational chart, functional statements and staffing
pattern of the OWWA.
June 18, 2004, DOLE Acting Secretary Imson issued Administrative Order No. 186, Series of
2004, prescribing the guidelines on the placement of personnel in the new staffing pattern of
the OWWA.
June 29, 2004, herein respondents filed with the RTC, a Complaint for Annulment of the
Organizational Structure of the OWWA, as approved by OWWA Board Resolution No. 001, Series
of 2004, with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against herein
petitioner OWWA and its Board of Trustees to prevent the implementation of the said Board
Resolution. According to the respondents, the resulting decrease in the number of employees
due to Organizational Structure will result in the constructive dismissal of at least 110
employees. Meanwhile, the deployment of the regular central office personnel to the regional
offices will displace the said employees, as well as their families. Respondents challenged the
validity of the new organizational structure of the OWWA. In fine, they contended that the
same is null and void; hence, its implementation should be prohibited.
 RTC granted respondents prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioner, thru OSG filed
with CA a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Issuance of a TRO and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. CA dismissed the petition. It declared that it was proper for the RTC to
restrain, for the meantime, the implementation of OWWAs reorganization to prevent injury until
after the main case is heard and decided. Petitioner, thru OSG filed the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether CA erred in affirming the RTC in its grant of the assailed writ of preliminary
injunction.
RULING: Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, defines a preliminary injunction as an order
granted at any stage of an action prior to the judgment or final order requiring a party or a
court, an agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It persists until it is
dissolved or until the termination of the action without the court issuing a final injunction. To be
entitled to an injunctive writ, petitioner must show, inter alia, the existence of a clear and
unmistakable right and an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage. A writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial and incomplete
evidence. In fact, the evidence required to justify the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
in the hearing thereon need not be conclusive or complete.
Preliminary injunction is merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to the main case subject to the
latters outcome, the sole objective of which is to preserve the status quo until the trial court
hears fully the merits of the case. The status quo usually preserved by a preliminary injunction is
the last actual, peaceable and uncontested status which preceded the actual
controversy. The status quo ante litem is the state of affairs which is existing at the time of the
filing of the case. The trial court must not make use of its injunctive power to alter such status.
In the case at bar, the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting lack or excess of
jurisdiction because it did not maintain the status quo when it issued the writ of preliminary
injunction. Rather, it effectively restored the situation prior to the status quo, in effect,
disposing the issue of the main case without trial on the merits. What was preserved by the RTC
was the state of affairs before the issuance of Resolution No. 001, which approved the structure
of the OWWA, and the subsequent administrative orders pursuant to its passing. The RTC
forgot that what is imperative in preliminary injunction cases is that the writ cannot be
effectuated to establish new relations between the parties.
Courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction which would in effect dispose of the
main case without trial. In this case, the RTC also did not maintain the status quo but restored
the landscape before the implementation of OWWAs reorganization. In thus issuing the writ of
preliminary injunction, the substantive issues of the main case were resolved by the trial
court. What was done by the RTC was quite simply a disposition of the case without trial. This
is an error in law and an exercise of grave abuse of discretion. The RTC pre-judged the validity
of the issuances released by the OWWA Board of Trustees, as well as the other governmental
bodies (i.e., DBM, DOLE), which approved the organizational structure and staffing pattern of
the OWWA.
This Court is not convinced that respondents were able to show a clear and unmistakable legal
right to warrant their entitlement to the writ. A mere blanket allegation that they are all officers
and employees of the OWWA without a showing of how they stand to be directly injured by the
implementation of its questioned organizational structure does not suffice to prove a right in
esse. There was no showing that Respondents are the employees who are in grave danger of
being displaced due to the reorganization. Injunction is not a remedy to protect or enforce
contingent, abstract, or future rights; it will not issue to protect aright not in esse and which
may never arise, or to restrain an action which did not give rise to a cause of action.
The question as to the validity of the OWWA reorganization remains the subject in the main
case pending before the trial court. Its annulment is outside the realm of the instant Petition.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the RTC
is LIFTED and SET ASIDE.
SMART COMMUNICATION INC. V. ASTORGA
JANUARY 28, 2008
SUMMARY: Petitioner was dismissed due to redundancy following a joint venture by SMART.
Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The company demanded that she either pay the
market value of a car given to her as part of her employment benefits or to return the same.
Because she refused to do either, SMART filed a suit for replevin to recover the vehicle from her.
She filed a motion to dismiss the replevin suit. The motion to dismiss the replevin case was
denied. Petitioner then elevated the issue to the CA via certiorari. The CA dismissed the replevin
suit on the ground that because the case is intertwined with Astorgas complaint for illegal
dismissal, it is the labor tribunal that has rightful jurisdiction over the complaint. Both petitioner
and respondent brought the issues to the SC. The SC consolidated the three actions to resolve
that the replevin suit should not have been dismissed
DOCTRINE: The labor dispute involved is not intertwined with the issue in the Replevin Case.
