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Meaning and Mind from the Perspective of

Dualist versus Relational Worldviews:
Implications for the Development of Pointing
Gestures

Article in Human Development January 2013

DOI: 10.1159/000357235

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 Original Paper

Human Development 2013;56:381400

DOI: 10.1159/000357235

Meaning and Mind from the Perspective of Dualist

versus Relational Worldviews: Implications for the
Development of Pointing Gestures
Jeremy I.M. Carpendale Sherrie Atwood Viktoria Kettner
Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, B.C., Canada

Key Words
Gestures Infancy Meaning Pointing Social development Worldviews

Abstract
Worldviews consist of preconceptions about the nature of mind, knowledge, and
meaning, and these assumptions influence theorizing about human development and
the interpretation of research. We outline two contrasting worldviews dualist versus
relational and explicate the implications of such preconceptions for studying the de-
velopment of pointing gestures. Pointing is a pivotal social skill that is an aspect of social
understanding, as well as a foundational form of interaction for language. In studying
the development of pointing it is possible to observe how infants develop the social
skills required to convey meaning in human ways. Thus, this is an area in which to exam-
ine the nature and development of meaning, and an adequate conception of meaning
is necessary for theories of language and cognition. We argue that dualist approaches
have problems that can be avoided by adopting a relational worldview and the rela-
tional developmental systems framework that follows from it, which we suggest is a
fruitful approach to theorizing about human development. 2014 S. Karger AG, Basel

Where we start from matters. The preconceptions on which theories of human

development are based have far-reaching, and often overlooked, consequences. These
assumptions set up problems, constrain possible solutions, and structure theories, as
well as influence methodology. Rather than explicit assumptions, they are interre-
lated sets of presuppositions that constitute worldviews ways of thinking that are
not generally considered open to questioning. Worldviews are frameworks of precon-

2014 S. Karger AG, Basel Jeremy I.M. Carpendale

0018716X/14/05660381$39.50/0 Department of Psychology, Simon Fraser University
E-Mail karger@karger.com 8888 University Drive
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www.karger.com/hde Burnaby, BC V5A 1S6 (Canada)

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ceptions that guide inquiry in human development and have implications for concep-
tions of knowledge, understanding, mind, meaning, and language [e.g., Jopling, 1993;
Overton, 2010, 2013].
We trace the implications of adopting two contrasting worldviews for theorizing
about human development by using research on the development of pointing ges-
tures as an example. Pointing is an important test case because it involves the devel-
opment of triadic interaction in which infants learn to coordinate the attention of self
and others with aspects of the world. It is an early example of social understanding as
well as communicative development, emerging around infants first birthday. Al-
though pointing has been described as the simplest social action [Colle, Becchio, &
Bara, 2008, p. 337], once mastered, it is a foundational form of interaction on which
language is based because it involves conveying meaning in a human way. That is, it
involves being aware of the meaning ones action has for others (i.e., anticipating how
others will react to ones action), which does not seem to be required in many other
animal communication systems [e.g., Mead, 1934]. Therefore, in studying the devel-
opment of pointing it should be possible to observe the emergence of the form of
meaning on which human languages are based. It is important to have an adequate
account of meaning to understand language and human thinking because such think-
ing is about the world, and thus is based on a system of meaning. Pointing with the
index finger is widespread, although not universal in adults across cultures [Wilkins,
2003]. However, some way to direct attention seems to be required in human forms
of life and it is possible that pointing may develop in infancy and then be suppressed
in cultures and situations where it is considered rude. Even though typically develop-
ing children regularly learn to point, this process is still controversial. This, we sug-
gest, may be partially due to the role of worldviews in conceptualizing social and com-
municative development, as well as in studying such development.
Theories of pointing and the interpretation of research in this area reveal the
framework of assumptions concerning meaning and mind on which they are based.
These worldviews are not based on empirical research. Instead, preconceptions
structure the questions and interpretation of research, and they cannot be simply
discounted through research because results are interpreted through such a frame-
work [Lakatos, 1970; Overton, 2013]. However, these worldviews can still be evalu-
ated in terms of their coherence and the validity of the assumptions on which they
are based.
We begin by introducing the dualist worldview, and then, in the second section,
we trace the implications these preconceptions have for thinking about early infant
communication and pointing gestures in particular. We describe positions but do not
attempt to definitively characterize individual researchers because some researchers
appear to adopt elements of different worldviews. We suggest that this results in con-
tradictions rather than a coherent position, because we believe that these positions are,
in fact, incompatible. In the third section, we discuss criticism of dualist approaches
to the development of pointing gestures. As an alternative to dualism, in the fourth
section, we outline a relational worldview and the relational developmental systems
framework [Lerner & Benson, 2013; Overton, 2013] following from it, which avoids
the problems present in dualism, and, we believe, should be more fully integrated into
theorizing about human development. These approaches have a long history [e.g.,
Baldwin, 1906; Mead, 1934; Piaget, 1936/1963], and there is increasing recent interest
in this sort of approach [e.g., Barrett, 2011; Carpendale & Lewis, in press; De Jagher,

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Di Palolo, & Gallagher, 2010; Hutto & Myin, 2013]. Then, in the fifth section, we out-
line a way of applying this way of thinking to account for the development of gestures
such as pointing. Finally, in the sixth section, we consider the implications of these two
worldviews for methodological approaches to early communicative development.

