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Case 1: Kilosbayan Incorporated vs.


GR 118910 | July 17, 1995 | Mendoza, J.:

As a result of a previous G.R. invalidating the Contract of Lease between the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management Corp. (PGMC) on the
ground that it had been made in violation of the charter of the PCSO, the parties entered into
negotiations for a new agreement that would be consistent with the PCSOs charter.

On January 25, 1995, the parties signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (therefore called
ELA) whereby the PGMC leased online lottery equipment and accessories to the PCSO. Under the
law, 30% of the net receipts from the sale of tickets is allotted to charity. The term of lease is eight (8)
years, commencing from the start of commercial operation of the lottery equipment first delivered to
the lessee pursuant to the agreed schedule.

In the operation of the lottery, the PCSO is to employ its own personnel. It is responsible for
the loss of, or damage to, the equipment arising from any cause and for the cost of their maintenance
and repair. Upon the expiration of the lease, the PCSO has the option to purchase the equipment for
the sum of P25 million.

On February 21, 1995 this suit was filed seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground
that it is substantially the same as the Contract of Lease nullified in the first case. Petitioners argue
that it is inconsistent with and violative of PCSOs charter and the previous decision of the Court on
May 5, 1995, and that it is violative of the public bidding requirement of contracts and the furnishing
of supplies, materials, and equipment to the government and also the requirement of prevention of
irregular expenditures.

PCSO and PGMC (1) questioned the petitioners standing, (2) maintained that the ELA is a
different lease contract that is not a joint venture (so not the same as the previous cause SC ruled on),
(3) that ELA was an exception that did not have to go through public bidding (4) that the power to
determine whether the ELA is advantageous to the government is vested in the Board of Directors of
the PCSO (5) that for lack of funds PCSO cannot purchase its own equipment, and (6) petitioners are
only doing this to further their own political agenda.

(1) Whether or not petitioners have standing.
(2) Whether the petitioners had a right to bring this suit because of the law of the case.
(3) Whether the ELA is valid as a lease contract under the Civil Code and is not contrary to the
charter of PCSO, and PCSO has authority to enter in into a contract so long as it itself holds or
conducts such lottery.
(4) Whether or not the ELA had to be submitted to public bidding.

(1) No. Petitioners do not show a particularized interest in bringing this suit. There is no
allegation that public funds are being misspent so as to make this action a public one.
Petitioners invoking Article II of the Constitution is uncalled for because they are not
self-executing provisions that judicially enforce constitutional rights, but mere guidelines to
(2) No. The parties are the same but the cases are not. This case is not a continuation of the
previous ruling of SC invalidating lease between PCSO and PGMC. It is a different lease
(3) Yes. It is valid because it is not a joint venture like the Contract of Lease agreement that was
invalidated in a previous case with the same parties. In the new contract, the PGMC is assured
of payment of the rental and PCSO bears all losses because the operation of the system is
completely in its hands. Just because PCSO agrees to collaborate with PGMC and needs its
assistance does not change the fact that PCSO is still in the drivers seat in the ELA.
(4) No. ELA is a negotiated contract E.O. No. 301 applies only to contracts for the purchase of
supplies, materials, and equipment. It does not refer to contracts of lease of equipment like the

Concurring Opinion:
Padilla, J
It is the duty of the SC to apply laws enacted by Congress even if such laws run counter to a
Members personal conviction. The argument that the ELA still constitutes a prohibited association,
collaboration, or joint venture with PGMC is a much too strained interpretation of the law which
results from a less than pragmatic analysis of the issue. The ELA is a contract of lease, not a joint
venture, and validly and lawfully entered into, as far as PCSOs charter is concerned.

Dissenting Opinion:
Feliciano, J.
The Courts previous decision should be largely taken into consideration. Mr. Justice Davide
hismelf, as the legislator who contributed in the crafting of the PCSO charter, should have an
authoritativ say on how to interpret the charter because he represents the intent of the legislative body.

Regalado, J.
Peittioners have locus standi by manner of the SCs decision in the first case.

Davide, JR.
The sudden reversal of rulings in two similar cases upsets the doctrines of the law of the case,
res judicata, and stare decisis. Petitioners have locus standi by virtue of the previous related case.
This case is but a continuation of the first lotto case or a new chapter in the raging controversy
between the petitioners.
Even assuming that ELA is not a joint venture contract (which it is), it must be nullified for
having been entered without public bidding and for being disadvantageous to the Government.

Separate Concurring Opinion

Vitug, J.
Petitioners dont have locus standi. This issue is not a judiciable controversy.

Case 2: Tondo Medical Center Empoyees Association v. Court of Appeals (CA)

G.R. No. 167324 | July 16, 2007 | Chico-Nazario, J.:

In 1999, DOH launched Health Sector Reform Agenda which provided fiscal autonomy to
government hospitals, among other things. Petitioners are questioning the fiscal autonomy provision
which mandates government hospitals to be allowed to collect socialized user fees so they can reduce
their dependence on direct subsidies from the government. Naturally, petitioners also assailed the
issuance of administrative orders by the DOH to set in motion the compliance with the
aforementioned provision. Petitioners allege that HSRA violates constitutional provisions particularly
those in Article II.
On May 24, 1999, President Joseph Estrada Issued EO 102 further setting in motion
compliance with the provision. This EO pushed DOH to refocus its mandate from being the sole
provider of health services to being a provider of specific health services and technical assistance. The
provisions for the streamlining of the DOH and the deployment of DOH personnel to regional offices
was also a problem for the petitioners.

(1) Whether or not HSRA and RSP are constitutional.

(1) Yes. Article II of the Constitution are not self-executing but merely guidelines for legislation.
HSRA does not violate any equal protection clauses. The DOH is among the cabinet-level
departments tasked with the functional distribution of the work of the President. Both have
authority to implement HSRA and RSP. While these rules will indeed lead to inconveniences
by DOH employees, the need to make health services available and make delivery of health
services more efficient is too big of a benefit to sacrifice.

Case 3: Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA) v. Commission on Audit (COA)
G.R. No. 178160 | February 26. 2009 | Carpio, J.:
Year-end Bonuses
RA No. 7227 - creating the BCDA
TLDR; BCDA kept on increasing their year-end bonuses and gave it away to everyone
(consultants, full-time employees and contractors) - COA says that it shouldnt be allowed
This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and a writ of preliminary injunction. The petition seeks to nullify Decision re: the disallowal
of year-end benefits to all the employees .
On 13 March 1992, Congress approved Republic Act (RA) No. 7227 creating the Bases
Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA).
Section 9 of RA No. 7227 states that the BCDA Board of Directors (Board) shall exercise the
powers and functions of the BCDA.
Under Section 10, the functions of the Board include the determination of the organizational
structure and the adoption of a compensation and benefit scheme at least equivalent to that of
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).
The Board adopted a new compensation and benefit scheme which included a P10,000
year-end benefit granted to each contractual employee, regular permanent employee, and
Board member.
Board Chairman Victoriano A. Basco (Chairman Basco) recommended the new compensation
and benefit scheme to President Fidel V. Ramos (President Ramos), and was approved.
In 1999, the BSP gave a P30,000 year-end benefit to its officials and employees
In 2000, the BSP increased the year-end benefit from P30,000 to P35,000.
Aside from the contractual employees, regular permanent employees, and Board members,
the full-time consultants of the BCDA also received the year-end benefit.
On 20 February 2003, State Auditor IV Corazon V. Espao of the COA issued Audit
Observation Memorandum stating that the grant of year-end benefit to Board members
was contrary to Department of Budget and Management.
As such, Director Tablang, COA, Legal and Adjudication Office-Corporate, disallowed the
grant of year-end benefit to the Board members and full-time consultants.
BCDA President and Chief Executive Officer Rufo Colayco asked for reconsideration.
Director Tablang denied the request.

Whether the year-end benefit should be granted to the Board members and full-time consultants?
(Was it constitutional?) NO. (Petition partially granted)

The Petition was partially granted -- year end benefit should not be given to all the
employees (only Board members), and that those who already received the benefits do
not need to return it since they received it good faith (not knowing that it was unlawful).
First, the the BCDA claims that the Board can grant the year-end benefit to its members and
full-time consultants because, under Section 10 of RA No. 7227, the functions of the Board
include the adoption of a compensation and benefit scheme.
The Boards power to adopt a compensation and benefit scheme is not unlimited.
Section 9 of RA No. 7227 states that Board members are entitled to a per diem:
Members of the Board shall receive a per diem of not more than Five
thousand pesos (P5,000) for every board meeting: Provided, however,
That the per diem collected per month does not exceed the equivalent of
four (4) meetings:
Members of the Board of Directors of agencies are not salaried officials of the
government. As non-salaried officials they are not entitled to PERA, ADCOM, YEB and
retirement benefits unless expressly provided by law. RA No. 7227 does not state that the
Board members are entitled to a year-end benefit.
Second, the BCDA claims that the Board members and full-time consultants should be
granted the year-end benefit because the granting of year-end benefit is consistent with
Sections 5 and 18, Article II of the Constitution. Sections 5 and 18 state:
Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and
property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by
all people of the blessings of democracy.
Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect
the rights of workers and promote their welfare.
Article II of the Constitution is entitled Declaration of Principles and State Policies. By its
very title, Article II is a statement of general ideological principles and policies. It is not a
source of enforceable rights. In Tondo Medical Center Employees Association v. Court of
Appeals, the Court held that Sections 5 and 18, Article II of the Constitution are not
self-executing provisions. In that case, the Court held that Some of the constitutional
provisions invoked in the present case were taken from Article II of the Constitution
specifically, Sections 5 x x x and 18 the provisions of which the Court categorically ruled to
be non self-executing.
Third, the BCDA claims that the denial of year-end benefit to the Board members and
full-time consultants violates Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. More specifically, the
BCDA claims that there is no substantial distinction between regular officials and employees
on one hand, and Board members and full-time consultants on the other. The BCDA states
that there is here only a distinction, but no difference because both have undeniably one
common goal as humans, that is x x x to keep body and soul together or, [d]ifferently put,
both have mouths to feed and stomachs to fill.
Every presumption should be indulged in favor of the constitutionality of RA No. 7227
and the burden of proof is on the BCDA to show that there is a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution. In Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, the Court held that:
A law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong presumption of constitutionality. To
justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful and unequivocal one. To invalidate [a law] based on x x x
baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed
it but also of the executive which approved it.

