W.

BALZER 1

INCOMMENSURABILITY, REDUCTION, AND

TRANSLATION

On several occasions StegmfiUer has advanced the hypothesis that even

in the case of incommensurability a structuralist reduction relation may
be established between the theories involved. 2 If the historically
preceding theory can be reduced to its successor then the latter is
" b e t t e r " , some comparison is possible, and we need not give up our
idea of a progressing, "rational" science in the light of phenomena of
incommensurability. Recently, Pearce has taken objection to the hypo-
thesis by pointing out that according to a generalized version of the well
known Interpolation Theorem structuralist reduction implies trans-
lation. 3 So Stegmfiller's hypothesis would lead to the untenable result
that theories are incommensurable but nevertheless translatable into
each other.
My aim in this paper is, first, to give a precise reconstruction of
Pearce's objection, second, to argue that usually the above-mentioned
theorem cannot be applied, and third, to propose a new and precise
definition of incommensurability. As a further result some clarification
of the concept of translation will be achieved.

I. THE OBJECTION RECONSTRUCTED

t
In the following let T = (Mp, M) and T' = (Mp, M') be theories consis-
ting of classes of potential models (Mp) and models (M) such that the
potential models of Mp and Mp have the form (D1 . . . . . Dk;
R1 . . . . , Rm) and (D~ . . . . . D',; R~ . . . . . R's), respectively, where the D~
are sets and the Rj are relations " o v e r " DI . . . . . Dk. Further com-
ponents of the structuralist theory-concept are neglected 4 for the sake
of simplicity. This will lead to a sharpening of our negative results. Let
L(T) = (o-1. . . . . Ok, ~,1 . . . . . P,m) and L(T') = (o-i, 9 9 o'" P,1. . . . . R's)
be the tuples of sorts and non-logical symbols from the languages which
may be associated with T and T' in a natural way. That is, each potential
model ( D 1 , . . . , Dk; R I , . . . , Rm) may be regarded as a structure for, or
an interpretation of, the corresponding language. Let Form(T) and
Sent(T) denote the classes of formulas and sentences of the language of

Erkennmis 23 (1985) 255-267. 0165-0106/85.10

9 1985 by D. Reidel Publishing Company
256 w. BALZER

T, and let IL(T)I be {o'1. . . . . ok, P,1 . . . . , R,,}. Further, let us assume
that the logic ~ employed by T (as given by the formation rules for
formulas, the logical axioms and the rules of derivation) is the same as
the one employed by T'.
With respect to reduction we will confine ourselves to the "bare
bones" used by Pearce. Again - although this concept of reduction
comprises only part of the structuralist concept - the restriction affects
my negative conclusions only inasfar as it will sharpen them. The
definitions of Sec. III can be easily emended to include the full
structuralist apparatus.
D1. If T = (Mp, M) and T' = (M~, M') are theories then p reduces T' to
Tiff
(1) p: Mp ~ M~, is a partial function, and onto
(2) for all x, y: if x ~ M and y = p(x) then y c M'.

The function p establishes a correspondence between the potential

models of both theories which essentially "respects" the proper axioms
(as satisfied in the models). On the background of the distinction
between language and structures (interpretations of the language) we
could say that reduction operates on the semantical level, and (only in
the present context) we might even say that p establishes a "meaning
relation" because p connects the denotations of the terms (the non-
logical constants) of both theories, and therefore also their meaning.
We will also need what Pearce calls "translations". 3 For reasons to
become clear in the following we will not use the term "translation" and
will speak of "potential translations" instead.
D2. If p reduces T' to T then F is a potential translation of T' into T
relative to p iff
(1) F: Form(T') --~ Form(T)
(2) for all x c Dom(p) and all ~ s Sent(T'):
x ~ F(~) iff p(x) ~
Here, "Dom(p)" denotes the domain of p and " x k ~b" means that
sentence ~ is valid in structure x. A potential translation essentially
maps the formulas of T' - and consequently also the sentences - into
their "translations" which are formulas of T. Condition (2) requires that
this mapping of the sentences is "compatible" with the given "meaning
 INCOMMENSURABILITY 257