The Dualist Worldview

The dualist worldview starts from the assumption of the individual mind as giv-
en and knowledge as representational. The family of approaches sharing these pre-
conceptions is variously referred to as intellectualism, individualism, cognitivism,
mentalism, or Cartesian-split-mechanistic approaches. The term split captures the
idea of two pre-existing entities, such as nature and nurture or mind and body, which
interact [Overton, 2006, 2010, 2013]. This is a common worldview for theorizing
about human development and it starts from the individual mind taken as given and
thus not explained [Jopling, 1993]. Minds are assumed to be private and inaccessible
to others, and mental states are separate from, and underlie and cause behavior. It
might be thought that such Cartesian views have been left behind in the dust of mod-
ern brain research. It might appear that neuroscience has resolved this dualism by
putting everything in the brain, but these dualist assumptions are so deeply rooted
that they still affect theorizing. The old view of mental states as causing behavior is
still there: mind/body dualism has been replaced by brain/body dualism, immate-
rial substance by grey glutinous matter, and the large part of the general structure of
the Cartesian picture survives intact [Hacker, 1997, pp. 1617].
The dualist assumption of splitting mind from body is based on deep-seated,
long-held intuitions. This view can be traced back to the preconceptions on which
theories are based [Jopling, 1993; Overton, 2006, 2010]. The assumed split between
mind and body has a long history [Ryle, 1949]. Hacker [1997] suggests that,
The thought that a human being is a composite creature consisting of body and soul (or
mind, or spirit) is an ancient one. It is bound up with our fear of death, with the craving for
an afterlife in a happier world, with our grief at the death of our loved ones and our longing
to be reunited with them. This conception, in different forms, was articulated in the re-
ligious and philosophical thought of antiquity and the Middle Ages. It was given its most
powerful philosophical expression in our era by Descartes. According to Descartes, a human
being is composed of two distinct substances, the mind and the body. In volition, the will
brings about motions of the limbs. What passes in ones own mind is immediately accessible
to oneself by consciousness one is invariably conscious of, and knows indubitably, what
one is thinking, feeling or wanting. The minds of others are only indirectly knowable, by
inferences from what they do and say. (pp. 1415)
To illustrate this view of the mind, Mead [1934] used the metaphor of prisoners
trapped in their individual cells attempting to figure out a way to communicate with
each other. That is, when the individual mind is assumed to be present from the be-
ginning, the problem individuals face is how to communicate with others. The long
history of this view of the mind as the starting point can be seen in Saint Augustines
Confessions in his description of himself as an infant attempting to communicate with
others. He wrote that:
Gradually I became aware of my surroundings, and wished to express my demands to those
who could comply with them; but I could not, since the demands were inside me, and out-

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 side were their fulfillers, who had no faculty for entering my mind. So I worked my limbs
and voice energetically, trying to signal out something like my demands to the best of my
little (and little availing) ability. [Wills, 2001, p. 39]
Augustine would not have been able to remember his infancy. Thus his descrip-
tion is based on observing infants and it is a reflection of his conception of the mind
as always there, as the infants beginning point. This view of the mind is not an em-
pirical finding; it is a preconception that precedes empirical work. However, once that
beginning assumption is built into a theory its implications are far reaching.
Based on these preconceptions the mind is private and inaccessible to others,
and mental states are separate from and cause behavior the problem children are
assumed to face in learning about the social world is figuring out other minds when
all that they can see are bodies. This is known as the problem of other minds. That
is, faced only with other bodies, infants must determine whether these bodies also
have minds, and they must learn how to communicate with other people [Overgaard,
2006]. It follows from this that it is possible to understand others either at the behav-
ioral level or the mental level.

Implications for Conceptualizing Pointing from a Dualist Perspective

Implications for theorizing about human development based on the dualist

worldview can be seen in the case of research on early communicative skills such as
pointing. The view of the mind that follows from this worldview is cognitivism or
mentalism. According to this mentalistic position, various skills involving coordinat-
ing attention with others, such as the use of pointing gestures, are made possible by
infants understanding of others as intentional agents. Beginning with the individual
mind means that communication must depend on skills in reading others inten-
tions as well as the motivation to do so. Communication is conceptualized as requir-
ing understanding others intentions, attention, and mental states [Tomasello, Car-
penter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005]. That is, infants understand others as persons on
a mental level, with attention that can be directed, and this insight makes gestures
such as pointing possible [Tomasello, 1995, 1999, 2008]. For example, Tomasello,
Carpenter, and Liszkowski [2007] defend a rich interpretation of prelinguistic com-
munication, that is, one that posits that when young infants point for an adult they
are in some sense trying to influence her intentional/mental states (p. 706). Toma-
sello et al. [2007] go on to claim that, infants thus comprehend and produce their
pointing gestures basically from their first points at around 12 months of age in
surprisingly adult-like ways 1 (p. 715).
The preconceptions about mind on which this dualist worldview is based mean
that infants face the problem of other minds. The possible solutions to understanding
other private minds are to assume that infants: (a) make inferences about other minds
[e.g., Gopnik & Wellman, 2012]; (b) have innate knowledge in the form of a compu-
tational system [e.g., Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005] or innate theory [Gopnik & Well-
man, 2012], or (c) introspect on their own mind and reason by analogy about others.

1 Although they do qualify this strong claim by acknowledging that such understanding is still ru-

dimentary, it is not clear how to understand these contrasting claims.

