Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Section 1. Time to move to quash. At any time before entering his plea, the accused may move to quash the complaint or
information. (1)
Section 2. Form and contents. The motion to quash shall be in writing, signed by the accused or his counsel and shall distinctly specify
its factual and legal grounds. The court shall consider no ground other than those stated in the motion, except lack of jurisdiction over the
offense charged. (2a)
Section 3. Grounds. The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds:
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent. (3a)
Section 4. Amendment of the complaint or information. If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or
information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be made. (4a)
If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity to
correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall be granted if the prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the complaint or
information still suffers from the same defect despite the amendment. (n)
Section 5. Effect of sustaining the motion to quash. If the motion to quash is sustained, the court may order that another complaint or
information be filed except as provided in section 6 of this rule. If the order is made, the accused, if in custody, shall not be discharged unless
admitted to bail. If no order is made or if having been made, no new information is filed within the time specified in the order or within such
further time as the court may allow for good cause, the accused, if in custody, shall be discharged unless he is also in custody for another
charge. (5a)
Section 6. Order sustaining the motion to quash not a bar to another prosecution; exception. An order sustaining the motion to quash
is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense unless the motion was based on the grounds specified in section 3 (g) and (i) of this
Rule. (6a)
Section 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or
other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction
or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to
commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the
former complaint or information.
However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged
in the former complaint or information under any of the following instances:
(a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or omission constituting the former charge;
(b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after a plea was entered in the former complaint or
information; or
(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the prosecutor and of the offended party except as provided
in section 1 (f) of Rule 116.
In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused satisfies or serves in whole or in part the judgment, he shall be credited with the same in
the event of conviction for the graver offense. (7a)
Section 8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with
notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become
permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by
imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without
the case having been revived. (n)
Section 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor. The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to
quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said
motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of section 3 of this
Rule. (8)
Prescription;
Double jeopardy;
Supervening event;
Provisional dismissal.
CASES:
1. ESMENA VS POGOY, 102 SCRA 862
FACTS: Petitioners Esmea and Alba were charged with grave coercion in the Court of Cebu City for allegedly forcing Fr. Thomas Tibudan to
withdraw a sum of money worth P5000 from the bank to be given to them because the priest lost in a game of chance.
No trial came in after the arraignment due to the priests request to move it on another date. Sometime later, Judge Pogoy issued an order
setting the trial Aug.16,1979, but the fiscal informed the court that it received a telegram stating that the complainant was sick. The accused
invoked their right to speedy trial.
Respondent judge dismissed the case because the trial was already dragging the accused and that the priests telegram did not have a
medical certificate attached to it in order for the court to recognize the complainants reason to be valid in order to reschedule again another
hearing. After 27 days the fiscal filed a motion to revive the case and attached the medical certificate of the priest proving the fact that the
priest was indeed sick of influenza. On Oct.24,1979, accused Esmea and Alba filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of double
jeopardy.
ISSUE: W/N the revival of grave coercion case, which was dismissed earlier due to complainants failure to appear at the trial, would place
the accused in double jeopardy?
HELD:
Yes, revival of the case will put the accused in double jeopardy for the very reason that the case has been dismissed already without the
consent of the accused which would have an effect of an acquittal on the case filed. The dismissal was due to complainants incapability to
present its evidence due to non appearance of the witnesses and complainant himself which would bar further prosecution of the defendant
for the same offense.
In the case at bar, all three conditions were present, as the case filed was grave coercion, filed in a court of competent
jurisdiction as to where the coercion took place and last the accused were arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or the
information. When these three conditions are present then the acquittal, conviction of the accused, and the dismissal or termination of the
case without his express consent constitutes res judicata and is a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged.
In the case, it was evidently shown that the accused invoked their right to a speedy trial and asked for the trial of the case and not its
termination which would mean that respondents had no expressed consent to the dismissal of the case which would make the case filed res
judicata and has been dismissed by the competent court in order to protect the respondents as well for their right to speedy trial which will be
equivalent to acquittal of the respondents which would be a bar to further prosecution.
The trial judge declined to grant the writ, and from that decision an appeal has been taken to this court.
Joseph L. Wilson was convicted in the Court of First Instance in four cases. He appealed from the judgments in all four cases to
the Supreme Court, and they were there submitted for consideration. The twenty-second assigned error for the appellant advanced the
proposition that the facts alleged in the three complaints in the three cases did not constitute more than one crime.
Before the decisions had been rendered, the appellant fled the jurisdiction of the court. Thereupon, on motion of the Attorney-
General, the judgments against Wilson were declared final and his appeal was dismissed. An attempt was made to take the
cases to the United States Supreme Court and to obtain a stay of execution of the judgments but the motion to this effect was
unsuccessful.
Subsequently, another motion which relied on the point of double jeopardy was denied. Wilson was eventually placed in Bilibid
Prison to serve his sentences.
The writ of habeas corpus secures to a prisoner the right to have the cause of his detention examined and determined by a court
of justice, if he is held under lawful authority. The function of habeas corpus, where the party who has appealed to its aid is in custody
under process, does not extend beyond an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the court by which it was issued and the validity of the
process upon its face. It is not a writ of error. This court has held that a commitment in due from, based on a final judgment,
convicting and sentencing the defendant in a criminal case, is conclusive evidence of the legality of his detention under such
commitment, unless it appears that the court which pronounced the judgment was without jurisdiction or exceeded its jurisdiction in
imposing the penalty (Trono Felipe vs. Director of Prisons [1913]; 24 Phil., 121).
Former jeopardy is a defense which must be pleaded at the time of the arraignment. The general rule, with certain exceptions, is
that the question of a second jeopardy is not reviewable upon a writ of habeas corpus. The reason is that such a defense does not
go to the jurisdiction of the trial court but involves simply the judgment of the court which if wrongfully exercised, is but mere
error not reviewable upon habeas corpus (Ex parte Bigelow [1885], 113 U.S., 328; In the Matter of Cardona [1917], 10 Porto Rico Fed.,
40; 1 Bailey on Habeas Corpus, sec. 40).
Applying the foregoing principles to the facts, the entire lack of merit in appellant's contention is plainly apparent. Judgments of conviction
were properly handed down after a trial in accordance with the law. That appeals from those judgments did not gain the attention of
the appellate court was the fault of the appellant and not of the court. The trial court had jurisdiction of the offenses described in the
informations and it had jurisdiction to hear and decide upon the defenses offered by the accused. The question now submitted is
one of those defenses. The petition savors of an attempt to secure in an indirect manner a ruling from the appellate court on
question which, on account of the dismissal of the appeal, was not passed upon. That cannot be permitted.
Resolving the various errors assigned against the appellant, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed, with the costs of this
instance against the appellant.
3. LIZARRAGA VS TICO, 24 PHIL 504
SYLLABUS
1. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; SUFFICIENCY OF THE COMPLAINT. While a complaint may be awkwardly drafted, and for this reason be
subject to criticism with respect to incidental particulars, it will be held sufficient if it fairly apprises the defendant of the plaintiff's real claims
and contentions in such manner that the defendant is not misled to his surprise or injury.
2. ID.; ID.; THE DEMURRER, ITS PURPOSE AND SUFFICIENTLY. "The demurrer must distinctly specify the grounds upon which any of
the objection to the complaint, or to any of the causes of action therein stated, are taken." (Sec. 91, Code of Civil Procedure.) When a
demurrer is interposed to a complaint, whether upon one ground or upon another, it should set forth distinctly the ground upon which the
objection is based. It cannot be couched simply in the language of the Code; it must set out clearly the grounds upon which that language is
founded. It is not fair to the plaintiff to interpose simply an objection that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action, nor is it fair to the court. Neither the plaintiff nor the court should be left to make what may possible be a long and tiresome
examination of the complaint. The real reasons for the objection should be pointed out so that all may see. The demurrer was not invented to
make useless work for the court or to deceive or delude a plaintiff; its purpose is to clarify all ambiguities, to make certain all indefinite
assertions, to bring the plaintiff to a clear expression of his precise grievance, to aid in arriving at the real issue, to promote understanding,
and to prevent surprise.
3. ID.; ID.; A DEFECTIVE COMPLAINT MAY BE CURED BY SUITABLE EVIDENCE ADMITTED AT THE TRIAL WITHOUT OBJECTION. I a
complaint be defective, but the parties go to trial thereon, and the plaintiff, without objection, introduces sufficient evidence to constitute the
particular cause of action which it was intended to allege in the original complaint, and the defendant voluntarily produces witnesses to meet
the cause of action thus established an issue is joined as fully and as effectively as if it had been previously joined by the most perfect
pleadings.
PER TRENT, J., dissenting:
4. ID.; ID. The compliant in this case considered, and it should be held that it does not allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action.
5. ID.; SUFFICIENCY OF A DEMURRER. A demurrer to a complaint, on the ground that it does not allege facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action, is sufficient if stated in the language of the statute.
6. ID.; VARIANCE BETWEEN PLEADINGS AND PROOF. Where the pleadings are so defective as to wholly fail to show a cause of action,
so that the omitted allegations cannot properly be presumed to have been proved, the defect is not cured by evidence admitted at trial.