relation" p. If some sentence ~ is valid, say, in some model p(x), its

translation, F(qJ), must be valid in (one of) the corresponding model(s)
x, and vice versa.
On the basis of these definitions the objection can be obtained from
the following argument.
(P1) For all T, T' and p:
if: (1.1) T, T' are theories and p reduces T' to T
(1.2) IL(T)I n IL(T')I = 0
(1.3) p preserves isomorphisms and can be characterized by
a compact set of sentences
(1.4) ~ is such that the interpolation theorem holds
then: there is a potential translation F of T' into T relative to p
(P2) There are T, T' and p such that
(2.1) conditions (1.1)-(1.4) are satisfied
(2.2) T and T' are incommensurable
(C) There are T, T', p and F such that T, T' are theories, T and T'
are incommensurable and F is a potential translation of T' into
T relative to p.
Some intuitive explanations are necessary here. Condition (1.2) just
says that the languages of T and T' are disjoint: they share no
non-logical symbols. The first part of (1.3) means that if x and y e Mp
are isomorphic and in the domain of p then so are p ( x ) and p(y). In
order to understand the second part of (1.3) it is helpful to regard p as a
set of pairs of potential models p ~ Mp M~ with elements of the form
(x, x')~ p, x ~ Mp, x'~ M~. Each (x, x') again can be regarded as a
structure, and the corresponding language is given by IL(T)I U IL(T')I.
The requirement then says that there is a compact set 92 of sentences of
this language such that the relation ~R, defined in terms of p by ~(x, x')
iff
3 z ( x ' ~ z A p(X) = Z)
is exactly the class of models of 92 ( " ~ " denotes isomorphism). The
interpolation theorem in its most simple form states that if some formula
A--~B is provable in the system then there exists a formula C
containing only non-logical constants and free variables occurring both
in A and B such that A---~ C and C---~ B are provable.
Premiss (P1) was proved in a setting of abstract logic by Feferman. 5
258 w. BALZER

Premiss (P2) is a consequence of Stegmfiller's hypothesis that T and T'

may be incommensurable and nevertheless T' be reducible to T,
provided we do not bother about (1.2)-(1.4) being satisfied. Note that
the conclusion (C) follows without any reference to special features of
the notion of incommensurability.
The objection to Stegmiiller's hypothesis now is this. If the hypothesis
was correct then (P2) would hold, and because (P1) as a logical theorem
is out of question (C) would follow. But (C) is not tenable because
incommensurability (under each possible explication of the concept)
will imply non-translatability. Therefore Stegmfiller's hypothesis has to
be given up.

II. THE OBJECTION ESSENTIALLY IS NOT RELEVANT

I want to argue that the objection just stated essentially does not apply
in the domain of the empirical philosophy of science. By the empirical
philosophy of science I mean philosophy of science understood as the
empirical investigation of existing empirical theories.
Let me denote by I the domain of existing empirical theories, i.e., the
domain of intended applications of the empirical philosophy of science.
On the other hand, let ~ denote the class of all triples (T, T', p) for
which (1.1)-(1.4) above are satisfied. ~ may be called the domain of
application of the above argument. If v denotes the class of all sets then
I want to argue that ~t fq (I x I v) is "essentially" empty. In other
words: those triples (T, T', p) to which the argument can be applied
(which satisfy (1.1)-(1.4)) do not represent existing pairs of empirical
theories supplied with a reduction relation. I have added the
qualification "essentially" because there may be (and most likely there
are) some empirical theories yielding triples in ~ . But these are not
essential both in number and in importance, and I will neglect them in
the following. Also, I will not say much about (1.2). As it turns out (1.2)
typically will not be satisfied in the case of incommensurable theories.
But Feferman's results can be extended to cover non-disjoint vocabu-
laries too, under further specific assumptions. So my only remark in
connection with (1.2) is that "renaming" - which is freely performed in
formal logic - may not be used in an unrestricted way in the philosophy
of science.
 INCOMMENSURABILITY 259