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These theories (i.e., theory theory, innate modules, and simulation theory) are frame-
work theories in the sense that they are situated between worldviews and particular
theories. All three of these theoretical approaches are based on the same worldview,
dualism, because they are all solutions to the problem of other minds. Although par-
ticular instances of such theories may be disproven, the core assumptions of the theory
theory and the others cannot be disproven based on evidence, and the approaches can
be, and have been, modified while retaining the core assumptions [Lakatos, 1970].
It is the potential solution of simulation that has influenced recent research on
pointing. From this perspective, a possible solution to understanding other people is
for infants to draw on their own inner experience in order to understand others. To-
masello et al. [2005] propose such a solution by stating that, infants begin to under-
stand particular kinds of intentional and mental states in others only after they have
experienced them first in their own activity and then used their own experience to
simulate that of others (p. 688). Extending their own experience to others by anal-
ogy requires viewing others as like themselves. To solve this problem Tomasello
[1995, 1999] initially relied on Meltzoffs argument that neonatal imitation demon-
strates infants innate view of others as like themselves [for a review and critique of
this debate, see Carpendale & Lewis, 2006]. More recently, however, Tomasello and
his colleagues have reconsidered this position because neonatal imitation has been
observed in neonatal chimpanzees. Tomasello et al. [2005]
speculate at this point that more deeply psychological levels of identification with others of
a kind sufficient to enable individuals to simulate the intentional and mental states of others
on analogy with their own depend crucially on the skills and motivations for interperson-
al and emotional dyadic sharing characteristic of human infants and their caregivers. (p. 689)
The view of the mind assumed, with a split between mental states that underlie and
cause behavior, means that other people can be understood either at the level of the
surface behavior or at the deeper level of the underlying mental states. Tomasello
et al. [2007] claim that 12-month-old infants understand others at the deeper men-
tal level, not merely in terms of others surface behavior. They assert that when point-
ing first emerges in human infants at around the first birthday, before the emergence
of language, it already possesses these foundational components of mature pointing
and that infants pointing is at a mental level involving an understanding of the inten-
tions, attention, and knowledge of their partner [Tomasello et al., 2007, p. 720].
There are criticisms of this approach from a tradition of developmental theoriz-
ing [e.g., Mead, 1934; Piaget, 1936/1963; Scheler, 1913/1954] as well as more recent
work [e.g., Carpendale & Lewis, 2004, 2006, 2010, in press; De Jaegher et al., 2010;
Zahavi, 2008].

Criticism of the Dualist Approach to Pointing

A simulation position may appear to make sense intuitively because as adults it

is possible to understand others in this way through reflecting on ones own experi-
ence and reasoning through analogy about others. However, even though adults may
be able to simulate, this still does not mean that this indirect and cumbersome process
is the primary way of encountering others in everyday interaction [e.g., Aboulafia,
2011; Zahavi, 2008]. In fact, adults only occasionally resort to this way of thinking

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when easy, everyday interaction breaks down. Adults, having mastered a language,
can have the experience of being able to introspect in the sense of imagining possi-
bilities and considering how they would feel in such situations. That is, adults can
conceptualize their experience in psychological terms. It is a step that goes unnoticed
to impose this view of the mind on infants. If the adult ability to simulate is an out-
come of development it cannot be the cause of social development. This would be
putting the cart before the horse.
The idea of simulation has been extensively debated and criticized for some time
[e.g., Aboulafia, 2011; Carpendale & Lewis, 2004, 2006, 2010, in press; Mller &
Carpendale, 2004; Scheler, 1913/1954; Zahavi, 2008]. The argument from analogy
that we see others as similar to us and thus we can understand others in terms of our
own experience has been criticized by Scheler [1913/1954] because it already pre-
supposes what it is meant to explain. That is, in order to see reactions from others as
expressive of emotions and thus as similar to her own experience, the child must al-
ready take these actions as expressive of emotions rather than as mere physical move-
ments. In order for the argument from analogy to work, children would already have
to assume that others have minds like themselves [Zahavi, 2008].
The simulation approach of Tomasello et al. [2005], according to which infants use
their own experience to simulate that of others (p. 688), depends on a form of experi-
ence that is too sophisticated for infants of 912 months of age. The position is prob-
lematic because two meanings of experience are conflated. Infants are, clearly, embed-
ded in immediate experience, but this is not available for understanding others. Instead
it is experience in the adult reflective sense that could potentially be applied to under-
standing others [Baldwin, 1906, p. 138]. Tomasellos argument requires that infants
have experience in this second and more complex sense in order to apply this analogi-
cally to others. This meaning of experience is conflated with experience from an ob-
servers perspective in which an observer can say that an organism experiences some-
thing, but young infants cannot be assumed to have reflective awareness. Without re-
flective awareness such experience cannot be used in reasoning analogically about
others. For example, infants begin acting intentionally around 9 months when they
perform an action to achieve a separate outcome [e.g., Piaget, 1936/1963]. That is, they
begin to have goals that are separate from the means to accomplish them. This does not
mean, however, that young infants have an understanding of their own intentional ac-
tion and attention that can be applied to others in order to understand others actions.
Yet this is what is required for the argument of Tomasello et al. Adults can reflect on
their own experience and posit that others might have similar experiences, but this only
occurs once they have learned a language and can reflect on their own experience.
The simulation position endorsed by Tomasello et al. [2005] is based on attribut-
ing an adult level of understanding, which depends on language, to infants before they
can talk. It seems to require that infants can reflect on their own experience through
some process that must be like introspection. If so, this position requires assumptions
that are undermined by Wittgensteins [1953/2009] private language argument [see
also Mead, 1934; Ryle, 1949]. What Wittgenstein meant by a private language is one
that could not be taught to others because the meanings of the words are based on
private connections between the words and inner mental entities that are inaccessible
to others. This argument applies against the causal-psychological view of the mind
according to which infants could experience mental states in a way that could be ap-
plied to others.