The respective issues raised in each forum can be resolved independently on the other. The RTC
rightfully assumed jurisdiction over the suit and acted well within its discretion in denying
Astorgas motion to dismiss. SMARTs demand for payment of the market value of the car or, in
the alternative, the surrender of the car, is not a labor, but a civil, dispute. It involves the
relationship of debtor and creditor rather than employee-employer relations. As such, the
dispute falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
FACTS:
1. Regina M. Astorga was employed by SMART as District Sales Manager. She received a car as
part of her employment benefits.
2. SMART launched an organizational realignment to achieve more efficient operations. SMART
entered into a joint venture agreement, and formed SMART-NTT Multimedia, Incorporated
SNMI. As a result, SMART abolished Astorgas division.
3. SNMI agreed to absorb the CSMG personnel who would be recommended by SMART based
on a performance evaluation of personnel. Astorga landed last in the performance evaluation,
thus, she was not recommended by SMART. SMART, nonetheless, offered her a supervisory
position in the Customer Care Department, but she refused the offer because the position
carried lower salary rank and rate.
4. On March 3, 1998, SMART issued a memorandum advising Astorga of the termination of her
employment on ground of redundancy, effective April 3, 1998. Astorga received it on March 16,
1998.
5. Astorga to filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of salaries and other benefits
with prayer for moral and exemplary damages against SMART and Ann Margaret V. Santiago.
6. In the meantime, SMART sent a letter to Astorga demanding that she pay the current market
value of the Honda Civic Sedan which was given to her under the companys car plan program,
or to surrender the same to the company for proper disposition. Astorga, however, failed and
refused to do either, SMART then filed a suit for replevin with the RTC of Makati.
7. Astorga moved to dismiss the complaint on grounds of (i) lack of jurisdiction; (ii) failure to
state a cause of action; (iii) litis pendentia; and (iv) forum-shopping. Astorga posited that the
regular courts have no jurisdiction over the complaint because the subject thereof pertains to a
benefit arising from an employment contract; hence, jurisdiction over the same is vested in the
labor tribunal and not in regular courts.
8. Pending resolution of Astorgas motion to dismiss the replevin case, the Labor Arbiter
rendered a Decision declaring Astorgas dismissal from employment illegal, ordering SMART to
reinstate her with full backwages and pay damages.
9. The RTC issued an Order denying Astorgas motion to dismiss the replevin case. Astorga filed
a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied it.
10. Astorga elevated the denial of her motion via certiorari to the CA which reversed the RTC
ruling. The CA granted the petition and dismissed the replevin case. It held that the case is
intertwined with Astorgas complaint for illegal dismissal; thus, it is the labor tribunal that has
rightful jurisdiction over the complaint. SMARTs motion for reconsideration was denied, it
elevated the case to the Supreme Court.
11. Meanwhile, SMART also appealed the unfavorable ruling of the LA to the NLRC. The NLRC
reversed the LA and upheld Astorgas dismissal. Astorga filed a motion for reconsideration, but
the NLRC denied it. Astorga then went to the CA via certiorari. The CA affirmed the NLRC with
modification as to the procedural due process aspect of the case. The CA also set aside the
NLRCs order for the return of the company vehicle holding that this issue is not essentially a
labor concern, but is civil in nature, and thus, within the competence of the regular court to
decide. It added that the matter had not been fully ventilated before the NLRC, but in the
regular court.
12. Astorga filed a motion for reconsideration while SMART sought partial reconsideration of the
Decision. The CA resolved the motions in that SMART was ordered to pay Astorga her
backwages and the replevin case was dismissed.
ISSUE: WoN the RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint for recovery of a car acquired as part
of employment benefits. - YES
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition of SMART (replevin) is GRANTED. On the other hand, the
petitions of SMART and Astorga (labor) docketed are DENIED.
RATIO:
1. Replevin is an action whereby the owner or person entitled to repossession of goods or
chattels may recover those goods or chattels from one who has wrongfully distrained or taken,
or who wrongfully detains such goods or chattels. It is designed to permit one having right to
possession to recover property in specie from one who has wrongfully taken or detained the
property.
2. The RTC rightfully assumed jurisdiction over the suit and acted well within its discretion in
denying Astorgas motion to dismiss. SMARTs demand for payment of the market value of the
car or, in the alternative, the surrender of the car, is not a labor, but a civil, dispute. It involves
the relationship of debtor and creditor rather than employee-employer relations. As such, the
dispute falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
3. The labor dispute involved is not intertwined with the issue in the Replevin Case. The
respective issues raised in each forum can be resolved independently on the other.