Intuitively, the reason why the argument does not apply to empirical
theories is that empirical theories make use of (and in this sense contain)
very strong mathematical theories which cannot be formalized in
logical systems in which the interpolation theorem (1.4) holds. There-
fore, the empirical theories themselves cannot be formalized by such
systems.
Actually, the situation is more delicate and requires more detailed
consideration. The mathematics used in empirical theories usually
contains classical analysis, or at least arithmetic or Euclidean geometry.
These mathematical theories can only be adequately formalized in
logical systems of at least second order because they involve axioms of
completeness (resp. induction) which cannot be fully expressed in
predicative systems. Therefore, existing empirical theories can only be
formalized in logical systems of higher order. But in such systems the
interpolation theorem does not hold any longer. Thus (1.4) fails and the
empirical theory under consideration cannot occur in a triple (T, T', p)
of premiss (P2).
To this conclusion there are three objections from the point of view
of formal logic. First, it may be pointed out that the claim that the
mathematical theories mentioned above can only be formalized in
higher-order systems is plainly false. We all know that Zermelo-
Fraenkel set-theory (ZF) can be formalized in first-order logic, and in
ZF we can define all the mathematics needed, including classical
analysis, geometry, and arithmetic.
Let us assume we make use of this possibility in the empirical
philosophy of science. The result will be a series of reconstructed
empirical theories such that the models of these theories are models of
ZF in which further special sets (like the set S of models of classical
particle mechanics relativized to a fixed s e t of particles) are dis-
tinguished.
I have two problems with such a program. (A) I would hesitate to call
a reconstruction of some empirical theory along these lines an
adequate reconstruction. The criterion of adequacy I have in mind here
is that in an adequate reconstruction only those axioms should be made
explicit which are treated explicitly in the corresponding informal
theory itself. Of course, this cannot be understood very strictly: often
one aim of reconstruction is to point to logical deficiencies, "gaps" in
the standard formulation of a theory, and to show how such gaps may be
260 W. BALZER

closed. But what I want to exclude by the criterion is that a whole new
theory is added in the course of reconstruction of a given theory. This
would be the case if, say, a reconstruction of particle mechanics
incorparates a system of ZF. Formal set theory does not play any role in
the introduction of physical theories, and even in the introduction of
those mathematical theories which are used in physics. I do not deny
that instances of the axioms of ZF may be used in informal, "naive" set
theoretic reasoning in connection with physical theories, and I do not
want to deny that in this sense set theory is "presupposed". But the
same holds for large parts of ordinary language, too, and nobody would
get the idea of incorporating a formalization of ordinary language in a
reconstruction of mechanics (even if this was possible).
Formal set theory basically has foundational character. I agree with
Putnam 6 that mathematics usually proceeds without foundations and in
a sense does not need foundations, and this extends a forteriori to
empirical theories. Therefore the incorporation of ZF into the recon-
struction of an empirical theory adds some new body of theory, and this
definitely leads to a theory very different from the one to be recon-
structed. In this sense such a reconstruction is inadequate.
What has just been said remains valid if ZF is replaced by some
weaker system of set theory which is still sufficient to express the
mathematics needed.
(B) Reconstructions incorporating ZF in a certain sense will beg the
question of reduction and incommensurability. For if all theories consist
of ZF plus further stipulations then there is always the possibility of a
trivial reduction (identity), and it is difficult to see in what sense such
theories would be incommensurable. The meaning of all the "interes-
ting", empirical concepts would be completely determined by the
meaning of the basic set theoretic notions because the former are
explicitly defined in terms of the latter. But the latter are the same in
both theories and so no meaning variance can occur, or so it seems.
Therefore, I do not regard reference to ZF as a refutation of what I
said above, namely that most empirical theories can be adequately
formalized (reconstructed) only in systems of higher-order logic.
A second objection against the latter statement might consist of
pointing out that the crucial mathematical theories (analysis, geometry,
arithmetic) do not really deserve the definite article. To speak of, say,
the theory of real numbers, it might be said, is to assume clarity where
there is none. For there are various formalizations of different logical
 INCOMMENSURABILITY 261