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 The core of Wittgensteins [1953/2009] private language argument is based on
his argument that meaning cannot be attached to any representation such as an im-
age, word, or utterance because multiple interpretations are always possible [Gold-
berg, 1991]. Wittgenstein shows this by considering a simple language in which a
builder and a helper use the utterance, five slabs. Even in this simple case the utter-
ance could have various meanings such as a command or report or multiple other
possibilities depending on the routines those people have established. This shows that
meaning cannot be based on interpretation. Instead, meaning is based on shared ex-
perience in routine activities [Canfield, 2007]. This general argument about meaning
is extended to the case of sensation words and equally applies to psychological terms
[Chapman, 1987]. That is, children learn words like scared, want, look, and see,
through learning about the relevant social situations. They can then use this language
to reflect on their own experience, but introspection could not be the source of learn-
ing this language.
Infants clearly attend to objects and events of interest, desire certain aspects of
their world, and act to try to achieve their desires. That is, we do not deny mental
states. But such mental states are not separate from the activity and do not cause the
activity. Infants cannot be aware of inner states in an introspective sense. These ac-
tivities, however, are the basis on which language about human activity can be built
[Racine & Carpendale, 2007].
The dualist view of the mind as private and only accessible to the individual is
built into our language, and we are led to it by the grammar of our language. When
it is said that someone has a coin it implies possession of an object. When someone
is said to have a pain or an idea it also implies possession and since this cannot be
possession of an object it must be immaterial, inner, and mental. Whereas possession
of an object is in the physical world, having an idea is conceived of as a separate men-
tal, intangible world. Furthermore, unlike an object such as a coin, a pain or idea must
be possessed by someone. And the nature of this possession must be private. That is,
others could not have access to an individuals pain or ideas [Hacker, 1997].
It follows from this dualist way of thinking about the mind that others could ei-
ther be understood at the level of surface behavior, or at the deeper level of the
mental states that are presumed to cause the behavior. As noted above, Tomasello et
al. [2007] claim that infants pointing at about 12 months of age is at a mental level
involving an understanding of the intentions, attention, and knowledge of their part-
ner (p. 720). Others intentions, attention, and knowledge are all manifest in their
activity. It is this activity that is understood. Once the activity is understood it is not
clear what the mentalistic level of explanation adds. The split between the surface be-
havior and deeper mental levels is based on a preconception regarding the mind, and
research is interpreted in this way, but this is a preconception that is not based on
empirical evidence and it is not clear that there would be any empirical evidence that
would decide this issue.
A further issue that follows from taking a dualist approach is the nature of un-
derstanding. The view of understanding that follows from dualism is cognitivism,
that is, the view that understanding is a sort of cognitive mechanism that pre-exists
and is applied in particular cases [Baker & Hacker, 1984; Heil, 1981]. This view of
understanding can be seen in the notion of shared intentionality, which is now a
much-discussed concept [e.g., Tomasello et al., 2005]. This notion is drawn from phi-
losophers of action where it is also referred to as collective intentionality. There is

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considerable debate in this area, making it difficult to derive a single position [see
Racine, 2011]. Bratman [1992], for example, appears to focus on describing this im-
portant form of human cooperative activity, whereas Searle [2010] appears to take the
goal as explaining this form of activity. Tomasello and colleagues have occasionally
used the concept in a descriptive sense: Shared intentionality, sometimes called we
intentionality, refers to collaborative interactions in which participants share psycho-
logical states with one another [Tomasello & Carpenter, 2007, p. 121]. But they also
take a shift that is natural from a cognitivist perspective from description to explana-
tion in terms of the underlying cognitive mechanisms that make the activity possible,
viewing shared intentionality as an adaptation for participating in collaborative ac-
tivities involving shared intentionality [Tomasello et al., 2005, p. 690], the underly-
ing psychological processes that make these unique forms of cooperation possible
[Tomasello, 2009, p. xiii], or a suite of social-cognitive and social-motivational skills
that may be collectively termed shared intentionality [Tomasello & Carpenter, 2007,
p. 121]. Tomasello et al. [2005] make a critical, and questionable, move from a de-
scription of activity to taking shared intentionality as a cognitive skill that makes it
possible for individuals to engage in such activity a shift from description to expla-
nation that follows from the assumptions of a cognitivist perspective.
This approach results in a paradox. Although it is assumed that the understanding
makes the behavior, such as pointing, possible, there is no way to independently assess
the understanding separate from the behavior. From the perspective of Tomasello and
his colleagues, infants have an understanding that makes pointing possible. But this
understanding is only revealed by whether the infant does indeed point, and it cannot
be assessed independently. Therefore, this is a redescription of the infants action in
terms of a psychological mechanism, and this seems to result in a circular position [Bi-
bok, 2011; Heil, 1981]. That is, when a child can point it is assumed that she has the
understanding that makes this possible. This is not an empirical finding; it is an inter-
pretation of behavior based on a set of preconceptions that are prior to research.
The paradox from the cognitivist perspective is that it appears that infants must
have social cognitive abilities already mastered in order to engage in communication.
This is a version of the paradox articulated by Rousseau in 1755 [Wells, 1987]. That
is, how could language originate if language is already needed in order to establish the
use of words? Condillac had already suggested a way to resolve this apparent paradox
in 1746 [Wells, 1987]. He argued that the first forms of human communication must
have been self-explanatory in the way that the meaning of a threatening posture is
clear [Wells, 1987]. That is, it is based on a natural reaction. This is the way the arms
up gesture presumably develops [Lock, 1978; Service, Lock, & Chandler, 1989; see
also Plooij, 1978]. These are patterns of activity that naturally emerge in typical hu-
man ways of living together such as an infant reaching toward a caregiver and learn-
ing that this results in getting picked up. This alternative explanation is consistent
with the relational worldview that we turn to next.

