1. Tatad v.

Secretary garcia - gr no 114222, april 6, 1995

Section 11 of Article XII of the Constitution provides:

No franchise, certificate or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility
shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations
organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned
by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive character or
for a longer period than fifty years . . . (Emphasis supplied).

In law, there is a clear distinction between the "operation" of a public utility and the ownership
of the facilities and equipment used to serve the public.

While private respondent is the owner of the facilities necessary to operate the EDSA. LRT III, it
admits that it is not enfranchised to operate a public utility (Revised and Restated Agreement,
Sec. 3.2; Rollo, p. 57). In view of this incapacity, private respondent and DOTC agreed that on
completion date, private respondent will immediately deliver possession of the LRT system by
way of lease for 25 years, during which period DOTC shall operate the same as a common
carrier and private respondent shall provide technical maintenance and repair services to DOTC
(Revised and Restated Agreement, Secs. 3.2, 5.1 and 5.2; Rollo, pp. 57-58, 61-62). Technical
maintenance consists of providing (1) repair and maintenance facilities for the depot and rail
lines, services for routine clearing and security; and (2) producing and distributing maintenance
manuals and drawings for the entire system

2. 1st phil industrial corp v ca - gr no 125948, dec. 29 1998

Under the Petroleum Act of the Philippines (Republic Act 387), petitioner is considered a
"common carrier." Thus, Article 86 thereof provides that:

Art. 86. Pipe line concessionaire as common carrier. A pipe line shall have the
preferential right to utilize installations for the transportation of petroleum owned by him, but
is obligated to utilize the remaining transportation capacity pro rata for the transportation of
such other petroleum as may be offered by others for transport, and to charge without
discrimination such rates as may have been approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources.

Republic Act 387 also regards petroleum operation as a public utility. Pertinent portion of
Article 7 thereof provides:

that everything relating to the exploration for and exploitation of petroleum . . . and everything
relating to the manufacture, refining, storage, or transportation by special methods of
petroleum, is hereby declared to be a public utility. (Emphasis Supplied)

The Bureau of Internal Revenue likewise considers the petitioner a "common carrier." In BIR
Ruling No. 069-83, it declared:
. . . since [petitioner] is a pipeline concessionaire that is engaged only in transporting petroleum
products, it is considered a common carrier under Republic Act No. 387 . . . . Such being the
case, it is not subject to withholding tax prescribed by Revenue Regulations No. 13-78, as
amended.

3. Loadstar shipping co, inc. v ca - gr no 131621, Sept 28 1999

Anent the first assigned error, we hold that LOADSTAR is a common carrier. It is not necessary
that the carrier be issued a certificate of public convenience, and this public character is not
altered by the fact that the carriage of the goods in question was periodic, occasional, episodic
or unscheduled.
The records do not disclose that the M/V "Cherokee," on the date in question, undertook to
carry a special cargo or was chartered to a special person only. There was no charter party. The
bills of lading failed to show any special arrangement, but only a general provision to the effect
that the M/V"Cherokee" was a "general cargo carrier." 14 Further, the bare fact that the vessel
was carrying a particular type of cargo for one shipper, which appears to be purely coincidental,
is not reason enough to convert the vessel from a common to a private carrier, especially
where, as in this case, it was shown that the vessel was also carrying passengers.

Moving on to the second assigned error, we find that the M/V "Cherokee" was not seaworthy
when it embarked on its voyage on 19 November 1984. The vessel was not even sufficiently
manned at the time. "For a vessel to be seaworthy, it must be adequately equipped for the
voyage and manned with a sufficient number of competent officers and crew. The failure of a
common carrier to maintain in seaworthy condition its vessel involved in a contract of carriage
is a clear breach of its duty prescribed in Article 1755 of the Civil Code." 16