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY V. POWERED (164299) FEB 2008
In assessing the issue of whether the injunction was proper, both the trial court and the CA
closely examined whether the notice to proceed in fact amended the PGA. A careful perusal of
the records, however, shows that such a determination touched essentially on the merits of the
main action. Part of the relief requested by respondent in the trial court was to [direct] the
[petitioner] MIAA to comply with the [PGA] and purchase from and pay to respondent the
minimum guaranteed energy consumption of four million KWH in accordance with Article 7.3 of
the PGA.[20]
It must be borne in mind that an injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of ones
substantive right or interest,[21] issued to preserve the status quo of the things subject of the
action or the relations between the parties during the pendency of the suit.[22] The application
for the injunctive writ is not a cause of action in itself but only a provisional remedy, a mere
adjunct to the main suit.[23]
Moreover, as held in Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. CA:[24]
In general, courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction which in
effect disposes of the main case without trial. This is precisely the effect of the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the respondent appellate court. Having granted
through a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction the main prayer of the complaint, there is
practically nothing left for the trial court to try except the plaintiffs claim for damages.
(emphasis supplied)[25]
If this Court affirms the trial court and the CA, that is, if we decide the issue of whether the
notice to proceed indeed amended the PGA, we will essentially be disposing of the main action
and the trial court will have nothing more to try except what rate respondent should charge
petitioner. Thus, we decline to issue judgment on a case which has not gone through
trial. Under the circumstances, a full blown trial is necessary in order to assess the true intention
of the parties and to determine whether respondents acceptance indeed modified the obligation
under Article 7.3.
If only to emphasize our point, we recall our decision in Capitol Medical Center, Inc. v. CA[26] on
the purpose of an injunctive writ:
The sole object of a preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to
preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard. The status quo is the
last actual peaceable uncontested status which preceded the controversy. It may only be
resorted to by a litigant for the preservation or protection of his rights or interests and for no
other purpose during the pendency of the principal action. It should only be granted if the party
asking for it is clearly entitled thereto. (emphasis supplied)[27]
In that case, the Court enunciated a clear-cut policy on when a mandatory injunctive writ may
issue:
Inasmuch as a mandatory injunction tends to do more than to maintain the status quo, it is
generally improper to issue such an injunction prior to the final hearing. It may however, issue
in cases of extreme urgency; where the right is very clear; where considerations of relative
inconvenience bear strongly in complainants favor; where there is a willful and unlawful invasion
of plaintiffs right against his protest and remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one; and
where the effect of a mandatory injunction is rather to reestablish and maintain an preexisting
continuing relation between the parties, recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant,
than to establish a new relation. Indeed, the writ should not be denied the complainant when he
makes out a clear case, free from doubt and dispute.[28]
To grant the injunction sought by respondent will not preserve the status quo as it will give
respondent the right to collect from petitioner more than what it has been collecting, without
the benefit of trial. Without a clear showing of extreme urgency to prevent irreparable injury and
of a clear and unmistakable right to it, free from doubt and dispute, the injunction sought
cannot be justified.
Respondents allegation of extreme urgency is not supported by concrete proof of irreparable
injury. Nothing is offered except sweeping conclusions about the alleged possibility of financial
ruin. Moreover, respondent makes much of the threat of petitioner to transfer its operations to
Terminal 3 and thus consume less energy to respondents detriment, an argument that is
speculative at best as petitioner has not transferred its operations nor can it possibly do so.
Terminal 3 is still subject of a protracted litigation and will not conceivably open anytime soon.
Thus, respondents claim of urgency cannot be believed
WEE vs. TANKIANSEE G.R. No. 171124
February 13, 2008 NACHURA, J.:
FACTS: Petitioner Wee has money placements totaling to more than P210M with the Wincorp,
to which, respondent Tansiankee is a vice president and director.
Wincorp extended a loan equal to petitioners total money placement to a corporation, Power
Merge, with a subscribed capital of only P37.5M.
This credit facility originated from another loan of about P1.5B extended by Wincorp to another
corporation [Hottick Holdings]. When the latter defaulted in its obligation, Wincorp instituted a
case against it and its surety. Settlement was, however, reached in which Hotticks president,
Virata, assumed the obligation of the surety.
Under the scheme agreed upon by Wincorp and Hotticks president, petitioners money
placements were transferred without his knowledge and consent to the loan account of Power
Merge through an agreement that virtually freed the latter of any liability. Allegedly, through the
false representations of Wincorp and its officers and directors, petitioner was enticed to roll over
his placements so that Wincorp could loan the same to Virata/Power Merge.
Finding that Virata purportedly used Power Merge as a conduit and connived with Wincorps
officers and directors to fraudulently obtain for his benefit without any intention of paying the
said placements, petitioner instituted suit for damages with the RTC Manila. Respondent was
impleaded in the complaint as one of the defendants.