The Relational Worldview

In contrast to dualism, the relational worldview and the relational developmen-

tal systems framework that follows from it begins from social processes and offers an
explanation for the origin of the mind [e.g., Mead, 1934]. The relational developmen-

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tal systems framework [Lerner & Benson, 2013; Lerner & Overton, 2008; Overton,
2010, 2013] has much in common with Bickhards [e.g., 2008] interactivism, as well
as other approaches such as enactivism [McGann, De Jaegher, & Di Paolo, 2013; Va-
rela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991] and radical enactivism [Hutto & Myin, 2013].2 Re-
lational developmental systems approaches focus attention on relations and interac-
tive emergence rather than on pre-existing levels (e.g., genes and environment, mind
and world, self and other) that then interact [e.g., Hendriks-Jansen, 1996]. At the
biological level, the relational approach overlaps with developmental system theory,
which deals with biological development and the relations between the organism and
the environment [Griffiths & Tabery, 2013; Oyama, Griffiths, & Gray, 2001]. This
attempt to do biology without dichotomies [Oyama et al., 2001, p. 1] means that
complexity does not pre-exist in either level or entity in the dichotomies they reject,
and that instead it is essential to think of interactive emergence of complexity [e.g.,
Gottlieb, 2007; Hendriks-Jansen, 1996].
Interactive emergence is central to constructivism in the context of the develop-
ment of knowledge. That is, a constructivist view of knowledge follows from the re-
lational developmental systems framework. For Piaget, cognitive development ex-
tends biological evolution, and constructivism can apply to understanding cognitive
and social cognitive development. That is, knowledge does not pre-exist in either the
child or the world but instead develops as children learn through their actions on the
world. Children learn what they can do with the world, its interactive potential, and
this applies to human forms of life, the social, emotional, and cultural world in which
children develop. Children learn to anticipate how others react to their actions and
in this way they learn the meaning their actions have for others [Mead, 1934]. From
the perspective of the constructivist and developmental systems approach we take, it
is not possible to clearly separate the multiple biological and social levels because they
mutually interact bidirectionally.
The relational developmental systems framework provides an alternative ap-
proach to theorizing about human development that avoids the problems associated
with dualism because it does not start with the assumption of a split between mind and
body. For Mead, Piaget, and Wittgenstein there is no split to start with. To be clear, we
are not denying mental states, but rather a conception of them as underlying and caus-
ing behavior, as assumed in the cognitivist approach [e.g., Wittgenstein, 1953/2009].
The starting point is activity, and mental states and observable behavior are both as-
pects of activity [Mead, 1934]. In contrast to the dualist assumption that the mind
makes communication possible, from the constructivist perspective it is communica-
tion that makes the mind possible, and mind is explained as emerging within human
social relations. That is, Mead did not begin with the mind as assumed but instead

2 Chapman [1991] argued that theories of self-organization are a way to approach development that

draws on aspects of Peppers [1942] organismic, contextualist, and mechanist worldviews, because these
theories attempt to reconcile the apparent contradiction between the Second Law of Thermodynamics
and the principles of biological growth and evolution. Chapman further argued that Piagets theory could
be considered an incipient theory of self-organization. In considering root metaphors for such ap-
proaches Chapman [1991] noted that a system seems the obvious choice, but systems can be static because
they lack a temporal dimension; therefore, it is necessary to refer to developmental systems or dynamic
systems. Instead, he suggested that the metaphor of process based on Whitehead includes a temporal di-
mension as an intrinsic characteristic. The notion of process is also present in Bickhard [2008] and Over-
tons [2010] contrast between substance versus process approaches.

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explained the development of the mind beginning from the social process. Children
develop forms of communication of increasing complexity within this social process.
Communication and then language emerge from social activity, and mind and the
ability to think reflectively then become possible through applying this to the self.
From this perspective, knowledge is constructive, not representational. Children
learn what they can do with the world; they learn the interactive potential of their ac-
tion on the physical and the social world [e.g., Bickhard & Terveen, 1995; Piaget,
1936/1963, 1937/1954]. There is no clear separation between the social and physical
worlds; objects are already treated in the context of cultural views [Rodrguez, 2009].
From such an action-based approach, infants first develop a practical or sensorimotor
knowledge of others through social experience [Bibok, Carpendale, & Lewis, 2008].
Infants learn that people respond in different ways compared to objects and they
learn what to expect from the social world [Baldwin, 1906]. Infants learn about the
interactive potential of their social world, their caregivers, in terms of patterns of in-
teraction [Chapman, 1999], or in Piagetian [1936/1963] terms, schemes. Thus, a de-
tailed historical description of the gradual emergence of progressively more complex
forms of interaction provides an appropriate form of explanation [Bibok et al., 2008;
de Barbaro, Johnson, & Dek, 2013; Hendriks-Jansen, 1996].
The paradox of communication encountered in the cognitivist worldview is not
a problem for the constructivist view. Communication in early infancy begins in a
functional but not yet in an intentional sense. When a newborn infant cries, natu-
rally expressing her emotional state, this functions to communicate the infants dis-
comfort to caregivers because the crying is meaningful to them even though the infant
is not yet aware that she is communicating. Meaning is present in the social relations
before infants become aware of it. As caregivers respond to the infants crying over
time the infant can learn the meaning this action has for others, that is, she can learn
how others typically respond and she may start to expect certain responses from her
caregivers. Infants do not read intentions in the sense of inference as in the cogni-
tivist worldview, but rather they understand others in the practical or sensorimotor
sense in which they learn to anticipate patterns of activity and understand goals as the
endpoint of acts. Understanding is based on learning skills and learning to anticipate
the outcome of actions.
Researchers working on infants early social development have grouped various
social skills together with the concept of joint attention because they all seem to in-
volve coordinating attention. But this results in combining skills such as gaze follow-
ing and pointing that are very different, potentially overlooking important distinc-
tions crucial to explaining development. Pointing, once mastered, involves conveying
meaning. Gaze following may do so in some cases, but this is not necessary and is
often unlikely, such as when this activity is observed in domestic goats [Kaminski,
Riedel, Call, & Tomasello, 2004].
Unlike joint attention, the concept of joint action [Brownell, 2011; Rodrguez,
2009] makes it possible to understand how meaning is conveyed. Infants learn about
routine social activities such as feeding, washing, and being picked up, as well as oth-
er regular activities around the home. Infants learn to anticipate what is coming up
next, the outcome of the action. They understand the activity to the extent that they
can anticipate the outcome [Stone, 2013]. If they desire that outcome, they may try to
initiate the action pattern. This tendency to attempt to re-engage reluctant social
partners in enjoyable cooperative games has been observed in young children as well

