MARTTI KUOKKANEN

THE POZNAIq SCHOOL METHODOLOGY OF

IDEALIZATION AND CONCRETIZATION
FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF A REVISED
STRUCTURALIST THEORY CONCEPTION*

ABSTRACT. My thesis is that some methodological ideas of the Poznafi school, i.e.,
the principles of idealization and concretization (factualization), and the correspondence
principle can be represented rather successfully using the relations of theoretization and
specialization of revised structuralism.
Let (a(i), l(j)) (i = 1. . . . m, j = 1. . . . k) denote the conceptual apparatus of a theory
T, and a class M = { ( D , n ( i ) , t(j))} (i= 1. . . . m , j = 1. . . . k) the models of T. The
n-components refer to the values of dependent variables and t-components to the
values of independent variables of the theory. The n- and l-components in turn
represent appropriate concepts. Consider T* as a conceptual enrichment of T with
concepts (n(i*),t(j*)) ( i < i * or j < j * ) and models M * = { ( D * , n ( i * ) , t ( j * ) ) } . If the
classes M and M* are suitably related, then the situation illustrates both the case of the
theoretization-relation of (revised) structuralism and of the factualization-principle of
the Poznafi school.
Assume now that the concepts n(i'), t(j') of T for some i', j' are operationalized using
some special assumptions generating appropriate empirical values n and t for these
concepts. Let M' denote the class {(D . . . . n . . . . t . . . . )} which is formed by substituting n
and t for values of concepts n(i'), t(j') in the elements of M. If the classes M and M' are
related in a suitable way then the situation is an example of both the specialization-
relation of (revised) structuralism and the concretization-principle of the Poznafi school.
The correspondence principle in turn can be represented as a limiting case of the
theoretization-relation of (revised) structuralism.

T h e m o s t d i s c u s s e d t o p i c s of p h i l o s o p h y o f s c i e n c e in t h e last d e c a d e
a r e p e r h a p s t h e p r o b l e m s of r a t i o n a l i t y o f t h e o r y c h o i c e a n d g r o w t h of
knowledge. These problems have generated very different reactions
r e f l e c t i n g d i f f e r e n t b a s i c v i e w s o f d i f f e r e n t p h i l o s o p h i c a l s c h o o l s . In
this p a p e r I'll c o n s i d e r s o m e p a r a l l e l s b e t w e e n t w o m e t a s c i e n t i f i c
s c h o o l s , t h e s o - c a l l e d s t r u c t u r a l i s m s c h o o l a n d t h e P o z n a f i s c h o o l of
methodology. The problems of the rationality of scientific change and
t h e g r o w t h o f k n o w l e d g e in t h e m s e l v e s h a v e in this p a p e r o n l y a
s e c o n d a r y r o l e . M y p r i m a r y i n t e r e s t is to j u s t i f y t h e t h e s i s t h a t s o m e
c e n t r a l m e t h o d o l o g i c a l i d e a s a n d s t a n d a r d s of t h e P o z n a f i s c h o o l c a n
b e a d e q u a t e l y r e p r e s e n t e d in t h e f o r m a l f r a m e w o r k o f a r e v i s e d
structuralism.

Erkenntnis 28 (1988) 97-115.

(~) 1988 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
98 MARTTI KUOKKANEN

Prima facie the methodological and philosophical starting points of

these metatheoretic schools are entirely different. Structuralism
identifies scientific theories directly (without explicit reference to
linguistic entities) with certain set-theoretic structures. The Poznafi
school in turn analyzes scientific theories, i.e., collections of scientific
laws as linguistic entities, as (collections of) implications (condition-
als). According to the Poznafi school, the general scheme of a quan-
titative law may be presented as follows: 1
(1) Vx(C(x) ~ F(x) = 0).
Here the symbols have the following meanings; ~ denotes material
implication; x refers to a material object; C(x) presents a set of
conditions; F(x) = 0 in turn specifies a dependence (equation) which is
fulfilled under conditions C(x). More specifically, C formulated in a
given period of time determines a set of objects which is called a
supposed domain of a law, denoted by Dora, i.e., Dora = {x{C(x)}. On
the other hand, the equation F(x) = 0 has a more explicit form
(2) F(a(x), b(x) . . . . ) = O,
where a(x), b(x) . . . . refer to the parameters (values of variables) of
each object (of a certain kind) x.
It is worth stressing that the methodology of the Poznafi school is
entirely empirical; the conditions C(x) refer to concretely realizable
(experimental) test-conditions. 2 So, from the point of view of realist
philosophy it might be more appropriate to call the set of objects
which fulfill the relevant conditions the (experimental) empirical test-
domain of a law instead of using the name "supposed domain".
Next I'll introduce the relevant fragments of a revised structuralism.
According to the present revised version of structuralism, 3 scientific
theories are reconstructed as pairs of sets of structures, X = (Mp, M),
called potential m + k-theory-elements. Mp = {(D, nl . . . . nm, tl . . . . tk)}
is called the class of potential models of the theory, and M, M ~ Mp
(M :/: 0) in turn is called the class of the models of the theory; i.e., M
consists of these structures in Mp which satisfy the [actual, semantical
(and mathematical) axioms of the theory. Moreover, each potential
theory-element is assigned a linguistic (conceptual) structure
(nl . . . . nm, tt . . . . tk), called the factual-intensional model of the
theory. It is thus quite natural to consider the elements of M (and Mp)
as interpretations of appropriate "formulas" and "statements" for-
 THE POZNAIq SCHOOL METHODOLOGY 99