4. Sabena belgian world airlines v ca - gr no 104685 march 14 1996

Petitioner airline company, in contending that the alleged negligence of private respondent
should be considered the primary cause for the loss of her luggage, avers that, despite her
awareness that the flight ticket had been confirmed only for Casablanca and Brussels, and that
her flight from Brussels to Manila had yet to be confirmed, she did not retrieve the luggage
upon arrival in Brussels. Petitioner insists that private respondent, being a seasoned
international traveler, must have likewise been familiar with the standard provisions contained
in her flight ticket that items of value are required to be hand-carried by the passenger and that
the liability of the airline for loss, delay or damage to baggage would be limited, in any event, to
only US $20.00 per kilo unless a higher value is declared in advance and corresponding
additional charges are paid thereon.
The "loss of said baggage not only once but twice, said the appellate court, "underscores the
wanton negligence and lack of care" on the part of the carrier.
The Warsaw Convention however denies to the carrier availment of the provisions which
exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his wilful misconduct or by such default
on his part as, in accordance with the law of the court seized of the case, is considered to be
equivalent to wilful misconduct, or if the damage is (similarly) caused . . . by any agent of the
carrier acting within the scope of his employment

5. Monarch v ca gr no 92735 june 8 2000

We agree with the uniform finding of the lower courts that Aboitiz had failed to prove that it
observed the extraordinary diligence required of it as a common carrier. We therefore reiterate
our pronouncement in Aboitiz Corporation v. Court of Appeals 77 on the issue of Aboitiz'
liability in the sinking of its vessel, to wit:

In accordance with Article 1732 of the Civil Code, the defendant common carrier from the
nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is bound to observe extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by it
according to all circumstances of the case. While the goods are in the possession of the carrier,
it is but fair that it exercise extraordinary diligence in protecting them from loss or damage, and
if loss occurs, the law presumes that it was due to the carrier's fault or negligence; that is
necessary to protect the interest of the shipper which is at the mercy of the carrier . . . In the
case at bar, the defendant failed to prove hat the loss of the subject cargo was not due to its
fault or negligence. 78

The failure of Aboitiz to present sufficient evidence to exculpate itself from fault and/or
negligence in the sinking of its vessel in the face of the foregoing expert testimony constrains us
to hold that Aboitiz was concurrently at fault and/or negligent with the ship captain and crew of
the M/V P. Aboitiz.

6. Coastwise lighterage corp v ca gr no 114167 july 12,1995

Although a charter party may transform a common carrier into a private one, the same
however is not true in a contract of affreightment on account of the aforementioned
distinctions between the two.
Petitioner admits that the contract it entered into with the consignee was one of
affreightment.5 We agree. Pag-asa Sales, Inc. only leased three of petitioner's vessels, in order
to carry cargo from one point to another, but the possession, command and navigation of the
vessels remained with petitioner Coastwise Lighterage.
Clearly, petitioner Coastwise Lighterage's embarking on a voyage with an unlicensed patron
violates this rule. It cannot safely claim to have exercised extraordinary diligence, by placing a
person whose navigational skills are questionable, at the helm of the vessel which eventually
met the fateful accident.

7. Samar mining v nordeutscher lloyd gr no L 28673, oct 23 1984

A vessel is liable as a common carrier only up to the point of destination. After that, in case of a
tranship- ment, it is a mere agent of the consignee and will not be liable for loss or damage in
the absence of its own negligence or malice.
Article 1736. The extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier lasts from the time the
goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by the carrier for
transportation until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the
consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them, without prejudice to the
provisions of article 1738.
Article 1736 is applicable to the instant suit. Under said article, the carrier may be relieved of
the responsibility for loss or damage to the goods upon actual or constructive delivery of the
same by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them. In sales,
actual delivery has been defined as the ceding of corporeal possession by the seller, and the
actual apprehension of corporeal possession by the buyer or by some person authorized by him
to receive the goods as his representative for the purpose of custody or disposal. 17 By the
same token, there is actual delivery in contracts for the transport of goods when possession has
been turned over to the consignee or to his duly authorized agent and a reasonable time is
given him to remove the goods. 18 The court a quo found that there was actual delivery to the
consignee through its duly authorized agent, the carrier.