On the basis of the allegations in the complaint and the Affidavit of petitioner, RTC ordered the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against the properties not exempt from execution
of all the defendants subject to petitioners filing of a P50M-bond. The writ was consequently
issued.
Arguing that the writ was improperly issued and that the bond furnished was grossly insufficient,
respondent moved for the discharge of the attachment.
The other defendants likewise filed similar motions. RTC denied all the motions. The defendants,
including respondent filed their respective motions for reconsideration but the trial court likewise
denied the same.
Incidentally, while respondent opted not to question anymore the said orders, his co-
defendants, Virata and UEM-MARA Philippines Corporation (UEM-MARA), assailed the same via
certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA. CA, however, denied it and the motion for
reconsideration thereon.
In a petition for review on certiorari before SC, the latter denied the petition and affirmed the
CA rulings for Viratas and UEM-MARAs failure to sufficiently show that the appellate court
committed any reversible error.
Respondent filed before the trial court another Motion to Discharge Attachment, re-pleading the
grounds he raised in his first motion but raising the following additional grounds: (1) that he
was not present in Wincorps board meetings approving the questionable transactions; and (2)
that he could not have connived with Wincorp and the other defendants because he and
Pearlbank Securities, Inc., in which he is a major stockholder, filed cases against the company
as they were also victimized by its fraudulent schemes.
Ruling that the grounds raised were already passed upon by it in the previous orders affirmed
by the CA and SC, and that the additional grounds were respondents affirmative defenses that
properly pertained to the merits of the case, RTC denied the motion.
With the denial of his motion for reconsideration, respondent filed a certiorari petition before the
CA where the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision reversing and setting aside the
aforementioned orders of the RTC and lifting the Writ of Preliminary Attachment to the extent
that it concerned respondents properties. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the said
ruling, but the CA denied the same. Hence, petitioner filed a petiton for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 before the SC.
ISSUE: Whether the CA was correct in lifting the writ of preliminary attachment against
respondent based on additional ground that allegedly pertains already to the merits of the main
action, i.e., lack of factual circumstances of fraud.
HELD: YES. Section 1(d) of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court which pertinently reads:
Section 1. Grounds upon which attachment may issue.-At the commencement of the action or at
any time before entry of judgment, a plaintiff or any proper party may have the property of the
adverse party attached as security for the aatisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered in
the following cases:
x x x x
(d) In an action against a party who has been guilty of a fraud in contracting the debt or
incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought, or in the performance thereof.
For a writ to issue under this rule, the applicant must sufficiently show the factual circumstances
of the alleged fraud because fraudulent intent cannot be inferred from the debtors mere non-
payment of the debt or failure to comply with his obligation. The applicant must then be able to
demonstrate that the debtor has intended to defraud the creditor.
In the instant case, petitioners Affidavit is bereft of any factual statement that respondent
committed a fraud. The affidavit narrated only the alleged fraudulent transaction between
Wincorp and Virata and/or Power Merge, by which SC affirmed the writ of attachment issued
against the latter.
As to the participation of respondent in the said transaction, the affidavit merely states that
respondent, an officer and director of Wincorp, connived with the other defendants to defraud
petitioner of his money placements. No other factual averment or circumstance detailing how
respondent committed a fraud or how he connived with the other defendants to commit a fraud
in the transaction sued upon. In other words, petitioner has not shown any specific act or deed
to support the allegation that respondent is guilty of fraud.
The affidavit, being the foundation of the writ, must contain such particulars as to how the fraud
imputed to respondent was committed for the court to decide whether or not to issue the writ.
Absent any statement of other factual circumstances to show that respondent, at the time of
contracting the obligation, had a preconceived plan or intention not to pay, or without any
showing of how respondent committed the alleged fraud, the general averment in the affidavit
that respondent is an officer and director of Wincorp who allegedly connived with the other
defendants to commit a fraud, is insufficient to support the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment.
In the application for the writ under the said ground, compelling is the need to give a hint about
what constituted the fraud and how it was perpetrated because established is the rule that fraud
is never presumed.
Verily, the mere fact that respondent is an officer and director of the company does not
necessarily give rise to the inference that he committed a fraud or that he connived with the
other defendants to commit a fraud. While under certain circumstances, courts may treat a
corporation as a mere aggroupment of persons, to whom liability will directly attach, this is only
done when the wrongdoing has been clearly and convincingly established.
Considering that petitioner has not fully satisfied the legal obligation to show the specific acts
constitutive of the alleged fraud committed by respondent, the trial court acted in excess of its
jurisdiction when it issued the writ of preliminary attachment against the properties of
respondent.
The merits of the main action are not triable in a motion to discharge an attachment otherwise
an applicant for the dissolution could force a trial of the merits of the case on his motion.