mulated via (nl . . . . nm, tx . . . . tk). For our purpose, it is not at all
necessary to specify this "language". It is quite satisfactory on this
point to speak about the conceptual apparatus of the theors which is
designated by the structure (nl . . . . n,,, t~ . . . . tk).
Consider next the relations of an arbitrary element
(D, nl . . . . nm, tl . . . . tk) of Mp (or M) and the n- and t-components of
the conceptual apparatus. T h e set D denotes a (potentially infinite)
multi-sorted domain, called the intended domain (or reference class) of
the theory. T h e components ni (i = 1 . . . . m) and tj (j = 1 . . . . k) in
turn denote the values (of extensions) of appropriate predicates and
functors ni, tj defined o v e r appropriate sorts. T h e components ni and tj
refer specifically to the values of dependent and of independent
(explanatory) variables (of the theory). This distinction is specified in
the factual-intensional model of the theory according to the basic
hypotheses.

1. THE FIRST PARALLEL OF STRUCTURALISM AND

THE POZNA/q SCHOOL: METHODOLOGY

Consider now the following potential l + 3-theory-element with Mp =

{(D, y, x, a, b)} and M = { ( D , y , x , a , b ) l y = a x + b }. Here y is the
only n-component, and the rest, i.e., x, a, b, are the t-components of
the theory. T h e only interesting factual axiom of the theory is expres-
sed by the equation y = ax + b; the other of the axioms - i.e., seman-
tical, mathematical and other possible factual axioms of the theory are
not relevant for the purposes of this paper.
Consider now the equation y = ax + b in a little more detail. In
typical cases, y and x as values of variables and a and b as values of
parameters are logically analyzable as values of appropriate functions.
Their types are defined via the conceptual apparatus using its ap-
propriate assumptions. T o simplify assume the variables y, x and the
parameters a, b are of the following type (specified by concepts y, x, a
and b):

(3) y = f~(dl)
x = [2(d:)
a = f3(d3)
b =/,,(d,).
100 MARTTI KUOKKANEN

Hence, the factual assumption, expressed by the equation

(4) y = ax + b
is representable in the following form:
(5) f , ( d , ) = (f3(d3)f2(d2)) + f4(d4).
Now (5) is clearly an exemplification of the general functional depen-
dence expressed by (2) above. It would be quite trivial to identify the
parallel of the factual axiom y = ax + b with the consequence-part
F ( x ) = 0 of (1). But there is a non-trivial alternative for this. Instead of
the factual axiom of the theory, i.e., y = a x + b , we identify the
parallel of the consequence-part F ( x ) = 0 of a law (expressed by (1))
with appropriate fragments of elements of (potential) models of the
theory. For this some technical notions are needed.
Let ( M p , M ) be a potential m + k-theory-element. A class (of
structures) {(ni. . . . . ni:, t j , , . . , tj. )1 there is an x ~ M p such that each
n~. . . . . n~:, i~<i*, v ~ < i * - i + l , occurs as the ith . . . . i*th n-com-
ponent of x, respectively, and each ti. . . . . tj*, j ~< j*, s ~< j* - j + 1,
occurs as the jth . . . . j*th t-component of x, respectively} is called a
f r a g m e n t class f o r m e d with regard to the concepts n~. . . . . ni:, tj . . . . . t~*.
If every element of such a class can be expanded to an element of the
class M then such a class is called a model f r a g m e n t class f o r m e d with
regard to the concepts n~,, . . . ni., t j , , . . , tj. .
Intuitively the notion of a (model) fragment class allows the partial
consideration of a theory via fragments of its (potential) models. Two
special cases of (model) fragments are structures which lack only the
domain-component, as well as the structures which consist of only
values of one concept. Now the first special case is appropriate for our
purposes.
Return now to our example of the i + 3 - t h e o r y - e l e m e n t with the
factual axiom expressed by the equation y = ax + b. Consider the
following model fragment class
(6) {(y,x,a,b)l(D, y,x,a,b)cM}.
Now I propose that the set-theoretic (structuralist) parallel of the
consequence-part F ( x ) = 0 of the general form of a law of the Poznafi
school is exactly the special type of a model fragment class which
lacks only the domain component. Such structures consist precisely of
these values (extensions) of concepts of the theory which are com-
patible with the (factual) axioms of the theory. Specifically in the case
 THE POZNAN SCHOOL METHODOLOGY 101