DECISION
MORELAND, J p:
The action is one to determine the ownership of certain real property and to secure a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from
levying upon and selling or otherwise invading the same.
There is only one appellant, F.M. Yap Tico. Three questions are raised: one, the sufficiency of the complaint on demurrer; another,
the sufficiency of the complaint to sustain the injunction; third, upon the merits.
The ownership and right to possession of the plaintiffs to the property in question is conceded.
We regard this case as turning upon the question whether the defendant sheriff had levied upon or announced for sale the corpus of the
property in litigation herein or whether he had seized upon and was selling merely the right to repurchase which at the time belonged to the
judgment debtor, Secundino Mendezona, one of the defendants herein. If he had levied upon and was selling the latter only, an injunction
would not lie. If the former, an injunction was proper.
The argument of counsel for the appellants is based upon the theory that the sheriff had levied upon and was about to sell only that interest
in the premises belonging to Mendezona known as the right of repurchase. In such case the action would not lie and injunction was, of
course, improper.
In resolving this question it must be borne in mind that, although there was a trial the introduction of evidence by both parties, such evidence
has not been brought to this court. In deciding this appeal upon the merits we look only to the pleadings and proceedings in the
action and to the facts stated in the opinion of the trial court.
It is true that the complaint seems to allege in a general way that the sheriff proposed selling the "right, interest, and share" which the
judgment debtors had in the premises in litigation; but it does not state that was all that the sheriff had actually seized and levied upon. On
the contrary, it affirmatively alleges that the defendants were actually invading the property, rights and interests of the
plaintiffs. Moreover, the prayer of the complaint indicates that the corpus of the property had actually been seized by the sheriff
under execution, and was being advertised for sale. The prayer is to the effect that the court "issue a preliminary injunction against all
of the defendants and each of them, their agents, servants, lawyers, and other persons, requiring them to abstain from selling, taking
possession of, or seizing any of the property described in the complaint until after final judgment in this case." While the prayer is not strictly
an allegation of the complaint, it may, nevertheless, be used to make clear an allegation which might, rigidly speaking, be susceptible of
different interpretations.
As we have said, the defendants failed to bring here the levy and return of the sheriff, which are primarily the best evidence of the nature and
extent of the levy, and failed also to present on appeal the notice of sale published by the sheriff. We have, however, in addition to the finding
of the court below, the answer of the sheriff in this case. In the absence of the evidence referred to, and, in fact, any other
evidence in the case, we must take this answer, together with the finding of the court on the subject, as conclusive of the
question as to what property was the subject of the levy and the proposed sale.
"A warehouse of strong materials located on land situated in the pueblo of Cabanatuan of the Province of Nueva Ecija an leased to
Doa Ruperta Garcia, which warehouse measures 126 feet in length and 65 feet in width, with a wing 52 feet in length and 39 feet in
width; a steam engine of 35; a steam engine of 35 nominal English horsepower; 6 mills; 4 sifters; 7 elevators; 3 ventilating cones and
complete accessories for threshing paddy and bleaching and polishing rice with a capacity of 1,500 sacks daily, installed in the said
warehouse, as well as a locomotive of 15 American horsepower; a threshing machine with a capacity of 1,000 cavanes of paddy daily; and 75
carts with iron axles and wheels."
This property, as is readily seen, is not the interest known as the right of repurchase, but is the property, and the whole
thereof, which was purchased by the plaintiffs in this action from Mendezona and his partners and as to which said Mendezona
reserved only the right of repurchase.
This admission of the sheriff that he had levied upon the corpus of the property and was attempting to sell it is of importance
in this action for the reason that he is the person who knew best the nature of the levy and the property that he had actually
seized. We regard this answer as substantially taking the place of the sheriff's levy and return and the published notice of sale, as it shows
the property levied upon and exposed for sale as fully as the levy and return would do.
It is conceded in this case that plaintiffs had a right to the possession and control of this property and that the sheriff had no right to interfere
therewith. It is also conceded that the sheriff had no right to levy upon anything concerning said property except Mendezona's
right to repurchase the same, leaving plaintiffs in the possession and control of the corpus and permitting them to continue the
business in which they were then engaged thereon.
Such being the case, a seizure of and levy upon said property itself was an unwarranted invasion of the rights and interests of
the plaintiffs; and an attempt to sell the property under said levy could be enjoined in the proper action.
It may be true that the terms of the injunction were somewhat broader than the prayer of the complaint. If so, a motion should
have been made to vacate the injunction, or such part of it as was in excess of the remedy demanded. In such case the execution
creditor would have been at liberty to levy upon the right of repurchase and proceed with its sale. The only objection made, however, was
directed against the sufficiency of the complaint as a basis for any injunction whatever. Such objection, in the form of a demurrer, was not
made, however, until the 29th of April, 1907, when the demurrer was filed; while the answer of the sheriff above referred to, showing the
nature of the levy, was filed on the 12th of March, 1907.
While the complaint, from the viewpoint of the draftsman is not well drawn, and while criticism of it in incidental particulars as easy, still the
broad question is, Does it fairly apprise the defendants of the plaintiff's real contentions and claims against them? Would they be misled to
their surprise and injury if they placed faith in its allegations? (Code of Civ. Proc., sec. 106.)
Paragraph 7 of the complaint, so much relied upon those attacking the validity of the judgment below, does not allege what property was
actually seized, or in what manner the execution had been levied, or what methods were being used to carry the levy and sale to completion.
It simply states that the sheriff was offering for sale certain interests defendants. This would, of course, indicate that those interests
were the only property levied upon. But it does not indicate what property had actually been seized, or taken possession of, or invaded, in
order to make such levy and sale. It may well be, and it seems to be, the intention and purpose of paragraph 8 of the complaint to allege
that, in order to sell the right to repurchase plaintiff's property, the sheriff had gone upon and taken possession of the property itself, or, at
least, was attempting to do so. It would not be at all surprising if the sheriff, attempting to levy upon such an indefinite thing as a right to
repurchase, should deem it necessary, for a valid levy, to take possession of or otherwise invade the property to which that right pertained.
Construing paragraphs 7 and 8 together, and considering them in conjunction with the prayer for relief, one is forced to the conclusion that
objection is made not only to the notice of sale, but also to what had been done to carry the proposed sale to completion. It is reasonably
clear that the plaintiffs were complaining to defendants that they were actually invading the plaintiff's property. It matters not whether
that invasion was for the purpose of selling the corpus of the property, or whether it had as its object merely the sale of the right to
repurchase. It was an invasion in either event. Seizing on man's property for the purpose of selling that of another is, in principle, as
illegal and indefensible as it is to seize and sell one man's property to pay the debt of another. Selling property is not the only way of
committing trespass upon it.
For these reasons we believe that the demurrer was properly overruled.
But, granting all that may be said about the deficiency of the complaint, still it is not more deficient than the demurrer urged against it.
Strictly speaking, the demurrer to the complaint in this case is valueless as a pleading, in that it fails in one of the essential
requirements of a demurrer. Section 91 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides:
"The demurrer must distinctly specify the ground upon which any of the objections to the complaint, or to any of the causes of
action therein stated, are taken."
When demurrer is made to a complaint, whether upon one ground or another, it should set out distinctly the grounds upon
which the objection is based. It cannot be couched simply in the language of the code. It must set forth distinctly the grounds upon
which that language is founded. The reason for this is plain. It is not fair to the plaintiff to interpose to a complaint the simple
objection that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Neither is it fair to the court. Neither the plaintiff
nor the court should be left to make, possibly, a long and tiresome examination and investigation and then, perhaps, finally be compelled to
guess. The grounds of the objection should be pointed out so that all may see. A demurrer was not invented to make useless work for
a court, or to deceive or delude a plaintiff. Its purpose was to clarify all aviguties; to make certain all indefinite assertions; to
bring the plaintiff to a clear and clean expression of the precise grievance which he has against the defendant ; to aid in
arriving at a real issue between the parties; to promote understanding and prevent surprise.
To that end, a demurrer should specify, for the benefit of the plaintiff and the court as well, the very weakness which the demurrant believes
he sees in the complaint. It should be so presented and handled as to bring to a quick determination the question whether the plaintiff has, at
bottom, a legal claim against the defendant. To attain this object, the demurrer should be clear, specific, definite, and certain as to
the precise weakness of the complaint. Being an instrument to cure imperfections, it should not itself be imperfect.
To the complaint before us a demurrer was interposed, stating merely that the complaint did not allege facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action. No particular ground was specified. No specific failure was asserted or named. No. precise
weakness was pointed out.
The order overruling the demurrer does not indicate that the court was informed as to the specific grounds upon which it was based.
Certainly, so far as the records goes, the plaintiffs never knew until after the demurrer was decided precisely what the defendant was driving
at when he presented it.
Under such conditions, we do not feel that we should use our discretion to indulge presumptions in favor of the demurrant in
determining whether or not the allegations of the complaint are sufficient. We do not feel like going out of the beaten path, even if
we could, to search for defects in the complaint when neither the plaintiff nor the court was precisely informed of the alleged defects until it
was too late to be use to either. We do not feel like favoring a demurrer which is as full of defects as the court overruling the
demurrer should be sustained if there is any legal ground upon which it can be, although such ground was not presented by the
court below as one of the reasons for its decision. The fact that the demurrer was worthless as a pleading is one of the strongest
reasons for overruling.