The BCDA failed to show that RA No. 7227 unreasonably singled out Board members and
full-time consultants in the grant of the year-end benefit. It did not show any clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution.
Fourth, the BCDA claims that the Board can grant the year-end benefit to its members and
the full-time consultants because RA No. 7227 does not expressly prohibit it from doing so.
A careful reading of Section 9 of RA No. 7227 reveals that the Board is prohibited
from granting its members other benefits. Section 9 states:
Members of the Board shall receive a per diem of not more than Five
thousand pesos (P5,000) for every board meeting: Provided, however,
That the per diem collected per month does not exceed the equivalent of
four (4) meetings:
Section 9 specifies that Board members shall receive a per diem for every board meeting;
limits the amount of per diem to not more than P5,000; limits the total amount of per diem for
one month to not more than four meetings; and does not state that Board members may
receive other benefits. In Magno, Cabili, De Jesus, Molen, Jr., and Baybay Water District, the
Court held that the specification of compensation and limitation of the amount of
compensation in a statute indicate that Board members are entitled only to the per diem
authorized by law and no other.
Fifth, the BCDA claims that the Board members and full-time consultants are entitled to the
year-end benefit because
(1) President Ramos approved the granting of the benefit to the Board members, and
(2) they have been receiving it since 1997.
The State is not estopped from correcting a public officers erroneous application of a statute,
and an unlawful practice, no matter how long, cannot give rise to any vested right
The Court, however, notes that the Board members and full-time consultants received the
year-end benefit in good faith, so the do not need to return the YEBs that they already
Case 4: People v. Gozo
No. L-36409 | October 26. 1973 | Fernando, J.:
House in a base = Does the Municipal have jurisdiction? Yes! Military Bases Agreement
doesnt apply here. PH has jurisdiction over issues that are punishable here right? :O

Gozo seeks to set aside a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Zambales, convicting her
of a violation of an ordinance of Olongapo, Zambales, requiring a permit from the
municipal mayor for the construction or erection of a building, as well as any
modification, alteration, repair or demolition thereof.
She questions its validity, or at the very least, its applicability to her, by invoking due process,
a contention she would premise on what for her is the teaching of People v. Fajardo.
If such a ground were far from being impressed with solidity, she stands on quicksand when
she would deny the applicability of the ordinance to her, on the pretext that her house was
constructed within the naval base leased to the American armed forces.
While yielding to the well-settled doctrine that it does not thereby cease to be Philippine
territory, she would, in effect, seek to emasculate our sovereign rights by the assertion that we
cannot exercise therein administrative jurisdiction.
The Court of Instance of Zambales, on appeal, found her guilty on the above facts of
violating such municipal ordinance but would sentence her merely to pay a fine of P200.00
and to demolish the house thus erected. She elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but in
her brief, she would put in issue the validity of such an ordinance on constitutional ground
or at the very least its applicability to her in view of the location of her dwelling within
the naval base.

ISSUE: Whether the property of the Gozo shall be exempted from the application of the Municipal
Ordinance? NO. SHE IS GUILTY.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of November 11, 1969 is affirmed insofar as it found
the accused, Loreta Gozo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Municipal
Ordinance No. 14, series of 1964 and sentencing her to pay a fine of P200.00 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and modified insofar as she is required to
demolish the house that is the subject matter of the case, she being given a period of thirty
days from the finality of this decision within which to obtain the required permit. Only upon
her failure to do so will that portion of the appealed decision requiring demolition be
enforced. Costs against the accused.
On a concern purely domestic in its implications, devoid of any connection with national
security, the Military-Bases Agreement could be thus interpreted, then sovereignty indeed
becomes a mockery and an illusion.
Aka Military-Bases Agreement is not applicable for domestic concerns (such as the
Within the limits of its territory, whatever statutory powers are vested upon it may be
validly exercised. Any residual authority and therein conferred, whether expressly or
impliedly, belongs to the national government, not to an alien country.
Case 5 - No. L-5: Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh
Sept. 17, 1945
- De facto government, International Law, Hague Conventions of 1907
- Japanese Occupation, Gen. Douglas MacArthur, juridical acts and proceedings

- Petition for mandamus Respondent Judge refused to continue the proceedings of civil case
No. 3012 which was initiated under the regime of the so-called Republic of the Philippines
during the Japanese Occupation
- Respondent Judge contends:
- Proclamation issued by Gen. Douglas MacArthur nullified and invalidated all judicial
proceedings and judgements of the courts under the PH Executive Commission and
the so-called Republic of the PH during the Jap Occupation
- Having said that, lower courts have no jurisdiction to continue judicial proceedings
that were pending during the said occupation without an enabling law
- Governments established in the PH during the occupation were not de facto
- The rest of the facts focus on the different proclamations and orders during and after the
Japanese Occupation.
- Orders made by the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Forces in the PH:
- Order No. 1: A civil government called PH Executive Commission was established
- Order No. 3, Sec 1: activities of the administrative organs and judicial courts in the
PH shall be based upon the existing statues, orders, ordinances, and customs.
- The Chairman of the PH Exec Commission also issued Executive Orders No. 1 and 4 which
stated: the SC, Court of Appeals, Courts of First Instance, and the justices of municial courts
shall continue with the same jurisdiction
- The so-called Republic of the Philippines was then inagurated
- October 23, 1994: Gen. Douglas MacArthur landed in Leyte. He also issued a proclamation
which declared the ff under the PH areas free of enemy occupation and control:
- Government of the Commonwealth of the PH is subject to the supreme authority of
the Gov of the US.
- Laws now existing on the statue books of the Commonwealth of the PH and
regulations promulgated in pursuant thereto are in full force and effect.
- All laws, regulations, and processes of any other gov are null and void and
without legal effect. [this is the contended provision]
- February 3, 1945: City of Manila partially liberated. The full powers and responsibilities
under the Constitution restored to the Commonwealth whose seat is here reestablished.

- WoN the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts existing under the PH Exec Commission
and the Republic of the PH were good and valid and remained so after the liberation or
reoccupation by the US. YES. GOOD AND VALID.
- WoN the proclamation issued by Gen. Douglas MacArthur has invalidated all judgements and
judicial acts and proceedings of courts existing under the PH Exec Commission. NO.
- (If not invalidated) WoN the present courts in the Commonwealth, which were the same
courts existing prior to and during the Jap Occupation, may continue pending proceedings at
the time the PH was reoccupied. YES, THEY MAY CONTINUE.

Issue 1
- Accrdg to international law, all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and
judicial depts of a de facto government are good and valid.
- So we just have to establish WoN the PH Exec Commission and the Republic of the PH were
de facto govs.
- There are 3 kinds of de facto govs:
- Government that usurps or gets control of the rightful legal government by the voice
of majority. (Ex: People Power usurped the government)
- Government that is established and maintained by military forces who have invaded
and occupied a territory of an enemy
- Government that is established as an independent gov by the inhabitants of a country
who rise in insurrection against the parent state
- Since the PH Exec Commission was established by the Commander of the Jap forces was a
civil gov established by the military forces of occupation, it is a de facto government of
the second kind
- The so-called Republic of the PH which was supposedly independent from any other
government was actually a government established by the Japanese gov (puppet gov)
because its ultimate source of authority is still the Jap military and gov.
- It was merely a scheme by Japan to make it seem like they were granting us
independence in hopes of getting our support or neutrality in their fight against US.
- Following the international law stated earlier, the PH Exec and the Republic of the PH, being
de facto govs, follow that their judicial acts and proceedings, which are NOT of political
complexion, are good and valid and remain so after the liberation/reoccupation of the

Issue 2
- This hinges upon the interpretation of processes of any other government used in the
proclamation by Gen.Douglas MacArthur.
- In other words: WoN it was the intention of the Commander in Chief of the American
Forces to annul and avoid thereby all judgements and judicial proceedings of the
courts established in the Philippines during the Jap occupation. (Spoiler alert: It
- Given the principle of international law stated in Issue 1, it could not have been his
intention to refer to judicial processes in violation of said principle of international law.
- Rule on StatCon: A statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any
other possible construction remains.
- It is not to be presumed that Gen. MacArthur who enjoined the same proclamation full
respect and obedience to the Constitution of the Commonwealth of the Philippines
should not only reverse the international policy and practice of his own government, but also
disregard Art II, Sec 2 of the Constitution:
- The Philippines [...] adopts the generally accepted principles of international law
as part of the law of the nation.
- EO No. 37, an EO made by the President under the Commonwealth of the PH also stated: all
cases duly appealed to CA shall be transmitted to SC.
- This is obviously an implied recognition that the previous judicial acts and
proceedings have not yet been invalidated.
- The mere possibility that the titular sovereign or his representatives who reoccupies a territory
may set aside or annul all the judicial acts or proceedings of the tribunals would be sufficient
to paralyze the social life of the country (because litigants wouldnt submit their cases to court
if they knew decisions may be annulled anyway).

Issue 3
- When Manila was occupied, Commander of Jap Forces proclaimed: all the laws now in force
in the Commonwealth, as well as executive and judicial institutions, shall continue to be
effective for the time being as in the past.
- If the pending proceedings prior to the Jap Occupation were continued during said
occupation, it stands to reason that the SAME COURTS may continue its pending
proceedings after the occupation without the necessity of enacting a law
conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue.
- Legal Maxim: Law once established continues until challenged by some competent
legislative power. It is not merely changed by change of sovereignty.

All things considered, respondent judge is ordered to continue the final judgement and proceedings
of Civil Case No. 3012 by Co Kim Cham.

Case 6 - AM No. 90-11-2697: In re Letter of Associate Justice Puno

June 29, 1992
- Batas Pambansa Blg, 129
- Associate Justice appointment, difference in seniority ranking

- Reynato Puno was first appointed Assoc. Justice of the Court of Appeals on 1980, but only
took his oath on 1982.
- 1983: the Court of Appeals was reorganized and became the Intermediate Appellate Court
pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg, 129: An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary. Appropriating
Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes.
- Puno was appointed Appellate Justice
- 1984: Puno was appoined Deputy Minister of Justice in the Minister of Justice
- 1986 (after EDSA Rev): There was a reorganization of the entire government, including the
judiciary under EO33. A Screening Commitee was created and said committee
recommended the return of Puno as Associate Justice of the new Court of Appeals and have
him a rank of (11)
- HOWEVER, when the appointments were signed by Cory, Puno rank dropped to rank (26)
- Puno argues that the change in his seniority ranking could only be attributed to inadvertence
for, otherwise, it would run counter to Sec 2 of EO33:
- Any member who is reappointed to the Court after rendering service in any other
position in the government shall retain the precedence to which he was entitled
under his original appointment, and his service shall be considered as continuous
and uninterrupted.
- Puno says that the correction of the error would only implement the INTENT of the
- Court granted Punos request, and from number (12), he became number (5)
- A motion for reconsideration was filed by (2) Assoc Justices who were affected by such
- Assoc Justice Jose Campos Jr and Luis Javellana
- They contend:
- Present CA is a new court with (51) members, so Puno cannot claim reappointment
from a prior court that has ceased to exist
- Appeal by Puno was sent to the wrong party (should be Office of the Pres instead of
- Puno indeed sent a letter to the Office of the Pres as well, but was
- Thus, they content that such non-approval must be respected
- Puno states that under Corys Freedom Constitution, no right provided under the unratified
1973 Constitution (shall) be absent in the Freedom Constitution.
- Given this, Puno contends that EO33 cannot be wielded in violation of law.

- WoN the present Court of Appeals is a new court such that it would negate any claim to
precedence or seniority admittedly enjoyed by petitioner in the courts existing prior to EO33.