strength available in the literature. So why not speak of a first-order

theory of real numbers, constructible reals etc., and consequently, why
not just introduce first-order versions of empirical theories?
It seems to me that in ordinary mathematics and in empirical theories
there is more uniqueness and agreement with respect to these mathe-
matical theories than is suggested by a survey of the literature in
mathematical logic. There is practically complete agreement that
arithmetic is the theory captured by Peano's axioms and that Euclidean
geometry is the theory as formalized by Hilbert (or some equivalent
version). And even in the case of real numbers there is common
agreement - as expressed by common usage - that the~axiom of
completeness is used in its full (second-order) strength, that is, the
theory of real numbers is (up to equivalence) the one axiomatized by
Tarski. 7
But I am not committed to any uniqueness of those mathematical
theories. Even if different people favour different versions of, say,
classical analysis my claim can be defended. For the crucial point is that
in the "ordinary science" presentations of those mathematical theories
the decisive axioms of completeness and induction are (almost) always
formulated in their ordinary, second order form. (Counterexamples are
typically found not in "ordinary" scientific or mathematical works but
in treatises about formal logic.) This clearly indicates that an adequate
reconstruction has to use the second-order versions, too.
To avoid misunderstandings: I do not want to deny the value of
developing "elementary" or constructive versions of the classical
theories, on the contrary. All I want to say (as already mentioned) is that
such activities are not to be called, and do not contribute to, empirical
philosophy of science (at least today).
A third objection, finally, might consist in the claim that there are or
might be developed formal systems in which full classical mathematics
can be expressed but which nevertheless have the interpolation pro-
perty (i.e., the interpolation theorem holds for these systems). With
respect to ZF or variants thereof this is true but we have already dealt
with these systems. What remains are systems somewhere inbetween
first- and second-order predicate logic, like for instance infinitary logic.
But such systems simply do not have the strength of second-order
calculi. An axiomatization of geometry in infinitary logic will clearly
yield only a fragment of classical Euclidean geometry.
I think it is not .very bold to hypothesize that any less than second-
262 W. BALZER

order formalization of classical mathematical theories will not have the

interpolation property, provided the detour via set theory is excluded.

III. INCOMMENSURABILITY AND TRANSLATION

I now want to attack the above argument against reduction of incom-

mensurable theories and thereby constructively contribute to the
concepts of incommensurability and translation. The above argument
leads to a rejection of reducibility of incommensurable theories only if
conclusion (C) is regarded as untenable: there are theories T, T' so that
T and T' are incommensurable and there is some potential translation of
T' into T (relative to some t9). What I want to claim is that (C) is not at
all odd, and may, in fact, obtain in concrete cases. (C) would be odd
only if we replace "potential translation" by "translation". If we agree
that incommensurability implies non-translatability then, under this
replacement, (C) would indeed amount to expressing that there are
non-translatable (incommensurable) theories which are translatable.
But it seems questionable whether potential translations in the sense of
(D2) can be regarded as proper translations. If we come to see that a
proper translation is much more than a potential translation then (C)
loses its original oddity. In fact, I will now give an explication of
"incommensurability" from which it becomes clear that in cases of
incommensurable theories a mere potential translation is no translation
at all.
Let us start by recalling typical cases of incommensurable theories.
Typically, what is encountered in concrete examples is this. T h e r e are
(one or more) words c o m m o n to two theories which in both theories
have a different meaning. Recall the word " c l o c k " in classical and
relativistic space-time theory, the word " m o t i o n " in Aristotelian and
Newtonian physics 8, the term "freely moving body" in impetus theory
and in Netwonian mechanics, the word "state" in phenomenological
thermodynamics and in statistical mechanics. We may achieve a
potential translation of one theory into the other (i.e., a mapping of
sentences on sentences) but not in a way which preserves these identical
words as well as their meanings. Either the crucial words remain
unchanged in the translation. Then they will have different meanings in
both theories, and so the potential translation does not preserve
meaning (and thus is no proper translation). Or the crucial word in one
of the theories is " r e n a m e d " . Then the different meanings are
 INCOMMENSURABILITY 263

represented by different words, and, or so it seems, the incom-

mensurability-debate will not even begin. Of course, it would start in
this case, too. It only would have another point of departure, namely the
puzzling phenomenon that the two theories with their different words
with different meanings are (at least potentially) "about the same
thing".
It is only if we concentrate on such special potential translations
which preserve certain words as well as their meanings that (C)
becomes false. If T and T' are incommensurable we cannot translate T'
into T in a way which leaves identical the meanings of all the common
terms. This in fact would clash with our intuitions about, and with the
standard examples of, incommensurable theories.
These considerations show that (C) sheds some light on both the
concept of incommensurability and of translation. First, if (C) is true
then the concept of potential translation as introduced in (D2) is a
rather general one. A more restricted notion of translation seems to be
relevant for the comparison of theories (see (D3) below). Second,
incommensurability (or some central aspect of it) is intimately linked
with particular kinds of potential translations. Roughly, what has
become clear now is that incommensurability clashes only with proper
translations, i.e., translations preserving words as well as their mean-
ings.
I want to take up this fact, and propose that incommensurability
consists (at least in an essential part) of non-translatability of the
particular kind indicated.
In order to bring out that feature more clearly let me start once
again. In the conceptual frame introduced in Sec. I consider two
theories T and T' with corresponding vocabularies L ( T ) =
(O'1, " 9 " , Ok, R1 ..... R m ) and L(T') = (tr~ . . . . . or', ~,1 . . . . . Rs). If T and
T' are incommensurable then there will be some "word" occurring in
both vocabularies but having different meaning in the two theories. In
our frame this can be represented by some non-logical constant
occurring in both languages (R c {R1 . . . . . R,,} CI {~,~. . . . . R'~}) which
has different denotations ("meaning") in both theories. That is, if
R . = R I = P , ~ then at least in some models x it will be the case
that Ri ~ Rj (where x = (D1 . . . . . D k , R1 . . . . . R,.) and p ( x ) =
(D'I, 99 9 D',; RI . . . . . R'~)). Here it is important to treat the ~,i and R,) as
the non-logical constants themselves, and not as syntactical variables.
A renaming of these constants would completely dissolve the problem
264 W. BALZER