8. Maersk line v ca gr no 94761 may 17 1993

Private respondent alleging gross negligence and undue delay in the delivery of the goods, filed
an action before the court a quo for rescission of contract with damages against petitioner and
Eli Lilly, Inc. as defendants.

Denying that it committed breach of contract, petitioner alleged in its that answer that the
subject shipment was transported in accordance with the provisions of the covering bill of
lading and that its liability under the law on transportation of good attaches only in case of loss,
destruction or deterioration of the goods as provided for in Article 1734 of Civil Code
An examination of the subject bill of lading (Exh. "1"; AC GR CV No. 10340, Folder of Exhibits, p.
41) shows that the subject shipment was estimated to arrive in Manila on April 3, 1977. While
there was no special contract entered into by the parties indicating the date of arrival of the
subject shipment, petitioner nevertheless, was very well aware of the specific date when the
goods were expected to arrive as indicated in the bill of lading itself. In this regard, there arises
no need to execute another contract for the purpose as it would be a mere superfluity.

In the case before us, we find that a delay in the delivery of the goods spanning a period of two
(2) months and seven (7) days falls was beyond the realm of reasonableness. Described as
gelatin capsules for use in pharmaceutical products, subject shipment was delivered to, and left
in, the possession and custody of petitioner-carrier for transport to Manila via Oakland,
California. But through petitioner's negligence was mishipped to Richmond, Virginia.
Petitioner's insitence that it cannot be held liable for the delay finds no merit.

9. Mauro ganzon v ca gr no L 48757

In the second place, before the appellee Ganzon could be absolved from responsibility on the
ground that he was ordered by competent public authority to unload the scrap iron, it must be
shown that Acting Mayor Basilio Rub had the power to issue the disputed order, or that it was
lawful, or that it was issued under legal process of authority. The appellee failed to establish
this. Indeed, no authority or power of the acting mayor to issue such an order was given in
evidence. Neither has it been shown that the cargo of scrap iron belonged to the Municipality
of Mariveles. What we have in the record is the stipulation of the parties that the cargo of scrap
iron was accilmillated by the appellant through separate purchases here and there from private
individuals (Record on Appeal, pp. 38-39). The fact remains that the order given by the acting
mayor to dump the scrap iron into the sea was part of the pressure applied by Mayor Jose
Advincula to shakedown the appellant for P5,000.00. The order of the acting mayor did not
constitute valid authority for appellee Mauro Ganzon and his representatives to carry out.

10. Pedro de guzman v ca gr no L 47822

It appears to the Court that private respondent is properly characterized as a common carrier
even though he merely "back-hauled" goods for other merchants from Manila to Pangasinan,
although such back-hauling was done on a periodic or occasional rather than regular or
scheduled manner, and even though private respondent's principal occupation was not the
carriage of goods for others. There is no dispute that private respondent charged his customers
a fee for hauling their goods; that fee frequently fell below commercial freight rates is not
relevant here.

Under Article 1745 (6) above, a common carrier is held responsible and will not be allowed
to divest or to diminish such responsibility even for acts of strangers like thieves or robbers,
except where such thieves or robbers in fact acted "with grave or irresistible threat, violence or
force." We believe and so hold that the limits of the duty of extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods carried are reached where the goods are lost as a result of a robbery
which is attended by "grave or irresistible threat, violence or force."