- The Court held that the CA and the Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to EO33
phased out as part of the legal system abolished by the revolution.
- Thus, the CA established under EO33 is an entirely new court with its appointments
having no relation to the abolished courts.
- BP Blg No. 2 as amended by EO33 applies to prospective situations
- The People Power Revolution overthrew the ENTIRE government, including its legal systems
and legal order. It was done in defiance to the 1973 Constitution.
- Aside from that, President Cory Aquino, at the time of the appointments, modified or
disregarded the rule of prescedence or seniority in the case of Puno for reasons known only to
- Given that such is a political question, the Courts can neither question nor correct
such exercise of revolutionary power of the President,
- Court grants motion for reconsideration. Seniority rankings made by the President are
recognized and upheld.
Case 7 -- GR 104768: Republic of the Philippines,
petitioner VS Sandiganbayan, Major General Josephus
Q. Ramas and Elizabeth Dimaano, respondents
July 21, 2003
Tags: PCCG Specific Functions
- President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 (EO No. 1) creating the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)
- EO No. 1 primarily tasked the PCGG to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates. EO
No. 1 vested the PCGG with the power (a) to conduct investigation as may be necessary in
order to accomplish and carry out the purposes of this order and the power (b) to promulgate
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this order.
- Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained
wealth of respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas (Ramas). On 27 July 1987, the
AFP Board issued a Resolution on its findings and recommendation on the reported
unexplained wealth of Ramas. The relevant part of the Resolution reads:
- Evidence in the record showed that respondent is the owner of a house and lot located
at 15-Yakan St., La Vista, Quezon City. He is also the owner of a house and lot
located in Cebu City. The lot has an area of 3,327 square meters.
- The equipment/items and communication facilities which were found in the premises
of Elizabeth Dimaano and were confiscated by elements of the PC Command of
Batangas were all covered by invoice receipt in the name of CAPT. EFREN
SALIDO, RSO Command Coy, MSC, PA. These items could not have been in the
possession of Elizabeth Dimaano if not given for her use by respondent Commanding
General of the Philippine Army.
- Aside from the military equipment/items and communications equipment, the raiding
team was also able to confiscate money in the amount of P2,870,000.00 and $50,000
US Dollars in the house of Elizabeth Dimaano on 3 March 1986.
- Sworn statement in the record disclosed also that Elizabeth Dimaano had no
visible means of income and is supported by respondent for she was formerly a
mere secretary.
- This money was never declared in the Statement of Assets and Liabilities of
respondent. There was an intention to cover the existence of these money
because these are all ill-gotten and unexplained wealth
- Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted
and tried for violation of RA 3019, as amended, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act and RA 1379, as amended, otherwise known as The Act for the
Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property.[3]
- Thus, on 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No.
1379 (RA No. 1379) against Ramas.
- On 28 September 1989, during the continuation of the trial, petitioner manifested its inability
to proceed to trial because of the absence of other witnesses or lack of further evidence to
- However, on 18 May 1990, petitioner again expressed its inability to proceed to trial
because it had no further evidence to present. Again, in the interest of justice, the
Sandiganbayan granted petitioner 60 days within which to file an appropriate pleading. The
Sandiganbayan, however, warned petitioner that failure to act would constrain the court to
take drastic action.
- Private respondents then filed their motions to dismiss based on Republic v. Migrino. The
Court held in Migrino that the PCGG does not have jurisdiction to investigate and
prosecute military officers by reason of mere position held without a showing that they
are subordinates of former President Marcos.
- On 18 November 1991, the Sandiganbayan rendered a resolution, the dispositive portion of
which states:
- judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the Amended Complaint, without
pronouncement as to costs.
- Return the property to Dimaano
- Dismissed it because:
- No previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases
was conducted against Ramas and Dimaano.
- The evidence adduced against Ramas does not constitute a prima facie case
against him.
- There was an illegal search and seizure of the items confiscated.

Issues and Answer:

1) First Issue: PCGGs Jurisdiction to Investigate Private Respondents
2) Second Issue: Propriety of Dismissal of Case Before Completion of Presentation of
3) Third Issue: Legality of the Search and Seizure

- (1) The primary issue for resolution is whether the PCGG has the jurisdiction to
investigate and cause the filing of a forfeiture petition against Ramas and Dimaano for
unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379.
- We hold that PCGG has no such jurisdiction.
- The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the unexplained wealth
and corrupt practices of AFP personnel who fall under either of the two
categories mentioned in Section 2 of EO No. 1.
- (1) AFP personnel who have accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the
administration of former President Marcos by being the latters
immediate family, relative, subordinate or close associate, taking undue
advantage of their public office or using their powers, influence
- (2) AFP personnel involved in other cases of graft and corruption
provided the President assigns their cases to the PCGG.
- Petitioner, however, does not claim that the President assigned Ramas case to the
PCGG. Therefore, Ramas case should fall under the first category of AFP personnel
before the PCGG could exercise its jurisdiction over him.
- We hold that Ramas was not a subordinate of former President Marcos in the
sense contemplated under EO No. 1 and its amendments.
- Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically make him
a subordinate as this term is used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A absent a
showing that he enjoyed close association with former President Marcos.
- [T]he term subordinate as used in EO Nos. 1 & 2 refers to one who enjoys a
close association with former President Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the
immediate family member, relative, and close associate in EO No. 1 and the
close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in EO No. 2.
- It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a government
official or employee during the administration of former President Marcos.
There must be a prima facie showing that the respondent unlawfully
accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or relation with former
Pres. Marcos and/or his wife.
- Have to show prima facie evidence that RESPONDENT got ILL-GOTTEN
- Omission of this is FATAL as this is the jurisdiction of PCGG
- Petitioner has no jurisdiction over private respondents. Thus, there is no
jurisdiction to waive in the first place. The PCGG cannot exercise investigative
or prosecutorial powers never granted to it. PCGGs powers are specific and
limited. Unless given additional assignment by the President, PCGGs sole task is
only to recover the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their relatives and cronies.
Without these elements, the PCGG cannot claim jurisdiction over a case.
- (2) Petitioner also contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case before
completion of the presentation of petitioners evidence. We disagree.
- we find that petitioner has only itself to blame for non-completion of the presentation
of its evidence.
- First, this case has been pending for four years before the Sandiganbayan dismissed
it. Petitioner filed its Amended Complaint on 11 August 1987, and only began to
present its evidence on 17 April 1989. Petitioner had almost two years to prepare its
evidence. However, despite this sufficient time, petitioner still delayed the
presentation of the rest of its evidence
- The Sandiganbayan gave petitioner more than sufficient time to finish the
presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan overlooked petitioners delays and
yet petitioner ended the long-string of delays with the filing of a Re-Amended
Complaint, which would only prolong even more the disposition of the case.
- (3) Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the properties confiscated from
Dimaanos house as illegally seized and therefore inadmissible in evidence. This issue bears a
significant effect on petitioners case since these properties comprise most of petitioners
evidence against private respondents. Petitioner will not have much evidence to support its
case against private respondents if these properties are inadmissible in evidence.
- The correct issues are:
- (1) whether the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill of Rights of
the 1973 Constitution during the interregnum, that is, after the actual and
effective take-over of power by the revolutionary government following the
cessation of resistance by loyalist forces up to 24 March 1986 (immediately
before the adoption of the Provisional Constitution); and
- (2) whether the protection accorded to individuals under the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Covenant) and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (Declaration) remained in effect during the
- We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative
during the interregnum. However, we rule that the protection accorded to
individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration remained in effect during
the interregnum.
- With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution,
there was no municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the
revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person could not
invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was
neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum.
- Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary government had the
duty to insure that [n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence.
- provides in its Article 17(2) that [n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
property. Although the signatories to the Declaration did not intend it as a
legally binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has
interpreted the Declaration as part of the generally accepted principles
of international law and binding on the State. Thus, the revolutionary
government was also obligated under international law to observe the rights
of individuals under the Declaration.
- However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not included in the
warrant. As admitted by petitioners witnesses, the raiding team confiscated
items not included in the warrant, thus
- It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant did not
include the monies, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles that
the raiding team confiscated. Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its authority
when it seized these items.
- The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are
contraband per se,[53] and they are not, they must be returned to the person
from whom the raiding seized them. However, we do not declare that such
person is the lawful owner of these items, merely that the search and seizure
warrant could not be used as basis to seize and withhold these items from the
possessor. We thus hold that these items should be returned immediately to
- WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The questioned Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037,
remanding the records of this case to the Ombudsman for such appropriate action as the
evidence may warrant, and referring this case to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue for a determination of any tax liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, are
Case 8 -- GR 155027: THE VETERANS
Hon. ANGELO T. REYES in his capacity as Secretary
of National Defense, respondent
February 28, 2006
Tags: Public Office VS Private Corporation
- Petitioner in this case is the Veterans Federation of the Philippines (VFP), a corporate body
organized under Republic Act No. 2640, dated 18 June 1960, as amended, and duly registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
- On 15 April 2002, petitioners incumbent president received a letter dated 13 April 2002
which reads:
- we came across some legal bases which tended to show that there is an organizational
and management relationship between Veterans Federation of the Philippines and the
Philippine Veterans Bank which for many years have been inadvertently overlooked.
- On 10 June 2002, respondent DND Secretary issued the assailed DND Department Circular
No. 04 entitled, "Further Implementing the Provisions of Sections 12 and 23 of Republic Act
No. 2640," the full text of which appears as follows:
- Section 1: These rules shall govern and apply to the management and operations of
the Veterans Federation of the Philippines (VFP) within the context provided by EO
292 s-1987.
- Veteran = or who rendered military service in the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and has been honorably discharged or separated after at least six (6) years total
cumulative active service or sooner separated due to the death or disability arising
from a wound or injury received or sickness or disease incurred in line of duty while
in the active service.
- Section 3 Relationship Between the DND and the VFP
- The Secretary of National Defense shall be charged with the duty of
supervising the veterans and allied program under the jurisdiction of the
Department. It shall also have the responsibility of overseeing and ensuring
the judicious and effective implementation of veterans assistance, benefits,
and utilization of VFP assets.
- 3.2 To effectively supervise and control the corporate affairs of the
Federation and to safeguard the interests and welfare of the veterans who are
also wards of the State entrusted under the protection of the DND, the
Secretary may personally or through a designated representative,
require the submission of reports, documents and other papers
regarding any or all of the Federations business transactions
particularly those relating to the VFP functions under Section 2 of RA
- Respondent Undersecretary requested both for a briefing and for documents on personnel,
ongoing projects and petitioners financial condition.
- Subsequently, the Secretary General of the VFP sent an undated letter to respondent
DND Secretary, with notice to respondent Undersecretary for Civil Relations and
Administration, complaining about the alleged broadness of the scope of the
management audit and requesting the suspension thereof until such time that specific
areas of the audit shall have been agreed upon.
- The request was, however, denied by the Undersecretary in a letter dated 4 September 2002
on the ground that a specific timeframe had been set for the activity.
- Petitioner thus filed this Petition for Certiorari with Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, praying for the following reliefs:
- 1. For this Court to issue a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary
prohibitory and mandatory injunction to enjoin respondent Secretary and all those
acting under his discretion and authority from: (a) implementing DND Department
Circular No. 04; and (b) continuing with the ongoing management audit of
petitioners books of account;
- 2. After hearing the issues on notice a. Declare DND Department Circular No. 04 as
null and void for being ultra vires; b. Convert the writ of prohibition, preliminary
prohibitory and mandatory injunction into a permanent one.6

Issues and Answer:

secretary cannot control or supervise it)
PURPOSE To promote social justice and patriotic sentiments
- DND has power of control and supervision over VFP