of incommensurability as far as it can be represented in the present

conceptual frame.
Now in a first step we have to pass over from languages having some
basic concepts in common, to potential translations which preserve
them. In the absence of individual constants this step can be performed
easily.9
D3. Let T, T' be theories such that p reduces T' to T, and let
P, ~ {RI . . . . . R,,} CI {R~. . . . . R's}- F is an It-preserving potential trans-
lation iff
(1) F is a potential translation of T' into T relative to p
(2) for all fix ~ Form(T') there is y such that
r(f x) = y
(e Form(T), where x and y are suitable sequences of
variables)
(3) F respects logical constants.

Here, T, T' and p are supposed to be given. Requirement (D3-3)

depends on how the formulas of both theories are actually formed. If
they are formed, say, by means of " v " , "-n" and " 3 " on both sides, then
requirement (3) just means that F(Av B ) = F(A)v F(B), F(-nA)=
-nF(A) and F(3xA) = 3xF(A), for all A, B ~ Form(T'). Intuitively, F is
R-preserving if by mapping some sentence A by means of F all
occurrences of " R " will remain unchanged.
R-preserving potential translations respect certain identities on the
syntactical level, the level of language. But if such an R-preserving
potential translation is given it does not follow that R will have the same
meaning in both theories. R's denotations in two models of the two
theories may be different, even if these models are connected by the
"meaning relation" p. This is the point where potential translations differ
from proper translations: for a proper translation the latter situation is
ruled out. If it would occur nobody would speak of translation. The
problems with incommensurability come up_just because of such
differences in meaning in the presence of an R-preserving potential
translation. When such a potential translation is given then com-
mensurability of T and T' requires that the meaning of R is preserved
under p just in the same way as the symbol or word " R " is preserved
under F. Relative to some symbol R such a kind of commensurability can
be defined as follows.
 INCOMMENSURABILITY 265

D4. If R ~ {R1. . . . , R,,,} n {R] . . . . . R's} and F is R-preserving then r

renders T and T' R-p-commensurable itt
there is x ~ Dom(p) such that Rx = Rp(x)
(where R~ and Rp(x) stand for the denotations of R in x and p(x),
respectively).
Intuitively, (D4) is satisfied whenever the denotations of some common
term, R in two models of the theories are identical, provided these
models are linked with each other by the reduction relation p. One
might object that the quantifier "there is x" will render the definition
much too weak. I would not oppose replacing (D4) by a stronger
version holding that "for all x ~ Dom(p): Rx = Rp(~)". The only reason
for the present, weaker formulation is that it allows obtaining an
explication of incommensurability just by negation (see (D5) below). If
we replace "there is" by "for all" then my explication of incom-
mensurability will have to be stated independently of (D4), and some
possibility will emerge of theories not being incommensurable but also
not being R-p-commensurable (in the sense of (D4) for all R). For these
reasons I also have avoided speaking of a proper translation in (D4). A
proper translation would be one which renders T and T' R-g-com-
mensurable for all R, and for which "there is x" in (D4) is replaced by
"for all x".
Incommensurability is now explicated as non-commensurability
where commensurability is understood in the weaker version of (D4).
D5. T and T' are incommensurable iff either
_t
{R, .... , R,.} n{R; ..... Rs) = 0

or there is no p and no F such that for all R e { R 1 . . . . . Rm}

n { -Rr 1 , . . . , R'~}: F is R-preserving and F renders T and T' R-p-com-
mensurable
Though (D5) is formulated in the form of a proper definition I would
not insist that it really covers all essentials of incommensurability. More
modestly, and perhaps more realistically, one would take (D5) only as a
necessary condition. Intuitively, then, if T and T' are incommensurable
either their vocabulary is disjoint or they have common terms, in which
case for any potential translation preserving these terms some meaning
variance must occur. Expressed differently, but equivalently: if T and
266 w. BALZER