when the theory or law is quantitative - i.e., the conceptual machinery

of the theory consists of (real-valued) functions (functors) - any such
value-structure of appropriate variables (values of functions) is an
element of an appropriate model fragment class if and only if this
value-structure satisfies the factual axioms (or laws) of the theory
(expressed by appropriate functional dependencies).
For convenience it is appropriate to call the fragment class which
lacks only the domain-component (D-component) the F - f r a g m e n t
class, and call the corresponding model fragment class the F - m o d e l
f r a g m e n t class, to clarify, if the factual-intensional model of a
theory is of form (n~ . . . . IIIm,tl . . . . | k ) , then the class
{ ( n l , . . . n,,, tl . . . . tk)[(D, nl . . . . n,., tl . . . . tk)~ Mp} is called the F-
f r a g m e n t class of the theory. Similarly, the class {(nl . . . . n,.,
tl . . . . tk)[(D, n l . . . . r i m , t I . . . . tk) ~ M } is called the F - m o d e l f r a g m e n t
class of the theory.
So far we have found that the structuralist (set-theoretic) parallel of
the consequence-part of the Poznafi-type form of a law is expressible
as the F-model fragment class of a theory. Now what about the
antecedent-part of the Poznafi-type form of a law? May its struc-
turalist (set-theoretic) parallel be identified with the intended domain
D (D-component) of the models of a theory?
The Poznafi school differentiates two extreme cases relative to the
epistemic-methodological nature of scientific laws. 4 According to this
school, a scientific law is called factual if its supposed domain consists
of real, empirically existing objects. When we know that a law has no
real domain, we call this law idealizational. The domain of an ideal-
izational law consists of ideal objects which don't really exist.
Moreover, the supposed domain of a law is construed using idealizing
or non-idealizing (=factual) conditions, i.e,, assumptions concerning
specific characteristic parameters p~ (i = 1 . . . . n). More specifically the
set of idealizing conditions have the form:
(7) pl(x) = 0 A p2(x) = 0 A 9 9 9 A pn(x) = 0;
and the set of non-idealizing (factual) conditions the form:
(8) p,(x) # o A p~(x) # 0 A " " A p.(X) # O.
According to the Poznafi school the criterion of ideal (real) objects is
mainly related to our knowledge, but it also has metaphysical ele-
ments: we k n o w that the characteristic parameters of all real objects
have non-zero values, i.e., the clause (8) holds for them; on the other
102 MARTTI KUOKKANEN

hand, if some of the characteristic parameters are assumed as zero-

valued, the object under consideration is ideal, i.e., it doesn't really
exist. Hence, the clause (7) expresses the maximal idealizing conditions
relative to our knowledge of the characteristic parameters.
Some critical comments are in order. First, we don't need to accept
the (idealizational) empiricism which is the basic philosophy of the
differentiation between ideal - real objects in the form presented
above. Hence, it is not necessary to accept the view which identifies
really existing with empirically existing. 5 Second, the clause (7) in-
dicates that some idealizing assumptions are made concerning the
values of the characteristic parameters. But this doesn't mean - I feel
- that some new kind, i.e., ideal (or really non-existing) ontology has
been postulated. Rather the situation indicates that different kind of
assumptions have been made: more or less idealizing assumptions about
the very same objects.
In the following I'll sketch an alternative, realistic way to charac-
terize the factual content of a theory (of a law) and an empirical
methodology for testing it. The ideas of idealization - concretization
(factualization) of theories (laws) as an empirical testing methodology
can be associated in a very nice and natural way.

2. INTENDED APPLICATIONS OF THEORIES

For several reasons it is appropriate to differentiate between a theory

and its empirical applications. So it is possible to make a differen-
tiation between " p u r e " (or some cases also "potential") theories and
applied theories, i.e., " p u r e " theories cure their empirico-technical
application-assumptions. Such differentiation is necessary for a realist
interpretation of theories, for if we can't identify theories independent
of their empirical content (applications), we can't make sense using
realist (non-empiricist) semantics of scientific terms (and theories). It is
also methodologically extremely important to keep separate the fac-
tual content of a theory and the (pragmatical) empirical evidence for a
theory. 6 Such differentiation is necessary if we want to use the concept
of theory-independent evidence in a relevant manner. For instance
critical test-procedures presuppose theory -independent evidence. It is
worth noting that the concept of theory-independent evidence doesn't
presuppose that we should give up the so-called thesis of theory-
ladeness of perceptions. On the contrary, it is relevant to explicate
 THE POZNAN SCHOOL METHODOLOGY 103

these application-assumptions of a theory which make the "raw" data

or "raw" perceptions conceptually appropriate for testing (and apply-
ing) the theory. These assumptions may be called the structural and
semantical operationalizing assumptions of a theory, and they are
allowed to vary without causing any changes in the identity-conditions
of a " p u r e " theory. 7
Let T = (Mp, M) be a (potential) m + k-theory-element with the
factual-intensional model (nl . . . . n,,, t! . . . . tk). Then a class (of struc-
tures) {(D r, nlt . . . . n~, t ~ , . . , t~)[ 1 ~< l + h ~< m + k} constitutes a class
of intended applications of T given D r is a non-empty class called the
empirical (experimental) domain of T, and each component n~, tjI of
any structure (D r, n[ . . . . n~, t{ . . . . t~,) is (a value of) an empirical
variable representing some observable and/or measurable and/or
manipulable aspect of intended domain D of the theory-element T as
an empirical, operational counterpart of appropriate n- and t-concepts
of T. Moreover, it is assumed that (values of) empirical variables
n~, tj are independent of values hi, tj of those n- and t-concepts for
which they stand as empirical, operational counterparts. In general,
neither the sorts of the intended domain D and of the empirical
(experimental) domain D r nor the types of n/s, tj's and of their
corresponding operational counterparts n~r's, tJ's need coincide with
each other.
Empirical variables n~, t~r may be defined over (sorts of) the in-
tended domain D or over (sorts of) the empirical (experimental)
domain D r (or perhaps at least in social sciences most usually over
sorts of both D and Dr). The first case is an exemplification of direct
operationalization, i.e., (some) aspects of intended domain D are
directly empirically operationalizable. The second case indicates the
situation in which the direct empirical manipulation of some aspect of
the intended domain is not possible (relative to the present "know
how", knowledge and abilities). So the best that can be done is done
indirectly using "auxiliary" sorts of elements of D r .