It has been urged that our decision requiring that in all demurrers the specific grounds of the particular objection should be set
out distinctly, is against the weight of authority. We do not think so. But if it were, we should still be forced, in conscience, to stand
upon the proposition as we have stated it, as it seems to us to be fundamentally right and to be fully supported by reason and logic.
In an examination of the authorities which have been urged against the proposition here taken, we have found only one State
which has been shown, to our satisfaction, to have taken a position opposed to ours.
The courts of the State of New York Code of Civil Procedure provides expressly that a demurrer, based upon the ground that the
complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, may be presented in those words, which are the words of the
statute; and no specific grounds of such objection need be given. Instead, then of requiring the specific grounds upon which the
objection is based to be distinctly stated, as does our statute, the New York are opposed to our decision seems to be unfounded. As a
necessary result, the claim that New York is not in accord with this decision is also unfounded. Most of the decisions presented
from other States, such as those of Indiana, North Dakota, and Missouri, are based, so far as can be ascertained with the material at hand,
upon statutes materially different from our own, and for that reason are not in point.
As highly as we respect the learning the ability of the supreme courts of the States holding contrary views, if there is more than one, we
cannot accept their judgment as to the construction which should be given to section 91 of our Code of Civil Procedure. To our mind, that
section clearly requires two things to be done by the demurrant: (1) He shall make an objection, putting such objection in the
words of the statute, or substantially in t hose words; and (2) he shall specify the grounds of that objection. The construction
given by that section by those who oppose that here set forth requires only one of those things to be done, namely, the making of the
objection in the words of the statute. This construction leaves the other part of the statute, namely, that requiring that the grounds of the
objection shall also be specified, without force and effect. Thus, by what appears to be construction, a very important, in fact the most
important, part of the law has been abrogated. As for us, we do not construe or interpret this law. It does not need it. We apply it.
By applying the law, we conserve both provisions for the benefit of litigants. The first and fundamental duty of courts, in our
judgment, is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is
impossible or inadequate without them. They are the very last functions which a court should exercise. The majority of the laws need no
interpretation or construction. They require only application, and if there were more application and less construction, there would be more
stability in the law, and more people would know what the law is.
Some authorities still adhere to the technicalities of the old pleading and procedure in spite of the liberal tendency of procedural laws. They
still cling to the old difference between general and special demurrers, holding with the old authorities that in special demurrers, the precise
defect must be pointed out, while in a general demurrer no defect whatever need be specified. This is distinctly against the tendency of
modern thought and modern legislation. The more general a demurrer is, the worse it is. The assertion that a special demurrer, which
under the old practice was used only as to substance, he may aim at the sky, is not convincing. As we view it, it is not logical to maintain
that, as to form, which, as a rule, is of slight importance, the party must be fully advised and informed of the alleged defect, and to that end
the demurrant must point it out specially; while as to the substance, which, at all times, is the important thing of all, the party need not be
advised or informed as to the precise defect alleged, and that, therefore, the demurrant need not point it out but is fully justified in keeping,
so far as he can, both the court and the party in complete ignorance thereof.
It is claimed, following the old theory, that the general demurrer searches the whole record; but if it searches, it does not discover or
disclose. It may search, but if it finds anything, it puts it carefully away in a dark place, cautiously concealing it from the eyes of the court and
the knowledge of the adversary. The reason for this is that, if the court or the party knew the precise defect that had been "searched," there
would be an immediate amendment. If the party against whom a demurrer is interposed can be kept from discovering the real defect in his
pleading until he is deeply in the meshes of demurrant's net, then the case many times is substantially won. He cannot escape except by loss
of so much time and at so great expense that, many times, it is not worth while to recommence or continue his action.
It has been the policy of modern legislation to do away with these objectionable features, as well as others, and to that end the general
demurrer has been, effect, abolished in a number of States. Our own statute requires that "the demurrer must distinctly specify the grounds
upon which any of the objections to the complaint, or to any of the causes of action therein stated, are taken."
A pleading is not an instrument of deception. It is not something to get parties into trouble. It is not to be used to dig pitfalls or to
lay traps or snares. It is not to be used to deceive but to inform; not to befog but to clarify; not to cause trouble but to obviate it;
not to make expense but to same it. A demurrer, for example, should not leave the court and the party against whose pleading it is aimed
as ignorant of the defect in the offending pleading as before the demurrer is filed. Many times the objection that the complaint does not state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action means very little. There are occasions, of course, when it is sufficient. But is certain that no
injury can ever result from naming the precise reason why the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; and ,
in the great majority of cases, great good will come of it. Take this very case. Much of the real difficulty and uncertainty would have been
avoided if the demurrer had pointed out the precise defect which it was claimed was found in the complaint. If the demurrer had specified
and stated that the complaint was defective, if it were really so defective, in that it alleged that the defendant had levied
simply upon the interest of Mendezona in the premises known as the right to repurchase, something which he had a right to do
and upon which no cause of action could be predicated, then the plaintiff would have been given a fair opportunity to meet the
objection, either by amending his complaint and alleging a levy by the defendant upon the corpus of the property, or by
standing upon the complaint and submitting to the court the question of law whether the defendant had a right to levy upon
the right of repurchase. If the plaintiff had amended by alleging a levy upon the corpus, then the demurrer and all the questions relating
thereto, now vexing the parties, would have been out of the case. If the plaintiff really intended to allege just what the demurrant
now claims that he did allege, then the question of law above referred to would have been clearly presented and the case
entirely resolved by the decision of that question. Indeed, it is more than probable that the plaintiff, if his complaint was really
defective, would have withdrawn it after full consideration of the objection urged against it.
It is not to be taken, from what we have said, that we will, of our own motion, raise the question of the sufficiency of a demurrer. We treat it
as we do every other pleading. if the parties do not make timely objection to the defect, it will be deemed to have been waived. We take
cognizance of the defect only when it has been duly and properly raised below or when, as in this case, it is necessary to sustain a judgment
of the inferior court.
It must be remembered that, although, according to the record, there was a formal trial, with the introduction of testimony by both parties,
the evidence has not been brought up on this appeal and we are, therefor, limited to the facts stated in the opinion of the trial court, together
with the pleadings and proceedings in the action, in determining whether the judgment should be affirmed or reserved. The trial court, in
its decision, finds as a fact that, "by virtue of two executions issued our to the Court of First Instance of Manila against the
property of Secundino Mendezona, the sheriff of Nueva Ecija announced for public sale the property described in paragraph 2
of complaint." The property there described is concededly the property of the plaintiff. This finding is, of course, fatal to appellant's
contention that only the right to repurchase was levied upon. We must assume this finding to be based upon evidence, as none of it is here
from which we may determine otherwise.
Having these things in mind, we consider the place which a demurrer, as a pleading, occupies in our practice.
In this jurisdiction, the results flowing from the interposition of a demurrer, as a pleading, lack some of the features which pertain to such
interposition in other jurisdictions. It has been uniformly held by this court that an order overruling a demurrer is not separately
appealable, for the reason that is interlocutory in its nature and falls within the prohibition of section 123 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. (Segovia vs. Prov. Board of Albay, 13 Phil. Rep., 331; Averia vs. Reboldera, 10 Phil. Rep., 316; Serrano vs. Serrano, 9 Phil. Rep.,
142.) There are two cases only in which proceedings based upon demurrers are appealable, and then only after final judgment
have been entered, terminating definitely the action in that court.
One case is where a demurrer to a complaint is sustained, the plaintiff refuses to amend and final judgment dismissing the complaint is
entered. This is, however, in one sense, an appeal from a final judgment and not from an order. The other is where a demurrer is
overruled, the defendant declines to answer and a judgment in favor of the plaintiff is entered upon the evidence thereupon offered to
establish the allegations of the complaint. Even this case may partake much of the nature of an appeal from a judgment on the merits. In
every other case, except, of course, where a demurrer is made to an answer, to a cross complaint, or to a counter claim, in which
substantially the same proceedings are had as are described above relative to a demurrer to the original complaint, the order overruling the
demurrer and the exception taken thereto are brought to this court, not separately, but along with and as a part of the appeal from the final
judgment after trial. In such appeal, if no objection has been made to the introduction of plaintiff's evidence, the case is here
considered upon the merits, and, even though it clearly appears that the complaint was and is still fatally defective, the
demurrer thereto is of no consequence in the decision of the appeal, provided the evidence presented by the plaintiff, received
without objection, has cured the defect and established a cause of action.
This court, under such circumstances, has never reversed a case based upon the fact that the demurrer was, in the first instance, well
founded. On the contrary, the appeal has always been, and is now, decided upon the merits as presented by the evidence, and, if the
evidence establishes a cause of action, the judgment is affirmed, no matter how defective the complaint may have been.
The reason for this practice is not far away: To prevent the multiplication of appeals, to secure the speedy termination of litigation, and to
save expense to litigants.