- The petition itself, in this case, does not specifically and sufficiently set forth the special and
important reasons why the Court should give due course to this petition in the first instance
(have to follow hierarchy of courts)
- Power to Control AND Power of Supervision
- power of control as "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside
what a subordinate has done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former to that of the latter.
- power of supervision, on the other hand, means "overseeing, or the power or authority
of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or
neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to
make them perform their duties.
- ***These definitions are synonymous with the definitions in the assailed Department
Circular No. 04,
- Thus, in order for petitioners premise to be able to support its conclusion, petitioners
should be deemed to imply either of the following:
- (1) that it is unconstitutional/impermissible for the law (Rep. Act No. 2640) to
grant control and/or supervision to the Secretary of National Defense over a
private organization
- (2) that the control and/or supervision that can be granted to the Secretary of
National Defense over a private organization is limited, and is not as strong as
they are defined above.
- In 1987 Consti:
- Sec. 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation,
organization, or regulation of private corporations. Government-owned and controlled
corporations may be created or established by special charters in the interest of the
common good and subject to the test of economic viability
- From the foregoing, it is crystal clear that our constitutions explicitly prohibit the
regulation by special laws of private corporations, with the exception of
government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs). Hence, it would be
impermissible for the law to grant control of the VFP to a public official if it were
neither a public corporation, an unincorporated governmental entity, nor a GOCC.
- Petitioner argues that it is not a public corporation because:(Under them are what SC says)
1. does not possess the elements which would qualify it as a public office, particularly
the possession/delegation of a portion of sovereign power of government to be
exercised for the benefit of the public;
- Public office, that it is "the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by
which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the
creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the
- In the same case, we went on to adopt Mechems view that the delegation to the
individual of some of the sovereign functions of government is "[t]he most
important characteristic" in determining whether a position is a public office or
- Such portion of the sovereignty of the country, either legislative,
executive or judicial, must attach to the office for the time being, to be
exercised for the public benefit.
- Unless the powers conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a public
- The issue, therefore, is whether the VFAs officers have been delegated some
portion of the sovereignty of the country, to be exercised for the public benefit.
- These cases, which deal with activities not immediately apparent to be
sovereign functions, upheld the public sovereign nature of operations
needed either to promote social justice or to stimulate patriotic
sentiments and love of country.
- In the case at bar, the functions of petitioner corporation enshrined in
Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 264031 should most certainly fall within the
category of sovereign functions. The protection of the interests of war
veterans is not only meant to promote social justice, but is also intended
to reward patriotism.
2. VFP funds are not public funds because no appropriations from government funds,
VFP funds come from membership dues, etc
- If the DBM, however, is mistaken as to its conclusion regarding the nature of VFPs
incorporation, its previous assertions will not prevent future budgetary appropriations
to the VFP.
- The erroneous application of the law by public officers does not bar a
subsequent correct application of the law.
- Nevertheless, funds in the hands of the VFP from whatever source are public
funds, and can be used only for public purposes. This is mandated by the
following provisions of Rep. Act No. 2640:
- Section 2 provides that the VFP can only "invest its funds for the exclusive
benefit of the Veterans of the Philippines;
- Section 4 provides that "the Federation shall exist solely for the purposes of a
benevolent character, and not for the pecuniary benefit of its
- Etc
3. Although the juridical personality of the VFP emanates from a statutory charter, the
VFP retains its essential character as a private, civilian federation of veterans
voluntarily formed by the veterans themselves to attain a unity of effort, purpose and
4. The Administrative Code of 1987 does not provide that the VFP is an attached
agency, nor does it provide that it is an entity under the control and supervision of the
DND in the context of the provisions of said code.
5. The DBM declared that the VFP is a non-government organization and issued a
certificate that the VFP has not been a direct recipient of any funds released by the
- These arguments of petitioner notwithstanding, we are constrained to rule that
petitioner is in fact a public corporation. Before responding to petitioners allegations
one by one, here are the more evident reasons why the VFP is a public corporation:
- (1) Rep. Act No. 2640 is entitled "An Act to Create a Public Corporation to be
Known as the Veterans Federation of the Philippines, Defining its Powers, and for
Other Purposes."
- (2) Any action or decision of the Federation or of the Supreme Council shall be
subject to the approval of the Secretary of Defense.
- (3) The VFP is required to submit annual reports of its proceedings for the past year,
including a full, complete and itemized report of receipts and expenditures of
whatever kind, to the President of the Philippines or to the Secretary of National
- (4) Under Executive Order No. 37 dated 2 December 1992, the VFP was listed as
among the government-owned and controlled corporations that will not be privatized.
- (5) In Ang Bagong Bayani OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC,21 this Court held in a
minute resolution that the "VFP [Veterans Federation Party] is an adjunct of the
government, as it is merely an incarnation of the Veterans Federation of the
Case 9: Javier vs Sandiganbayan | GR 147026-27 | Sept 11, 2009

Republic Act No. 8047 (Book Publishing Industry Development Act), was enacted into law.
Its policy is to promote and continue development of the book publishing industry, through
active participation of the private sector, to ensure a supply of affordable, quality books for
the domestic and export market.
To achieve this purpose, National Book Development Board (NBDB) was created, under the
supervision of the office of the President. It is composed of 11 appointed members. 5 from the
government, and 6 from the private sector.
Petitioner Javier is appointed as a member of the NBDB. Part of her function is to attend book
fairs to establish linkages with international book publishing bodies. She was issued by the
Office of the President a travel authority to attend the Madrid International Book Fair in
Spain. She was paid P139,199.00 as her travelling expenses, but she did not attend the book
Jaiver was charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 before the Sandiganbayan,
for failure and refusal to return and/or liquidate her cash advances intended for official travel
abroad which did not materialize. Meanwhile, the Commission on Audit charged petitioner
with Malversation of Public Funds, as penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code
Jaiver pleaded not guilty and delivered the money subject of the criminal cases. Jaiver filed a
Motion for Consolidation of the criminal cases (Third Division orders the consolidation).
Javier then filed a Motion to Quash Information, averring that
1) The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to hear the Criminal Case as the information did not allege
that she is a public official who is classified as Grade 27 or higher
2) She is not a public officer or employee and that she belongs to the Governing Board only as a
private sector representative under R.A. No. 8047, hence, she may not be charged under R.A. No.
3019 before the Sandiganbayan or under any statute which covers public officials.
3) She does not perform public functions and is without any administrative or political power to speak
of, she only obtains priority status for the book publishing industry
First Division denied the motion to quash (reason: The NBDB is a statutory government
agency and the persons who participated therein even if they are from the private sector, are
public officers to the extent that they are performing their duty therein as such.) Javier filed a
motion to quash the information by invoking her right against double jeopardy. Her motion
was denied, she then filed for a motion for reconsideration, but the Sangidanbayan denied her.
The present petition hinges on Javiers contention that the Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction for not quashing the two informations
charging her with violation of the Anti-Graft Law and the Revised Penal Code on
malversation of public funds. She advanced the following arguments in support of her
petition, to wit: first, she is not a public officer, and second, she was being charged under two
(2) informations, which is in violation of her right against double jeopardy.

(1) Whether or not Javier is a public officer - Yes
(2) Whether or not she is under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan - Yes
(3) Whether or not her right against double jeopardy was violated No
1 - She is a public officer

The NBDB is the government agency mandated to develop and support the Philippine book
publishing industry. It is a statutory government agency created by R.A. No. 8047, which was enacted
into law to ensure the full development of the book publishing industry as well as for the creation of
organization structures to implement the said policy. Examples of some functions:
a) assume responsibility for carrying out and implementing the policies, purposes and objectives provided for in this Act;
b) formulate plans and programs as well as operational policies and guidelines for undertaking activities relative to promoting book
development, production and distribution as well as an incentive scheme for individual authors and writers;
c) formulate policies, guidelines and mechanisms to ensure that editors, compilers and especially authors are paid justly and promptly
royalties due them for reproduction of their works in any form and number and for whatever purpose;
d) conduct or contract research on the book publishing industry including monitoring, compiling and providing data and information of book
e) provide a forum for interaction among private publishers, and, for the purpose, establish and maintain liaison will all the segments of the
book publishing industry;

The court concludes that the powers and functions above are those of public function. An individual is
invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for
the benefit of the public. The individual is a public officer. Even if Javier came from the private
sector, she was invested with some portion of sovereign functions of the government, to enhance the
book publishing industry as it has a significant role in the national development.
- Antigraft law - one is a public officer if one has been elected or appointed to a public office.
Petitioner was appointed by the President to the Governing Board of the NDBD. Though her term
is only for a year that does not make her private person exercising a public function
- Revised Penal Code - a public officer is any person who, by direct provision of the law, election,
or appointment, shall take part in the performance of public functions in the Government of the
Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said Government or in any of its branches public duties as
an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or classes.

2- She is within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan

Section 4. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving
Violations of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) Republic Act No. 1379,
and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, Where one or more of the
accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent,
acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense. And..

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade Grade '27' and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

In determining the rank equivalence Governing Board of the NBDB notwithstanding that they do not
have any salary grade assignment, the same may be equated to Board Member II, SG-28. Thus
Javier belongs to the (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade Grade '27' and
higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
3- Her right to double jeopardy was not violated when the Sandiganbayan denied her motion to
quash the two informations filed against her

Double jeopardy: when a person is charged with an offense and the case is terminate either by
conviction or acquittal, or in any other manner without the consent of the accused, the latter
cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense

Criminal Case Nos. 25867 (penalized under R.A. No. 3019) and 25898 (Penalized under RPC) refer
to offenses penalized by different statues

In this case, Petitioner pleaded not guilty to the Information for violation of the Anti-Graft Law. She
was not yet arraigned in the criminal case for malversation of public funds because she had filed a
motion to quash the latter information. Double jeopardy could not attach considering that the two
cases remain pending before the Sandiganbayan and that herein petitioner had pleaded to only one in
the criminal cases against her.

For the claim of double jeopardy to prosper, the following requisites must concur:
(1) there is a complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction
(2) the same is filed before a court of competent jurisdiction
(3) there is a valid arraignment or plea to the charges
(4) the accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is otherwise dismissed or terminated without his
express consent.

The third and fourth requisites are not present in the case at bar.

Petition is DISMISSED
Case 10: Manila International Airport Authority. Court of Appeals | G.R. No.
155650 | July 20, 2006

Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport (NAIA) Complex in Paraaque City under Executive Order No. 903 (issued by the
then president Ferdinand Marcos). MIAA administers the land, improvements and equipment
within the NAIA Complex. The MIAA Charter provides that no portion of the land
transferred to MIAA shall be disposed of through sale or any other mode unless specifically
approved by the President of the Philippines.
The Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) issued Opinion No. 061. Which
opined that the Local Government Code of 1991 withdrew the exemption from real estate tax
granted to MIAA. The MIAA paid for some of the real estate tax already due. MIAA received
Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of Paraaque for the taxable years
(Total Tax Due: 392,435,861.95 + Penalties 232,070,863.47 = Grand total of 624,506,725.42)
The Mayor of the City of Paranaque threatened to sell at public auction the Airport Lands and
Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the real estate tax delinquency. A day before the public
auction the MIAA filed before this Court an Urgent Ex-Parte and Reiteratory Motion for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, to prevent the auctioning the lands. This Court
issued the TRO effective immediately.
The MIAA sought clarification of the OGCC opinion 061. THE OGCC issued Opinion No
147 to clarify, which opined that Section 21 of the MIAA Charter is proof that the MIAA is
exempt from the real estate tax. MIAA filed before the CA a petition for prohibition and
injunction, to restrain the City of Paranaque from imposing real estate tax and auctioning their
lands. However the CA dismissed the petition because they filed it beyond the 60-Day
reglementary period. Hence the present petition for reconsideration.
The court heard the parities in oral arguments.
- Admits that the MIAA Charter has placed the title of Airport Lands and buildings to their name,
however they cannot claim ownership of these properties since the real owner of the Airport Lands
and Buildings is the Republic of the Philippines.
- Since the Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use and public service, the ownership of
these properties remains with the State.
- Section 21 of the MIAA Charter specifically exempts MIAA from the payment of real estate tax.
- MIAA invokes the principle that the government cannot tax itself.
- invoke Section 193 of the Local Government Code, which expressly withdrew the tax exemption
privileges of government-owned and-controlled corporation
- An international airport is not among the exceptions mentioned in Section 193 of the Local
Government Code. MIAA cannot claim that the Airport Lands and Buildings are exempt from real
estate tax.
- cite the ruling of this Court in Mactan International Airport v. Marcos where held that the Local
Government Code has withdrawn the exemption from real estate tax granted to international airports.
Issue: Whether the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax under
existing laws. yes

MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation but an instrumentality of the
National Government and thus exempt from local taxation.
Section 2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 defines a
government-owned or controlled corporation as follows: (13) Government-owned or controlled
corporation refers to any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation

MIAA is not organized as a stock or non-stock corporation. MIAA is not a stock corporation because
it has no capital stock divided into shares. MIAA has no stockholders or voting shares. (According to
its charter). MIAA is also not a non-stock corporation because it has no members. Section 87 of the
Corporation Code defines a non-stock corporation as one where no part of its income is distributable
as dividends to its members, trustees or officers. Section 88 of the Corporation Code provides that
non-stock corporations are organized for charitable, religious, educational, professional, cultural,
recreational, fraternal, literary, scientific, social, civil service. MIAA is not organized for any of these

MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to perform efficiently its
governmental functions. MIAA is like any other government instrumentality, the only difference is
that MIAA is vested with corporate powers.
Section 2(10) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code defines a government
instrumentality as follows:
Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department
framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all
corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a
charter. A government instrumentality like MIAA falls under Section 133(o) of the Local Government
Code, which states:
SEC. 133 of the Local Government Code. Unless otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the
taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the levy of the
(o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities
and local government units.