3. EMPIRICAL TEST-APPLICATIONS OF THEORIES

Some structural and semantical assumptions of operationalizing a

theory were under consideration above. These are the assumptions
which are relevant for making the data conceptually adequate for
methodological purposes. One of the most important methodological
104 MARTTI KUOKKANEN

purposes is perhaps the evaluation of the (empirical) adequacy of the

theory. This is done by testing the theory critically.
In testing situations, i.e., in " g e n u i n e " experimental or quasi-
experimental situations there are more or less justified assumptions
with a special role. These assumptions consist of different views
concerning the function of controllable and uncontrollable factors in
operationalizing situations: First there is an infinite set of factors which
are considered as irrelevant relative to the present state of knowledge
and abilities. Second, we may differentiate two finite classes of relevant
factors; manipulable factors which we cause to vary and manipulable
factors which we make stable, ceteris paribus. We see the former of
these as relevant for the present operationalizing and testing situation,
and usually there are definite assumptions concerning the effects of
these factors.
Technically this somewhat idealized experimental testing situation
can be represented in our formalism using a finite set of functions ei
( i = 1. . . . ) as follows. T h e r e is exactly one function ei for each
relevant experimental factor and different realizable conditions of this
factor are expressed as values of the function ei. So, in the most trivial
cases the realizable experimental conditions are represented using a
set of dichotomious variables. In general the relevant control and
manipulable factors in experiment situations are representable as (real
valued) numerical structures of form (e* . . . . e*).
T h e basic idea of an experimental situation (or more generally the
basic idea of experimental research) from the point of view of the
present formalism is to discover or specify exactly the conditions on
which we can produce the empirically relevant data for the theory.
Now let the intended applications of a theory consist of structures of
form ( D I, n / . . . . n/, t~. . . . t~,). The basic problem of experimental
research is to find the experimental condition(s) (e* . . . . e*) which
generate(s) appropriate empirical structures ( D I, n~ . . . . n[, tl . . . . t~,).
At last in ideal cases this basic idea can be represented as a hypo-
thetical functional dependence between experimental conditions ei,
I
and empirical variables hi, tj, as an experimental function exp as
follows:
(9) exp((e* . . . . e*)) = ( D r, n~ . . . . hi, t( . . . . t~).
In testing situations empirical values n* . . . . t* . . . . are generated
using manipulable factors, i.e., realizing and making experimental
 THE POZNAlq SCHOOL METHODOLOGY 105

conditions el*. . . . es vary. That is, the conceptually relevant and

methodologically adequate data are generated based upon these par-
ticular assumptions which specify the semantical and structrual rele-
vance as well as the functioning of different experimental factors in
operationalizing empirical situations.
Let the class of intended applications of a theory T be
{(Dr, n~ . . . . n~, t~ . . . . t/)}. Then, the elements of this class are
generated using appropriate semantical and structural assumptions
(axioms) as sketched above. Assume that for every element of this
class there are realizable experimental conditions e* . . . . es such that
the relevant assumptions exp concerning the functioning of ex-
perimental factors e~. . . . e~ are fulfilled. Call this class
Ie = { ( D r, rll* .... n*, t* . . . . t*)[ there are e* . . . . e* such that
( D r, n* . . . . n*, t* . . . . t*) = exp((e* . . . . e*))} a class of possible
experimental results of a theory T. Hence, possible experimental results
of a theory are generated by assumptions concerning semantical and
structural relevance as well as the functioning of experimental factors
of empirical testing situations.

4. THE SECOND PARALLEL OF STRUCTURALISM AND

THE POZNAIq SCHOOL: METHODOLOGY

Now we are ready to return to the question how to identify the parallel
of the antecedent-part of the Poznafi-style law. The fully idealized and
fully concretized (factualized) forms of laws are respectively8
(10) Cv(X) A p l ( x ) = O A "'" A p , ( x ) = O ~ F ( x ) = O
and
(11) CF(x) A p l ( x ) - ~ O A ' ' " Ap,(x)~O~F~")(x)=O.
Comparing formulas (10) and (11) now gives the following: First, the
component denoted by Cv doesn't change at all. This might be
interpreted such that the conditions generating the supposed domain
do not change relative to the characteristic parameters p~. Second,
more or less systematic assumptions concerning the values of the
characteristic parameters p~ generate more or less systematic alter-
ations to the form of the consequence-part of the law, i.e., the
(functional) dependence F ( x ) = 0 changes to F~")(x)= 0. Let's pass
over the changes of the (functional) dependence for a moment and
106 MARTTI KUOKKANEN