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as in bonobos [Pika & Zuberbhler, 2008]. For example, a 13-month-old toddler
wishing to initiate the routine of going outside was observed to bring his shoes to his
father and raise his foot in anticipation of the activity of putting on shoes [Stone,
2013]. As another example, a 14-month-old toddler walking to the park beside his
uncle approached a curb and held out his hand to his uncle walking beside him for
help in stepping down over the curb. Within the context of this routine activity the
meaning of the toddlers action was clear. It was a request to hold a hand for support.
Later, at dinnertime, the child was being fed by his mother, but he then took the spoon
and fed himself. After a few minutes he handed his spoon to his uncle, clearly expect-
ing to be fed. These are well-known social routines. This toddler knew what is to be
expected in these enjoyable social situations and therefore communication was pos-
sible. This fits with the view of meaning as based on a history of interaction in shared
routines [Canfield, 2007; McDonough, 1989, 2004; Mead, 1934; Wittgenstein,
1953/2009]. Infants learn the meaning their actions have for others through becom-
ing able to anticipate how others will typically respond to them. Infants come to un-
derstand the interactive potential of their world and they become aware of commu-
nication that has been occurring. They develop skill in conveying meaning based on
shared practices [e.g., Mead, 1934; Vygotsky, 1978; Wittgenstein, 1953/2009].
Some of these social activities will vary somewhat across families and cultures,
but social acts are part of being human and some action patterns are likely to be com-
mon across cultures due to the nature of human physical embodiment [Canfield,
1995, 2007; Carpendale & Racine, 2011; Carpendale & Wereha, 2013; Saari, 2004;
Wittgenstein, 1953/2009]. For example, requesting seems to be a social act that would
be expected to emerge across cultures given the nature of human infants physi-
cal embodiment. That is, human infants are born relatively helpless [Portmann,
1944/1990], and this results in a social environment with caregivers in which infants
develop. This is a set of conditions in which it is likely that requests would emerge
[Carpendale & Lewis, 2012]. Due to infants embodiment they will reach toward what
they want, such as their caregivers. The problem space infants encounter is similar to
that faced by chimpanzees kept in captivity and cared for by humans. In this situation
chimpanzees tend to develop gestures to make requests [Leavens, 2011].
The beginning of the social act can become a gesture to initiate that act [Mead,
1934]. For example, there is general agreement that the arms up gesture, which de-
velops early at about 910 months, is learned through parents responses to infants
natural reaction of reaching toward them [Lock, 1978; Service et al., 1989; see also
Plooij, 1978]. That is, this gesture develops from a natural action and reaction pattern
that functions to communicate, and infants gradually become aware of how their
caregivers respond to their action. This is a form of request, although it is dyadic
rather than triadic, as in requests for an object. In attempting to request an object, a
9.5-month-old infant was observed to try to move his mothers arm toward the de-
sired object. Gestures for requests may develop through caregivers responding to an
infants action of reaching toward a desired object. For example, a 13-month-old in-
fant sitting in a high chair raised her arm and opened and closed her hand. Her moth-
er responded to the gesture as a request for more of the bread and jam she was eating
[Carpendale & Carpendale, 2010]. Imitation would play some role in learning con-
ventional gestures such as waving, but this cannot be a complete explanation because
infants still have to learn how to use the action of waving in the appropriate situation
in order to accomplish a social act.

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 Through experience, infants develop a web of potential patterns of interaction
or routines. These routines form the foundation on which language can be based. For
example, infants may learn to use words such as want along with gestures for requests,
and words may gradually replace such gestures [Canfield, 2007]. Language then al-
lows for the development of a reflective and verbal form of knowledge that enables
children to talk about and think about concepts such as the mind and mental states
[e.g., Canfield, 2007]. This potential for reflective thought arises through the social
process. Self-awareness and reflective thinking become possible through individuals
becoming aware of themselves by taking the perspectives of others [Mead, 1934].
The process we have described, however, does not mean that infants only under-
stand others on a behavioral or surface level. Infants learn to understand others
actions, which are intentional and do not consist of surface behavior caused by
separate mental states. Rather than being forced to choose between mentalism and
behaviorism, which are both based on the dualist worldview, we, instead, take a third
option based on a relational worldview, beginning from the infants experience with
the action of others. Intentions, interests, desires, and so on are aspects of this action.
These are not separate mental states that underlie and cause the action. Following
Mead [1934] and others, the goal or intention is the end point of the action. When we
say that infants develop a practical understanding of others, we are not deciding be-
tween whether they either understand others behavior or the mental states causing
the physical movements. We reject the causal-psychological view of the mind with
mental states causing behavior. Instead, infants are coming to understand others ac-
tions, which involve both. To question mental states as separate from and as causing
behavior is generally viewed as behaviorism. But behaviorism shares the assumption
of a split between behavior and mental states and rejects mental states. Beginning
with activity does not entail behaviorism [e.g., Hendriks-Jansen, 1996]. The position
we are suggesting does not fit into the Procrustean bed of either mentalism or behav-
iorism both are based on a dualist perspective of splitting mental states and behav-
ior. We now apply this general approach to the development of pointing gestures.