n the instant case, armed men held up the second truck owned by private respondent which
carried petitioner's cargo. The record shows that an information for robbery in band was filed in
the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, Branch 2, in Criminal Case No. 198 entitled "People of the
Philippines v. Felipe Boncorno, Napoleon Presno, Armando Mesina, Oscar Oria and one John
Doe." There, the accused were charged with willfully and unlawfully taking and carrying away
with them the second truck, driven by Manuel Estrada and loaded with the 600 cartons of
Liberty filled milk destined for delivery at petitioner's store in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. The
decision of the trial court shows that the accused acted with grave, if not irresistible, threat,
violence or force.3 Three (3) of the five (5) hold-uppers were armed with firearms. The robbers
not only took away the truck and its cargo but also kidnapped the driver and his helper,
detaining them for several days and later releasing them in another province (in Zambales). The
hijacked truck was subsequently found by the police in Quezon City. The Court of First Instance
convicted all the accused of robbery, though not of robbery in band. 4

In these circumstances, we hold that the occurrence of the loss must reasonably be regarded as
quite beyond the control of the common carrier and properly regarded as a fortuitous event.
 11. Bascos v ca gr no 101089
petitioner interposed the following defenses: that there was no contract of carriage since
CIPTRADE leased her cargo truck to load the cargo from Manila Port Area to Laguna;

Regarding the first contention, the holding of the Court in De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals 14 is
instructive. In referring to Article 1732 of the Civil Code, it held thus:
"The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the
carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary
activity (in local idiom, as a "sideline"). Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction
between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis
and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does
Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the "general public," i.e., the
general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a
narrow segment of the general population. We think that Article 1732 deliberately refrained
from making such distinctions."

that CIPTRADE was liable to petitioner in the amount of P11,000.00 for loading the cargo; that
the truck carrying the cargo was hijacked along Canonigo St., Paco, Manila on the night of
October 21, 1988; that the hijacking was immediately reported to CIPTRADE and that petitioner
and the police exerted all efforts to locate the hijacked properties; that after preliminary
investigation, an information for robbery and carnapping were filed against Jose Opriano, et al.;
and that hijacking, being a force majeure, exculpated petitioner from any liability to CIPTRADE

To establish grave and irresistible force, petitioner presented her accusatory affidavit, 22 Jesus
Bascos' affidavit, 23 and Juanito Morden's 24 "Salaysay". However, both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals have concluded that these affidavits were not enough to overcome the
presumption. Petitioner's affidavit about the hijacking was based on what had been told her by
Juanito Morden. It was not a first-hand account.

12. Everette v ca gr no 122494

Private respondent, however, insists that the carrier should be liable for the full value of the
lost cargo in the amount of Y1,552,500.00, considering that the shipper, Maruman Trading, had
"fully declared the shipment . . ., the contents of each crate, the dimensions, weight and value
of the contents," 10 as shown in the commercial Invoice No. MTM-941.

This claim was denied by petitioner, contending that it did not know of the contents, quantity
and value of "the shipment which consisted of three pre-packed crates described in Bill of
Lading No. NGO-53MN merely as '3 CASES SPARE PARTS.'" 11

The bill of lading in question confirms petitioner's contention. To defeat the carrier's limited
liability, the aforecited Clause 18 of the bill of lading requires that the shipper should have
declared in writing a higher valuation of its goods before receipt thereof by the carrier and
insert the said declaration in the bill of lading, with extra freight paid. These requirements in
the bill of lading were never complied with by the shipper, hence, the liability of the carrier
under the limited liability clause stands. The commercial Invoice No. MTM-941 does not in itself
sufficiently and convincingly show that petitioner has knowledge of the value of the cargo as
contended by private respondent. No other evidence was proffered by private respondent to
support is contention. Thus, we are convinced that petitioner should not be liable for the full
value of the lost cargo.

The stipulations are, to our mind, reasonable and just. In the bill of lading, the carrier made it
clear that its liability would only be up to One Hundred Thousand (Y100,000.00) Yen. However,
the shipper, Maruman Trading, had the option to declare a higher valuation if the value of its
cargo was higher than the limited liability of the carrier. Considering that the shipper did not
declare a higher valuation, it had itself to blame for not complying with the stipulations.