concentrate upon the characterization of CF and pi's from the point of

view of structuralism.
Recalling now the empiricism of the Poznafi school it is very natural
to identify the structuralist parallel of the C~-component with the
empirical (experimental) domain D I of possible experimental
results Ie = {(D I, n* . . . . n*, t* . . . . t * ) l ( D I, n* . . . . n*, t* . . . . t*) =
exp((e* . . . . e*))}. Second, it is natural to think that the structuralist
parallels of the characteristic parameters pl are identifiable as the
relevant control and manipulable factors denoted by el . . . . es. Hence,
the antecedent-part of a Poznafi-style law is identifiable structuralis-
tically using two types of components of the technical notion of
possible experimental results. The empirical (experimental) domain D I
fixes the parameter-independent part CF of the supposed domain; and
- realizing some experimental conditions e * , . . . e *s, i.e., making some
control and manipulable factors to function and preventing the func-
tion of some others - constitutes the values of appropriate charac-
teristic parameters pi ~ 0.
Earlier in this paper, I proposed that the consequence-part of the
Poznafi-type law, i.e., the dependence F ( x ) = O, might be identifiable
with the appropriate F-model fragment class. Now assuming that every
concept of a given theory element is empirically operationalizable, the
parallels between the present version of structuralism and the type
of law of the Poznafi-school methodology are complete. So, given
that every component of the factual-intensional model
(nl . . . . n , , , t l . . . . tk) is adequately operationalizable and relevant
elements of possible experimental results are of the form
( D I, n * , . . , n,~,* t~ . . . . t*) = exp((e*, . .. e*)), then the exp-assump-
tions generate the appropropriate empirical F-model fragment class
{ ( n * , . . . rim,* t*, . .. t~)} given e*, . .. e* hold. This special case exem-
plifies extreme empiricism. But in general every concept of a theory-
element need not be operationalizable.

5. T I l E CONCRETIZATION PROCESS OF THEORIES

Consider now a theory-element with the factual-intensional model

(nl . . . . n,,, tl . . . . tk). Assume for simplicity that only two concepts,
say n~ and t j, are empirically operationalized for critical testing.
Hence, we have found some relevant control and manipulable factors,
say ei for ni and ej for t j, and according to our assumptions the
 THE POZNAIq SCHOOL METHODOLOGY 107

realization of empirical (experimental) situations of a relevant kind

produces adequate experimental results, i.e.,

(12) (n*, t*) = exp((e*, e*)).

Now we may concretize our theory in two different ways. First, we

might find some new ]:actors, eextra, which affect the empirical values of
the operationalized concepts ni, tj. Hence, instead of (12) we have

(13) (n**, t**)= exp'((e*, e*, e ex,ra)).

*
Between empirical fragments (n*, t*) and (n**, t**) there might exist
different relations. 9
On the other hand, we might happen to learn to use our theory in
such a way which makes it possible to handle empirically some
concept thus far empirically non-manipulable. In this case we have
empirical fragments of the form
(14) (n*, t*, no* tra) or <n*, t*, textra)
*
generated by appropriate experimental assumptions including possibly
some new experimental assumptions. Both cases are clearly instances
of the concretization process of a theory, but it is important to see that
they are of different types. Case (13) relative to (12) indicates in the
first place the expansion ,of our know-how concerning empirical
(experimental) technics. Case (14) relative to (12) in turn indicates
that we have learned to handle empirically (experimentally) some
aspects of reality which thus far have been beyond experimental
techniques. In fact, Poznafi school -methodologists do not consider the
latter case at all.
It is easy to justify the Poznafi-school view of concretization of
theories as adequately representative of a special case of an opera-
tionalizing and testing process of a revised structuralist viewpoint. 1~
Assume now that we have found exactly n relevant empirical experi,
ment- and test-factors, denoted by e l , . . , e,. Moreover, assume that
no experimental innovations will occur, i.e., no new test factor ee~tra
will be found. We generate possible experiment results as follows: First
we vary the first factor, say put one as its value and keep the others
constant, say as zero. Then we vary both the first and second factors
and keep the rest constant, and so on. This procedure generates the
following sequence:
108 MARTTI KUOKKANEN

(15) el = 1, e 2 = O . . . . e n = O 1st step

el = 1, e2 = 1, e 3 = O . . . . e . = O 2nd step

el = 1, e2 = 1. . . . e , = 1 nth step.

T h e n we might wait to see what happens to the values of opera-

tionalized concepts hi, tj. If our assumptions concerning the effects of
relevant factors (exp-assumptions) are true or approximately true, then
we have justified our expectations of what happens to values of
operationalized concepts, n T h e results are recorded as possible
experiment results {(D I, n* . . . . t * , . . . ) ] there are e* . . . . e* such that
( D I, n* . . . . t* . . . . ) = exp((e* . . . . e*))}. This shows that this process
expresses the relation of concretization of the theories of the Poznafi
school.
Let Ii denote the set of possible experiment results generated by the
ith step of schema (15). If for every i, j, i < j holds
(16) /j ~/~,
then schema (15) generates the structuralist specialization-relation
upon possible experiment results. If there is an i such that for every
j l , ]2,
" ]1,
.t ]2,
.p i < jl < j2, i < j~ < j~ holds

(17) Ih c_ Ih c_ I,, Ifi ~_ Ij[ c_ I , but lh N Ij; r O,

then schema (15) generates branching specialization-relation upon
possible experiment resultsJ 2 It seems that the Poznafi-school
methodologists do not notice the possibility of branching at all. This
excludes for instance the possibility of branching correspondence-
relation. And finally it is worth noting that the various assumptions
concerning experimental factors might be (totally) inconsistent. This
happens if for every j there is an i, i < j, such that the relation
(18) Ii A / j = 0
holds.