The real properties of MIAA are owned by the Republic of the Philippines and thus exempt
from real estate tax.

Airport Lands and Buildings are of Public Dominion

The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion and therefore owned by
the State or the Republic of the Philippines. Article 420 of the Civil Code provides that public
dominion: are (1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and
bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character
The term ports includes seaports and airports. The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute a
port. Thus, they are part of public dominion and owned by the State
Airport Lands and Buildings are Outside the Commerce of Man

Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to levy, encumbrance or
disposition through public or private sale. (or auction). Or else contrary to public policy. Essential
public services will stop if the 600-hectare runway of the MIAA was auctioned for non-payment of
real estate tax.
Unless the President issues a proclamation withdrawing the Airport Lands and Buildings from public
use, these properties remain properties of public dominion and are inalienable.

Real Property Owned by the Republic is Not Taxable

Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code exempts from real estate tax any [r]ealproperty owned
by the Republic of the Philippines. Section 234(a) provides:
SEC. 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. The following are exempted from payment of the real
property tax:
(a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except
when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person;

Refutation of Arguments of Minority

The minority states that MIAA is indisputably a juridical person, and argues that since the Local
Government Code withdrew the tax exemption of all juridical persons, then MIAA is not exempt from
real estate tax. Argument is flawed. Section 193 of the Local Government Code expressly withdrew
the tax exemption of all juridical persons [u]nless otherwise provided in this Code. Now, Section
133(o) of the Local Government Code expressly provides otherwise, specifically prohibiting local
governments from imposing any kind of tax on national government instrumentalities. (and MIAA is
a government instrumentality)

Petition is granted, the court declares all real estate tax against MIAA VOID

Dissenting Opinion of J Tinga

Believes that decision is wrong because the court did not explain why the Mactan Ruling was wrong.
Both the Mactan case and the present case are similar. The Mactan-Cebu International Airport
Authority claimed that it was exempt from paying taxes because they allege to be an instrumentality
of the government. Citing section 133 of the local government code which excepts tax for certain
government bodies unless otherwise provided herein Setion 232 otherwise provded allowed the
LGUs to levy an ad volerem property tax, irrespective of who owned the real property.
Case 11: Funa vs. Manila Economic and Cultural Office
G.R. No. 193462 | February 4, 2016 | Perez J.
Petition is for mandamus to compel Commission on Audit (COA) to examine funds of Manila
Economic and Cultural Office, and for the latter to submit to the audit
Despite ending diplomatic ties with China, the Philippines maintained unofficial facilitated
relationship by the MECO (respondent)
Task of MECO: To establish and develop commercial and industrial interest of
Filipino nationals here and abroad, and assist on all measures designed to promote
and maintain the trade relations of the country with the citizens of other foreign
MECO is given the responsibility of fostering friendly and unofficial relations

with the people of Taiwan

MECO was authorized by the government to perform certain consular and
other functions
Funa (petitioner) sent a letter to COA requesting a copy of MECOs finances invoking his

constitutional right to information on matters of public concern.

Petitioner believed that respondent is a Government-owned and controlled

corporation (GOCC) supervised by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)

COA says that MECO was not among the agencies audited by any of the three clusters of the
corporate government sector.
Petitioner Contends:
Files the suit in his capacity as a taxpayer
That the MECO is a GOCC vested with government functions, controlled by the
government, and is under the operation and policy supervision of the DTI.
Respondent Contends:
Mandamus was prematurely filed his request for audit has not yet been disposed of
when it was filed.
Denies that it is not owned by the government, and the desire letters of the
President as to who should be among the board of directors is a recommendation
Government only has policy supervision
COA contends:
Petitioner has no locus standi
Petitioner violated hierarchy of courts
That the petition is moot and academic since at the time that the petition was filed
COA has already audited the verification fees of MECO
Affirmed that MECO is not a government entity, but is required to pay a government
(1) Is the petition moot and academic?
(2) Does the petitioner have locus standi?
(3) Did the petitioner violate hierarchy of courts?
(4) Is the MECO a GOCC or Government Instrumentality?
(5) Are the accounts of accounts of MECO subject to the audit jurisdiction of COA?
(1) A case is deemed moot once it ceases to pose a justiciable controversy, as in this case,
however there are exceptions where dismissal is not recommended
Grave violation of the constitution
Exceptional character of the situation and paramount of public interest is involved
When constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, bar, and the public
The case is capable of repetition yet evading review
The case may still be heard based on the commission of grave violation of the Constitution,
and the matters involved paramount public interest
Allegation that COA is remiss in its constitutional duty to examine accounts of
Paramount public interest in the resolution of said issue, and the legal status of
A definitive ruling is also necessary for the formulation of controlling principles for the
education of the bench, bar and general public
The case is also dangerously capable of being repeated yet evading review
(2) Yes, the petitioner has locus standi since he is a taxpayer.
The issue is of transcendental importance since it will define constitutional duty, and
as a concerned citizen, petitioner had legal standing
(3) No, since the issue is of transcendental importance.

(4) MECO is not a GOCC, they have a special function or jurisdiction and are allotted
operational autonomy, and are not integrated within the department framework.
To be a GOCC it should (a) non-stock or stock corporation, (b) public character in its
function, and (c) government ownership over the same
Absence of one requisite = not a GOCC, and only the first two are present for MECO
MECO is a non-stock corporation not owned by the government
Held in the case that the by-laws dictate the officials
MECO is sui generis, and not a government instrumentality

(5) Yes, but only for verification and consular fees. Other accounts are no under the
jurisdiction of COA.
Verification fee service fee for verification of overseas employment contracts,
recruitment agreement and special powers of attorney. They are receivables by DOLE
Consular Fees emanate from the government
Case 12: Philippine Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals vs. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 169752 | September 25, 2007 | Austria-Martinez Jr.

Philippine Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (petitioner) was informed by the
Commission on Audit (respondent) about audit survey of petitioners accounts
Petitioner was incorporated by Act No. 1285, enacted on January 19, 1905

The Corporation Law or Act No. 1459 was not in effect yet
Their role is to enforce law relation to cruelty inflicted upon animals
They have the power to make arrests as well as the privilege to retain a portion of the
fines collected
This power was recalled through Commonwealth Act No. 148, wherein the full
amount is now given to the municipality where the violation took place
Executive Order No. 63 also deprive the power of the petitioner to make arrest in
Petitioner contends on appeal for re-evaluation to COA that

It is a private entity, and therefore not under the jurisdiction of COA

It was created by special legislation before the corporation law, and as such nor
organized under the Securities and Exchange Commission
E.O. 63 deprived petitioner power to make arrests, and is not given operation funding
by the government highlighting its non-government function
Respondent, however affirmed that petitioner is a government entity

Petitioner contends to the court that

Although it was created under special legislation, it has no government functions as it

has been revoked by E.O 68, and C.A. No. 148
Nowhere in its charter does it say that it is a public corporation
If it were a government body, the state would not have given it tax exemptions
Employees are registered under the Social Security System, and not the Government
Service Insurance System
Petitioner does not receive financial assistance from the government
No government appointee sits on the board
The charter fails to show that any act or decision of the petitioner is subject to the
approval of the government
Committee on Animal Welfare formed under Animal Welfare Act includes members
from both the private and public sectors
Respondent contends that
Sinceit was a body politic created by special legislation it has governmental purpose,
and the COA may audit
Task of the petitioners is ultimately redound to the public good and welfare so it is
of government instrumentality
Administrative Code of 1987 Section 23, Title II, Book III, says that the Office of the
President has supervision or control over petitioner
Petitioner is required to report to civil governor, and reflects the nature of government
Designates that petitioner as member of the Committee on Animal Welfare

(1) Whether or not Charter Test may apply to petitioner.
(2) Is petitioner under control or supervision of state?
(3) Is the petitioner body politic because of its purpose?
(4) Is the requirement to report to Civil Governor make petitioner government

Charter Test used to determine if a corporation is government owned, or private
(1) No, since it was introduced only on 1935, and the petitioner was established in 1905

The law is prospective in nature and cannot be given retroactive effect except under
special circumstances
Any juridical entity formed under before the Corporation Law shall be entitled at its option
to continue business as such corporation or to reform and organize under and by virtue of the
provisions of this act
C.A. 128 made it clear that petitioner is a private corporation, and since the C.A. is curative

in nature its given retroactive effect

(2) No, since no government representative sits on the board of trustees, and their successors
are decided solely by the petitioners.
The employees are not insured under the GSIS as well, which would be a requirement
if they were government employees
(3) No since impression on public interest does not, by that circumstance alone, make the
entity a public corporation
It is a quasi-public corporation, however it is still a PRIVATE CORPORATION
If the state gives it power then its considered public, but C.A. 128 deprived
petitioners powers to arrest offenders of Animal Welfare Laws, and the power to
serve processes in connection therewith
(4) This argument is inconclusive since reportorial requirement is applicable to all forms of
Reportorial Requirement is simply to make sure that the governmental creature
(corporation) acted with the power conferred upon it
Case 13: GR 118295: WIGBERTO E. TANADA,
petitioner VS EDGARDO ANGARA, respondent
May 2, 1997
Tags: WTO agreement against the Constitution
- Like many other developing countries, the Philippines joined World Trade
Organization as a founding member with the goal, as articulated by President
Fidel V. Ramos in two letters to the Senate (infra), of improving Philippine
access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the
reduction of tariffs on its exports
- Instant petition before this Court assails the WTO Agreement for
violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to develop a self-reliant
and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos x x x
(to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use
of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods. Arguing
- (1) that the WTO requires the Philippines to place nationals and
products of member-countries on the same footing as Filipinos
and local products and
- (2) that the WTO intrudes, limits and/or impairs the constitutional
powers of both Congress and the Supreme Court
- On April 15, 1994, Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Secretary of the
Department of Trade and Industry (Secretary Navarro), representing the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco,
the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Negotiations (Final Act) agreeing that the PH will:
- to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of
their respective competent authorities, with a view to seeking approval
of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures
- adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.
- On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted Resolution No. 97
which Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, that the Senate concur, as it hereby
concurs, in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.
- To emphasize, the WTO Agreement ratified by the President of the
Philippines is composed of the Agreement Proper and the associated legal
instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that
Agreement which are integral parts thereof.
- On the other hand, the Final Act signed by Secretary Navarro embodies not
only the WTO Agreement (and its integral annexes aforementioned) but also
(1) the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions and (2) the Understanding on
Commitments in Financial Services. In his Memorandum dated May 13, 1996

Issues and Answer:

1) Whether Political question is present and whether this Court has
- Yes it has not on the wisdom of getting into WTO agreement, but if the
Senate had grave abuse of discretion in ratifying WTO agreement.
2) Whether there was grave abuse of discretion for approving the WTO
agreement which supposedly goes against the Constitution
- No, because it is accepted that in international agreements, there may
be some restriction on sovereignity to agree with other states.
- This is especially so if this exchange is returned with greater
gains for the country.