However, the principle finds no application here because petitioner has not yet fulfilled the
requirements set by the Rules of Court for the issuance of the writ against the properties of
respondent. The evil sought to be prevented by the said ruling will not arise, because the
propriety or impropriety of the issuance of the writ in this case can be determined by simply
reading the complaint and the affidavit in support of the application.
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION vs. ASIAN CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 158271 April 8, 2008
FACTS:
On July 24, 1996, China Bank granted respondent ACDC an Omnibus Credit Line in the amount
of P90,000,000.00.
On April 12, 1999, alleging that ACDC failed to comply with its obligations under the Omnibus
Credit Line, China Bank filed a Complaint for recovery of sum of money and damages with
prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary attachment before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati, China Bank claimed that ACDC, after collecting and receiving the proceeds or
receivables from the various construction contracts and purportedly holding them in trust for
China Bank under several Deeds of Assignment, misappropriated, converted, and used the funds
for its own purpose and benefit, instead of remitting or delivering them to China Bank.
On April 22, 1999, the RTC issued an Order granting China Banks prayer for writ of preliminary
attachment. Consequently, as shown in the Sheriffs Report dated June 14, 1999, the writ of
preliminary attachment was implemented levying personal properties of ACDC, i.e., vans, dump
trucks, cement mixers, cargo trucks, utility vehicles, machinery, equipment and office machines
and fixtures.
On March 27, 2000, upon motion of China Bank, the RTC issued a Summary Judgment in favor
of China Bank. ACDC filed its Notice of Appeal dated April 24, 2000.
On June 15, 2000, China Bank filed a Motion to Take Custody of Attached Properties with Motion
for Grant of Authority to Sell to the Branch Sheriff with the RTC, praying that it be allowed to
take custody of ACDCs properties for the purpose of selling them in an auction. On June 20,
2000, ACDC filed its Opposition to the June 15, 2000 Motion arguing that there can be no sale of
the latters attached properties in the absence of a final and executory judgment against ACDC.
On August 25, 2000, China Bank partially appealed the Summary Judgment for not awarding
interest on one of its promissory notes. Records of the case were elevated to the CA.
On April 18, 2002, China Bank filed a Motion for Leave for Grant of Authority to Sell Attached
Properties which the CA denied in the herein assailed Resolution dated October 14, 2002.
According to the CA, selling the attached properties prior to final judgment of the appealed case
is premature and contrary to the intent and purpose of preliminary attachment for the following
reasons: first, the records reveal that the attached properties subject of the motion are not
perishable in nature; and second, while the sale of the attached properties may serve the
interest of China Bank, it will not be so for ACDC. The CA recognized China Banks apprehension
that by the time a final judgment is rendered, the attached properties would be worthless.
However, the CA also acknowledged that since ACDC is a corporation engaged in a construction
business, the preservation of the properties is of paramount importance; and that in the event
that the decision of the lower court is reversed and a final judgment rendered in favor ACDC,
great prejudice will result if the attached properties were already sold.
China Bank filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied in the herein assailed CA
Resolution dated May 16, 2003. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari
ISSUE: WON the vehicles, office machines and fixtures are perishable property under Section
11, Rules 57 of the Rules of Court.
HELD:
Section 11, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 11. When attached property may be sold after levy on attachment and before entry of
judgment.- Whenever it shall be made to appear to the court in which the action is pending,
upon hearing with notice to both parties, that the property attached is perishable, or that the
interests of all the parties to the action will be subserved by the sale thereof, the court may
order such property to be sold at public auction in such manner as it may direct, and the
proceeds of such sale to be deposited in court to abide the judgment in the action. (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, an attached property may be sold after levy on attachment and before entry of judgment
whenever it shall be made to appear to the court in which the action is pending, upon hearing
with notice to both parties, that the attached property is perishable or that the interests of all
the parties to the action will be subserved by the sale of the attached property.
No local jurisprudence or authoritative work has touched upon this matter. This being so, an
examination of foreign laws and jurisprudence, particularly those of the United Stateswhere
some of our laws and rules were patterned after, is in order. In Mossler Acceptance Co. v.
Denmark, an order of the lower court in directing the sale of attached properties, consisting of
20 automobiles and 2 airplanes, was reversed by the Supreme Court of Louisiana. In support of
its contention that automobiles are perishable, Mossler offered testimony to the effect that
automobile tires tend to dry-rot in storage, batteries to deteriorate, crankcases to become
damaged, paint and upholstery to fade, that generally automobiles tend to depreciate while in
storage. Rejecting these arguments, the Supreme Court of Louisiana held that while there might
be a depreciation in the value of a car during storage, depending largely on existing economic
conditions, there would be no material deterioration of the car itself or any of its appurtenances
if the car was properly cared for, and therefore it could not be said that automobiles were of a
perishable nature within the intendment of the statute, which could only be invoked when the
property attached and seized was of a perishable nature.