6. FACTUALIZATION OF THEORIES

So far the methodology of the Poznafi school has been considered in

the context of testing theories. T h e Poznafi school term " c o n -
cretization" is essentially reserved in this paper to refer to empirical
 THE POZNAN SCHOOL METHODOLOGY 109

testing situations. ~3 This implies that theories should be considered as

a form which allows empirical testing, i.e., different operationalizing
assumptions are relevant. But from a general philosophical point of
view there is an interesting theoretical (non-empirical) level, too. For
instance, the problems of concept formation belong to these theoreti-
cal aspects of methodology, and these problems need not have any-
thing directly to do with empirical problems. At least there need not
exist any direct connections between these two aspects. So, to a certain
extent, the problems of conceptual enrichment need not have any
direct contact with empirical problems of theories. Particularly, if we
accept a realist view of theories, we might have a special interest in
trying to make our theories more informative, more explanatory, more
truthlike etc. Conceptual enrichment of theories might together with
growth of informativeness, truthlikeness and explanatory power give
us instruments for these purposes. 14 Roughly speaking, conceptual
enrichment of theories allows us to manage conceptually more aspects
of reality than before. And if it happens that the conceptually enriched
theory turns out to be more truthlike than the conceptually p o o r e r
theory, isn't it justifiable to say that we now have more a factual
picture of some aspects of reality, or that we now have factually more
complete theory than before? This is so, because we have factualized
the theory by conceptual innovations. I think that even in the case
where the conceptually enriched theory turns out to be false when
tested empirically we might say that we have a potentially more
factual, even if a false picture of reality.
Consider now a theory-element T with its factual-intensional model
(n~ . . . . n , . , t ~ , . . , tk). A conceptual enrichment of T occurs by our
introducing some new concepts, n,, or tk+j (i >/1, j/> 1). Recalling
that n-concepts are primarily used for description of puzzling
p h e n o m e n a and t-concepts for explanatory purposes, we might
differentiate explanatory conceptual enrichment (using t-concepts)
from descriptive conceptual enrichment (using n-concepts). Hence,
conceptual enrichment means a transition from the old conceptual
machinery (nl . . . . n,,,,tl . . . . tk) to a new and richer one of form
(nl . . . . nm, n,,+l . . . . n,, tl . . . . tk, tk+l . . . . tl). T h e (possible) models of
the enriched theory are of different type, i.e., M' =
{(D', nl . . . . rim, n,,+l . . . . n,, tl . . . . tk, tk+l . . . . tt)}. 15
Let T and T' be r e + k - and n + / - t h e o r y - e l e m e n t s , n = m + i ,
l = k + j), i.e., T' is a conceptual enrichment of T. Let M and M',
respectively, denote their models. Define two projective functions f
110 MARTTI KUOKKANEN

and f * as follows:
(19) [ f((D', nl . . . . nm, nm+~. . . . n , , , t~, . . . t k , t k + , . . . . tl)) =
= (D, nl . . . . n,,,, tl . . . . ta), and
f*((n, . . . . n,~, nm+, . . . . n., tl . . . . tk, tk+l . . . . h)) =
= (nl . . . . nm, tl . . . . tk).

T h e n it holds for every ni, tj ( i ~ < m , i ~ < k ) : if ni or tj occurs as a

c o m p o n e n t of some x e D i ( f ) , n'i or t~ occurs as a c o m p o n e n t of some
x* ~ Dr(f*) and ni = n'. tj = t~, then n~ occurs as the ith component of
f(x) iff n'~ occurs as the ith c o m p o n e n t of f*(x*) and ti occurs as the
jth c o m p o n e n t of f(x) iff t~ occurs as the ]th c o m p o n e n t of f*(x*).
Denote by M~,k, M.,~ the F-model fragment classes of T and T',
respectively. Assume that for every x* e DAf*) holds: f*(x*) 9 Mm,k.
T h e n there is an x 9 Dr(f) such that f ( x ) ~ M. If it also holds that
D1(f*) c M..t then D~(f) c_ M'. And if for every z e Mm,k there is an
x* 9 M.,t such that z = f*(x*) then there is a y' 9 M' for every y 9 M
such that y = f(y'). All these propositions follow directly from the
definitions of- the functions f and f * and from the definition of model
fragment classes. And the last of them exemplifies the relation of
theoretization of structuralism. ~6
T h e principle of factualization can be presented analogously to the
principle of concretization described above. Assume that a conceptual
enrichment occurs introducing one concept at time. Denote by fi, f*
the functions defined by the schema (19) which project appropriate
(possible) models and appropriate F-(model) fragments into (possible)
models and F-(model) fragments preceding the ith conceptual
enrichment, i.e., to the i t h - 1 conceptual enrichment, respectively.
D e n o t e appropriate models and appropriate F-model fragments by M ~
and Mi, respectively. Assume that for every i (i > 1) the relation
(20) Du(f*) ~_ DI(fL1) ~_ M~-I
or the relation
(21) Dn(f,) ~_ D , ( f , - 0 ~ M ' - '
holds. T h e n the following holds for every i (i > 1):
(22) f*[M~] ~_ M~_~ if and only if/~[M'] _ M '-1.
This proposition is an immediate consequence of the definitions of the
functions f~ and f* and of the definition of model fragment classes.
 THE POZNAI~ SCHOOL METHODOLOGY 111

T h e condition fi[M~]~_ M ~-~ is sufficient for the existence of the

theoretization-relation of structuralism between theory-elements T~
and Ti-~ because the function fi maps the models of T~ into the
models of T H . On the other hand, consider two theory-elements T~_~
and T~ with classes of models {(D, nl . . . . rim, t1 . . . . tH)} and
{(D', n~ . . . . n,,, q , . . . t~_~, t~)}, respectively. Let t~ = 0 and define gi as
follows:
(23) g~((D', n, . . . . n,,, t h . . . t,-1, t,)),
= ( D , nl . . . . n,,, tl . . . . ti-l), if tl = 0.
Now (23) exemplifies with respect to one concept, t~ the relation of
factualization of the Poznafi school 9
More generally, define projective functions ~,~, fs*i analogously to
the schema (19), i.e., these functions project j - c o m p o n e n t structures
to / - c o m p o n e n t structures. T h e n the schemas

