Comment on Hekman's "Truth and Method: Feminist Standpoint Theory Revisited": Where's

the Power?
Author(s): Patricia Hill Collins
Source: Signs, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Winter, 1997), pp. 375-381
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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Commenton Hekman's"Truthand Method: Feminist
StandpointTheoryRevisited":Where'sthePower?

Patricia Hill Collins

Y READING OF STANDPOINT THEORY sees it

as aninterpretive
framework
dedicated
toexplicating
how
knowledgeremainscentralto maintainingand changing
unjustsystemsof power.While themain argumentsin Su-
san Hekman'sarticle(inthisissue)containsurfacevalidity, becausestand-
point theoryneverwas designedto be argued as a theoryof truthor
method,Hekman'sarticlesimplymissesthe point of standpointtheory
overall.By decontextualizing standpointtheoryfromitsinitialmoorings
in a knowledge/power framework whilesimultaneously recontextualizing
itin an apoliticaldiscussionoffeminist truthand method,Hekmanessen-
tiallydepoliticizesthepotentiallyradicalcontentof standpointtheory.
First,the notion of a standpointrefersto historicallyshared,group-
based experiences.Groups have a degreeof permanenceovertimesuch
thatgrouprealitiestranscendindividualexperiences.For example,Afri-
can Americansas a stigmatizedracial group existedlong beforeI was
born and will probablycontinuelong afterI die. While my individual
experienceswithinstitutionalized racismwill be unique,thetypesof op-
portunities and constraintsthat I encounter on a dailybasis will resemble
thoseconfronting AfricanAmericansas a group.ArguingthatBlacks as
a group come into beingor disappear on the basis of my participation
seemsnarcissistic, egocentric,and archetypally postmodern.In contrast,
standpointtheoryplaces less emphasison individualexperienceswithin
sociallyconstructedgroupsthan on the social conditionsthatconstruct
such groups.
I stressthisdifference
betweentheindividualand thegroupas unitsof
analysisbecause usingthesetwo constructsas iftheywere interchange-
able clouds understanding of a hostoftopics,in thiscase, theverynotion
of a group-basedstandpoint.Individualismcontinuesas a taproot in
Westerntheorizing, includingfeminist versions.Whetherbourgeoisliber-
alism positingnotionsof individualrightsor postmodernsocial theory's
celebrationof humandifferences, market-basedchoice modelsgrounded
in individualismarguethatfreedomexistsvia the absence of constraints
of all sorts,includingthose of mandatorygroup membership.Freedom
occurs when individualshave rightsof mobilityin and out of groups,
muchas we join clubs and othervoluntaryassociations.
[Signs:Journalof Womenin Cultureand Society1997,vol.22, no. 2]
? 1997 byThe University
ofChicago.Allrights reserved.
0097-9740/97/2202-0005$01.00

Winter 1997 SIGNS 375

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 Collins COMMENT

But the individualas proxyforthegroup becomesparticularly prob-

lematicbecause standpointtheory'streatment ofthegroupis not synony-
mous witha "familyresemblance"of individualchoice expandedto the
level of voluntarygroup association.The notionof standpointrefersto
groupshavingsharedhistoriesbased on theirsharedlocationin relations
of power-standpointsariseneitherfromcrowdsof individualsnorfrom
groupsanalytically createdbyscholarsor bureaucrats.Take,forexample,
thecommonalityofexperiencesthatemergesfromlong-standing patterns
of racial segregationin theUnitedStates.The degreeof racialsegregation
betweenBlacksand Whitesas groupsis routinely underestimated. Blacks
and Whiteslivein raciallysegregatedneighborhoods,and thisbasic fea-
turegeneratesdistinctiveexperiencesin schools, recreationalfacilities,
shopping areas, health-caresystems,and occupational opportunities.
Moreover,middle-classBlacks have not been exemptfromtheeffectsof
diminishedopportunitiesthat accompanyracial segregationand group
discrimination. It is commonlocationwithinhierarchical powerrelations
that createsgroups,not the resultsof collectivedecisionmakingof the
individualswithinthe groups.Race, gender,social class, ethnicity, age,
and sexualityare not descriptive categoriesof identity appliedto individ-
uals. Instead,these elementsof social structureemergeas fundamental
devicesthatfosterinequalityresultingin groups.
To ignorepower relationsis simplyto misreadstandpointtheory-
its raison d'etre,its continuingsalience,and its abilityto explain social
inequality.Hekman'streatment ofgroupsas an accumulationofindividu-
als and not as entities with theirown realityallows her to do just this.
Note theslippage between individualand groupstandpointinthefollow-
ing passage: "If we take the multiplicityof feministstandpointsto its
logicalconclusion, coherent analysisbecomes impossiblebecausewe have
too manyaxes of analysis.Ultimately, every woman is unique; ifwe ana-
lyze each in her uniqueness,systemicanalysis is obviated. So is feminist
politics: we lose the abilityevento speak forcertain categoriesofwomen"
(359). Hekman clearly the
identifies veryconstruct of standpointwiththe
idea of individualperspectiveor point of view.This assumptionallows
herto collapse theindividualand groupas unitsof analysisand proceed
to reason that individualsand collectivitiesundergosimilarprocesses.
Butbecause sheremainsfocusedon theindividualas proxyforthegroup,
it becomesdifficult to constructthegroupfromsuch "unique" individu-
als. Arrivingat thedead end of theimpossibility of systemicanalysisthat
leads to systemicchange appears as the result.By omittinga discussion
of group-basedrealitiesgroundedin an equallycentralnotionof group-
based oppression,we moveintothesterilegroundof a discussionof how
effectively standpointtheoryservesas an epistemology of truth.
In contrastto Hekman's view that attentionto multiplicity fostersin-