With respect to the determination of the question on whether the attached office furniture,
office equipment, accessories and supplies are perishable properties, the Supreme Court of
Alabama inMcCreery v. Berney National Bank discussed the perishable nature of the attached
properties, consisting of shelving, stock of drygoods and a complete set of store fixtures,
consisting of counters iron safe, desk and showcases, to be within the meaning of perishable
property under the Alabama Code which authorizes a court, on motion of either party, to order
the sale, in advance of judgment, of perishable property which had been levied on by a writ of
attachment.
In McCreery, the Supreme Court of Alabama rejected the argument that the sale of the attached
property was void because the term perishable property, as used in the statute, meant only
such property as contained in itself the elements of speedy decay, such as fruits, fish, fresh
meats, etc. The Supreme Court of Alabama held that whatever may be the character of the
property, if the court is satisfied that, either by reason of its perishable nature, or because of the
expense of keeping it until the termination of the litigation, it will prove, or be likely to prove,
fruitless to the creditor, and that the purpose of its original seizure will probably be frustrated,
the sale of the attached property is justified.
McCreery applied the doctrine in Millards Admrs. v. Hall where the Supreme Court of Alabama
held that an attached property is perishable if it is shown that, by keeping the article, it will
necessarily become, or is likely to become, worthless to the creditor, and by consequence to the
debtor, then it is embraced by the statute. It matters not, in our opinion, what the subject
matter is. It may be cotton bales, live stock, hardware provisions or dry goods. Although the
statute under which Millards was decided used the words likely to waste or be destroyed by
keeping, instead of the word perishable, the reasons given for the construction placed on the
statute apply equally to the Alabama Code which uses the term perishable.
In the Motion for Leave for Grant of Authority to Sell Attached Properties filed before the CA,
China Bank alleged that the attached properties are placed in locations where they are totally
exposed to the natural elements and adverse weather conditions since their attachment in 1999;
that as a result, the attached properties have gravely deteriorated with corrosions eating them
up, with weeds germinating and growing thereon and their engines and motors stock up; and
that the same holds true to the office furniture, office equipment, accessories and supplies. No
evidence, however, were submitted by China Bank to support and substantiate these claims
before the CA.
The determination on whether the attached vehicles are properly cared for, and the burden to
show that, by keeping the attached office furniture, office equipment and supplies, it will
necessarily become, or is likely to become, worthless to China Bank, and by consequence to
ACDC, are factual issues requiring reception of evidence which the Court cannot do in a petition
forcertiorari. Factual issues are beyond the scope of certiorari because they do not involve any
jurisdictional issue
As a rule, only jurisdictional questions may be raised in a petition for certiorari, including matters
of grave abuse of discretion which are equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
Sale of attached property before final judgment is an equitable remedy provided for the
convenience of the parties and preservation of the property. To repeat, the Court finds that the
issue of whether the sale of attached properties is for the convenience of the parties and that
the interests of all the parties will be subserved by the said sale is a question of fact. Again, the
foregoing issue can only be resolved upon examination of the evidence presented by both
parties which the Court cannot do in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.
 accordance with Section 12, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. The Court of Appeals granted
respondents petition. Metro Inc. filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 2 March 2006
Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion.

ISSUE: Whether the writ of attachment issued by the trial court was improperly issued such
that it may be discharged without the filing of a counter-bond.

METRO INC. VS LARAS GIFTS
GR NO 171741, NOV. 27, 2009
FACTS: Laras Gifts and Decors Inc. (LGD) and Metro, Inc. are corporations engaged in the
business of manufacturing, producing, selling and exporting handicrafts. Luis Villafuerte, Jr. and
Lara Maria R. Villafuerte are the president and vice-president of LGD respectively.
Frederick Juan and Liza Juan are the principal officers of Metro, Inc. Sometime in 2001, Metro
Inc. and LGD agreed that LGD would endorse to Metro Inc. purchase orders received by LGD
from their buyers in the US in exchange for a 15% commission, to be shared equally by LGD
and James R. Paddon (JRP), LGDs agent. The terms of the agreement were later embodied in
an e-mail labeled as the "2001 Agreement."4In May 2003, LGD filed with the RTC, Branch 197,
Las Pinas City (trial court) a complaint against Metro Inc. for sum of money and damages with a
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. Subsequently, respondents filed an
amended complaint5and alleged that, as of July 2002, Metro Inc. defrauded them in the amount
of $521,841.62. Respondents also prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.