It may be urged that, where the complaint fails to state a cause of action against a defendant, an appeal from an order
overruling the demurrer should be permitted in order that he may not be forced to undergo the expense, trouble, and worry of
a trial when nothing has been alleged against him. This contention, however, overlooks two very important considerations, aside from
the insurmountable one that the Code of Civil Procedure prohibits it. One of them is, "Who is to determine whether or not the
complaint does state a cause of action?" The answer to that question presents the other consideration, namely, that the
decision of the court upon the demurrer holds that the complaint does state a cause of action. Now, the strong probabilities are
that the decision is right. The chances are strongly against the defendant in his appeal from that decision. Why, then, should the plaintiff be
put to the expense of an extra appeal when he has the judgment of a court in his favor, and when, for that reason, the probabilities are in
favor of the proposition that the defendant is wrong in his pleading? To the contention that the defendant ought not to be pressed to
trial if he is right is interposed the reply that the plaintiff ought not to be pressed to an appeal if he is right. The question is,
"Who is right?" The only answer to that question is, "The plaintiff." It is always the one against whom the judgment of the
court runs who is the appellant, and it is always he against whom all the presumptions are indulged.
He cannot be permitted, therefore, to play his one chance of reversal against plaintiff's nine chances of affirmance, and thereby cause the
plaintiff the expense, trouble, and worry of an appeal. It proves nothing to say that the defendant may be right in interposing his demurrer.
The plaintiff may be right also. Having already a judgment in his favor, he has more chances of being right than the defendant.
Moreover, if the demurrer alone cannot be made the basis of an appeal, why should it be made the sole reason for a reversal in an appeal
taken from a judgment on the merits?
It may be asked what, then, is the protection which a demurrer affords a pleader? There are several. In the first place, if a demurrer is well
found, an amendment, generally speaking, immediately results or the action is withdrawn or is dismissed, and the demurrer has
accomplished a real purpose. In the second place, if the demurrer is overruled, the pleader, if the has sufficient faith, may still stand upon it,
with or without answering, and, upon the proof of plaintiff's cause of action if there is no answer, or upon the trial if there is an answer, object
to the introduction of any testimony which tends to surprise him in that it is not within the scope of the allegations of the complaint. Whatever
testimony offered is, in reality, subject to objection must be rejected. This will prevent surprise and protect the demurrant from the
establishment of a cause of action of which he was not appraised by the allegations of the complaint. Moreover, when the case
has reached this point the trial court is given an opportunity to use its sound discretion relative to the allowance of
amendments of the defective pleading, of giving time to other party to procure witnesses to meet the purpose of the
amendments, and of doing all those things necessary to dispose of the case according to the right and prevent an error or
mistake from causing a miscarriage of justice.
It is apparent in this case that the complaint, if defective, was cured by the evidence introduced on the trial, as shown by the
finding of the court, presumably based on the evidence, that the sheriff had levied upon the corpus of the property which
concededly belonged to the plaintiff.
The appeal must, therefore, be decided upon the merits. We are of the opinion that a sufficient case has not been made for reversal.
Much objection has been made to that branch of our decision which provides that, under the Code of Civil Procedure, the introduction of
evidence upon the trial, without objection on the part of the defendant, which establishes a cause of action against the
defendant, will prevent him from thereafter raising the question that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute
a cause of action, as well as from taking advantage of an equivalent objection made before the trial. Cases are cited to the effect
that "such a defect is not cured by verdict and judgment, even in the absence of any objection by demurrer or answer in the
lower court, and objection made on account thereof may be made at any time;" and that "pleadings which wholly and
completely fail to state any cause of action or defense, so that the admitted allegations cannot be assumed to have been
proved, is not cured by verdict." (148 Cal., 660; 222 Ill., 232; 149 Ind., 413.)
It must be observed, however, that we are not asserting that a cure of the complaint is brought about by verdict or a judgment. Our
contention is that the cure is brought about by defendant's own act. An issue may be joined as well at the trial as before. The reason
why issues are required by law to be joined before trial is to give all the parties due notice of the claims made against them, thereby offering
full and fair opportunity to produce their witnesses and meet the charges against them. But, where the issue, by some defect in the
complaint or answer, has not really been joined before the trial, the parties may, by mutual consent, join issue at the trial.
Issues may be raised between the parties in other ways than by pleadings. They may be raised on the trial by the evidence of
the parties.
However defective the complaint may be, if the parties go to trial, and, without objection from the defendant, the plaintiff proves facts
sufficient to constitute the particular cause of action which it was intended his complaint should allege and the defendant voluntarily produces
his witnesses to meet the cause of action thus proved, there is then and there joined an issue as fully and effectively as if it had been joined
long before by the most perfect pleadings. As we have already said, the purpose of pleadings is to notify the parties of the claims
which each has against the other and what each expects to prove. This is in order that each may have a fair opportunity to
rebut the evidence of the other by the production of witnesses of his own. If each can be informed of the claims and demands of the
other and can have a fair opportunity to produce his evidence in relation thereto, then the object of pleadings has been subserved. When,
therefore, upon the trial the plaintiff, by his own proof, tenders the issue which the complaint was intended to tender, and the defendant
accepts it and presents his evidence in relation thereto, is it not unreasonable, successfully move to dismiss the whole matter for the reason
that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action? If necessary, may not the complaint be amended to meet the
situation? (Code Civ. Proc., 107, 109, 110.)
It has also been urged that sufficiency of the demurrer under the law was not raised at any time by anyone. It is asserted that
the plaintiffs always accepted the demurrer as sufficient, and that this court, upon its own motion, has taken up the question of its
sufficiency without either of the parties having been heard upon it.
While this objection has been fully answered before, we may here add that we do not regard this objection as sound either in fact or in law.
The judgment of the court below is entitled to be upheld upon any legal ground, and it is of no consequence whether the court
assigned that ground as a basis for its judgment or not. It could very well have dismissed the demurrer upon the sole ground
that it was insufficient in law and that the court would not be moved to exercise its power by a pleading which itself did not
comply with the law. All this court has done in this connection, therefore, if anything, is to add one more ground to the support of the
decision of the lower court.
We are of the opinion that the judgment of the court below overruling the demurrer was, under all the conditions, proper, even
though the complaint were as defective as is now contended. (See 31 Cyc., pp. 317, 318, and cases cited.)
The judgment is accordingly affirmed, without special finding as to costs.
The first transmittal letter elaborated upon details concerning petitioner's failure to account for the aggregate amount of P21.0
million RBSM funds, of which P10.0 million was used to purchase five (5) Manager's Checks payable to Soriano Holdings
Corporation (SHC) of which petitioner was Chief Executive Officer and Treasurer-in-Trust and P11.0 million was deposited on various
occasions to the PCI Bank Account of SHC. cEaCTS
The second letter described how petitioner failed to account for the amount of P12.6 million, which was part of the approved
emergency loan granted to RBSM by the BSP, which, upon his instructions, was delivered to him and was never placed under the
custody of RBSM nor reflected on its books.
The letters of transmittal, which were not filed under oath, requested that a preliminary investigation be conducted and the
corresponding criminal charges be filed against petitioner.
Acting on these letters and their annexes, State Prosecutor Josefino A. Subia filed, on May 2, 2001, four (4) separate
informations for estafa as penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a), of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner for allegedly
defrauding RBSM of various amounts through false pretenses and misrepresentations committed on different occasions during the year 1999.
The same were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 1178 to 1181-M-2001 and raffled off to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 80,
Malolos, Bulacan, presided by respondent Hon. Caesar A. Casanova. TSIEAD
In Criminal Case No. 1178-M-2001, the information alleged that petitioner converted the P12.6 million emergency loan approved by the BSP
to RBSM to his own personal use and which amount was never recorded in the books of RBSM.
In Criminal Case No. 1179-M-2001 and Criminal Case No. 1181-M-2001, petitioner was alleged to have caused the withdrawal of P7.0 million
and P4.0 million, respectively, from the RBSM account on the strength of his representation that said amounts would be invested. Instead of
being invested, these amounts were deposited to SHC, where petitioner was the Treasurer-in-Trust and Chief Executive Officer, and was
purportedly converted by the latter to his own personal use.
In Criminal Case No. 1180-M-2001, petitioner allegedly caused the purchase of P10.0 million worth of manager's checks payable to SHC from
RBSM's account and, instead of using the same for investment purposes, converted the same to his own personal use. DSATCI
On August 27, 2001, petitioner moved to quash these informations on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the
offense charged. 5 It was petitioner's contention that the letters sent to the DOJ by the BSP and PDIC constituted the complaint
and hence were fatally defective for not being filed under oath or sworn to before the investigating prosecutor as required
under Section 3(a) of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, he argued that said letters contravened Section 18, paragraphs
(c) and (d) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7653, otherwise known as the New Central Bank Act, which requires that the complaint must be
filed under the delegated authority of the Governor of the BSP or pursuant to a Monetary Board Resolution.