(24) f j , i ( ( D ' , n, . . . . nm, t,, . . . tk)), ( m + k = j)

= ( D , n m , . . , rim,, q . . . . t k , ) , ( m ' + k ' = i)

and
(25) f ~ , i ( ( n , . . . . n , . , t, . . . . tk)), ( m + k = j)
= ( n ~ , . . . n,,,, tl . . . . tk'), ( m ' + k ' = i)

generate the factualization-principle of the Poznafi school as their

special case when the appropriate p a r a m e t e r s i + 1 . . . . j are kept as
zeros (or as some other constants). T h e relations (24) and (25) are
each exemplifications of a generalized theoretization-relation.
D e n o t e by M * - i the model f r a g m e n t class { ( n * , . . 9 n .*, t* .... t*)}
which is formed with regard to the n e w concepts and by Mi the
F - m o d e l f r a g m e n t class {(n~ . . . . t~. . . . )} which consists of values of old
concepts. D e n o t e by M = {(D, n~ . . . . t~. . . . )} the models of the " o l d "
t h e o r y - e l e m e n t and M* = {(D', n~, . . n. * ., . . n ,*, tl . . . . t* . . . . t*)} the
models of the enriched theory-element. Now if M*_i and M~ are
inconsistent in the following sense, then we have an exemplification of
the so called correspondence-principle of the Poznafi school. 17
If for every (nl . . . . tl . . . . ) c Mi there is an element
(n'l . . . . (1 . . . . ) ~ ~ and an F-model fragment element
(n~, . . n. * ., . . n,,* tl, . . . . .t*,
. t*) of the enriched theory-element
such that
112 MARTTI KUOKKANEN

(26)(a) fj*i((n,, . . n*, . . . .n.,t,,*. . . . t*,. . .t*))=(n,,. . . '. tl,' .),

(b) fj*,i((nl . . . . . .n*,
. . . .n * n,. tl, t~, . t~))
= ( h i , 9 . . t h . ..), as n * , . . . n ,*, t* . . . . t* go to zero (or to
some other constant)
(c) (n'l . . . . (1 . . . . ) approximates (nl . . . . q . . . . ) and
(d) ( n * , . . 9 n .*, t * . . . . t * ) ~ M * _ h if n * = 0 . . . . n .*= 0 , t*=
0 . . . . t* = 0, (or these variables have some other specific
values)
then the schema (26) gives the relation of correspondence of the
Poznafi school.
Poznafi school methodologists do not give any exact definition of
the correspondence principle. In fact they have presented in the
literature several incompatible versions of this n o t i o n ) s So I argue by
means of a typical example of correspondence-relation (principle) that
schema (26) really has as its instance this principle.
Consider the so called Ohm's law which states that when an electric
current flows through a conductor the tension between its ends is
equal to the product of the intensity of current and the resistance of
the conductor, i.e., Vo = Rolo. If the circuit contains a condenser with
an electric charge Q and a capacity C, and a coil with self-induction
L, then the situation can be presented by means of the so-called
differential law of current. This law has the following form:
V = RI + L(dI/dt) + Q/C.
Consider fragments {(V, R, I, L, Q, C) I V = R I + L ( d I / d t ) + Q/C}
and {( Vo, Ro, Io)l Vo = Rolo}. Consider the following projection

g6,3(( V, R, I, L, Q, C))
= [ i V o , Ro, Io) if R = Ro, I = Io and L--* 0, C---> oo,
I iV, R, 1) otherwise.
Obviously g6.3 is a function. In general Vo ~ V although Ro = R and
Io = I if L -~ 0, C r Hence i Vo, Ro, Io) ~=i V, R , I) although Ro = R
and Io = I. But if Ro = R , Io = I when L-->0, C--->oo then V--> Vo
because Vo = R I and V = R I + L ( d I / d t ) + Q / C . This shows that for
any fragment ( V * , R * , I * ) c { i V o , Ro, Io)l Vo = Rolo} there is a frag-
ment i V*, R*, 1 " ) c {i V, R, I)lthere are L, Q, C such that V = R1 +
L ( d I / d t ) + Q / C } and iV*, R*, I*) approximates i V * , R*, I*) as L--->
0, C---> oo. Hence, the clause (c) of the schema (26) is fulfilled. On the
 THE POZNAlq SCHOOL METHODOLOGY 113

other hand as L--* 0, C--~ o0 the fragment (L, C ) r {(L, C) I there are
V, R, I, O such that V = RI+ L(dI/dt)+ Q/C} because in general it
holds L -~ 0, C ~ ~. This shows that the clause (d) of the schema (26)
is fulfilled. The definition of g6,3 in turn fulfils the clauses (a) and (b) of
the schema (26). This concludes the demonstration.