HELD: The petition is without merit. Metro inc. Frederick juan are guilty of fraud committed
both at the inception of the agreement and in the performance of the obligation. Through
machinations and schemes, Metro Inc. successfully enticed LGD to enter into the 2001
Agreement. In order to secure LGDs full trust in them and lure LGD to endorse more Purchase
Orders and increase the volume of the orders, Metro Inc during the early part, remitted to LGDs
shares under the Agreement. However, soon thereafter, just when the orders increased and the
amount involved likewise increased, Metro Inc. suddenly, without any justifiable reasons and in
pure bad faith and fraud, abandoned their contractual obligations to remit to plaintiffs their
shares. And worse, Metro Inc. transacted directly with LGDs foreign buyer to the latters
exclusion and damage. Clearly, Metro Inc. planned everything from the beginning, employed
ploy and machinations to defraud plaintiffs, and consequently take from them a valuable client.
Metro Inc. are likewise guilty of fraud by violating the trust and confidence reposed upon them
by LGD. Metro Inc. received the proceeds of LGDs LCs with the clear obligation of remitting
15% thereof to LGD. Their refusal and failure to remit the said amount despite demand
constitutes a breach of trust amounting to malice and fraud. LGDs allegation that petitioners
undertook to sell exclusively and only through JRP/LGD for Target Stores Corporation but that
petitioners transacted directly with respondents foreign buyer is sufficient allegation of fraud to
support their application for a writ of preliminary attachment. Since the writ of preliminary
attachment was properly issued, the only way it can be dissolved is by filing a counter-bond in
accordance with Section 12, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court.

In its 23 June 2003 Order, the trial court granted LGDs prayer and issued the writ of
attachment against the properties and assets of petitioners. On 26 June 2003, petitioners filed a
motion to discharge the writ of attachment. Metro Inc. argued that the writ of attachment
should be discharged on the ground that respondents failed to substantiate their allegations of
fraud with specific acts or deeds showing how petitioners defrauded them. After considering the
arguments of the parties, the trial court granted Metro inc. motion and lifted the writ of
attachment. LGD filed a motion for reconsideration.

In its 10 September 2003 Order, the trial court denied the motion. According to the trial court,
respondents failed to sufficiently show that petitioners were guilty of fraud either in incurring the
obligation upon which the action was brought, or in the performance thereof. The trial court
found no proof that petitioners were motivated by malice in entering into the 2001 agreement.
The trial court also declared that petitioners failure to fully comply with their obligation, absent
other facts or circumstances to indicate evil intent, does not automatically amount to fraud. LGD
filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. LGD alleged that the trial court gravely
abused its discretion when it ordered the discharge of the writ of attachment without requiring
petitioners to post a counter-bond. According to the Court Appeals, the trial court gravely
abused its discretion when it ordered the discharge of the writ of attachment without requiring
petitioners to post a counter-bond. The Court of Appeals said that when the writ of attachment
is issued upon a ground which is at the same time also the applicants cause of action, courts
are precluded from hearing the motion for dissolution of the writ when such hearing would
necessarily force a trial on the merits of a case on a mere motion. The Court of Appeals pointed
out that, in this case, fraud was not only alleged as the ground for the issuance of the writ of
attachment, but was actually the core of respondents complaint. The Court of Appeals declared
that the only way that the writ of attachment can be discharged is by posting a counter-bond in

SUSAN LIM-LUA v. DANILO Y. LUA, GR Nos. 175279-80, 2013-06-05
Facts:
On September 3, 2003,[3] petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the declaration of nullity
of her marriage with respondent Danilo Y. Lua
In her prayer for support pendente lite for herself and her two children, petitioner sought the
amount of P500,000.00 as monthly support, citing respondent's huge earnings from salaries and
dividends in several companies and businesses here and abroad.
After due hearing, Judge Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr. issued an Order... granting support pendente
lite
From the evidence already adduced by the parties, the amount of Two Hundred Fifty
(P250,000.00) Thousand Pesos would be sufficient to take care of the needs of the plaintiff.
This amount excludes the One hundred thirty-five (P135,000.00) Thousand Pesos... for medical
attendance expenses needed by plaintiff for the operation of both her eye[s] which is
demandable upon the conduct of such operation. The amounts already extended to the two (2)
children, being a commendable act of defendant, should be continued by him... considering the
vast financial resources at his disposal.
According to Art. 203 of the Family Code, support is demandable from the time plaintiff needed
the said support but is payable only from the date of judicial demand.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration
,[7] asserting that petitioner is not entitled to spousal support considering that she does not
maintain for herself a separate dwelling from their children and respondent has continued to
support the family for... their sustenance and well-being in accordance with family's social and
financial standing.
As to the P250,000.00 granted by the trial court as monthly support pendente lite, as well as the
P1,750,000.00 retroactive support, respondent found it unconscionable and... beyond the
intendment of the law for not having considered the needs of the respondent.