Respondents filed an opposition 6 contending that the letters of transmittal did not constitute the complaint and were merely
transmittal or covering letters. They argued that what comprised the criminal complaints were the affidavits and since these
were made under oath and supported by evidence, there was substantial compliance with the Rules. Moreover, it was their
contention that since estafa is a public crime, any person may institute the complaint and that the letters were mere
indorsements routinely done by one government office to another and need not bear the written authorization of the head of
office. AaSHED
In an order dated December 4, 2001, the trial court denied the motion to quash filed by the petitioner for lack of merit ruling
that it had jurisdiction over the case since from the record there are affidavits and supplemental affidavits executed and sworn
to by complaining witnesses. Thereafter, petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on April 19, 2002. 7
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to the Court of Appeals claiming that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the case. 8 On August 15, 2003, the
Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner's petition finding that there was no grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial court and ruled that
the order denying petitioner's motion to quash is an interlocutory order and that the proper remedy in such a case is to appeal after an
adverse decision has been rendered on the merits.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, the present petition. Petitioner contends that the two letters transmitted by
the legal departments of the BSP and PDIC to the DOJ constituted the complaints. The letters were not subscribed under oath and
were signed by BSP and PDIC officers without authorization from the BSP governor. These letter-complaints, petitioner argues, do not comply
with the mandatory requirements of Rule 112, Section 3(a), of the Rules of Court, thus the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
offense. CHaDIT
Petitioner's contention is not well-taken.
Section 3(a), Rule 112, of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 3. Procedure The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the following manner:
(a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses, as well as other supporting documents to establish probable cause. They shall be in such number of copies as there are
respondents, plus two (2) copies for official file. The affidavit shall be subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or government official
authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, before a notary public, each of whom must certify that he personally
examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits. IEHSDA
While Section 18(c) and (d) of R.A. No. 7653 read:
Section 18 Representation of the Monetary Board and the Bangko Sentral. The Governor of the Bangko Sentral shall be the principal
representative of the Monetary Board and of the Bangko Sentral and, in such capacity and in accordance with the instruction of the Monetary
Board, shall be empowered to:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) represent the Bangko Sentral, either personally or through counsel, including private counsel, as may be authorized by the Monetary
Board, in any legal proceedings, action or specialized legal studies; and
(d) delegate his power to represent the Bangko Sentral, as provided in subsections (a), (b) and (c) of this section, to other officers upon
his own responsibility: Provided, however, that in order to preserve the integrity and the prestige of his office, the Governor of the Bangko
Sentral may choose not to participate in preliminary discussions with any multilateral banking or financial institution on any negotiations for
the Government within or outside the Philippines. During the negotiations, he may instead be represented by a permanent negotiator.
CSIHDA
A close scrutiny of the letters transmitted by the BSP and PDIC to the DOJ shows that these were not intended to be the complaint envisioned
under the Rules. It may be clearly inferred from the tenor of the letters that the officers merely intended to transmit the affidavits of the bank
employees to the DOJ. Nowhere in the transmittal letters is there any averment on the part of the BSP and PDIC officers of
personal knowledge of the events and transactions constitutive of the criminal violations alleged to have been made by the
accused.
In fact, the letters clearly stated that what the OSI of the BSP and the LIS of the PDIC did was to respectfully transmit to the
DOJ for preliminary investigation the affidavits and supplemental affidavits of the employees who had personal knowledge of
the acts of the petitioner. 9 These affidavits were subscribed under oath by the witnesses who executed them before a notary
public. Since the affidavits, not the letters transmitting them, were intended to initiate the preliminary investigation,
SC hold that Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court was substantially complied with.
Citing the ruling of this Court in Ebarle v. Sucaldito, 10 the Court of Appeals correctly held that a complaint for purposes of preliminary
investigation by the fiscal need not be filed by the offended party. The rule has been that, unless the offense subject thereof is one that
cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the same may be filed, for preliminary investigation purposes, by any competent person.
The crime of estafa is a public crime which can be initiated by "any competent person." The witnesses who executed the
affidavits based on their personal knowledge of the acts committed by the petitioner fall within the purview of "any competent
person" who may institute the complaint for a public crime.
Section 18, paragraphs (c) and (d), of R.A. No. 7653 does not apply in this case because the BSP did not institute the complaint
but merely transmitted the affidavits of the complainants to the DOJ. EcATDH
Finally, there is no dispute that as a general rule, the remedy of an accused from the denial of his motion to quash is for him to
go to trial on the merits, and if an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law. 11
Indeed, basic is the doctrine that "the denial of a motion to dismiss or to quash, being interlocutory, cannot be questioned by
certiorari; it cannot be [the] subject of appeal, until final judgment or order is rendered." 12
Petitioner cites the case of Morales v. Court of Appeals 13 as an exception to this rule, claiming that certiorari under Rule 65 may be
availed of when the lower court has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in denying a motion to quash.
The Morales ruling does not apply. Since the requirements of the Rules of Court were substantially complied with, the trial court
validly acquired jurisdiction over the offense and it did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner's motion
to quash.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed August 15, 2003 Decision and the April 28, 2004 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP NO. 70519 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. DAHaTc
SO ORDERED.
The respondent-courts are: CFI of Manila Branches VII and XVIII and CFI of Samar
Several informations were filed before the abovementioned courts charging the accused of Illegal Possession of Deadly
Weapon in violation of Presidential Decree #9. The counsel of the defense filed motions to quash the said informations after
which the respondent-courts passed their own orders quashing the said informations on common ground that the informations
did not allege facts constituting ang offense penalized until PD#9 for failure to state an essential element of the crime, which is,
that the carrying outside of the accuseds residence of a bladed, pointed, or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected
with, or related to to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder.
The respondent courts stand that PD#9 should be read in the context of Proc.1081 which seeks to maintain law and order in the
country as well as the prevention and suppression of all forms of lawless violence. The non-inclusion of the aforementioned
element may not be distinguished from other legislation related to the illegal possession of deadly weapons.
Judge Purisima, in particular, reasoned that the information must allege that the purpose of possession of the weapon was
intended for the purposes of abetting the conditions of criminality, organized lawlessness, public disorder. The petitioners said that
the purpose of subversion is not necessary in this regard because the prohibited act is basically a malum prohibitum or is an
action or conduct that is prohibited by virtue of a statute.
The City Fiscal also added in cases of statutory offenses, the intent is immaterial and that the commission of the act is voluntary is
enough.
ISSUE: W/N the informations filed by the people sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense of Illegal possession of deadly
weapon penalized under Presidential Decree No. 9?
HELD: DISMISSED
1. It is the constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him.
2. Under Sec. 5 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, for a complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the designation of
the offense by the statute and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. This is essential to avoid surprise on
the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly.
3. The supreme court says that the preamble of PD#9 states that the intention of such decree is to penalize the acts which are related to
Proc.1081 which aim to suppress lawlessness, rebellion, subversive acts, and the like. While the preamble is not a part of the statute, it
implies the intent and spirit of the decree. The preamble and whereas clauses also enumerate the facts or events which justify the
promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions provided.
Labor And Social Legislation; Labor Code; Illegal Recruitment; Making Referrals to Agency Constitutes Recruitment. In People v. Agustin,
therein appellant argued that she could not be convicted of illegal recruitment because in introducing the complainants to the alleged
recruiters, she merely acted "out of the goodness of her heart." In resolving said case, the Court ruled: The testimonial evidence hereon show
that she indeed further committed acts constitutive of illegal recruitment. All four prosecution witnesses testified that it was Agustin whom
they initially approached regarding their plans of working overseas. It was from her that they learned about the fees they had to pay, as well
as the papers that they had to submit. It was after they had talked to her that they met the accused spouses who owned the placement
agency. As such, the Court concluded that appellant was an employee of the Goce spouses, as she was actually making referrals to the
agency. She was, therefore, engaged in recruitment activities.
Labor And Social Legislation; Labor Code; Illegal Recruitment; Case at Bar. Although accused-appellant was not an employee of the alleged
illegal recruiter Julie Micua, the evidence show that she was the one who approached complainants and prodded them to seek employment
abroad. It was through her that they met Julia Micua. This is clearly an act of referral. Worse, accused-appellant declared that she was
capable of placing them in jobs overseas. Suffice it to say that complainants' recruitment would not have been consummated were it not for
the direct participation of accused-appellant in the recruitment process.
Labor And Social Legislation; Labor Code; Illegal Recruitment In Large Scale; Elements. Illegal recruitment is conducted in a large scale if
perpetrated against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group. This crime requires proof that the accused: (1) engaged in the
recruitment and placement of workers defined under Article 13 or in any of the prohibited activities under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2)
does not have a license or authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (3) committed the infraction against
three or more persons, individually or as a group.
Labor And Social Legislation; Labor Code; Illegal Recruitment In Large Scale; Case at Bar. All these three essential elements are present in
the case at bar. As earlier discussed, accused-appellant recruited the six complainants. Further, the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration certified that neither accused-appellant nor Julie Micua is licensed to recruit workers for overseas employment. Moreover,
accused-appellant and her husband's acts of receiving almost all the payments of the complainants and issuing receipts signed by Julie Micua
contradict her claim of being a mere applicant. There were even times that accused-appellant herself signed the receipts for the placement
fees. Taken as a whole, the evidence shows that accused-appellant conspired and actively participated in the deceitful plan adopted by her
co-accused Julie Micua, Rico Cordova and her own husband, Renato Meris, to hire without license or authority, gullible and naive applicants
for non-existent overseas jobs.
FACTS: Leonida Meris was convicted of six (6) counts of estafa and one count of illegal recruitment for defrauding the six (6)
complainants, Meris townmates in Pampanga and relatives in large scale in the amount of P30,000.00 each for five complainants and one
complainant for P20,000.00 for alleged overseas employment which did not materialize.