NOTES

* Many thanks to my anonymous referees for critical and fruitful comments and special
thanks to Dr. Carol Norris for correcting the language of this paper.
1 Krajewski (1977a, b) are the main references for this paper so far as the views of the
Poznafi school are under consideration. For some philosophically relevant divergencies
and nuances of the Poznafi school see also Nowak (1975a, b, c; 1976a, b).
2 However, the Poznafi school is no monolithic metatheoretic school. It shows clear
reflections of both empiricism and realism and its representatives especially stress the
Marxian roots of the school. For this, see for example Krajewski (1977a).
3 I have presented the basic motivation of the revision of structuralism and also the
reformulated structuralism elsewhere and I prefer not to repeat them here. See Kuok-
kanen (1986a, b, c) for this.
4 See for example Krajewski (1977b).
5 At this point there are philosophically extremely important differences within the
Poznafi school. For example it seems that Krajewski (1977a, b) represents radical
(idealizational) empiricism and Nowak (1975a, b , c ; 1976a, b) radical (idealizational)
realism when they are compared from this ontologico-epistemological angle.
6 For this see Tuomela (1978).
7 The problems of operationalizing and testing theories from the point of view of
structuralism are analyzed more systematically and comprehensively in Kuokkanen
(1986c).
8 See Krajewski (1977a, b).
9 Some of these are analyzed later in this paper.
~o I prefer the term 'concretization' to the term 'factualization' in the context of
empirical techniques. I think that the term "factualization' is more appropriate in the
(theoretical) context of theory formation or theory-enrichment, i.e., it functions at "the
conceptual level" rather than at "the empirical level". Poznafi school methodologists do
not take this differentiation sufficiently into account. Compare for instance Krajewski
(1977a, b).
11 It is worth noting that this is also Cohen's starting point when he constructs his
system of inductive methods of empirical sciences. See Cohen (1970, 1977). It seems
that Cohen and Poznafi school methodologists share essentially the same basic views on
empirical research.
t2 For different theory-relations of structuralism see Balzer and Sneed (1977, 1978).
For the branching development of theory-sequences see Stegmiiller (1976).
~3 See note 10.
14 For a systematic analysis of these aspects of theory change see Tuomela (1985).
114 MARTTI KUOKKANEN

is The most general conceptual change where two theories share no common concept
can be adequately handled by the notion of conceptual correlation. For this see
Kuokkanen (1986a, b).
16 The essence of theoretization-relation is a function which maps the models of the
conceptually richer theory-element to the models of conceptually poorer theory-
element. And the function f does exactly this although there are little formal differences
between the function f and the required theoretization function of structuralism. See
Balzer and Sneed (1977, 1978).
17 For correspondence-principle see Krajewski (1977a, b). For different accounts of
approximation and idealization in a relevant context see Niiniluoto (1986) and Moulines
(1976, 1980).
t8 See Krajewski (1977a, b). For a comprehensive discussion on related problems see
Niiniluoto (1986).

REFERENCES

Balzer, W. and J. D. Sneed: 1977, 'Generalized Net Structures of Empirical Theories I',
Studia Logica Y~XVI, 196-211.
Balzer, W. and J. D. Sneed: 1978, 'Generalized Net Structures of Empirical Theories
II', Studia Logica XXXVII, 167-94.
Cohen, L. J.: 1970, The Implications o[ Induction, Methuen, London.
Cohen, L. J.: 1977, The Probable and the Provable, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Krajewski, W.: 1977a, Correspondence Principle and Growth o[ Science, D. Reidel,
Dordrecht.
Krajewski, W.: 1977b, 'Idealization and Factualization in Science', Erkennmis 11,
323-39.
Kuokkanen, M.: 1986a, 'On Conceptual Correlation', Erkennmis 25, 371-401.
Kuokkanen, M.: 1986b, 'Conceptual Correlation: An Example of Two Social Psycho-
logical Theories', Theory and Decision 20, 1-32.
Kuokkanen, M.: 1986c, 'The Hierarchical Structure of Testing Theories', submitted to
Erkenntnis.
Moulines, C. U.: 1976, 'Approximate Application of Empirical Theories: A General
Explication', Erkenntnis 10, 201-27.
Moulines, C. U.: 1980, 'Intertheoretic Approximation: The Kepler-Newton Case',
Synthese 45, 387-412.
Niiniluoto, I.: 1986, 'Theories, Approximations, and Idealizations', in R. Barcan Mar-
cus, G. J. W. Dorn, and P. Weingartner (eds.), Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of
Science VII, North-Holland, Amsterdam, pp. 255-89.
Nowak, L.: 1975a, 'Idealization: A Reconstruction of Marx's Ideas', Poznah Studies in
the Pholosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, Vol. l, No. 1.
Nowak, L.: 1975b, 'Idealization and the Problem of Correspondence', Poznarl Studies in
the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, Vol. 1, No. 1.
Nowak, L.: 1975c, 'Relative Truth, the Correspondence Principle and Absolute Truth',
Philosophy o[ Science 42, 187-202.
Nowak, L.: 1976a, 'Essence-Idealization-Praxis - An Attempt at a Certain Inter-
 MARTTI KUOKKANEN 115

pretation of the Marxist Concepts of Science', Poznati Studies in the Philosophy of the
Sciences and the Humanities, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 1-28.
Nowak, L.: 1976b, 'On Some Interpretation of the Marxist Methodology', Zeitschrift [iir
allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie VII/l, pp. 141-83.
Stegmiiller, W.: 1976, The Structure and Dynamics o]: Theories, Springer-Verlag, New
York.
Tuomela, R.: 1978, 'On the Structuralist Approach to the Dynamics of Theories',
Synthese 39, 211-31.
Tuomela, R.: 1985, Science, Action and Reality, D. Reidel, Dordrecht.

Manuscript submitted 9 August 1986

Final version received 9 March 1987

Department of Philosophy
University of Helsinki
Unioninkatu 40 B
00170 Helsinki
Finland