376 SIGNS Winter 1997

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 COMMENT Collins

coherence,currentattentionto the theme of intersectionality situated

withinassumptionsofgroup-basedpowerrelationsrevealsa growingun-
derstandingof thecomplexityof theprocessesbothof generating groups
and accompanyingstandpoints.Initiallyexaminingonly one dimension
of powerrelations,namely,thatof social class, Marx positedthat,how-
everunarticulatedand inchoate,oppressedgroupspossesseda particular
standpointon inequality.In morecontemporary versions,inequalityhas
been revisedto reflecta greaterdegreeof complexity, especiallythat of
race and gender.What we now have is increasingsophisticationabout
how to discussgrouplocation,not in thesingularsocial class framework
proposedbyMarx, nor in theearlyfeminist frameworks arguingthepri-
of
macy gender, but withinconstructsof multiplicityresidingin social
structuresthemselvesand not in individualwomen. Fluiditydoes not
mean thatgroupsthemselvesdisappear,to be replacedby an accumula-
tionof decontexualized,uniquewomenwhose complexityerasespolitics.
Instead,thefluidity of boundariesoperatesas a new lensthatpotentially
deepens understandingof how the actual mechanismsof institutional
power can change dramaticallywhile continuingto reproducelong-
standinginequalitiesof race,gender,and class thatresultin groupstabil-
ity.In thissense,grouphistoryand locationcan be seen as pointsof con-
vergencewithinhierarchical,multiple,and changingstructuralpower
relations.
A second featureof standpointtheoryconcernsthe commonalityof
experiencesand perspectives thatemergeforgroupsdifferentially arrayed
withinhierarchicalpower relations.Keep in mindthat if the group has
been theorizedaway,therecan be no common experiencesor perspec-
tives.Standpointtheoryargues that groupswho share common place-
mentin hierarchicalpower relationsalso sharecommon experiencesin
such power relations.Such sharedangles of vision lead those in similar
social locationsto be predisposedto interprettheseexperiencesin a com-
parable fashion.The existence
of the as
group theunitof analysisneither
meansthatall individualswithinthegrouphavethesame experiencesnor
that theyinterpretthemin the same way.Using the group as the focal
point providesspace for individualagency.While these themesremain
meritorious, theysimplydo not lie at thecenterof standpointtheoryas
a theoryof group power and the knowledgesthat group location and
powergenerate.
Unfortunately, the much-deservedattentionto issues of individual
agency and diversityoftenovershadowinvestigating the continuedsa-
lienceofgroup-basedexperiences.Butgroup-basedexperience,especially
thatofraceand/orsocial class,continuesto matter.Forexample,African-
American male rates of incarcerationin Americanjails and prisons
remainthe highestin the world,exceedingeven those of South Africa.