Meris, who voluntarily appeared in court, pleaded not guilty to the charges and actively participated in her defense. She
interposed the defense of denial claiming that she merely introduced complainants to Julie Micua, her recruiter in Manila, with
whom complainants transacted with for their employment abroad upon payment of placement fees denied having represented herself
as having the capacity to deploy workers abroad.
Evidence for the prosecution, however, disclosed, that complainants would not have known Julie Micua were if not for appellant
who even accompanied them to Manila to see Julie Micua. It was appellant and her husband who received almost all the
payments of complainants and who issued receipts signed by Julie Micua. Certification from the POEA showed that Meris and Julie
Micua were not licensed to recruit workers for overseas employment.
In this appeal, appellant assailed the lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over his person because of the warrantless arrest and its findings of
fact.
ISSUE: W/N Meris committed the crimes large-scale illegal recruitment and estafa?
HELD:
Yes, The prosecution undoubtedly proved that Meris, without license or authority, engaged in recruitment and placement
activities. This was done in collaboration with Julie Micua, when they promised complainants employment in Hong Kong. Art. 13,
par. (b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as any act of canvassing enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or
procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or
not; Provided that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be
deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
Although Meris was not an employee of the alleged illegal recruiter Julie Micua, the evidence show that she was the one who
approached complainants and prodded them to seek employment abroad. It was through her that they met Julia Micua. This is clearly
an act of referral. Worse, accused-appellant declared that she was capable of placing them in jobs overseas. Suffice it to say that
complainants recruitment would not have been consummated were it not for the direct participation of accused-appellant in the recruitment
process.
The Supreme Court noted that the information failed to state the age of the complainant considering that the accused was convicted of statutory
rape. This defect notwithstanding, the Court ruled that the trial court did not err in its decision. At the time the crime was committed, the
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, and the information was merely defective. The same was cured by evidence during trial and no objection
was raised. Further, the defect cannot be considered a violation of the right of the accused to be informed of the charge against him, as he was
aware that his victim was a mere slip of a girl, unsophisticated and defenseless. Moreover, the Order issued by the investigating judge clearly
stated that the complainant was only nine (9) years old when the crime started.
On the propriety of being charged of ten counts of rape under one information, the accused, before entering his plea, should have moved to
quash the complaint for being duplicitous. For failure therefor, he is deemed to have waived the defect and, hence, the Court could convict him
of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each and every one of them. ITSCED
The Court after going over the case in its entirety, was convinced about the culpability of the accused. The trial court's decision was affirmed,
with modification that the offended party be paid by the accused an additional amount of P100,000.00 as moral damages.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; STATUTORY RAPE; CONVICTION PROPER ALTHOUGH THE INFORMATION FAILED TO STATE THE AGE OF COMPLAINANT;
CASE AT BAR. The accused was convicted of statutory rape, although the information failed to state the age of the complainant. This defect
notwithstanding, the trial court did not err in convicting the accused of statutory rape. First, the crime having occurred prior to the effectivity
of Republic Act No. 7659, the imposable penalty would still be reclusion perpetua. Second, the information was not void, it was merely defective.
A defective information cannot support a judgment of conviction unless the defect was cured by evidence during the trial and no objection
appears to have been raised. In this case, complainant, at the time the first sexual abuse occurred, was only nine years old, a fact not objected
to by the defense. Third, the failure to state the age of the complainant in the information cannot be considered as a violation of the right of
the accused to be informed of the charge against him. After all, it would be illogical not to assume that when accused ravished the complainant,
he was aware that his victim was a mere slip of a girl, unsophisticated and defenseless. Moreover, aside from being his niece, the complainant
lived with him under the same roof. Furthermore, there was substantial compliance with the constitutional mandate that an accused be informed
of the nature of the charge against him when the Order issued by the investigating judge clearly stated that the complainant was nine years
old. Consequently, the defense cannot invoke the element of surprise as to deprive it of the opportunity to suitably prepare for the accused's
defense.
2. ID.; RAPE; GUIDING PRINCIPLES IN DECIDING CASE THEREOF. The following are the principles in deciding crimes of rape: that the
accusation for rape can be made facilely, it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused to disprove; the evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
Corollarily, when the victim says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been committed, and if
her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof. Therefore, it is necessary that for evidence to
be believed, it must not only proceed from a credible witness, but must be credible in itself, such as the common experience and observation
of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. CDESIA
3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; WITNESSES; CREDIBILITY; NOT AFFECTED BY DELAY IN REPORTING THE CRIME. Accused harps on the
fact that it took the complainant more than five (5) years to report the crime. The delay can easily be explained by the fact that from the first
to the last offense, the victim was still a minor living in the house of the accused and dependent on him for shelter and sustenance. To aggravate
the situation, accused threatened the complainant with death. Under such circumstances, a young girl is easily intimidated and would rather
keep quiet than risk physical harm and humiliation. Also, the accused was the uncle of the complainant He was at least 40 years old when the
first assault was committed and must have exercised moral ascendancy, not to mention physical superiority, over the complainant.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT AFFECTED BY FAILURE TO REMEMBER DATES OF THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE. Failure of the
complainant to remember the specific dates of defilements is immaterial. We have held that victims of rape hardly retain in their memories the
dates, number of times and manner they were violated. Suffice it to say, the date of the commission of the rape is not an essential element of
the crime.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TESTIMONIES OF THE RAPE VICTIM, UPHELD. No young and decent Filipina would publicly admit that she was
ravished and her honor tainted unless the same was true, for it would be instinctive on her part to protect her honor and obtain justice for the
wicked acts committed upon her. Plainly, only a woman seeking justice with truth as her weapon could have braved this calvary. Complainant's
testimony, during the direct and cross examination, was straightforward, clear and convincing. The testimony of rape victims who are young
and immature deserve full credence.
6. ID.; ID.; DENIAL; WEAK DEFENSE THAT CANNOT PREVAIL OVER POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION. The accused could only offer, by way
of defense, a mere denial, without even explaining relevant factors. Denial, as a defense, is inherently weak and is viewed with disfavor by the
courts due to the facility with which it can be concocted. The same cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution
witness.
7. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES; DUPLICITY OF OFFENSES; CURED BY FAILURE TO QUASH COMPLAINT
BEFORE ENTERING A PLEA. Accused also questions the propriety of being charged of ten (10) counts of rape under one information.
Admittedly, Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that an information must only charge one offense, except only in those cases
in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses. However; under Sections 1 and 3(e) of Rule 117, the accused, before
entering his plea, should have moved to quash the complaint for being duplicitous. Otherwise, he is deemed to have waived the defect. Hence,
the Court could convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each and every one of them.
8. CRIMINAL LAW; RAPE; PROPER PENALTY AND CIVIL INDEMNITY IN CASE AT BAR. Since the offenses were committed prior to the
effectivity of RA 7659, the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed. Thus, the trial court correctly sentenced the accused to reclusion
perpetua for each count of rape. Furthermore, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for each count of rape was in line with prevailing jurisprudence
existing at the time the trial court rendered its judgment. Accordingly, the civil indemnity to be awarded to the complainant is P50,000.00 for
each count of rape, or a total of P500,000.00. Also, moral damages may now be awarded to the victim without the need for proving the same
in the pleadings. After all, the anguish and pain that the victim had to endure are so evident that it would be expecting too much for her to
recite in detail her traumatic experience, simply to obtain pecuniary restitution. IHCESD
DECISION
ROMERO, J p:
In an information dated December 23, 1993, 1 accused was charged with multiple rape allegedly committed as follows: cda
"The undersigned 1st Asst. Provincial Prosecutor, accused CARLOS VILLAMOR, of Marintoc, Mobo, Masbate, of the crime of Multiple Rape,
committed as follows:
That sometime in the month of September, 1989 up to October 1993, at Barangay Marintoc, Municipality of Mobo, Province of Masbate,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge many times with Efegin Villamor against the latter's will and without her consent.
Contrary to law."
Thereafter, with the assistance of counsel, accused entered a plea of "not guilty" during his arraignment and the case proceeded to trial in due
course. On January 5, 1996, Judge Manuel S. Pecson of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Branch 48, rendered judgment convicting the
accused of ten counts of rape. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision is quoted herein: cda
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, CARLOS VILLAMOR is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of ten (10) counts of rape committed
under Article 335, paragraphs 1 and 3 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court hereby imposes upon the accused the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA for each count or a total of ten (10) RECLUSION PERPETUA. In line with the prevailing jurisprudence, and considering the age of the
victim, the depravity of the crime, and the psychological trauma involved, he is ordered to indemnify the complainant the sum of FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) for each count or a total of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) and to support the offspring.
With costs.
SO ORDERED."
The evidence of the prosecution relied heavily on the testimony of the complainant Efegin Villamor, thirteen (13) years of age. According to
her, sometime in September 1989, while she was at home sleeping in the bedroom, she was awakened by the movements inside the room and
was surprised to see in front of her the accused, her own uncle, with a bolo in his hand. Immediately, the accused removed the complainant's
underwear. However, the complainant resisted his advances, as a result of which she was punched and strangled until she lost consciousness.