- The First Issue: Does the Court Have Jurisdiction Over the Controversy?
- As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases, it
will not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to
uphold the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of
discretion brought before it in appropriate cases, committed by any
officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the government.
- in deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition, this Court will not
review the wisdom of the decision of the President and the Senate in
enlisting the country into the WTO, or pass upon the merits of trade
liberalization as a policy espoused by said international body. Neither
will it rule on the propriety of the government's economic policy of
reducing/removing tariffs, taxes, subsidies, quantitative restrictions,
and other import/trade barriers.
- Rather, it will only exercise its constitutional duty to determine
whether or not there had been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
Senate in ratifying the WTO Agreement and its three annexes.
- Second Issue: The WTO Agreement and Economic Nationalism
- This is the lis mota, the main issue, raised by the petition.
- Petitioners vigorously argue that the letter, spirit and intent of the
Constitution mandating economic nationalism are violated
- Specifically, the flagship constitutional provisions referred to are Sec.
19, Article II, and Secs. 10 and 12, Article XII, of the Constitution, which
are worded as follows:
- Art 2 Sec. 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by
- Art 12 Sec. 10. The Congress shall enact measures that will
encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose
capital is wholly owned by Filipinos. In the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
- Sec. 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino
labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods, and adopt
measures that help make them competitive.
- The paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 referred to is quoted as
follows: The products of the territory of any contracting party imported
into the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded
treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like products of
national origin
- Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members treatment
no less favourable than that it accords to its own nationals with regard
to the protection of intellectual property(par. 1, Article 3, Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspect of Intellectual Property rights)
- It is petitioners position that the foregoing national treatment and
parity provisions of the WTO Agreement place nationals and
products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos
and local products, in contravention of the Filipino First policy of the
- They allegedly render meaningless the phrase effectively
controlled by Filipinos.
- Declaration of Principles Not Self-Executing
- These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing
principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are used by
the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial
review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws.
- As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato,[24]
the principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and some
sections of Article XII are not self-executing provisions, the disregard of
which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not
embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for
- Justice Feliciano in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.
- It seems to me important that the legal right which is an
essential component of a cause of action be a specific, operable
legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy
- One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated
or disregarded is given specification in operational terms,
defendants may well be unable to defend themselves
intelligently and effectively;
- where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation is not
alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on
the expanded conception of judicial power in the second
paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which
- Economic Nationalism Should Be Read with Other Constitutional
Mandates to Attain Balanced Development of Economy
- Rather, the issue is whether, as a rule, there are enough balancing
provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine
concurrence in the WTO Agreement. And we hold that there are.
- While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino
goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it
recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the
world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits
protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition
and trade practices that are unfair.
- WTO is said to protect weak economies and developing countries
- To eliminate discrimination in international trade relations
- with respect to tariffs in general, preferential treatment is given to
developing countries in terms of the amount of tariff reduction and the
period within which the reduction is to be spread out.
- GATT requires an average tariff reduction rate of 36% for
developed countries to be effected within a period of six (6)
years while developing countries -- including the Philippines --
are required to effect an average tariff reduction of only 24%
within ten (10) years.
- Constitution Does Not Rule Out Foreign Competition
- Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent
national economy does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign
investments, goods and services.
- As explained by Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo Villegas,
sponsor of this constitutional policy:
- Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing
country that is keenly aware of overdependence on external
assistance for even its most basic needs.
- It does not mean autarky or economic seclusion; rather, it
means avoiding mendicancy in the international community.
- Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign control
of the national economy, especially in such strategic industries
as in the development of natural resources and public utilities.
- Consequently, the question boils down to whether WTO/GATT will favor the
general welfare of the public at large.
- This should be answered by those who have the wisdom like the
- Third Issue: The WTO Agreement and Legislative Power
- Petitioners maintain that this undertaking unduly limits, restricts and
impairs Philippine sovereignty, specifically the legislative power
which under Sec. 2, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution is
vested in the Congress of the Philippines.
- It is an assault on the sovereign powers of the Philippines because this
means that Congress could not pass legislation that will be good
for our national interest and general welfare if such legislation will
not conform with the WTO Agreement, which not only relates to the
trade in goods but also to the flow of investments and money
- Sovereignty Limited by International Law and
- By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness
of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may surrender some
aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by
or derived from a convention or pact.
- By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by
generally accepted principles of international law, which are
considered to be automatically part of our own laws.
- Fourth Issue: The WTO Agreement and Judicial Power
- One contention is about burden of proof of infringing on
- Says in WTO burden of proof is with the alleged offender and it is up to
him to show he did not use patented process/product under 2
- if (1) the product obtained by the patented process is NEW or
- (2) there is a substantial likelihood that the identical product was
made by the process and the process owner has not been able
through reasonable effort to determine the process used.
- Is in line with RA 165 Not much substantial difference except in
- WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Case 14: GR 138570: BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan), petitioner VS EXECUTIVE
October 10, 2000
Tags: VFA if Constitutional, Philippine following International Agreement
- Confronting the Court for resolution in the instant consolidated petitions
for certiorari and prohibition are issues relating to the Visiting Forces
- On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged a
Military Bases Agreement which formalized, among others, the use of
installations in the Philippine territory by United States military personnel. To
further strengthen their defense and security relationship, the Philippines and
the United States entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951.
- Under the treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any external armed
attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels, and aircraft
- The Military bases agreement expired and not extended BUT Mutual Defense
Treaty was still in effect so defense and security relationship continued
- Thereafter, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA, which was
respectively signed by public respondent Secretary Siazon and Unites
States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard on February 10, 1998.
- On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA
- On October 6, 1998, the President, acting through respondent Executive
Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, officially transmitted to the Senate of the
Philippines, the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the President and the
VFA, for concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987

Issues and Answer:

1) Whether the VFA is a valid agreement that is legally binding agreement
on the Philippines and the US
- Yes, as the President can ratify an international agreement and it will be
binding when both the PH and US have agreed that they obligate
themselves to what is written in the agreement
- Based on Article 2, we must fulfill our obligations to international law
and treaties in which the PH is a party thereof
2) Whether there is grave abuse of discretion
- No, because Executive has power to ratify and Legislative has power to
concur These are questions of wisdom in relation to issue present
- In terms of standing
- Citizens = Have to show they are in danger of direct injury as a result of
enforcement of VFA
- But the requirement of standing is waived as there is important issue.
- Constitutional Articles and sections applicable
- Section 21, Article VII deals with treatise or international agreements
in general, in which case, the concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) of
all the Members of the Senate is required to make the subject treaty, or
international agreement, valid and binding on the part of the
- Need concurrence of Senate to be valid and effective
- Section 25, Article XVIII, provides: After the expiration in 1991 of the
Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United
States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except
under a treaty duly concurred in by the senate and, when the
Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the
people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized
as a treaty by the other contracting State.
- On the whole, the VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of
United States troops and personnel visiting the Philippines.
- It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of military
personnel, and further defines the rights of the United States and
the Philippine government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction,
movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of
equipment, materials and supplies.
- It is a finely-imbedded principle in statutory construction that a special
provision or law prevails over a general one. Lex specialis derogat generali.
- Thus, where there is in the same statute a particular enactment and
also a general one which, in its most comprehensive sense, would
include what is embraced in the former, the particular enactment
must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken to
affect only such cases within its general language which are not
within the provision of the particular enactment.
- It is a rudiment in legal hermenuetics that when no distinction is made by law,
the Court should not distinguish- Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire
- In like manner, we do not subscribe to the argument that Section
25, Article XVIII is not controlling since no foreign military bases,
but merely foreign troops and facilities, are involved in the VFA.
(because of below)
- Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, OR
facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met,
viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in
by the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority
of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized
as a treaty by the other contracting state.
- There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the
case of the VFA.
- As to the matter of voting, Section 21, Article VII particularly
requires that a treaty or international agreement, to be valid and
effective, must be concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
members of the Senate.
- On the other hand, Section 25, Article XVIII simply provides that
the treaty be duly concurred in by the Senate
- Applying the foregoing constitutional provisions, a two-thirds vote of
all the members of the Senate is clearly required so that the
concurrence contemplated by law may be validly obtained and
deemed present.
- Having resolved that the first two requisites prescribed in Section 25,
Article XVIII are present, we shall now pass upon and delve on the
requirement that the VFA should be recognized as a treaty by the
United States of America.
- Petitioners contend that the phrase recognized as a treaty,
embodied in section 25, Article XVIII, means that the VFA
should have the advice and consent of the United States Senate
pursuant to its own constitutional process, and that it should not
be considered merely an executive agreement by the United
- In opposition, respondents argue that the letter of United States
Ambassador Hubbard stating that the VFA is binding on the
United States Government is conclusive
- This Court is of the firm view that the phrase recognized as a
treaty means that the other contracting party accepts or
acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other
contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to
submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence
pursuant to its Constitution,[33] is to accord strict meaning to the
- Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA
only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an
executive agreement is as binding as a treaty.
- A treaty, as defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
is an international instrument concluded between States in written form
and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single
instrument or in two or more related instruments, and whatever its
particular designation.
- In our jurisdiction, we have recognized the binding effect of executive
agreements even without the concurrence of the Senate or Congress.
- In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President
and not, as commonly believed, in the legislature. The role of the
Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or
concurrence, to the ratification.
- With the ratification of the VFA, which is equivalent to final acceptance,
and with the exchange of notes between the Philippines and the United
States of America, it now becomes obligatory and incumbent on our
part, under the principles of international law, to be bound by the terms of the
- Section 2, Article II of the Constitution, declares
that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy
of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all
- As a member of the family of nations, the Philippines agrees to be
bound by generally accepted rules for the conduct of its
international relations.
- In terms of grave abuse of discretion and Judicial Review power
- For Executive, it is not for the Courts to question whether VFA should
be entered into. The question is if the Executive acted with
capriciousness or whimsically OR went against the Consti.
- As to the power to concur with treaties, the constitution lodges the
same with the Senate alone. Once the Senate performs that power, or
exercises its prerogative within the boundaries prescribed by the
Constitution, the concurrence cannot be viewed to constitute an abuse
of power, much less grave abuse thereof.
- WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant
petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
Case 16: Bayan Muna vs. Romulo
G.R. No. 159618 | Feb 1, 2011 | Velasco, JR.

The Rome Statute hopes to establish the International Criminal Court with the power
to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern
and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions. On December 28, 2000, the
RP signed the Rome Statute but PH still has not completed the ratification, approval, and
concurrence process.
On May 9, 20003, Francis Ricciardone (then Ambassador) sent US Embassy Note to
the Department of Foreign Affairs proposing the terms of the non-surrender bilateral
agreement between the USA and RP. The Agreement aims to protect what it refers to and
defines as persons of the RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits that might be
brought against them in international tribunals. As of May 2, 2003, similar bilateral
agreements have been effected by and between the US and 33 other countries. The
non-surrender agreement was an exchange of diplomatic notes and constitutes a legally
binding agreement under international law which did not require the advice of the consent of
the US or PH Senate (according to then Solicitor General Alfredo Benipayo).
Petitioners impute grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and
ratifying the agreement and prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional or at least
declared without force and effect.