Pointing from a Relational Developmental Systems Perspective

From the perspective we take, gestures develop within shared routines. This can
also be referred to as common ground, which Tomasello et al. [2007] acknowledge has
an important role in understanding how pointing gestures can convey meaning, but
this acknowledgement contrasts with the way they begin their article by stating that
understanding a pointing gesture requires some serious mindreading (p. 705). No
amount of mindreading, however, is sufficient for understanding the meaning of a
gesture. Recognizing the importance of common ground requires a shift in thinking
about meaning. Even an adult level of social cognitive ability would not be sufficient
to understand the meaning others attempt to convey without a shared history of in-
teraction. Adults with decades of experience with pointing may still not understand
particular pointing gestures if they lack the relevant shared experience.
Explaining the development of communicative pointing from the relational per-
spective does not involve the problem of how infants learn that others have mental
states and attention that can be directed. From the perspective we endorse, pointing
may emerge in various ways, but one common pathway is from a non-communica-

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tive orienting action [Carpendale & Carpendale, 2010]. Rather than developing as a
conventional gesture such as waving, we argue that it is likely that pointing is based
on a natural reaction, such as exploring objects by touching, which may be linked to
differences between humans and chimpanzees in the morphology of the index finger.
Due to the nature of the human hand, the index finger is associated with the pincer
grasp and seems to be well suited for exploring close-by objects [Povinelli & Davis,
1994]. The extended arm and hand configuration may become associated with chil-
drens directedness of attention, and so may become a manifestation of their own at-
tention toward more distant objects or events of interest. This has been referred to as
pointing for the self [e.g., Liszkowski & Tomasello, 2011], but this description in
early development is likely to assume too much. It is more neutrally described as a
non-communicative orienting response. Early in development, children are not in-
tending to communicate, because they do not persist in attracting attention, although
the action may function to communicate in the sense that others may respond to it.
Children learn how others respond to their action, they learn the meaning their
action has for others, and in so doing learn to use the action as a communicative ges-
ture. In other words, pointing is initially a manifestation of infants attention towards
objects or events of interest in the environment. Parents tend to interpret these acts
in a social way and respond to them accordingly. That is, infants skills in interacting
with others develop in particular situations as they learn how others respond to their
actions [e.g., Bates, 1976, 1979; Kaye, 1982; Lempert & Kinsbourne, 1985; Leung &
Rheingold, 1981; Lock, 1978, 1992, 2001; Mead, 1934; Mller & Carpendale, 2004;
Newson, 1974; Shinn, 1900; Vygotsky, 1978; Werner & Kaplan, 1963]. Thus, the non-
communicative use of the pointing hand configuration would be expected before in-
fants master pointing as a social act. Infants as young as 3 months of age and continu-
ing during their first year have been observed holding their hands in the canonical
pointing hand configuration, but this does not function as a social act [Blake,
ORourke, & Borzellino, 1994; Fogel & Hannan, 1985; Masataka, 2003]. The key point
here is that communication and social understanding emerge in this early social pro-
cess. They are not assumed to start with [Carpendale & Carpendale, 2010; Carpendale
& Racine, 2011; Mead, 1934].
We believe that pointing and requests of various forms would develop given
typical human ways of living, which includes others responding to infants [Carpen-
dale & Wereha, 2013]. If these conditions were not present then such gestures would
not develop. The different functions of pointing may develop somewhat separately in
different routines as caregivers respond to children in different ways depending on
the social setting. If an infant is pointing to a light, for example, which does not seem
to be a request situation, the caregiver may simply talk about the object. Alternative-
ly, if the infant is pointing to a close-by attractive object or food, the caregiver may
interpret it as a request. Understanding the gesture will depend on the particular
situation. Once a child has mastered an effective action pattern or social scheme, such
as a pointing gesture, she may try it out in other social situations [Piaget, 1936/1963].
Given the two ways of thinking about how early gestures such as pointing de-
velop discussed in this article, the next question is: how should this early communi-
cative development be studied? It is often assumed that methodology is independent
of theory, but this is not correct [Danziger, 1985]. In the next section, we turn to the
implications of the two worldviews for methodology.

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 Implications of Worldviews for Methodologies

Either of the two frameworks discussed can be employed to interpret research

based on a variety of methodologies. However, there are some methodologies that are
commonly used in the dualist framework that may not be so well suited for the con-
structivist and relational developmental systems framework. Much of the recent re-
search on pointing has focused on characterizing the skills of 12-month-old infants
who are already pointing [e.g., Liszkowski, Albrecht, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2008;
Liszkowski, Carpenter, Henning, Striano, & Tomasello, 2004]. Although this approach
can be important for clarifying ambiguities in interpretations of infants skills, given
that these infants have at least some rudimentary skills at pointing before being se-
lected for such studies, this research logically cannot tell us much about how pointing
develops during infants first year. It is generally agreed that any methodology has ad-
vantages as well as disadvantages. Thus, alternative methods should also be considered.
If communication emerges in natural patterns of interaction that develop within
dyads, then in addition to other methods, careful description of the phenomena is
needed. Earlier research consisted of classic diary studies [e.g., Darwin, 1877; Piaget,
1937/1954, 1945/1962, 1936/1963; Preyer, 1890/1973; Stern & Stern, 1909/1999], but
there are fewer recent studies using this methodology [e.g., Acredolo & Goodwyn,
1985, 1988; Adolph, Robinson, Young, & Gill-Alvarez, 2008; Bates, Camaioni, &
Volterra, 1975, 1976; Canfield, 2007; Zinober & Martlew, 1985]. In studying the de-
velopment of pointing the problem is to record observations of sufficient density, that
is, close enough in developmental time as infants are in the process of mastering the
skill, as well as of sufficient breadth across various situations. Both of these require-
ments are difficult to achieve in lab studies because of limited resources and the prob-
lem of overtaxing the families involved in the study. For this reason, detailed descrip-
tions from a naturalistic perspective would be useful in documenting the gradual
emergence and differential of such activity patterns. An advantage of diary studies for
early infant communication is that this approach can capture observations occurring
in the home that would be difficult to elicit in labs. Video diaries would also be help-
ful, but since some behaviors of importance may be rare and fleeting, diaries could be
used to extend and supplement video recordings. Methodologies should fit the topic
of study and diary studies can be used to chart the actual development of gestures
rather than their presence or absence.
An additional reason for adding diary studies to our research methodologies
concerns the links between methods and theories. The possibility that methods might
conflict with and constrain theories is rarely raised [Danziger, 1985]. However, ac-
cording to our view, forms of communication develop and become fine-tuned with-
in particular parent-infant dyads. Therefore, the general process through which in-
fants come to master gestures may be common across dyads, but some idiosyncratic
gestures may develop within particular dyads. That is, somewhat different patterns
might be expected to emerge in different dyads. The typical methodology in psychol-
ogy, however, of averaging across a large sample could eliminate any differences in
the pathway of development within particular dyads. In other words, the methodol-
ogy would stack the deck against the theory. From the perspective of the relational
developmental systems and constructivist family of approaches, multiple case studies
would enable examining potential differences in development between dyads, as well
as looking for similar pathways among dyads.