His second motion for reconsideration having been denied, respondent filed a petition for
certiorari in the CA
On April 12, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision,... nullified and set aside and instead a new one
is entered... to pay private respondent a monthly support pendente lite of P115,000.00
ORDERING the deduction of the amount of PhP2,482,348.16 plus 946,465.64, or a total of
PhP3,428,813.80 from the current total support in arrears of Danilo Y. Lua to his wife, Susan
Lim Lua and their two (2) children;
The appellate court said that the trial court should not have completely disregarded the
expenses incurred by respondent consisting of the purchase and maintenance of the two cars,
payment of tuition fees, travel expenses, and the credit card purchases involving groceries,
dry... goods and books, which certainly inured to the benefit not only of the two children, but
their mother (petitioner) as well.
It also noted the lack of contribution... from the petitioner in the joint obligation of spouses to
support their children.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA
Issues:
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE DEDUCTION OF THE AMOUNT OF
PHP2,482,348.16 PLUS 946,465.64, OR A TOTAL OF PHP3,428,813.80 FROM THE CURRENT
TOTAL SUPPORT IN ARREARS OF THE RESPONDENT TO THE PETITIONER AND THEIR
CHILDREN.[17]
Ruling:
As a matter of law, the amount of support which those related by marriage and family
relationship is generally obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the resources or
means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient.[18] Such support... comprises everything
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
Upon receipt of a verified petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or for
annulment of voidable marriage, or for legal separation, and at any time during the proceeding,
the court, motu proprio or upon verified application of any of the... parties, guardian or
designated custodian, may temporarily grant support pendente lite prior to the rendition of
judgment or final order.[19] Because of its provisional nature, a court does not need to delve
fully into the merits of the... case before it can settle an application for this relief. All that a court
is tasked to do is determine the kind and amount of evidence which may suffice to enable it to
justly resolve the application. It is enough that the facts be established by affidavits or other
documentary... evidence appearing in the record.[20]... n this case, the amount of monthly
support pendente lite for petitioner and her two children was determined after due hearing and
submission of documentary evidence by the parties. Although the amount fixed by the trial
court was reduced on appeal, it is... clear that the monthly support pendente lite of P115,000.00
ordered by the CA was intended primarily for the sustenance of petitioner and her children, e.g.,
food, clothing, salaries of drivers and house helpers, and other household expenses.
Petitioner's testimony also mentioned the cost of regular therapy for her scoliosis and
vitamins/medicines.
As to the financial capacity of the respondent, it is beyond doubt that he can solely provide for
the subsistence, education, transportation, health/medical needs and recreational activities of
his children, as well as those of petitioner who was then unemployed and a full-time...
housewife.
The Family Court may direct the deduction of the provisional support from the salary of the
spouse.
Since the amount of monthly support pendente lite as fixed by the CA was not appealed by
either party, there is no controversy as to its sufficiency and reasonableness. The dispute
concerns the deductions made by respondent in settling the support in... arrears.
The amounts already extended to the two (2) children, being a commendable act of petitioner,
should be continued by him considering the vast financial resources at his disposal.
 VIVARES V. REYES, GR No. 155408, February 13, 2008, 545 SCRA 80

Receivership; He who alleges fraud has the burden to prove it. Petitioners miserably failed to
adduce clear, convincing, and hard evidence to show the alleged fraud in the transfers and the
antedating of said transfers. The fact that the transfers were dated prior to the demise of the
Torcuato on May 12, 1992 does not necessarily mean the transfers were attended by fraud. He
who alleges fraud has the burden to prove it. Same; Same; Same; Receivership is a harsh
remedy to be granted only in extreme situations. Receivership is a harsh remedy to be
granted only in extreme situations. As early as 1914, the Court already enunciated the doctrinal
pronouncement in Velasco & Co. v. Gochuico & Co., that courts must use utmost circumspection
in allowing receivership, thus: The power to appoint a receiver is a delicate one and should be
exercised with extreme caution and only under circumstances requiring summary relief or where
the court is satisfied that there is imminent danger of loss, to be averted. The court should
consider the consequences to all of the parties and the power should not be exercised when it is
likely to produce irreparable injustice or injury to private rights or the facts demonstrate that the
appointment will injure the interests of others whose rights are entitled to as much
consideration from the court as those of the complainant

No digest available:

1. Telson v. CA

2. Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Icot, G.R. No. 168601, October 12, 2009,
603 SCRA 322)

3. G.R. No. 174356 : January 20, 2010 610 SCRA 399 Evelina G. Chavez, Et Al.
vs. Court of Appeals and Atty. Fidela Y Vargas

4. G.R. No. 165003 : February 2, 2010 611 SCRA 340 The City Mayor of Baguio
and the Head of the Demolition Team-Engr. Nazita Baez vs. Atty. Brain
Masweng

5. G.G. Sportswear v. BDO, GR 184434, Feb 8, 2010

6. G.R. No. 190382 : March 9, 2010 614 SCRA 810 Joseph Bernardez vs.
Commission on Elections

7. Atty. Ong v. Judge Balindong A.M. No. RTJ-10-2225- September 6, 2011