(1) Whether the RP President and DFA Secretary gravely abused their discretion
for concluding the non-surrender agreement when the PH government has
already signed the Rome Statute of the CC although is pending ratification by
the Philippine Senate.
(2) Whether the non-surrender agreement is void from the beginning for
contracting obligations that are immoral or at variance with universally
recognized principles of international law.
(3) Whether the agreement is valid, binding, and effective without the concurrence
by at least of all the members of the Senate.

(1) No. An exchange of notes falls into the category of inter-governmental agreements,
which is an internationally accepted form of international agreement. The Agreement
is a recognized mode of concluding a legally binding international written contract
among nations. Petitioners reliance on Adolfo is misplaced. In that case the SC held
that an executive agreement cannot be used to amend a duly ratified and existing
treaty (which the Rome Statute is not because it has not been ratified yet).
(2) No. The Agreement does not contravene or undermine international laws like the
Rome Statute. Rather, it complements it. The sixth preambular paragraph of the Rome
Statute declares that it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction
over those responsible for international crimes. This provision indicates that primary
jurisdictgino over the so-called international crime rests, at the first instance, with the
state where the crime was commiitted; secondarily, with the ICC in appropriate
situations contemplated under the Rome Statute.
(3) Yes. An act of the executive branch with a foreign government must be afforded great
respect. The power to enter into executive agreements has long been recognized to be
lodged with the President. It does not need the concurrence of the Legislature. The
rationale behind this principle is the doctrine of separation of powers.

Carpio, J.
The RP-US non-surrender agreement violates existing municipal laws on PHs
obligation to prosecute persons responsible for any of the international crimes of genocide,
war crimes, and other crimes against humanity.
Case 17: Deutsche Bank AG Manila Branch vs.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue
G.R. No. 188500 | August 28, 2013 | Sereno, CJ.
REVENUE MEMORANDUM ORDER NO. 1-2000 issued January 4, 2000 prescribes the procedures
for processing tax treaty relief applications, amending RMO No. 10-92 dated February 1, 1992. The
Order covers exclusively applications for tax treaty relief, including claims or requests for tax
exemption, preferential tax treaty rate and refund or credit of taxes on income derived or to be derived
by the taxpayer under existing tax treaties. The processing for tax treaty relief shall be transferred
from Law Division to the International Tax Affairs Division (ITAD). Any availment of the tax treaty
relief shall be preceded by an application by filing BIR Form No. 0901 (Application for Relief from
Double Taxation) with ITAD at least 15 days before the transaction (i.e. payment of dividends,
royalties, etc.), accompanied by supporting documents justifying the relief. Consequently, BIR Form
Nos. TC 001 and TC 002 prescribed under RMO No. 10-92 are declared obsolete. Claims for tax
credit/refund pertinent to the tax treaty relief requested shall be filed with ITAD within the two year
period prescribed by Section 229 of the NIRC, as amended under RA 8424. The Tax Credit
Certificate (TCC) for this purpose shall be issued for the account of the "non-resident
taxpayer/recipient of the income". Issuance of the TCC shall be done by the Appellate Division upon
receipt of endorsement memo from ITAD recommending the issuance of such. The release of the
signed TCC to the taxpayer/applicant, however, shall be done by ITAD.
In the year 2003 petitioner remitted to respondent the amount of Php 67,688,553.51, which
constitutes 15% of the branch profit remittance tax (BRPT)
Believing it made an overpayment petitioner filed with the BIR on 2005 Large Taxpayers
Assessment and Investigation Division an administrative claim for refund of Php
On the same date, petitioner requested from International Task Affairs Division (ITAD) a
confirmation of its entitlement to the preferential tax rate of 10% under RP-Germany Tax
On the BIRs inaction, petitioner filed for review with CTA Second Division for the refund of
the overpayment
CTA denied petitioners claim for refund since petitioner failed to apply tax treaty
relief with ITAD before the BRPT was paid
Using the case of Mirant as precedent, CTA further stated that before the benefits of
tax treaty may be extended to a foreign corporation wishing to avail itself thereof, the
latter should first invoke the provisions of the tax treaty and prove that they indeed
apply to the corporation
CTA also said petitioner violated the fifteen day period to for tax treaty relief
application under RMO No. 1-2000
(1) Does the failure of petitioner to strictly comply with RMO No.1-2000 deprive the
corporation of the tax treaty?
Petitioner argues that since it meets the conditions of Article 10 of the RP-Germany Tax
Treaty the CTA erred in denying its claim solely on the basis of RMO No. 1-2000
Article 10 States: where a resident of the Federal Republic of Germany has a branch
in the Republic of the Philippines, this branch may be subjected to the branch profits
remittance tax withheld at source in accordance with Philippine law but shall not
exceed 10% of the gross amount of the profits remitted by that branch to the head
The filing of a tax treaty relief application is not a condition precedent to the
availment of a preferential tax rate
Respondent however, alleges that RMO No. 1-2000 makes prior application mandatory, and
CTA ruled for the same
The court disagrees
Mirant is not a binding precedent, since there are differences in parties, taxes, taxable periods
and treaties involved.
Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties, and obligations under the treaty must be
performed by them in good faith. More importantly, treaties have the force and effect of law
in this jurisdiction.
"A state that has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its
legislations those modifications that may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the
obligations undertaken."
(1) Laws and issuances must ensure that the reliefs granted under tax treaties are accorded to
the parties entitled thereto.
BIR must not impose additional requirements that would negate the availment of the
reliefs provided for under international agreements.
In addition nothing in RMO No. 1-200 indicates a deprivation of entitlement to a tax
treaty relief for failure to comply with the fifteen day period.
CTAs denial for relief, for failure to abide by the period is not in harmony with the
objective of the contracting states
RMO No. 1-2000 should not operate to divest entitlement to the relief as it would violate duty
required by good faith in complying with the tax treaty
OVER RMO No. 1-2000
The taxpayer is afforded a remedy for tax recovery when there has been an erroneous
Case 18: CBK Power Company Limited vs. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue
G.R. No. 193383-84 | January 14, 2015 | Perlas-Bernabe J.
To finance CBK (petitioner) project, loans from several foreign banks were obtained
Petitioner allegedly withheld final taxes from payments of interest to foreign banks and
remitted taxes to BIR at a rate of 15% and 20% on February 2001
However petitioner alleges under the relevant tax treaties, the interest income derived by the
aforementioned banks are subject only to a preferential tax rate of 10%.
On April 2003, CBK filed claim for refund of its excess final withholding tax allegedly
erroneously withheld for the years 2001 and 2002
Inaction of commissioner prompted petitioner to file petition for review on before CTA
CTA initially granted petitions, and ordered the refund of Php 15,672,958.42
CTA confirmed petitioners claim that it is only subject to 10% withholding tax
On motion of reconsideration by commissioner, CTA lowering amount to refund
stating that CBK failed to obtain an International Tax Affairs Division (ITAD) ruling
with respect to its transactions with Fortis-Netherlands
CTA En Banc also affirmed CTAs decision that an ITAD ruling is necessary to avail
of tax preferential
Commissioner laments he was deprived of the opportunity to act on the administrative claim
for refund of excess final withholding taxes covering taxable year 2003 which CBK Power
filed on March 4, 2005, a Friday, then the following Wednesday, March 9, 2005, the latter
hastily elevated the case on petition for review before the CTA.
He argues that the failure on the part of CBK Power to give him a reasonable time to
act on said claim is violative of the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies
and of primary jurisdiction.
(1) Whether the BIR may add a requirement that is not found in the income tax treaties
signed by the Philippines before a tax payer can avail of preferential tax rates under said
(2) Whether petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies.

(1) The obligation to comply with a tax treaty must take precedence over the objective of
RMO No. 1-2000 as held in the Deutsch case.
The objective of RMO No. 1-2000 is to avert the consequences of any erroneous
interpretation and/or application of treaty provisions, such as claims for refund/credit for
overpayment of taxes, or deficiency tax liabilities for underpayment.
Moot in refund cases CBK could not have applied for a tax treaty relief 15 days
prior to its payment prior application would be illogical
The prior application is also not part of the treaty
BIR should not impose additional requirements
Since CBK Power had requested for confirmation from the ITAD on June 8, 2001
and October 28, 2002 before it filed on April 14, 2003 its administrative claim for
refund of its excess final withholding taxes, the same should be deemed substantial
compliance with RMO No. 1-2000
The government has a corollary duty to implement tax laws in good faith; to
discharge its duty to collect what is due to it; and to justly return what has been
erroneously and excessively given to it.
(2) The taxpayers claims for refund must be done within toe years of payments according to
section 204, and 229 of the NIRC.
Had CBK Power awaited the action of the Commissioner on its claim for refund prior
to taking court action knowing fully well that the prescriptive period was about to
end, it would have lost not only its right to seek judicial recourse but its right to
recover the final withholding taxes it erroneously paid to the government
The claim with the Collector of Internal Revenue was intended primarily as a notice
of warning that unless the tax or penalty alleged to have been collected erroneously or
illegally is refunded, court action will follow.
Means to say that it was primarily to inform/notify commissioner, and it also does
not call the commissioner to act upon the claim