Winter 1997 SIGNS 377

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 Collins COMMENT

Transcendingsocial class, regionof residence,commandof English,eth-

nic background,or othermarkersof difference, all Black men mustin
some way grapplewiththe actual or potentialtreatment bythecriminal
justice system.Moreover, mothers,daughters,wives, and loversof
as
Black men, Black women also participatein this common experience.
Similarly, childrenfrompoor communitiesand homelessfamiliesare un-
likely to attend college, not because theylack talent,but because they
lack opportunity. Whatevertheirracial/ethnic classification,poor people
as a group confrontsimilarbarriersforissues of basic survival.In this
sense, standpointtheoryseems especiallysuitedto explainingrelations
of race and/orsocial class because thesesystemsof power sharesimilar
institutional structures.Giventhehighdegreeof residentialand occupa-
tional segregationseparatingBlack and/orworking-classgroups from
Whitemiddle-classrealities,it becomesplausibleto generatearguments
about working-class and/orBlackculturethatemergefromlong-standing
shared experiences.For both class and race, a much clearercase of a
groupstandpointcan be constructed. Whetherindividualsfromor associ-
ated withthesegroupsacceptor rejectthesehistories,theyrecognizethe
saliencyof thenotionof groupstandpoint.
But genderraises different issues, for women are distributedacross
theseothergroups.In contrastto standpointsthatmustlearnto accom-
modate differenceswithin,feministstandpointsmust be constructed
across differences such as these.Thus, genderrepresents a distinctlydif-
ferentintellectualand politicalproject withinstandpointtheory. How ef-
fectively can a standpointtheory that was to
originallydeveloped expli-
cate thewage exploitationand subsequentimpoverishment of European,
working-classpopulations be applied to the extremelyheterogeneous
populationof womenin thecontemporary UnitedStates,let alone glob-
ally?For example,Black womenand Whitewomendo notlivein racially
integratedwomen'scommunities,separatedfrommen and childrenby
processessuchas gendersteeringintosuchcommunities, experiencebank
redlining that resultsin refusal to lend money to women's communities,
attendinferiorschools as a resultof men movingto all-malesuburban
areas,and thelike.Instead,Black and Whitewomenlivein raciallysegre-
gatedcommunities, and theexperiencestheygarnerin suchcommunities
reflecttheracial politicsoperatingoverall.Moreover,proximity in physi-
cal space is not necessarilythe same as occupyinga commonlocationin
thespace of hierarchical powerrelations.For example,Blackwomenand
women of color routinelyshareacademic officespace withmiddle-class
and/orWhitewomenacademics.It is quitecommonforwomenof color
to clean the officeof the feministacademicwritingthe latesttreatiseon
standpointtheory.Whilethesewomenoccupythesame physicalspace-
thisis whyproximity shouldnot be confusedwithgroupsolidarity-they

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 COMMENT Collins

occupyfundamentally differentlocationsin hierarchicalpowerrelations.

These womendid not justenterthisspace in a randomfashion.An entire
arsenalof social institutions createdpaths in whichthe indi-
collectively
vidualsassignedto one groupreceivedbetterhousing,healthcare,educa-
tion,and recreationalfacilities,while thoserelegatedto the othergroup
did withworse or did without.The accumulationof thesedifferent ex-
periences led thetwo groups of women to thatsame academic space. The
actual individualsmatterless than the accumulationof social structures
that lead to theseoutcomes.In this sense,developinga politicaltheory
forwomen involvesconfronting a differentand morecomplex set of is-
sues thanthatfacingrace theoriesor class-basedtheoriesbecause wom-
en'sinequalityis structured differently.
Thereis a thirdthemeof standpointtheoryin whichpoweris erased,
namely,thesignificance ofgroupconsciousness,groupself-definition, and
"voice" withinthisentirestructureof power and experience.Collapsing
individualand groupidentity emergeshereas significant because applying
standpointtheoryto the individualas proxyforthe groupbecomespar-
ticularlyproblematicin comparingindividualvoice withgroupvoice or
standpoint.Typically, thisprocessoperatesvia imagininghow individuals
negotiateself-definitionsand thenclaiminga "familyresemblance"pos-
itingthat collectivitiesundergoa similarprocess. Because collectivities
certainlydo constructstoriesin framingtheiridentity, thisapproach ap-
pears plausible.But can the individualstand as proxyforthegroupand
thegroupfortheindividual?Moreover,can thisparticularversionof the
individualserveas theexemplarforcollectivegroupidentity?
If an individualreasons fromhis or her own personalexperiencesby
imaginingthatsince "we are all thesame underthe skin,therefore, what
I experiencemustbe thesame as what everybodyelse experiences,"then
a certainperceptionof groupnarrativestructure emerges.Ifan individual
believesthathis or herpersonalexperiencesin comingto voice,especially
the innervoices withinhis or her own individualconsciousnesshidden
fromhierarchalpowerrelations,not onlyreflect a commonhumanexpe-
riencebut, more to the point,also serveas an exemplarforhow group
consciousnessand decision makingoperate,thenindividualexperience
becomes the model forcomprehending group processes.This approach
minimizesthe significance of conflictwithingroupsin generatinggroup
narratives.In themodel in whichan individualconductsinnerdialogues
among various partsof his or her "self,"the process of mediatingcon-
flictingidentitiesoccurs withineach individual.The individualalways
holds completepower or agencyover the consciousnessthat he or she
constructsin his or her own mind and the voice that she or he uses to
expressthatconsciousness.
Shiftingthismode of comingto voice to the level of the small group