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 One disadvantage of diary observations is that participating parents require the
motivation and talent to record observations of sufficient detail to enable the research-
er to understand the sequence of development. Parents may include their own inter-
pretation, but they must describe the situation and their infants behavior in detail to
justify this interpretation and the researcher will interpret the observation. That is, the
observations must be sufficiently detailed in order to be able to stand alone. The ob-
servations these studies provide hold the potential to keep the field honest by revealing
the actual diversity of phenomena before they are constrained by theoretically derived
categories such as proto-imperatives and proto-declaratives, which, although useful,
can result in overlooking the variety of social situations in which infants use pointing
gestures. Experimental procedures involve setting up certain types of situations, which
elicit certain types of gestures, but this does not tell us about the other ways in which
infants may use pointing gestures at home, as well as in many other situations they
encounter. In method sections authors sometimes note that only pointing gestures to
the stimuli were coded, leaving the reader to wonder what other communicative ges-
tures end up on the cutting room floor. In order to be aware of the diversity of what
needs to be explained it is important to avoid just searching where the methodological
lights are brightest. This is especially crucial in early phases of research when it is es-
sential to form an adequate description of what it is that must be explained.
Parents can be asked to record significant changes in the way their infant com-
municates, as well as to provide brief summaries, and some examples of common
ways of communicating. Parents notice such differences: As anyone who is in con-
stant contact with the same young child can attest, the novel developmental event is
easily noticed even in the midst of domestic chaos [Braunwald & Brislin, 1979,
p. 39]. Observations can be collected with ad libitum sampling [Martin & Bateson,
1993], that is, without predefined time sampling periods [Gmez, 2010]. This is ap-
propriate for recording rare, but important, events [Martin & Bateson, 1993], and it
also emphasizes the most advanced form of the infants communication [Braunwald
& Brislin, 1979]. Time sampling at regularly spaced intervals would not be appropri-
ate and could result in missing the rare events that are crucial for the study of the
emergence of a behavior [Braunwald & Brislin, 1979].
We believe that diary studies could be important components of research on
early infant behavior in order to collect information on the diversity and complexity
of the behavior, as well as to avoid missing important changes and stepping stones
that might be overlooked in experimental studies that involve observations at preset
time intervals in constrained situations. Careful analysis of video recordings could
also provide detail regarding transitional forms of infant-adult interaction [de Bar-
baro et al., 2013].

Conclusion

We have explicated two worldviews dualist and relational and traced their
implications for theorizing about human development using the example of research
on the development of pointing. Pointing gestures have attracted a great deal of re-
search attention as well as controversy regarding how they develop. We have argued
that the dualist position is problematic for a number of reasons, and that the rela-
tional developmental systems framework avoids these problems. We encourage a bet-

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ter integration of relational and constructivist thinking into theorizing in develop-
mental psychology. Finally, we traced some methodological implications that follow
from adopting particular worldviews.
Even those researchers who take the most extreme dualist positions and propose
genetically determined modules acknowledge the fact that these modules do have to
develop. This is the thread that if pulled would unravel such positions and move them
closer to a relational developmental systems framework. Dualist approaches do dis-
cuss interaction, but it is interaction between pre-existing entities; this view overlooks
the possibility that interaction is primary in creating such entities, and that they can-
not be so readily separated. That is, the action is in the relations [e.g., Carpendale,
Hammond, & Atwood, 2013].
As Bates [1979] noted, we are mesmerized by the beauty of the final product of the
symbol-using mind, but to understand this development it is necessary to see how it is
put together with tape and safety pins [Bates, 1979, p. 1] the messy and complex
details of development. With pointing this should be possible. It is a social practice that
once mastered involves conveying meaning in a human way. Because gestures lack the
complexity of syntax to obscure the process, pointing represents an opportunity to ob-
serve the development of skill in conveying meaning. These are observations of the
natural history of human beings; , which have escaped notice only because they are
always before our eyes [Wittgenstein, 1953/2009, p. 415]. Conceptions of language
and human cognition are based on assumptions about meaning. Thus, understanding
the development of this skill is crucial in grasping what it is that makes us human.

Acknowledgement

We thank Celia Brownell, Stuart Hammond, Jack Martin, and Wanda Power for comments
on earlier drafts of this article.

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