HONORABLE ANGELO REYES in his capacity as Secretary of National Defense
G.R. No. 151445 | April 11, 2002 | De Leon Jr., J.:
TLDR; US Military are in the PH because of the Balikatan 02-1. There is conflict with Abu
Sayyaf. Is Balikatan Constitutional or consistent with VFA? Yes! Treaties are a thing here.
This case involves a petition for certiorari and prohibition as well as a petition-in-intervention,
praying that respondents be restrained from proceeding with the so-called Balikatan 02-1 and
that after due notice and hearing, that judgment be rendered issuing a permanent writ of
injunction and/or prohibition against the deployment of U.S. troops in Basilan and Mindanao
for being illegal and in violation of the Constitution.
Beginning January 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the United States of
America started arriving in Mindanao to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine
military, in Balikatan 02-1.
These so-called Balikatan exercises are the largest combined training operations
involving Filipino and American troops. In theory, they are a simulation of joint
military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense
agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951.
Prior to the year 2002, the last Balikatan was held in 1995 because there wasnt a formal
The entry of American troops into Philippine soil is proximately rooted in the international
anti-terrorism campaign declared by President George W. Bush in reaction to the tragic
events that occurred on September 11, 2001.
three (3) commercial aircrafts were hijacked, flown and smashed into the twin towers
of the World Trade Center in NYC and the Pentagon building in Washington, D.C. by
terrorists with alleged links to the al-Qaeda (the Base), a Muslim extremist
organization headed by the infamous Osama bin Laden. Of no comparable historical
parallels, these acts caused billions of dollars worth of destruction of property and
incalculable loss of hundreds of lives.
Thus, on Feb 1, 2002, the petitioners, together with SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG
MANGGAGAWA (w/ members from Mindanao) filed (in their capacities as citizens,
lawyers and taxpayers), filed this petition stating that residents from Zamboanga and Sulu will
be directly affected by the operations conducted in Mindanao. (Locus Standi)
Feb 7, Senate conducted a hearing and VP Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. presented the Draft
Terms of Reference (TOR), and approved it.
1. The Exercise shall be Consistent with the Philippine Constitution and all its
activities shall be in consonance with the laws of the land and the provisions of the
RP-US Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).
2. The conduct of this training Exercise is in accordance with pertinent United
Nations resolutions against global terrorism as understood by the respective parties.
3. No permanent US basing and support facilities shall be established. Temporary
structures such as those for troop billeting, classroom instruction and messing may be
set up for use by RP and US Forces during the Exercise.
4. The Exercise shall be implemented jointly by RP and US Exercise Co-Directors
under the authority of the Chief of Staff, AFP. In no instance will US Forces operate
independently during field training exercises (FTX). AFP and US Unit Commanders
will retain command over their respective forces under the overall authority of the
Exercise Co-Directors. RP and US participants shall comply with operational
instructions of the APP during the FTX.
5. The exercise shall be conducted and completed within a period of not more than six
months, with the projected participation of 660 US personnel and 3,800 RP Forces.
The Chief of Staff, AFP shall direct the Exercise Co-Directors to wind up and
terminate the Exercise and other activities within the six month Exercise period.
6. The Exercise is a mutual counter-terrorism advising, assisting and training Exercise
relative to Philippine efforts against the ASG, and will be conducted on the Island of
Basilan. Further advising, assisting and training exercises shall be conducted in
Malagutay and the Zamboanga area. Related activities in Cebu will be for support of
the Exercise.
7. Only 160 US Forces organized in 12-man Special Forces Teams shall be deployed
with AFP field commanders. The US teams shall remain at the Battalion
Headquarters and, when approved, Company Tactical headquarters where they can
observe and assess the performance of the APP Forces.
8. US exercise participants shall not engage in combat, without prejudice to their right
of self-defense.
9. These terms of Reference are for purposes of this Exercise only and do not create
additional legal obligations between the US Government and the Republic of the
a. The Exercise shall involve the conduct of mutual military assisting, advising and
training of RP and US Forces with the primary objective of enhancing the operational
capabilities of both forces to combat terrorism.
b. At no time shall US Forces operate independently within RP territory.
c. Flight plans of all aircraft involved in the exercise will comply with the local air
traffic regulations.
a. RP and US participants shall be given a country and area briefing at the start of the
Exercise. This briefing shall acquaint US Forces on the culture and sensitivities of the
Filipinos and the provisions of the VFA. The briefing shall also promote the full
cooperation on the part of the RP and US participants for the successful conduct of
the Exercise.
b. RP and US participating forces may share, in accordance with their respective laws
and regulations, in the use of their resources, equipment and other assets. They will
use their respective logistics channels.
c. Medical evaluation shall be jointly planned and executed utilizing RP and US
assets and resources.
d. Legal liaison officers from each respective party shall be appointed by the Exercise
a. Combined RP-US Information Bureaus shall be established at the Exercise
Directorate in Zamboanga City and at GHQ, AFP in Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City.
b. Local media relations will be the concern of the AFP and all public affairs
guidelines shall be jointly developed by RP and US Forces.
c. Socio-Economic Assistance Projects shall be planned and executed jointly by RP
and US Forces in accordance with their respective laws and regulations, and in
consultation with community and local government officials.
Petitioners present the following arguments:
PH and US signed the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) in 1951 to provide
MUTUAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE in accordance with the Constitutional
Processes of each Country only in the case of an ARMED ATTACK BY AN
By no stretch of the imagination can it be said that the Abu Sayyaf Bandits in
Basilan Constitute an External Armed Force that has subject the Philippines to an
Armed External Attack to warrant U.S. Military Assistance under the MDT of 1951.

Whether Baliktan 02-1 is covered by the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)? YES.
Whether VFA was constitutional? YES.

WHEREFORE, the petition and the petition-in-intervention are hereby DISMISSED
without prejudice to the filing of a new petition sufficient in form and substance in the proper
Regional Trial Court
The first question that should be addressed is whether Balikatan 02-1 is covered by the
Visiting Forces Agreement. To resolve this, it is necessary to refer to the VFA itself. Not
much help can be had therefrom, unfortunately, since the terminology employed is itself the
source of the problem. The VFA permits United States personnel to engage, on an
impermanent basis, in activities, the exact meaning of which was left undefined. The
expression is ambiguous, permitting a wide scope of undertakings subject only to the approval
of the Philippine government.The sole encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in
the negative, in that United States personnel must abstain from any activity inconsistent
with the spirit of this agreement, and in particular, from any political activity. All other
activities, in other words, are fair game.
As regards the question whether an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts,
suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the
affirmative, by providing, in Section 2 of Article VIII thereof, that the Supreme Court
may not be deprived of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on
appeal, certiorari, or writ of error as the law or the rules of court may provide, final
judgments and decrees of inferior courts in (1) All cases in which the constitutionality or
validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question. In other
words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with
the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.
Yet a nagging question remains: are American troops actively engaged in combat alongside
Filipino soldiers under the guise of an alleged training and assistance exercise? Contrary to
what petitioners would have us do, we cannot take judicial notice of the events transpiring
down south as reported from the saturation coverage of the media. As a rule, we do not take
cognizance of newspaper or electronic reports per se, not because of any issue as to their
truth, accuracy, or impartiality, but for the simple reason that facts must be established in
accordance with the rules of evidence. As a result, we cannot accept, in the absence of
concrete proof, petitioners allegation that the Arroyo government is engaged in
doublespeak in trying to pass off as a mere training exercise an offensive effort by
foreign troops on native soil.


G.R. No. 159938 | March 31, 2006 | Garcia, J.:
Shangri-la won
At the core of the controversy are the "Shangri-La" mark and "S" logo. Respondent DGCI
claims ownership of said mark and logo in the Philippines on the strength of its prior use
thereof within the country.
On the other hand, the Kuok family owns and operates a chain of hotels with interest in hotels
and hotel-related transactions since 1969. As far back as 1962, it adopted the name
"Shangri-La" as part of the corporate names of all companies organized under the aegis of the
Kuok Group of Companies (the Kuok Group). The Kuok Group has used the name
"Shangri-La" in all Shangri-La hotels and hotel-related establishments around the world
which the Kuok Family owned. Here there are 2 Branches - EDSA Shang and Makati Shang.
From the records, it appears that Shangri-La Hotel Singapore commissioned a Singaporean
design artist, a certain Mr. William Lee, to conceptualize and design the logo of the
Shangri-La hotels.
During the launching of the stylized "S" Logo in February 1975, Mr. Lee gave the following
explanation for the logo, to wit:
The logo which is shaped like a "S" represents the uniquely Asean architectural structures as
well as keep to the legendary Shangri-la theme with the mountains on top being reflected on
waters below and the connecting centre [sic] line serving as the horizon. This logo, which is a
bold, striking definitive design, embodies both modernity and sophistication in balance and
SLIHM pointed to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property and further
claimed that they have used the mark and logo since 1975.
RTC ruled that the mark used by Shangri-La was an infringement of DGCIs right.
Petitioners moved to CA but was denied.
Whether or not Shangri-Las logo was an infringement of DGCIs logo? - NO!

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals dated May 15, 2003 and September 15, 2003, respectively, and the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City dated March 8, 1996 are hereby SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, the complaint for infringement in Civil Case No. Q-91-8476 is ordered
The new Intellectual Property Code (IPC), R.A. No. 8293, undoubtedly shows the firm
resolve of the Philippines to observe & follow the Paris Convention by incorporating the
relevant portions of the Convention such that persons who may question a mark (that is,
oppose registration, petition for the cancellation thereof, sue for unfair competition) include
persons whose internationally well-known mark, whether or not registered, is identical with or
confusingly similar to or constitutes a translation of a mark that is sought to be registered or is
actually registered.
Paris Convention mandates that protection should be afforded to internationally known
marks as signatory to the Paris Convention w/o regard as to whether the foreign
corporation registered, licensed or doing business in the Phils. our municipal law on
trademarks regarding the requirement of actual use in the Phils must subordinate a
international agreement the fact that international law has been made part of the law of
the land does not any means imply the primacy of international law over national law in
the municipal sphere.
Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of international law are
given equal footage petitioners separate personalities from their mother corporation be an
obstacle in the enforcement of their rights as part of Kuok Grp of Companies.
SEC. 161. Authority to Determine Right to Registration In any action involving a registered
mark the court may determine the right to registration, order the cancellation of the
registration, in whole or in part, and otherwise rectify the register with respect to the
registration of any party to the action in the exercise of this. Judgement and orders shall be
certified by the court to the Director, who shall make appropriate entry upon the records of
the Bureau, and shall be controlled thereby.(Sec. 25, R.A. No. 166a)


THE PHILIPPINES VS. DUQUE | G.R. No. 173034 | October 9, 2007

President Corazon Aquino issued A.O. No. 2006-0012 entitled the Revised Implementing
Rules and Regulations of Executive Order No. 51, Otherwise Known as The "Milk Code,"
Relevant International Agreements, Penalizing Violations Thereof, and for Other Purposes
The code gives effect to Article 11 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk
Substitutes (ICMBS). This code was adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA). The
WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported,
promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not
permitted for breastmilk substitutes.
The Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of
said instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant
and child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and children, are
informed of the advantages of breastfeeding
The DOH issued the RIRR. But petitioner representing its members that are manufacturers of
breastmilk substitutes, filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for
the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), assailing the RIRR for allegedly going
beyond the provisions of the Milk Code, by amending and expanding the coverage of said law
The defense of the DOH is that the RIRR implements not only the Milk Code but also various
international instruments regarding infant and young child nutrition. said international
instruments are deemed part of the law of the land and therefore the DOH may implement
them through the RIRR

Issue: Whether the DOH violated the provisions of the constitution for promulgating the RIRR No

Under the consti- international law can become part of domestic law either by transformation
(requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional
mechanism such as local legislation ) or incorporation (applies when, by mere constitutional
declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law)

Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to Article VII, Section 21
of the Constitution. The ICMBS and WHA Resolutions are not treaties as they have not been
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all members of the Senate
However, the ICMBS which was adopted by the WHA, had been transformed into domestic law
through local legislation, the Milk Code. Consequently, it is the Milk Code that has the force and
effect of law in this jurisdiction and not the ICMBS

The Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of the ICMBS, but it did not adopt the provision in
the ICMBS absolutely prohibiting advertising or other forms of promotion to the general public of
products within the scope of the ICMBS. Instead, the Milk Code expressly provides that
advertising, promotion, or other marketing materials may be allowed if such materials are duly
authorized and approved by the Inter-Agency Committee (IAC).

However article Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, provides that

SECTION 2. The Philippines, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part
of the law of the land .
"Generally accepted principles of international law" refers to norms of general or customary
international law which are binding on all states

WHA Resolutions have not been embodied in any local legislation. The World Health Organization
(WHO) is one of the international specialized agencies allied with the United Nations. Under the 1946
WHO Constitution, it is the WHA which determines the policies of the WHO.

Regulations, along with conventions and agreements, adopted by the WHA will bind member states.
However under article 23 of the WHO constitution,
Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make recommendations to Members with
respect to any matter within the competence of the Organization

The ICMBS adopt the code in the form of a recommendation rather than a regulation

Thus, the WHA Resolution that adopts The ICMBS which has a provision that absolutely prohibiting
advertisements and promotions of breastmilk substitutes, are merely recommendatory and legally

WHA Resolutions may constitute "soft law" (does not fall into any category of international law,
-non-binding norms, principles and practices that influence state behavior.)

For an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that such rule is
being followed by states because they consider it obligatory to comply with such rules (opinio juris).
Respondents have not presented any evidence to prove that the WHA Resolutions, although signed by
most of the member states, were in fact enforced or practiced by at least a majority of the member
states; neither have respondents proven that any compliance by member states with said WHA
Resolutions was obligatory in nature.

The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the petition. Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of Administrative Order
No. 2006-0012 (regarding the RIRR provision for the absolute prohibition of advertising) are declared
NULL and VOID for being ultra vires. The Department of Health and respondents are PROHIBITED
from implementing said provisions.