2 Upon regaining consciousness soon after, she saw to her dismay the accused still on top of her in the process of consummating his bestial
desire. 3 After satisfying his lust, accused threatened the complainant not to report the incident to anyone. 4
Complainant's harrowing experience continued for four (4) more years or until October 30, 1993, when the accused again sexually assaulted
the complainant. At this point, complainant could no longer take such deprivations that sometime in November 1993, she related her experience
to a certain Donna Thelma Bongais. 5 Thereafter, Bongais reported the matter to Nilda Medina of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD) in Masbate. The DSWD, in turn, took custody of the complainant.
The complainant was immediately examined by Dra. Florenda D. Almero, provincial health officer of Masbate, who issued a report entitled
"Physical and Medical Examination" which shows the following:
"EXTERNAL FINDINGS:
Breast developed
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
resistance dctai
In addition, the complainant also revealed that she was abused at least ten (10) times from September 1989 to October 1993. 6 As a result of
these abuses, she became pregnant and gave birth on July 2, 1994. 7
The accused, on the other hand, claims that the charge against him was a fabrication by the complainant due to her hostility against him and
upon the inducement of Donna Thelma Bongais. Accused testified that private complainant, at an early age, was already involved with his son
Danilo, as evidenced by the two letters he discovered in his son's wallet. 8 Upon learning of their relationship, he confronted the complainant
and manifested his objections. Moreover, on two (2) occasions, he allegedly caught the complainant and his son having carnal knowledge. 9
These incidents, according to the accused, aroused the anger of the complainant, precipitating her charges against him alleging rape. The
testimony of the accused was corroborated by his wife, Romana, who narrated that she knew the relationship of Danilo and the complainant.
10
Meanwhile, to establish the basis for Bongais' inducement, accused testified that he had a quarrel with the former's brother due to a
misunderstanding concerning an ice box. 11
In resolving the case, the trial court accorded full faith and credence to the testimony of the complainant regarding how she was sexually
molested by the accused. Finding her testimony clear, straightforward and convincing, it dismissed the claim of the accused that the charge
against him was merely a fabrication by both the complainant and Bongais. Thus, the trial court convicted the accused of ten (10) counts of the
crime of rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of ten reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the complainant the sum of P500,000.00 and to
support the offspring. cdasia
Obviously, unable to accept his fate, accused appeals before us raising the sole issue that:
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF TEN (10) COUNTS OF RAPE." 12
Before resolving the substantive issue of this appeal, it is worth noting that the information filed against the accused failed to state the age of
the complainant, considering that the accused was convicted of statutory rape.
This defect notwithstanding, we rule that the trial court did not err in convicting the accused of statutory rape. First, the crime having occurred
prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659, otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law, whether the offense was committed under paragraph
1 using force or intimidation or paragraph 3 statutory rape of Article 335, the imposable penalty would still be the same reclusion
perpetua. Second, the information filed was not void, it was merely defective. In this regard, the general rule is that a defective information
cannot support a judgment of conviction unless the defect was cured by evidence during the trial and no objection appears to have been raised.
13 In this case, complainant Efegin Villamor testified that at the time the first sexual abuse occurred, she was only nine years old, 14 a fact
which was not objected to by the defense. Third, the failure to state the age of the complainant in the information cannot be considered as a
violation of the right of the accused to be informed of the charge against him. After all, it would be illogical not to assume that when accused
ravished the complainant, he was aware that his victim was a mere slip of a girl, unsophisticated and defenseless.
Moreover, aside from being his niece, the complainant lived with him under the same roof. Furthermore, even if the information filed did not
allege that the complainant was nine years old, there was substantial compliance with the constitutional mandate that an accused be informed
of the nature of the charge against him when the Order issued by the investigating judge, a copy of which was attached in the record of the
preliminary investigation, clearly stated that the complainant was nine years old. 15 Consequently, the defense cannot invoke the element of
surprise as to deprive it of the opportunity to suitably prepare for the accused's defense. 16
With respect to the substantive aspect of this case, established by a growing body of jurisprudence are the following principles in deciding
crimes of rape: that the accusation for rape can be made facilely; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused to disprove;
the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence
for the defense. 17 Corollarily, when the victim says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has
been committed, and if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof. 18 Therefore, it is
necessary that for evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from a credible witness, but must be credible in itself, such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. 19 These doctrines are material and pertinent in
resolving instant appeal. prcd
In the instant petition, accused harps on the fact that it took the complainant more than five (5) years to report the crime. 20 The delay can
easily be explained by the fact that from the first to the last offense in October 1993, the victim was still a minor living in the house of the
accused and dependent on him for shelter and sustenance. To aggravate the situation, accused threatened the complainant with death. Under
such circumstances, a young girl is easily intimidated and would rather keep quiet than risk physical harm and humiliation.
In a plethora of cases, we have ruled that "it is not uncommon for a young girl of tender age to be intimidated into silence by the mildest threat
against her life." 21 Also, the accused was the uncle of the complainant, her father being the brother of the accused. 22 He was at least 40
years old when the first assault was committed and obviously, he must have exercised moral ascendancy, not to mention physical superiority,
over the complainant, a nine-year old ingenue. In addition, the accused stresses the failure of the complainant to remember the specific dates
of the ten (10) other defilements. This is immaterial. We have held that victims of rape hardly retain in their memories the dates, number of
times and manner they were violated. 23 Suffice it to say, the date of the commission of the rape is not an essential element of the crime. 24
It is highly inconceivable that the complainant would accuse appellant of rape just because he allegedly castigated her over her lovelife. No
young and decent Filipina would publicly admit that she was ravished and her honor tainted unless the same was true, for it would be instinctive
on her part to protect her honor and obtain justice for the wicked acts committed upon her. 25 Plainly, only a woman seeking justice with truth
as her weapon could have braved this calvary. 26 In the same light, it stretches the imagination to assert that Bongais urged the complainant
to concoct the charge of rape against the accused on the flimsy ground of a misunderstanding between her brother and the accused over a
trifle dispute involving an ice bucket. LLphil
In like manner, we cannot accept the theory that it was Danilo, the son of the accused, who had intercourse with the complainant. The records
show that the private complainant vehemently denied this allegation. Her testimony, during the direct and cross examination was
straightforward, clear and convincing. 27 Besides, we find it unbelievable that the complainant and Danilo would even have a sexual relationship,
considering that both were less than fourteen (14) years old when the alleged liaison started in 1992. On this score, it has been stressed often
enough that the testimony of rape victims who are young and immature deserve full credence. 28
Accused, in an effort to destroy the credibility of the complainant, contends that the fact that she cannot even remember the exact month and
date of her brother's death casts a serious doubt on the veracity and reliability of her testimony, especially regarding important matters. 29
This alleged "lapse of memory" of the complainant is too inconsequential to merit a discourse on the matter. The complainant cannot be faulted
for her inability to remember the exact date, for after all, her brother died when she was only nine years old.
Finally, accused also questions the propriety of being charged of ten (10) counts of rape under one information. 30 Admittedly, Section 13, Rule
110 of the Rules of Court provides that an information must only charge one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe
a single punishment for various offenses. However, under Sections 1 and 3(e) of Rule 117, the accused, before entering his plea, should have
moved to quash the complaint for being duplicitous. Otherwise, he is deemed to have waived the defect. 31 Hence, the Court could convict him
of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each and every one of them. 32
After going over the complainant's testimony in its entirety, we are convinced about the culpability of the accused for the other nine (9) counts
of rape. The accused could only offer, by way of defense, a mere denial, without even explaining or elucidating relevant factors. 33 Time and
again, we have ruled that denial, as a defense, is inherently weak and is viewed with disfavor by the courts due to the facility with which it can
be concocted. 34 The same cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witness. 35
As regards the penalty imposed and damages awarded by the trial court, it must be pointed out that under Republic Act No. 7659, 36 which
amended Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, the relationship of uncle and niece in rape makes the imposition of the death penalty mandatory.
37
However, since the offenses were committed prior to the effectivity of the aforementioned law, then the original penalty which is reclusion
perpetua, a single indivisible penalty, should be imposed. Thus, the trial court correctly sentenced the accused to reclusion perpetua for each
count of rape. 38
In addition, since there was a total of ten separate counts of rape in the instant case, the trial court imposed P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for
each, or a total of P500,000.00. Evidently, the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity was in line with prevailing jurisprudence existing at the
time the trial court rendered its judgment. Accordingly, the civil indemnity to be awarded to the complainant should be P50,000.00 for each
count of rape, or a total of P500,000 00. cdtai
In addition to the civil indemnity, in crimes of rape, moral damages may now be awarded to the victim without the need for proving the same
in the pleadings. 39 After all, the anguish and pain that the victim had to endure are so evident that it would be expecting too much for her to
recite in detail her traumatic experience, simply to obtain pecuniary restitution. We need not belabor the fact that a rape victim is a victim many
times over. She is physically, socially, psychologically and emotionally scarred resulting in trauma which may last a lifetime. Simply put, "rape
stigmatizes the victim worse than the perpetrators, as our culture puts premium into purity and virginity as virtues. 40
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Branch 48, in Criminal Case No. 7224 is hereby
AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that accused Carlos Villamor is ordered to pay the offended party, Efegin Villamor, the additional amount
of P100,000.00 as moral damages, or a total of P600,000.00, with costs.