T' are incommensurable and have some terms in c o m m o n then for all
reduction relations p and all translations F there must be some term
so that F is not an P,-preserving potential translation or F does not
render T and T' P,-p-commensurable. Of course, this explication is
dependent on the given formulations of the theories in question. It
certainly would be interesting to know whether the idea comprised in
(D5) can be stated invariantly for "equivalent" formulations of the
theories involved. In the light of various ideas about " e q u i v a l e n c e " of
empirical theories already to be found in the literature 1~ such an
invariant explication of incommensurability seems feasible.
By confronting (D3)-(D5) with the examples mentioned above there
seems to be one feature of the examples which does not yet fit nicely
with the general definitions. T h e (or some of the) crucial terms which
are c o m m o n to both theories in standard expositions of the theories are
not used as basic concepts. So in the usual treatments of relativity
" c l o c k " is no basic concept, and the same applies to "freely moving
b o d y " and " m o t i o n " in their respective theories. But it is easy to
enlarge the scope of (D3)-(D5) by including defined terms in addition
to primitives. If we replace "P," in (D3)-(D5) by some symbol which is
either primitive, or introduced by an extension by definitions then all
the intuitive considerations remain valid, and all relevant examples -
including those mentioned above - can be covered.
T o summarize, from the argument stated above I would not conclude
that Stegmiiller's hypothesis concerning incommensurability and re-
duction has to be rejected. I rather would conclude that incom-
mensurability should not be confused with non-translatability in the
weak sense of "potential translation" of (D2). If incommensurability is
understood in the way proposed in (D3)-(D5) as being linked with
certain forms of non-preserving potential translations then both the
concept of incommensurability and of translation become more rich
and interesting. The possibility of rendering incommensurable theories
comparable (though not with full meaning preservation), and thus the
possibility of scientific progress is maintained.

NOTES

t This paper was written during a fellowship at the Netherland Institute for Advanced
Studies (NIAS), 1982/83. I am indebted to T. Kuhn and W. Stegmiillerfor illuminating
discussions of the topic, and to G. Berger for correcting my English.
 INCOMMENSURABILITY 267

2 See, for instance, [Stegmiiller, 1979], p. 68, 69.

3 [Pearce, 1982].
4 Compare [Stegmiiller, 1979], Appendix.
5 [Feferman, 1974].
6 [Putnam, 1967].
7 [Tarski, 1966]. [Montague, 1974] seems to have created the impression among
philosophers of science that classical analysis can be first-order formalized. But actually
his system comprises only a fragment of Tarski's.
a See [Kuhn, 1981].
9 An informal and broader account of the following explication is given in [Balzer, 1984].
~o See, for instance, [Sneed, 1971], Chap. VII.

REFERENCES

Balzer, W.: 1985, 'Was ist Inkommensurabilit/it?', Kant-Studien 76, 169-213.

Feferman, S.: 1974, 'Two Notes on Abstract Model Theory', Part 1, Fund. Math. 82,
153-165.
Kuhn, T.: 1981, 'What Are Scientific Revolutions?', Occasional Paper No. 18, Center for
Cognitive Science, MIT.
Montague, R.: 1974, 'Deterministic Theories', in R. H. Thomason (ed.), Formal
Philosophy: Selected Papers of Richard Montague, Yale University Press.
Pearce, D.: 1982, 'Stegmiiller on Kuhn and Incommensurability', The British Journal for
the Philosophy of Science 33, 389-396.
Putnam, H.: 1967, 'Mathematics without Foundations', The Journal of Philosophy 64,
5-22.
Sneed, J. D.: 1971, The Logical Structure of Mathematical Physics, Dordrecht.
Stegmiiller, W.: 1979, The Structuralist View of Theories, Berlin-Heidelberg-New York,
Tarski, A.: 1966, Einfiihrung in die mathematische Logik, 2nd ed., G6ttingen.

Manuscript received 22 February 1984

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