Winter 1997 SIGNS 379

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 Collins COMMENT

providesspace to thinkof groupsas collectionsof individualsengaged

in dialogue withone another.As equal and different, theconcernlies in
finding rules to decide whose voice has most validity.By asking,"If we
acknowledgemultiplerealities,multiplestandpoints, how do we discrim-
inate among them?" (359), Hekman continuesthe searchforrulesthat
everyonecan followin orderto come to a collective"voice."Withinthe
scope of individualsengagedin face-to-face interaction, thisseemsrea-
sonable. Butdoes thisworkwiththeunderstanding ofgroupthatunder-
lies standpointtheory?
Hekman quite rightlyrecognizesthatmultiplerealitiesyieldmultiple
perspectiveson reality.But again, herconcernwiththe questionof who
has the best,"truest,"or privilegedstandpointremainsgroundedin am-
biguousnotionsofgroupthatomitgroup-basedconflicts and how hierar-
chical powerrelationsgeneratedifferences in groupvoice or standpoint.
Bracketingthe questionof power and restricting argumentsolelyto the
questionoftruthcertainly revealsthelimitations of usingepistemological
criteriain defenseofprivilegedstandpoints.Butwithintherealityofhier-
archicalpower relations,the standpointsof some groupsare most cer-
tainlyprivilegedoverothers.The amountof privilegegrantedto a partic-
ular standpointlies less in itsinternalcriteriain beingtruthful, theterrain
in which Hekman situatesher discussion,and more in the power of a
group in makingits standpointprevailoverotherequallyplausibleper-
spectives.Withinhierarchicalpower relations,it seems reasonablethat
groupsdisadvantagedbysystemsofpowermightsee theirstrength in soli-
darityand collectiveresponses to theircommon location and subjuga-
tion.In contrast,it seemsequallyplausiblethatthoseprivilegedbythese
typesof group placementsmightwant to do away with notionsof the
groupaltogether, in effectobscuringthe privilegestheygain fromgroup
membership.
Again, genderraises some particularchallengesin using standpoint
theoryto represent thestandpointofwomen.One fundamental contribu-
tion of feministmovementgroundedin standpointtheorywas that it
aimed to bringwomen'sgroupconsciousnessinto being.Earlyemphasis
on women'scomingto voice via theprocessof consciousness-raising and
claiming individual"voice" inadvertentlylaid the foundation for the type
of conceptualambiguitybetweenindividualand group as categoriesof
analysis.Contemporaryfeministtheorizing,especiallythe emergenceof
postmodernsocial theory'sthemeof deconstructing the subject,aggra-
vates this long-standingcommitment to bringingindividualwomen to
voice as emblematicof thecollectivestruggleof womenfor"voice." Col-
lapsingtheprocessesof individualand groupvoice and usingtheprocess
of individualwomencomingto voiceas emblematicofwomen'scollective
comingto voicereinforces thisnotionthatindividualand collectivevoice

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 COMMENT Collins

or standpointare the same. For manycontemporaryfeminists, voicing

theirdiscontentwithoppressionis sufficient-actually changinginstitu-
tional powerrelationsseemsless important.Gainingvoice onlyto lose it
again to a standpointtheorythat replaces the freedomof individually
negotiatedfriendships or sisterhoodwith the obligationsof race, class,
and gender "families"seems unacceptableto those with the means to
escape.
Standpointtheoryarguesthatideas matterin systemsof power.In this
sense,standpointsmaybe judgednotonlybytheirepistemologicalcontri-
butionsbut also bythetermsof theirparticipationin hierarchicalpower
relations.Do theyinherently explain and condone injustice,or do they
challengeit? Do theyparticipatein relationsof rule via creatingknowl-
edge,or do theyrejectsuch rulebygeneratingculturesof resistance?Ex-
tractingany claims about knowledgefromthe power relationsin which
theyare embeddedviolates the basic premiseof standpointtheorybe-
cause such theoryexists primarilyto explicate these power relations.
Thus, attemptsto take the knowledgewhile leavingthe power behind
inadvertentlyoperatewithintheterrainof privilegedknowledge.While I
respectpostmoderncontributions in deconstructinglanguagesof power,
standpointtheoryencompassesmuchmorethanchangingthe "language
game of politics" (363). Oppressionis not a game,nor is it solelyabout
language-for manyof us, it stillremainsprofoundly real.

Departmentof African-AmericanStudies
of Cincinnati
University

Winter 1997 SIGNS 381

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