SO ORDERED.
The lower court acquitted the accused of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide. The respondents filed their notice of appeal
on the civil aspect of the lower courts judgment. Even if the accused was acquitted from his criminal liability, the Appellate Court held him
civilly liable and ordered him to indemnify the aggrieved party for the death of Nicolas.
HELD:
The acquittal was based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. Article 29 of the Civil Code provides that a civil liability is not
extinguished in criminal cases. Therefore, the accused cannot be exempted from paying civil damages which may only be proven by
preponderance of evidence.
Manantan claimed that he was placed on double jeopardy but the courts did not give merit to this contention. The following elements must be
present for double jeopardy to exist: (1) A first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) The first jeopardy must have
terminated; and (3) the third jeopardy must be for the same offense as the first.
In the case at bar, the initially put into jeopardy but he it was terminated by his discharge. When the case was elevated to the Court of
Appeals, the issue was about the civil aspect of the criminal case. Thus, there could be no double jeopardy.
SUMMARY: The petitioners in this case are the governor, vice-governor, members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, and provincial
administrator of Oriental Mindoro. They were charged with the violation of Section 3 (e) in relation to Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 3019,
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. It was alleged that the said public official entered into a contract of loan granting Engr. Atienza a
loan of 2.5M to the injury of the province. During the pendency of the criminal case, the administrative case against them was dismissed due
to their reelection. The petitioners filed a motion to quash with the Sandiganbayan alleging that the crim case should likewise be dismissed on
account of the dismissal of the admin case. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion so they filed a certiorari case with the SC. The SC ruled
that the dismissal of the motion to quash was proper. The SC further ruled that the dismissal of the admin case does not automatically
warrant the dismissal of the crim case because they have different purposes.
DOCTRINE:
The re-election of a public official extinguishes only the administrative, but not the criminal, liability incurred by him during his
previous term of office
The ruling, therefore, that when the people have elected a man to his office it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge
of his life and character and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct if he had been guilty of any refers only to an action
for removal from office and does not apply to a criminal case, because a crime is a public wrong more atrocious in character than mere
misfeasance or malfeasance committed by a public officer in the discharge of his duties, and is injurious not only to a person or group of
persons but to the State as a whole. This must be the reason why Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, which enumerates the grounds for
extinction of criminal liability, does not include reelection to office as one of them, at least insofar as a public officer is concerned. Also, under
the Constitution, it is only the President who may grant the pardon of a criminal offense
FACTS:
Petitioners + 4 others (Emmanuel Buenaventura, Cesareo Cueto, Violeta Dakis and Dante Manao) were public officials of Oriental Mindoro,
with Rodolfo Valencia and Pedrito Reyes as the Governor and Vice-Governor, others were members of Sangguniang Panlalawigan. They were
charged with violation of Sec.3(e) in relation to Sec.3(g) of RA3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Information provides that
they were:
o public officials of the provincial government of Oriental Mindoro, while in the performance of their official and/or administrative
functions, and acting in evident bad faith and manifest partiality, conspiring and confederating with private accused Engr. Alfredo M. Atienza,
and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally give said accused Alfredo M. Atienza unwarranted
benefit, privilege and advantage by entering into a grossly disadvantageous contract of loan, whereby the provincial funds of Oriental Mindoro
in the sum of P2.5M was given to Alfredo M. Atienza to finance the cost of repair, operation and maintenance of his vessel, thereby causing
the provincial government of Oriental Mindoro damage and undue injury
Petitioners filed a "Motion for Reinvestigation and Valencia filed a "Motion to Quash". Sandiganbayan granted Motion for
Reinvestigation and ordered Ombudsman to conduct a reinvestigation, but the latter recommended for its denial and the dismissal of the case
with respect to the 4 others (thats why only 10 petitioners in this case). Prosecution accordingly filed an Amended Information.
Petitioners Arguments: (1) the administrative case against them, involving the same subject matter as the criminal case, was
dismissed by the Ombudsman after finding that the contract of loan was entered into in pursuance of the police power of the local chief
executive; (2) delay of 3 years in filing of Information.
Invoking the Resolution of Ombudsman, petitioners filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Motion to
Resolve Motion to Quash Information. Sandiganbayan denied, hence, this case via Rule 65.
HELD: # 1:
Under Rule 117 Sec. 3, the grounds on which a complaint or information may be quashed are:
o That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
o That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
o That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;
o That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
o That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
o That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;
o That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
o That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and
o That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.
Save where the Rules expressly permit the investigation of facts alleged in a motion to quash, the general rule is that in the hearing
of such motion only such facts as are alleged in the information, and those admitted by the prosecutor, should be taken into account in the
resolution thereof. Matters of defense cannot be produced during the hearing of such motions, except where the rules expressly permit, such
as extinction of criminal liability, prescription and former jeopardy.
o Otherwise put, facts which constitute the defense of the accused against the charge under the information must be proved by them
during trial. Such facts or circumstances do not constitute proper grounds for a motion to quash the information on the ground that the
material averments do not constitute the offense.
With respect to the inquiry into facts outside the information
o As a general proposition, a motion to quash on the ground that the allegations of the information do not constitute the offense
charged, or any offense for that matter, should be resolved on the basis alone of said allegations whose truth and veracity are hypothetically
admitted.
o The informations need only state the ultimate facts; the reasons therefor could be proved during the trial. The fundamental test in
reflecting on the viability of a motion to quash under this particular ground is whether or not the facts asseverated, if hypothetically admitted,
would establish the essential elements of the crime defined in the law. In this examination, matters aliunde are not considered. However,
inquiry into facts outside the information may be allowed where the prosecution does not object to the presentation thereof.
In the case at bar:
o A careful scrutiny of the Information shows that all the elements of Sec.3 (e) and (g) are present. So it could not fall under Rule 117
Sec. 3 (a).
o As regards the dismissal of administrative case
SC said that the dismissal of the administrative case does not affect the criminal case on the following grounds:
The basis of administrative liability differs from criminal liability. The purpose of administrative proceedings is mainly to protect the
public service, based on the time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust. On the other hand, the purpose of the criminal
prosecution is the punishment of crime.
The Resolution of Ombudsman was not even offered and admitted as evidence by the Sandiganbayan. It was merely attached to
petitioners "Supplemental Pleading in Support of Motion to Quash Information."
Furthermore, the Resolution does not bear the approval of the Ombudsman. In any event, the Ombudsman subsequently denied
petitioners motion for reinvestigation.
SC then cited the conflicting findings of Ombudsman and ruled that SC is not a trier of facts, Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction on the
matter.
Also, SC discussed the rule that a re-elected local official may not be held administratively accountable for misconduct committed
during his prior term of office, but this applies only to an administrative case, NOT to a criminal case. There is, thus, no reason for the
Sandiganbayan to quash the Information against petitioners on the basis solely of the dismissal of the administrative complaint against them.
o Rationale of the rule that a reelected local official may not be held administratively accountable for misconduct committed during his
prior term of office: when the electorate put him back into office, it is presumed that it did so with full knowledge of his life and character,
including his past misconduct. If, armed with such knowledge, it still reelects him, then such reelection is considered a condonation of his past
misdeeds.
o The ruling, therefore, that when the people have elected a man to his office it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge
of his life and character and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct if he had been guilty of any refers only to an action
for removal from office and does not apply to a criminal case, because a crime is a public wrong more atrocious in character than mere
misfeasance or malfeasance committed by a public officer in the discharge of his duties, and is injurious not only to a person or group of
persons but to the State as a whole. This must be the reason why Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, which enumerates the grounds for
extinction of criminal liability, does not include reelection to office as one of them, at least insofar as a public officer is concerned. Also, under
the Constitution, it is only the President who may grant the pardon of a criminal offense
o As regards the delay of 3 years citing Tatad v. Sandiganbayan
The Special Prosecutor was able to sufficiently explain the chronology of events. Also, during the preliminary investigation itself,
petitioners sought extensions of time before they filed their counter-affidavits. Thus, the ruling in Tatad does not apply here. In that case, the
delay was exacerbated by the fact that the charges against petitioner were found to be politically motivated. In the case at bar, there is no
indication that the complaint against petitioners was filed to serve political ends. Neither is the delay vexatious, capricious or oppressive.
Disposition: petition dismissed.
Marcopper was charged with violation of 3 special laws and reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property.
It is the contention of marcopper that the violations of the special laws are absorbed in reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property.
ISSUE: Whether or not crimes mala inse are absorbed in crimes mala prohibita.
HELD: No. crimes mala inse are not absorbed in crimes mala prohibita.
1. AS TO PERFORMANCE
2. AS TO EXECUTION
3. AS TO GOOD FAITH
4. AS TO VIOLATION
5. AS TO INTENT
MI-intent is material
6. AS TO MORAL
7. AS TO CIRCUMSTANCES
The RTC and the CA also denied the petition. The CA held that petitioner failed to appeal within the 15-day reglementary period under Rule 41
of the Revised Rules of Court. Petitioner should have filed an appeal, instead of a special civil action for certiorari.
The SC found that the lower courts did not commit any grave abuse of discretion. The facial examination of the information shows that the
document is valid.
The SC also concurred with the CA that the remedy for petitioner was to file an appeal.